Social Legislation

Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015

Facts:
Employees Compensation This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed
by respondent Matilde S. Belo in the 28 October
Commission 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court holding that
government service rendered on a per diem basis
Table of Contents is not creditable in computing the length of
service for retirement purposes. Thus, the orders
of the CSC requiring the GSIS to consider as
Case Page creditable the services of Belo were reversed.
1 GSIS v. CSC, Baradero Belo rendered service as Vice Governor of Capiz.
2 Beronilla v. CSC GSIS likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on the same grounds in behalf of Belo and
3 Cena v. CSC another private respondent Dr. Manuel Baradero,
4 Rabor v. CSC a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
5 Profeta v. Drilon Municipality of La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
6 Santiago v. COA
Issue:
7 Raro v. ECC Whether regular government service on a per
8 Iloilo Dock v. WCC diem basis, without any other form of
9 Belarmino v. ECC compensation or emolument, is compensation
within the contemplation of the term service with
10 Alano v. ECC
compensation under the GSIS law.
11 Lazo v. ECC
12 Enao v. ECC Held:
13 Menez v. ECC YES. (Motion was granted)
The Court reconsidered its earlier
14 Narazo v. ECC decision and said that the amounts received may
15 Dabatian v. GSIS be denominated as per diem but are actually in
16 Rodriguez v. ECC the nature of compensation or pay and that what
17 ECC v. Arreola is controlling in both cases would be the nature
of the remuneration and not the label attached to
18 Tancinco v. GSIS it.
19 Panotes v. ECC
20 Jimenez v. ECC In the case of Belo, the Court noted that
21 Ma-AO Sugar Central v. CA she held the position continuously from 5 January
1972 to 1 February 1988. In that span of time,
22 Chua Yeng v. Michael Roma she was paid a fixed salary by virtue of her
23 Visayan Stevedore v. WCC election from 25 January 1972 to 31 December
24 Bellosilo v. City of Manila 1972; paid with per diem from 31 December
1976 to 31 December 1979; and fixed salary
25 Davao Gulf Lumber v.
from 1 January 1980 to 1 February 1988. The per
Del Rosario diems received by respondent was actually paid
26 Batangas Transportation for in the performance of her duties not as per
Company v. Vda. de Rivera diem referred in Sec. 1 (c) of the GSIS Act.
27 Marinduque Iron Mines
Per diem, based on the GSIS law, is
Agents v. WCC defined as a daily allowance given for each day
28 De Inguillo v. ECC an officer or employee of government is away
29 Clemente v. GSIS, ECC from his home base. It is a reimbursement for
extra expenses incurred by the public official in
30 Casumpang v. ECC
the performance of his duties. Generally
allowance for expenses incident to the discharge
of an office is not a salary office. However, if the
remuneration received by a public official in the

1
GSIS v. CSC, Dr. Manuel
Baradero, Matilde S. Belo
GR No. 98395 and 102449,
performance of his duties does not constitute a
mere allowance for expenses but appears to be
his actual base pay, a per diem would take the
allowances received by petitioner from the term
service with compensation for the purpose of

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Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
computing the number of years of service in
government.
In the other case, Dr. Baradero was paid on a per
diem basis from 1 January 1976 to 10 October
1978. Applying the Belo case, the Court
considered the following: a) the continuous
government service rendered; b) being a full time
employee although on a hold-over capacity; c)
and that no other forms of remuneration was
received. Respondent Baradero, who, before and
after the period in question had an unblemished
record of service to the government as a member
of the army and as a medical officer of the
Philippine Medicare Commission. The disputed
period was served on a full-time basis regardless
of the denomination given to the compensation
received by him.
2
Hilarion Beronilla v. Civil Service
Commission
GR No. 97419, July 3, 1992
Facts:
From 1917 to 1925, Hilarion Beronilla
uniformly indicated in his application for
employment, application for life and retirement
insurance, and application to take the CSC
examination that his birth date is January 14,
1898. He also indicated the same date in his
Members Service record submitted to the GSIS
on October 29, 1954.
In 1959, Beronilla requested the
Commissioner of Civil Service thru the Auditor
General to change his birthdate to January 14,
1900. In his petition, he stated he only found out
his true date of birth before his mothers demise
on 1955. His mother said that in 1916, his uncle
Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula to show that
Hilarion was 18 years old so that he may vote for
Alvaro who was then a candidate for election.
Since Beronilla was informed of this, it
was only in 1959 that he finally found 2 people, a
former member of the provincial board and a
retired justice of the peace, that could attest to
his true date of birth. Together with his letter to
the Civil Service Commissioner were affidavits of
these two persons. The letter was then endorsed
by the commission to the GSIS for action
without intervention of the Civil Service
Commission.
In the GSIS, the letter-request was
referred to the Legal Counsel who denied the
same on October 22, 1959. Upon learning this,
petitioner submitted additional evidence
consisting of Photostat copies of the yearbooks of
the Phil Institute of Accountant in 1954 and
1958. Even with the additional evidence, Legal
Counsel denied petition again on March 21, 1960.
On May 21, 1960, petitioner appealed to GSIS
General Manager, Mr. Rodolfo Andal, and upon
favorable recommendation of the 2nd Asst.
General Manager, F.G. Arana, placed OK at the
foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating
approval of the request change. Based on the
action of the General Manager, notes of
adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner to
January 14, 1900 was sent to the Auditor General
and Commission on Civil Service and proceeds of
petitioners policy was recomputed.
On May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay,
then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the
Phil. Natl Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS about the service of the petitioner of
petitioner and stated that Hilarion Beronilla has
been continuously paid since January 15, 1963,
his salary allowances and other fringe benefits
notwishtanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla turned
65 on January 14, 1963, the date of his
automatic and compulsory retirement. The board
referred the letter to the Claims department who
then submitted a memorandum tating the facts
and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the
determination of the date of birth of petitioner
including the actions taken by Mr. Andal and the
Legal Counsel.
On, August 9, 1963, the Board adopted
the disputed resolution of Mr. Mathays letter
without notifying petitioner and without giving
him an opportunity to be heard.
Issue:
Whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted
within its powers when it reversed the approval
by the General Manager of petitioners request
for the change of his date of birth.
Held:
Yes, it is within the powers of the GSIS
Board of Trustees to reverse decisions made by
the General Manager.
By express statutory authority (See Sec.
16-18 of GSIS charter), the Board of Trustees
directly manages the System while the General
Manager is only the chief executive officer of the
Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules
and regulations for the administration of the
System and the transaction of business, the
Board may lodge in the GM the authority to act
on any matter the Board may deem proper, but
in no wise can such conferment of the authority
be considered as a full and complete delegation
resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion,
of the Boards own statutorily-based prerogative
and responsibility to manage the affairs of the
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Atty. R. Raypon
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system and, accordingly, to decide with finality
any matter affecting its transactions or business.
In other words, even if the Board may entrust to
the GM the power to give final approval to
applications for retirement annuities, the finality
of such approval cannot be understood to divest
the Board, in appropriate cases and upon its
attention being called a flaw, mistake or
irregularity in the GMs action, of the authority to
exercise its power of supervision and control
which flows naturally from the ultimate and final
responsibility for the proper management of the
System imposed upon it by the charter.
Gaudencio Cena v. Civil Service
3
Commission
GR No. 97419, July 3, 1992
Facts:
Gaudencio Cena worked for 7 years as a
Legal Officer of the Law Dept of Caloocan City.
He was then transferred to the Office of the
Congressman where he worked as a Supervising
Staff Officer for 3 months. He was then
appointed as Registrar of the RD (Register of
Deeds) in Malabon. In total, he has rendered
govt service for 11 years, 9 months and 6 days.
Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested
the LRA Administrator that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the 15-year
service requirement to enable him to retire with
full benefits of old age pension.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling
from the CSC. The CSC denied the extension but
Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. This time
around, CSC granted a 1-yr extension to him.
Cena still filed a case against CSC for grave
abuse of discretion when it granted an extension
of only 1 yr. He contends that the law (Sec 11 of
PD 1146 also known as Revised Govt Insurance
Act) does not limit or specify the maximum
number of years the retiree may avail of to
complete the 15-year service. Thus, the CSC has
no authority to limit through a memorandum the
number of years.
In defense, CSC said that since it is the
central personnel agency of the govt, it is vested
with power to grant or allow extension of service
beyond retirement age.
Issue:
Whether or not Cena is allowed to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service
requirement?
Held:
Yes. Being remedial in character, a
statute creating a pension or establishing
retirement plan should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to
be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims
to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law
in order that the efficiency, security and well-
being of government employees may be
enhanced.
An administrative circular, such as a
memorandum of the CSC cannot limit PD 1146,
on extension of service of employees who reach
65. While it is true that CSC is given the authority
to take appropriate action on all appointments
and other personnel matters in the Civil Service,
it cannot extend to matters not covered. The
CSCs authority is limited only to carrying into
effect what PD 1146 says. It cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law.
The CSC Memorandum, being in the
nature of an administrative regulation, must be
governed by the principle that a regulation must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. CSC has no power to
supply or add perceived omissions in PD 1146.
Dionisio Rabor v. Civil Service
4
Commission
GR No. 111812, May 31, 1995
PD 626
Facts:
Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in
the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered
the government service as a Utility Worker on 10
April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in
May 1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor of
Davao City advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for
retirement, considering that he had already more
than 68 years old.
Rabor responded by showing a GSIS
certificate with a notation to the effect that his
service is extended for him to complete the 15-
year requirement for retirement. The Davao City
Government wrote to the Regional Director of the
Civil Service Commission informing the latter of
the foregoing and requesting advice as to what
action should be taken on Rabors case. Director
Cawad replied by saying that Rabors continued
employment is contrary to M.C. No. 65 issued by
the Office of the President hence which only
provides for retention of service for extremely
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1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
meritorious reasons which should not exceed 6
months.
Mayor Duterte furnished Rabor a copy
of Cawads letter and ordered him not to work
anymore. Rabor asked Director Cawad for
extension of his job until he completes the 15-
year requirement but was denied. Rabor then
asked the Office of the President for an
extension. His request was referred by OP to CSC
and thereafter CSC denied Rabors request.
Rabor asked for reconsideration of CSC ruling
citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated
his request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON Rabor request for extension should be
granted in view of Cena case
Held:
No. this case modified the Cena
doctrine.
The SC found it very difficult to suppose
that the limitation of permissible extensions of
service after an employee has reached sixty-five
(65) years of age has no reasonable relationship
or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of
the present Civil Service Law. The physiological
and psychological processes associated with
ageing in human beings are in fact related to the
efficiency and quality of the service that may be
expected from individual persons. The policy
considerations which guided the Civil Service
Commission in limiting the maximum extension of
service allowable for compulsory retirees, were
summarized by Justice Grio-Aquino, in her
dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points
raised by the Civil Service Commission that
extending the service of compulsory retirees for
longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a
premium to late-comers in the government
service and in effect discriminate against those
who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay
the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank
employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for
employment of qualified young civil service
applicants who have already passed the various
government examination but must wait for jobs
to be vacated by "extendees" who have long
passed the mandatory retirement age but are
enjoying extension of their government service to
complete 15years so they may qualify for old-age
pension.
SCs conclusion is that the doctrine of
Cena should be and is hereby modified to this
extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically
paragraph (1) thereof,is hereby declared valid
and effective. The law on extension of service
under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146
(Retirement Law) must, accordingly, be read
together with Memorandum Circular No. 27.
We reiterate, however, the holding in
Cena that the head of the government agency
concerned is vested with discretionary authority
to allow or disallow extension of the service of an
official or employee who has reached sixty-five
(65) years of age without completing fifteen (15)
years of government service; this discretion is,
nevertheless, to be exercised conformable with
the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
5
Lydia M. Profeta v. Hon.
Franklin M. Drilon
GR No. 1104149, December 22, 1992
PD 626
Facts
Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served
as Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological
Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October
1978 until her promotion to President on 1 May
1979. After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5
March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy
resignation as President of the Rizal
Technological Colleges and the same was
accepted on 21 March 1986. A day before the
acceptance of her courtesy resignation, petitioner
applied for sick leave. On 4 November 1988,
petitioner was appointed Acting President of
Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science
and Technology (hereinafter referred to as
EARIST) and was thereafter appointed its
President on 29 March 1989.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65)
years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from
the GSIS as to whether she may be allowed to
extend her services with the government as
President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-five
(65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age
pension retirement benefits under PD 1146
(Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977). Petitioner was advised by the GSIS to
return to the service until she shall have fulfilled
the 15 years service to qualify for the old-age
pension retirement plan. The GSIS declared that
petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD
1146 and that her creditable service was only 12
years and two 2 months. Therefore, she could
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only claim one hundred percent (100%) of her
average monthly compensation for every year of
creditable service or to a refund of her premium
contributions with the GSIS.
On 6 October 1989 DECS Secretary and
the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President
Aquino, through Deputy Executive Secretary
Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of
petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall
have completed the required fifteen (15) years of
service after reaching the age of sixty five (65)
years on the date of her normal retirement on 16
June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2)
years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days.
In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and
Employees Union filed an administrative
complaint against petitioner before the Office of
the President, for her alleged irregular
appointment and for graft and corrupt practices.
Pending investigation of the complaint, petitioner
was placed under preventive suspension for a
period of ninety (90) days. After serving the
period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her
duties and functions as President of EARIST.
After evaluating the evidence presented before
the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision dated 23
October 1991, the Office of the President
dismissed the administrative complaint against
petitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the
same decision, the Office of the President also
declared petitioner as compulsory retired from
government service as of 15 October 1991,
holding that if the sick leave of 62 working days
(approximately 3 months) were to be added to
the petitioners creditable service, together with
the period of two (2) weeks where the petitioner
served as Professorial Lecturer, the petitioner
should be considered as compulsorily retired as
of Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required
15 years in the service on or about the said date
after reaching the age of 65.
Petitioner requested the GSIS to
determine the exact date of her retirement. On 5
November 1991, petitioner was advised by the
GSIS that the exact date of her retirement falls
on 14 August 1992. Petitioner assailed the
portion of the decision of the Office of the
President declaring her as compulsorily retired
from the service as of 15 October 1991, alleging
that the said office has no jurisdiction over the
issue of her compulsory retirement from the
government service.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Office of the President has
jurisdiction over the issue of her compulsory
retirement from the government service.
2. Whether or not the petitioner could avail of the
old-age retirement after the declaration of the
Office of the President the amended exact date
of her retirement.
Held:
The Court held that it is the GSIS which
has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a member is qualified or not
to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D.
1146, based on its computation of a member's
years of service with the government. The
computation of a member's service includes not
only full time but also part time and other
services with compensation as may be included
under the rules and regulations prescribed by the
System.
Retirement is compulsory for a member
who has reached the age of 65 years with at
least 15 years of service. If he has less than
fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed
to continue in the service to complete the 15
years, to avail of the old-age pension benefit.
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor
of the retiree because their intention is to provide
for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort,
when he no longer has the stamina to continue
earning his livelihood. The liberal approach aims
to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law
in order that the efficiency, security and well-
being of government employees maybe
enhanced.
The computation made by the GSIS of
petitioner's date of retirement failed to take into
account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months
service of petitioner which was not reflected in
her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded
three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of
petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to
be considered retired on 30 April 1992.
The Court ruled that the decision of the Office of
the President dated 23 October 1991 declaring
petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15
October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby
declared to have been in the service as President
of EARIST from 16 October 1991 until 30 April
1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries,
benefits and other emoluments of said office
from 16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992. In
addition, she is declared as entitled to her old-
age pension benefits for having reached age 65
years while in the service with 15 years of service
to her credit, subject to her compliance with all
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Atty. R. Raypon
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applicable regulations and requirements of the
GSIS.
6
Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA and
GSIS
GR No. 92284, July 12, 1991
Facts:
The petitioner was employed in the
Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV with a
monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was
assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the
Department of Transportation and
Communications and detailed to the Manila
International Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988,
the board of directors of the MIAA passed a
resolution designating the petitioner as Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration
subject to the following conditions: (a) he retains
his plantilla position in COA, (b) his compensation
from MIAA shall be the difference between the
salary of AGM for Finance and that of State
Auditor IV, and (c) his retirement benefits shall
be chargeable against COA.
On August 10, 1988, MIAA board of
directors issued an office order formally
designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration,
effective August 16, 1988. The petitioner as
Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration collected the differential salary of
P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total
compensation of P13,068.00. He received this
compensation until December 5, 1988. On March
1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in
the government for 44 years.
In computing his retirement benefits,
GSIS used as basis the amount of P13,068.00,
considering this the highest basic salary rate
received by the petitioner in the course of his
employment. The COA disagreed and paid his
retirement benefits on the basis of only his
monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV.
It has been argued that the additional
compensation received by the petitioner was
merely an honorarium and not a salary. As a
mere honorarium, it would not fall under the
provision of Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966
and should not be added to his salary in
computing his retirement benefits.
The Solicitor General's main argument is
that the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9
Highest Basic Salary Rate of EO No. 966 because
he was not appointed to the second position in
the MIAA but only designated thereto. Under the
provision, compensation of salary or pay which
may be used in computing the retirement
benefits shall be received by an official employee
as fixed by law and/or indicated in his duly
approved appointment. The petitioner's additional
salary was fixed not in a duly approved
appointment but only in a designation.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner can
invoke Section 9 of EO No. 966 for the
recomputation of his basic salary rate as basis for
his retirement benefits.
(2) Whether or not his designation as
Assistant General Manager constitutes as an
approved appointment under the purview of
Section 9 of EO No. 966.
Held:
(1) Yes, the court granted the petition
and directed the computation of the petitioners
retirement benefits on the basis of his Highest
Basic Salary Rate of 13,068.00.
(2) Yes, the law in question, the term
"appointment" was used in a general sense to
include the term "designation." In other words,
no distinction was intended between the two
terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966.
The Court held that more reasonable
interpretation, especially considering that the
provision includes in the highest salary rate
"compensation for substitutionary services or in
an acting capacity." This need not always be
conferred by a permanent appointment. The
spirit of EO No. 966 seeks to extend the
maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional
if belated recognition of his many years of loyal
and efficient service in the government.
Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner,
who was designated Acting Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration on
August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant
and could be filled either by permanent
appointment or by temporary designation. It
cannot be said that the second position was only
an extension of the petitioner's office as State
Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as
otherwise there would have been no need for his
designation thereto. The second office was
distinct and separate from his position in the
Commission on Audit. For the additional services
he rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to
additional compensation which, following the
letter and spirit of Section 9, should be included
in his highest basic salary rate.
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Retirement laws should be interpreted
liberally in favor of the retiree because their
intention is to provide for his sustenance, and
hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has
the stamina to continue earning his livelihood.
After devoting the best years of his life to the
public service, he deserves the appreciation of a
grateful government as best concretely expressed
in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate
with the value and length of his services. That
generosity is the least he should expect now that
his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as
he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses
the approach of the lengthening shadows, he
should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he
did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
=====
EO No. 966
Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. The
compensation of salary or pay which may be
used in computing the retirement benefits shall
be limited to the highest salary rate actually
received by an official/employee as fixed by law
and/or indicated in his duly approved
appointment. This shall include salary
adjustments duly authorized and implemented by
the presidential issuance(s) and budget
circular(s), additional basic compensation or
salary indicated in an appointment duly approved
as an exception to the prohibition on additional
or double compensation, merit increases, and
compensation for substitutionary services or in an
acting capacity. For this purpose, all other
compensation and/or fringe benefits such as per
diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay,
honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees,
consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in
correcting and/or releasing examination papers
shall not be considered in the computation of the
retirement benefits of an official/employee.
Zaida Raro v. ECC
7
GR No. L-58445, November 26, 1970
Facts:
Petitioner Zaida Raro was in perfect
health when she was employed by the Bureau of
Mines and Geo Sciences in Camarines Norte, as a
Mining Recorder.
Later, she began suffering from severe
and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of
vision. She was forced to take sick leaves. She
was diagnosed with brain tumor at the Makati
Medical Center. Petitioners husband filed a claim
for disability benefits with the GSIS which was
denied. On appeal to the ECC, the GSIS decision
was affirmed.
Issue:
(1) Whether petitioner is entitled to
compensation under the present laws.
(2) Whether the present law is oppressive and
arbitrary as the presumption of compensability
cannot be applied if the disease is not listed as
an occupational disease.
Held:
(1) No, the law says they are not. Under
the Labor Code, sickness is defined as any
illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the Commission, or any illness
caused by employment subject to proof by the
employee that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions. For this
purpose, the Commission is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases
and work-related illnesses that may be
considered compensable based on peculiar
hazards of employment. Also, Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation
defines who are entitled:
Sec 1b. For the sickness and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
these rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that
the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
the working conditions."
Hence, under the law, the claimant must
prove that the illness was caused by employment
and the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions and to say
that the trust fund has the obligation to pay
because the proof required is not applicable is
contrary to the legal requirement that proof must
be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-
existent proof cannot be presumed.
The present law, in essence, has struck
out the presumption of compensability and
incorporated a new system based on social
security principles with a system administered by
social insurance agencies (GSIS and SSS). The
reason for this was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employers obligation to
pay workmens compensation and the employees
right to receive reparation for work-connected
death or disability.
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Instead of an adversarial contest by the
worker or his family against the employer, we
now have a social insurance scheme where
regular premiums are paid by employers and
employees to a trust fund and claims are paid
from the trust fund to those who can prove
entitlement. Since there is no employer fighting a
claim for compensation, the rules on presumption
of compensability and controversion cease to
have significance.
The employer is spared the problem of
proving a negative proposition that the disease
was not caused by employment. It is a
government institution which protects the
stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund
against the payment of non-compensable claims.
The employee, this time assisted by his
employer, is required to prove a positive
proposition, that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by working conditions.
The fixing of the amount of
contributions are based on actuarial studies. The
actuarially determined number of workers who
would probably file claims within any given year
is important in insuring the stability of the trust
fund and making certain that the system can pay
benefits when due to all who are entitled and in
the increased amounts fixed by law. Thus, if
diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently included, the
integrity of the State Insurance Funds is
endangered.
8
Iloilo Dock and Engineering v. WCC
GR No. L-26341, November 27, 1980
Facts:
Pablo Santiago worked for petitioner
company as an iron worker with a weekly
compensation of Php 38.64. On August 16, 1955,
while doing repairs at work, the petitioner
suffered slight compression fracture of the 12th
thoracic vertebrae which prevented him from
performing his work for 14 and 6/7 weeks. The
company physician certified that Santiago
suffered partial permanent disability of the back
due to slight stiffness at the 12th thoracic
vertebrae of the back. Petitioner company in its
Employers Report of Accident stated that it will
not controvert Santiagos right to claim for
compensation.
Santiago then reported for work and
performed his usual tasks before the accident
without any complaints about the injury. He was
also given the same wages he used to receive.
Before the manifestation of the
petitioner that it will not controvert the right for
compensation, the Regional Administrator of the
Department of Labor, Regional Office No. V, Iloilo
City, computed the compensation benefits and
awarded Santiago the total sum of P1, 148.10, as
per letter-computation dated January 16, 1958.
This amount is based on the sum of all
compensations under Sections 13, 14 and 18 of
the Workmans Compensation Act. Petitioner
company settled the first two items but refused
to settle item 3 (compensation under Sec. 18
concerning amputations)
Issue:
Whether the injury of Pablo Santiago
was compensable under Section 18 of the WCA.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the law, where the employer
fails to controvert the employees right to
compensation, he shall be deemed to have
renounced his right to controvert and the Hearing
Officer may, if a claim has already been filed,
receive evidence for the claimant, if necessary,
and treat the same as uncontested. The Labor
Administrators task was then to award the
claimant in accordance with the law which he did.
The pertinent provisions of Section 18,
WCA, states -
Amputation. - Amputation between elbow and
wrist shall be considered as equivalent to the loss
of a hand. Amputation between knee and ankle
shall be considered as loss of a foot. Amputation
at or above the elbow shall be considered as
equivalent to the loss of an arm. Amputation at
or above the knee shall be considered as
equivalent to the loss of a leg. x x x
In all other cases of this kind of disability not
mentioned in other sections of this Act, x x x
Petitioner claims that the above
provision does not apply to the case of Santiago
as there was no amputation at all. Petitioner also
contends that the compensation could not be
computed as Santiago returned to work with the
same pay as before the accident and that he was
already cured of whatever disability he might
have had.
Argument is untenable.
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Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
The cited section even if entitled
Amputation does not exclude other injuries
similar in nature. In fact, included in the provision
is serious disfigurement. Paragraph 4 even
provides among other things that "in all other
cases of this kind of disability not mentioned in
other sections of this Act." Santiagos injury is
akin to those mentioned in the said section and
which is not covered by other sections of the law.
Petitioner is also wrong when it claimed
that the compensation could not be computed as
Santiago returned to work with the same pay as
before the accident. As cited in Azucarera de Don
Pedro v De Leon and Alla, "an injured laborer's
capacity for work is not measured solely by the
wages he receives, or his earning, after the
injury, since the amount of such wages or
earning may be affected by various extraneous
matters or factors, x x x for there are a number
of possible explanations of the fact that an
employee who receives higher wages after an
injury than what he earned before may still have
suffered an impairment of earning capacity."
Meaning, under the law, the criterion is
earning capacity and not the wages given. The
WCC was correct when it said that "it is
sufficiently clear that once a workman sustains a
permanent impairment he is entitled to what the
law provides for such condition regardless of the
actual remuneration he receives after the injury.
A laborer who lost an arm in an accident may still
have the fortune of landing a job where the rate
of pay is the same what he was receiving before
the accident but surely as his lost arm should be
compensated because it is a permanent partial
disability contemplated under the Workmen's
Compensation Law".
Finally, it has been held that the
Workmen's Compensation Act should or must be
construed fairly, reasonably or liberally in favor,
or for the benefit, of employees and their
dependents, all doubts as to the right to
compensation being resolved in their favor, and
all presumption indulged being in their favor.
9
Manuel Belarmino v. ECC
GR No. 90204, May 11, 1990
Facts:
Mrs. Belarmino, a classroom teacher and
was 8 months pregnant, accidentally slipped and
fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she
complained of abdominal pain and stomach
cramps. For several days, she still continued to
suffer from recurrent abdominal pains and a
feeling of heaviness in her stomach. Her co-
teachers told her to take a leave of absence but
she continued to report to school. On January 25,
1982, she went into labor and delivered a
premature baby girl at home.
Her abdominal pains persisted even
after delivery, accompanied by high fever and
headache. She was brought to the hospital and
found that she was suffering from septicemia
post partum due to infected laceration of the
vagina. She was discharged after 5 days but died
3 days later.
COD: septicemia post partum.
Her husband claimed for death benefits but was
denied by GSIS claiming that the cause of death
if petitioner's wife is not an occupational disease.
On appeal, ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS.
Issues:
Whether the death of Mrs. Belarmino is a
compensable disease.
Held:
Yes. The illness, which resulted in the
death of Mrs. Belarmino, is admittedly not listed
as an occupational disease in her particular line
of work as a classroom teacher (See Rule III,
Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation).
However, her death from that ailment is
compensable because an employment accident
and the conditions of her employment
contributed to its development. The condition of
the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip
and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall
precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal
pains which culminated in the premature
termination of her pregnancy with tragic
consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom
floor brought about her premature delivery which
caused the development of post partum
septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall
therefore was the proximate or responsible cause
that set in motion an unbroken chain of events,
leading to her demise.
ECC and GSIS were ordered to pay
death benefits to the petitioner.
10
Generoso Alano v. ECC
GR No. L-48594, March 16, 1988
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Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015

being at the place of the accident. She was there

Facts: because her employment required her to be
Dedicacion de Vera was a principal in a there.
public school. Her tour of duty was from 7:30
a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at

11
Salvador Lazo v. ECC
7:00 a.m., while waiting for a ride on her way to GR No. 78617, June 18, 1990
school, she was bumped and run over by a
speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her
death. She is survived by her four sons and a
daughter.
Facts:
Salvador Lazo is a security guard of the
The brother of the deceased claimed for
Central Bank of the Philippines. His regular tour
income benefit with the GSIS for and behalf of
of duty is from 2pm to 10pm. One day, the
the descendant's children. The claim was denied
Security guard who was to relieve him failed to
on the ground that the injury upon which
arrive, so, Lazo rendered over time up to 5am of
compensation is being claimed is not an
July 19,1986. He then asked permission from his
employment accident satisfying all the conditions
superior to leave early order to take home his
prescribed by law. Appellant requested for
sack of Rice.
reconsideration but was denied and the case was
elevated for review.
On his way home, the jeepney he was
riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a
The respondent Commission affirmed
result, he sustained injuries and was confined to
the decision of the GSIS. The deceased's accident
National Orthopedic Hospital for 6 days.
did not meet any of the aforementioned
conditions (Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended
Lazo claimed for disability benefits
Rules on Employees' Compensation). First, the
under PD 626. However, his claim was denied by
accident occurred at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty
GSIS for the reason that he was not at his work
minutes before the deceased's working hours.
place performing his duties when the incident
Second, it happened not at her workplace but at
occurred ECC affirmed GSIS' decision.
the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to
Issue:
her work. Third, she was not then performing her
Whether the injury sustained by Lazo was due to
official functions as school principal nor was she
the vehicular accident on his way home from
on a special errand for the school. The case,
work and should be construed as "arising out of
therefore, was dismissed
or in the course of employment" and thus,
compensable?
Issue:
Whether or not the injury sustained by
Held:
the deceased resulting in her death is
compensable under the law as an employment
The claim is compensable. When an
accident.
employee is accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the place at work, while
Held:
he is going to and from his work, such injury is
In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v.
deemed to have arisen out of and in the course
Employees' Compensation Commission which has
of his employment.There is no evidence on
a similar factual background, this Court held:
record that petitioner deviated from his
usual,regular homeward route or that
When an employee is accidentally injured at a
interruptions occurred in the journey.
point reasonably proximate to the place at work,
while he is going to and from his work, such
It is significant that the liberality of the law
injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the
in general in favor of the workingman still
course of his employment.
subsists. As an agent charged by the law to
implement social justice guaranteed and secured
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that
by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation
the deceased died while going to her place of
Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in
work. She was at the place where her job
favor of the employee in deciding claims for
necessarily required her to be if she was to reach
compensability, especially where there is some
her place of work on time. There was nothing
basis in the facts for inferring a work connection
private or personal about the school principal's
to the accident.

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Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
There is no reason, in principle, why
employees should not be protected for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after
working hours and for a reasonable distance
before reaching or after leaving the employer's
premises.
The rule is to interpret the law liberally in
favor of the employee because the Employees
Compensation is basically a social legislation
designed to afford relief to the working men and
women in our society.
Emelita Enao v. ECC
12 GR No. L-46046, April 5, 1985
Facts:
On August 1, 1975, while on her way to
Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing
supplies and other training and school aids for
her office, Emilita Enao together with others,
were ambushed by unidentified men believed to
be communist insurgents.
As a result of the ambush, the appellant
sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm
and abdomen which compelled her confinement
at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital
from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of
foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and
later at the Dipolog Medical Center from
September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive
treatment. She also developed interstitial
pneumonia as a result.
On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice
of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education
and Culture, through the Division Superintendent
of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this
claim was not controverted. On the same date, a
claim for income benefits for disability was filed
by the herein petitioner with the GSIS but this
claim was denied on its reasoning that said
accident happened outside her time and place of
work, not to mention the fact that she was not in
the performance of her official functions when it
happened.
Enao appealed to the Employees'
Compensation Commission. ECC affirmed the
decision of the GSIS appealed from and
dismissed the Petitioner's claim, on the grounds
that:
(1) the day when the accident occurred was an
off-day, hence, the injury was incurred not during
office hours,
(2) appellant incurred injury while en route to
Dipolog City while outside the school premises
where she normally discharges her official
(3) while appellant's witnesses testified in an
affidavit that appellant left her official station for
Dipolog City on the day in question for the
purpose of procurring school supplies and
training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency,
we find the version of the Acting Administrative
Officer more credible-that is, the appellant was
on her way home from station-for there is
nothing which indicates that it is false.
At the time of the incident in question, the
pertinent and governing provisions of law are to
be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable,
the injury must be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury
during his working hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the
place where his work requires him to be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing
his official function.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner's claim for loss of income
benefits should be awarded?
Held:
Yes, for the Petitioner, in proceeding to
Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, intended to
procure supplies and other training aids which
are needed facilities in connection with her
services as a school teacher at the Wilbon
Primary School, cannot be at all disputed - "for
the purpose of securing supplies and other
training and school aids necessary for the
furtherance of their services as school teachers."
As it can be rightfully ruled that the
Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing
her official functions, it hardly matters then
whether such task which Petitioner was then
engaged in or discharging, happened outside the
regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's
place of work. It is rather obvious that in
proceeding to purchase school materials in
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Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to
leave the school premises and her travel need
not be during her usual working hours. What is
significant and controlling is that the injuries she
sustained are work-connected, which the Court
finds to be so.
It was therein ruled that "where an
employee is accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the place of work, while
she is going to and from her work, such injury is
deemed to have arisen out of and in the course
of her employment.
Gloria Menez v. ECC
13
GR L-48488, April 25, 1980
Facts:
Gloria D. Menez was as a school teacher
who retired on August 31, 1975 under the
disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years
after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid
arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement,
she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in
Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek. 1976,
petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
with respondent Government Service Insurance
System
GSIS denied said claim on the ground
that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis
and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases
taking into consideration the nature of her
particular work. Based on the evaluation of
medical authorities, her ailments were found to
be the least causally related to her duties and
conditions of work and thus, the ailments are not
work-connected.
GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case
and elevated the entire records thereof to the
Employees' Compensation Commission for review
and ECC and with its decision. The Commission
fully agrees with the respondent system that
appellant's employment has nothing to do with
the development of her disabling illnesses.
Appellant's ailments are not listed as occupational
diseases for the employment she was engaged in
as to merit compensation under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended
Menez claims she contracted
pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with
hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis after wetting
and chilling and aggravated by the condition and
nature of her work during the course of
employment which are permanent and recurring
in nature and work-connected.
Again respondents contend that
petitioner's ailments are not among the
occupational diseases listed as compensable
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees'
Compensation and Commission' is supported by
substantial evidence in the form of accepted
medical findings.
Issue:
Whether Menez ailment can be considered
occupational disease and can claim for
compensation.
Held:
Yes, her ailment may be considered as
occupational disease and she can claim for
compensation.
As defined occupational disease is one
which results from the nature of the employment,
and by nature is meant conditions to which all
employees of a class are subject and which
produce the disease as a natural incident of a
particular occupation, and attach to that
occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from
the usual run of occupations and is in excess of
the hazard attending the employment in general.
To be occupational, the disease must be one
"due wholly to causes and conditions which are
normal and constantly present and characteristic
of the particular occupation that is, those things
which science and industry have not yet learned
how to eliminate.
Thus the ailment of Menez is considered
as occupational disease. All public high school
teachers are the most underpaid but overworked
employees of the government, are subject to
emotional strains and stresses. In the case of the
Menez, her emotional tension is heightened by
the fact that the high school in which she teaches
is situated in a tough area Binondo district,
which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal
elements and further aggravated by the heavy
pollution and congestion therein as well as the
stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina
nearby. There is ample proof that petitioner
contracted such ailments by reason of her
occupation as a public high school teacher due to
her exposure to the adverse working conditions.
Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as
the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers,
recognized the enervating effects on the health
of school teachers when it directed in one of its
provisions that "Teachers shall be protected
12
Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
against the consequences of employment injury
in accordance with existing laws. The effects of
the physical and nervous strain on the teachers's
health shall be recognized as compensable
occupational diseases in accordance with laws"
Under the New Labor Code Rule 111 of
its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury
which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and
the resulting disability or death shall be
compensable under these Rules. It must be
borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of a
High school in Binondo District and exposed to
the heavily polluted air and congestions and
other elements.
Consequently, this Court finds petitioner
to have substantially shown that the risk of
contracting her ailments had been increased by
unfavorable working conditions.
Citing Dimaano v. WCC, the Court held
that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with sub-
acute exacerbation and hypertension by Dimaano
who was herself a teacher is service-connected
considering her working conditions and nature of
employment. As the petitioner is similarly-
situated, the same rule should apply.
Furthermore, it must be stressed that
"the approval of petitioner's application for
retirement is a clear indication that she was
physically incapacitated to render efficient
service. Petitioner was allowed to retire under the
disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at
the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory
retirement age of 65. Under Memorandum
Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be
recommended for approval only when "the
employee applicant is below 65 years of age and
is physically incapacitated to render further
efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus
retired by reason of her ailments.
Amalia Narazo v. ECC
14
GR No. 80157, February 6, 1990
Facts:
Geronimo Narazo was employed for 38
years as Budget Examiner in the Office of the
Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. His
duties included preparation of the budget of the
Province, financial reports and review or
examination of the budget of some provincial and
municipal offices.
Narazo died at the age of 57. Medical
records shows that he was confined 3 times at
the Doa Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in
Bacolod City, for urinary retention, abdominal
pain and anemia and diagnosed to be suffering
from "obstructive nepropathy due to benign
prostatic hypertrophy", commonly known as
"Uremia."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner, as the widow of the
deceased, filed a claim with the GSIS for death
benefits for the death of her husband, under the
Employees Compensation Law but was denied on
the ground that the cause of death of Narazo is
not listed as an occupational disease Petitioner
moved for reconsideration claiming the cause of
her husbands death is not considered as an
occupational disease but his job as Budget
Examiner which required long hours of sedentary
work, coupled with stress and pressure, caused
him many times to delay urination, which
eventually led to the development of his
ailments. The GSIS denied said motion for
reconsideration.
The ECC affirmed the decision of the
GSIS on the ground that the ailments of the
deceased could not be attributed to employment
factors and as impressed by medical experts,
benign prostatic hypertrophy is quite common
among men 50 years of age.
Petitioner avers that the nature, length
of time, and circumstances of the occupation of
the deceased were not considered in determining
whether the work of the said deceased had
increased the risks of contracting the ailments
which caused his death. The work of the
deceased, which required long sedentary work
under pressure, aggravated the risk of
contracting the disease leading to his hospital
confinement and death.
The ECC argues that petitioner failed to
show proof that the disease which caused the
death of her husband is work-connected; and
that no credence could be given to petitioners
claim that her husbands delayed urination gave
rise to the development of his ailments, for lack
of medical bases. Allthat petitioner has shown,
according to the ECC, are mere aggravation, and
not work-connection causes. 5
Issue:
Whether the widow of the deceased can claim of
death benefits under GSIS under ECL
Held:
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Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
Yes.
The ECC is empowered to determine
and approve occupational diseases and work-
related illnesses that may be considered
compensable based on peculiar hazards of
employment. Under Rule III, section 1,
paragraph 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, defines a "compensable sickness" as
any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the ECC or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased
by working conditions.
Sickness or death caused by said
sickness is compensable if the same is listed as
an occupational disease. If it is not so listed,
compensation may still be recovered if the illness
was aggravated by employment. It is incumbent
upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of
contracting the illness was increased by his
working conditions.
The cause of death of petitioners
husband is by Uremia and it was proved that it is
work-connected disease the risk of contracting
the illness was aggravated by the nature of the
work as a Budget examiner was dealt with many
factors, so much so that petitioner is entitled to
receive compensation benefits for the death of
her husband.
As per finding of the ECC, "Uremia is a
toxic clinical condition characterized by
restlessness, muscular twitchings, mental
disturbance, nausea, and vomiting associated
with renal insufficiency brought about by the
retention in blood of nitrogeneous urinary waste
products." One of its causes is the obstruction in
the flow of urinary waste products.
Under the increased risk theory the claimant
must show proof of reasonable work-connection,
not necessarily direct causal relation. The degree
of proof required is merely substantial evidence
which means such relevant evidence as will
support a decision, or clear and convincing
evidence.
15
Hilaria Dabatian v. GSIS
GR No. L-47294, April 8, 1987
PD 626
Facts:
Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as
Garbage Truck Driver in the General Services
Department of the City Government of Cagayan
de Oro City. He was mostly assigned in the night
shifts. It was also noted that Sigfredo was a
heavy coffee drinker which was his way to ward-
off sleep during his duty.
Prior to his death, his co-workers
observed that he grew paler and weaker until he
collapsed and became unconscious during his
tour duty. He was then brought to his residence.
Despite hospitalization, he died 2 weeks after
with the diagnosis of peptic ulcer.
A claim for income benefits under ECP
(Employee's Compensation Program) was filed by
the widow, Hilaria Dabatian. GSIS decided
against the compensability of the claim on the
ground that Sigfredo's ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is
definitely not accepted as an occupational
disease as listed under the present law on
compensation. Neither was there a showing that
the disease was directly caused by his
employment and the risk of contracting the same
was increased by the working conditions.
The case was then elevated to ECC
which ruled that deceased's ailment was not
related to his duties and work conditions. His
ailment is principally not work-connected.
Aggravation of illness is not a ground for
compensation under the present compensation
law.
ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse
GSIS's ruling which denied the petitioner's claim.
Hence, this petitioner's certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not under the premises the death of
Sigfredo A. Dabatian is compensable.
Held:
No.
The records show that petitioner died on
July 3, 1976 when the old compensation law had
already been abrogated. No competent evidence
whatsoever was submitted to prove that
Dabatian's ailment was contracted prior to
January 1, 1975 in order to bring it under the
protective mantle of the old compensation law.
Thus, under the present law, in order for the
employee to be entitled to sickness or death
benefits, the sickness or death resulting
therefrom must be, or must have resulted from
either a) any illness definitely accepted as an
occupational disease listed by the Commission or
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Social Legislation
Atty. R. Raypon
1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
b) any illness caused by employment subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is
increased by working conditions.
Since peptic ulcer is not included in the
list of occupational diseases as drawn up by the
Commission, then petitioner has the burden of
proving that the nature of her husband's work
increased the risk of contracting the disease.
Aside from the undisputed fact that the
deceased is a heavy coffee drinker, which was his
way of warding off sleepiness, no evidence was
ever adduced by petitioner to bolster the theory
that her husband's work increased the risk of
contracting the ailment.
Being a heavy coffee drinker may have
aggravated his peptic ulcer, but, aggravation of
an illness is no longer a ground for compensation
under the present law.
This Court takes notice of the fact that the
conditions in this case are not peculiar to the
work mentioned herein. Many, if not most,
employees are equally exposed to similar
conditions but have not been victims of peptic
ulcer.
Niceta C. Rodriguez v. ECC
16
GR No. L-46454, September 28, 1989
Facts:
Hector P. Rodriguez was a public school
teacher assigned at Salaan Elementary School in
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975
he went on sick leave and was confined at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after complaining
of severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea
and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal
Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with Obstruction
of the Ascending Colon." His ailment called for a
surgical operation which was performed on
November 27,1975 but this proved unavailing. A
few days thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he
died.
On January 28, 1976, the wife filed a
claim for death compensation under the Labor
Code with Government Service Insurance
System. In a letter-decision dated February 23,
1976, the GSIS denied the claim finding that the
cause of the death of petitioner's husband is not
an occupational disease since the nature of his
duties as a teacher, as well as the working
conditions of his employment, could not have
directly caused his ailment which eventuated in
his subsequent death. Motion for reconsideration,
dated August 11, 1976, was denied upon the
finding that the evidence failed to establish that
the decedent's employment had any causal
relationship with the contraction of the ailment
and there was no showing that the same directly
arose therefrom or resulted from the nature
thereof. A second motion for reconsideration filed
on October 18, 1976 having been denied by the
GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review
to the respondent commission where it was
docketed as ECC Case No. 0266.
On March 16, 1977, respondent
commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS and
denied the claim of petitioner. The case is now
before us on a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether petitioner should be given the
compensation.
Held:
No.
The applicable rule established in law
and jurisprudence concerning claims based on
the provisions of the Labor Code on employees'
compensation, particularly on death benefits
under Article 194, is that they must result from
an occupational disease. A compensable disease
means any illness accepted and listed by the
Employees' Compensation Commission or any
illness caused by the employment subject to
proof by the employee that the risk of contracting
the same was increased by the working
conditions.
If the disease is listed in the Table of
Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of
the Rules on Employees' Compensation, no proof
of causation is required. However, if it is not so
listed, it has been held that the employee, this
time assisted by his employer, is required to
prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions. The fact that the cause of the
disease was not positively identified does not
dispense with this burden of proof.
The observations heretofore made do
not mean that proof of direct causal relation is
indispensably required. It is enough that the
claimant adduces proof of reasonable work
connection, whereby the development of the
disease was brought about largely by the
conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict
rules of evidence are not demanded, the degree
of proof required being merely substantial
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evidence, which has been held to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.
Petitioner does not dispute the fact that
the principal duties of her husband as a
classroom teacher alone would not have any
connection with his disease. However, she posits
that the deceased's auxiliary activities as a
classroom teacher directly affected his physical
constitution and indubitably caused him to have
sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity
and other parts of the body.
It is our considered view that the
circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the
evidence she presented are not enough to
discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal
as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the
disease commenced and supervened; the tumors
which developed in the deceased's colon may
have been growing for many years even before
he was employed as a teacher. Neither was there
any indication as to what really caused the
disease: in fact, the nature of the disease as
described militate against a finding of a causal
nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to have
caused or at least contributed to the disease was
neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately
proved. Surely, the activities relied upon by the
petitioner, being outside the regular or primary
functions of a teacher, could not have been done
every working day. It is safe to assume that they
were done only for certain limited periods of time
and on isolated occasions as, for instance, during
competitions.
Thus, it cannot be said that decedent's
work as a teacher exposed him to hazards
different or greater from those involved in
ordinary or normal life-styles. There is no
showing that he did not engage in other
extraneous activities, aside from playing
basketball or being a member of the Boy Scouts.
Of further note is the observation that the
abdomen of the deceased was markedly obese,
which circumstance may also have been a
causative or contributive factor considering the
etiological and pathological particulars of said
ailment.
17
ECC vs. CA, Lilia Arreola
GR No. 121545, November 14, 1996
Facts:
Lilia Arreola was employed as a
Chemical Laboratory Technician in the NBI since
1972. She was later promoted to Engineer II. In
1993, Arreola suffered pains at her left flank
accompanied by nausea, vomiting and low
moderate fever. She was diagnosed as having
Ureterolithiasis and filed before GSIS an
application for compensation benefit under PD
626.
GSIS denied her claim on the ground
that (1) ailment is a non-occupational disease
and (2) she failed to show that the position has
increased the risk of contracting the sickness.
Arreola appealed to ECC which deemed the case
without merit because there was lack of proof
that the illness was a result of an occupationl
diseased listed uner the rules and that it was
increased by her working conditions.
She filed a petition for review before the
CA reversed the decision of ECC and ordered
GSIS to pay.
Issue:
Whether the illness of Arreola is
compensable under PD 626.
Held:
Yes, her illness is compensable.
Although PD. 626 abandoned the
presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation under the Workmens Compensation
Act, a claimant may still be entitled to
compensation even if the same is not listed as an
occupational disease if he can prove that the risk
of contracting the illness or disease was
increased by his working conditions.
Despite the abandonment of the
presumption of compensability established by the
old law, the present law has not ceased to be an
employees compensation law or a social
legislation; hence the liberality of the law in favor
of the working man and woman still prevails, and
the official agency charged by law to implement
the constitutional guarantee of social justice
should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the
employee in deciding claims for compensability,
especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor of the 1987 Constitution.
Indeed private respondent concedes
that her ailment, ureterolithiasis, is not included
in the list of occupational diseases but she was
able to prove that the risk of contracting it was
increased by the exigency and nature of her
work. The work of private respondent exposed
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her to drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels
and inorganic compounds and chemical
laboratory equipment. She also attended to field
cases and rendered holiday and night duties once
a week. Neither have the petitioner refuted the
claim of the private respondent that she missed
some important health habits such as regularly
drinking enough water and urination.
18
Rufina Tancinco v. GSIS
GR No. 132916
Facts:
In 1995, while being on off duty and at
home, SPO1 Eddie Tancinco who was repairing a
service vehicle was shot dead by five unidentified
armed men. Tancinco was a member of the NCR
Security Protection Group of the PNP and was
assigned as a close-in security detail of VP
Joseph Estrada. Tancinco was off-duty at the
time inasmuch as the VP was in the US for
medical treatment.
His widow, Rufina, filed a claim for
benefits before the GSIS which denied the claim
on the ground that there was no proof that her
husbands deah was work-related. ECC affirmed
the finding since SP)1 was on off duty status and
thus, his death did not arise out of and in the
course of his employment as a member of the
PNP.
Petitioner filed a petition for review
before the CA which denied the petition on
technicalities, i.e. certificate of non-forum
shopping was defective, etc, in May of 1997.
However, Rufina only filed a motion for
reconsideration on January 27, 1998 or 7.5
months after receipt of the assailed decision.
The Solicitor General adopts the view
that Tancincos death is work-related given the
fact that the deceased was a policeman and the
killing was done in a professional manner.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Court may still take cognizance
of the petition.
(2) Whether the death of Tancinco is work-
related.
Held:
(1) No, a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the CA must be made within 15
days from notice of the judgment. Rufina filed
the MR 231 days late, thereby making the
resolution final and executory.
The gap of seven months is too large to
ignore. The period of appeal is not only
mandatory, but it is also jurisdictional. Even the
SC cannot ignore the immutable character of a
final judgment.
(2) No, his death is not work-related,
and is thus not compensable.
The grounds for the injury and resulting
disability or death to be compensable are as
follows:
(a) employee msut have been injured at
the place where his work requires him to be;
(b) employee must have been
performing his official functions; and
(c) if the injury is sustained elsewhere,
employee must be executing an order for the
employer.
These requirements have not been met.
Tancinco was at home and off-duty at that time.
It was not sufficiently established that he was
performing official functions at the time of his
death. Although the Court in ECC vs CA has held
that a soldier or policeman are by the nature of
their functions technically on duty 24 hours a
day, the 24-hour doctrine was modified in the
recent case of GSIS vs. CA where the court held
that:
At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine
serves more as an after-the fact validation of
their acts to place them within the scope of the
guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit
them in all situations that may give rise to their
deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine
should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and
circumstances causing the death of a police
officer but only to those which, although not on
official line of duty, are nonetheless basically
police service in character.
Tancinco was repairing a service vehicle
when he was killed. This cannot, in any way, be
said to be in line with his task as a policeman in
maintaining order, preventing and detecting
crimes, and enforcing the laws.
Finally, Tancinco being at home, it was
incumbent on petitioner to show that her
husband was discharging a task pursuant to an
order issued by his superiors. This also was not
done.
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With regret, the Court denies the
petition.
19
Venusto Panotes v. ECC
GR No. L-64802, September 23, 1985
Facts:
On Mar 29, 1984, the Supreme Court
rendered a decision granting compensation
benefits to petitioner Venusto Panotes for the
death of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes. She
died of colonic malignancy cancer of the colon, a
fatal disease considered by the Court as having
been contracted due to or at least the risk of
contracting the same had been increased by the
working conditions to which the deceased had
been subjected as a public school teacher, and
accordingly, ordered respondent Government
Service Insurance System to pay death benefits,
reimburse medical and hospital expenses duly
supported, funeral expenses and attorneys fees.
On May 2, 1984, respondent GSIS filed
a motion for reconsideration based on the
following grounds:
1) reasonable work-connection is required by the
law for an employees'compensation claims, the
alleged fact of impossibility of proof
notwithstanding;
2) the legal requirement of work-connection
should prevail upon the general liberality of the
law;
3) award of attorney's fees is not within the
contemplation of the law and which this Court
had previously reduced to 5% (p. 82, rec.).
Issue:
Whether the disease which caused the death of
Agustina Panotes has a reasonable work-
connection despite cause of the ailment being
unknown
Held:
Yes. The motion for reconsideration is
devoid of merit.
The respondent contends that the
standard reasonable work connection for
compensation of cases was rendered
meaningless because the petitioner was granted
death benefits despite the fact that the cause of
her colon cancer is unknown. Adding that it
would be unfair to grant compensation to cases
where causes of disease are unknown compared
to those whose causes are known but cannot be
proved as work-connected. Respondent GSIS
further alleges that the evidences presented
tended to prove a mere case of aggravation and
not reasonable work-connection
Under the employees' compensation
law, there are two categories of occupational
illness or disease deemed compensation; a) those
listed as occupational disease by the Commission,
and b) any illness caused by the employment,
subject to a showing by the employee that the
risk of contracting the same is increased by the
working condition
An occupational disease generally
providing compensation therefor, is a disease
which is caused by, or especially incident to, or
the natural consequence of, the particular
employment in which the workman is engaged,
which results from exposure therein to hazards
greater or different than those involved in
ordinary living, which generally develops
gradually over a considerable period of time in
the employment, and which industry has not
learned to fend against or eliminate.
In determining the cause of disability,
and whether the cause was an occupational
disease within the provisions of the statute, all
factors must be taken into consideration; and
whether a disease is compensable must be
determined on the basis of the particular facts
involved in each case and the peculiar
characteristics of each employment
In the case at bar, this Honorable Court
went on to describe in detail the physical, mental
and emotional pressures undergone by the
deceased public school teacher who entered the
service in perfect health was not confined in the
classroom but engaged in other school activities,
was exposed to the elements, missed her meals
because of workloads, etc.all of which factors
weakened her body resistance and made her
susceptible to diseases.
It is apparent from respondent's
arguments that what it seeks is a direct, actual
proof of the causal connection between the fatal
disease and the working conditions of the
deceased. WE, however, rule in this case as WE
did in the other cases that actual proof of
causation is not necessary to justify
compensability. The degree of proof required to
establish proof of work-connection between
ailment and the deceased's employment is only
substantial evidence or reasonable work
connection
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Finally, with respect to the award of
attorney's fees, respondent argues that the
award is not proper or should have been reduced
to only 5% of the compensation claim. The
argument is devoid of merit. There is no
prohibition against imposing attorney's fees on
the employer, for the benefit of the counsel for
the claimant
20
Ruth Jimenez v. ECC
GR No. 58176, March 23, 1984
Facts:
Petitioner is the widow of Alfredo
Jimenez, a constable in the Philippine
Constabulary since 1969.
In 1978 he was confined at V Luna
Medical Center where he was diagnosed of aortic
aneurysm, medrastinal tumor. His ailment
continued and became more serious leading to
his death on May 12, 1980. The cause of death,
as found by the doctors, is "bronchogenic
carcinoma" which is a malignant tumor of the
lungs.
In June 1980 an administrative hearing
was conducted before the PC Board, the findings
that the subject enlisted man died in line of
duty, the he is a member of the PC, died through
bronchonegenic carcinoma; and that he died not
as a result of misconduct and did not violate any
provisions of the articles of war. The board then
recommended all benefits due to the subject.
Nevertheless, petitioner filed a claim for
death benefits under PD No. 626, as amended
with the respondent GSIS. Said claim was denied
by the GSIS on the ground that her husbands
death is not compensable "for the reason that
the injury/sickness that caused his death is not
due to the circumstances of the employment or
in the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of said employment". It is also the
opinion of the respondent that since there is
evidence of the deceased to be a smoker, "the
late Sgt. Jimenez may have indulged heavily in
smoking and drinking, not merely occasionally.
ECC affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether her husbands death from bronchogenic
carcinoma is compensable under the law.
Held:
Yes.
The theory of increased risk is applicable
in the instant case. The SC had the occasion to
interpret the theory of increased risk in the case
of Cristobal v. Employees Compensation
Commission that to establish compensability
under the said theory, the claimant must show
proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree
of proof required is merely substantial evidence,
which means such relevant evidence to support
a decision or clear and convincing evidence. In
this connection, it must be pointed out that the
strict rules of evidence are not applicable in
claims for compensation.
Respondents however insist on evidence
which would establish direct causal relation
between the disease rectal cancer and the
employment of the deceased. Such a strict
requirement which even medical experts cannot
support considering the uncertainty of the nature
of the disease would negate the principle of the
liberality in the matter of evidence, Apparently,
what the law merely requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit
of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new
Labor Code which states that all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The case deals with possibilities and
medical authorities have given credence to the
stand of the petitioner that her husband
developed bronchogenic carcinoma while working
as a soldier with the Philippine Constabulary. The
records show that when the deceased enlisted
with the Philippine Constabulary in 1969, he was
found to be physically and mentally healthy. A
soldiers life is a hard one. As a soldier assigned
to field duty, exposure to the elements, dust and
dirt, fatigue and lack of sleep and rest is a
common occurrence. Exposure to chemicals while
handling ammunition and firearms cannot be
discounted.
SC took note also of the fact that he
became the security of one Dr. Emilio Cordero of
Anulung, Cagayan, and he always accompanied
the doctor wherever the latter went. Such
assignment invariably involved irregular working
hours, exposure to different working conditions,
and body fatigue, not to mention psychological
stress and other similar factors which influenced
the evolution of his ailment.
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In compensation cases. strict rules of
evidence are not applicable. A reasonable work-
connection is all that is required or that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions." Respondent GSIS was
ordered to pay death benefits, reimburse medical
and hospital expenses and burial expenses.
21
Ma-Ao Sugar Central Co v. CA
GR No. 83491, August 27, 1990
Facts:
On March 22, 1980, Julio Famoso was
riding with a co-employee in a cargo train of the
petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly
derailed. He and his companion jumped off to
escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught
his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He
was declared dead on the spot. The claims for
death and other benefits having been denied by
the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed
suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago City. RTC
ruled in her favor but deducted from the total
damages awarded 25% thereof for the
decedent's contributory negligence and the total
pension that would be received from the SSS for
the next five years. The widow appealed,
claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did
the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not
negligent and therefore not liable at all. On
appeal, the CA sustained the rulings of the trial
court except as to the contributory negligence of
the deceased and disallowed the deductions
protested by the private respondent.
Issues:
1. Whether CA erred for finding the
petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its
defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions
made by the trial court.
2. Whether the CA erred in
disauthorizing the deduction from the total
damages awarded the private respondent by the
SSS.
Held:
1. No. Investigation of the accident
revealed that the derailment of the locomotive
was caused by protruding rails which had come
loose because they were not connected and fixed
in place by fish plates. Fish plates that should
have kept the rails aligned could not be found at
the scene of the accident. There is no question
that the maintenance of the rails was the
responsibility of the petitioner, and that this
responsibility was not discharged.
According to Jose Treyes, its own
witness, who was in charge of the control and
supervision of its train operations, cases of
derailment in the milling district were frequent
and there were even times when such
derailments were reported every hour. The
petitioner should therefore have taken more
prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead
of waiting until a life was finally lost because of
its negligence. The argument that no one had
been hurt before because of such derailments is
of course not acceptable. For what is important is
that the petitioner should act on these reports
and not merely receive and file them. The fact
that it is not easy to detect if the fish plates are
missing is no excuse either. The fact that the fish
plates were not found later at the scene of the
mishap may show they were never there at all to
begin with or had been removed long before. At
any rate, the absence of the fish plates
whatever the cause or reason is by itself alone
proof of the negligence of the petitioner.
Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and
conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting
derailments-which reports have not been acted
upon as shown by the hourly derailments is-not
the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil
Code.
We also do not see how the decedent
can be held guilty of contributory negligence
from the mere fact that he was not at his
assigned station when the train was derailed.
That might have been a violation of company
rules but could not have directly contributed to
his injury. Contributory negligence has been
defined as "the act or omission amounting to
want of ordinary care on the part of the person
injured which, concurring with the defendant's
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury."
It has been held that "to hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that
he performed an act that brought about his
injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body." There is
no showing that the caboose where Famoso was
riding was a dangerous place and that he
recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or
signs of impending danger.
2. No. Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as
amended provides that any amount received by
the heirs of a deceased employee from the
Employees Compensation Commission, whose
funds are administered by the SSS, shall be
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exclusive of all other amounts that may otherwise
be claimed under the Civil Code and other
pertinent laws. The amount to be paid by the SSS
represents the usual pension received by the
heirs of a deceased employee who was a
member of the SSS at the time of his death and
had regularly contributed his premiums as
required by the System. The pension is the
benefit derivable from such contributions. It does
not represent the death benefits payable under
the Workmen's Compensation Act to an employee
who dies as a result of a work-connected injury.
Indeed, the certification that the respondent
herein is receiving a monthly pension from SSS
submitted by the petitioner does not indicate that
the pension is to be taken from the funds of the
ECC.
Famoso's widow and nine minor children
have since his death sought to recover the just
recompense they need for their support. Instead
of lending a sympathetic hand, the petitioner has
sought to frustrate their efforts and has even
come to this Court to seek our assistance in
defeating their claim. That relief-and we are
happy to say this must be withheld.
22
Chua Yeng v. Michaela Roma
GR No. L-14827, October 31, 1960
Facts:
Santos Romeo was, on May 16, 1956,
working for petitioner as cargador in loading and
unloading copra at the former's warehouse. In
the morning of that day, after asking permission
from his employer, Santos Romeo went to
petitioner's house just across the street from the
warehouse to get a drink of water, the water
pump in the warehouse being out of order and
no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen
of said house and while he was drinking, he saw
a puppy eating some fried fish inside an open
cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy, but as
the puppy still continue to eat the fish, Santos
made a motion with hand to drive it away, in the
course of which his right hand was bitten by said
puppy. On June 26, 1958, Santos Romeo died of
hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that
the puppy was not owned by petitioner.
Appellant contends that, under the circumstances
narrated, the death of the laborer cannot be
considered to arise "out of and in course" of his
employment.
Issue:
Whether the death of the laborer be
considered to rise out of and inside of his
employment.
Held:
Yes. Such acts as are reasonably
necessary to the health and comfort of an
employee while at work, such as satisfaction of
his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands, or
protecting himself from excessive cold, are
nevertheless incidental to the employment, and
injuries sustained in the performance of such act
are generally held to be compensable as arising
out of and in the course of the employment. That
Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's
house and not at his usual place of work does
not bring the case out of the operation of the rule
previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer
was practically driven to that place through the
appellant's fault in not providing an adequate
supply of drinking water at the warehouse.
Appellant urges that the dog bite was
provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish away
from the puppy and hence, while he was
engaged in an independent activity. But the act
of the deceased was practically an instinctive
one, that would naturally be expected from any
person in his position. Moreover, it was motivated
by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to
protect the latter's property, that cannot be
deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the
laborer as such.
At any rate, the resulting injury is not
without causation in the conditions under which
deceased was required to perform his work. It
appears that there were no adequate and
sanitary means of water supply in the place of
work; that petitioner's workers used, for drinking
purposes, water from a well at the back of the
warehouse; that this well was out or order at the
time of the incident, so that the deceased had to
cross a wide public street to petitioner's house
just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to
hazards which may well have been avoided if
there were drinking facilities at, or more
proximate to, the place of work. Finally, the
Workmen's Compensation Act being a social
legislation, and in line with the intent of the law
to effect social justice, the provisions thereof
should be liberally construed in favor of the
workingman
23
Visayan Stevedore & Trans Co. v.
WCC, Julieta Labiyo
GR No. L-26657, September 12, 1974
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Facts:
The deceased, employed as engineer by
Visayan Stevedore & Transportation Company
with a monthly salary of P235.00 was part of a 3-
man crew of the tugboat "M/T DILIS." His main
duty consisted in his starting the engine and
seeing to it that it functioned properly during the
voyage, with the actual navigation of the tugboat
being the responsibility of his 2 other
companions, the "Patron" who controlled the
wheel and a helper (timonel) who operated the
rudder.
According to Federico Sespene, "patron"
of the tugboat when the deceased died, prior to
that they were ordered to tow and load cargos.
They also had to shift or bring barges and as a
consequence of this work, they were compelled
to stay in the tugboat. While they were
navigating Eduardo visibly tired and inactive
asked permission to take a rest and was granted.
But when he was called to start the engine, there
was no answer from him. The quartermaster was
the one who responded instead and was ordered
to wake up Eduardo, who at the time was already
dead. It was about 6:30am in the morning of
February 17, 1964.
A subsequent autopsy of the deceased's
remains conducted by Dr. Raymundo L. Torres,
the assistant medicolegal officer of the Iloilo City
Police Department, traced the cause of
Eduardo Labiyo's death to "bangungot."
On March 16, 1964 respondent Julieta Labiyo,
the widow, filed a claim for compensation with
the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. VII,
Iloilo City. After appropriate proceedings, the
acting referee of the Workmen's Compensation
Unit in Iloilo City dismissed the case upon a
finding that "the cause of death of Eduardo
Labiyo did not arise out of and was aggravated
by the nature of his employment." Upon review
this decision was set aside by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission in a decision dated
June 16, 1966, ordering at the same time the
petitioner to pay compensation benefits, burial
expenses and costs. Petitioner thereafter moved
to reconsider but the Commission, in a resolution
en banc dated August 30, 1966, denied the
motion.
Issue:
Whether petitioner VISAYAN STEVEDORE &
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY liable to pay
benefits and other expenses to respondent.
Held:
Yes .
We do not think that the main point
pressed by petitioner, namely, that death caused
by "bangungot" is not compensable, is at all
decisive in the case at bar. What is not denied,
and this is crucial insofar as the compensability of
Eduardo Labiyo's death is concerned, is that
when death came to the deceased he was in
active duty as an engineer-employee of the
petitioner. This being the case, the need to
pinpoint the cause of his death as work
connected in order to render it compensable
assumes very little importance. "(It) is to be
presumed, under section 44 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, that the
employee's death, supervening at the time of his
employment, either arose out of, or was at least
aggravated by said employment. With this legal
presumption the burden of proof shifts to the
employer, and the employee is relieved of the
burden to show causation. ... The mere opinion
of doctors presented by petitioner as evidence
cannot prevail over the presumption established
by law."
Jurisprudence provides that it proceeds
from an awareness of the fact that when an
employee undertakes to satisfy, in the course of
employment, certain human wants, i.e. eating,
freshening up, sleeping and the like, "and
something takes place that may cause injury,
harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is
fair and logical that the happening be considered
as one occurring in the course of employment for
under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken
in any other way unless it can be clearly shown
that the mishap occurred because the employee
acted beyond his duty or outside the course of
employment, which is not so in the case at bar.
24
Natividad Bellosillo v.
City of Manila
GR No. 34552, November 9, 1931
Facts:
This is an action to recover from the City
of manila the sum of P937.60 as compensation to
the widow and minor child of Andres Taborda
under the Workmens Compensation Act. The
deceased Taborda was a laborer in the employ of
the City and at the time the accident occurred, he
was then assigned to work on Dewey Boulevard.
During working hours, in answer to a
call of nature, Taborda with another laborer
crossed Dewey Boulevard to the shore of Manila
Bay. On their way back, Taborda was run over by
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Atty. R. Raypon
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a garage car which was negligently drive, thus
causing his death.
Issue:
(1) Whether the accident was due to and in
pursuance of the employment
(2) Whether the injury was caused by the
notorious negligence of the deceased.
Held:
(1) The injury was caused by an accident due to
and in the pursuance of the employment. The
workman was then employed by the City and in
the course of that employment, it was necessary
for him to relieve himself. As there were no toilet
accommodations available, he was compelled to
cross the street. It cannot then be said that the
workman, to satisfy a call of nature, went to a
dangerous and unauthorized place.
(2) Neither was there notorious negligence which
implies willful negligence, and that is not the
equivalent of contributory negligence or simple
negligence. The law would serve little purpose if
the general rules relating to damages and
negligence were invariably invoked.
25
Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation
v. Hon. Del Rosario
GR No. L-115978, December 29, 1960
Facts:
On September 29, 1967, the truck of
Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation carrying some
lumber from its sawmill to Davao City,
accidentally overturned on the road. Vicente
Soriano, its driver, was killed instantly together
with his son, Vicente Soriano Jr.
His widow, Flavia A. Soriano, claimed
compensation on November 11, before the
Regional Office No. 8, at Davao, of the
Department of Labor. Having found the driver
guilty of notorious negligence, the hearing officer
denied compensation.
On appeal, the Chairman of the
Workmen's Compensation saw differently. He
found no such negligence, and awarded
compensation.
Notorious negligence was imputed to the driver
because:
1. Preceding the accident the truck was running
40 to 50 kilometers per hour;
2. That the road was dangerous forming a steep
slope and the curve of the road was very near
the accident;
3. That the machine of the truck was very
defective as the truck that met the accident has
no more brakes at the time it was going down at
a distance of 5 kms;
4. That the trip in question was personal to meet
the relative of the wife of the deceased and the
loading of the lumber on that day SUNDAY was
never authorized by the respondent nor any of its
representatives.
5. That the trip was made solely at the instance
of the deceased;
6. That the dump truck that met the accident was
not registered in the Motor Vehicle Office as the
same must be utilized only in carrying slabs
inside the sawmill compound; so that its brakes
are not in good condition and unworthy to be
taken to the public highway;
7. That despite the defective condition of the
truck the deceased (Vicente Soriano Sr.) still
drove the truck until he met the accident;
8. That the members of his family were all seated
in the front seat and immediately preceding the
accident his Jr. jump into his arms as a
consequence of which he lost control of the
steering wheel thus hitting a kilometer post.
(Affidavit of Mario Bariquit). (Exh. 7-B)
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano was guilty of notorious
negligence barring his death from being
compensable.
Held:
No, the court finds that Soriano was
without negligence in the performance of his
duties. The truck was running fast just before
overturning because it was then on a slope, and
(as declared by the Commission) the "gear of the
truck went out of order rendering the gear shift
useless," and that the brake "would not
function." As to the fourth and fifth
circumstances, the Commissioner's decision says
the Company consented to or authorized the trip.
Concerning the non-registration of the
truck in Motor Vehicle Office, and its defective
condition - there is no finding that the driver
knew this at the time of driving. Registration of
the vehicle was not his concern.
As to the presence of members of his
family in the vehicle, supposing it was in violation
of company regulations, it is not certain that it
caused the accident. 1Indeed, as his wife and
children were present, this driver must have been
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Atty. R. Raypon
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extremely careful - not reckless. What happened
must have been unforeseen; it may only be
blamed upon the worn-out condition of the motor
transport or as an "accident," for which the
employer is responsible, it having arisen out of
and in the course of the deceased's regular
duties as driver.
The death was, consequently,
compensable. The Commission and this Court
find no notorious negligence.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Batangas Transportation
26
Company v. Vda de Rivera
GR No. L-7658, May 8, 1956
Facts:
Aurelio Rivera was one of the petitioner's bus
driver. While he was driving his bus, a passenger
shot him from behind leading to his death. At the
hearing before the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, the petitioner claimed that the
motive behind the killing was personal. However,
he failed to prove this.
Issue:
Whether in the absence of proof of motive for the
killing, the heirs of the deceased driver are
entitled to compensation.
Held:
If it is proved that the employee died in
the course of the employment, the legal
presumption is that the claim comes within the
provisions of the compensation law. Here, the
driver died in the course of the employment. In
defense, the petitioner alleged before the
commission that the cause of death was a
"personal grudge" on the part of the assailant,
but they failed to prove this. In the absence of
proof on the part of the employer to support its
defense, the statutory presumption that the
death of the employee arose out of employment
should prevail. This is in line with Section 6,
Article XIV of the constitution, which enjoins the
state "to afford protection to labor".
Judgement affirmed.
27
Marinduque Iron Mines Agents
v. WCC
GR No. L-8110, June 30, 1956
Facts:
On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m, the
deceased Mamador together with other laborers
of Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. (Petitioner
Company) boarded a truck belonging to the
latter, which was then driven by one Procopio
Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and
on its way to their place of work at the mine
camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake
another truck on the company road, it turned
over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death
of said Mamador and injury to the others.
Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased. He has paid nothing however, to the
latter.
Referee Ramon Villaflor of the
Workmens Compensation Commission (the
Commission) awarded compensation to the heirs
of Pedro Mamador for his accidental death to be
paid by Petitioner Company which was confirmed
by the Workmens Compensation Commissioner
in an order. The Petitioner Company, thru its Vice
President, denied its liability under the
Workmens Compensation Act, as amended.
Petitioner Company questioned by certiorari said
order before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not proceedings before the
Commission are not valid because Petitioner
Company had not been given the opportunity to
cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
(2) Whether or not the claim was barred by
section 6 of the Workmens Compensation Law,
because (a) Macunat was prosecuted and
required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded
between said heirs and Macunat. The settlement
consisted of an affidavit wherein, for the sum of
150 pesos, Mamadors widow promised to
forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and
not to bring him before the authorities for
prosecution.
(3) Whether or not the deceased has no right to
compensation for having violated the employers
prohibition against laborers riding the haulage
trucks constituting notorious negligence which
under the law, precludes recovery.
Held:
(1) No, the proceedings before the
Commission are valid because Petitioner
Company was given notice, and therefore had
the chance, to examine and cross-examine the
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witnesses against it. Records show that pursuant
to a request made by this Commission on March
28, 1953 to investigate the case, the Public
Defender of Boac notified Geronimo Ma. Coll and
the general manager of the Petitioner Company,
Mr. Eric Lenze, to appear before him in an
investigation twice when neither of them
appeared after the first notice, and when only Mr.
Geronimo Ma. Coll appeared on the second. In
an investigation conducted on February 8, 1954
by Referee Villaflor, the Petitioner Company thru
Mr. Lenze who was assisted by counsel, was
allowed to examine the records of the case
including the sworn declaration of Ma. Coll and
was given all the opportunity to rebut the same
by additional evidence. Furthermore, the statute
(Section 48, Act 3428 as amended) even permits
the Commissioner (or his referee) to take
testimony without notice provided such ex parte
evidence is reduced to writing, and the adverse
party is afforded opportunity to examine and
rebut the same which was done in this instance.
(2) No, because as already decided in
Nava v. Inchausti Co. (57 Phil 751), the
indemnity granted to the heirs in a criminal
prosecution of the other person does not affect
the liability of the employer to pay compensation.
It was erroneous for the Petitioner Company to
contend that the criminal case and its outcome
constituted an election by the employee (or his
heirs) to sue the third person, such election
having the effect of releasing the employer. The
criminal case was not a suit for damages against
the third person, it being alleged, without
contradiction that the heirs did not intervene
therein and have not so far received the
indemnity ordered by the court. As to the alleged
amicable settlement, all the widow promised was
to forego the offenders criminal prosecution not
the compensation.
Section 6 of the Workmens Compensation Law
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. In case an
employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other
person besides his employer, it shall be optional
with such injured employee either to claim
compensation from his employer, under this Act,
or sue such other person for damages, in
accordance with law; and in case compensation
is claimed and allowed in accordance with this
Act, the employer who paid such compensation
or was found liable to pay the same, shall
succeed the injured employee to the right of
recovering from such person what he paid:
Provided, That in case the employer recovers
from such third person damages in excess of
those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess
shall be delivered to the injured employee or any
other person entitled thereto, after deduction of
the expenses of the employer and the costs of
the proceedings. The sum paid by the employer
for compensation or the amount of compensation
to which the employee or his dependents are
entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in
any damage suit or action.
(3) No, the deceased (or his heirs) has
the right to compensation because the order of
the employer (prohibition rather) could not be of
a greater obligation than the rule of a
Commission or board. The referee correctly
considered this violation as possible evidence of
negligence but it declared that under the
circumstance, the laborer could not be declared
to have acted with negligence since the
prohibition had nothing to do with personal
safety of the riders. Such finding is virtually a
finding of fact which the Supreme Court may not
overrule in this certiorari proceeding.
Nevertheless, even granting there was
negligence, it surely was not notorious
negligence, which have been interpreted to mean
the same thing as gross negligence. Getting or
accepting a free ride on the companys haulage
truck could not be gross negligence, for as the
referee found, no danger or risk was apparent.
Also, the Commission has not declared that the
prohibition was known to Mamador and the
employer does not point out in the record
evidence to that effect.
28
Emilia vda De Inguillo v. ECC
GR No. L-51543, June 6, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner's husband, the late Enrique V.
Inguillo, during his lifetime, worked as a janitor
at the E. Jacinto Elementary School in Tondo,
Manila. He was in the government service for
thirty-one (31) years. From February 25 to June
5, 1978, he was confined at the Veteran's
Memorial Hospital on "complaints of difficulty in
swallowing of food, solid and liquid, accompanied
by chest pains difficulty of breathing, fever and
productive cough." As indicated in his Death
Certificate, he died on June 20, 1978, at the age
of 52, the cause of death being attributed to
"Terminal malignancy, Poorly differentiated
Esophageal Edenocarcinoma with Bone and
Cervical Metastasis, Pneumonia."
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The surviving spouse, Emilia Inguillo,
filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS.
The claim was denied on the ground that the
cause of death, cancer of the esophagus, is not
an occupational disease. A motion for
reconsideration of the GSIS decision having been
denied, claimant-petitioner appealed to
respondent ECC. On August 9, 1979 respondent
ECC affirmed the GSIS denial and dismissed
petitioner's claim. Hence, she filed a petition for
review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the death of petitioner's
husband is compensable.
Held:
Yes, although cancer ailments, except
for specified few, are not compensable, ECC
failed to adequately take into consideration that
there was another cause of death which was
pneumonia. Even though, all of the qualifying
conditions to consider pneumonia compensable
do not concur as provided by Annex A of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
there was substantial compliance therewith,
added to the fact that punctilious adherence to
stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the
interest of the working man, who has less in life,
and in consonance with the avowed policy of the
State to give maximum aid and protection to
labor.
Under the Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation, pneumonia is a
qualifiedly occupational disease under all the
following conditions:
(a) There must be an honest and definite history
of wetting and chilling during the course of
employment, also industrial injury to the chest
wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of
noxious gases, fumes and other deleterious
substances in the place of work.
(b) There must be a direct connection between
the offending agent or event and the worker's
illness.
(c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon
(within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial
chilling and fever should at least be twenty-four
(24) hours after the injury.
(d) The patient must present one of the following
findings within a few days of the accident:
(1) Severe chill and fever.
(2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in
the side.
(3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged
expectoration.
(4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales
(ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1988).
Noteworthy is the fact that the
decedent's complaint of "difficulty in swallowing
of food, solid and liquid" was accompanied by
"chest pains, difficulty of breathing, fever and
productive cough." The latter are clearly some of
the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia,
which by itself can also be a killer disease
(Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th
ed., pp. 802-804). Further, a review of the
deceased's work activities, as janitor, will show
that they included the regular use of "deleterious
substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes
from which are inhaled when used in cleaning
and clearing of toilet bowls and unclogging of
toilet pipes and plumbing connections. The
deceased also performed other varied manual
work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping
school corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a
lot of dust, lifting heavy objects, painting
classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during
school programs, as well as going to and from his
place of work thus exposing him to occasional
"wetting and chilling" from downpours and rains.
The combination of all these, coupled with the
fact that the decedent was working in Tondo, a
depressed and congested area characterized by
unsanitary conditions and heavy pollution, must
have lowered his resistance to fight the microbes
causative of pneumonia. The risk of contracting
the said disease, therefore, was increased by his
working conditions, thereby satisfying an
additional condition for compensability.
29
Carolina Clemente v. GSIS, ECC
GR No. L-47521, July 31, 1987
Facts:
Petitioner is the wife of the late Pedro
Clemente. Pedro was a janitor in the Department
of Health, assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic
for 10 years. He was hospitalized for 11 days in
1976 due to his ailment of nephritis. He was
also found to be suffering from such ailments as
portal cirrhosis and leprosy.
In November 1976, Pedro died of
uremia due to to nephritis. His wife filed a claim
with the GSIS for employees compensation but
the same was denied because the ailments of her
husband are not occupational diseases and/or
were not in the least causally related to his duties
and conditions of work. ECC affirmed the decision
of GSIS. Petitioner argues that the death of her
husband is compensable under the theory of
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Atty. R. Raypon
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increased risk. Respondent GSIS asked to be
dropped as a party.
Issues:
(1) Whether there is sufficient evidence to
sustain theory of increased risk
(2) Whether the fact that Pedros existing ailment
was aggravated by his work may still be
compensable when this is no longer a ground for
compensation under the present law.
(3) Whether GSIS may be dropped as a party.
Held:
(1) Yes, for Pedro worked in a skin clinic and as a
janitor, he was exposed to different carriers of
viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the
clinic itself where patients with different illnesses
come and go. He had to put in order the hospital
equipment that had been used. He had to
dispose garbage and wastes that accumulated in
the course of each working day. He was the
employee most exposed to dangerous
concentration of infected materials, and not
being a medical practitioner, least likely to know
how to avoid infection.
It is therefore not unreasonable to
conclude that Pedros working conditions
definitely increased the risk of his contracting the
aforementioned ailments.
(2) Yes, the fallacy in the theory of respondent is
its failure to explain how a sick person was able
to enter the government service more than ten
year before he became too ill to work and at a
time when aggravation of disease was still
compensable. There is no evidence to show that
pedro was hired inspite of having an existing
disease liable to become worse.
(3) No, GSIS should not be dropped as a party in
the case for it is the ultimate implementing
agency of the ECC.
Gliceria Casumpang v. ECC,
30
GSIS and BoP
GR No. L-47521, July 31, 1987
Facts:
Petitioner is the widow of the late Jose
Casumpang.
Jose Casumpang was a prison guard of
the Bureau of Prisons with assignment at the San
Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga
City. He died due to cancer of the stomach.
When petitioner claimed for death benefits, the
same was denied because the cause of death is
not an occupational disease nor the result of the
deceaseds nature of occupation as prison guard.
Issue:
Whether cancer of the stomach is an occupation
disease and hence, compensable under PD 626.
Held:
No.
Under Art. 167 (b) of the New Labor
Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation, for the
sickness and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the sickness must be the result
of an occupation disease listed under Annex A
of the Rules with the condition set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that
the risk of contracting the disease is increased by
the working conditions.
Under the Labor Code, cancer of the
stomach is not an occupation disease. In ECC
Resolution No. 247-A, cancer of the stomach and
other lymphatic and blood forming, vessels was
considered occupational only among
woodworkers; wood products industry
carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and
paper mills and plywood mills. The complained
illness is therefore not compensable under the
first group provided in the Labor Code.
Under the second group for
compensability, it should be shown that an illness
is caused by employment and that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. Petitioner failed to show that the
conditions, i.e. missed meals, overtaken by rain,
work at night, brought about cancer of the
stomach.
Why is it important to determine which law is
applicable?
Under the former Workmens Compensation
Act or Act. No. 3428, the claimant was relieved of the
duty to prove causation as it was ten legally presumed
that the illness arose out of employment under the
presumption of compensability. (Tortal v. WCC)
However, under the new law, the principles
of aggravation and presumption of compensability have
been stricken off by lawmakers as grounds for
compensation. In order to be compensable, the injury
or illness must be listed under Annex A with the
conditions set therein or it must be shown that the risk
of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
27