Zimbabwe Under Siege

by Gregory Elich

As Zimbabwe descends into anarchy and chaos, land is irrationally

seized from productive farmers, we are told. President Robert Mugabe
of Zimbabwe is portrayed as a dictator bent on driving his nation into
starvation and economic disaster while benevolent U.S. and British
leaders call for democracy and human rights. These are the images
presented by Western news reports, intended to persuade the public to
support an interventionist policy. As always when the West targets a
foreign leader for removal, news reports ignore complexity and context,
while the real motivations for intervention remain hidden. Concern for
democracy and human rights is selective and it is always the nation that
displays too much independence that evokes concern, even in cases of a
functioning multiparty system and wide ranging media. On the other
hand, no one calls for democracy and human rights in oppressive
nations as long as the political environment is conducive to Western
investment. Saudi Arabia, for example, holds no elections and imposes
an abusive oppression on the lives of its women. The pattern is
consistent. Any nation that embarks on a path diverging from Western
corporate interests and places the needs of its people over the demands
of Western capital finds itself the target of destabilization, sanctions and
intervention. History and context are essential for understanding
political events, and it is precisely these aspects that are lacking in
Western news reports.

The Legacy of Colonialism and Land Reform

In 1888, representatives from Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa

Company induced Lobengula, king of the Ndebele people, to sign an
agreement allowing the company to mine gold. This agreement granted
the company "the complete and exclusive charge over all metals and
minerals" in the region, as well as "full power to do all things that they
may deem necessary to win and procure the same," which the company
was to interpret as permission to seize land. Unable to read the
document he had signed, a dismayed King Lobengula sent a protest
letter to Queen Victoria in which he objected that he was deliberately
misled by British negotiators. "A document was written and presented
to me for signature. I asked what it contained, and was told that in it
were my words and the words of those men. I put my hand to it. About
three months afterwards I heard from other sources that I had given by
that document the right to all minerals of my country." Lobengula
declared that he would "not recognize the paper, as it contains neither
my words nor the words of those who got it." The unsympathetic
response from the Queen's Advisor to Lobengula was that it was
"impossible to exclude white men."

It soon became apparent to the British South Africa Company that

little gold was to be had and the company's outpost in Mashonaland
found itself in financial straits. Land seemed a more promising venture,
and in October 1893 British troops and volunteers crossed into King
Lobengula's core territory of Matabeleland. The entire region rapidly
fell into their hands as they inflicted heavy casualties on the Ndebele.
Under terms of the resulting Victoria Agreement, each volunteer was
entitled to 6,000 acres of land. Rather than an organized division of
land, there was instead a mad race to grab the best land, and within a
year 10,000 square miles of the most fertile land had been seized from
its inhabitants. White settlers confiscated most of the Ndebele's cattle in
the process, a devastating loss to a cattle-ranching society such as the
Ndebele. The large tracts of land now run by relatively few white
settlers required workers, and the Ndebele became forced laborers on
the land they once owned, essentially treated as slaves. The Shona also
saw their cattle confiscated by white settlers, and were driven into
poverty through the imposition of onerous taxes by the new British
rulers. The inevitable uprising by the dispossessed Ndebele and Shona
in 1896 was finally crushed over one year later by the British at the cost
of 8,000 African lives. The region was established as a new colony in
the British realm and named Rhodesia in honor of Cecil Rhodes.

Passage of the Native Reserves Order in 1899 created reserves on

the most arid land, on which the indigenous inhabitants were to be
herded. By 1905, nearly half of the indigenous population was confined
to reserves. From 1930 onwards, Africans were not allowed to own land
outside of the barren reserves. During the twenty-year period beginning
in 1935, the Rhodesian regime forced an additional 67,000 African
families from their homes and transported them to the reserves. As the
Africans were beaten and herded into trucks at gunpoint, their homes
were levelled by bulldozers. The reserves soon became overcrowded
with people and cattle, and the colonial government decreed in 1944
that 49 of the reserves were overstocked. During the next thirty-some
years, well over one million cattle in the reserves were either killed or
confiscated for use by white settlers. As the long liberation struggle
grew, Rhodesian Security Forces became increasingly repressive,
executing civilians, burning villages and crops and shooting cattle.

When it was clear that the apartheid Rhodesian government could

not long remain in power, the Lancaster House Conference was
convened in 1979. Land was the core issue for the liberation struggle,
and British and American negotiators ensured that independence would
not be granted without the imposition of certain conditions. One
provision stipulated that for a period of 10 years, land ownership in
Zimbabwe could only be transferred on a "willing seller, willing buyer"
basis, which effectively limited the extent of land reform. Whites were
also allotted a parliamentary quota of 20 seats, far exceeding their
actual percentage of the population.

Passage of the Land Acquisition Act in 1992 finally permitted a

more flexible approach to land reform, but progress continued to be
constrained by outside pressure. Despite real progress, by the time the
latest round of land reform was launched, 70 percent of the richest and
most productive land still remained in the hands of a mere 4,500 white
commercial farm owners. Meanwhile, six million African peasants eke
out a precarious existence on small farms averaging 3 hectares [1
hectare = 2.47 acres] in the "communal areas," formerly native reserves.
Due to the historically imposed overcrowding in the communal areas,
the already barren land was further depleted by deforestation and over-
grazing. Over one million landless blacks were engaged as hired labor
on white commercial farms, condemned to work for low wages
on the land their ancestors once owned. Agriculture is the most
significant sector of Zimbabwe's economy. Western news reports
encourage the view that land reform is harming economic performance,
implying that efficient farming is best left in the hands of 4,500 wealthy
white farmers, while ignoring the millions of blacks barely able to
survive. The unspoken assumption is that only white farmers are
capable of efficiency. The concern expressed in the West for
"efficiency" is in reality a mask for the preservation of white privilege.
Temporary economic dislocation is an unavoidable byproduct of land
reform, but genuine and lasting progress can only be achieved through
land redistribution. In the West, the gross imbalance imposed by
colonial theft is accepted as the natural order in Zimbabwe, with the
indigenous population lacking any claim to the land. Fast track land
reform is intended to rectify historical injustices and to ensure a more
equitable division of the land.

When Zimbabwe had a Model Economy

There was a time when the management of the economy in

Zimbabwe was highly regarded in Western circles. Throughout its first
decade of independence, Zimbabwe's economy grew at an average of 4
percent per year, and substantial gains were made in education and
health. Zimbabwe was handling its finances well, and between 1985
and 1989 had cut its debt-service ratio in half. However, the demise of
socialism in Europe resulted in an inhospitable environment for nations
charting an independent course, and Zimbabwe felt compelled by
Western demands to liberalize its economy. In January 1991, Zimbabwe
adopted its Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), designed
primarily by the World Bank. The program called for the usual
prescription of actions advocated by Western financial institutions,
including privatization, deregulation, a reduction of government
expenditures on social needs, and deficit cutting. User fees were
instituted for health and education, and food subsidies were eliminated.
Measures protecting local industry from foreign competition were also
withdrawn.

The impact was immediate. While pleasing for Western investors,

the result was a disaster for the people of Zimbabwe. According to one
study, the poorest households in Harare saw their income drop over 12
percent in the year from 1991 to 1992 alone, while real wages in the
country plunged by a third over the life of the program. Falling income
levels forced people to spend a greater percentage of their income on
food, and second-hand clothes were imported to compensate for the
inability of most of Zimbabwe's citizens to purchase new clothing. A
1994 survey in Harare found that 90 percent of those interviewed felt
that ESAP had adversely affected their lives. The rise in food prices was
seen as a major problem by 64 percent of respondents, while many
indicated that they were forced to reduce their food intake. ESAP
resulted in mass layoffs and crippled the job market so that many were
unable to find any employment at all. In the communal areas, the rise in
fertilizer prices meant that subsistence farmers were no longer able to
fertilize their land, resulting in lower yields. ESAP also mandated the
elimination of price controls, allowing those shop owners in communal
area who were free of competition to mark prices up dramatically. In
1995, the IMF cut funding to the program when it felt that Zimbabwe
wasn't cutting its budget and laying off civil service employees fast
enough. Furthermore, the IMF complained, the pace of privatization
wasn't rapid enough. But implementation of ESAP was quite fast
enough for the people of Zimbabwe. By 1995, over one third of
Zimbabwe's citizens could not afford a basic food basket, shelter and
clothing. From 1991 to 1995, Zimbabwe experienced a sharp
deindustrialization, as manufacturing output fell 40 percent. According
to an economic writer from the ruling Zimbabwe African National
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), "There is a general consensus
among the people of Zimbabwe that ESAP has driven many families
into poverty. The program only benefited a privileged minority at the
expense of the underprivileged majority." As intended by Western
financial institutions, one could argue.

Ditching ESAP

The government of Zimbabwe felt it could no longer endure this

debacle, and by the end of the 1990's, started moving away from the
neoliberal program. Finally, in October 2001, the abandonment of
ESAP was officially announced. "Enough is enough," declared
President Mugabe. "ESAP is no more." A press release issued by the
governing ZANU-PF declared, "The termination of ESAP brings to an
end the era of control of our economy by the IMF and the World Bank.
While we must continue to work with these organizations on agreed
projects, they will no longer dictate the direction of policy and the
country." Price controls were implemented for basic commodities that
soaring prices had made all but unattainable for many poor
Zimbabweans, including bread, maize meal, flour, sugar, cooking oil,
beef, chicken, pork, milk, soap and generic drugs. To counter the threat
of companies closing in protest against price controls, President
Mugabe announced, "The State will take over any businesses that are
closed. We will reorganize them with workers, and at last that socialism
we wanted can start again." Mugabe dismissed claims that government
should not interfere with the market as "absolute nonsense," and stated
that the nearly hourly price increases for goods and commodities had
been unjustified. The 1997 launch of a new phase in the land reform
program, in which 1,471 farms were listed for compulsory purchase,
triggered British intervention in Zimbabwe. The jettisoning of ESAP
four years later, coupled with the statement that sectors of the economy
would be placed on a socialist path, only increased the sense of outrage
among Western leaders.

The establishment of a new opposition party, the Movement for

Democratic Change (MDC), in September 1999, found instant support
from Western leaders. Significant funding from Western sources
enabled the party to rapidly grow to the point where it won 57 out of
120 seats in the June 24-25 2000 parliamentary election, less than one
year after its creation. Ostensibly based in the labor movement, the
program of MDC reads like a call for a return to ESAP. A policy paper
issued by the party spelled out its plans for privatization. Upon taking
power, the party plans to appoint a "fund manager to dispose of
government-owned shares in publicly quoted companies." The boards
of all public enterprises would be "reconstituted," and the new boards
would be "required to privatize their enterprises within specified
timetables...with an overall target of privatizing all designated
parastatals [public companies] within two years." The interests of
Western capital would not be ignored. "In areas where a high level of
technical skill is required, foreign strategic investors will be encouraged
to bid for a majority stake in the enterprises being privatized." A
primary principle of the program would be that "all sales of major state
assets will be conducted through open, international [that is, Western],
competitive bidding." In order to counter opposition from workers made
redundant, the National Privatization and Procurement Agency would
be instructed to "carry out public awareness campaigns regarding the
privatization program in order to generate public awareness and support
for the exercise." Implementation of its program, the MDC feels, will
mean "that foreign direct investment will take place on a substantial
scale." As a further incentive for Western investors, the MDC plans to
review income and corporate tax levels "for regional competitiveness."

The MDC appointed an official of the Confederation of Zimbabwe

Industries, Eddie Cross, as its Secretary of Economic Affairs. In a
speech delivered shortly after his appointment, Cross articulated the
MDC economic plan. "First of all, we believe in the free market. We do
not support price control. We do not support government interfering in
the way people manage their lives. We are in favor of reduced levels of
taxation. We are going to fast track privatization. All fifty government
parastatals will be privatized within a two-year frame, but we are going
far beyond that. We are going to privatize many of the functions of
government. We are going to privatize the Central Statistics Office. We
are going to privatize virtually the entire school delivery system. And
you know, we have looked at the numbers and we think we can get
government employment down from about 300,000 at the present
time to about 75,000 in five years."

A press release issued by ZANU-PF presents a contrasting vision for

Zimbabwe. "For ZANU-PF, the central question was and still is who
benefits from the management of the economy? The answer is simple; it
must be the broad masses of our people. That is where we differ with
the MDC and with other parties. They want to benefit the employers
and the capitalists. We say no, no, no."

Western Response

As Zimbabwe moved away from the neoliberal path dictated by

Western financial institutions, Western hostility grew. On September
24, 2001, the IMF "declared Zimbabwe ineligible to use the general
resources of the IMF, and removed Zimbabwe from the list of countries
eligible to borrow resources under the Poverty and Growth Facility."
The stated motivation for the cutoff was that Zimbabwe had fallen $53
million in arrears on payments. Rather than work with Zimbabwe, as
the IMF had elsewhere in similar circumstances, the IMF "urged the
Zimbabwean authorities to adopt the economic and financial policies
needed to enable Zimbabwe to achieve economic recovery as soon as
possible." In other words, the IMF felt nervous at indications that
ZANU-PF was abandoning ESAP, and was demanding a return to the
neoliberal agenda. The IMF added that it "stood ready to cooperate with
the authorities in support of efforts to adopt and
implement a comprehensive economic recovery program."

Three months later, on December 14, the IMF issued a statement

regarding recent consultations with authorities in Zimbabwe. The IMF
characterized Zimbabwe's efforts to reverse the ESAP-induced
economic plunge as "deterioration," and worried that Zimbabwe's
"inappropriate economic policies" had "undermined investor
confidence." During consultations in Zimbabwe, IMF officials had
advocated "significant changes in the government's economic policies,"
and "underscored the importance of sustained structural reforms aimed
at liberalizing the economy."

IMF policy was only one component in a broad-based Western effort

to discipline Zimbabwe and force it to return to a neoliberal economic
model in which the interests of Western capital would have primacy
over the needs of its people. On December 21, 2001, President George
W. Bush signed into law S. 494, the "Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act of 2001." The law instructed American
officials in international financial institutions to "oppose and vote
against any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit, or
guarantee to the government of Zimbabwe," and to vote against any
reduction or cancellation of "indebtedness owed by the government of
Zimbabwe." The law also authorized President Bush to fund "an
independent and free press and electronic media in Zimbabwe,"
referring to media opposed to the government of Zimbabwe. Six million
dollars were granted for aid to "democracy and governance programs,"
a euphemism for groups seeking to topple the government. The bill was
sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, who had been a
supporter of Ian Smith's apartheid Rhodesia. After the bill passed the
House of Representatives by a vote of 396-11, an African diplomat in
Washington remarked, "The passing of the Bill is a triumph of right
wing people who have always been against Zimbabwe and do not
understand the land issue but would want to safeguard the imperial
rights of Britain."

Zimbabwe's path ran counter to Western efforts to integrate the

economies of sub-Saharan Africa in the interests of Western capital.
The African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), designed to
primarily benefit U.S. textile producers wanting to take advantage of
cheap labor in Africa, offered the prospect of expanded trade with
African countries the President designates as establishing "market-based
economies" and "elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment."
At the first meeting of the AGOA Forum on October 29, 2001,
President Bush announced the "creation of a $200 million Overseas
Private Investment Corporation support facility that will give American
firms access to loans, guarantees and political risk insurance for
investment projects in sub-Saharan Africa." In addition, Bush
announced the establishment of a "regional office in Johannesburg, to
provide guidance to governments and companies which seek to
liberalize their trade laws" and to "improve the investment
environment" for U.S. corporations.

In the period leading up to the March 2002 elections, Western

leaders attempted to tighten the screws on Zimbabwe, hoping to affect
the outcome. Already a sort of de facto sanctions regime was in place,
in that Western officials were actively discouraging trade with
Zimbabwe, while overheated news reports painted a picture of
instability and unreliability, which also tended to deter trade. In
November 2001, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw revealed that
during the past few months he had been "building coalitions" against
Zimbabwe.

As the Extraordinary Summit of the South African Development

Community (SADC) opened in Blantyre, Malawi on January 14, 2002,
Great Britain threatened to withhold $18 million in budgetary support
from Malawi, the chair of the SADC, unless it agreed to direct the
SADC towards the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe. This was
a significant portion of Malawi's budget. Some sources also indicate
that Great Britain held the threat of withholding aid for Malawi's food
crisis. Similar threats to withdraw budgetary support were wielded
against Mozambique. At the summit, President Benjamin Mkapa of
Tanzania announced that British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Baroness Amos telephoned him directly and urged him not to support
Zimbabwe at the SADC and at the upcoming meeting of the
Commonwealth. When that call failed, British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw then telephoned and attempted to bully him.

Emotions were running high in Zimbabwe itself, as the fate of the

nation rested on the outcome of the election. Supporters of both ZANU-
PF and the MDC engaged in violent acts against each other,
including a few cases of murder. Complaints from both Zimbabwe and
the SADC concerning hostile Western intervention in the political
process in Zimbabwe were sent to the European Union. Under Article
98 of the Cotonou Agreement, disputes between the European Union
and African Pacific Caribbean (ACP) countries must be taken to the
joint EU-ACP Council of Ministers for resolution or arbitration
proceedings. Zimbabwe's invocation of Article 98 was simply ignored
by the European Union, prompting President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi
to write to the EU on behalf of the SADC. Muluzi complained that
Zimbabwe's "legitimate concerns had received neither a response nor an
acknowledgment from the EU," and that the EU had instead
threatened to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe remained
steadfast and President Mugabe declared, "We will resist the sanctions.
We cannot bow to them. I know Tony Blair and the British are waging
war against me and my government. I will fight
against their colonialistic attitude without giving up." Mugabe's firm
resolve disappointed British officials, who hoped to make him grovel,
and on February 18, 2002, the European Union's foreign ministers voted
unanimously to impose sanctions against Zimbabwe. Under terms of the
sanctions, The European Union suspended budgetary support to
Zimbabwe and terminated "financial support for all projects" except
"those in direct support of the population." All financial aid would be
"reoriented in support of the population, in particular in the social
sectors, democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law,"
by which the EU meant that financial support would be funnelled to
groups seeking tooverthrow the government of
Zimbabwe. Additionally, a visa ban was imposed on 20 Zimbabwean
government officials and their spouses, forbidding travel within the
European Union, and overseas assets held by thetargeted officials were
frozen. Zimbabwe Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, among those
listed in the EU's sanctions, sharply criticized the EU. "It is very clear
that what we are now dealing with is organized economic terrorism
whose aim is clear and is to unseat a legitimately elected government
which has decided to defend its national independence and national
sovereignty."

Four days after the EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe the United

States followed suit, expanding the list of targeted individuals to include
not only Zimbabwean government officials, but prominent businessmen
as well. The Bush Administration even added church leaders to the
sanctions list, including Anglican Bishop Nolbert Kunonga,
who had merely praised President Mugabe.

Despite intense pressure from Great Britain, African leaders at the

March 2002 Commonwealth meeting rejected the demand for sanctions
against Zimbabwe. President Mkapa of Tanzania revealed that members
of the Commonwealth had endured a "bombardment for an alliance
against Mugabe." British Prime Minister Tony Blair petulantly insisted,
"There can be no question of Mugabe being allowed to stay in power
with a rigged election," considering any result other than a win by the
MDC as "rigged." In response to the British propensity for constantly
lecturing its former colony on "democracy," President Mugabe pointed
out, "There is no one who can teach us about elections. There is no one
who can teach us about democracy and human rights. There was no
democracy here, no human rights at all until the people of Zimbabwe
decided to fight."
 After the polls closed at the end of the March 9-10, 2002 election in
Zimbabwe, there were still people in Harare who had not yet voted, so
voting was extended for a third day to accommodate them. The MDC's
base of support is largely urban and ZANU-PF's rural, thus the
extension of the voting period benefited the MDC. Although the
election law was bent in favor of the urban vote, President Mugabe won
the presidential election by a convincing margin of over 400,000 votes.
Predictably, Western leaders cried "foul," outraged that the millions
they had poured into the MDC's campaign failed to pay off. While
President Bush was saying, "We do not recognize the outcome of the
election," the South African Observer Team, which monitored the
election, concluded that the "elections should be considered legitimate."
Namibia announced that its observers judged the election "watertight,
without room for rigging," while Nigerian observers claimed that they
had not witnessed anything that would affect the integrity of the vote.
Similarly, an observer from the Organization for African Unity
characterized the election as "transparent, credible, free and fair." The
first-hand reports by observers were simply dismissed out of hand, as
U.S. and British officials loudly accused President Mugabe of fraud,
motivated by their desire to use the accusation as ammunition
on their continuing campaign against Zimbabwe. Great Britain wasted
no time in acting. A three-member panel representing Australia, Nigeria
and South Africa decided to suspend Zimbabwe from the
Commonwealth for a period of one year. The vote came as a startling
surprise, given the assessment of the South African Observer Team.
Behind the scenes, Tony Blair had subjected South African President
Thabo Mbeki to intense pressure, threatening to kill plans for the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) if Mbeki did not vote
as instructed. Mbeki harbored great hopes that NEPAD would become
the engine of African development, and could not bear to see his dream
shattered. Tony Blair, aware of his sentiments, extorted Mbeki's
compliance, telling him that NEPAD would be "dead in the water,"
unless he voted against Zimbabwe.

If British diplomatic behavior appeared overweening, it was not

unconsciously so. Shortly after Tony Blair's hijacking of the March
Commonwealth meeting, an essay was published by his foreign affairs
advisor, Robert Cooper, calling for a new imperialism. "The challenge
of the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards,"
wrote Cooper. "Among ourselves," by which he meant the West, "we
operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when
dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern
continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an
earlier era -- force, preemptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary
to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every
state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are
operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle." Rather
than charting a new course, Cooper's bluntly stated paper merely
provided the ideological underpinning for Western policy as it is
actually practiced. The citizens of Iraq, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Zimbabwe
and others who attempted to defend their sovereignty against the
imperial onslaught would no doubt feel that it is Cooper who is living in
the nineteenth century. "[T]he opportunities, perhaps even the need for
colonization is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century,"
suggests Cooper. "What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism,
one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values."
Only the haughtiest imperial mind could claim "human rights and
cosmopolitan values" only for the West and "force, preemptive attack,
deception, whatever is necessary" for subject peoples in the Third
World and Eastern Europe.

Reports from Zimbabwe claim that the British government was

involved in planning a mass action to force President Mugabe from
office, following the scenario that was implemented against former
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. The British High
Commissioner to Zimbabwe, Brian Donnelly, was said to be
instrumental in formulating the plan, and it should be noted that he had
been the ambassador to Yugoslavia for two years and undoubtedly
played a role in Western covert operations there. It is highly probable
that he was selected to the position in Zimbabwe entirely because of the
experience he gained in undermining the Yugoslav government. Local
security forces uncovered attempts by members of the MDC to smuggle
weapons into Zimbabwe at three border crossings in preparation for a
plan to stage incidents. Communications with an armed MDC group
calling itself Mumvuri waDavid Coltart were intercepted by
government security forces and revealed that the group was planning to
murder MDC officials and members of the MDC youth organization in
order to create disorder and affix blame on the ruling ZANU-PF. Other
armed MDC groups were believed to be planning to assassinate ZANU-
PF district leaders. White activists close to large landowners and former
members of the Rhodesian security forces were said to be tasked with
coordinating the murders, and they were supplied with mobile
communication stations by the British. The plans never came to
fruition, though, as the MDC was forced to back down in the face of a
show of force by the police and National Guard.

There is always more than one arrow in the Western quiver, and
when the mass uprising failed to materialize, moves were made to exert
increased economic pressure and to broaden sanctions against
Zimbabwe. On June 13, 2002, the IMF issued a declaration of non-
cooperation and announced that it was suspending "the provision of
technical assistance" to Zimbabwe and "urged the Zimbabwean
authorities to adopt an economic adjustment program." Once again, the
IMF was urging Zimbabwe to revive ESAP. As usual, the IMF was all
too eager to offer "to assist the authorities in designing the necessary
policy measures." The following month, the European Union
announced that it was adding the names of a further 52 Zimbabwean
officials who would be banned from travel in the EU, and whose assets
abroad would be frozen, or in effect, seized. The wanton nature of the
list can be gauged by its inclusion of such persons as the Health and
Child Welfare Minister; the Education, Sports and Culture Minister; the
Secretary for Gender and Culture; the Deputy-Secretary for Disabled
and Disadvantaged; and others who had little if any
influence on economic policy in Zimbabwe.

Meanwhile, de facto sanctions continued to press Zimbabwe, as

foreign trade continued to slump. Rapidly dwindling foreign currency
reserves severely restricted the import of fuel, causing manufacturing
and mining operations to go into a tailspin. Zimbabwe, which has no
natural gas or oil reserves, must rely entirely on imported fuel supplies,
leaving it vulnerable to economic pressure. At the end of June 2002, the
black-market exchange rate for the Zimbabwe dollar went into free
fall. Zimbabwe Financial Holdings Limited, a commercial bank,
reported that the nation's entire foreign currency supply was sufficient
to cover only three days of imports, and that "shortages have worsened
in the past few weeks." The IMF's declaration of non-cooperation was
expected to discourage lending by other financial institutions, resulting
in a further squeezing of Zimbabwe's economy. Due to the evaporation
of foreign trade and the denial of credit, unemployment in Zimbabwe
has soared to 70 percent while three fourths of the population is
classified as poor. Finance Minister Simba Makoni reports that since
2000, one third of the jobs in Zimbabwe have vanished. "Workers are
living from hand to mouth," says Lucia Matibenga, vice president of the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions. "Business people are struggling
in a collapsing economy and employees can't survive with the current
high prices."

By the end of June, there was a wave of panicked withdrawals from

foreign currency accounts at banks, further depleting reserves. In an
effort to raise foreign currency for the purchase of food to feed its
people, Zimbabwe was compelled to seek money in the black market,
which exacerbated its economic difficulties. A Zimbabwean economic
analyst pointed out, "The recent decline of the Zimbabwean dollar and
the massive escalation of the black market has been necessitated by the
government which is sourcing forex (foreign exchange) on the black
market. It has sourced over US$55 million for the Grain Marketing
Board to import maize over the last three weeks."

On July 30, 2002, Daniel Maviva, management services officer at

the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, reported that sanctions had
caused the firm to lose $18 million. The elimination of foreign funding
by the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and other
institutions had dealt a crippling blow, forcing the firm to use its "own
resources due to the withdrawal of those financiers under targeted
sanctions." As sanctions continue to tighten the noose around
Zimbabwe, electrical power blackouts may become a frequent
occurrence.

A Plague of NGOs

British and American foreign policy has increasingly come to rely on

the use of proxy organizations to carry out specific tasks involved in
destabilizing other nations. The use of Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) was a very effective tool in the campaign to
overthrow the government of Yugoslavia, and much is expected from
NGO operations in Zimbabwe. Although NGOs may appear to be
independent organizations operating outside of government, many
receive the bulk of their funding from Western governments, shape their
policy in consultation with Western officials, and act in every way to
further Western interests. As they work to undermine and destabilize
nations and to further Western corporate interests, they cover their
hostile actions with nice-sounding phrases such as "human rights" and
"civil society." It is a perfect arrangement. For U.S. and British leaders,
it allows them to engage in illegal and hostile actions against another
nation while assuming a pose of innocence. Zimbabwe is cursed with a
plague of NGOs, all operating with the self-righteous sense of mission
that they have the right to meddle in the affairs of a Third World nation
and with the colonial attitude that they should dictate how others are to
think and live.

One of the more active NGOs in Zimbabwe is the Westminster

Foundation for Democracy (WFD), which defines its purpose as
providing "assistance in building and strengthening pluralist democratic
institutions overseas." As always, terms such as "pluralist" and
"democratic" actually signify parties and organizations that are willing
to take orders from Western leaders and give primacy to Western
corporate interests. The Westminster Foundation currently receives
around $6 million from the British government, and is also tasked with
"selected extra-budgetary technical assistance projects," so the true
scale of government funding is much higher. The WFD may be the
most perfect example of an NGO that is a government operation in
every way except name. Sitting on its Board of Governors are
representatives from each of the three major British political parties,
along with representatives of business and other sectors of the society.
Staffed and funded by the British government, it is no surprise that its
policy happens to coincide with that of the British government. WFD
has been involved in over 80 projects aiding the MDC, and helped plan
election strategy. It also provides funding to the party's youth and
women's groups. The Foundation considers "the development of
political parties as one of the key areas for our
support and assistance," and in 2000 it provided the MDC with $10
million. No figures are available since then, but the flow of money has
continued unabated, and some ZANU-PF officials indicate that the
MDC had received at least $30 million by the beginning of
2002. According to analysts, the majority of the MDC's funding
originates from abroad. Passage of the Political Parties (Finance) Act in
Zimbabwe in 2001 made it illegal for political parties to receive
financing from abroad, thus requiring the MDC to be more circumspect
about the extent of its financial support from Western sources. The need
for such legislation was urgent, as the influx of Western money was
grossly distorting the political process. The effect, however, was merely
to drive such contributions into the shadows.

The Westminster Foundation works closely with the major British

political parties to assist in efforts to "strengthen individual political
parties or movements with which they have a political affinity," and
also provides training and consultation to parties such as the MDC. In
all, the WFD spends fifty percent of its "project budget towards work
which assists individual parties abroad," and the money is channelled
through British political parties who then see to it that it ends up in the
hands of its intended recipients. Propaganda is an important aspect of
any destabilization campaign, and the WFD gives "direct support for
media organizations" abroad. This support can include funding
"production costs including equipment, training, expansion of
circulation, radio and TV coverage," as well as a range of other
activities. The Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe, Stan Mudenge, claims to
have "documentary evidence" that the WFD not only bankrolls the
MDC, but also opposition media as well. British and American leaders
would never countenance a foreign power attempting to buy their
elections or funding hostile media within their countries, yet they
arrogate to themselves the right to engage in such activities against
others.

Another so-called NGO active in Zimbabwe is the Zimbabwe

Democracy Trust (ZDT), which claims to "advance the cause of
freedom and democracy." Sponsored by prominent Western politicians
and businessmen, the ZDT hopes that with a change in government,
Zimbabwe will become "a magnet for investment." Western investment,
of course. The patrons of the ZDT include former U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Chester Crocker, architect of the "Constructive
Engagement" policy with apartheid South Africa during the
1980s. Crocker has very specific financial interests in seeing Zimbabwe
move to a more business-friendly environment, occupying a seat on the
board of directors of the Ashanti Goldfields Company. Ashanti
Goldfields owns seven producing gold mines located in four African
countries, including Zimbabwe. The company brags that it is "managed
predominantly by Africans," yet 9 of its 13 board members are either
American or British. Three former British foreign secretaries are listed
as patrons of the Zimbabwe Democracy Trust: Sir Malcom
Rifkind, Lord Douglas Hurd and Lord Geoffrey Howe. The primary
mover in the organization is reputed to be Sir John Collins, the
Zimbabwean chairman of National Power, the largest British energy
company which happens to have sizable investments in Zimbabwe.
Rifkind is involved with an Australian company which owns a mine in
Zimbabwe. Political analyst John Makumbe, a supporter of the MDC,
admits, "It is largely white Rhodesians who are backing the trust." To
put it plainly, the ZDT receives much of its support from former
officials and supporters of Ian Smith's apartheid Rhodesia.

The Southern African Media Development Fund (SAMDEF) focuses

its attention on supporting "independent private media enterprises." In
Zimbabwe, SAMDEF directs its aid, predictably enough, to opposition
media. Among its projects was issuing a loan to the publisher of the
opposition Mirror. The loan was "primarily aimed at making the
newspaper competitive and improving its market share." When financial
difficulties brought Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe, publishers of
the major opposition newspaper Daily News, to the point of bankruptcy,
SAMDEF stepped in and loaned the publishers $526,000, enabling it to
stay afloat. The publisher proved recalcitrant in repaying its loan,
however, and this failure was only recently resolved in court. It remains
to be seen whether the loan will ultimately be repaid or turn out to be a
gift. The total budget of SAMDEF's financial assistance fund stands at
almost $3 million, but is expected to expand by $2 million per year over
the next three years. SAMDEF lists among its partner organizations
other NGOs working in Zimbabwe, such as the Media Development
Loan Fund, which assists "independent news organizations working in
difficult economic and political climates," and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. SAMDEF is owned by another NGO, the
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). An umbrella organization
claiming 100 members, MISA's mission is to promote and support
regional media friendly to Western interests. A significant portion of its
funding is provided by the U.S. Government through the U.S.
Agency for International Development.

Closely involved in SAMDEF's operations in Zimbabwe is the

Communication Assistance Foundation (CAF), which openly admits
giving "financial support" to "independent media initiatives" and
"media organizations." CAF also participates in Zimbabwe Watch, a
consortium of several NGOs from the Netherlands seeking to "influence
policies," and "coordinate efforts to support Zimbabwean Civil
Society," once again that widely used euphemism for organizations
seeking to topple President Mugabe. A primary objective of Zimbabwe
Watch is to "influence governments and government networks" such as
the European Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations "to put
pressure on the Zimbabwean government to hold free and fair
elections," a term that is understood by NGOs as any election the
opposition wins. "Political and economic sanctions could be useful
means" of applying pressure, Zimbabwe Watch helpfully suggests.

Yet another of the myriad NGOs executing Western policy in

Zimbabwe is International Media Support (IMS), funded by the Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The intent of IMS is to be an "action-
oriented" organization providing "technical and practical assistance" to
media as well as working to build "diplomatic pressure at the political
level." It is rather commonplace for an NGO to not only engage in
practical mayhem but to also devote considerable time and resources
urging more extreme measures from Western governments.
Among its recent "interventions," IMS lists Zimbabwe.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bankrolls

sixteen "civil society organizations" in Zimbabwe, with
emphasis on supporting MDC's parliamentary activities. One of the
departments of USAID, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), was
said to be funding a new short-wave radio station recently established in
Great Britain, SW Radio Africa, to the tune of millions of dollars.
According to diplomatic sources, SW Radio Africa utilizes the studios,
transmitters and frequencies of "a global communications provider."
The operating expenses for SW Radio Africa are covered by OTI.
While the specific station hosting SW Radio Africa has not been
identified, it is either Voice of America, with transmitters located
throughout southern and central Africa, or the BBC, with a transmitter
located in South Africa. According to Radio Netherlands, BBC Radio 4
recently rebroadcast a program that had originally appeared on SW
Radio Africa, "suggesting that there is some contact between
them at [the] editorial level." OTI gained experience in destabilizing
nations through its involvement with covert operations in Yugoslavia,
funding the printing of over four million newspaper and magazines, as
well as supporting opposition radio and television. Zimbabwe's Minister
of Information Jonathan Moyo reacted sharply to the inflammatory tone
of the illegal broadcasts by SW Radio Africa, accusing Western nations
of "fanning tribal divisions and ethnic hatred among Zimbabweans," in
order to render Zimbabwe ungovernable.

Drought, Famine, and Food Aid

From January through April 2002, Zimbabwe experienced its worst

drought in 20 years. The drought affects several countries in southern
Africa, and the UN World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 12.8
million people may require urgent food aid in order to avert the threat of
famine. Jean-Jacques Graisse, Deputy Executive Director of the WFP
says, "We see this as a crisis of enormous proportions. The situation
worsens with each day." Western news reports focus their gaze on
Zimbabwe, attributing the drop in agricultural output primarily to
disruption caused by land redistribution. While it is a normal pattern for
land reform to cause some temporary dislocation, clearly drought is the
major factor in the decline of agricultural output. All of the other
countries the WFP identified as being at risk have seen their crops
suffer, none of which are undergoing land reform, while the crisis is
thought to be worst in Malawi.

In Malawi, Western demands forced that nation to dispose of its

grain reserves in order to conform to the neoliberal economic model.
The IMF then halted new loans and the United States and Great Britain
severed aid in response to questions over the accounting of the sale of
the grain reserves. Left without grain reserves, Malawi had nothing to
fall back on when the drought deepened. Western officials also
pressured Malawi to eliminate food subsidies, again according to
neoliberal prescription, and the subsequent escalation in prices meant
that maize very rapidly reached the point of unaffordability for most
people. February 2002 saw the first reports of people dying of
starvation in Malawi. The WFP concludes that the elimination of the
grain reserve and "the dramatic price increases played a critical role in
the humanitarian crisis last year." Malawi was in a food crisis even
before the onset of the drought, and the situation has since become far
more troubling.

Severe weather in Lesotho has affected crop output for two years in
a row, and cereal production for 2002 is calculated at 33 percent less
than the already reduced output of the previous year. Crop production is
declining, reports the WFP, "and could cease altogether over large tracts
of the country." The total area planted is only sixty percent compared to
normal. Here too, escalating food prices have driven more and more
people into poverty. Similarly, in Swaziland, agricultural output has
declined by a startling 60 percent and half of the farmers will have
nothing to harvest. In Zambia, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) reports, "People are turning to desperate measures
including eating potentially poisonous wild foods, stealing crops and
prostitution to get enough for their families to eat."
 It is estimated that cereal production in Zimbabwe will drop by 57
percent, while output of maize, the primary staple in the diet of
Zimbabweans, could drop by as much as two thirds. The overall
agricultural sector is expected to contract by nearly 25 percent. A
mission from the WFP and FAO determined that the "major cause of
collapse of the 2002 main season" has been "a severe prolonged drought
between January and March, which wiped out crops in most parts of the
country. Land reform activities contributed to the steep fall in
production." It should also be pointed out that severe fuel shortages
have also limited agricultural production, and that international
sanctions are responsible for Zimbabwe's lack of foreign currency to
import sufficient quantities of fuel. The extent of the net effect of land
reform has been exaggerated in Western reports, which operate on the
premise that only white commercial farmers are producing a meaningful
supply of food. In actuality, black small-scale farmers account for 70
percent of Zimbabwe's production of maize, while the main crop grown
by the large white commercial farms is tobacco.

Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (Agritex), which

performs crop forecasting in Zimbabwe, reported in March 2002 the
"early planted crop" of maize "to be a complete write-off, with the late
crop at temporary to wilting point in Kwekwe." "Complete" means both
on black farms and on white; both on farms listed for redistribution and
those that are not. Agritex also noted that the maize crop in Umguza,
Tsholotsho and Bubi districts was a complete failure, while in
Masvingo and Manicaland provinces the crop was a near total failure.
"Lack of sufficient moisture during the critical flowering and grain-
filling stages is the cause of the poor crop condition," the report said. It
wasn't only drought that was causing problems. Termites and
grasshoppers destroyed crops in Gokwe and Matabeland South, while
elephants ruined maize crops in Binga. Another survey in Manicaland
province concluded that most crops were a complete write-off, and that
very little remained to be harvested. Conditions were so dry, one farmer
claimed, that one "can light a match and it will take a few
minutes to burn the whole field." Adverse weather conditions affected
both white commercial and black small-scale farmers, although the
situation was more dire in the always arid communal regions where
most black-owned farms operate. The situation does not seem
noticeably better in surrounding countries. "There was no land grab in
either Malawi or Zambia," points out a Zimbabwean diplomat, "yet
their people suffer the consequences of the drought and famine
threatens their neighbors as well."

Projections indicate that Zimbabwe will need to import up to 1.2

million tons of grain through May 2003. At current import prices, this
would cost $165 million. The WFP's aid program to Zimbabwe has set a
target of half that amount, but so far has managed to raise only about a
third of its goal. Although the government of Zimbabwe has been
importing maize to compensate for the crop deficit, its ability to meet
the demand is constrained by its depleted foreign currency reserves.
International sanctions also prevent the country from obtaining loans to
cover the import of food. To partially ease the pressure, half of the
funds the government had set aside for reviving closed companies were
shifted to the purchase of food. It was announced that additional funds
would be transferred from other programs to help meet the demand for
food. "We had to take such an action because of the need to feed the
nation in the wake of the drought," a government finance official
announced. "We cannot leave people to die."

In August 2002, The European Union said it would be providing

Zimbabwe with about $34 million in aid, while blaming the political
situation in Zimbabwe for the food crisis. Great Britain had earlier
announced a $33 million program of aid, and the United States $33
million. However, much of the American aid intended for Zimbabwe
was instead sent to other countries due to a dispute with
Zimbabwe over genetically modified (GM) maize. Zimbabwe balked at
accepting a shipment of 10,500 tons of gene-modified maize because of
fears that it would ruin Zimbabwe's beef exports to the European Union.
Joseph Made, Minister of Lands and Agriculture, pointed out that there
was concern that some farmers might use the imported grain as seed
rather than for consumption. "This could have created many problems
for us. Biotech maize, if eaten by livestock, would have jeopardized
future Zimbabwe's beef exports to Europe." The European Union
currently bans the import of GM food. There were also concerns that
the spread of GM strains of maize would result in Zimbabwe losing its
certification to export hybrid maize throughout Africa. Portrayed in
Western reports as an act of arbitrary childishness, Zimbabwe's
reluctance to accept GM maize was based on real concerns over its
potentially adverse effect on exports. Zambia also rejected shipments of
GM maize, refusing to distribute the maize that had already been
imported from the U.S. American officials applied heavy pressure on
southern African states to accept GM maize, for this was an opportunity
to help U.S. corporations start to break down barriers to the export of
GM food in general. Zimbabwe insisted that it mill the maize before
distribution, precluding the possibility that farmers planting the grain
would spread GM strains throughout Zimbabwe. The U.S. and the UN,
however, refused to allow the government of Zimbabwe to be involved
in the distribution of the grain. In the end, a compromise was reached in
which the U.S. and UN agreed to allow Zimbabwe to accept the maize
on the condition that the government provide the UN an equivalent
amount of maize from its stocks which the UN would then pass to
NGOs for distribution. For Western officials, it was important to
prevent the government of Zimbabwe from distributing food, and to
ensure that NGOs active in trying to overthrow the government appear
to be responsible for providing food to the hungry. Food aid from the
West was motivated more from its utility as another weapon in the
effort to overthrow the government of Zimbabwe than it was by a
concern for human suffering.

Meanwhile, Western officials were playing other political games

with food aid. During meetings with United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) coordinator Victor Angelo in New York in May
2002, U.S. and European Union representatives claimed that the food
crisis in Zimbabwe was "two-thirds a result of wrong economic
policies." Angelo was attempting to organize an aid package of $80
million from Western governments and aid agencies, but the donors told
him that unless Zimbabwe agreed to devalue its currency, "no
significant food aid will be given to Zimbabwe." Other demands
Western officials placed included the abandonment of the current land
reform program. Without the protection of "property rights," they
indicated, foreign investment in Zimbabwe was unlikely. One European
diplomat revealed, "We told the UNDP to first convey our concerns to
the Zimbabwe authorities. Food aid can come but there have to be
associate measures that must be taken that would ensure that there will
not be a repeat of this same situation we are dealing with now." When
the IMF and World Bank announced in August 2002 that they would be
reviewing current assistance to drought-stricken countries in southern
Africa to plan expanding financial arrangements to help fill the gap with
donor assistance, they pointedly excluded Zimbabwe.

The state-owned Grain Marketing Board has sole responsibility for

the purchase and sale of strategic commodities in Zimbabwe, including
maize and wheat. Commercial farmers hope to break the monopoly on
the distribution of key commodities in order to capitalize on scarcities
and realize high returns. When some permits were illegally issued to
private firms to purchase grains, commercial farmers who had earlier
told the Grain Marketing Board that they had nothing for sale were
offering to sell to private firms. Many farmers refused to sell to the
Board, leaving it with dwindling stocks, while private firms drove up
the prices, causing hardship for ordinary citizens. When the government
finally cancelled all illegal private permits, it sought to recover the lost
stocks. Over 16,000 tons of maize was impounded in initial efforts, and
it is thought that this is a small proportion of the total grain that found
its way outside of official distribution channels. Prior to the issuance of
permits to private firms, many commercial farmers were hoarding food,
refusing to sell to the Board in hopes of realizing greater profits
elsewhere. At the end of a six-week period in January 2002, during
which the Grain Marketing Board impounded 36,000 tons of hoarded
maize, Minister of Lands and Agriculture Joseph Made declared, "We
cannot have a situation where people are starving while others are
withholding maize."

In August 2002, American officials proposed setting up a $85

million fund which would allow private firms in Zimbabwe lacking
foreign currency to obtain and sell Western food aid. Western officials
are withholding food aid to Zimbabwe until it relents and allows private
firms to purchase and speculate in strategic food commodities. One aid
official said his agency was waiting for Zimbabwe to agree to "allow
private sector players a bigger role in importing food." Zimbabwean
officials reject this demand, arguing that in a time of scarcity, private
speculation in food would drive the price of food beyond the reach of
most people. The United Nations Development Fund has also joined
Western officials in attempting to force Zimbabwe into permitting the
establishment of the fund. Western officials are also insisting that
private firms be allowed to purchase strategic food commodities
whether or not they participate in the proposed fund. By halting food
shipments, the West was using food as a weapon to pry open a key
state-owned sector of Zimbabwe's economy and coercively ensure its
privatization. Throughout the food crisis in Zimbabwe, the U.S. has
maintained its focus on what it feels matters most: privatization and an
economic environment in Zimbabwe friendly to Western investors.
Where others might see hunger and poverty, U.S. leaders see dollar
signs. A U.S. government analysis of the economy of Zimbabwe
complains, "Privatization of state-owned companies, liberalization of
foreign exchange policies, removal of price controls from food staples
and energy are areas where progress has been sub-optimal. The local
ownership requirement and the large areas of the economy where
foreign investment is not allowed are other hindrances to business
establishment and free cross-border capital and equity flows." Note the
desire for the removal of price controls, which would result in greater
numbers of starving people. Profits always come first. At the time of the
1980 revolution in Zimbabwe, 70 to 80 percent of the corporate sector
was foreign-owned. Today, Zimbabwe's efforts to shift the economy
towards the interests of its people has reduced this to about 30 percent.
According to this same U.S. government economic analysis, "The vast
majority of foreign investment predates independence and is held by
British and South African interests." The central goal of U.S. and
British policy is to return Zimbabwe's economy to those fondly recalled
days of apartheid Rhodesia, when there were no impediments to
Western investment.

The Struggle Over Land Reform

Since the triumph of the 1980 revolution in Zimbabwe the promise

of land reform has gone largely unfulfilled. For ten years the nation was
saddled with constitutional restrictions imposed by British negotiators.
Nevertheless, during the 1980s three million hectares were redistributed
to about 70,000 families. This was followed immediately by the
adoption of ESAP at the urging of the West. Little could be done in the
context of the neoliberal agenda to rectify the inequity of the land
ownership pattern inherited from the apartheid Ian Smith regime.
Investment was offered primarily to white owners of large commercial
farms, while the structure of land ownership changed little. Under terms
of the Lancaster House Agreement, Great Britain was obligated to
provide certain levels of funding to support land redistribution. By
1996, when Great Britain ceased payments, it had only contributed
slightly more than half the promised funds. The $45 million contributed
by Great Britain paled in contrast to the billions it expropriated from the
people and land throughout the colonial period. By emphasizing that
land be held in so-called "capable" hands, British officials encouraged
the continued dominance of the agricultural sector by white commercial
farmers. In 1997, Zimbabwe finally abandoned the "willing buyer,
willing seller" formula which handcuffed efforts at progress,
particularly given Great Britain's parsimonious attitude.
 By 1998, growing frustration and resentment over the slow pace of
land reform induced rural workers, impoverished by ESAP, to take
matters in their own hands and occupy land on several large white-
owned farms. In many areas, local officials gave their support to these
actions. Land occupations, while variable and small in scale compared
to the massive land expropriation of blacks under colonial rule, served
to put land reform at the political center stage in Zimbabwe. According
to one study, "land invasions is the generic term used to denote a
negative view of politically organized 'trespass' of farms led by war
veterans. Invasions involve temporary visits of a few days and sporadic
repeat visits. They do not entail the extended stays." The number of
farms experiencing occupations peaked at around 800 in 2000, falling to
around 300 the following year. A total of approximately 300
occupations over the years were marred by violence, often the acts of
opportunistic criminals engaged in extortion. Several case studies
conclude that where grievances existed against specific landowners,
their farms tended to be marked for occupation. Landowners who had
mistreated workers, paid excessively low wages or exhibited racism
were much more likely to experience occupation of sections of their
farms. To a certain extent, the recent acceleration in the pace of land
reform is a response to the pressure exerted from pent-up anger by the
landless. "Past studies had all predicted that inadequate land delivery
would precipitate violent confrontations," points out a Zimbabwean
economist. "There has been an instrumentalization of violence although
the scale of it has been exaggerated and it has been wrongly made the
focus of the whole land reform issue. In fact, compared to rural and
urban violence in South Africa, Ireland or Brazil, the level in Zimbabwe
has been quite low."

A total of around 2,900 white-owned commercial farms were

earmarked for redistribution in the latest round of land reform. Owners
of listed farms were notified to stop farming within 45 days, and given
an additional 45 days to move from their farms. Land subject to
acquisition comprised the following categories: unused land,
underutilized land, land owned by absentee owners, land owned by a
person possessing multiple farms, land exceeding size limits (varying
by region), and land contiguous with communal lands. Owners of farms
marked for redistribution will be compensated for improvements made
on the land, but not for the land itself, as this land was stolen
from its original owners in the colonial era. The government of
Zimbabwe has repeatedly stated that those landowners whose only farm
is being taken will be given another farm of suitable quality. "All
genuine and well meaning white farmers who wish to pursue a farming
career as loyal citizens of this country will have land to do so,"
reiterated President Mugabe recently.

Western reports repeatedly charge that land reform is an exercise in

rewarding President Mugabe's "friends and cronies." With over 125,000
families settled through February 2001 and an additional 100,000-some
expected to receive land in the current phase of land reform, one can
only conclude that President Mugabe is an extraordinarily popular man
to have so many friends and close colleagues. Nor do Western reports
have an explanation for why many of those receiving land are members
of the opposition MDC. Another oft-repeated myth is that land reform
spells ruin for the agricultural sector. Aside from the temporary
dislocation caused by land reform, Western reports assert that the break
up of commercial farms will lead to a loss of production, subtly, or in
some cases not so subtly, implying that black farmers are ignorant and
incapable of knowing how to farm efficiently. Aside from anecdotal
stories about withering crops without mentioning drought conditions,
little evidence is offered.

One of the popular assertions in Western reports is that land reform

is the cause of the drop in maize production, without pointing out 70
percent of Zimbabwe's maize crop is grown by small-scale black
farmers. While it is reported that commercial farmland devoted to
growing maize has declined due to land reform, what is never
mentioned is that the overall level has grown. According to the WFP,
"The area planted to cereals actually increased by 9 percent over last
year, with maize increasing by 14 percent, mainly due to expansion in
the communal and resettled areas." This is a far cry from the arrogant
picture we are usually offered of inept black farmers not knowing what
they are doing, and either botching the process of farming, or simply
sitting idle and confused on empty land.

It is difficult to separate the effect of drought from that of land

reform in determining the overall impact of the process on agricultural
production, but it appears that the effect has been deliberately
exaggerated and losses due to drought are routinely attributed to land
reform by Western reporters. A report by the FAO concludes, "Yields
on commercial farms are on average four times higher than on
communal farms, in part due to inherent differences in land quality, but
mainly because of facilities for supplementary irrigation, greater use of
improved technology and management practices, as well as better
access to working capital." None of these factors need necessarily be
denied to resettled farmers.

Although Western reports persist in viewing land reform primarily

through the prism of its immediate effect on production, understanding
the process can only be achieved through judging its long-term results.
The widespread economic benefit for recipients of land must also be
considered. One study determined that "land reform can generate a
sustainable income flow for the beneficiaries, in year 15 reaching 570-
690 percent of their incomes before the project." The same study also
examined the effect of land reform on production and employment, and
concluded that "production achieved by the resettled farmers after 15
years would be significant." Since small-scale farming is more labor
intensive than on commercial farms, land reform should also result in a
net increase in employment. Increasing wealth throughout a broader
spectrum of the population should act as a spur to what has been
sluggish growth in Zimbabwe.

A report issued by four economists, including two employed by the

World Bank, states, "Economic theory is very clear on the fact that a
one-time redistribution of assets can, in an environment of imperfect
markets, be associated with permanently higher levels of growth."
Conversely, "inequality in the distribution of land ownership is
associated with lower subsequent growth." A survey of resettlement
households covering the years from 1983 determined that "the income
of resettled households is more than five times as high as that of
communal households in similar areas," and their "productivity has
increased significantly." Given enough time, the increase in
productivity means that crop yield should improve substantially,
although it may never entirely match that of commercial farms, due to
the greater possibilities for mechanization on large farms. It is important
to note, however, that the percentage of underutilized land in large
commercial farms averages about 40 to 50 percent in the regions with
the best land, and 85 percent where the land is less suitable for farming.
Every study finds that resettled farmers plant a far larger percentage of
land than commercial farmers. Therefore, the difference in yield
between commercial farms and small-scale farming is to a certain
extent offset by the greater utilization of land by small-scale farmers.
Consequently, the report by the four economists finds that previous land
redistribution has had "no negative impact on large-scale commercial
farm output." Those farmers who were resettled in the first phase of
land reform in the 1980s "represent 5 percent of the population, but
produce between 15 and 20 percent of the marketed output of maize and
cotton, while also largely satisfying their own food consumption
needs." The report concludes, "The best available data show that the
performance of resettled farmers in Zimbabwe is better than is
conventionally believed," and that a well-designed land reform program
"can have a large impact on equity as well as productivity."

A study examining the effect of global warming on agricultural

production in Zimbabwe lends urgency to the land reform process. The
study found that maize in Zimbabwe "is increasingly coming under
stress due to high temperatures and low rainfall conditions. Projected
climate change causes simulated maize yields to decrease dramatically
under dryland conditions," that is, primarily in communal areas.
Previous studies on the effect of global warming "indicate that
smallholder farmers in the marginal semiarid regions of Zimbabwe are
the most vulnerable to climate change." The study noted that Zimbabwe
has experienced three droughts since 1982 (and now a fourth in 2002,
after the study was performed), and that southern Africa is "one of the
regions that appear most vulnerable to climate change." As the climate
changes, more and more of the land in the arid communal areas will
become nonviable for agriculture. Most of the communal areas "are
marginal," the study adds, "and will become more vulnerable with
climate change." Consequently, without land reform, six million poor
black farmers crowded into the communal areas are likely to be driven
from their homes as their land becomes increasingly incapable of
producing crops. As black small farm owners account for the majority
of maize grown in Zimbabwe, climatic change could have a serious
effect on agricultural production, and leave millions subject to
starvation. Farmers migrating from their no longer viable farms would
be left homeless and jobless, with devastating consequences for the
economy of Zimbabwe. The lack of land reform, or even a delay in the
implementation of land reform, could spell economic and human
disaster of grand proportions. The fertile land occupied by the large
commercial farms can withstand climate change much more readily
than the communal areas. Because land reform is a long-term process, it
will take years for resettled farmers to achieve full potential yields. Any
delay in implementing land reform would run the risk of production in
the resettled areas lagging dangerously behind the rate of loss of
production in the communal areas as rising global temperature
implacably eliminates farmland in arid communal regions.

Zimbabwe can no longer tolerate the grossly unjust distribution of

land created by colonial expropriation. The average white farmer owns
approximately 100 times more land than a black farmer, and the land he
owns is far more suitable for agriculture. Farms belonging to the
Oppenheimer family alone total an area exceeding the size of Belgium,
while a great many large tracts of land belong to absentee
owners. Among the absentee landowners are members of the British
House of Lords and other prominent British citizens, a fact not entirely
unrelated to British efforts to derail land reform.

The success of land reform hinges on the extent of inputs into the
process from the government of Zimbabwe. A major impediment is that
the government finds itself in a dire financial situation due to
international sanctions, and this is affecting its ability to implement the
support structure necessary for the success of land reform. The
government has in place plans to establish 36 irrigation schemes in dry
land communal and resettlement areas. The irrigation project will rely
on water in existing dams and allow irrigation in areas formally lacking
access to water. Irrigation would result in increased yields in dry land
areas, and allow nearly year round farming. It would also help to limit
or delay the loss of farmland due to rising global temperatures.
Unfortunately, progress on implementing the irrigation schemes is held
up by the lack of funding. An official from the Department of Irrigation
commented that some irrigation projects "have been around for more
than five or six years, the feasibility studies are done, etcetera. But due
to budgetary constraints we have been unable to implement those
projects." Once again, it is seen that international sanctions serve to hurt
efforts to improve agricultural output.

The government of Zimbabwe proposes spending a total of $3

billion in support of the land reform process, much of which will be
earmarked for building up the infrastructure in resettled areas, including
roads, schools and clinics. The initial phase of the plan focuses on
immediate support to allow resettled farmers to start farming. Funding
the process will be difficult without access to foreign loans. Economist
John Robertson warned, "This will place a severe strain on the
government's coffers and increase pressure on money supply growth
and inflation." Despite these constraints, the government has spent $155
million in initial support for resettled farmers. The intent of land reform
in Zimbabwe is not only to redress the injustice of colonial theft, but
also to reduce widespread poverty and raise the standard of living not
only for the resettled farmers, but for society as a whole. It is also
expected that land reform will eventually result in a net increase in
agricultural production. Sylvestre Maunganidze, head of political affairs
at the Zimbabwe Embassy in Georgia, says, "We realized that unless we
maximized production we would not be able to survive the onslaught of
the West. We are not a perfect people but we know that there is a group
of people outside of Zimbabwe who would only be waiting to pounce
on our mistakes but the only response we have for them is to ask them
to come back in two years and they would see a transformed Zimbabwe.
We thought we had good partners abroad and did not know that we
were killing ourselves with this dependency. Now we are winning
ourselves from dependency and we want to be independent both
politically and economically." No longer would Zimbabwe be "an
appendage of the industrial capitalist system," he affirmed.

It is precisely this independence that has made Zimbabwe a target.

The Western campaign against Zimbabwe will continue to escalate until
it achieves its goal of reversing that independence, regardless of the cost
to the people of Zimbabwe. Already New Zealand's Prime Minister
Helen Clark has advocated "tougher economic sanctions" against
Zimbabwe and its "full expulsion" from the Commonwealth, while
British Prime Minister Tony Blair is discussing possible further actions
with leaders of African countries. U.S. State Department spokesman
Philip Reeker implied that the U.S. is considering further punitive
action against Zimbabwe when he warned that "it is time to tell
President Mugabe that he needs to reexamine these policies in terms of
land seizures and go back to the road of democratic norms that
Zimbabwe should be on."

Sanctions continue to take their toll, and Zimbabwe's economy

continues to plummet. According to Ken Jerrard, Bulawayo regional
president of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, the foreign
currency shortage has prevented most firms from importing essential
capital goods and raw materials necessary to maintain production. He
noted that over 100 companies closed down in his province in the
previous few months, while others are making drastic cuts in staff to
avoid closing. In order to raise foreign currency to meet its budget
commitments, the government has been forced to engage in limited and
targeted privatization, a painful but unavoidable compromise under the
circumstances. A ship carrying fuel intended for Zimbabwe was unable
to offload its cargo at the port of Beira in Mozambique. British
Petroleum, which owns the fuel storage facilities at the port, refused to
accept the fuel because Zimbabwe owed the firm $3 million.
Approximately 70 percent of Zimbabwe's fuel is shipped from Libya
through the port of Beira, where it is transferred to pipelines. The lack
of foreign currency has prevented Zimbabwe from meeting its payments
to British Petroleum, and unless a resolution to the dispute can be
reached, it could mean a near-total cutoff of fuel,
bringing down production in virtually all sectors of Zimbabwe's
economy.

Despite Western hostility and belligerence, Zimbabwe remains

resolute in its pursuit of land reform and rejection of the neoliberal
economic model. "We have not sought to quarrel with any nation. We
have no other ambition than to remain sovereign as we cooperate and
respect the sovereignty of others," President Mugabe pointed out. "It
cannot be the rule of law that is the matter, for here they massacred
thousands as they colonized our country and pillaged our resources. We
cannot be a nation worth its name if we succumb to and acquiesce in the
sheer erosion of our sovereignty."