ASEAN and Multilateralism: The Long, Bumpy Road to Community

Author(s): SHELDON SIMON

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 30, No. 2 (August 2008), pp. 264-292
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41220507
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ContemporarySoutheastAsia Vol.30,No. 2 (2008),pp. 264-92 DOI: /-
2008ISEAS ISSN 0219-797Xprint/ISSN 1793-284Xelectronic

ASEAN and Multilateralism:

The Long,BumpyRoad
to Community1
SHELDON SIMON

OfthethreeAsian subregions- Northeast, Southeastand South-

Southeast Asiais theonlyonethatcontains no GreatPower.YetSoutheast
Asian stateshave originated mostAsian regionalorganizations, and
SoutheastAsianproceduresacquiredthrough ASEANdetermine their
processes.The"ASEANWay", emphasizing consensus, in
non-interference
members' internal andvoluntary
affairs enforcement ofregionaldecisions
havecharacterized thesebodies,insuring at bottomthattheyreinforce
sovereigntyprotection.Nevertheless, ASEAN'sexpansionin the1990sto
includeVietnam, Laos, Myanmarand Cambodiaincorporated states
whoseharshdomestic politicswereseenbyseveraloftheAssociation's
originalmembers tobe undermining itsinternational stature.Additionally,
copingwithterrorism in thenewcentury has also led tosomeerosionof
thenon-interference norm.Transnational cooperation is nowessentialto
eachnation'ssecurity becauseterroristgroupscrossnationalborders, and
egregioushumanrightspracticesin one country can lead to refugees
fleeingintoneighbouring countries.
ASEAN'snewNovember 2007Charter
constitutesan efforttomovebeyondsovereignty protection toeconomic,
and socio-cultural
political-security communities by2020. TheCharter
also commits itssignatoriestodemocracy (forthefirsttime)and human
rights.Otherregionalorganizations dominatedbyASEANprocedures
includetheASEAN RegionalForum(ARF)forsecuritydiscussions,
ASEAN+3(Japan, SouthKoreaand China)foreconomicmatters, and the
EastAsianSummit (EAS)whichaddedAustralia, NewZealandandIndia
totheASEAN+3.DialoguesinthesegroupscoverthegamutofAsianinter-
nationalrelations.Perhapstheirgreatest utilityis as venuesfornational
leaderstodiscusspressing issueson thesidelinesofthesegatherings.

Keywords:ASEAN, ASEAN RegionalForum,ASEAN Plus Three,East Asia Summit.

Sheldon Simonis Professorof Political Science at Arizona State

United States.
University,

264

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ASEANandMultilateralism 265

Froma geopoliticalperspective,the Asian littoraldivides into three

subregions:NortheastAsia (the People's Republic of China, Japan,
Northand South Korea,Taiwan and the Russian Far East), Southeast
Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar,the Philippines,Singapore,Thailand and Vietnam)and
South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka).
Both NortheastAsia and South Asia containpolitical and economic
GreatPowers. In the latter,India's economic activitiesand growing
politico-securityinfluenceextendto all of Asia. In the former,Japan,
China, South Korea and Taiwan play significantglobal economic
roles, while Tokyo and Beijing are also major political-security
players.By contrast,SoutheastAsia containsno GreatPowers with
global reach. While the regionconsistsof severalstateswithvibrant
economies- Singapore,Malaysia,Thailand- or economicpotential
- Vietnamand Indonesia - in geopoliticalstature,SoutheastAsia
pales in comparisonto its Northeastand South Asia neighbours.Yet
SoutheastAsia is wheremostAsian regionalorganizationsoriginate
and whose structuresand proceduresare determinedby Southeast
Asian preferences. The primarygoal of this articleis to explain how
this has happened,what the implicationsare forAsia's futureand
whetherSoutheast Asian states organized for the past fortyyears
throughthe Associationof SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) will
be able to maintaintheirpivotal position in Asian affairs.For the
past several decades, the Asia-Pacificregionhas been markedby a
difficultasymmetry: the most dangerousdisputes lie in Northeast
and South Asia while the region'smultilateralinstitutionsdesigned
to manage and reduce conflicthave originatedin SoutheastAsia.
While ASEAN has maintained its organizational integrity,
it has added new internaland external dimensions. The former
include the incipientASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN
Interparliamentary Organizationwhich has been particularlyvocal
in condemningMyanmar'shuman rightsviolations,and the "Track
Three" ASEAN People's Assembly,an NGO that brings a variety
of societal interestgroups togetherto lobby ASEAN governments.
ASEAN-dominatedorganizationsencompass the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) on securitymatters,ASEAN+3 (Japan,South Korea
and China), various ASEAN+1 dialogues with importantstates,
the ASEAN-Europe meeting (ASEM), and most recently,regular
dialogues with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Africa and Latin
America.The newest and most contentiousaddition to the mix is
the East Asian Summit(EAS) inauguratedin December 2005. The
EAS bringsASEAN+3 countriestogetherwith India, Australiaand

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266 SheldonSimon

New Zealand- all ofwhichhavesignedASEAN'sTreaty

ofAmity
and Cooperation
(TAC) as a condition.
membership

ConceptualizingASEAN
TheAsia-Pacific regionhas no hegemon. Instead,political,economic
andsocialnetworks proliferate.
Regional issuesareaddressed through
collectiveaction.The variousframeworks have diminishedthe
strength oftheabsolutesovereignty normthatdominated ASEANat
thetimeofits1967creation. Overtheensuingdecades,security issues
have becomeincreasingly transnational. Moneylaundering, human
trafficking,environmental degradation, multi-national riverdevelop-
ment,migratory maritime species, terrorism and piracyrequire
multilateral regime buildingratherthanad hoc diplomacy. In theory,
at least,organizations such as ASEANhave established procedures
and decision-making rulesin whichall governmental stakeholders
have a voice.2
ConceptualizingASEAN, InternationalRelations theorists
generallyemploythreeanalyticalframeworks: neo-realism, neo-
liberalismand constructivism.3 Neo-realistsdisdain ASEAN's
role in regionalsecuritybecause, in theirview,institutions are
epiphenomenal.Stabilitydepends on the distribution of power
withintheAsia-Pacific and not on an international organization of
smalland mediumstatesconfined to Southeast Asia. The reallocus
of Asia-Pacific powerdependson relationswiththe majoractors:
theUnitedStates,Chinaand Japan.Neo-liberal theorists rejectthe
realists'dismissalof ASEAN and pointout thatthe Association
engagesin neither balancingorbandwagoning withtheGreatPowers
but ratherthrough multinationalinstitutions,particularly ASEAN
and its offspring (theARF and APT).4By promoting economicand
politicalcooperation withall threeGreatPowers,ASEAN and its
offspring promotewhatneo-liberals call "absolutegains",meaning
thatcollaboration providesbenefits to all through reciprocity.The
distribution of thosebenefits - "relativegains",a majorconcern
ofneo-realists - is less important to neo-liberalsthanthefactthat
aggregate benefitsincreaseforall fromlowertariffs to maritime
security patrols.Neo-liberals
weresetback,however, bythe1997-98
AsianFinancialCrisis.Neither ASEAN,theARF,northeAsia-Pacific
EconomicCooperation (APEC)forum wereabletocopewithfinancial
distressin Indonesia,ThailandandMalaysia.As forsecurity, ASEAN
also failedto mediatethe 1999 East Timorcrisis.Nationalinterests
prevailed inboththesechallenges toneo-liberalism. Thethirdschool,

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ASEANandMultilateralism 267

constructivism,emphasizesideas,normsand identities, arguingthat

thequalityof interactionsamong states is based on whether norms
aresharedand howtheychangeovertime.So, constructivists argue,
ASEAN is emergingas a nascentsecuritycommunity as a "we
feeling"developsamongitsmembers. Criticsofconstructivism insist,
however, that norms and cultural variablesin ASEAN are too
to defineand operationalize.
difficult Moreover, linkingvaguenorms
to actualpolicyoutcomes in ASEAN is still based on bargaining
amongmemberstateswhose interests vary. Rationalistscontend
thatrealistsand neo-liberals presentmorepersuasiveevidencefor
ASEANoutcomesthando constructivists.5
For this author,the mostusefultheoreticalapproachto the
ASEAN systemmaybe EvelynGoh's enmeshment concept.This
is a processby which statesare drawninto a systemto gain
benefits(neo-realismand neo-liberalism). However,throughthe
processof interactionwithinthesystem, states'normsmayalso be
altered.6Thus,beginning in the 1990s,ASEAN led by Singapore
and Thailand,have pushedfora regionalsecurity structure- the
-
ARF thatwould involve(or enmesh)as manyGreatPowersas
possible.Nevertheless,enmeshment is not necessarily harmonious.
FromtheAmericanand Chineseviewpoints, theremaybe tension
betweentheARF,a security dialoguemechanism in whichbothare
members, and the APT whichincludesChinabut not the United
States.Washington prefersthatthe ARF be the venueforregional
securitydialoguewhileBeijingdesiresto add securitydiscussions
to the APT, originallyan economicdialoguegroup,in whichthe
UnitedStatesis notrepresented.
NeitherASEANnorits offspring possesssignificant centralized
mechanisms to enforceagreements struck bytheirmembers, monitor
domesticeventsin memberstatesor anticipateemerging problems.
The Association's"ASEANWay",at bottomis moralsuasion- the
belief(orhope)thatmember stateswill do therightthingso as not
to embarrass Clearlythathopehas notbeenrealized
thecollectivity.7
in the case of Myanmarand Cambodia.Their domesticpolitics
constitutenotonlyan embarrassment buthavealso createdproblems
forASEANin dealingwithEuropeand the UnitedStates.On the
otherhand,thereis an impressive exampleofASEAN'sabilitytobind
outsiderstoan ASEANnorm- a pointfortheconstructivists. China,
India, Russia, South Korea,Mongolia,Pakistan,Australia,New
ZealandandJapanbetween2003and2005all signedtheAssociation's
Treatyof Amityand Cooperation (TAC)bindingthe signatories to
a commitment forthe peacefulresolutionof regionaldisputes.By

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268 SheldonSimon

2008,Timor-Leste, France,Sri Lanka,and Bangladeshhad also signed

instruments of accession to the TAC.
Peaceful resolution of interstatedisputes does not translate,
however,directlyinto multilateralsecuritycooperation.Regional
if trulyindivisible,entailsneighbouring
security, states'involvement
in each other's domestic affairswhether the issue is terrorism
perpetrated by the radical groupJemmahIslamiyah(JI),the regional
haze emanatingfromIndonesian Borneo, or arms trafficking from
mainlandto maritimeSoutheastAsia. Suppressingthese challenges
to regionalsecurityrequiressome erosion of the principleof non-
interferencein internalaffairs.Thus, to understandASEAN one
requires a combinationof the three major theoreticalframeworks
dependingon the issue being addressed.

ASEAN's Evolution
ASEAN's originalraisond'etreamongitsfirstsix members(Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore,the Philippinesand Brunei) was to
protecteach state'ssovereignty.Formedin 1967 at the heightof the
Cold Warand duringAmerica'smilitary involvement in Indochina,the
non-communist SoutheastAsian statescame togetherto hold North
Vietnam,China and the SovietUnion at bay,while permitting US and
Britishallies (Thailand,the Philippines,Malaysia and Singapore)to
maintaintheir securityties to these outside powers. Intra-ASEAN
relationshad anotherpurpose. Indonesia under PresidentSoekarno
(1945-66) had been a significantsource of regionaltrauma,opposing
the creationofthe FederationofMalaysia as well as the US presence
in the Philippines and flirtingwith the PRC, NorthVietnamand
the USSR. AfterSoekarno's fall frompower in the course of an
alleged abortivecommunistcoup, a yearlaterthe foundingfathersof
ASEAN saw an opportunity to integratea new military-led Indonesia
into a largerSoutheastAsian political enterprisethat would both
provideJakartaan opportunity forregionalleadershipand commit
Indonesiato peacefulrelationswithitsneighbours. Fromthattentative
beginning,ASEAN has evolved arguablyto become the best known
intergovernmental organizationin Asia.
As the late Michael Leiferobserved:
The Associationhas developedoverthe yearsinto a working
diplomaticcommunity andhasconcurrentlygrownin international
staturebecoming in theprocessa factorof somesignificance in
the calculationsof bothregionaland extra-regional states.To
thatextent,despiteintra-mural it has been able to
differences^,

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ASEANandMultilateralism 269

assumea prerogativeroleofa kindin an intermittent processof

about
negotiations rules
establishing of the game.8
The normspurveyedby ASEAN in additionto sovereignty protection
included the peaceful settlementof disputesvia the 1976 TAC, the
avoidanceofmilitary pactswithone anotherand frequent consultations
to effecta commonresponseto regionalproblems(if feasible).
For ASEAN's founders,non-interference in the domesticaffairs
of its memberswas the litmus test for the Association; until the
mid-1990s that norm was directed outward against Great Power
intervention.With ASEAN expanding to include the Indochinese
states (Vietnam,Cambodia and Laos) and Myanmar,however,the
norm's deficienciesbecame apparent as human rightsviolations
by the newest memberswere shielded. For Myanmar,Laos and
Cambodia in particular,ASEAN's socialization effortshave had
littleeffect.Nevertheless,forthe Indochinese states and Myanmar,
joining ASEAN entailed political costs they had not anticipated.
Theirgovernments saw the Associationas a statusquo maintenance
mechanism.9 Admittance to ASEAN had neverbeen based on domestic
political However,the harsh domesticpolitics practised
conditions.
in Indochina and Myanmarwere seen by ASEAN's othermembers
to be erodingthe Association'sinternationalstature,especially in
its relationswiththe United Statesand Europe. Still,ASEAN's TAC
offered Laos and Cambodiaa pledgethatVietnamwould notencroach
on the formers'territory and that disputes would not escalate into
militaryconfrontation.
For Vietnam, adherence to ASEAN constituted diplomatic
reconciliation with the Association that had been branded an
instrumentof US neo-colonialismby Hanoi duringthe Cold War.
ASEAN's originalmembershipwonderedhow Vietnamwould taketo
ASEAN's informalprocess,quiet diplomacy,self-restraint, confidence
building and conflictavoidance. Afterall, Hanoi had enteredthe
Associationwith a long traditionof confrontation and intransigent
demands. In fact,Vietnamhas proved accommodatingand eager
to work within ASEAN's rules of the game.10While Vietnamhas
territorialdisputes with ASEAN members,for example over the
SpratlyIslands with the Philippines and Malaysia, they have not
interfered with overall cordial relationsbecause ASEAN has never
been a mechanismto resolve conflictingterritorialclaims among
its members.Rather,the Associationrestrainssuch conflicts.Again,
the Spratlysdispute providesa good example. The Philippinesand
Vietnamwere activelyinvolved in negotiatingthe November2002

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270 SheldonSimon

ASEAN-China Declarationon the Conductof Partiesin the South

ChinaSea (DoC) whichpledgedclaimants to abjuretheuse offorce
as well as the occupationof any additionalgeographicalfeatures
withinthe Spratlyislandschain.

TerrorismChallengesthe Non-interference
Norm
Because SoutheastAsian radical Islamistterrorgroupsregularly
move acrossborders,not onlybetweenIndonesia,Malaysiaand
the Philippinesbut also betweensouthernThailandand northern
Malaysiaandperhapsevenbetween Cambodiaandsouthern Thailand,
nationalsecurityhas come to requireinternational cooperation.
Priorto the AI Qaeda attacksof 11 September 2001,ASEAN did
not mentionterrorism in eitherjointcommuniqus or chairman's
statements. Insofaras terrorism was considereda regionalsecurity
issue, it was associatedmorewith separatistmovements in the
Philippines and Indonesiaand seen,therefore, as an internalmatter,
requiring littlecooperation amongstatesotherthanas a sub-type of
transnational crime.11Whenterrorism cooperation occurred,it was
primarily bilateral,betweenThailandand Malaysia,and Malaysia
and Singapore, duringthe communist insurgencies.
After 9/11,responding to US requests,ASEANbeganto address
terrorism as a regionalconcern.However, member statesconfronted
a host of obstacles,includinginconsistent legal systemsas well
as differing law enforcement mechanismsand securitypractices.
Dealingwithterrorism as a regionalissuerequired thatASEANstates
standardize politicalandlegalmechanisms. However, ASEAN'sinitial
November2001 Declarationon JointActionto CounterTerrorism
amountedto littlemorethana broadstatement of supportto the
UnitedStatesin its timeof need.
Theprospect ofdirectAmerican involvement in ASEANcounter-
terrorism created newproblems fortheAssociation. WhileUS aid was
welcome,especiallyin intelligence andlaw enforcement the
training,
prospect ofdirectUS participation in regionaland domestic counter-
terrorism wouldappearto involveSoutheastAsian statesin a war
popularly perceivedto be anti-Islamic.Thus,Malaysiacriticized the
Philippines forconducting exercises
jointmilitary aimedateradicating
theAbu SayyafGroup(ASG) believedto be linkedto AI Qaeda.12
Nevertheless, in 2002, the Philippines,Indonesia,Malaysia,and
laterCambodiaand Thailand,signedan agreement to shareairline
passengerlists,blacklistsof knowncriminals,and computerized
fingerprint databases as well as strengthening bordercontrols.

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ASEANandMultilateralism 271

The majorimpetusforregionalcounter-terror collaborationcame

in the aftermath of the October2002 Bali bombingperpetratedby
Indonesia-basedJI,an organizationwith directlinks to AI Qaeda.
Indonesia established a central counter-terrorism agency with the
ability to detain suspects without trial. Subsequently,Jakartaalso
invited American and Australian assistance in modernizingthe
country'snational police forcewhich had been hived offfromthe
militaryin the post-Soehartoperiod. Even Malaysia, more openly
criticalof Westerninvolvementin its domesticaffairs, agreedto host
theSoutheastAsia RegionalCentreforCounter-Terrorism (SEARCCT),
quietly funded by the United States. Nevertheless,while ASEAN
states after9/11 and the Bali bombingssigned treatiesproviding
for anti-terroristand criminal suppression,these treatiesdid not
contain extraditionprovisions;and it was understoodthat despite
the treaties,which had still not been ratifiedby mid-2008,domestic
laws tookprecedence.Intra-ASEANdifferences on threatperceptions
ofterrorism and unevensenses ofcollectiveidentitymilitatedagainst
counter-terrorism collaboration.Sovereigntyprotectioncontinuedto
be the prevailingASEAN norm.
Continued terroristbombings in the southernPhilippines as
well as communal violence in Indonesia and southernThailand,
however,have moved ASEAN closer to hammeringout a regional
anti-terrorismagreement.At its January2007 summitin Cebu, the
Philippines,an ASEAN Conventionon Counter-terrorism was tabled.
Expanding on earlier agreements,the new convention mandates
cooperation on tracking movements of suspicious people and
moneythroughoutthe regionand forthe firsttime urges members
to agree on extradition.The pact calls upon each memberstate
to craftlegislation that will ensure intelligencesharing and the
establishment of computer-compatible terrorist
data bases. The treaty
definesterrorism in accordancewithUN conventionsand protocols.
However,a unique characteristic of the documentis that it draws
upon the best practices related to the rehabilitationand social
integrationof capturedterrorists back into theirsocieties based on
the experiencesof Singapore,Indonesia and Malaysia.
Whilethe conventionis undoubtedlya step towardsgreateranti-
terroristcooperation,thereis littlereason to believe thatsignificant
changes in ASEAN behaviourare imminent.The Association does
not have a good record in taking such obligationsseriously.For
example,in 1993,ASEAN agreedto setup a humanrightsmechanism.
Nothinghappeneduntil2007 whenthenew ASEAN Charterprovided
forthe creationof a human rightscommission.Whetherit will in

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272 SheldonSimon

fact come into existenceand what its powers will be remainsto

be seen. Of sixteen counter-terrorism treatiesand protocols,only
the Philippines and Singaporehave ratifiedmost, while Thailand
has endorsedfive.13 Human rightsadvocates in some ASEAN states
view the new conventionwith suspicion fearingit could become a
furtherjustificationforthe violation of civil libertiesin countries
experiencingdomesticturmoil.14

Myanmarand the Normof Non-interference

ASEAN's non-interference normwas based on the belief that each
member'sdomesticaffairswere no one else's concern.Thus, regime
type,economic structure, and ethnicand social class compositions
werenotto be subjectsfordebatewithinASEAN. However,when the
domesticdifficultiesof one memberspilled overinto a neighbouring
state,the non-interference norm was strained.The most dramatic
example of this strainhas been Myanmarsince its 1997 admission
into the Association.Myanmarhas posed threeseriousproblemsfor
ASEAN: (1) the flightof thousands of ethnic minorityKaren into
northwestern Thailand fleeingMyanmar'smilitaryjunta, (2) illegal
drugtraffickingfrommethamphetamine factories
insideMyanmarfrom
which an estimatedtwo million tabletsare smuggledannuallyinto
Thailand - a situationthe Thai government has labelled amongits
greatestsecuritythreatsand (3) the brutalsuppressionof Myanmar's
major oppositionparty,the National League forDemocracy(NLD),
led by Nobel-laureateAung San Suu Kyi who has been underhouse
arrestforeleven years.
To cope with the junta's "un-ASEAN" behaviour, Thailand
took the lead, initiallyproposingin 1998 that ASEAN modifyits
non-interference principle by considering "flexible engagement"
with fellow memberswho pose a problem for neighbours.This
proposalwas only supportedby the Philippinesand unsurprisingly
strongly rejectedby Myanmar.A somewhatweakeralternativecalled
"enhanced interaction"followed which encouragedASEAN states
to discuss theirconcernsbut did not authorizedirectinterference
in members'internalaffairs.There the matterlay until 2003 when
Thailand proposeda "road map" to reconciliationand democracyin
Myanmar.The road map's purpose was to obtain Suu Kyi's release
fromhouse arrest- to no avail.
The most interestingcondemnationof Myanmarcame from
its primaryASEAN membershipsponsor,Malaysia. PrimeMinister
MahathirMohamadhad been the junta's ardentadvocatewithinthe

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ASEANandMultilateralism 273

Association.Subsequently, he feltpersonallybetrayedby the military

regime'sunyielding resistance to ASEAN's insistenceon a pathwayto
democratization. Along with the Philippines,Kuala Lumpurpressed
to its
Myanmar giveup projected 2006 ASEAN chairmanship, insisting
that some events inside a country'sborders could not be strictly
describedas "internalaffairs".15 At its December 2005 summitin
Malaysia,ASEAN openlyurged juntato releasepoliticalprisoners
the
and expedite democraticreforms.The Association also agreed to
send a delegationto investigatethe situation.Nevertheless,when
the junta extendedSuu Kyi's house arrestforanotheryear in May
2007, ASEAN sidestepped the issue with senior ministerssimply
referringto the 2005 Kuala Lumpur declaration.16
Myanmarstands in stark contrastto other ASEAN members
- particularlythe Philippines,Indonesia and Thailand - which
have providedchannelsforinvolvementof fellowmembersin their
internalaffairs.Indonesia invitedmilitarypersonnelfromThailand
and thePhilippinesto observethepeace agreement in Aceh. Malaysia
has mediatedpeace negotiationsbetweenthe Philippinegovernment
and the Moro Islamic LiberationFront (MILF) in Mindanao; and
Thailand is workingwith Malaysia to help cope with its southern
insurgency.17Of course, these lattercases differsignificantly from
Myanmar.Manila, Bangkokand Jakartaall requestedassistancefrom
fellowASEAN members,so arguablythe non-interference normwas
not breached.
The vicious September2007 crackdown on Buddhist monks
and citizens protestingthe Myanmaresejunta's arbitrary fuel price
increasesand tyranny led to globalcondemnation, the intervention of
a UN observerand even some ASEAN recriminations at its November
summit.However,the Association backed away fromany formal
censure,retreating to its basic principleof "non-interference in the
internalaffairsof ASEAN memberstates"and callingfor"respectfor
therightofeverymemberstateto lead its nationalexistencefreefrom
externalinterference,
subversion, orcoercion".The ASEAN Chairman's
Statementratherweaklyurgedthe rulingmilitaryto "worktowards
a peacefultransitiontowardsdemocracy"as well as liftrestrictions
on Suu Kyi. The Statementalso assured Myanmarthat its internal
would not obstructASEAN's integration
difficulties efforts.18

WhitherASEAN?
Before examining other East Asian organizations spawned by
ASEAN, it is importantto inquire about the Association's future.

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274 SheldonSimon

Will it go beyond being a consultationconclave - useful as that

may be - and towardsa rule-makingregime?Skeptics insist that
ASEAN cannotbe a change agent,nor was it ever intendedto be
a collective securityregime.Nevertheless,by the firstdecade of
the new millennium,Indonesia was toleratingregional discussion
of Papua, and Myanmar'spolitical travailswere debated regularly
in ASEAN meetings.In July2005 at the ASEAN ForeignMinisters
meetingin Vientiane,an ActionAgendawas proposedthatincluded
an ASEAN Charter,the basis for a rules-based regime. Such a
Charterwould enhance ASEAN's capacityto mediate one another's
internalconflictsand empowerASEAN's SecretaryGeneralto provide
good offices.19ASEAN is projectingthe formationof an ASEAN
Communityby 2015 built on three distinct areas - economic
cooperation,political and securitycooperation,and socio-cultural
cooperation.Its new November2007 Charterwas developed by an
"eminentpersons group" (EPG) and can be tracedback to a 2003
Indonesianproposal fortransforming ASEAN into a more effective
East Asian entity.
At theirJanuary2007 Summitmeetingin Cebu, ASEAN leaders
approveda blueprintforthe ASEAN Charter.It was a compromise
between traditionalprinciples and new aspirations.The bedrock
non-interference norm is still there,but ways around it have also
been planted. The Chartercommitsits membersto democracy(for
the firsttime),good governanceand human rights.While the EPG
documentdid not include the word sanctionsfornon-compliance,
it allowed the ASEAN Secretariatto serve as the monitoringbody
which would have the authorityto suspend certainrightsfornon-
compliance. (However,this authoritydid not appear in the final
documentvoted in the November1997 ASEAN meeting.)
The Charteralso opens the door to votingin ASEAN. Up till
now, all ASEAN decisions were made by consensus,thoughover
time a procedure had evolved wherebythose memberswho did
not wish to implementan ASEAN decision could abstain without
blockingthe outcomeforothers.The Charterretainsconsensus as
the primaryvotingrequirementforvery importantissues such as
political concerns or decisions on suspension. On less sensitive
issues, forexample,on economicmatters,votingmay occur,though
the EPG did not recommendwhat typeof votingshould be applied:
majorityor super-majority. That decision will be left to ASEAN
leaders. Finally, the Charter sets up three ministerial councils
underneaththe ASEAN Council - on political-security, economic
and socio-culturalissues.20

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ASEANandMultilateralism 275

The Charterprovidesforno disciplinaryactionagainstmembers,

so Myanmar'srulingmilitarycan continueto treatits populationwith
impunity.Because sanctioninga memberis considered a political
decision,it would have to be consensual,and the state whose fate
is being consideredcould, in effect,veto any outcome.Even more,
Myanmar- constantly criticizedforitslack ofdemocracyand human
rightsviolations - could decide to blockadoptionoftheCharteritself
througha veto. Even economic and socio-culturalissues can prove
problematic.At the January2007 Cebu Summit,the issue of rights
formigrantlabourerswas raised.Indonesia,a majorsourceofmigrant
workersforthe region,insistedthatany ASEAN declarationon the
subjectinclude "migrantworkersand theirfamilies".Both Singapore
and Malaysia, recipients of Indonesian migrantlabour, objected.
Human rightsgroupsin the regionwanted ASEAN to improvepay
and workingconditionsofmigrantworkers,but even withan ASEAN
declaration,host countrieswould have to follow up with binding
legislationof theirown - an unlikelyprospect.21
Securitymattersmay be the area whereASEAN's futurerole is
morepromising.The Association'slatestcounter-terrorism convention
was initialedat theJanuary 2007 summit.As withearlierdeclarations
goingback to November2001, the latestiterationcalls on members
to shareintelligence,training, curbterroristfinancingand rehabilitate
convictedterrorists. The 2007 Conventionon Counter-terrorism is
seen as an integralpartof the putativeASEAN SecurityCommunity
and closely relatedto the most recentASEAN ministerialgathering
of its defenceministers.ASEAN's database on terrorism and crime
is also now being linked to Interpol.22
While these declarationspromisecollaboration,the one domain
in which it is definitelyoccurringis maritimesecurity.Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore's coordinatedpatrols,aided by the Japan
Coast Guard'sprovisionof equipmentto Indonesia'smaritimepolice
have correlatedto a significant reductionof piracy in the Malacca
Straits,and so far,no incidence of maritimeterrorism.23 In fact,as
the piracy/terrorismconcernseems to have abated,discussionsabout
the Straitsare now focusingon maritimesafetyUnder Article43
of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention(UNCLOS), it is the
responsibilityof the littoralstatesto maintainnavigationalaids and
preventpollution.In recentyears,the littoralstateshave held several
TrackI and TrackII meetingson navigationsafetyand the potential
impact of accidents and pollutionon coastal communities.
Japanhas long contributed financiallyto installationand upkeep
of navigational aids in the Straits, and in recent years, India,

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276 SheldonSimon

SouthKoreaand the UnitedStateshave also pledgedassistance.

China,too, has offered to restorethe navigational aids thatwere
damaged in the December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. However,
theseare all voluntary contributions. The NipponFoundationof
Japanhas suggested thatall shipstransiting the Straitscontribute
one US centper deadweight ton of cargo,thereby generating $40
milliona yeartowardsnavigational safety.Nevertheless, userstates
and theircompanieshave notbeen forthcoming, insisting thatthe
responsibility is solely withthe littorals.In actuality,thereare
numerous stakeholders includingthe littorals, userstates,shipping
companies and insurance agents.Safetyin the Straitswouldbe an
excellentissue forASEAN to undertake as well as otherregional
organizations, includingtheARF and APEC.24
Maritimesecurityin SoutheastAsia also involvesthe South
ChinaSea disputes.Claimedentirely byChina,Vietnam and Taiwan,
and partlyby thePhilippines, Malaysiaand Brunei,and potentially
richin seabedfossilfuelsas well as mineralnodulesand fish,the
SpratlyislandssitastridethemajorsealanesfromtheIndianOcean
through the SouthChinaSea and up to the Sea ofJapan.ASEAN
beganto play a role in these disputesin the early1990s when
Chinaagreedto discussthemmultilaterally forthefirst time,albeit
informally. Thesetalksled to the2002 DoC signedby ASEANand
thePRCin November 2002.Although nota bindingcode ofconduct
preferred byASEAN,theDoC providedforfreedom ofnavigation and
overflightabovetheSouthChinaSea and proclaimed thatterritorial
disputeswould be resolvedpeacefully. The Partiesalso agreedto
exercise restraintandrefrain fromactivitiesthatwouldcomplicate the
disputes.Nevertheless, severalclaimants increasedtheirpopulations
on theisletstheyoccupiedand enhancedtheirarmaments.
In 2005,thePhilippines, ChinaandVietnam afterseveralyearsof
challenging eachother's oil exploration agreedtojointseismic
efforts,
surveysto determine the extendof hydrocarbon resourcesin their
overlapping areas.This agreement could be the firststep towards
a management arrangement thataddressesthe increasing need for
oil and gas resources. To defusethesepersistent mutualsuspicions,
ASEAN and China could issue a JointDeclarationcontaininga
"without prejudice"clause thatpromotes jointdevelopment in the
areasof overlapping claimsby emphasizing thatthejointactivities
do notimpactthevalidityof theunderlying claimsto sovereignty
and jurisdiction.Thus, the claimantswould not give up their
claimsbutwould"freeze"themforthetimenecessary to determine
whetherthereare exploitableseabed resources.If such resources

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ASEANandMultilateralism 277

are discovered,then additionalnegotiationswould be necessaryto

determinean exploitationregime.25 In December2007, thePhilippine
House of Representatives createda new complicationby passing a
bill thatwould incorporatethe Spratlyislands into the Philippines
via an extension of archipelagic baselines. AnticipatingChina's
probableobjection,in mid-2008,PresidentArroyomanaged to put
the proposed legislationon hold.26
Despitetheseagreements on jointexploration,however,maritime
disputespersistand at timesbecome violent.Chinese naval vessels
firedon Vietnamesefishing boats near the Paracel Islands in July
2007, reportedlysinkingone, killinga Vietnamesefishermanwhile
woundingseveral others.Vietnameseofficialssay therehas been a
patternofChineseharassmentwheneverone oftheirboatsencounters
a Chinese counterpart. Accordingto VietnamspecialistCarl Thayer:
"These Chinese actions are part of a generalpostureof stakingout
territorialclaims and curtailingencroachmentsby Vietnamese,.."27
The Vietnamesehave littlerecoursebecause theirfast-attack coastal
craftare outgunnedby the Chinese ships. The potentialforserious
conflictin waterssurroundingthe SpratlyIslands has caused some
oil companiesto suspend explorationactivities.In June2007, British
Petroleum, US ConoccoPhillips,and state-owned PetroVietnamhalted
a US$2 billion projectto develop a gas field in the area.28
In mid-November 2007,thePeople'sLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)
held an exercisearoundthe Paracel Islands,elicitinga formalprotest
fromVietnamwhich claims both the Paracel and SpratlyIslands.
A monthlater,Vietnampermittedanti-Chinaprotestorsto rally in
frontof Beijing'sembassyin Hanoi, triggering a diplomaticprotest
fromBeijing.The Hanoi streetprotestsfolloweda PRC decision to
set up a county-level government unitthatincludes the Paracels and
Spratlys. In China's
effect, maritime assertivenesscreates conflicts
withVietnam'splans to develop its offshore resourcesover the next
decade.29China may also be concerned about enhanced relations
by both India and the United States with Vietnam.In December
2007, New Delhi agreed to supply vital spares of Russian origin
for Vietnam's Petya-class anti-submarinewarships, enabling the
Vietnamesenavy to once again make them operational.30

ASEAN's New Constitution

Afteryears of preparationand negotiationsamongthe ASEAN Ten,
its memberssignedthe organization'sfirstformalconstitutionat the
November2007 ASEAN Summit,the ASEAN Charter.Afteryearsof

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278 SheldonSimon

preparationby a coterieof seniorASEAN statesmen- the Eminent

Persons Group (EPG) - the Charterprovides a legal personality
forthe Associationand stipulatesnormssuch as human rightsand
democracy- conceptsthatASEAN heretofore had avoided as part
of the Association'smandate.A formalcommitment to humanrights
and democracyassociatesASEAN withsuch prominentinternational
institutionsas theOrganization forSecurityand Cooperationin Europe
(OSCE) and the European Union (EU) as well as the UN.31
Nevertheless,althoughthe Charter stipulatesthat ASEAN will
createa humanrightscommission,and a foreignministers'taskforce
is writingits termsof referenceto be presentedat the November
2008 ASEAN Summit,the CharteritselfinsuresthatASEAN human
rightsremainssubordinateto the Association'sbedrockprincipleof
non-interference and ASEAN's insistencethat the Association not
interferein its members'internalaffairs.On a more positivenote,
the Charterincludes a blueprintforeconomic reformsdesignedto
createan economic communityby 2015 coveringtrade,investment
and skilled labour movementamongmembercountries.Association
memberswill also send permanentrepresentatives to the ASEAN
Secretariatin Jakarta,thoughthe Charterprovides no change for
ASEAN's meager centralbudget that remains constrainedby the
financial capabilities of its poorest member,Laos. The EPG had
originallycalled forEU-stylecash transfers to the secretariatbased
on the economic strengthof each member;that proposal did not
make it into the finaldocument.32

ASEAN's Offspring:The ARF33

The ARF emergedin 1994 fromASEAN's post-ministerial conferences
thatwere held afterASEAN's annual foreignministersmeeting.The
conferenceswere one day events with Asia-PacificGreat Powers
includingthe United States, China and Japan.The subject matter
broadlyaddressed is political and securityissues. Formalizationof
these extra-ASEANdiscussions into the ARF occurredas ASEAN
realized thatif the Associationwas to remainrelevantin the post-
Cold War securityenvironment, it should ensurethatits procedures
would dominate Asia-Pacific security discourse. The ARF has
achieved these goals forthe Association.Realists see the ARF as
anotherbalance of power mechanismin which mostmembersdefer
to the China-USrelationship.Neo-liberalsbelieve it is an arena for
bargainingover regionalsecurityissues while constructivists insist
thatit is a framework forthe developmentand practiceof norms.

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ASEANandMultilateralism 279

All agree that the ARF is not meant to be a collective security

arrangement.34 Nor is the ARF designedto resolve specificregional
disputes such as the Spratlys.Rather,as the constructivists
suggest,
the ARF is aimed at bringingabout long-termpeace by fosteringa
sense of mutual trust.Whetherthis works depends on the quality
of relationshipsover time among the members.
Organizationally, the ARF's highestlevel is its annual foreign
minister'smeeting,always chairedby the ASEAN countryoccupying
the rotatingchairmanship.This annual meetingis supportedby an
annual Senior OfficersMeeting (SOM) that deals with substantive
issues. The SOM, in turn,is aided by a workinglevel venue called
the Inter-sessionalSupportGroupon ConfidenceBuildingMeasures.
Confidencebuilding activitieshave remainedARF's primaryfocus
since its inception.These groupsare supplementedby gatheringsof
specialistson topics such as transnationalcrimethatconsistofTrack
II expertsorganizedthroughthe Councils of SecurityCooperationin
the Asia-Pacific(CSCAP) which themselvesrun parallel dialoguesto
the ARF. CSCAP is non-governmental but also employsthe ASEAN
Way in its deliberations,i.e., consensus and no votes.35
The ARF reflectsASEAN's preferredstrategyof consensus
diplomacy,which managesproblemsratherthan solves them.That
is why the ARF has had such difficulty movingbeyond its initial
stageof promotingconfidencebuildingto its proposed second stage
of preventivediplomacy(PD) or to the long-postponedapex of ARF
maturation: conflictresolution.Anotherexplanationforthisdifficulty
is that ASEAN wanted to enmesh China, the United States and
Japanas securitypartnerswho would committo SoutheastAsia's
stabilityvia confidencebuildingby keepingan eye on one another
to discourageadventurism. However,thisARF statusquo orientation
does notpromotethekindofchangeinherentin preventivediplomacy
and conflictresolution.
An additional ASEAN goal with respect to outside powers
joining the ARF has been to extend the aims and principles of
ASEAN's TAC to ARF members,meaningthat all agree to resolve
disputes peacefully.This refersparticularlyto the PRC's claims in
South China Sea. For powers externalto SoutheastAsia, the ARF
provides otherbenefits.Washingtonhas used the ARF to promote
dialogue betweenSouth Korea and Japan.Japanand China use the
ARF as a vehicle fortheirenhanced Asia-Pacificdiplomacy.
As fortheinterface betweenconfidencebuildingmeasures(CBMs)
and PD by 2000, the ARF began discussinga good officesrole for
the ARF Chair,the creationof an EPG withinthe ARF to address

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280 SheldonSimon

futurechallenges,the productionof an Annual SecurityOutlook

and voluntarybackgroundbriefingsby any memberon regional
security.Originatingfroma Track II advisory group, these ideas
were endorsedby the ARF withthe exceptionof a good officesrole
forthe Chair.Both China and some ASEAN statesobjectedto this
enhanced Chair authorityforfearthatit could lead to interference
in theirinternalaffairs.36
The activiststates within the ARF (the United States,Japan,
Australiaand Canada) have promoteda PD agenda,but the ASEAN
Way procedure requiring consensus has effectivelyblocked it.
Moreover,the factthatan ASEAN statewill always chair the ARF
means thatdisputesbetweenASEAN and non-ASEANmemberswill
not be deliberatedbeforethe ARF. One observer,Takashi Yuzawa,
has notedthatfrustration withthe ARF's inabilityto have an impact
on regionalsecurityhas led the United States and Japanto reduce
theirattention.The only way PD will be activatedin the ARF is
if the non-interference principle is moderated,the ARF develops
more practical PD measures and structuralreformoccurs that
dilutesASEAN's dominance.None of these appear on the horizon.37
Nevertheless,a recentinnovativeARF exercise suggeststhat there
may still be hope for innovation:in January2007, the ARF held
its firstsimulated sea exercise in Singapore with representatives
fromtwenty-onecountries.Their task was to trace a missingship
possiblyhijackedby terrorists. The key aim of the exercisewas to
acquaintparticipantswithvaryingnationalprotocols.While general
satisfactionwas expressed with the results,no plans have been
made forfutureexercises.38

ASEAN Offspring:
ASEAN+3
IftheARF has been ASEAN's expansionto theAsia-Pacificand beyond
forsecuritydiscussions,thenASEAN+3 (APT) is the device to link
Northeastand SoutheastAsia togetherforeconomic mattersin the
aftermathof the 1997 financialcrisis. Unlike the ARF, the ASEAN
ministerialconferencesand the Asia-PacificEconomic Cooperation
(APEC) forum,the UnitedStatesis excluded while China,Japanand
South Korea were chartermembers.Closer East Asian cooperation
in the APT emergedfromthe frustration and disappointment caused
by Washington'sperceivedreluctanceto aid SoutheastAsia during
the financialcrisis.Moreover,thisperceivedUS indifferencetowards
ASEAN also made SoutheastAsia aware of the dangerof a unipolar
worldand theneed to diversify economicrelations.By 1998,theAPT

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ASEANandMultilateralism 281

leaders agreedto hold a regularsummitand a series of meetingsfor

foreignand financeministers.The APTs majorachievementto date
has been the ChiangMai Initiativeinauguratedat the 2000 summit
in Thailand. The Initiativeis a currencyswap arrangement between
centralbanks enablingmemberstates to protectthemselvesbetter
against futurespeculative attacks on their currency.For ASEAN
particularly,ChiangMai was designedto offeran alternativeto the
Western-dominated InternationalMonetaryFund (IMF) thatimposed
such draconianconditionsin the 1997 crisis thattwo governments
fell (Indonesia'sand Thailand's) and some ASEAN states'economies
were set back for several years. In 2004, at China's initiative,the
APT launched a new East Asia Summitwhich expanded the APT's
purviewto securityissues.China,withMalaysia'sendorsement, hoped
the EAS would be restrictedto APT membersonly,thus excluding
the United States and othernon-EastAsian states.
APT has become a forumwhere the major powers of Northeast
Asia compete for the economic leadership of Southeast Asia via
a set of freetrade agreementsthat primarilyprivilegethe stronger
Northeast Asian economies.39An APT unit was set up in the
ASEAN Secretariatto researchspecificissues raisedby the principals
that gradually led to the creation of detailed agendas for APT
meetings.Though as in all ASEAN-based organizations,decisions
carriedno enforcement provisions,APT throughthe currencyswap
arrangements built a financialreservethatcould servethe
significant
of
practicalpurpose dampeningmonetarycrises. By early 2004, the
cumulativevalue of these swap arrangements had risen to US$36.5
billion, providingsome financial psychological securitythat had
been unavailable in 1997.40

ASEAN and China

Duringthe Cold War,one ofASEAN's strategicgoals was to keep the
Americansinvolvedand the Chinese and Russians out of Southeast
Asian affairs.By the 1990s, this original orientationhad become
obsolete. Instead, Singapore'soriginalplan of involvingthe Great
Powers in the region'ssecuritywas adopted by the Association.For
ASEAN, China constitutedboth a challengeand an opportunity: the
challenge has been to avoid becomingsubordinateto the PRC's Asia
strategythatwould constrainthe role of otherGreatPowers in the
region;the opportunityis to take advantageof China's burgeoning
economyto enhancethe ASEAN states'own development.In effect,
ASEAN's engagementstrategycoincides with Beijing's effortsto

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282 SheldonSimon

createa benignprofilein SoutheastAsia based on educationaland

culturalexchanges,no stringsaid packages,public works projects,
and investmentsin resourceindustriesand critical infrastructure.
The fruitsof these effortsinclude the China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA),China'saccessionto theTAC and the 2002 DoC.
These developmentswere encapsulatedin the October2003 "Joint
Declaration of the PRC and ASEAN State Leaders - A Strategic
PartnershipforPeace and Prosperity".41
This is notto saythatall is well in theASEAN-Chinarelationship.
Territorialdisputes in the South China Sea have resurfacedas the
energyrequirements of some ASEAN claimantsand China increase.
ClaimantstatesotherthanChinaare reportedly operating120 offshore
oil wells in areas thatthe PRC claims to be Chinese space. Despite
a varietyof codes of conduct and territorial boundaryagreements
betweenChina and Vietnam,and China and thePhilippines,sporadic
armedconflictspersist.(China and Vietnamhave signed a maritime
demarcationagreementin the Gulf of Tonkin,but the PRC and
Philippines have not signed any territorialboundary agreement.)
These skirmishesare probablypart of a generalChinese postureof
stakingterritorial claims. They also providea partialexplanationfor
why ASEAN statesare modernizingtheirnavies and air forces.
Economicrelationshipsare morepositive.The CAFTA provides
an "earlyharvest"forASEAN exportsboostingASEAN-Chinatradeto
US$202.7 billion in 2007, a significant increasefromapproximately
US$140 billion in 2006. China's trade with ASEAN exceeded the
Assocation'strade with the United States in 2007 which stood at
US$171.32 billion.42Moreover,unlike the United States,China does
notconditionitstradeagreements or economicaid withhumanrights,
labourrightsand environmental concerns.On theotherhand,ASEAN
importsfromChina outweighexports,leading to an overallASEAN
trade deficitof US$9.6 billion in 2005, accordingto the ASEAN
SecretaryGeneral.He also noted thatrecentChinese investments in
SoutheastAsia remained"modest",averagingUS$210 millionbetween
2003 and 2004,while globalFDI in ASEAN reachedUS$31.5 billion.43
(US aid and investmentin the regionfaroutstripsChina's.)
Cognizant of its trade surplus and impedimentsto ASEAN
investment, at theJanuary2007 ASEAN Plus China meetingin Cebu,
PrimeMinisterWen Jiabaosigned an importantaccord to open key
service sectorsof the Chinese economythatwould providegreater
access for Southeast Asian investors in banking,transportation,
construction, real estate,information technologyand othersectors
heretofore restrictedforforeigninvestors.44

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ASEANandMultilateralism 283

ASEAN's collective diplomacytowardsChina has appealed to

Beijingbecause it is still based on sovereignty
protection,embodied
in consensus decision-makingand the exclusion of internalaffairs
in ASEAN-China discussions. China's accession to the TAC in
2003 - the firstmajor power to accede to the non-aggression pact
- moved the relationshipto a new level, a securityunderstanding
that presumablylimitedChina's freedomto employ militaryforce.
Nevertheless,despite China's adherence to the TAC and Beijing's
signatureon the DoC, the PRC remainsunwillingto compromiseits
sovereignty claimsbecause such a compromiseoverthe South China
Sea could undermineChina's strictinsistenceon sovereigntyover
Taiwan. Indeed, China's acceptanceof the DoC may well have been
motivatedby the desire to preventfurther US militaryinvolvement
in the area. Avoidingmilitaryexerciseswas a provisionin its draft
code of conduct on the South China Sea, though this was not
included in the finalagreement.45
Singapore'sPrime MinisterLee Hsien Loong said at the 2007
ShangriLa Dialogue that China's militarybuild-up constitutedno
threatto SoutheastAsia because it was "a specificresponse to the
[Taiwan] cross-Straitsituation".He went on to say that the heavy
US militarypresence insured the region's continued stability.46 A
parallel effortby Beijing to help make ASEAN comfortablewith
the PLA's naval build-upis its offerto hold a joint naval drill with
ASEAN servicessome timein 2008. No combinedASEAN response
had occurredby the Fall of 2007 in partno doubtbecause ASEAN
armed services are only just beginningto engage in multilateral
cooperationamong themselves.47

ASEAN and the UnitedStates and Japan

In the aftermathof Iraq and Afghanistan,the United States has
rediscoveredthe importanceof burden sharingand regionalpower
centresthat can take primaryresponsibilityfortheirown security.
Buildingon existingregionalorganizations, Washingtonsees ASEAN
and the ARF as forums whose goals coincide with America's
To a certain extent,the United
aspirationsfor regional stability.48
States (and Japan)are playingcatch up to China's so-called "charm
offensive".Both Washingtonand Tokyo have respondedto China's
CAFTA with their own trade liberalizationplans. For the United
States, the Enterprisefor ASEAN Initiative(EAI) is an expansion
to ASEAN membersof the Singapore-USFTA. Japanalso issued a
"JointDeclarationof the Leaders of ASEAN and Japan"in November

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284 SheldonSimon

2002; and Tokyohas also negotiatedan FTA with ASEAN, though

unlike the PRC, thereis no "earlyharvest"clause.
Capitalfrominternationalfinancialinstitutionssuch as theWorld
Bank, the Asian DevelopmentBank and the IMF in whichthe United
States and Japanplay major roles have a commandingpresencein
SoutheastAsia. The same is trueof country-specific donorconsortia
for Indonesia and Cambodia. Disaster and humanitarianrelief is
also a productof Westernand Japaneseassistancein which China
has no role. However,in 2007 China joined the ConsultativeGroup
of aid donors forCambodia and promised$91 million out of the
total $689 million package.49The United States remainsby farthe
largestsource of FDI in ASEAN countries;and the United States,
EU and Japanaccountedfor60 per cent of FDI in ASEAN in 2004.
By contrast,China provideslittleFDI forthe region,thoughsince
2006 Beijinghas increasedits investment in the region,primarilyin
extractiveindustriesand power generationprojects.Instead,China
is a competitorof ASEAN forFDI.50
In November 2005, President Bush met with seven ASEAN
leaderson the sidelinesofthe APEC Summitto launch an Enhanced
Partnershipcombining all the dimensions that have also been
articulatedin the ASEAN Community:political,economic,security
and socio-cultural domains. Subsequently, an ASEAN-US Plan
of Action was developed and a Five-Year FrameworkDocument
writtento guide the US-ASEAN "deeper phase" in relations.The
likely venue for an annual ASEAN-US summitmeetingis on the
sidelines of APEC which is attendedby heads of state as well as
foreignministers.51By 2007, however,it remainedunclearwhat the
"deeper phase" entailed.Across all economictransactions- trade,
investment,developmentassistance - the United States is still
ASEAN's largestpartner,but all of this has occurredindependent
of the Enhanced Partnership.
Insofaras ASEAN has a securitystrategyinvolvingthe United
States, it may best be described as hedging or soft balancing.
SoutheastAsian stateswelcome an Americanmilitarypresenceand
providebase access but decline any new formalmilitaryalliances.52
Moreover,Southeast Asian leaders want Washingtonto maintain
good relationswithChina as well as Japan,accordingto Singapore's
Prime MinisterLee Hsien Loong, so that ASEAN states will not
have to "choose sides".53ASEAN membersare also pressingthe
United States to sign the TAC as a prelude to membershipin the
EAS to which all of America's Asia-Pacificallies belong as does
the PRC.

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ASEAN and Multilateralism 285

ASEAN and Multilateralism's

Future:The EAS
The mostrecentmanifestation of a wider East Asia came into
existence withtheDecember 2005inaugural EastAsia Summit. While
SoutheastAsia had been "institutionalized" sinceASEAN'screation
in 1967,therewas no Northeast AsianadditionuntilASEAN+3was
puttogether at ASEAN'sinitiative in 1997.TheEAS was a Malaysian
proposalstrongly backedbyChina.ForKuala Lumpur, theintention
was fortheEAS to developliketheAPT,movingfroma relatively
restrictedeconomicagendagradually to lookat "security, democracy,
goodgovernment, theruleof law,everyaspectofhumansecurity".
BothMalaysiaand Chinaprojectedthe EAS to be independent of
the UnitedStates,an exclusively East Asian forum.OtherASEAN
members plus Japan,however, fearingChina'spossibledomination,
pressed forinvitations
to Australia,New Zealandand India - the
resultbeingthatthe EAS includesa numberof America'sfriends
and allies despiteWashington's absence.54 ASEANalso insistedthat
only its members could host the annual summits. Thus,comparable
to theASEAN+1.ARF and APT meetings, ASEANwouldbe in the
driver'sseat.
ASEAN had imposedthreeconditionsforEAS participation:
(1) adherenceto theTAC,(2) dialoguepartner statusand (3) "sub-
stantial"relationswithASEAN.Russiahas appliedto theEAS with
strongsupportfromMalaysia,China and the Philippinesdespite
reservations fromSingapore, Indonesiaand Japan.Singaporeargued
thatRussia'sASEAN ties were not substantial; Jakarta fearsthat
Moscow'smembership wouldreduceASEAN'sdominance; andTokyo
opposedbecauseof its territorial disputeand also becauseit saw
Russiaas a Chineseally.55 Becauseof a lack of consensus,Russia
was notrepresented at theJanuary 2007 EAS.
US reticenceabout the EAS is based on skepticismabout
the proliferationof multilateral activitiesin Asia and the belief
thatAPEC and the ARF should be the lead Asia-Pacificagents
in economicsand security.The United States oftenfindsthe
Asian modelof multilateralism to be inordinately concernedwith
and
consensus, therefore, the lowest common denominator approach
to confidence-building. This orientationmoves the regiontoo
slowlyto solve Asia's pressingpolitical,economicand security
challenges.Washington prefersad hoc multilateral mechanisms to
deal withspecificregionalproblemssuch as theSix PartyTalkson
NorthKorea'snuclearweaponsprogramme.56 ASEAN leadershave
urged the United Statesto sign the TAC and join the EAS. While

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286 SheldonSimon

not explicitlyrefusingto do so, in March2007, the StateDepartment

statedcoylythat"We are studyingthevariouslegal and policyissues
related to possible US accession to the treaty.The United States
has not made a decision at this time on whetherto sign."57One
explanationfrequently given forWashington'shesitationis concern
thatthe TAC would limitnaval movementsin wartimebecause the
treatyconstitutesa non-aggression pact. However,none of America's
Asian allies acceptthisinterpretation;nor do theysee theirsignature
on the TAC as limitingtheirdefencerelationshipswith the United
States. One otherpossible explanationforWashington'sinactionis
the Bush Administration's apprehensionthatthe US Senate will not
ratifythe treaty,thusworseningWashington's relationswithASEAN.
Moreover,US membership in the EAS would require yet another
officialpresidentialoverseas visit annually.

Conclusion
ASEAN and the ARF as cooperativesecurityarrangements designed
to enhance common interestsand cope with common challenges
are explicitly neither defence arrangementsnor alliances. They
were not formedto counterspecificthreats;moreover,theyco-exist
with several of theirmembers'separatedefencearrangements with
externalpowers,not onlywiththe UnitedStates,but also the United
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand throughthe Five Power
Defence Arrangements(FPDA). Although ASEAN and the ARF
focus on dialogue and confidence-building, they also attemptto
createnormsand codes of conductas ways to avoid conflict.(These
characteristicsare emphasizedby constructivist theories.)Balance of
powerconsiderations operatewithincooperativesecurityregimes.For
example, a major purpose in ASEAN's formationwas to constrain
Indonesia's hegemonic aspirationsby forcingJakartato consider
its neighbours'securityneeds. Nevertheless,successfulcooperative
securitystill depends on access to an externalcountervailing power
whose own policies are compatiblewith the cooperativesecurity
organization's.In ASEAN's case, thisis theUnitedStates.Washington's
Asian militarypresencesupportsASEAN's own goal of ensuringthat
no hegemonarises (i.e., China). That China and the United States
are both ARF membersconstitutesfromASEAN's viewpointa way
of constraining China's politicalambitionswhile keepingthe United
Statesinvolvedin East Asian security.In recentyears,however,the
PRC has more effectively used the ARF and such relatedgroupsas
APT to promoteBeijing'spoliticaland economicinternational agendas

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ASEANandMultilateralism 287

than has the United States which appears fromSoutheast Asia's

vantagepointto be inordinately concernedwiththe Middle East and
fightingradical Islamist terrorism.
Nevertheless,to signal ASEAN's
continuedimportanceforAmerica'sAsia policy,in April 2008, the
United States appointed an ambassador to the Association - the
currentdeputyassistantSecretaryofStateforEast Asia, Scot Marciel.
However,his otherduties will primarilykeep him in Washington.
ASEAN membersare still suspicious of one another'spolicies
and motives.Thereis a historyof subversionagainstneighboursthat
led to an importantinstitutionalpledge: the Declarationof ASEAN
Concordby whicheach memberstateresolvedto eliminatesubversive
threatsto neighbours.No sanctuarywould be given to groupsbent
on overthrowing members'regimes.Nevertheless,Myanmareseand
Laotianminority ethnicinsurgentshave takenshelterin Thailand,and
thousandsof Indonesian illegal migrantshave periodicallystrained
Kuala Lumpur-Jakarta relations.Most recently,Indonesian terrorist
recruitshave journeyedto the southernPhilippines fortrainingin
Islamist camps run by the Abu Sayyafor radical membersof the
Moro Islamic LiberationFront.All of these reveal the susceptibility
of severalASEAN statesto domesticchallengesacross international
boundaries.ASEAN is able to do littleto counteracttheseintramural
frictions.
The Associationis more successfulin assistingits membersto
maintaintheirindividualsovereignties. Brunei'sadherenceto ASEAN
served to protectthe tiny Borneo Sultanate fromthe competitive
pressuresof Malaysia and Indonesia. The Third Indochina Conflict
(1978-91) illustratesASEAN's use of extramuralbalancingby which
the Association aligned diplomaticallywith both China and the
United States to preventVietnamfromconsolidatingits hold over
Cambodia.Nevertheless, ASEAN fellshortwhenitwas unableto agree
on a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea to counterChina's
"creepingassertiveness".Differencesamong those ASEAN members
claimingsome degreeof sovereignty over the Spratlysblocked any
consensus so thatthe ultimatelytoothless1992 ASEAN Declaration
on the South China Sea was more an effortat conflictavoidance
than resolution.Vietnam,the Philippines and China reached an
agreementin 2005 completelyoutside ASEAN and which provides
forjoint explorationof the seabed around the Spratlys.ASEAN's
inabilityto effecta South China Sea regimemay be attributedto
both its intramuraldifferences and the inabilityof the Association
to findan externalcountervailing power willing to contain China's
hegemonicaspirations.

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288 SheldonSimon

Withthe end oftheCold War,the structure ofEast Asian politics

changed. ASEAN statesrealized that prospectsforSoutheastAsia's
autonomy had become obsolete.The ARF's creationin 1994 brought
East Asia's two subregionstogether along with theEU, NorthAmerica,
Australiaand New Zealand, to formthe largestsecuritydiscussion
organizationin the world. ASEAN's hope was to dominatethe ARF
procedurallyand to imposetheTAC as theForum'sCode ofConduct,
thus committing membersto abjure the use of force;China and its
South China Sea claims was the target.ASEAN also hoped thatby
includingthe United States,China and Japanin the ARF, a stable
distributionof power would result. The EAS whittles down the
ARF's membershipso thatonly predominantly Asian statesbelong,
though as in the other Asian regionalorganizationsthus far"talk"
predominates over "community".
Disappointmentin the efficacyof regional bodies has meant
that bilateralengagementsremain the focal point of real regional
security actions. A recent example is the 2007 Bali agreement
between Singaporeand Indonesia for a bilateralextraditiontreaty
and defencecooperationagreementthatrequiredtoughnegotiations
because the outcome had real effectson the signatories.(And by
mid-2008,the agreementhas still not been ratifiedand may well
be dead in the water.) Indeed, annual ASEAN summitsare more
significantforthe bilateraldeals concluded on the sidelines than
any multilateralagreementsat the main event. The US agreement
to hold a summitwithASEAN is one such sideline case in point.58
Ironicallythen,ASEAN and its offspring (ARF, APT and the EAS)
betterserveAsian international relationsas venuesforsmallersideline
meetingsthat address specificnational concernsthan in the larger
gatheringsthat create rhetoricalagreementswith little subsequent
capabilityor intentionforimplementation.

NOTES
1 An earlierand considerablyshorter versionofthisarticleappearsas theSoutheast
Asia chapterin David Shambaughand Michael Yahuda, eds., International
Relationsin Asia: The New RegionalSystem(New York:Rowmanand Littlefield,
forthcoming 2008). The authorwishes to thankIan Storeyand two anonymous
reviewersforhelpfulsuggestionson the paper's revision.
2 For a good discussion of regimecreationin the Asia-Pacific,see JimRolfe,
"A Complex of Structures:FunctionalDiversity,Regional Consolidationand
Community in the Asia-Pacific",
Asian Affairs:An AmericanReview33, no. 4
(Winter2007): 217-34.

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ASEAN and Multilateralism 289

3 Representative authorsfortheseschoolsincludeMichaelLeiferand RalfEmmers

forrealism,Shaun Narineforneo-liberalism and AmitavAcharya,MelyAnthony-
Caballeroand See Seng Tan forconstructivism.
4 Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN and Its SecurityOffspring", a paper prepared
for the 10th Annual Security Conference of the US Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute,Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania, 27-29 March
2007.
5 An excellentdiscussionof theseframeworks as theyapply to ASEAN is found
in Kai He, "Does ASEAN Matter?International RelationsTheories,Institutional
Realism,and ASEAN," Asian Security2, no. 3 (October2006): 189-214.
6 Evelyn Goh, "GreatPowers and SoutheastAsian Regional Security",Military
Technology, January2006, pp. 321-23.
7 Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs, "Is ASEAN Powerful?Neo-realistversus
ConstructivistApproachesto Powerin SoutheastAsia", The PacificReview19,
no. 2 (June2006): 135-56.
8 Cited in AmitavAcharya,"Do Norms and IdentityMatter?Communityand
Powerin SoutheastAsia's RegionalOrder",The PacificReview18, no. 1 (March
2005): 98.
9 RalfEmmers,"The IndochineseEnlargement of ASEAN: SecurityExpectations
and Outcomes",AustralianJournalof InternationalAffairs59, no. 1 (March
2005): 74.
10 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
11 JonathonChow, "ASEAN CounterTerrorismCooperationSince 9/11", Asian
Survey45, no. 2 (March/ April 2005): 304-05.
12 Ibid., pp. 312-13.
13 Douglas Bakshian, "ASEAN Summitto Tackle Tough Issues fromTerrorism
to NorthKorea", VOA News.com,8 January2007; and Kavi Chongkittavorn,
"ASEAN's Accord on Counter-terrorism a Major Step Forward",The Nation
(Internetversion),19 February2007.
14 "MilitantsWarnof Dangersof ASEAN Anti-Terror Pact", Philstar.com(Manila),
11 January2007.
15 Much of thisdiscussionon Myanmaris takenfromRuukunKatanyuu,"Beyond
Non-interference in ASEAN: The Association's Role in Myanmar'sNational
Reconciliationand Democratization",
Asian Survey46, no. 6 (November/December
2006): 825-45.
16 EstrellaTorres,"ASEAN Meetingsdrop BurmaIssue fromAgenda",Irrawaddy,
23 May 2007.
17 RuukunKatanyuu,"BeyondNon-interference in ASEAN", op. cit., p. 840.
18 Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman, "Regional Overview", Comparative
Connections:A QuarterlyE-Journalon East Asian RilateralRelations,January
2008, pp. 3-4.
19 Michael Vatikiotis,"ResolvingInternalConflictsin SoutheastAsia: Domestic
Challenges and Regional Perspectives", ContemporarySoutheast Asia 28,
no. 1 (April 2006): 42.

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290 SheldonSimon

20 Abul Khalikinterview withEPG memberand former IndonesianForeignMinister

Ali Alatas,"ASEAN faces 'CriticalPeriod' in a ChangingWorld",JakartaPost,
17 January2007.
21 "ASEAN TacklesFate of MigrantWorkers", AgenceFrancePresse (HongKong),
10 January2007.
22 Rajesh M. Basrur,"The Threatof WMD Terrorism: ASEAN Needs to Respond",
RSIS Commentaries (Singapore)(56), 6 June2007.
23 For an excellentreviewand assessmentof Malacca Straitsecuritycooperation
withdata demonstrating thedeclineofpiracy,see Ian Storey,"SecuringSoutheast
Asia's Sea Lanes: A Workin Progress",Asia Policy 6 (July2008): 95-127.
24 Much oftheprecedingdiscussionis drawnfromVijaySakhuja,"Malacca: Who's
to Pay forSmoothSailing?"Asia TimesOnline,16 May 2007.
25 This South China Sea discussion may be found in RobertBeckman,"Joint
Developmentin the South China Sea: Time forASEAN and China to Promote
Cooperation?"RSIS Commentaries (Singapore)(46), 29 May 2007; and MarkJ.
Valencia,"In Response to RobertBeckman",RSIS Commentaries (53), 4 June
2007.
26 Michael Lim Ubac and NormanBordora,"SpratlysBaselines Bill Placed in
Freezer",PhilippineDaily Inquirer,23 April 2008. Also see Chen Huang-yu,
"Philippineshas No Rightto Spratlys,",Taipei Times(Internet version),21 May
2008.
27 Roger Mitton,"Vietnam,China Clash Again Over Spratlys",Straits Times
(Singapore),19 July2007.
28 For a good backgrounddiscussionon theseskirmishes, see Ian Storey,"Trouble
and Strifein the South China Sea: Vietnamand China", China Rrief8, no. 8,
14 April 2008: 11-14.
29 "VietnamProtestsChineseMilitaryExercisein Hoang Sa", Thanh Men News,
25 November2007; and FrankZeller, "VietnameseRally Again Over Islands
Disputed with China", Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), 16 December
2007.
30 "India to Supply WorkingSpares to Vietnam", Zee News (New Delhi),
17 December2007.
31 HiroKatsumata,"The ASEAN CharterControversy: BetweenBig Talkand Modest
Actions",RSIS Commentaries (Singapore),14 November 2007.
32 "FifthFromtheRightis thePartyPooper",TheEconomist,London,24 November
2007, pp. 43-44.
33 For an essentiallyrealistassessmentof the ARF,see Sheldon Simon,"Realism
and Regionalismin SoutheastAsia: The ARF and the Waron Terror", in Joseph
Liow and RalfEmmers,eds., Orderand Securityin SoutheastAsia: Essays in
Memoryof Michael Leifer(London:Routledge2006), pp. 93-109.
34 Hiro Katsumata,"Establishment of the ASEAN RegionalForum",The Pacific
Review19, no. 2 (June2006): 182 and 194.
35 Sheldon W. Simon,"EvaluatingTrackII Approachesto SecurityDiplomacyin
the Asia-Pacific:The CSCAP Experience",The PacificReview15, no. 2 (2002):
176-200.

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ASEAN and Multilateralism 291

36 TakeshiYuzawa,"The EvolutionofPreventive Diplomacyin theASEAN Regional

Forum",Asian Survey46, no. 5 (September/October 2006): 793-94.
37 Ibid., pp. 802-04.
38 "ASEAN RegionalForumHolds FirstSimulatedSea Exercise",Channel News
Asia.com,23 January2007.
39 David MartinJonesand Michael L.R. Smith,"Constructing Communities:The
Curious Case of East Asian Regionalism",Review of InternationalStudies 33
(2007), pp. 181 and 183.
40 YoshimatsuHidetaka,"PoliticalLeadershipInformality and RegionalIntegration
in East Asia: The Evolutionof ASEAN Plus Three",EuropeanJournalof East
Asian Studies 4, no. 2 (2005): 213, 220-21.
41 TamaraReneShie,"RisingChineseInfluencein theSouthPacific",Asian Survey
47, no. 2 (March/April2007): 308. Also see Jing-dong Yuan, China-ASEAN
Relations:Perspectives,Prospectsand Implicationsfor US Interests(Carlisle
Barracks,U.S. ArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute, October2006), p. 5.
42 Data on China-ASEAN total trade is found in the WorldTrade Organization,
Trade Policy Review- China, 7 May 2008. Data on U.S.-ASEAN total trade
comes fromthe US-ASEAN Business Council Website<http://www.us-asean.
org/statistics/>.
43 Donald Weatherbee,"StrategicDimensions of Economic Interdependencein
Southeast Asia", in Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., StrategicAsia
2006-07: Trade,Interdependence, and Security(Seattle: The National Bureau
of Asian Research,2006), pp. 275-77; and RobertSutterand Chin-HaoHuang,
"China-Southeast Asia Relations:Summitry at Home and Abroad",Comparative
Connections:An E-Journalof East Asian RilateralRelations(Honolulu:Pacific
Forum/CSIS)(January 2007).
44 RobertSutterand China-Hao Huang, "China-SoutheastAsia Relations: Cebu
Meetings,UN Vetoon Myanmar",ComparativeConnections(April2007), p. 73.
45 LesekBuszynskiand IskandarSazlan,"Maritime Claimsand EnergyCooperation in
the SouthChina Sea", Contemporary SoutheastAsia 29, no. 1 (April2007): 154.
46 RobertSutterand Chin-HaoHuang, "China-SoutheastAsia Relations:China's
ActivismFaces Persistent Challenges",Comparative Connections (July2007),p. 81.
47 RobertKarniol,"China Seeks JointExercise with ASEAN Countries",fane's
Defence Weekly,25 April 2007, p. 14.
48 CharlesA. Kupchanand PeterTrubowitz, "GrandStrategy fora DividedAmerica",
ForeignAffairs(July/August 2007): 80.
49 "DonorspledgeUS$689mfor2007 to impoverished Cambodia",Channelnewsasia.
com, 20 June2007 <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/
view/283440/l/.html>.
50 Donald Weatherbee, "Southeast Asia: Strategic Dimension of Economic
Interdependence in SoutheastAsia", op. cit., pp. 277-78.
51 Ibid., pp. 284 and 291.
52 For discussions of US militaryexercises with and assistance to Thailand,
Singapore,Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines,see the quarterly"U.S.-
SoutheastAsia" articlesby Sheldon W. Simon in ComparativeConnections.

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292 SheldonSimon

Also see the remarksby US Secretaryof Defense RobertGates, deliveredto

the June2007 ShangriLa conferencein Singapore(US Departmentof Defense
Officeof Public Affairs),1 June2007.
53 "SingaporePM warnsUS over China", BBC website,5 May 2007.
54 JimRolfe,"A ComplexofStructures: FunctionalDiversity, RegionalConsolidation
and Community in the Asia-Pacific",op. cit., p. 224.
55 LesekBuszynski, "Russiaand SoutheastAsia: A New Relationship", Contemporary
SoutheastAsia 28, no. 2 (August2006): 29.
56 The StanleyFoundation,DialogueBrief:Buildingan Open and InclusiveRegional
ArchitectureforAsia (St. Michaels,Maryland,November2006), p. 5.
57 "U.S. May Sign Key ASEAN Treatywith Eye on East Asia Summit",Agence
FrancePresse (Hong Kong),22 March 2007.
58 Michael Vatikiotis,"US and China Tug at ASEAN Unity;",Asia TimesOnline,
8 May 2007.

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