HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70L-4254, Sept. 26, 1951

Facts:
Mejoff was a Russian national. He was brought to the Philippines from Shanghai as a secret spy by the
Japanese forces. When the US regime took over the Philippines Mejoff was arrested as a Japanese spy.
He was deported after finding out that he had no travel documents. Therefore his entry in the
Philippines was illegal. The Deportation Board ordered the Immigration Officials to deport Mejoff.
However, two Russian ships refused to take Mejoff because they don't have the authority to do so. Thus,
Mejoff was moved to Bilibid Prison Muntinglupa and his detention was prolonged.

Issue:
Whether or not Mejoffs' prolonged detention as an alien was unlawful

Held:
Mejoff entry in the Philippines was not illegal since he was brought in the Philippines by the arm forces
during the De Facto Government.
The Philippines adopt the generally accepted principles of the International Law as part of the Law of the
Nation. This principle provides the right to life and liberty to all human beings without any distinction.
This is embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The writ of Habeas Corpus was issued commanding the Director of Prisons to release Mejoff from
custody upon bail.

Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195

Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and
its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning
lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to
reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It
was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due
process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f car
owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and
undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation.
To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?
Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the
power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a citizen
to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record
in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing the
statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive
was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because its installed when parked for 30
minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesnt violate any constitutional
provision.
LOI 229 doesnt force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes
rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of
ewds. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983

Facts
Retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 starting from Luneta to the gates of the
United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully protest the removal of all foreign
military bases and to present a petition containing such to a representative of the Embassy so it may be
delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to initially compel the Mayor of the City of
Manila to make a decision on the application for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has already
been sent through mail. It also included a provision that if it be held somewhere else, permit may be
issued. The respondent mayor alleges that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation of
the resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the
Philippines is a signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with such
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the
other hand, contends that the denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the
freedom of speech and expression.

Issue
Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally in front of the
US Embassy

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect the exercise of the
rights to free speech and peaceful assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of the permit.
These rights are not only assured by our constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of diplomatic relations and human
rights, the former takes higher ground. The right of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is
highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.

Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 (1948)

FACTS: By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur, petitioners were
arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment order No 385. The
petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity with the Japanese,
active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power for Commander of the US
Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based proclamation on the
reasons that the apprehended have violated due allegiance to the US and it is a military necessity.
Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation? [Note: The power
of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation providing for military measures to be
taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance
to the enemy, cannot be seriously questioned.]

No. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, some formal
proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of the political
department, and not the judicial department, to determine if war has ended. The fact that delivery of
certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the
legal sense, already terminated, which clearly it has not. Delivery within the power of military
authorities to make even before was terminates.

2. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad
and sorry plight to which they have been and are being subjected?

No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to
be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage
implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline).
Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our
countrys faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.

BAER vs. TIZON

G.R. No. L-24294May 3, 1974
FACTS:
Respondent Edgardo Gener, asplaintiff, filed a complaint for injunctionwith the Court of First Instance of Bataan
against petitioner, Donald Baer,Commander of the United States NavalBase in Olongapo.
He alleged that he was engaged in thebusiness of logging and that theAmerican Naval Base authoritiesstopped his logging
operations.
He prayed for a writ of preliminaryinjunction restraining petitioner frominterfering with his logging operations.
A restraining order was issued byrespondent Judge
Counsel for petitioner, uponinstructions of the AmericanAmbassador to the Philippines, enteredtheir appearance for
the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground thatthe suit was one against a foreignsovereign
without its consent.

ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner thatthe respondent judge acquires no jurisdictionon the ground that
the suit was one against aforeign sovereign without its consent.

HELD:
YES

.The contention of the petitioneris tenable.The writ of certiorari prayed for isgranted, nullifying and setting aside the
writ of preliminary injunction.The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state withoutits consent is
appropriate

HE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First
policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUE

 Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and
reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and
reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and
foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment,
but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity
to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered
under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or
prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that
such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of
causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by
the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and
judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity
with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent
to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its
sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of
passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least
some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national
interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse
of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the
exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether
the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a
matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997

WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration
of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a
letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability
imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation
to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around
the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision
for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to
be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however
does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As
against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

VINUYA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered
withthe SEC for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in
thePhilippines during the WWII. They claim that they were comfort women at that time and
have greatlysuffered because of that. In 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA,and OSG and requested assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers whoordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines.
However, the officialsdeclined on that ground that the individual claims had already been satisfied by
Japans compliance withthe San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement
of 1956 between Japanand the Philippines. The petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made
by the Philippinegovernment in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void because the comfort women
system constituted acrime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. The same was prohibited
under the jus cogens normsfrom which no derogation is possible. Thus, such waiver was a breach
against the governments obligationnot to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. In addition, they
claim that the Philippine governmentsacceptance of the apologies made by Japan as well as funds
for the AWF were contrary to internationallaw.

ISSUESWas the refusal of the Executive Department to espouse petitioners claims against Japan valid?

RULINGYes, it was valid. It has the exclusive prerogative for such determination. So much so,
the Philippines is notunder any international obligation to espouse petitioners claim. Given the
extraordinary length of time thathas lapsed between the treatys conclusion, the Executive Department
had the ample time to assess theforeign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from
the standpoint of both the interestsof the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on
that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.Under
international law, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the internationallegal
system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
theindividuals behalf. When this happens, in the eye of the international tribunal, the State is the
soleclaimant.Therefore, the State is the sole judge to decide whether its protection in favor of those
petitioners will begranted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It is a discretionary power
and the exercise of which may be determined by consideration of a political or other nature.Moreover,
in the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligation of the Philippines, thepetitioners failed
to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jis cogens prohibitionsat the time the
Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimesin an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. DISPOSITIONPetition is dismissed.

PERALTA v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

75 PHIL 285

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as
defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The
petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and
which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and
impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the time of the restoration
of the Commonwealth?

HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by
the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power
and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political
complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as
such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered
as having ceased to be valid.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171

Facts
Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war
crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his
duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it,
Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions
Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the
Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United
States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the
Philippines.

Issue
1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional

2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing
rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the
Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted
principles of international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and
other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons,
military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the
doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that
commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it
was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more
greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68,
the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not
governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.