PEDRO SERRANO LAKTAW, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
MAMERTO PAGLINAWAN, defendant-
appellee.
Perfecto Gabriel for appellant.
Felix Ferrer and Crossfield and O'Brien for
appellee.
ARAULLO, J.:
In the complaint presented in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila on February 20,
1915, it was alleged: (1) That the plaintiff was,
according to the laws regulating literary
properties, the registered owner and author of a
literary work entitled Diccionario Hispano-
Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary) published
in the City of Manila in 1889 by the printing
establishment La Opinion, and a copy of which
was attached to the complaint, as Exhibit A; (2)
that the defendant, without the consent of the
plaintiff, reproduced said literary work,
improperly copied the greater part thereof in the
work published by him and
entitled Diccionariong Kastila-Tagalog (Spanish-
Tagalog Dictionary), a copy of which was also
attached to the complaint as Exhibit B; (3) that
said act of the defendant, which is a violation of
article 7 of the Law of January 10, 1879, on
Intellectual Property, caused irreparable injuries
to the plaintiff, who was surprised when, on
publishing his new work entitled Diccionario
Tagalog-Hispano (Tagalog-Spanish Dictionary)
he learned of the fact, and (4) that the damages
occasioned to the plaintiff by the publication of
defendant's work amounted to $10,000. The
plaintiff therefore prayed the court to order the
defendant to withdraw from sale all stock of the
work herein identified as Exhibit B and to pay
the plaintiff the sum of $10,000, with costs.
The defendant in his answer denied generally
each and every allegation of the complaint and
prayed the court to absolve him from the
complaint. After trial and the introduction of
evidence by both parties, the court on August
20, 1915, rendered judgment, absolving the
defendant from the complaint, but without
making any special pronouncement as to costs.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial on the ground
that the judgment was against the law and the
weight of the evidence. Said motion having been
overruled, plaintiff excepted to the order
overruling it, and appealed the case to the
Supreme Court upon a bill of exceptions.
The ground of the decision appealed from is that
a comparison of the plaintiff's dictionary with that
of the defendant does not show that the latter is
an improper copy of the former, which has been
published and offered for sale by the plaintiff for
about twenty-five years or more. For this reason
the court held that the plaintiff had no right of
action and that the remedy sought by him could
not be granted.
The appellant contends that court below erred in
not declaring that the defendant had reproduced
the plaintiff's work and that the defendant had
violated article 7 of the Law of January 10, 1879,
on Intellectual Property.
Said article provides:
Nobody may reproduce another
person's work without the owner's
consent, even merely to annotate or add
anything to it, or improve any edition
thereof.
Therefore, in order that said article may be
violated, it is not necessary, as the court below
seems to have understood, that a work should
be an improper copy of another work previously
published. It is enough that another's work has
been reproduced without the consent of the
owner, even though it be only to annotate, add
something to it, or improve any edition thereof.
Upon making a careful and minute comparison
of Exhibit A, the dictionary written and published
by the plaintiff, and Exhibit B, written and
published by the defendant, and, taking into
account the memorandum (fols. 55 to 59)
presented by the defendant, in which he
enumerates the words and terms which,
according to him, are in his dictionary but not in
that of that of the plaintiff, and viceversa, and the
equivalents or definitions given by the plaintiff,
as well as the new Tagalog words which are in
the dictionary of the defendant but not in that of
the plaintiff; and considering the notes, Exhibit
C, first series, presented by the plaintiff, in which
the terms copied by the defendant from the
plaintiff's dictionary are enumerated in detail and
in relation to each letter of the alphabet and
which the plaintiff's own words and terms are set
forth, with a summary, at the foot of each group
of letters, which shows the number of initial
"Q" 84 11
Spanish words contained in the defendant's
dictionary, the words that are his own and the "R" 847 140
fact that the remaining ones are truly copied
from the plaintiff's dictionary considering all of "S" 746 118
these facts, we come to a conclusion completely
different and contrary to that of the trial court, for "T" 591 147
said evidence clearly shows:
"U" 107 15
1. That, of the Spanish words in the defendant's
dictionary, Exhibit B, which correspond to each "V" 342 96
letter of the alphabet, those that are enumerated
below have been copied and reproduced from "X" 6 6
the plaintiff's dictionary, with the exception of
those that are stated to be defendant's own. "Y" 24 4

"Z" 73 17
Letter Words Defendant's
own ______ _____

"A" 1,184 231 23,560 3,108

"B" 364 28
Therefore, of the 23,560 Spanish words in the
"C" 660 261 defendant's dictionary, after deducting 17 words
corresponding to the letters K and X (for the
"CH" 76 10 plaintiff has no words corresponding to them),
only 3,108 words are the defendant's own, or,
"D" 874 231 what is the same thing, the defendant has added
only this number of words to those that are in
"E" 880 301 the plaintiff's dictionary, he having reproduced or
copied the remaining 20,452 words.
"F" 383 152
2. That the defendant also literally reproduced
"G" 302 111 and copied for the Spanish words in his
dictionary, the equivalents, definitions and
"H" 57 64 different meanings in Tagalog, given in plaintiff's
dictionary, having reproduced, as to some
"I" 814 328
words, everything that appears in the plaintiff's
dictionary for similar Spanish words, although as
"J" 113 25
to some he made some additions of his own.
"K" 11 11 Said copies and reproductions are numerous as
may be seen, by comparing both dictionaries
"L" 502 94 and using as a guide or index the defendant's
memorandum and notes, first series, Exhibit C,
"LL" 36 2 in which, as to each word, the similarities and
differences between them are set forth in detail.
"M" 994 225
3. That the printer's errors in the plaintiff's
"N" 259 53 dictionary as to the expression of some words in
Spanish as well as their equivalents in Tagalog
"" 6 2 are also reproduced, a fact which shows that the
defendant, in preparing his dictionary, literally
"O" 317 67 copied those Spanish words and their meanings
and equivalents in Tagalog from the plaintiff's
"P" 803 358
dictionary.
The trial court has chosen at random, as is
stated in the judgment appealed from, some
words from said dictionaries in making the
comparison on which its conclusion is based,
and consequently the conclusion reached by it
must be inaccurate and not well founded,
because said comparison was not complete.
In said judgment some words of the defendant's
dictionary are transcribed, the equivalents and
meanings of which in Tagalog are exactly the
same as those that are given in the plaintiff's
dictionary, with the exception, as to some of
them, of only one acceptation, which is the
defendant's own production. And with respect to
the examples used by the defendant in his
dictionary, which, according to the judgment, are
not copied from the plaintiff's the judgment
referring to the preposition a (to), in
Tagalog sa it must be noted that the
defendant, in giving in his dictionary an example
of said preposition, uses the expression
"voy a Tayabas" (I am going to Tayabas) instead
of "voy aBulacan" (I am going to Bulacan), as
the plaintiff does in his dictionary, or what is the
same thing, that one speaks of Bulacan while
the other speaks of Tayabas. This does not
show that there was no reproduction or copying
by the defendant of the plaintiffs work, but just
the opposite, for he who intends to imitate the
work of another, tries to make it appear in some
manner that there is some difference between
the original and the imitation; and in the example
referred to, with respect to the preposition a (to),
that dissimilarity as to the province designated
seems to effect the same purpose.
In the judgment appealed from, the court gives
one to understand that the reproduction of
another's dictionary without the owner's consent
does not constitute a violation of the Law of
Intellectual Property for the court's idea of a
dictionary is stated in the decision itself, as
follows:
Dictionaries have to be made with the
aid of others, and they are improved by
the increase of words. What may be
said of a pasture ground may be said
also of a dictionary, i. e., that it should
be common property for all who may
desire to write a new dictionary, and the
defendant has come to this pasture
ground and taken whatever he needed
from it in the exercise of a perfect right.
Such idea is very erroneous, especially in
relation to the Law of Intellectual Property.
Danvilla y Collado the author of the Law of
January 10, 1879, on Intellectual Property,
which was discussed and approved in the
Spanish Cortes, in his work entitled La
Propiedad Intelectual (page 362, 1st ed.) states
with respect to dictionaries and in relation to
article 7 of said law:
The protection of the law cannot be
denied to the author of a dictionary, for
although words are not the property of
anybody, their definitions, the example
that explain their sense, and the manner
of expressing their different meanings,
may constitute a special work. On this
point, the correctional court of the Seine
held, on August 16, 1864, that a
dictionary constitutes property, although
some of the words therein are explained
by mere definitions expressed in a few
lines and sanctioned by usage, provided
that the greater part of the other words
contain new meanings; new meanings
which evidently may only belonged to
the first person who published them.
Therefore, the plaintiff, Pedro Serrano, cannot
be denied the legal protection which he seeks,
and which is based on the fact that the
dictionary published by him in 1889 is his
property said property right being recognized
and having been granted by article 7, in
connection with article 2, of said law and on
the further fact that said work was reproduced
by the defendant without his permission.
This law was published in the Gaceta de Madrid
on January 12, 1879. It took effect in these
Islands six months after its promulgation or
publication, as provided in article 56 thereof. The
body of rules for the execution of said law
having been approved by royal decree of
September 3, 1880, and published in the Gaceta
de Madrid on September 6, 1880 and extended
to the Philippine Islands by royal decree of May
5, 1887, it was in turn published in the Gaceta
de Manila, with the approval of the Governor-
General of the Islands, on June 15, 1887. Said
law of January 10, 1879, and the rules for its
application, were therefore in force in these
Islands when the plaintiff's dictionary was edited
and published in 1889.
It appears from the evidence that although the
plaintiff did not introduce at the trial the
certificate of registration of his property rights to
said work which, according to said rules, was
kept in the Central Government of these Islands,
and was issued to him in 1890, the same having
been lost during the revolution against Spain,
and no trace relative to the issuance of said
certificate being obtainable in the Division of
Archives of the Executive Bureau on account of
the loss of the corresponding records, yet as in
the first page of said dictionary the property right
of the plaintiff was reserved by means of the
words "Es propiedad del autor" (All rights
reserved), taken in connection with the
permission granted him by the Governor-
General on November 24, 1889, to print and
publish said dictionary, after an examination
thereof by the permanent committee of censors,
which examination was made, and the
necessary license granted to him, these facts
constitute sufficient proof, under the
circumstances of the case, as they have not
been overcome by any evidence on the part of
the defendant, showing that said plaintiff did not
comply with the requirements of article 36 of
said law, which was the prerequisite to the
enjoyment of the benefits thereof according to
the preceding articles, among which is article 7,
which is alleged in the complaint to have been
violated by the defendant.
Even considering that said Law of January 10,
1879, ceased to operate in these Islands, upon
the termination of Spanish sovereignty and the
substitution thereof by that of the United States
of America, the right of the plaintiff to invoke said
law in support of the action instituted by him in
the present case cannot be disputed. His
property right to the work Diccionario Hispano-
Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary),
published by him and edited in 1889, is
recognized and sanctioned by said law, and by
virtue thereof, he had acquired a right of which
he cannot be deprived merely because the law
is not in force now or is of no actual application.
This conclusion is necessary to protect
intellectual property rights vested after the
sovereignty of Spain was superseded by that of
the United States. It was so held superseded by
that of the United States. It was so held in the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, between
Spain and the United States, when it declared in
article 13 thereof that the rights to literary,
artistic, and industrial properties acquired by the
subject of Spain in the Island of Cuba and in
Puerto Rico and the Philippines and other ceded
territories, at the time of the exchange of the
ratification of said Treaty, shall continue to be
respect.
In addition to what has been said, according to
article 428 of the Civil Code, the author of a
literary, scientific, or artistic work, has the right to
exploit it and dispose thereof at will. In relation to
this right, there exists the exclusive right of the
author, who is the absolute owner of his own
work, to produce it, according to article 2 of the
Law of January 10, 1879, and consequently,
nobody may reproduce it, without his
permission, not even to annotate or add
something to it, or to improve any edition
thereof, according to article 7 of said law.
Manresa, in his commentaries on article 429 of
the Civil Code (vol. 3, p. 633, 3d ed.) says that
the concrete statement of the right to literary
properties is found in the legal doctrine
according to which nobody may reproduce
another person's work, without the consent of
his owner, or even to annotate or add something
to it or to improve any edition thereof. And on
page 616 of said volume, Manresa says the
following:
He who writes a book, or carves a
statue, or makes an invention, has the
absolute right to reproduce or sell it, just
as the owner of land has the absolute
right to sell it or its fruits. But while the
owner of land, by selling it and its fruits,
perhaps fully realizes all its economic
value, by receiving its benefits and
utilities, which are presented, for
example, by the price, on the other hand
the author of a book, statue or invention,
does not reap all the benefits and
advantages of his own property by
disposing of it, for the most important
form of realizing the economic
advantages of a book, statue or
invention, consists in the right to
reproduce it in similar or like copies,
everyone of which serves to give to the
person reproducing them all the
conditions which the original requires in
order to give the author the full
enjoyment thereof. If the author of a
book, after its publication, cannot
prevent its reproduction by any person
who may want to reproduce it, then the
property right granted him is reduced to
 a very insignificant thing and the effort Kastila-Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary), of
made in the production of the book is no which Exhibit B is a copy, and the suit instituted
way rewarded. by said plaintiff being proper, we reverse the
judgment appealed from and order the
Indeed the property right recognized and defendant to withdraw from sale, as prayed for
protected by the Law of January 10, 1879, on in the complaint, all stock of his work above-
Intellectual Property, would be illusory if, by mentioned, and to pay the costs of first instance.
reason of the fact that said law is no longer in We make no special pronouncement as to the
force as a consequence of the change of costs of this instance. So ordered.
sovereignty in these Islands, the author of a
work, who has the exclusive right to reproduce
it, could not prevent another person from so
doing without his consent, and could not enforce
this right through the courts of justice in order to
prosecute the violator of this legal provision and
the defrauder or usurper of his right, for he could
not obtain the full enjoyment of the book or other
work, and his property right thereto, which is
recognized by law, would be reduced, as
Manresa says, to an insignificant thing, if he
should have no more right than that of selling his
work.

The reproduction by the defendant without the

plaintiff's consent of the Diccionario Hispano-
Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary),
published and edited in the City of Manila in
1889, by the publication of the Diccionariong
Kastila-Tagalog (Spanish-Tagalog Dictionary),
published in the same city and edited in the
press El Progreso in 1913, as appears from
Exhibit B, which is attached to the complaint,
has caused the plaintiff, according to the latter,
damages in the sum of $10,000. It is true that it
cannot be denied that the reproduction of the
plaintiff's book by the defendant has caused
damages to the former, but the amount thereof
has not been determined at the trial, for the
statement of the plaintiff as to the proceeds he
would have realized if he had printed in 1913 the
number of copies of his work which he stated in
his declaration a fact which he did not do
because the defendant had reproduced it was
not corroborated in any way at the trial and is
based upon mere calculations made by the
plaintiff himself; for which reason no
pronouncement can be made in this decision as
to the indemnification for damages which the
plaintiff seeks to recover.

The plaintiff having prayed, not for a permanent

injunction against the defendant, as the plaintiff
himself in his brief erroneously states, but for a
judgment ordering the defendant to withdraw
from sale all stock of his workDiccionariong
Ching v. Salinas, Sr. (G.R. No. 161295)
RTC quashed the SW. Ps MR having been
denied; he filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
Jun8by Jai Cdn
The petition was dismissed.

Facts:
Issues:

P is the owner and general manager of Jeshicris

(1) Whether or not Ps certificate of copyright
Manufacturing Co., the maker and manufacturer
registration over said utility models are valid;
of a Utility Model, described as Leaf Spring Eye
and
Bushing for Automobile made up of plastic,
which was issued by the National Library (2) Whether or not Ps utility models can be
Certificates of Copyright Registration and considered literary and artistic works subject to
Deposit. copyright protection.

P requested the NBI for police/investigative Ruling:

assistance for the apprehension and prosecution
of illegal manufacturers, producers and/or (1) The petition has no merit. To discharge his

distributors of the works. After due investigation, burden, the applicant may present the certificate

the NBI filed applications for SWs against R of registration covering the work or, in its

alleging that the latter therein reproduced and absence, other evidence. A copyright certificate

distributed the said models penalized under R.A. provides prima facie evidence of originality

No. 8293. RTC granted the application and which is one element of copyright validity. It

issued SWs for the seizure of the aforecited constitutes prima facie evidence of both validity

articles. and ownership and the validity of the facts

stated in the certificate. The presumption of
R filed a motion to quash the search warrants validity to a certificate of copyright registration
averring that the works covered by the merely orders the burden of proof. The applicant
certificates issued by the National Library are should not ordinarily be forced, in the first
not artistic in nature; they are considered instance, to prove all the multiple facts that
automotive spare parts and pertain to underline the validity of the copyright unless the
technology. They aver that the models are not respondent, effectively challenging them, shifts
original, and as such are the proper subject of a the burden of doing so to the applicant.
patent, not copyright.
A certificate of registration creates no rebuttable
presumption of copyright validity where other
evidence in the record casts doubt on the
question. In such a case, validity will not be
presumed. No copyright granted by law can be
said to arise in favor of the petitioner despite the
issuance of the certificates of
registration and the deposit of the Leaf Spring
Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion.
(2) We agree with the contention
petitioner (citing Section 171.10 of R.A. No.
8293), that the authors intellectual creation,
regardless of whether it is a creation with
utilitarian functions or incorporated in a useful
article produced on an industrial scale, is
protected by copyright law. However, the law
refers to a work of applied art which is an
artistic creation. It bears stressing that there is
no copyright protection for works of applied art
or industrial design which have aesthetic or
artistic features that cannot be
separately from the utilitarian aspects of the
article. Functional components of useful articles,
no matter how artistically designed, have
generally been denied copyright protection
unless they are separable from the useful article.
structural design of the components they seek to
replace, the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and
Vehicle Bearing Cushion are not ornamental.
They lack the decorative quality or value that
must characterize authentic works of applied art.
They are not even artistic creations with
copyright incidental utilitarian functions or works
incorporated in a useful article. In actuality, the
personal properties described in the search
warrants are mechanical works, the principal
of the
function of which is utility sans any aesthetic
embellishment.
In this case, the bushing and cushion are not
works of art. They are, as the petitioner himself
admitted, utility models which may be the
subject of a patent.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the CA are AFFIRMED.
identified

In this case, the petitioners models are not

works of applied art, nor artistic works. They are
utility models, useful articles, albeit with no
artistic design or value. Being plain automotive
spare parts that must conform to the original

Manly Sportswear Manufacturing, Inc vs.
Dadodette Enterprise
G.R. No. 165306
September 20, 2005
FACTS:
On March 17, 2003, RTC- Quezon
City, Branch 83 issued a search warrant against
Dadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports
Center after finding reasonable grounds that
respondents violated Sections 172 and 217 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8293. Respondents then
moved to quash and annul the search warrant
claiming that the sporting goods manufactured
by and/or registered in the name MANLY are
ordinary hence, not among the classes
protected under Sec. 172 of RA 8293.
On June 10, 2003 the trial court granted
the motion to quash and declared the search
warrant issued as null and void. MANLY filed a
motion for reconsideration on August 11, 2003,
but was later on denied for lack of merit.
After denial of the motion
reconsideration, MANLY filed a petition for
review of certiorari in the Court of Appeals but
was later on denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the copyrighted products of
MANLY are original creations subject to the
protection of RA 8293.
RULING:
No. The copyright certificates issued
in favor of MANLY constitute a prima facie
evidence of validity and ownership. However,
presumption of validity is not created when a
sufficient proof or evidence exist that may cast a
doubt on the copyright validity. In the case at
bar, validity and originality will not be presumed
since the copyrighted products of MANLY are
not original creations considering that these
products are readily available in the market
under various brands. Moreover, no copyright
accrues in favor of MANLY despite the issuance
of the copyright certificate this purely serves as
a notice of recording and registration of the work
and is not a conclusive proof of copyright
ownership as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 7 of the
Copyrights Safeguards and Regulations
Francisco Joaquin, Jr. vs Franklin Drilon
for
302 SCRA 225 Mercantile Law Intellectual
Property Law on Copyright Game Show
Ideas and Concepts Not Covered by Copyright
Presentation of the Master Tape
BJ Productions Inc. (BJPI) was the holder of
copyright over the show Rhoda and Me. It holds
rights over the shows format and style of
presentation. In 1991, BJPIs president
Francisco Joaquin saw on TV RPN 9s
show Its a Date, a show which is basically the
same as Rhoda and Me. He eventually sued
Gabriel Zosa, the manager of the show Its a
Date. The investigating prosecutor found
probable cause against Zosa. Zosa later sought
a review of the prosecutors resolution before
the Secretary of Justice (Franklin Drilon). Drilon
reversed the findings of the fiscal and directed
him to dismiss the case against Zosa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of Drilon
finding no probable cause is valid.
HELD: Yes. The essence of copyright
infringement is the copying, in whole or in part,
of copyrightable materials as defined and
enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No. 49
(Copyright Law). Apart from the manner in which
it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a
dating game show is a non-copyrightable
material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or
schemes in their abstract form clearly do not
fall within the class of works or materials
susceptible of copyright registration as
provided in PD. No. 49. What is covered by
BJPIs copyright is the specific episodes of the
show Rhoda and Me.
Further, BJPI should have presented the master
videotape of the show in order to show the
linkage between the copyright show (Rhoda
and Me) and the infringing show (Its a Date).
This is based on the ruling in 20th Century Fox
vs CA (though this has been qualified by
Columbia Pictures vs CA, this is still good law).
Though BJPI did provide a lot of written
evidence and description to show the linkage
between the shows, the same were not enough.
A television show includes more than mere
words can describe because it involves a whole
spectrum of visuals and effects, video and
audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may
be found by merely describing the general
copyright/format of both dating game shows.
I. SHORT TITLE : Pearl & Dean, Inc v.
Shoemart
II. FULL TITLE: Pearl & Dean (Phil.),
Inc. versus Shoemart,
Inc. and North EDSA
Marketing, Inc. 409
SCRA 231, August 15,
2003, Third Division, , J.
Corona
III. TOPIC : IPL Copyright,
Excluded Works
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Pearl and Dean (Phil.), Inc. (P&D) is a
corporation engaged in the manufacture of
advertising display units referred to as light
boxes. P&D was able to secure a Certificate of
Copyright Registration over these illuminated
display units. Sometime in 1985, P&D
negotiated with Shoemart, Inc. (SMI) for the
lease and installation of the light boxes in SM
Makati and SM Cubao; only the contract for SM
Makati was returned signed. Subsequently, P&D
wrote SMI inquiring about the other
contract. SMI did not bother to reply; instead,
SMIs house counsel informed P&D that it was
rescinding the contract for SM Makati due to
non-performance of the terms thereof. Two
years later, Metro Industrial Services, the
company formerly contracted by P&D to
fabricate its display units, offered to construct
light boxes for Shoemarts chain of stores. SMI
approved the proposal and light boxes were
subsequently fabricated. After its contract with
Metro Industrial was terminated, SMI engaged
the services of EYD Rainbow Advertising
Corporation to make the light boxes.
P&D, received reports that exact copies of its
light boxes were installed at certain SM
branches. Upon investigation, P&D found out
that aside from the reported SM branches, light
boxes similar to those it manufactures were also
installed in other SM stores. It further discovered
that North Edsa Marketing Inc. (NEMI), through
its marketing arm, Prime Spots Marketing
Services, was set up primarily to sell advertising
space in lighted display units located in SMIs
different branches. P&D sent a letter to both SMI
and NEMI enjoining them to cease using the
subject light boxes and to remove the same from
SMIs establishments, inter alia. Upon receipt of
the demand letter, SMI suspended the leasing of
224 light boxes and NEMI took down its
advertisements for Poster Ads from the lighted
display units in SMIs stores.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Claiming that both SMI and NEMI failed to meet
all its demands, P&D filed this instant case for
infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair
competition and damages. The RTC of Makati
City decided in favor of P & D. CA reversed
RTC.
VI. ISSUE:
If the engineering or technical drawings of an
advertising display unit (light box) are granted
copyright protection, is the light box depicted in
such drawings ipso facto also protected by such
copyright or should the light box be registered
separately and protected by a patent?
VII RULING:
Petitioners copyright certificate clearly stated
that it was for a class O work under Section 2
(O) of PD 49 (The Intellectual Property
Decree). Said Section 2 expressly enumerated
the works subject to copyright:
SEC. 2. The rights granted by this
Decree shall, from the moment of
creation, subsist with respect to any of
the following works: x x x
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations,
advertising copies, labels, tags, and box
wraps; x x x
Although petitioners copyright certificate was
entitled Advertising Display Units (which
depicted the box-type electrical devices), its
claim of copyright infringement cannot be
sustained. Copyright, in the strict sense of the
term, is purely a statutory right. Being a mere
statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the
statute confers. It may be obtained and enjoyed
only with respect to the subjects and by the
persons, and on terms and conditions specified
in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the
works falling within the statutory enumeration or
description.
Even as we find that P & D indeed owned a valid
copyright, the same could have referred only to
the technical drawings within the category of
pictorial illustrations. It could not have possibly
stretched out to include the underlying light
box. What the law does not include, it excludes,
and for the good reason: the light box was not a
literary or artistic piece which could be
copyrighted under the copyright law.
SMIs and NEMIs acts complained of by P & D
were to have units similar or identical to the light
box illustrated in the technical drawings
manufactured by Metro and EYD Rainbow
Advertising, for leasing out to different
advertisers. According to the SC, this was not an
infringement of petitioners copyright over the
technical drawings. During the trial, the
president of P & D himself admitted that the light
box was neither a literary not an artistic work but
an engineering or marketing invention. There
appeared to be some confusion regarding what
ought or ought not to be the proper subjects of
copyrights, patents and trademarks. SC
previously ruled that these three legal rights are
completely distinct and separate from one
another, and the protection afforded by one
cannot be used interchangeably to cover items
or works that exclusively pertain to the others
VII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 22, 2001 is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (IPL)
I. SHORT TITLE: ABIVA V. WEINBRENNER
II. FULL TITLE: Asuncion Q. Abiva, plaintiff
and appellant versus Lourdes Koppin
Weinbrenner, defendant and appellee
III. TOPIC: Infringement and unfair competition
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Plaintiff Abiva doing business under the name of
Abiva Publishing House (APH) is engaged in the
publication and sale of literary works and
printing and selling of Christmas cards depicting
local scenery. Defendant Weinbrenner is
likewise engaged in the printing and selling of
Christmas cards with Philippine views in the
name and style of PhilArt. The same cards are
now mixed in bookstores in one rack and due to
the alleged imitation, 250,000 of Abivas cards
remained unsold.
As early as January 7, 1954, plaintiff filed an
application of copyright with the Bureau of Public
Libraries of Christmas greeting cards with
Philippine views and scenes. Complaining of
infringement and unfair competition, Abiva
allegedly saw in the defendants artists office,
Mr. Serna his Moro Vinta Christmas card.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The CFI of Manila dismissed plaintiffs
complaint. Hence, this petition.
VI. ISSUE: Whether or not the Christmas cards
of defendant infringe the copyrighted cards of
the plaintiff thereby offering unfair competition.
VII. RULING:
Some designs infringed the copyrighted cards.
It is well known that there is no protection in the
subject of a copyrighted work. Indeed, one work
does not violate the copyright in another simply
because there is a similarity between the two, if
the similarity results from the fact that both deal
with the same subject or have the same
common source. It should be a copy and one
approved definition of copy is that which comes
so near to the original as to give to every person
seeing it the idea created by the original. xxx In
the case of prints and pictorial illustrations,
however, an exact reproduction is not essential
to constitute infringement. The question is
whether the main design of the original has been
copied.
It is immediately apparent that except for minor
alterations and colorable variations, defendants
cards are merely identical to the illustrations of
plaintiffs cards. Although the subject matter is
said to be typical or common properties like
Mayon Volcano, the conception, creation, design
and arrangement as well as the treatment of the
said subject matter are certainly not common.
It is significant that plaintiff had seen a copy of
her Moro Vinta card in the office of defendants
artist, Mr. Serna. This fact which is not rebutted
by failure to produce Serna as witness that he
did not make use of plaintiffs Christmas cards
tends strongly to confirm the copying of this
particular card.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
modified and defendant is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff the sum of P2000.00 as damages,
without pronouncement as to costs in this
instance, and a permanent injunction is issued
against defendants publishing printing and
selling her Christmas greeting cards Sunset,
Mayon Volcano, Albay and Moro Vinta. So Trial court issued a writ of preliminary
ordered.
I. SHORT TITLE:
SAMBAR V. LEVI STRAUSS &
CO
II. FULL TITLE:
VENANCIO SAMBAR, doing
business under the name and
style of CVS Garment Enterprises,
petitioner, vs. LEVI STRAUSS &
CO., and LEVI STRAUSS (PHIL.),
INC., respondents, G.R. No.
132604. March 6, 2002, J.
Quisumbing
III. TOPIC:
Infringement
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Private respondents alleged in their
complaint that Levi Strauss and Co.
(LS&Co.), an internationally known clothing
manufacturer, own the arcuate design
trademark which was registered under US
Trademark Registration No. 404,248 on
November 16, 1943. That sometime in 1987,
CVSGIC and Venancio Sambar, without the
consent and authority of private respondents
and in infringement and unfair competition,
sold and advertised, and despite demands
to cease and desist, continued to
manufacture, sell and advertise denim,
pants under the brand name Europress
with back pockets bearing a design similar
to the arcuate trademark of private
respondents, thereby causing confusion on
the buying public, prejudiced to private
respondents goodwill and property right.
Sambar filed a separate answer. He
admitted that copyright Registration No. 1-
1998 was issued to him, but he denied using
it. He said he did not authorize anyone to
use the copyrighted design.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
injunction enjoining CVSGIC and petitioner
from manufacturing, advertising and selling
pants with the arcuate design on their back
pockets.
Private respondents moved for
reconsideration praying for the cancellation
of petitioners copyright registration.
Trial court granted the prayer.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
VI. ISSUE:
Whether petitioner infringe on
private respondents arcuate design.
VII. RULING:
YES. To be entitled to a copyright,
the thing being copyrighted must be
original, created by the author
through his own skill, labor and
judgment, without directly copying or
evasively imitating the work of
another.
Both the trail court and the Court of
Appeals found there was
infringement.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January
30, 1998, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51553 AFFIRMING the
 judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 66, dated July 14, 1995, is
hereby MODIFIED so that nominal damages
are deleted but the amount of P50,000 is
hereby awarded only as TEMPERATE
DAMAGES. In all other respects, said
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, to wit:
a) the writ of preliminary injunction is made
permanent;
b) the defendants CVS Garment and
Industrial Company and Venancio Sambar
are ordered also to pay the plaintiffs jointly
and solidarily the sum of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and the sum of
P25,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, and to pay the costs; and
c) the Director of the National Library is
ordered to cancel the Copyright Registration
No. 1-1998 issued in the name of Venancio
Sambar.
SO ORDERED.
3. [G.R. No. 76193. November 9, 1989.] UNITE
D FEATURE SYNDICATE, INC., petitioner, vs.
MUNSINGWEAR
CREATION MANUFACTURING COMPANY,
respondent.
Petitioners claim:
Petitioner is asking for the cancellation of the
registration of trademark CHARLIE BROWN
(Registration No. SR. 4224) in the name of
respondent MUNSINGWEAR, alleging that
petitioner is damaged by the registration of the
trademark CHARLIE BROWN of T-Shirts under
Class 25with the Registration No. SR-4224
dated September 12, 1979 in the name of
Munsingwear Creation Manufacturing Co., Inc.,
on the following grounds: (1) that respondent
was not entitled to the registration of the mark
CHARLIE BROWN, & DEVICE at the time of
application for registration; (2) that CHARLIE
BROWN is a character creation or a pictorial
illustration, the copyright to which is exclusively
owned worldwide by the petitioner; (3) that as
the owner of the pictorial illustration CHARLIE
BROWN, petitioner has since 1950 and
continuously up to the present, used and
reproduced the same to the exclusion of others;
(4) that the respondent-registrant has no bona
fide use of the trademark in commerce in the
Philippines prior to its application for registration.
Respondents claim:
-It uses, the trademark "CHARLIE BROWN" &
"DEVICE" on children's wear such as T-shirts,
undershirts, sweaters, brief and sandos, in
class 25; whereas "CHARLIE BROWN" is used
only by petitioner as character, in a pictorial
illustration used in a comic strip appearing
innewspapers and magazines. It has no
trademark significance and therefore
respondent-registrant's use of "CHARLIE
BROWN" & "DEVICE" is not in conflict with the
petitioner's use of "CHARLIE BROWN"-Relied
on the ruling on October 2, 1984 in which the
Director of the Philippine Patent Officerendered
a decision in this case holding that a copyright
registration like that of the name andlikeness of
CHARLIE BROWN may not provide a cause of
action for the cancellation of atrademark
registration.
Issue
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSEOF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN BY DISMISSINGTHE
APPEAL TO IT FROM THE DECISION OF THE
DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ITKNOWINGLY
DISREGARDED ITS OWN DECISION IN AC-
GR. SP. NO. 0342, WHICH WAS AFFIRMED
BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT TO
THE EFFECT THAT ACOPYRIGHTED
CHARACTER MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATED
AS A TRADEMARK BY ANOTHER UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 49.
S.C.Ruling:
The petitioner is impressed with merit. Since the
name "CHARLIE BROWN" and its pictorial
representation were covered by a copyright
registration way back in 1950 the same are
entitled to protection under PD No. 49, otherwise
known as the "Decree on Intellectual Property"