Philosophia, 46, 2016, pp.

143-153

IS ARISTOTLE TRULY UNAWARE

OF THE NOTION OF SPACE?

Introduction. : place or space?

A somewhat fortuitous observation became the cue for writing this paper: in
De Caelo Aristotle uses the word more often than he does in Physics.
Even though De Caelo is approximately half the size of Physics, occurrences
of the word number 15 to 6, respectively; interestingly enough, in 5
cases it is used rather parenthetically: a passage concerning the much known
platonic reference to (Timaeus) contains three instances, while in the
other two  is connected to , possibly in the way of synonyms.
If we concede that Aristotle consciously avoided using the word in
Physics, and assuming that and in their pre-philosophical use
have similar meaning1, two issues emerge:
Why did Aristotle almost exclusively opt for the word in Physics,
in order to examine one of the a d , the knowledge
of which was considered necessary for the study of nature (the other
a d are , , , and possibly -
and )?
Does this almost exclusive use of (and the exclusion of )
imply that Aristotles theory concerns just locus-place-Ort and not
spatium-space-Raum? Is what we call space not encapsulated in the
philosophers study of nature? Are the chapters IV, 1-5 of Physics,
in which  is the focal concept, referring to what we call place
or to what we call space?

1. The word is more closely related to the being which occupies a certain position
( = position), whereas may be capable of functioning independently from the
being occupying a place ( = partly occupied space). See more in K. ALGRA, Concepts of
Space in Greek Thought, Leiden-New York-Kln 1995, pp. 32-37, indicatively p. 34: in
common parlance topos and chra were used more or less promiscue, the only traceable
difference being that, whereas chra appears to have always denoted a certain extension,
topos could also be used just to denote location in relation to the surroundings.
144 V. BETSAKOS

The scholars who have engaged this interpretative dilemma converge on an

answer that is typical in the current bibliography: Aristotle ignores the notion
of space (either he has no concept for what we call space, or he doesnt
accept its existence). H. S. Lang epitomizes the discussion regarding this
issue: Aristotles concept of is not the same as the modern notion of
space, and it is misleading to attribute a notion of space to Aristotle2.
The few scholars who do not concur with this interpretation either ignore
the interpretative distinction between place and space, using both words as
synonyms3, or they assert that Aristotles texts (and especially Physics, IV, 1-
5) authorize the inference that Aristotle has a theory of space beside the
indisputable existence of a theory of place4. I will argue that Aristotle has a
notion and a theory of space in case we understand space not as Newtonian
absolute space, but rather in the way it is understood from the 20th century
onwards, namely as not being independent of the moving things that are in
space; this theory of space is not a theory of space in the Newtonian sense.
Before I present my own view, I think it is necessary to remind that

2. H. S. LANG, The order of nature in Aristotles Physics. Place and the Elements,
Cambridge 1998, pp. 69-70. H. WAGNER, Aristoteles. Physikvorlesung, Berlin 1979, p. 533:
Aristotle hat eigentlich keine Raumlehre, sofern man einen strengen Raumbegriff zugrunde
legt, demzufolge der Raum als Prinzip zu denken ist, d.h. als Grund fr jene bestimmten
Eigenschaften und Verhltnisse, welche den rumlichen Gegenstnden notwendig eigen
sind: z. B. Gre, Richtung, Lage, Lageverhltnisse, Ortsbestimmtheit. Was Ar. allein ins
Auge fat, ist der Ort, d. h. nur eine besondere Bestimmtheit als solche selbst, die jedem
rumlichen Gegenstand und dem Universum der rumlichen Gegenstnde (der
Naturwelt) zukommt. See B. MORRISON, On Location. Aristotles Concept of Place, Oxford
2002, p. 170: Advocates of absolute space tend to identify space with a certain substance,
parts of which are occupied by bodies and which are their (absolute) places. [...] But of course,
Aristotle has no such conception of space (indeed, he has no conception of space), and
certainly that is not his conception of place.
3. R. SORABJI, Matter, Space, and Motion.Theories in antiquity, New York 1988.
4. Cf. inter alia, S. SAMBURSKY, The Physical world of the Greeks (tr. by M. Dagut),
London 1987, p. 96: Aristotles combination of geometry and matter to form his concept of
place is not unlike the conception of space in the General Theory of Relativity. This theory
also rejects the Newtonian portrayal of space as a sort of infinite box in which physical
bodies move. Instead, it pictures space as a kind of communion of the body and its
surroundings: it is the body that determines the geometry of its environment, and this
geometry cannot be artificially separated from the body itself. Hence a physical point is
simply a singularity in the metric field which surrounds it. Again, this field is not at all an
empty space, but a kind of emanation of the matter in it, just as matter is a kind of
materialization of the field. And K. ALGRA, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought, Leiden-
New York-Kln 1995, 36: there are instances when topos is used to denote the underlying
extension, not of an individual thing, but rather of the whole universe, or of all things. In these
cases, of course the translation space is also possible, and often even to be preferred. Cf.
. DEHN, Raum, Zeit, Zahl bei Aristoteles von mathematischen Standpunkt aus, Die
Naturphilosophie des Aristoteles, G. A. SEECK (ed.), Wege der Forschung, CCXXV, Darmstadt
1975, pp. 214-215.
IS ARISTOTLE TRULY UNAWAREOF THE NOTION OF SPACE? 145

Physics examines the principles of physics; the work pivots around an explicit
principle, , and traces the physical activity of a second (non-physical)
principle. Indissolubly associated with the two principles is the reality and the
sense of motion (), which functions as a thread transversing the treatise
and moulding it into a whole. Substantially related to motion are , -
, and . Irrespective of whether Aristotle demonstrates the
existence of these concepts, their examination is necessary, as these principles
claim universal operability, whose claim increases their methodological
significance.Thus is examined in its essential connection with the motion
of beings.
If, therefore, the research on presupposes its essential relationship
to motion, I think it is entirely improbable that Aristotle refused to examine
the notion of space, even if he did not admit its existence. After all, doesnt he
do the same with the infinite and the vacuum?
I am now in a position to reformulate the interpretative problem: is
for Aristotle just the place-position which is occupied by objects or is it a
reality which may exist independent of things but not of their motion?
As for the second question I posed at the beginning, my view is as follows:
in Physics as a whole and especially in ch. IV, 1-5 what is examined is space
with the proviso that we dont perceive space in the same sense it acquired
in Newtonian physics. Since it is impossible for us to operate in the same
epistemological paradigm5 as Aristotle, we should at least reject the
interpretation of Aristotles as a reality that is absolute and independent
of objects6 and the cosmic motion-change () (as it functioned in the
newtonean concept). We should comprehend the aristotelian precepts by
comparing them (while certainly not equating them) to the fundamental
tenets of modern physics7. On this issue, I will argue that Aristotles theory of

5. I use the term paradigm with the definition introduced by T. S. KUHN (The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. enlarged, Chicago 1970), Preface, viii: These I take to be
universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and
solutions to a community of practitioners. T. S. Kuhn does not perceive scientific knowledge
as a direct correlation with reality, but as a system of theses which temporarily answers to
specific questions (above, 2-3): The more carefully they [a few historians of science study],
say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain
they feel that those once current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientific nor
more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those current today. [...] Out-of-date theories
are not in principle unscientific because they have been discarded.
6. B. MORRISON, op. cit., 132: Aristotle has some interesting and forceful arguments
against the notion of a self-subsistent space.
7. See comparisons between Aristotles views and the conclusions of modern Physics, in
D. SFENDONI-MENTZOU, What is Matter for Aristotle? A clothes-Horse or a Dynamic
Element in Nature?,D. SFENDONI-MENTZOU (ed.), Aristotle and Contemporary Science.
New York, 2000, pp. 237-258; M. CAPEC, Two Views of Motion: Change of Position or Change
of Quality?, Rewiew of Metaphysics, 33, 1979, pp. 337-346.
146 V. BETSAKOS

 has attributes in common with our contemporary notion of space.

As to the first query: I will argue that Aristotle in Physics opted for the
word , because the words and were utterly impertinent to
his theory of space.

A. Aristotles e : the cosmological space in which the motion of

beings takes place

First of all, it must be emphasized that, as often is the case with fundamental
Aristotelian tenets, the scholar has two ways of apprehension: n the grounds
of Aristotles theory it is possible to reach either an entirely objectified
perception of the physical reality (where the totality of cosmic space is
constituted by the successive interpenetration of the spatial dimensions of
bodies up to the utmost reaches of the universe; or, one could employ a
relativistic approach to reality (where space functions conventionally, as a
motionless system of co-ordinates which allows the determination and
measuring of motion).
In order to choose one or the other interpretation we will make use of a
distinction drawn by Albert Einstein8. He suggested that the notion of place
(=the position taken by a certain material object) is, being psychologically
simpler, prior to the notion of space. Man, according to Einstein, is guided to
the sense of space through the sense of place and not the other way around. He
distinguishes two notions of space:
- space implying place: space as positional quality of the world of
material objects,
- space as container of all material object.
In the first case space without a material object is inconceivable; in the
second case, the reality of space is an absolute prerequisite in order to conceive
a material object, therefore presented as a reality which in a certain sense is
superior to the material world.
The exclusive use of the word by Aristotle leads us to the conclusion
that his perception of space corresponds to the former of the two definitions
that Einstein provides. Indeed, at a first reading of Physics, IV, 1-5, it seems

8. . EINSTEIN, Foreword to the excellent study by . JAMMER, Concepts of Space.

The History of Theories of Space in Physics, Cambridge, MA 19541, 19692, xiii: Now as to the
concept of space, it seems that this was preceded by the psychologically simpler concept of
place. Place is first of all a (small) portion of the earths surface identified by a name. The
thing whose place is being specified is a material object or body. Simple analysis shows
place also to be a group of material objects. Does the word place have a meaning
independent of this one, or can one assign such a meaning to it? If one has to give a negative
answer to this question, then one is led to the view that space (or place) is a sort of order of
material objects and nothing else.
IS ARISTOTLE TRULY UNAWARE OF THE NOTION OF SPACE? 147

that Aristotle cannot conceive space as independent of any material object.

However, the philosopher explicitly refers to the distinction between
and 9. In his analysis he inverts the obvious view according
to which space is prior as a self-existing , which supposedly contains the
sum of all beings, whereas motion secondarily takes place in this given context.
For Aristotle, what is presupposed is exactly the motion of bodies, as it opens
up space; there is no space independent of the moving body10.
An utterly objectified conception of space or, indeed, its autonomous
actuality11 is not to be found in Aristotle. He detects the manner of spaces
being in its relation to material bodies. The universe is defined by material
bodies and their motion; beyond the universe there is no space, nor void and
time12. Aristotles view lacks any form of transcendency of space.
In the present if by space we comprehend an ultimate reality, in other
words if we perceive space the same way that Descartes and Newton did, this
word then is completely inappropriate to convey Aristotles (following
the same reasoning A. Einstein believes that Aristotles adherence to the
association of being with space is close to the relativistic theory: Aristotelian
school tried to get along without the concept of independent-absolute space13).
On the other hand, if we (eventually decide to) comprehend the word space in
the sense it acquired after the general theory of relativity, if we perceive space
in an ontological connection to the moving beings, then it might be necessary
to render the word as space.

9.This explicit distinction alone continuously forces the reader to face the problem which
of the two notions, that is e (=space-Raum) or (=place-Ort) does the
word have in each particular case.
10. Physics, 212a 3-5.
11. Indicative is the following formulation by I. NEWTON (The Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy, trans. by A. Motte, London MDCCXXIX, pp. 9-10): I do not define
Time, Space, Place and Motion, as being well known to all [] it will be convenient to
distinguish them into Absolute and Relative, True and Apparent, Mathematical and
Common. [] Absolute Space, in its own nature, without regard to any thing external,
remains always similar and immoveable. I. HINCKFUSS (The existence of Space and Time,
Oxford, 1975, pp. 4-5) defines in a simple philosophical vocabulary the distinction made by
modern Physics between relational and absolute theories of space; he suggests that in ancient
Greece a relational conception of space is already present.
12. De Caelo, 279a 11-18.
13. A. EINSTEIN, op. cit., p. xiv: It seems to me that the atomic theory of the ancients,
with its atoms existing separately from each other, necessarily presupposed a space of type
(b), while the more influential Aristotelian school tried to get along without the concept of
independent (absolute) space.
148 V. BETSAKOS

: Aristotle uses the word in a sense that has similarities not to the
Newtonian sense but to the theory of relativity

1. The reality of is inextricably bound to the bodies; every body has its
. At the beginning of Physics the co-existence of with the bodies is
a prerequisite for its examination; the of non-being is inconceivable14.
Even though co-exists with bodies, it is not identified with them. -
may be 15. This means that it is not a body and it is not even a
quality of the extendible bodies16. co-exists with the distinct bodies and
their motion17 in a relative way.
Thus, per se can not be immobilized in a given , it does not exist
, \ e . is taken as immobile
in order to enable the measuring dimensional movable bodies18. is
conceptualized as immobile (it can be conceived as ), because
this is the only way to define motion (a e e -
c )19. is relatively immobile.
2. Typical of Aristotles reasoning is the dynamic concept of .
Aristotle holds that material bodies move towards their position in space,
some downwards while others upwards20. It seems that exercises on
every physical body a force which moves it (or tends to move it) towards its
familiar 21. By this specific force and the subsequent (direction)

14. Physics, 208a 29-31 and 209a 26-27.

15. Physics, 209b 22-28. Cf. F. SOLMSEN, Aristotles System of the Physical World. A
Comparison with his predecessors, New York 1960, p. 125.
16. Physics, 209a 6-7, 208b 6-8, 211a 1, 209a 1-2.
17. Aristotles opposition to the objectified version of is not to be perceived as a
diversion of the philosopher towards a subjective, almost psychological, interpretation. The
objects themselves with their perpetual motion, which constitutes their way of being (their
r) define space co-existing with it.
18. Physics, 212a 20-21: e , \
.
19. Physics, 212a 9-10.
20. De Caelo, 284b 30 285a 10. The physical motion of bodies in the sublunar space is
always rectilinear; naturally heavy bodies tend to move towards the centre of the universe,
whereas the naturally light towards its circumference. Naturally heavy are the bodies in the
constitution of which one of the heavy elements prevails earth and water- while light are the
bodies where a light element prevails air and fire. Cf. F. SOLMSEN, op.cit., New York 1960,
256. P. K. MACHAMER,Aristotle on Natural Place and Natural Motion, ISIS 69, 1978, pp. 377-
387, has shown that in the case of the motion of elements towards their the latter does
not function as an agent (of purpose or reason) of the motion. A different interpretation is
introduced by S. M. COHEN,Aristotle on Elemental Motion, Phronesis 39, 1994, pp. 150-159.
21. Physics, 210a 3-4: a y c b e j ,
r. And 208b 8-12: b d d , x e d
d , , \ d a -
. a c , e b e b .
IS ARISTOTLE TRULY UNAWARE OF THE NOTION OF SPACE? 149

can one define the dimensions of space, which are not subjective (dependent
on the human viewpoint), but exist by nature ().
This does not mean that the dimensions up and down are presupposed
to the bodies; the existence of the dimensions cannot be autonomous.
cannot be perceived as a neutral and static frame or box in which forces
are exercised and motion takes place independently; space co-exists with
things that are moving (or they tend to move) by nature upwards and
downwards. These inclinations this means forces rather than positions of
the bodies, and nature itself (not as a static fact but as a dynamic entity)
define the dimensions of .
Thus, in order to comprehend the phrase a , we
should not perceive space and bodies as self-sufficient entities in a Newtonian
sense (and conclude either that space draws the bodies as a magnet22 or that
bodies move towards it on their own). A dynamic relation is developed
between and the bodies. Space is a dynamic frame in which bodies
move along specific guidelines23. There are no independent beings, but rather
beings that derive their existence from their relations24. According to the

22. Physics, 209a 22: a .

23. . JAMMER, op. cit., p. 19: Of great importance from our point of view is a passage in
Aristotles Physics, in which space is likened (using a modern expression) to a field of force.
The dynamical field structure, inherent in space, is conditioned by the geometric structure of
space as a whole. Space, as defined by Aristotle, namely, as the inner boundary of the
containing receptacle, is, so to speak, a reference system which generally is of very limited
scope.The place of the sailor is in the boat, the boat itself is in the river, and the river is in the
riverbed. This last receptacle is at rest relative to the earth and therefore also to the universe
as a whole, according to contemporary cosmology. For astronomy, with its moving spheres,
the reference system has to be generalized still further, leading to the finite space of the
universe limited by the interior boundary of the outermost sphere, which, itself is not
contained in any further receptacle. This universal space, of spherical symmetry, has as its
center the center of the earth, to which heavy bodies move under the dynamic influence
intrinsic to space. It is natural for us, who have read Mach and Einstein, to raise the question
whether the geometric aspect of this dynamical field structure depends on the distribution
of matter in space or is completely independent of mass. Aristotle anticipated this question
and tried to show that the dynamics of natural motion depends on spatial conditions only.
24. Aristotle distinguishes between the essence of the existent and its way of being (g
). The way of being is the ontological category that presupposes the relation
between the subject and the object. Beings exist (the manner of their existence being
irrelevant at the moment) before and through their relatedness to man. The category of the
way of being illuminates the existence of beings as being contingent upon their relations with
one another, and redefines the human observer not as a horizon where beings emerge in the
sphere of their r (or correspondingly descend into the realm their c r) but just as a
participant in this fundamental relativity of the existence. By inserting the human conscience
in the substance of being per se, quantum physics would appear to be suggesting a similar
idea. Cf. J. D. BARROW F. J. TIPLER, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Oxford 1987,
pp. 505 ff.
150 V. BETSAKOS

theory of relativity, space is not defined by homogeneity and inertia, neither

is it absolute, as Newton believed. On the contrary, it interacts with the bodies
which move with it25.
Therefore, we should understand Aristotles as directions. The
modern term dimensions refers to the ewtonian concept of an absolute,
static space, a concept essentially different from Aristotles concept of space,
which ontologically presupposed the motion of beings.
3.The correlation of space to motion is the core of Aristotles theory of -
and exists in every aspect of his discussion. He emphasizes: if there were
no local motion, the most obvious (and also a prerequisite for the others)
kind of change, there would be no reference to . and motion
constitute an indissoluble unity of co-ordinates defining the physical reality;
therefore the perception of as an immobile vessel containing bodies is
not to be conceived independently of the structural relation of with the
containing body26. could not contain anything immobile by nature27.
We have to keep in mind that modern (non Newtonian) physics also
necessarily correlates (defines) space with motion. The concept of a finite
space, as it is presented in Aristotles teachings, is not as implausible today as it
would have appeared to be a century ago, when physics predicated the notion
of an infinite Euclidean space as a sine qua non of its scientific inquiry. This is
what establishes the validity of the parallel between the notion of space in
Aristotles cosmology and the notion of spherical space introduced by
Einstein. In both theories, the question of what is outside the finite space has
no meaning.

25. S. W. HAWKING, A brief History of Time, Bandam Books, 1988, p. 33: Before 1915,
space and time were thought of as a fixed arena in which events took place, but which was not
affected by what happened in it. This was true even of the special theory of relativity. Bodies
moved, forces attracted and repelled, but time and space simply continued, unaffected. It was
natural to think that space and time went on forever.The situation, however, is quite different
in the general theory of relativity. Space and time are now dynamic quantities: when a body
moves, or a force acts, it affects the curvature of space and time and in turn the structure of
space-time affects the way in which bodies move and forces act. Space and time not only
affect but also are affected by everything that happens in the universe.
26. Physics, 212a 6-7: b e e e a . And 212b
28-29: a e k , a e e .
27. The indispensable connection of space to motion is the answer to the query of Zeno
about the of . By referring to motion in a level which is substantially prior to space,
Aristotle does anything but to transfer the of to the objects themselves
(perpetually moving from the simple possibility of substance to the complete being of
rspecies). This should not be perceived locally, but as a different way of being (
) of space, that is the motion of bodies; motion is the actual of .
IS ARISTOTLE TRULY UNAWAREOF THE NOTION OF SPACE? 151

B. Why did Aristotle opt for the word instead of or in

Physics?

First, we should examine the way instances of the word in De Caelo fall
into three groups.
a) In most passages is occupied by a body; the body has . The
phrases used are: , , c , F
, 28. It is clear that in those passages Aristotle is
referring to place, considering it as static and indissolubly connected to each
body.
b) In some (fewer) passages is a position towards which the moving
bodies, that is , advance. The phrases used are: , -
c 29. In these cases the bodies do not occupy ,
but they move towards it. Whereas, still belongs to them in some way,
there is, nevertheless, a crucial difference: space exists separate from the
body.
c) In one passage conveys the space in which the movement of
bodies takes place. Aristotle uses the phrase q [] c -
30. In this case the bodies neither occupy nor do they move towards
their own , but space is the range of their movement.
I conclude that in De Caelo has mainly the meaning of place.
However, since Aristotle takes into account the reality of motion and refers
to space which exists in a way independent of the specific body and not from
the motion of beings, he can use meaning place as well as meaning
space. Similar conclusions may be drawn from an analysis of the (many
more) passages in De Caelo where he uses the word . Therefore, in De
Caelo and are mainly used in their pre-philosophical meaning,
presupposing the relation to each body. The semantic difference between the
two words was not sufficient to establish an equivalence of to what we
call space and of to what we call place (or vice versa).
Because of the epistemological nature of Physics, Aristotle should use only
one of the two words of everyday language ( or ), as a fundamental
technical term of his philosophical attempt to disclose nature. Thus, he tries to
avoid terminological obscurity; he almost exclusively uses the word
defining it cautiously and clarifying that it comprises both the sense of place
( ) and that of space ( ).
Then, why did Aristotle opt for the word ? (a word which is
found already in Homer and is preferred in poetry, especially in Sophocles)

28. De Caelo, 287a 17, 287a 22, 288b 18, 288b 20, 293a 31.
29. Ibid., 312a 4, 312b 16-19.
30. Ibid., 312a 5.
152 V. BETSAKOS

denotes a specific area, a separate place; therefore, it was completely

inappropriate for the second definition which Einstein gives (that is, space that
contains all bodies)31.
The word , as it is used in Timaeus32, has a highly specialized function
and meaning in the context of platonic cosmology. Using the word
with this specific function and meaning in Physics, Aristotle proclaims his
disagreement33. Hence, the word is equally inappropriate to express
Aristotles theories.
It remains to have a look at the few passages of Physics in which
exceptionally Aristotle uses the word .
In the first case34,Aristotle thought it was better to add next to the word -
the phrase d .What is the benefit of this addition? Probably in
the description of the alternation of bodies in a container (),
the word does not satisfy the conditions for referring to the separate
nature of place. On the contrary, the word can give this semantic
dimension. The word is used in the same manner in a second case as
well35. The use of the word , being directly and closely associated to the
dimensions of a certain body, was completely inappropriate as an equivalent of
Hesiods . In a third case36, the use of might be imposed by the
need to refer to a place of a surface and a point. It is difficult to grasp a
for those . In this last case37, it is obvious that is used in the
context of enunciating a critique of the platonic theses.
Therefore, Aristotle had no choice but to use the word as a technical
term of his philosophy of nature.

31. Just once does Aristotle use the word meaning a particular area which diverges
from its surroundings: Mirabilium auscultationes, 846b 10-12: O d ,
k f , Q , \ d
z .
32. Timaeus, 51a 4 - b 2 and 52a 8 - b 5.
33. Physics, 209b 11-17.
34. Ibid., 208b 7-8: z
a c , w,
q d , m d q .
35. Ibid., 208b 29-33: \ i d ^H e .
b \, a ,
s, a e , , r d
.
36. Ibid., 209a 7-9: d , d
d a e .
37. Ibid., 209b 11-15: e d c d c g e r
e a e d c d . b e -
e e d , e d c
e e .
IS ARISTOTLE TRULY UNAWARE OF THE NOTION OF SPACE? 153

Conclusion

We should perceive the word in Aristotle as meaning place only in

those passages where it is associated directly and intimately with reality and
the dimensions of a specific object. On the contrary, we should take it with
the modern meaning of the word space in the passages where is
associated essentially with the reality and notion of motion. Moreover, -
always has the meaning space when in reference to cosmological
dimensions. Aristotles enquiry uses as a starting point the strict meaning of a
place taken by a body, but gradually it expands into the cosmological space in
which the motion of beings takes place.

Vassileios BETSAKOS
(Thessaloniki)

           
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