Luz Farms v.

Secretary of DAR
G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990

Facts: On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the

Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage.
Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry
business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of
sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that
the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law
provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in
livestock and poultry business.
Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with
crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not
the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it
should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers agricultural
lands.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of RA 6657 is unconstitutional for
including in its definition of Agriculture the livestock and poultyr industry?
Ruling: The Court held YES.
Looking into the transcript of the Constitutional Commission on the meaning
of the word agriculture, it showed that the framers never intended to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated
agrarian reform program of the government.
Further, Commissioner Tadeo pointed out that the reasin why they used the
term farmworkers rather than agricultural workers in the said law is
because agricultural workers includes the livestock and poultry industry,
hence, since they do not intend to include the latter, they used farmworkers
to have distinction.
Hence, there is merit on the petitioners argument that the product-sharing
plan applied to corporate farms in the contested provisions is unreasonable
for being consficatory and violative of the due process of law.
 Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board
215 SCRA 86 (1992)

Facts: On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No.

467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of
land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project
titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its
faculty members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will
assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension of
technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid
the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided
that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP.
In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400
hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to
coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the
condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively
used" for educational purposes.
Issue: Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands
reserved for public use by presidential proclamation is no longer actually,
directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are
reserved?
Held: The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve
and answer the question of when and what lands are found necessary for its
use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on
the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision
stating that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited
and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program
with its present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very
significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.
 Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform 225 SCRA
278 (1993)
Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
225 SCRA 278 (1993)

Facts:Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. is the owner of a 125.0078-ha land set

aside by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 (1979) as townsite area for the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Estate Developers and Investors Corporation
(EDIC), the developer of the area, was granted preliminary approval and
locational clearances by the then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) for the establishment of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision therein. In
November 1990, a Notice of Coverage was issued by DAR on the undeveloped
portion of the landholding. The developer filed its objections and filed this case
imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including the
undeveloped portions of its landholding within the coverage of CARP.
Issue: Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial
use, and approved by HLURB and its precursor agencies prior to 15 June 1988,
covered by RA 6657?
Held: Sec. 4 of RA 6657 states that the CARL covers "regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private and agricultural
lands" and as per the transcripts of the Constitutional Commission,
"agricultural lands" covered by agrarian reform refers only to those which are
"arable and suitable lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands." The land subject of the controversy has been set aside for
the Lungsod Silangan Reservation by Proclamation No. 1637 prior to the
effectivity of RA 6657 and in effect converted these lands into residential use.
Since the Natalia lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, DAR is bound
by such conversion, and thus it was an error to include these within the
coverage of CARL.
 ROXAS VS. CA
G.R. No. 118436
March 21, 1997

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the CA decision dated December 8,

1994 alleging reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when
it affirmed the decision of the RTC of Cavite.
On July 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and
Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for
Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay City. In
support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as
vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza
in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein (because she
was substituted by her heirs in the proceedings upon her death), Trinidad de
Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) on the basis of Maguesun Corporations application for registration
enumerating adjoining owners, occupants or adverse claimants; Since
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named therein, she was not sent a
notice of the proceedings. After an Order of general default was issued, the
trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. Eventually, on
February 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporations application for
registration.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the
land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the
registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporations name.
Hence, on April 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to
set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties
she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas and that
her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty
years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land
titling (in which no decision has been rendered thereon). Petitioner further
denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met
before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. She also claimed that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining
owner in the application for registration submitted to the LRA such that the
latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing.
A document examiner from the PNP concluded that there was no forgery. Upon
petitioners motion, the signatures were re-examined by another expert from
NBI. The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample
documents were, however, not written by the same person.
Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court
dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration. Placing greater
weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it
concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it
was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible.
Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud.
In a decision dated December 8, 1994, respondent court denied the petition
for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The CA held that
petitioner failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud,
not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of
annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration.
Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the CA erred in
ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud warranting the
setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis
of Maguesun Corporations good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of
the subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said
property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent
corporation pay for damages.
ISSUE: WON private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud (signature forgery) in obtaining a decree of registration over the two
parcels of land, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a
decree of registration.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of
the CA is hereby REVERSED AND SET AS
1. The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed
actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by
petitioner. A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the
irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar.
Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporations direct
participation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there
are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the
innocent purchaser for value who merits the protection of the law. Even to
a laymans eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit
of the signatures, reveal forgery. Additionally, Zenaida Mellizas non-
appearance raises doubt as to her existence
Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of
which are leased out as restaurants. This is an indication that petitioner is not
unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely that indication
that she would sell over 13,000 sqm of prime property in Tagaytay City to a
stranger for a measly P200,000.00. Would an ordinary person sell more than
13,000 sqm of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased
for P200,000.00?
3. Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim
to or as an occupant of the subject property.
The names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the
owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3
and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown
on the plan (original application submitted in LRC No) as claimants are as
follows:
Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road

all at Tagaytay City (no house No.) 30

The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first
five letters of the word provincial typed over correction fluid. Maguesun
Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded application for the
petition to review case. In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to
the same number is as follows:

Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas.

The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word Roxas
were indeed erased and replaced with Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City
(no house No.) in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 BUT
the copy with the word Roxas was submitted to the trial court, it is
reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that
Roxas was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner,
encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the
basis for the LRA Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. (Section
15 of PD No. 1529 actually requires the applicant for registration to state the
full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining
owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the search made to find
them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with this requirement
of law.)
Respondent corporations intentional concealment and representation of
petitioners interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant
constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of
registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant
of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus effectively
depriving them of their day in court
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property
uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun
Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject
land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker
resided in the subject property.
To conclude, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its
possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza
conveyed not title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation
as she was not the owner thereof. Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled
to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision.
Petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open,
uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner
over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She
therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the
two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of PD No. 1529.
 DAR represented by Secretary Jose Mari Ponce vs. Delia Sutton, et.
al.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
Facts: Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel of land in Masbate devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the agrarian reform program
at the time, they made a voluntary offer to sell their holding to DAR to avail
of the incentives in 1987.
In 1988, a new law, CARL, took effect, which included farms used for raising
livestock under its coverage. In light of the Luz Farms ruling, the Suttons filed
a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their land was outside the coverage
of CARL. The DAR ignored their request.
In 1993 the DAR issued AO 9-1993, which provides that only lands used for
raising livestock, poultry and swine are outside the coverage of CARL. And in
1995, the DAR ordered a part of the Suttons landholdings to be segregated
and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of the assailed AO
HELD: Unconstitutional.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e.,the
power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress
with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law
entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity
in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public
functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force
and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review They may be
properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the
Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by
the administrative body concerned.
To be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority
of a law andmust not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. Nor can it
be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope
intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what
rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the
scope of their regulations.
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of
the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified
as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform.
Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to
address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have
been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their
coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with
the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents
family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in
the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the
cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this
fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the
enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents
intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL
prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes
after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business
interest in the case of respondents.
 People vs. Adillo
Facts: The defendant-appellee Elias Adillo was a share-tenant of one
Saturnino L. Rebong on a parcel of riceland situated at Victoria, Laguna. On
January 4, 1962, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Laguna
for violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act. He allegedly did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously reap and thresh a portion
of palay planted on said piece of land without the knowledge and consent of
Saturnino Rebong and even before a date has been fixed for the reaping and
threshing of the palay, to the damage and prejudice of Saturnino Rebong. On
August 24, 1964, the counsel for the defendant-appellee1 moved for the
quashal of the information on the submission that the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, on which the accusatory pleading against defendant-appellee was based,
has been repealed or abrogated by the new Agricultural Land Reform Code,
thereby resulting in the extinction of defendant-appellee's criminal
responsibility for pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the former law. The
lower court favorably resolved the motion and ordered the dismissal of the
case.
Issue: Whether or not the penal liability of a share-tenant for pre-reaping or
pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199,
enacted on August 30, 1954) has been obliterated by the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) and the
subsequent agrarian laws.
Held: Yes. It will be noted that Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of
1954 (Republic Act No. 1199) which prohibited either the tenant or landholder,
without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time
previous to the date set for its threshing and penalized any violation thereof
by either party is no longer found in the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389) for the obvious
reason that agricultural share tenancy provided in the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 has already been abolished by the new Code. The omission of
such provision as Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 in the
new Code operates as an implied repeal of said provision. Agricultural share
tenancy was declared "to be contrary to public policy and shall be abolished.
The injunction against pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of 1954 has lost its operative force and effect, and the penal
sanction therein subdued. Specifically, Section 39 of the Act, upon which the
accusatory pleading against defendant-appellee is predicted, is no longer
carried in the subsequent agrarian laws and decrees and its violation thereof
considered no longer an offense. As a result, it would be illogical to prosecute
or sentence defendant-appellee for such offense which no longer exists.
Ruling: The order of dismissal of the information against defendant-appellee
(Adillo) for violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic
Act No. 1199) is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to costs.
 Gabriel v. Pangilinan
Facts: Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner
of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract
of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was
notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was extended
for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial
court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian
Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between
the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The
defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally leased to him
by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted,
subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a
fishpond and that which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense,
which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue
leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally.
Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which
Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing
dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill and
incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps
her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to
the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the fishpond, defendants
other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all
residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.
Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold
tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section
35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of
the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No.
1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished
(Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code.
No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as
defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide this case.
Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant
as that of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199
as amended.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature
pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD: Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law
lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation,
the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate
the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate
or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy
is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for
any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special
laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to
exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members
of his immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in
money or in produce or in both
There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically
mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The
mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make
him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199.
He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above
enumerated are complied with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it wasnt raised.
For the third requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he
ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and
incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm
household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and
such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent
upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise
are included in the term "immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate
family to work the land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must
himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate
the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be
considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned
the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No.
1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the
relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence,
this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs
against the appellants.