TAADA VS.

TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced
if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in
the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner
remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that
the petitioners business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where
respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets?

RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national
law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his
national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped
by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had
always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged
natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under
California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is
ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional
rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of
Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law
of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the
matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could
dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not
being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and
the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict
rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed
to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Christensen being
domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is
referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

Wassmer vs. Velez 12 scra 648

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-
be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear
and was not heard from again.

Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default.
Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as
moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorneys fees.

Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby
rendered judgment hence this appeal.
Issue:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good
customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.

When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary
damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless
and oppressive manner.

RENE RONULO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 182438, 2014-07-02

Facts:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta.
Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating... priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that
the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and... guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage... certificate.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC

It held that the petitioner's act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an
official church... recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form
or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining
whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting... parties must appear
personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.

Issues:

under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs
such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a
"marriage ceremony.

Ruling:

Article 6[25] of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to
appear personally before the solemnizing officer... and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.

the law sets the minimum requirements... constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the
personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and...
wife.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes
the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner's
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the

Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage
is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core... requirements of law be
observed.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony,
as the minimum requirements set by law were complied

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential
and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was
illegal. The petitioner's knowledge of the absence of these requirements... negates his defense of good
faith

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals

Principles:

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes
the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony... this principle has been duly
preserved by Article 6 of the

Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage
is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core... requirements of law be
observed.

Ninal vs. Bayadog [G.R. No. 133778] March 14, 2000

by Quolete

Fact:
Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfas death.
Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage license because they lived together for 5 years and
thus exempt from marriage license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car accident.

The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only occurs after the death
of an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a petition for declaration for nullity of marriage
(a.k.a. declaration of nullity of void marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence
of a marriage license as a legal basis.

Issues:

The lower court dismissed the petition because:

(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a cause of action. Can there be such a petition
when the heirs parent is deceased?

(2) Are the heirs a proper party?

(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the beginning) is a must but is a
different matter. Void marriages cannot be attacked collaterally.

(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has prescribed.

The lower court ruled:

(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their fathers marriage before the
latters death.

(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding were used as a basis to
dismiss petitioners case.

Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that:

(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family Code. (In
determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was
contracted.)

(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The
exemption for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not
the one described by the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty
months whereas the law requires five years. If the respondent took into consideration the other years
and months before the second marriage, then the cohabitation would include the period of the first
marriage. This is in violation of the law.

(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count cohabitation.

This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.

(4) The judges ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made identical is erroneous.
Void and voidable marriages are not identical.

A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place.

A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while a void
marriage can never be ratified.

A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally.
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes.

Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.

Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.

(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before determining
succession rights.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking
par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City
and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their
son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the
States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for
authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the
petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the
issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

Held:

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his
allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as
an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The
Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

However, Orbecido is barred from remarrying because he did not present competent evidence showing
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco

FACTS:

Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she lived with him on
his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his hometown in San
Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.

After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the province. In January
1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left.
He cut short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.

He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He wrote several letters to
the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned to him. He claimed that he inquired from his
friends but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to the CA, contending
that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had failed to show that
there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under the Article 41 of the
Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to 4 years;
however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one
spouse. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about Janet's whereabouts
too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.

Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any information
about her was too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he
took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to
identify his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the returned letters,
he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London, he did not even dare to solicit help of
authorities to find his wife.

The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to
regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON

485 SCRA 376 (2006)
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity
of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to
prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved.
Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More than 15 years later, a Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, which
has been granted. Bailon, subsequently, contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque and
designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of the former.
SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on the
basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was
contracted during the subsistence of Bailons marriage with Alice.
Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefitsasserting that her marriage
with Bailon was not declared before any court of justiceas bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained
valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque may
terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon
HELD:
The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon
the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article
42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit
or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the
spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an
absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and Teresitas
marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of
Bailon.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They
were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They
acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his
prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil
Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved
to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved.
These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.
Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs
of the appellant.

SANTOS VS COURT OF APPEALS

Posted by kaye lee on 9:28 AM

G.R. No. 112019, January 4 1995 [Article 36; Psychological Incapacity]

FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant of the Philippine Army, married Julia in a municipal trial court and thereafter,
in a church. She gave birth to a baby boy and was named Leouel Jr. Occasionally, the couple quarreled
over a lot of things including the interference of Julia's parents into their family affairs.

Julia went to US to work as a nurse and promised husband that she will return once her contract will
expired. She never did. Leouel tried to find her in the US but somehow failed to contact her or get in
touch with her.

Leouel filed a petition to have their marriage declared null and void, citing Article 36 of the Family Code.
He argued that Julia's failure to return home and communicating with him for more than 5 years
constitute psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

RULING:

No. Julia's failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute psychological
incapacity. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) juridical antecedence, (b) gravity and (c)
incurability.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual
settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.
0
This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina and

Reynaldo Molinas marriage as void ab initio, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article

36 of the Family Code.

FACTS:

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a

year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the

marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with

them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.

Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March

1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their

child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo

Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker,

and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any

evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered

judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court

of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize

the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity

as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or

she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or

her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said

conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it

defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

RP V. CA AND MOLINA

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer

to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and

that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of

psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an

utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity

must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no

clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a

difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere

showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes

psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of

the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1)

The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be

medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of

marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must

be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the

Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents

and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for

the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding

that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

BRENDA MARCOS V. WILSON MARCOS

343 SCRA 755 (397 Phil. 840) Civil Law Family Code Article 36; Psychological Incapacity Molina
Guidelines Psychological Test Requirement
Wilson and Brenda were military personnel working at the Malacaang. They got married in 1982. After
the EDSA Revolution, they left the military and led a civilian life.
However, Wilson found it hard to get a job while Brendas business started to take off as a result of her
hard work. Unfortunately, due to Wilsons failure to engage in any gainful employment, the spouses
frequently quarreled. Wilson would verbally and physically abuse Brenda and would even force her to
have sex with him even if Brendas too tired from work. Wilson would also excessively chastise their
children even for slight mistakes.
In 1994, Brenda had too much of Wilsons abuses. She decided to file a petition to have their marriage
be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity. Brenda alleged that Wilsons drunkenness,
joblessness, and failure to give material and moral support to his family constitute psychological
incapacity. During the pendency of the case, Brenda requested Wilson to undergo psychological
examination but Wilson refused to submit himself to tests. Brenda submitted herself to tests and was
also interviewed by a competent psychologist as to the psychological state of her husband.
After said interview, the psychologist submitted that Wilson is psychologically incapacitated. The
Regional Trial Court granted Brendas petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the
ground that the petition should not have been granted because Wilsons psychological incapacity was
never proven due to the fact that Wilson was never subjected to psychological evaluation.
ISSUE: Whether or not psychological examination is required as a condition sine qua non for a
declaration of psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the
respondent in an annulment case should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine
qua non for such declaration.
In this case, Wilson refused to submit himself to psychological evaluation. Hence, his psycholoigcal
incapacity may be ascertained through other sources. Further, in the case of Republic vs CA and Molina,
the guidelines set therein did not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
But in this case, was Wilsons psychological incapacity proven?
No. The Supreme Court used the totality of evidence rule. Based on the totality of evidence presented,
Brenda failed to establish that Wilson is psychologically incapacitated. Psychological Incapacity must
exist at the time of the marriage. In this case, Wilsons behavior only arose when he failed to find gainful
employment. Verily, the behavior of Wilson can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes

FACTS:

Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8,
1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant
lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only
after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code.

The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997
Molina case had not been satisfied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist
who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded
to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified
that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her
psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not
of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remains unchanged.

In this cases also, the Supreme Court emphasized what fraud or misrepresentation means as
contemplated in Article 45 (3) of the Family Code vis-a-vis Article 46. But first, it must be stated: in
Psychological Incapacity, the misrepresentation done by Reyes points to her inadequacy to cope with
her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Article 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage. These provisions of Article 45 (3) and Article 46 cannot be applied in the
case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Reyes is not considered as fraud but rather such
misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes Psychological
Incapacity. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leonilos consent to marry her. Her
misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy from reality which
is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.

G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital obligations
starting 1988. His true color of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00
oclock in the afternoon until 1:00 oclock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least,
minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a
loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were
not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they
could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to give him a chance to
change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994,
respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered
black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio on
the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn reversed the
decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina should be taken
to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
HELD:
(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence showed
and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
(2) The doctrine of stare decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the
courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine
may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal life by the Court
in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the
parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was added.
Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the
case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.

ADDITIONAL:

ISSUE: Whether or not emotional immaturity and irresponsibility may be equated to psychological
incapacity.
HELD: No. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
As the CA observed, Lorna has not established the following: That Zosimo showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in
Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable;
that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness;
that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by
an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI

GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced
by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house
of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the
first night of their married life.
Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however just went
to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse
between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for
four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping
on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage)
until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results
were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to
this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said
she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. She
also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her
very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since
the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his
hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as
VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner
in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

227 Phil. 457

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity
of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in
Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein)
on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the
existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first
husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial
that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the
presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respon-dent court for an opportunity to
present evidence -
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on
both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari assail-ing the following Orders of the respondent Judge
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for
resolution based on "agreed facts"; and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in
her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against
both parties because assuming this to be so the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that
when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration[1] of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

Domingo vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia,
for support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some
of her properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and
separation of property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy.

Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is
required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Marriage is an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as such, it shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.

ARTHUR TE V CA, LILIANA CHOA

FACTS:Petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decisionof the Court of Appeals
denying Te's motion for reconsideration.Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in Sept 1988. They do
notlive together but meet regularly until after Liliana gave birth thatArthur stopped visiting her.On May
20, 1990, while their marriage was still subsisting, Arthurcontracted a second marriage with Julieta
Santella.On August 1990, Liliana filed an information charging Arthur withbigamy.Meanwhile, in July
1990, Arthur Te filed an action for annulment onthe ground that he was forced to marry her, that she
concealed herpregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage andpsychologically incapacity.On
November 8, 1990, Liliana also filed with the ProfessionalRegulation Commission (PRC) an administrative
case againstpetitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respectiveengineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality and an act of falsification against Arthur when he
statedin his 2
nd
marriage contract that he was still single.After the prosecution or criminal case, petitoner filed demurrer
toevidence and motion to inhibit the judge were filed but wereeventually denied by the court. Thus:<A.>
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari filed with the CAalleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge,Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for(1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards his
counsel;(2) violating the due process by denying his motion forreconsideration and demurrer to
evidence(3) x x x
(4) ruling that in a criminal case only prima facie evidence is
sufficient for conviction of an accused.<B.>Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC
amotion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendencyof the case for annulment of his 1
st
marriage and case for bigamy,but it was subsequently denied. Thus, he filed with the CA anotherpetition
for certiorari against Board for grave abuse of discretion:(1) NOT holding that the annulment case is
prejudicial to theoutcome of the administrative case;(2) X X X(3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of theRules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrativeproceeding before the PRC Board
despite the pendency of criminaland/or administrative proceedings against the same
respondentinvolving the same set of facts.CA rendered ff decision:1. upheld
the RTCs denial of the motion to inhibit due topetitioners failure to show any concrete evidence that the
trial
court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case.2. denial of motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law
3. affirmed the RTCs denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by
petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to supportthe same4. no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Board5.
no prejudicial question
existed since the action sought to besuspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involvedis a civil caseISSUES:1.

WON there is a prejudicial question between the civil case of annulment and criminal case of bigamy.2.

WON there is a prejudicial question between the civil case of annulment and administrative case.3.

WON there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of CA andBoard.HELD: No, No, No* Prejudicial
Question - one based on a fact distinct and separatefrom the crime but so intimately connected with it
that itdetermines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it tosuspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said caseinvolves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminalprosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of theissue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of theaccused would necessarily be determined.1. Civil case for annulment
did NOT pose a prejudicial question tothe criminal case of bigamy.T
he outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage
to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for bigamy to prosper is that the 1
st
marriage be subsisting at the time the 2
nd
marriage is contracted.Even a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would NOTnecessarily
absolve him from criminal liability. Art. 40 of Family Codeis already in effect at the time of their marriage
(Sept 1988) statingthat a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemedvalid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding,2. Civil case for annulment does NOT pose a prejudicial
question tosuspend an administrative proceeding.There is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrativeand the other is civil. The concept of prejudicial question involves acivil and a criminal
case.Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing theRegulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expresslyprovides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not
besuspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civilcase against the respondent
involving the same facts as theadministrative case.The Board shall proceed independently with the
investigation of thecase and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for thefinal decision of the
courts or quasi-judicial body.3. Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on thepart of
the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on twogrounds: first, the prosecution established a
prima facie case forbigamy against the petitioner; and second, peti
tioners allegations in
the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same.The denial for the motion to inhibit was
also correct. Mere suspicionthat a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear andconvincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality

BELTRAN V PEOPLE

In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24
years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs
PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she
filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against
Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised
the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said
that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended
until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the
RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in
the case at bar.
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must
appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than
proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously
and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for
bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a
fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been
declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.

SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.
Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being
void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on
account of psychological incapacityvoid marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no
judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. The complete nullity of a previously contracted
marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for
bigamy. Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy is still committed though marriage is ab initio null
and void (if marriage is contracted before th judicial declaration of its nullity). Canon law-reconcile
grounds for nullity of marriage. Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being
a mental state may not be so readily evident

c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.
Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugaldwelling. Two children were born out of the
marriage. Frederick, their son went to his fathers residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children to
her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when she
started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was
granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for
the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Ruling:
The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage licenseis a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever
resided in Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place
on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the
Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

*THE CHILDREN CCANNOT CONTINUE WITH THE ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION IN CASE THE
INNOCENT SPOUSE DIES PENDING ACTION

12 Phil. 453

TORRES, J.:

On the 23d of November, 1900, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against
Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of said year, at
night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and that upon
arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about
to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it
was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to remove the foetus by means of forceps which
operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the after-birth, in which service he
was occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient
several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the
defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that
judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and
costs, together with any other relief that might be deemed proper.

In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegations therein contained
and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the said
childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate
house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in
the house of the defendants, her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances;
therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer, directing the
defendants, on the 23d of January, 1907, to amend their answer.

In compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the same date, their amended answer,
denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and requesting that the same
be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court below on the
5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on account of the
lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants, with costs against the
plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition moved for a new trial on the ground that
the judgment was contrary to law; the motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due
course presented the corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that
the declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded the professional services
of the plaintiff be eliminated therefrom, for the reason that, according to the evidence, no such request
had been made, was also denied, and to the decision the defendants excepted.

Assuming that it is a real fact acknowledged by the defendants, that the plaintiff, by virtue of having
been sent for by the former, attended as physician and rendered professional services to a daughter-in-
law of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order to decide the claim of the
said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it becomes necessary to decide who is bound to pay
the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the patient, or the husband of the latter.

According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-
contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in special
laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between
the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts, 1090 and 1091.)

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to
which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)

If every obligation consists in giving, doing, or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses are mutually
bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of them by reason of
illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish
the necessary services of a physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed
from the sickness by which life is jeopardized; the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable
for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability
originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law lias expressly established between the
married couple.

In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to
the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants
during her childbirth is the husband of the patient and not her father and mother-in-law, the defendants
herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his
wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger
to which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was
urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife with the indispensable services of
a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and
compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover
his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to furnish medical assistance
to his lawful wife in such an emergency.

From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an action against
the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff and requested him to
assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly, because they were her father and
mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house. The defendants were not, nor are they now,
under any obligation by virtue of any legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any
contract entered into between them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.

In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of Spain, while
recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a person bound himself
to support another who was not his relative, established the rule that the law does impose the
obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability arose out of a contract, the
stipulations of the agreement must be upheld. (Decision of May 11, 1897.)

Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation
that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance
to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not appear that a contract
existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it is obvious that the
former can not be compelled to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not
appear that they consented to bind themselves.

The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the judgment below
are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the defendants, it is needless to
declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical operation.

Therefore, in view of the considerations hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment
appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Matabuena v. Cervantes

G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)

FACTS:

Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to
Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After thedeath of Felix Matabuena, his sister,
Petitioner, sought the nullification ofthe donation citing Art.133 of the Civil
Code Every
donation between thespouses
during the marriage shall be void.

The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because thedonation was made at
the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet marriedand were simply cohabitating.

ISSUE:

W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

HELD:

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spiritof the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reasonfor the ban on donations between spouses
during the marriage is to prevent thepossibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted
by one spouseon the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships.The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that thePetitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed
property because the relationshipbetween Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.

Vitug v. CA
G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990
Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with the Bank of American
National Trust and Savings Association. The said agreement contained the following stipulations:
(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings current account shall be
both their property and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them
during their lifetime; and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole property of the surviving
spouse and payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor
Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed a motion asking
authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property belonging to the estate to cover his advances
to the estate which he claimed were personal funds withdrawn from their savings account. Rowena
opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the savings account were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate. Hence, there should be no reimbursement. On the other
hand, Romarico insists that the same are his exclusive property acquired through the survivorship
agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the survivorship agreement were
conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate
No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither a donation mortis causanor a donation
inter vivos. It is in the nature of an aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties reciprocally
bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the
happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time or is uncertain, such as death. The
Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law and thus is valid unless its
operation or effect may be violative of a law such as in the following instances: (1) it is used as a mere
cloak to hide an inofficious donation; (2) it is used to transfer property in fraud of creditors; or (3) it is
used to defeat the legitime of a compulsory heir. In the instant case, none of the foregoing instances
were present. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement entered into
by the spouses Vitug. As such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested right over the
amounts under the savings account, which became his exclusive property upon the death of his wife
pursuant to the survivorship agreement. Thus, the funds of the savings account are not conjugal
partnership properties and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.

MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES, PETITIONER, VS. FEDERICO GUIANG, AURORA GUIANG, AND
COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:
The present Petition for Review seeks to set aside the Decision dated 9 December 1986 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. - G.R. CV 03299. The appellate court affirmed a Decision dated 31 May 1983 of Branch 83
of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2896-C filed by
petitioner company against private respondent spouses.

On 2 May 1975, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and petitioner
Marmont Resort Hotel Enterprises, Inc. ("Marmont"), a corporation engaged in the hotel and resort
business with office and establishment at Olongapo City. Under the agreement, Maris Trading
undertook to drill for water and to provide all equipment necessary to install and complete a water
supply facility to service the Marmont Resort Hotel in Olongapo, for a stipulated fee of P40,000.00. In
fulfillment of its contract, Maris Trading drilled a well and installed a water pump on a portion of a
parcel of land situated in Olongapo City, then occupied by respondent spouses Federico and Aurora
Guiang.

Five (5) months later, a second Memorandum of Agreement was executed between Maris Trading and
Aurora Guiang, with Federico Guiang signing as witness. This second agreement in essential part read:[1]
"That the First Party [Maris Trading] has dug, drilled and tapped water source for Marmont Resort,
located at Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City in accordance with their agreement executed on May 2, 1975 and
notarized before Isagani M. Jungco, Notary Public and entered as Doc. No. 166; Page No. 135; Book No.
XV; Series of 1975.

That the First Party has erected, built and drilled for the water source of Marmont Resort on the land
owned by the Second Party [Aurora Guiang] at the corner of J. Montelibano Street and Maquinaya Drive
(Provincial Road) with the latter's permission:
That for and in consideration of the sum of P1,500.00 the Second Party hereby Sell, Transfer and Cede
all possessory rights, interest and claims over that portion of the lot wherein the water source of
Marmont Resort is located unto and in favor of Maris Trading."

After some time, the water supply of the Marmont Resort Hotel became inadequate to meet the hotel's
water requirements. Petitioner Marmont secured the services of another contractor (the name of which
was not disclosed), which suggested that in addition to the existing water pump, a submersible pump be
installed to increase the pressure and improve the flow of water to the hotel. Accordingly, Juan
Montelibano, Jr., manager of the Marmont Resort Hotel, sought permission from the Guiang spouses to
inspect the water pump which had been installed on the portion of the land previously occupied by the
spouses and to make the necessary additional installations thereon. No such permission, however, was
granted.

On 13 May 1980, petitioner Marmont filed a Complaint[2] against the Guiang spouses for damages
resulting from their refusal to allow representatives of petitioner and the second contractor firm entry
into the water facility site. The claimed damages were broken down as follows: (a) P10,000.00
representing the amount advanced in payment to the second contractor; (b) P40,000.00 representing
the total project cost of the installation made by Maris Trading; (c) P50,000.00 representing additional
expenses incurred and incidental losses resulting from failure of the original pump to cope with the
water requirements of the Marmont Resort Hotel; and (d) P10,000.00 for attorney's fees.

In their Answer,[3] the Guiang spouses (defendants below) denied having had any previous knowledge
of the first Memorandum of Agreement and asserted that the second Memorandum of Agreement was
invalid for not having been executed in accordance with law. The spouses added a counterclaim for
damages in the amount of P200,000.00.

On 2 October 1980, at the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts
and issues embodied in a Pre-Trial Order:[4]

"III

In addition to the admission made elsewhere in their respective pleadings, the parties entered into the
following stipulation of facts:
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office
at Montelibano Street, Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City;
2.
3.
4. The contract referred to in paragraph 2 of the complaint between the plaintiff and Maris Trading
is contained in a document captioned Memorandum Agreement executed on May 2, 1975, a
xerox copy of which is Annex 'A' of plaintiff's complaint;
5.
6.
7. On October 7, 1975, the Maris Trading represented by Ceferino Cabral and defendant Aurora
Guiang entered into a memorandum agreement;
8.
9.
 10. The portion sold under Annex 'A' is still a part of the public domain.
IV

The plaintiff marked the following exhibits in evidence:

Exhibit 'A' Memorandum Agreement dated May 2, 1975

Exhibit 'B' Memorandum Agreement dated October 7, 1975

The issues left to be ventilated during the trial are the following:
1. Whether defendants has actually prohibited the plaintiff [from] making repairs, [on] the pump
constructed by Maris Trading for the plaintiff under the agreement Exhibit 'A', if so;
2.
3.
4. Whether defendants [have] the right to prohibit the Maris Trading from performing the repairs;
and if not
5.
6.
7. Whether defendants are liable for damages under the human relations provision of the Civil
Code."
On 1 January 1980, the Guiang spouses moved to dismiss the Complaint.[5] The spouses there assailed
the validity of the second Memorandum of Agreement, alleging that the subject matter thereof involved
conjugal property alienated by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of her husband, Federico
Guiang. Further, it was alleged that the land upon which the hotel's water supply facility was installed --
and which the Guiang spouses occupied -- formed part of the public domain and was then still the
subject of a Miscellaneous Sales Application submitted by Federico Guiang. The Motion to Dismiss,
however, was denied by the trial court.

No evidence having been adduced by the Guiang spouses on their behalf, the case was submitted for
decision. On 31 May 1983, the trial court rendered a decision,[6] dismissing the complaint. The trial
court found that Aurora Guiang had validly alienated her rights over the disputed portion of land to
Maris Trading, but held that the evidence failed to show that Maris Trading, in turn, had transferred
such rights to petitioner Marmont.

Petitioner Marmont appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court and
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.[7] The appellate court, citing Section 55, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court, held that the first and second Memoranda of Agreement could not legally be considered
by the court as included in the body of evidence of the case, as neither document had been formally
offered in evidence by either party. It also held that, in any event, neither document showed that
Marmont had in fact acquired from Maris Trading whatever rights the latter had over the land in
dispute.

In the instant Petition for Review, petitioner assigns the following errors:[8]
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Memorandum of Agreement of May 2, 1975 and 7
October 1975 as the same were already admitted in the pre-trial order; and

2. The Court of Appeals erred in deciding that ownership belongs to Maris Trading hence, private
respondent Guiang can prohibit Marmont Resort from entering the land."

We find for the petitioner.

Both the trial and appellate courts held that the first and second Memoranda of Agreement are not
properly considered as forming part of the record of this case, because neither had been formally
presented and offered in evidence at the trial of Civil Case No. 2896-C. The record shows, however, as
noted earlier, that at the pre-trial conference held on 2 October 1980, both petitioner Marmont and
respondent spouses had agreed upon a stipulation of facts and issues recognizing the existence of those
same two (2) agreements. Such stipulation of facts constitutes a judicial admission, the veracity of which
requires no further proof and which may be controverted only upon a clear showing that such
stipulation had been entered into through "palpable mistake." On this point, Section 2, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 2. Judicial Admissions. -? Admission made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the
trial or other proceedings do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to
have been made through palpable mistake." (Italics supplied)

There has been no showing and respondent spouses do not claim that "palpable mistake" had
intervened here, in respect of the formulation of the facts stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial
conference. Absent any such showing, that stipulation of facts is incontrovertible,[9] and may be relied
upon by the courts.[10] Respondent spouses are estopped from raising as an issue in this case the
existence and admissibility in evidence of both the first and second Memoranda of Agreement which,
having been marked as exhibits during pre-trial, properly form part of the record of this case, even
though not formally offered in evidence after trial.[11]

We consider briefly respondent spouses' argument that the second Memorandum of Agreement was
invalid for having been executed by Aurora Guiang without the marital consent of Federico, contrary to
Articles 165 and 172 of the Civil Code.

Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil law, that the wife may not validly bind the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband, who is legally the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. In this particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second Memorandum of
Agreement, although ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also signed
by her husband Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto. This circumstance indicates not only that
Federico was present during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact, given his
consent to the execution thereof by his wife Aurora. Otherwise, he should not have appended his
signature to the document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the second
Memorandum of Agreement as their effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in the
document itself.
That the land in dispute was, at the time of execution of the second Memorandum of Agreement, public
land, is of no consequence here. Pending approval of Federico's Miscellaneous Sales Application over
said land, respondent spouses enjoyed possessory and other rights over the same which could validly be
assigned or transferred in favor of third persons. In this case, respondent spouses chose to transfer such
rights (over the portion upon which the water pump was installed) to Maris Trading, as evidenced by the
fourth paragraph of the second Memorandum of Agreement, quoted earlier. Furthermore, assuming
(though only for the sake of argument) that the alienation to Maris Trading was legally objectionable,
respondent spouses are not the proper parties to raise the issue of invalidity, they and Maris Trading
being in pari delicto. Only the government may raise that issue.

Finally, respondent spouses allege that dismissal of the complaint by the trial court was not improper as
petitioner Marmont was not privy to the second Memorandum of Agreement, and that accordingly,
petitioner had no valid cause of action against respondents.

A closer scrutiny of the second and third paragraphs of the second Memorandum of Agreement
discloses that the first Memorandum of Agreement, including the obligations imposed thereunder upon
Maris Trading, had been acknowledged therein:
"That the First Party (i.e., Maris Trading) has dug, drilled and tapped water source for Marmont Resort,
located at Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City in accordance with their agreement executed on May 2, 1975 and
notarized before Isagani M. Jungco, Notary Public and entered as Doc. No. 166; Page No. 135; Book No.
XV; Series of 1975.

That the First Party has erected, built and drilled for the water source of Marmont Resort on the land
owned by the Second Party[respondent spouses] at the corner of J. Montelibano Street and Maquinaya
Drive (Provincial Road) with the latter's permission; x x x"(Italics supplied)

The above paragraphs establish, among other things, that construction work had been performed by
Maris Trading on the land occupied by respondent spouses; that such construction work had been
performed in accordance with terms and conditions stipulated in the first Memorandum of Agreement
and that the purpose of the work was to build a water supply facility for petitioner Marmont. The same
excerpts also show that the work so performed was with the knowledge and consent of the Guiang
spouses, who were then occupying the land.

It is clear from the foregoing stipulations that petitioner Marmont was to benefit from the second
Memorandum of Agreement. In fact, said stipulations appear to have been designed precisely to benefit
petitioner and, thus, partake of the nature of stipulations pour autrui,contemplated in Article 1311 of
the Civil Code.

A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in favor of a third person conferring a clear and deliberate favor
upon him, which stipulation is found in a contract entered into by parties neither of whom acted as
agent of the beneficiary.[12] We believe and so hold that the purpose and intent of the stipulating
parties (Maris Trading and respondent spouses) to benefit the third person (petitioner Marmont) is
sufficiently clear in the second Memorandum of Agreement. Marmont was not of course a party to that
second Agreement but, as correctly pointed out by the trial court and the appellate court, the
respondent spouses could not have prevented Maris Trading from entering the property possessory
rights over which had thus been acquired by Maris Trading. That respondent spouses remained in
physical possession of that particular bit of land, is of no moment; they did so simply upon the
sufferance of Maris Trading. Had Maris Trading, and not the respondent spouses, been in physical
possession, we believe that Marmont would have been similarly entitled to compel Maris Trading to
give it (Marmont) access to the site involved. The two (2) courts below failed to take adequate account
of the fact that the sole purpose of Maris Trading in acquiring possessory rights over that specific
portion of the land where well and pump and piping had been installed, was to supply the water
requirements of petitioner's hotel. That said purpose was known by respondent spouses, is made
explicit by the second Memorandum of Agreement. Maris Trading itself had no need for a water supply
facility; neither did the respondent spouses. The water facility was intended solely for Marmont Resort
Hotel. The interest of Marmont cannot therefore be regarded as merely "incidental."[13]Finally, even if
it be assumed (for purposes of argument merely) that the second Memorandum of Agreement did not
constitute a stipulation pour autrui, still respondent spouses, in the circumstances of this case, must be
regarded as having acted contrary to the principles of honesty, good faith and fair dealing embodied in
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code when they refused petitioner Marmont access to the water facility to
inspect and repair the same and to increase its capacity and thereby to benefit from it. In so doing,
respondent spouses forced petitioner Marmont to locate an alternative source of water for its hotel
which of course involved expenditure of money and perhaps loss of hotel revenues. We believe they
should respond in damages.

The evidence on record, however, appears insufficient for determination of the amount of damages for
which respondent spouses should be liable. For this reason, the Court is compelled to remand this case
to the trial court for determination of such damages in appropriate further proceedings.

ACAIN vs. IAC

October 27, 1987

FACTS:

Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided
that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father
of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo
pre-deceased Nemesio.

The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa
filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;

(2) he is merely a universal heir and

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.

ISSUE:

Was there preterition?

HELD:

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as
she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.

The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the
testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator
and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted
child.

Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession
the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises
made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such
institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.
 In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the
appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary
disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. At
the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having resulted
from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in
effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by
the deceased.

BRIONES VS MIGUEL, 440 SCRA 455FACTS:

On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition forHabeas Corpus against respondents
Maricel Pineda Miguel and FranciscaPineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimateson with respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. The petitioner prays that the custodyof his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him
as his biological father and[as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the custody andparental care of his own child in
the absence of the mother who isaway.
HELD:
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the motherof and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled tohave custody of him.

She has the right to keep him in her company.

She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounceor transfer it "except in the cases
authorized by law.
Not to be
ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally,no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from themother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise

TAMARGO VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM

G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992 [Parental Authority]

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's
natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.

In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in
November 1982.

Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was
decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial
court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

RULING:

No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still
lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural
parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to
the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time
when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be
essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

QUIAO V. QUIAO
G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor
children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after
more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision
under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal
separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolutionof conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal
partnership NO.
3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default
rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husbandand wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the properties of the ConjugalPartnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the
husbandand wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and
such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that
the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugalproperties be awarded to her. In fact, in
his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and
inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code)
form the common mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And
since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to
the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugalpartnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.

Share

FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor
children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period. After more than nine
months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.

RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code)
form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And
since the legal separation decision states that the share of Brigido in the net profits shall be awarded
to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article
142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.