Belgica v Ochoa
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development
Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members
may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from
the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which
would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats
happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to
which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs
Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power
to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress
can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the
GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of
the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose
a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives,
whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later
on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State
policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under
the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as
PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-
related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a
general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869
Araullo v Aquino
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment Constitutionality of
the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn
by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said
funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the
DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment
of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP
but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of
the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures
and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by
the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the Presidents
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the
case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within their
respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive,
these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated
to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under
the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to
the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all
actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that
they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable
to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals
(civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
BCDA v Pulido-Tan
The case tackles the decision of COA for denying allegation of BCDA that COA gravely abused its
discretion when it when it declared that disbursement made covering the remuneration pursuant to
the extension of CMS is without legal basis. The court ruled in favor of COA.It is the general policy of
the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not taintedwith unfairness
or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the COA has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
Tanada v Angara
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and
various NGOs to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to
the Filipino First policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with
exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the
agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such
legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization implied rejection of the treaty embodied in
the Final Act.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not
community. The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies,
which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the
basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor
countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-
on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form
powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which
is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of
the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With
regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The
Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power.
Rulings:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in
the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with
coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to
limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has
entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as
it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial
system.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members deliberation on August 25,
1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic
minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
Lansang v Garcia
Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8
people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos
urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were
invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the
validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case
where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground
could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter,
including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after
satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Espinas v COA
FACTS:
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 198, as amended, otherwise known as the
Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
Petitioners are department managers of the LWUA who, together with 28 other LWUA officials,
sought reimbursement of their extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME) for the period
January to December 2006. According to petitioners, the reimbursement claims were within the
ceiling provided under the LWUA Calendar Year 2006 Corporate Operating Budget approved by the
LWUA Board of Trustees and the Department of Budget and Management.
On April 16, 2007, the Office of the CoA Auditor, through Priscilla DG. Cruz, the Supervising Auditor
assigned to the LWUA (SA Cruz), issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. AOM-2006-27,
revealing that the 31 LWUA officials were able to reimburse 16,900,705.69 in EME, including expenses
for official entertainment, service awards, gifts and plaques, membership fees, and
seminars/conferences. Out of the said amount, 13,110,998.26 was reimbursed only through an
attached certification attesting to their claimed incurrence (certification). According to the AOM, this
violated CoA Circular No. 2006-0110 dated January 3, 2006 (CoA Circular No. 2006-01), which
pertinently states that the claim for reimbursement of such expenses shall be supported by receipts
and/or other documents evidencing disbursements.
During the CoA Exit Conference held sometime in April 2007, LWUA management officials, including
herein petitioners, manifested that they were unaware of the existence of CoA Circular No. 2006-01,
particularly during the period January to December 2006.
After the post-audit of the LWUA EME account for the same period, SA Cruz issued Notice of
Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) dated July 21, 2009, disallowing the EME reimbursement claims of
the 31 LWUA officials, in the total amount of P13,110,998.26, for the reason that they were not
supported by receipts and/or [other] documents evidencing disbursements as required under [Item
III(3)] of [CoA Circular No. 2006-01].
Pursuant to the CoAs 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure, petitioners appealed the notice of
disallowance to the CoA Cluster Director (Corporate Sector -Cluster B), contending that the
certification they attached in support of their EME reimbursement claims was originally allowed under
Section 397 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, Volume I (GAAM - Vol. I), which is a
reproduction of Item III(4) of CoA Circular No. 89-30017 dated March 21, 1989 (CoA Circular No. 89-
300) viz.:
4. x x x The corresponding claim for reimbursement of such expenses shall be supported by receipts
and/or other documents evidencing disbursement, if these are available, or, in lieu thereof, by a
certification executed by the official concerned that the expenses sought to be reimbursed have been
incurred for any of the purposes contemplated under Section 19 and other related sections of RA
6688 (or similar provision[s] in subsequent General Appropriations Acts) in relation to or by reason of
his position. In the case of miscellaneous expenses incurred for an office specified in the law, such
certification shall be executed solely by the head of the office.
Further, petitioners alleged that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 is violative of the equal protection clause
since officials of GOCCs, such as the LWUA officials, are, among others, prohibited by virtue of the
same issuance from supporting their reimbursement claims with certifications, unlike officials of the
national government agencies (NGAs) who have been so permitted.
To this end, petitioners argued that the employees of NGAs and GOCCs are similarly situated and that
there exists no substantial distinction between them.
Finally, petitioners submitted that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 was not duly published in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation and thus, unenforceable.
Petitioners appeal was denied by CoA Cluster Director IV Divinia M. Alagon. Unconvinced, petitioners
elevated the ruling to the Commission Proper which affirmed Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-
GF(06) but differed from CoA Cluster Director Alagons reasoning. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the
present certiorari petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA.
ISSUE: Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the CoAs ruling in this case.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
POLITICAL LAW: commission on audit
The CoAs audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check-and-
balance system inherent in our system of government. As an essential complement, the CoA has been
vested with the exclusive authority to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. This is found in Section
2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 2. x x x.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or
uses of government funds and properties.
As an independent constitutional body conferred with such power, it reasonably follows that the CoAs
interpretation of its own auditing rules and regulations, as enunciated in its decisions, should be
accorded great weight and respect.
The CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant
and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately, the people's
property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives
life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially
one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision
and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings.
REMEDIAL LAW: grave abuse of discretion
The concept is well-entrenched: grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when
the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism. Not
every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. The abuse of discretion to be qualified as grave must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Viewed in the foregoing light, the Court finds that the CoA did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion as its affirmance of Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) is based on cogent legal
grounds.
First off, the Court concurs with the CoAs conclusion that the certification submitted by petitioners
cannot be properly considered as a supporting document within the purview of Item III(3) of CoA
Circular No. 2006-01 which pertinently states that a claim for reimbursement of [EME] expenses shall
be supported by receipts and/or other documents evidencing disbursements. Similar to the word
receipts, the other documents pertained to under the above-stated provision is qualified by the
phrase evidencing disbursements. Citing its lexicographic definition, the CoA stated that the term
disbursement means to pay out commonly from a fund or to make payment in settlement of debt or
account payable.
That said, it then logically follows that petitioners certification, so as to fall under the phrase other
documents under Item III(3) of CoA Circular No. 2006-01, must substantiate the paying out of an
account payable, or, in simple term, a disbursement. However, an examination of the sample
certification attached to the petition does not, by any means, fit this description. The signatory therein
merely certifies that he/she has spent, within a particular month, a certain amount for meetings,
seminars, conferences, official entertainment, public relations, and the like, and that the certified
amount is within the ceiling authorized under the LWUA corporate budget. Accordingly, since
petitioners reimbursement claims were solely supported by this certification, the CoA properly
disallowed said claims for failure to comply with CoA Circular No. 2006-01.
The CoA also correctly rejected petitioners invocation of the provisions of Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I
and CoA Circular No. 89-300 since, at the outset, such rules are applicable only to NGAs, and not to
GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries which are specifically governed by CoA Circular No. 2006-01.50 A
perusal of CoA Circular No. 89-300, from which Section 397 of GAAM - Vol. I was merely reproduced,
clearly indicates in Item II thereof, captioned Scope and Coverage, that the rules thereunder applies to
appropriations authorized under the GAA of 1989 for National Government agencies that may be
used for incurrence of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses at the rates and by the offices and
officials specified therein for, among others. A similar inference may be reached from a reading of
Item I of CoA Circular No. 89-300, captioned as Rationale, which states that the circular was made in
response to the increasing number of queries and requests for clarification as to the real import and
true intent of the provisions of the GAA of 1989 authorizing the use by certain national government
officials of appropriations authorized for their agencies for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses.
Lastly, the Court upholds the CoAs finding that there exists a substantial distinction between officials
of NGAs and the officials of GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries which justify the peculiarity in
regulation. Since the EME of GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries, are, pursuant to law, allocated by
their own internal governing boards, as opposed to the EME of NGAs which are appropriated in the
annual GAA duly enacted by Congress, there is a perceivable rational impetus for the CoA to impose
nuanced control measures to check if the EME disbursements of GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries
constitute irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable government
expenditures. Case in point is the LWUA Board of Trustees which, pursuant to Section 69 of PD 198, as
amended, is authorized to appropriate out of any funds of the Administration, such amounts as it may
deem necessary for the operational and other expenses of the Administration including the purchase
of necessary equipment. Indeed, the Court recognizes that denying GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiaries
the benefit of submitting a secondary-alternate document in support of an EME reimbursement, such
as the certification discussed herein, is a CoA policy intended to address the disparity in EME
disbursement autonomy. As pertinently stated in CoA Circular No. 2006-01, the consideration
underlying the rules and regulations contained therein is the fact that governing boards of
GOCCs/GFIs are invariably empowered to appropriate through resolutions such amounts as they
deem appropriate for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses.
Hence, in due deference to the CoAs constitutional prerogatives, the Court, absent any semblance of
grave abuse of discretion in this case, respects the regulation, and consequently dismisses the
petition. With these pronouncements, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary
issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) dated July 21,
2009 is therefore upheld and the persons therein held liable are ordered to duly return the disallowed
amount of 13,110,998.26.
DISMISSED.
Garcia v Drilon
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and
of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial
court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the
TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to
raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said
law.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government
while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with
their duty executive function.
5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake ameliorative
action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by women and children
brought about by years of discrimination. The equal protection clause when juxtaposed to this
provision provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such discrimination. Indeed,
these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities and remove cultural inequities."
Ople v Torres (Legislative) Ate Ann
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator
Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that
the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative
Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Oples concern that the Executive branch not to
trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line
between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to execute laws will
disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
League of Provinces v Dep of Envi
Golden Falcon filed with the DENR an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement in
Bulacan. Their subsequent applications and appeals were later denied by the DENR. While Golden
Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato
Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
their respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area Atlantic Mines
and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application for Exploration
Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's Application for Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement. Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board PMRB, endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor
Josefina M. dela Cruz, the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been
converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz,
Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano). August 10, 2005, Governor Dela
Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto
S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant
of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a
Decision 14 in favor of AMTC. the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor
were null and void. On the other hand, the DENR Secretary declared that AMTC filed its Application
for Exploration Permit when the area was already open to other mining applicants; thus, AMTCs
Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held that the questioned
Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the
authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was
never proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are
unconstitutional for providing for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of
provinces. (2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-
scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved
powers of all provinces. HELD: (1) No. In this case respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to
nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR
Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is
subject to control by respondent DENR.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."Under
said provision, the
DENR has the duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in
the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local
Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples Small -Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the
Peoples Small
-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
concerned local government agencies. The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of
local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject
to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher
authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization of the country's natural resources. Before this Court determines the validity
of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in
our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court,
however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the
Court
//. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-
Scale Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has the power of
supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs
It is the DENR which is incharge of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development and autilization of the countrrys natural resources,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-
scale mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control and review of
the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement of the small-
scale mining law.
 RA 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24
of the law makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and control
of the Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by the same.
Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the
PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications outside the
mineral reservations.
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA 7076 likewise provides that
the DENR Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control over the Peoples Small-Scale
Mining Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Boards (PMRB) powers and
functions shall be subject to review by the DENR Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40
or the Revised IRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through their respective
Mining Regulatory Boards for areas outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in
coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-scale mining,
sand and gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.
Petitioners contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and
DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the
Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit
because the DENR Secretary was granted the power of review in the PMRBs resolution of disputes
under Sec. 24 of RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify
and cancel the Governors issuance of permits emanated from its power of review under RA 7076
ad its IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining
Permits by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the determination of
what the law is and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter
in controversy and on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial
power of the DENR can neither be equated with substitution of judgment of the Provincial
Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor control over the said act of the Provincial
Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In
this case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii)
of the LGC and Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said
provisions of the law.
Estrada v Desierto (Ate Tin Digest)
Macalintal v Pres Electroral Tribunal
Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the
formers petition and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution
does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President
or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of
Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power
granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect.
No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution
of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts
of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an
exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution
// Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his
arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro in Barok C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the president, the power to do so
being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the
Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in
the absence of an act of legislature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.
HELD:
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under
the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing
with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that
are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the
1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it
remained absolute.
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of
the provision itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PETs constitutionality.
The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission,
which drafted the present Constitution.
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was
merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme
Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific
wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests
is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial -
exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and
Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not
courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence,
an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)
of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their
decisions are still subject to judicial review - via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party - if
there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the
powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded
by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the
Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the
PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII.
Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which,
in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the
prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article
VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
 We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the
Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The
vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the
Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET.
Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant
of judicial power
Finally, petitioners application of the Courts decision in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth
Commission to the present case is an unmitigated quantum leap.
The decision therein held that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. A plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e., last
paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two
are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive and the Judicial Branches of
government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the PET was, in fact,
mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting
of the present Constitution.
Biraogo v PTC(Executive) Ohana
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino.
The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-
judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between
parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It
has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot
determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the
power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not
affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
Garcia v Exec SeC
211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the
Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the
board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines.
In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating
the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they
violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . .
and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the
President ot issue the said EOs.
Neri V senate com
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive
privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by
the Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the
other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers
were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to
attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications
between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.