GR No.

47101 April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, applicant-appellant,
v.
LUGO MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-appealed.
D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Panganiban and Mrs. Sotera N. Megia in
representation of the appellant.
Mrs. Luida Mangonon of Buccat in her own representation.
HORRILLENO, J .:
This matter has been raised to this Superiority by the Court of First Instance of
Baguio, since it only raises a purely legal question.
On March 20, 1939, the plaintiff initiated the present case, in which the defendant
did not appear, despite having been duly summoned. As a result, since the plaintiff
was allowed to present his evidence, the lower court ruled in favor of the
defendant. Hence this appeal.
The applicant seeks the annulment of his marriage to the defendant Luida
Mangonon de Buccat on November 26, 1938, in the City of Baguio, on the grounds
that, by consenting to that marriage, he did so because the defendant had assured
her that she was Virgin.
From the decision of the lower court, the following facts emerge:
The complainant met the defendant in March 1938. After several interviews, both
were committed on September 19 of the same year. On November 26 of the same
year, the plaintiff married the defendant in the Catholic cathedral of the City of
Baguio. Desoues to live together for a period of eighty-nine days, the defendant
gave birth to a nine-month-old boy, on February 23, 1939. As a result of this event,
the plaintiff abandoned the defendant and did not return to marital life with she.
We see no reason to revoke the judgment appealed. In fact, the plaintiff's and
appellant's allegation that the defendant and appellant had not even suspected the
defendant's pregnant condition was improbable, which is, as has been proved, in
very advanced pregnancy. So there is no place to estimate the fraud of which the
appellant speaks. The allegation that it is not uncommon to find people with a
developed abdomen seems childish to deserve our consideration, especially since
the plaintiff was a first-year student of law.
Marriage is a sacratistical institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To
clear it, clear and reliable evidence is needed. There is no such evidence in this case.
Finding the appellate judgment adjusted to law, must be confirmed, as we hereby
confirm, in all its parts, with the costs to the appellant. That is how it is commanded.
Avancea, Pres., Imperial, Diaz and Laurel, MM., Are satisfied.
 G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for
annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.

The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the
ground of fraud, it being alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita
Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner
Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that
she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed
that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.

At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to
prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant
neither appeared nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her
counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.

On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate was presented to
show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the
parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does
not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint.
Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff
tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the
defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to
secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The
petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable
neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her
birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for
reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible
for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement
so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that
he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married
her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be
reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to
the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes
thereof the following documents:

1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's

brother, with whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and
married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more children, aside from
her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of
defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her
pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by

Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to
the time of their marriage;

3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and
defendant lived together as husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date
of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;

4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date
of birth to be April 26, 1955;

5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant
with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar
Aquino and defendant; and

7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late

as November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show defendant's
pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the time the picture
was taken.

Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita
Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the
Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the
prayer for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and
the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity
of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6,
1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this
Court thru the present petition for certiorari.

After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint cannot be sustained.

Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud
and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par.
(3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be
reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant
was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an
advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife
was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage
to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part
of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of
the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness
of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If,
as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected
to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their
marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of
affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows
and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis
of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of
Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).

The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant
to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child
could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no
support or justification in the record.

Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken
together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient
to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not
have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file
her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of
collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the
Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents
of the motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing
evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new
trial were ordered.

Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the
court a quo for new trial. Without costs.
 G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.

Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.

Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein
as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O.
Palaroan, defendant."

The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora
and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that defendant
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action
was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that
judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of
Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was
being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that
several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-
marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage,
which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank
disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from
going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in
obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil
Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the
complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he
averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped
from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December
1953; that he denied having committed any fraud against her. He set up the
defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil Case
No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that
had been granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the
suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its
dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."

Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:

(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and
pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but
because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could
evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her family
were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);

(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and
not because he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to
perform the marital duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore,
he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;

(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely
concretized for him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members
of the family of the first girl (referent being the close relative) and to convince them
of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship with a third girl with
whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had several children during the
whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between
them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)

Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial
on 26 August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the
expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally
insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs. Yambao,
102 Phil. 168, holding:

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless,
the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal
separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of
our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record.

the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be
dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but
the court found it inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966,
for the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied reconsideration.

The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his
pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.

We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in
marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of
the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;

This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species
of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:

ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;

(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime

involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years
or more;

(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall

constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.

The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as
ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced
from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the
only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void
and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have
stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as
a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically
dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds
by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure
of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that
Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction:
"No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not

one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to
the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society,
and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's
duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-
divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her
husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise,
alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention
of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind
not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in
ignoring these allegations in her reply.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and
absence of intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and
additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of
allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint
..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were, therefore, improperly
alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend
or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil.
445), there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional
cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could
become interminable.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret
intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been
discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment
based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage.
Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was
only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and

Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.