2015 The Brazilian Rise and The Elusive South American Balance PDF

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March 2015
Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations
Elusive South American Balance

The Brazilian Rise and the
GIGA Research Programme:
Luis Leandro Schenoni

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TheBrazilianRiseandthe
ElusiveSouthAmericanBalance
Abstract
Withinthelast50years,theBrazilianshareofSouthAmericanpowerhasincreasedfrom
onethird to onehalf of the overall material capabilities in the region. Such a significant
changeintheregionalpowerstructurecannothavegoneunnoticedbyBrazilsneighbors.
ThearticleaddressesthemainquestionrelatedtoSouthAmericanunipolarity(19852014):
Why have most countries in the region not implemented any consistent balancing or
bandwagoning strategies visvis Brazil? Drawing on neoclassical realism, the article
proposesthatcertaindomesticvariablesgovernmentinstability,limitedpartysystemin
stitutionalization,andpowerfulpresidentshavedivertedtheattentionofpoliticalelites
and foreign policy executives from the challenges generated by a rising Brazil. Crispset
qualitative comparative analysis is used to test this hypothesis and other alternative ex
planationsfortheregionalimbalance.
Keywords:SouthAmerica,neoclassicalrealism,regionalpowers
Prof.LuisL.Schenoni
isapoliticalscienceprofessorandresearcheratUniversidadCatlicaArgentinaandaPhD
candidate at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Buenos Aires. This paper was written in
2014duringastayattheGIGAInstituteofLatinAmericanStudiesthatwasfundedbya
scholarshipfromtheErasmusMundusprogram.
<llschenoni@gmail.com>
<www.ucaar.academia.edu/LuisLeandroSchenoni>
269/2015 GIGAWorkingPapers
TheBrazilianRiseandtheElusiveSouthAmericanBalance
LuisLeandroSchenoni
ArticleOutline
1 Introduction
2 TheInternationalLevel:PowerDistributionandForeignPolicyBehavior
3 TheDomesticLevel:InstitutionsConstrainingForeignPolicy
4 AQualitativeAnalysisoftheNeoclassicalRealistHypothesis
5 Conclusion
Bibliography
Appendix
1 Introduction
It is unquestionable that the power gap between Brazil and its regional neighbors has in
creaseddramaticallyinrecentdecades.1AccordingtotheCompositeIndexofNationalCa
pabilities(CINC),2Brazilsshareofglobalpowerhasincreasedmoderatelyfrom1.2percent
to 2.4 percent over the last 50 years, while its share of regional power has increased from
36percentto50percentoverthesameperiod.ThishasmeantthatSouthAmericahasbeena
unipolarsubsystemsince1985.3
1 EarlierversionsofthisworkingpaperwerepresentedattheObservatoirePolitiquedelAmriquelatineetdes
CarabesSciencesPo(Paris,24April2014),theXXXIIInternationalCongressoftheLatinAmericanStudies
Association(Chicago,23May2014),andtheInstitutodeRelaesInternacionaisUSP(SoPaulo,12February
2015).IwouldliketothankJorgeBattaglino,OlivierDabne,AnjaJetschke,IgnacioLabaqui,AndrsMalamud,
DetlefNolte,AnbalPrezLin,MarcelVaillant,AmncioOliveira,JaninaOnuki,andLeslieWehner,aswell
asmyfellowdoctoralstudentsVctorMijares,JorgeGarzn,FernandoMourn,FranciscoUrdinez,andNicolas
Beckmann,formanythoughtprovokinginsightsonpreviousdrafts.
2 TheCINCisbasedonsixindicatorsofinternationalpower:energyconsumption,ironandsteelproduction,
militaryexpenditure,militarypersonnel,totalpopulation,andurbanpopulation.
3 Asystemturnsfrombipolartounipolarwhenthemostpowerfulcountryismorethantwotimesthesizeof
the secondmostpowerful country. In SouthAmerica, this happened in 1975 and then and definitely in
1985,whenBrazilsCINCbecamemorethantwicethatofArgentinas(Martin2006:55).
LuisLeandroSchenoni:TheBrazilianRiseandtheElusiveSouthAmericanBalance 5
Most studies on Brazilian foreign policy address the countrys relations with other
emerging powers or with great powers. However, it is evident that the rise of the South
Americancolossus,whilegeneratingnewparitiesatthesystemiclevel,hasproducedsubsys
temic disparities that have affected its relations with other states in the region (Malamud
2011;Lima2013;FlemesandWehner2015).Therehasbeenincreasingawarenessofandcon
cernabouttheeffectsthischangehashadandprobablywillhaveintheBrazilianback
yard.Moreover,alivelydebatehasignitedaroundaforthcomingeditedvolumeentitledLatin
AmericanReactionstotheRiseofBrazil(GardiniandTavaresdeAlmeida2014)andthelatest
issueofInternationalPolitics(FlemesandLobell2015),whereseveralscholarsaddressthisis
suefromdifferentperspectives.
Suchacademicinterestseemstobejustifiedbyapatentempiricalriddle.Realism4stands
asthesingleinternationalrelations(IR)theorythataddressestheexpectedeffectsofchanges
in relative power. In a nutshell, it predicts that in a unipolar yet not hegemonic South
AmericathepowergapbetweenBrazilanditsmorepowerfulneighborsshoulddrivethelatter
tocounterbalancebyincreasingtheircapabilitiesorreorganizingtheirregionalandextrare
gionalalliances(cf.Waltz1979;Mares1988;Huntington1999).Nonetheless,thishasnotcon
sistentlyoccurred.SouthAmericansecondarypowersmayhavecontestedBrazilianleader
ship at times, with varied intensity (Flemes and Wehner 2015),5 but this behavior has not
beenconsistentacrosscasesandyears.
WhatexplainstheSouthAmericanunderreactiontotheBrazilianrise?Neoclassicalreal
ismproposesananswertotheparadox,assertingthatinconsistentbalancingorbandwagon
ingstrategiesmaybeattributabletocertaindomesticconditionsthatpreventacoherentre
sponsetosubsystemicincentives(Rose1998;cf.Abb2013).Thisarticleteststheplausibility
ofsuchanexplanationbyanalyzingunipolarityinSouthAmericafrom1985to2014.Indo
ingso,itfocusesonlongtermstrategictrends,therebydifferentiatingitselffromforeignpolicy
analysesbasedonshorttermdata(cf.Lobelletal.2015).
The article is divided into three sections. The first section explains how Brazils neigh
borsforeignpoliciescouldbeexpectedtohavedevelopedintheabsenceofdomesticcon
straints. A second section identifies certain domestic variables that may have intervened,
preventingsuchbehavior.Athirdsectioncontraststheseexplanationswithothercompeting
hypothesesusingcrispsetqualitativecomparativeanalysis(csQCA).Thearticlecloseswith
4 Inabroadsensethatencompasesbalanceofpowertheory,hegemonicstabilitytheoryandalsopowertransi
tiontheory.
5 Theumbrellaconceptofcontestationalpoliticsinvolvesavarietyofforeignpolicyinstrumentsforexample,
alliance building, entangling diplomacy, binding, omnienmeshment, balking, hedging or fence sitting
whichcanbeinterpretedasalternativestoasoftbalancingstrategy(cf.Pape2005;Paul2005).DanielFlemes
andLeslieWehner(2015)applythisconcepttoSouthAmericaandfindsomeevidenceofstrategiccontesta
tionintheregion.However,secondaryregionalpowersinSouthAmericahavebehavedverydifferentlyfrom
eachother,withsomechangingtheirstrategyseveraltimessincetheinceptionofregionalunipolarityin1985.
Thisarticleattemptstoexplainthesedifferentbehaviors.
6 LuisLeandroSchenoni:TheBrazilianRiseandtheElusiveSouthAmericanBalance
conclusionsregardinghowgovernmentinstability,limitedpartysysteminstitutionalization,
andpowerfulpresidentshavedivertedtheattentionofpoliticalelitesandforeignpolicyex
ecutivesfromthechallengesgeneratedbyarisingBrazil.
2 TheInternationalLevel:PowerDistributionandForeignPolicyBehavior
Thisarticlearguesthatitisthecombinedeffectofinternationalanddomesticvariablesthat
hasgivenshapetoSouthAmericaninternationalpolitics.Forthesakeofclarity,thissection
explorestheinternationalvariablesfirst.Therefore,itfocusesonstatesasthemainactorsin
and relative capabilities as the main determinants of foreign policy outcomes, while ceteris
paribus is assumed for any other international or domestic variables. Thus, to begin with,
SouthAmericaisimaginedasaneorealistsubsystemofunitary,rational,andselfinterested
countries(Waltz1979).6
TheneorealistlogicwasomnipresentinSouthAmericanforeignpolicydecisionmaking
beforethe1980s.Infact,thebalancingofpowerwasthestandardbehaviorintheregionuntil
thecompetitiveArgentineBrazilianbipolaritygavewaytoBrazilianprimacyandcoopera
tiveunipolarity(Martin2006;Lima2013).Sincethen,secondaryregionalpowerssuchasAr
gentinahavenotattemptedtocountertheBrazilianrisebyincreasingtheirowncapabilities
throughinternalbalancingorbyreorganizingalliancesthroughexternalbalancing.
Figure1:PowerConcentrationinSouthAmerica:CountryPercentageofGDP,Military
Expenditures,andCINCin1950and2013

Source:CINC,CorrelatesofWar,andBanksDatabase.
6 Waltzdoesnotdevelopatheoryofhowsubsystemsbehave.HesaysinsteadthatAgeneraltheoryofinterna
tional politics is necessarily based on the great powers. [However,] The theory once written also applies to
lesserstatesthatinteractinsofarastheirinteractionsareinsulatedfromtheinterventionofthegreatpowers
ofasystem(Waltz1979:73).
Confrontedwiththisnewreality,manyIRscholarsabandonedneorealismandassumedthat
somehowidentitiesorinstitutionsexplainedtheimbalance.Evenamongthosewhocontinued
to subscribe to realism, the effect of the Brazilian rise was underestimated because of the
overwhelmingAmericanhegemonyintheregion.Forinstance,itwasarguedthattheUnited
States offensive policies in the commercial realm created incentives for secondary regional
powerssuchasArgentinatocooperatewithBrazilthroughMERCOSUR,evengiventheun
even conditions of Brazilian primacy (GmezMera 2013).7 However, the American hemi
spherichegemonyhadalreadyexistedduringtheperiodofArgentineBrazilianbipolarity,
andfewincentiveshadexistedthenforSouthAmericansecondarypowerstoallyagainstthe
hegemon(Mares1988).
IfwekeeptheAmericanhemispherichegemonyasaconstantfrom1945onwards,adis
tinctiveSouthAmericanlogicremains:themorethemajorregionalpower,Brazil,grows,the
greatertheincentivesforsecondaryregionalpowersArgentina,andalsoChile,Colombia,
Peru,andVenezuelatosafeguardtheirautonomyfromtheirrisingneighbor.Inthewords
ofSamuelHuntington,
theprincipalsourceofcontentionbetweenthesuperpower[theUnitedStates]and
themajorregionalpowers[thatis,Brazil]istheformersinterventiontolimit,counter,or
shapetheactionsofthelatter.Forthesecondaryregionalpowers[thatis,Argentina],on
theotherhand,superpowerinterventionisaresourcethattheypotentiallycanmobi
lize against their regions major power. The superpower and the secondary regional
powerswillthusoften,althoughnotalways,shareconverginginterestsagainstmajor
regional powers, and secondary regional powers will have little incentive to join in a
coalitionagainstthesuperpower.(Huntington1999:42)
ThelogichighlightedbySamuelHuntingtonisclear.Brazilhaswithoutadoubtsufficient
materialcapabilitiestoprojectpowerinitsregional[SouthAmerican]environmentwhich
assumesatypicallyunipolardistribution(Lima2013:190).Ofcourse,materialcapabilities
are not power per se, but are the raw material out of which power relationships are
forged (Baldwin 2013: 277); therefore, given that Brazil represents 50.5 percent of the re
gional CINC and 55.6 percent of the regional GDP, it is not unreasonable to think that the
country could eventually pose a threat to (cf. Walt 1985) or be perceived as a threat by (cf.
Jervis1976)theneighborhood,evenifitappearsunlikelyintheshortterm.Inotherwords,
7 Laura GomesMera (2013) provides evidence based on interviews with top policymakers that shows how
MERCOSUR served as a defensive strategy against the Free TradeArea of theAmericas (FTAA), but this is
differentfromstatingthatArgentinahadstructuralincentivesforformingastrategicalliancewithBrazil.Two
piecesofevidencecontradictGomesMerasclaim.Ontheonehand,theArgentinaBrazilcooperationstarted
throughregionalunipolarity,waybeforetheunipolarworldcameintobeing:theinitialrapprochementoc
curred much earlier, under the military regimes in 19791980, and economic integration proceeded under
democratic governments in the 1980s (Darnton 2012: 120; cf. ResendeSantos 2002). On the other hand, the
endoftheColdWardidnotsubstantiallychangepowerrelationsintheWesternhemisphere,whereUShe
gemonywasuncontestedbytheUSSR.Insum,MERCOSURmayhavebeenareactiontotheFTAAinitiative,
butnotaconsequenceofcapabilitydistribution.
ineachregiontherearesmallerpivotalstatesthatmakenaturalU.S.alliesagainst
anaspiringregionalpower.Indeed,theUnitedStatesfirstmoveinanycounterbalanc
inggameofthissortcouldbetotrytopromotesuchpivotalstatestogreatpowersta
tusregionalbalancingdynamicsarelikelytokickinagainstthelocalgreatpower
much more reliably than the global counterbalance works against the United States.
Given the neighbourhoods they live in, an aspiring Chinese, Japanese, Russian, or
German [and in this case Brazilian] pole would face more effective counterbalancing
thantheUnitedStatesitself.(Wohlforth1999:31)
Tosummarize,thereseemstobeagreementintheliteratureonhowsubsystemicincentives
should have operated in a unipolar region where Brazil was waxing but the United States
remainedaproximateandpowerfulregionalhegemon(Lobelletal.2015).Ontheonehand,
secondaryregionalpowersArgentina,Chile,Colombia,Peru,andVenezuelashouldhave
contestedBrazilianprimacyinaconsistentmanner.Ontheotherhand,smallstateshistori
callyatloggerheadswithsecondaryregionalpowersandsignificantlylessempoweredBo
livia,Ecuador,Paraguay,andUruguayshouldhavebandwagonedtheSouthAmericangi
ant.8 Figure 2 shows how the regional balance of power should, according to a realist per
spective,havebeensince1985.
Figure2:CINCCountryShareandExpectedBehaviorsinSouthAmerica

Notes: ThexaxisandtheyaxisbothrepresentthedistancefromBrazilintermsoftheCINCusingtheformula
CINCBR+CINCX2.TheareainsidethecirclesrepresentseachcountrysshareoftheCINC.
Source:CINCmean,19842013;CorrelatesofWar.
8 Thedifferencebetweensecondaryregionalpowersandsmallstatesisthattheformerhaveenoughresourcesto
affectthesubsystembyformingallianceswitharelativelysmallnumberoftheirpeers.Smallstates,incontrast,
havesolittlepowerthattheywouldhavetocoordinatehugealliancestogenerateaneffect(cf.Mare1988).
Fromthevantagepointofneorealismthatis,consideringmaterialcapabilitiesandcon
trollingforallotherdomesticandinternationalvariablesbehaviorsshouldfollowthepat
terndescribedinFigure1.Thisstatementisapointofdepartureforaddressingthisarticles
central research question: Why have South American countries not consistently reacted in
thisway?
Table 1 summarizes the countries actual behaviors towards Brazil, taking into account
two key features: commercial interdependence and military expenditures. Economic state
craft and military buildups have long been taken as proof of soft and hardbalancing, re
spectively(Pape2005).Therefore,expectedbalancerssecondaryregionalpowersaresup
posed to be less commercially attached to Brazil while maintaining relatively high military
expenditures.Incontrast,expectedbandwagonerssmallstatesarepresumedtoexhibita
highleveloftradeinterdependencewithBrazilandlowmilitaryexpenditures.
Consideringstructuralfactorssuchastradeinterdependenceandmilitaryexpenditures
inordertoassessbalancinginSouthAmericaisofutmostimportance.Thisallowsustodis
tinguish,unlikepreviousstudies(cf.FlemesandWehner2015),betweenstatesthatreallydo
softbalance and those that, despite some contestational tactics, do not actually apply a
longterm softbalancing strategy.9 Similarly, many studies have confused bandwagoning
withtacticconvergence.However,acertaincountryssupportforforeignpolicyinitiatives,
joint membership in regional institutions (Burges 2015), or friendly declarations (Gomez
Mera2013)donotguaranteethatitdoesnotseeBrazilasathreat.
Thisarticlefocusesonstructuralconditions.Itisnotasmuchaboutperceptions,threats,
and shortterm balancing (Walt 1985; cf. Wehner 2014) as it is about capabilities and long
term precautions (Waltz 1979). The point is that even if no SouthAmerican country is ob
sessedwiththepossibilityofconflictintheshortterm,somecountriesdoconsidertheprob
ability as low as it may be and thus have longterm independent strategies (cf. Brooks
1997). Therefore, secondary regional powers that remain commercially autonomous from
Brazilandmaintainsomedegreeofmilitaryreadinessstillbehaveasbalancersofsomesort.
Table1providesapictureoftheregionin2012;onlyChile,Colombia,andUruguaybehaved
asexpected.10
9 SeeFN5.
10Interestingly,thesebehaviorswerealmostconstantfrom1985to2012.Thechangesintheinternationalsystem
frombipolarityinthe1980stounipolarityinthe1990sandanemergingmultipolarityafter2000didnotaf
fecttheregionalhierarchiesofSouthAmericanintraregionaltradersormilitaryexpenders.Forinstance,the
mean in intraregional trade varied from 24.1 percent (19851990) to 32.7 percent (19912001) to 34.9percent
(20012014),butduringthewholeperiodArgentina,Bolivia,Paraguay,andUruguayremainedthegreaterin
traregionaltraders(CEPAL2014).Thesamewasthecasewithmilitarybudgets:ChileandColombiaremained
thehighestspendersinallthreeperiods(SIPRI2014).Therefore,evenifchangesatthesystemiclevelaffect
militaryexpenditureandtradewithBrazilinabsoluteterms,therelativeSouthAmericanhierarchiesremain,
provingthatasubordinatebutrelevantsubsystemiclogicexists.
Table1:TheoreticalExpectationsandActualBehaviortowardsBrazil
ARG CHI COL PER VEN BOL ECU PAR URU
Expectations Balance Bandwagon
ExportstoBrazil HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW HIGH LOW MED HIGH
Brazilianimports HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW MED LOW HIGH HIGH
FTAwiththeUS NO YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO
MERCOSUR YES NO NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Militarybudget LOW HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW HIGH LOW LOW
Rationalbehavior NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES
Notes: Exportsandimportsareclassifiedashighiftheyconstitutemorethan20percentofthecountrystotal
exports and imports, medium if between 10 percent and 20 percent, and low if less than 10 percent.A
thresholdof2percentofGDPseparateshighmilitaryexpendituresfromlowmilitaryexpenditures.
Sources:SIPRIMilitaryExpendituresDatabase(2012),WTOTradeProfiles(2012).
Ontheonehand,UruguayistheonlysmallstateinSouthAmericathatconsistentlyband
wagons with Brazil, as evidenced by its trade interdependence and military expenditures.
However,whilePresidentMujicahasliterallystatedthatUruguayshouldjumponBrazils
wagon,11 all the other small states have thwarted Brazils plans, be it by nationalizing
Petrobras facilities (Bolivia), blocking Venezuelas admission into MERCOSUR (Paraguay),
ordisturbingregionalstabilitybecauseofdomesticquarrelsandbordercrises(Ecuador).
Ontheotherhand,ChileandColombiaaretheonlysecondarypowersthathavesecured
somemarginformaneuvervisvisBrazil,bothinthecommercialandthedefenserealms.
Unlike Argentina and Venezuela, Chile has gently rejected the pressure to participate in
MERCOSUR since the organizations very inception and has used the UNASUR Defense
CounciltomonitorBraziliandoctrinesandexpenditures(NolteandWehner2014).Colombia
isamorerecklessbalancer.ItonceovertlydefiedtheUNASURprojectbysigningadealal
lowing the United States to use its military bases. Chile and Colombia are by far Brazils
mostcunningandwarymiddlesizeneighbors.
BesidesChileandColombia,regionalsoftbalancers,andUruguay,aregionalbandwagoner,
alltheothercountriescontradictrealistpredictions.Peru,forinstance,isasecondaryregion
al power whose behavior resembles the balancing ideal, but its military budget is too low,
1.3percentofitsGDP,forittobeconsideredacoherentbalancer.BoliviaandParaguay,on
theotherside,aresmallcountrieswhosebehaviorisclosetotheidealbandwagoningtype,
buttheyarenotinterdependentenoughwithBrazil.
Othercases,likeArgentina,Ecuador,andVenezuela,bluntlycontradicttheoreticalexpec
tations.Argentina behaves as a bandwagoner:Brazil is itsmajor trading partnerand it has
thelowestmilitaryexpendituresasashareofGDP(0.9percent)intheregion.Venezuela
islesscommerciallyinterdependentwithBrazilbutshowsasimilartendency:itstradehas
shiftedconsiderablyfromColombiatowardsBrazil,nowitsmajortradingpartnerinSouth
11UruguaydebeviajarenloestribosdeBrasil(ElObservador,1February2012).
America.Lastly,Ecuador,asmallcountryexpectedtobandwagon,behavesalmostasabal
ancerbystayingoutof MERCOSURandmaintaininghighmilitaryexpenditures.Thecon
tradictorynatureofthesecasesishighlightedinTable1anddeservesspecialattention.
Inthepast,somehaveexplainedtheabsenceofconsistentbalancersorbandwagonersas
being due to the thick normative nature of South American international society (Merke
2015). Others have focused on shortterm tactics rather than longterm structural con
straintssofteningtherealistlexiconandswitchingtheemphasistotheanalysisofBrazils
leadershipinsteadofitsprimacy(Malamud2011;Burges2015).Thenextsectionexplains
whymostcountriesintheregionhavenotimplementedanyconsistentbalancingorband
wagoning strategies visvis Brazil. Neoclassical realism (Rose 1998) offers insights on the
problem,assertingthatinconsistentbalancersorbandwagonersmayhaveparticulardomes
ticcharacteristicsthatexplaintheirbehavior.
3 TheDomesticLevel:InstitutionsConstrainingForeignPolicy
Wewillnowlookinsidetheblackboxofthestatetounderstandhowandwhyneorealist
previsionshavenottakenplaceinsomecountrieswhiletheyhaveinothers.
FollowingRandallSchweller,itcouldbesaidthatthemostimmediatevariableaffecting
acountrysassertionthatthereisapotentialthreatiseliteconsensusonitsexistence.Ifapar
ticularcountryspoliticaleliteisdividedonwhetherornottobalance,theexpectedbalanc
ingbehaviorsmaybeinconsistentormayneverbeexhibited.Therefore,eliteandsocialco
hesion,aswellasregimestability,arethekeyvariablesforunderstandingforeignpolicybe
havior,asthefollowingcausalschemeshows(Schweller2006:63):
Rise of an external threat social fragmentation (cohesion) + government or regime

vulnerability(stability)+elitefragmentation(cohesion)elitedisagreementornonbal
ancingconsensus(elitebalancingconsensus)underbalancing(balancing)behavior
InSouthAmerica,eliteandsocialfragmentationconstrainstatebehaviorbycallingtheforeign
policyexecutivesattentiontodomesticpoliticsratherthantheinternationalenvironment.12
Since 1985, South American democracies with deep elite divisions have demonstrated
less institutionalized party systems and more personalistic politicians as heads of govern
ment (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). Typically, these delegative presidents (ODonnell
12ThedividednatureofLatinAmericaneliteshaslongposedapuzzletoneorealistexplanations:[LatinAmer
icannations]problemsdidnothavesomuchtodowiththeirneighboursbutmorewithinternalfactionsex
cludedfrompower.Thisobservationbringsusonceagaintothetypesofunitsthatformtheregion.Theyare
statesthatarestrongintheircapabilitiestotakedecisionsbutweaktoimplementthem;statesthatarestrong
in articulating dominant coalitions but weak in administering conflicts when the factions are left out of the
loop. Here, the theory of omnibalancing brings complexity tothe power dynamics. Inother words, the re
gionsleadersdonotonlyseektobalancepowerinrelationtotheirneighboursbutalsoinrelationtodomes
ticfactions(Merke2010:18).
1994)haveaccumulatedagreatamountofpowertosecuretheirpositionbuthavesooneror
later fallen dramatically due to several episodes of government instability (cf. PrezLin
2007;LlanosandMarsteintredet2010).
Whentheinternalpoliticsareunstableandmandatesareatstake,thenationalarenabe
comesalmostasharshandanarchicasthatofinternationalpolitics.Intheeventoflowparty
institutionalizationandrecurrentgovernmentcrises,SouthAmericanpresidentsarenotex
pected to pay much attention to the power transitions taking place intheir region. Foreign
policyismorelikelytobecomeatoolforaccumulatingdomesticpower,andcountriesthat
wouldhaveotherwisebeenrivalscanbecomealliesorbeignored.
ParadigmaticcaseslikeArgentinaandVenezuelasuggestthattwoforeignpolicybehaviors
aretobeexpectedfromdividedcountries.First,theconcentrationofvetopowerinthepresi
dent should cause foreign policy instability (Tsebelis 2002). Second, domestic turmoil should
leadtotheunderestimationofinternationalthreats,aninternallyorientedforeignpolicy,and
behaviorsatoddswithneorealistexpectations.Thestorylooksmoreorlesslikethis:
Riseofanexternalthreathigh(low)partysysteminstitutionalization*representative
(delegative) president * government stability (instability) neorealist (no neorealist)
behavior
Very concrete empirical questions can be addressed to determine whether SouthAmerican

countriesareclosertotheunitaryordividedidealtype:Havethesecountriespresidents
completed their mandates? Are their party systems institutionalized? Are their presidents
delegative?Table2summarizesthesedata.Notsurprisingly,countrieswithrecurrentpresi
dentialcrises,hyperpresidentialism,andgreaterelectoralvolatilitythatis,dividedcoun
triesaretheonesthatareatoddswithneorealistexpectationsandthathavemoreunstable
foreignpolicies.
Table2:CharacteristicsofUnitary(Blue)andDivided(White)Countries
Governmentinstability HIGH LOW LOW MED MED HIGH HIGH MED LOW
Electoralvolatility HIGH LOW LOW HIGH HIGH MED HIGH LOW LOW
Delegativenature HIGH LOW LOW MED HIGH LOW MED MED LOW
Notes: Governmentinstabilityisclassifiedaslowiftherehasbeennopresidentialcrisis,mediumiftherehave
beenoneortwo,andhighifthreepresidentswereoustedbetween1985and2013.Theaverageelectoral
volatilityfortheperiod19902011ismeasuredbythePedersenindexandclassifiedaslowifitisless
than35percent,mediumifitisbetween35percentand48percent,andhighifitisabove48percent.Fi
nally, the delegative democracies index classifies countries according to an eightpoint scale, which is
dividedhereintolow,0to3;medium,3to5;andhigh,5to8.
Sources:GeorgetownPoliticalDataoftheAmericasdatabase(2013)andthedelegativedemocraciesindex(Gon
zlez2013).
ThefirstrowinTable2considerspresidentialcrisesthatendedwiththedissolutionofeither
theexecutiveorthelegislativebranch(PrezLin2007;LlanosandMarsteintredet2010).13
The second row shows the countrys average ranking on the Pedersen index, which
measures electoral volatility as a proxy of partysystem institutionalization, in presidential
electionsfrom1990to2011.Finally,thethirdrowshowswhetherthecountryismoreorless
similartowhatGuillermoODonnell(1994)calledadelegativedemocracy,asopposedtoa
representativeone(Gonzlez2013;cf.ShugartandCarey1992).14
Whenthecountriesarefilteredaccordingtopartysysteminstitutionalization,thelevelof
delegativedemocracy,andpresidentialstability,threecasesstandout:Chile,Colombia,and
Uruguay.15Aspredictedbyneoclassicalrealism,onlythesecountrieshaverespondedration
ally to international incentives. Chile and Colombia, secondary regional powers, have con
sistently counterbalanced Brazil by strengthening economic ties with extraregional powers
andmaintaininglargemilitarybudgets.ThesmallstateofUruguayhas,despiteitsharshtac
ticaldiscourse,optedtotieitselfstructurallytoBrazil.
The two secondary regional powers that have clearly underbalanced, Argentina and
Venezuela,as well asthe small state that hasbeen more reluctant to bandwagon, Ecuador,
arepreciselythosethathaveexperiencedmorepresidentialcrises,greaterelectoralvolatility,
andstrongerexecutives.Inthesecases,domesticinstabilityhasresultedinsignificantforeign
13Thepicturewouldbefarmoredramaticiffailedcoupsorcrisesthatdidnotleadtopresidentialorlegislative
breakdowns were considered. In Colombia, Csar Gaviria and Ernesto Samper had to face corruption scan
dals that threatened their governments in 1991 and 1996, respectively. This was also the case for Jaime Paz
ZamorainBolivia,GonzlezMacchiinParaguay,andRodrigoBorjainEcuador,amongothers.Venezuelan
coup dtat attempts in 1992 and 2002 are also not considered in Table 1 as long as they did not succeed in
oustingthepresident.Inallofthesecasesaninstitutionalarrangementwaspossibleandbothlegislativeand
executivepowersstood.
14LucasGonzlezmeasuresODonnellscelebratedconceptforthefirsttimebyaskingregionalexpertstoclas
sifyeverycountrywithregardtoeightcharacteristicattributesofdelegativedemocracies.Thoseattributesare
asfollows:i)thepresidentistakentobetheembodimentofthenation,custodian,anddefinerofitsinterests,
ii) the policies of his government need bear no resemblance to the promises of his campaign; iii) the presi
dentspoliticalbaseisapoliticalmovement,presentinghimselfasabovebothpoliticalpartiesandorganized
interests,iv)otherinstitutions,suchascourtsandlegislatures,areconsideredimpedimentstotheexerciseof
power,v)theexerciseofpowerisnoninstitutionalized,vi)thepresidentnominatesisolatedandshieldedtc
nicos to office,vii) extremely weak or nonexistent horizontal accountability and viii)swift policymaking a
higherlikelihoodofgrossmistakes,hazardousimplementation,andthepresidenttakingresponsibilityforthe
outcome(Gonzlez2013:7).TheindexofLatinAmericanpresidentslegislativepowersandpartisanpowers
providedbyKitscheltetal.(2010:222;cf.ShugartandCarey1992)reachessimilarconclusionsforalmostevery
case besidesUruguay, whose presidencyseems stronger.Of course, many institutional changes occurred in
mostSouthAmericancountriesfrom1985to2013,sothisindicatorlikeanyothermustbetakenasanap
proximationoftheconceptofhyperpresidentialism.
15AlthoughthisarticledoesnotaimtodiscusstheBraziliancase,thiscountryexhibitsaparticularhistory.Even
though Brazil saw one president ousted, in 1992, its domestic politics changed dramatically after the Plano
Realandeconomicstabilization(Panizza2000),becomingthoseofaveryunitaryactor.Inlinewithourhy
pothesis,itwasonlyinthislateperiodthatBrazilstartedbehavingasanemergingpower.
policyinconsistencies.Duringtheperiodanalyzedhere,Venezuelamovedfromtheopenly
neoliberal and proAmerican discourse of Carlos Andrs Perez to calling George W. Bush
the devil himself in the United Nations GeneralAssembly.16 Similarly,Argentina shifted
from a policy of carnal relations17 with the United States to a Chavezlike paranoia and
harshdiscourse.18ThechangesinEcuadorwerenolessremarkable.Domesticconsiderations
have been preeminent in these three unstable countries, resulting in overall foreign policy
behavior that overtly disregards structural factors. In Argentina or Venezuela, then, the
bandwagoning of Brazil has been driven by ideology and presidential preferences rather
thanlongtermstrategicconcerns.
Finally,therearethreecasesthatcannotbeclearlydefinedasunitaryordividedac
tors:Bolivia,ParaguayandPeru.Theirforeignpoliciesareneitherconsistentwithnorcom
pletelyatoddswithneorealism.
ThesedomesticsimilaritiesinSouthAmericahavelongbeenacknowledged.Davidand
RuthColliersseminalbookonpartysystemsformationandevolutionintwentiethcentury
Latin America pointed out that Brazil and Chile, by incorporating the labor movement
throughthestate,aswellasColombiaandUruguay,bydoingsothroughtraditionalparties,
developed a totally different partysystem structure and domestic politics dynamic than
those countries where labor was incorporated through populist parties Argentina, Peru,
andVenezuela(CollierandCollier1991).Manyotherhistoricalsimilaritiesarealsoevident
amongourfourunitaryactorsontheonehandandourfivedividedactorsontheother.19
A celebrated study on the Latin American Left recently differentiated between Brazil,
Chile,andUruguayontheonehandandArgentina,Bolivia,Ecuador,andVenezuelaonthe
other, in terms not only of their ideological discourse but also of their political institutions
16Thedevilcamehereyesterday,anditsmellsofsulfurstilltoday,thistablethatIamnowstandinginfront
of,inHugoChvezcomparaaBushconeldemoniodesdeelestradodeNacionesUnidas(ElPas,20Sep
tember2006).
17Those were the words of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a meeting held in the Inter
AmericanDevelopmentBankin1991(cf.EscudandCisneros:216).
18Cristinaacusaasectoresconcentradosdequerervoltearalgobiernoconayudaextranjera(Clarn,30Sep
tember2014).
19Theformerhavedemonstratedmorecohesivepoliticalelitebehaviorsincetheverybeginningofthetwentieth
century,whentheconservativeoligarchiesmanagedtocooperateandkeepworkersundercontrol.Thus,itwas
alsointhecaseofunitaryactorsthatthelabormovement,initiallyexcludedfrompolitics,radicalized,almost
achievingsocialrevolutionbeforebureaucraticauthoritariancoupsdtat(ODonnell1973),asinBrazilin1964
andChilein1973,orbipartisanagreements,asinColombiain1958,restoredtheexclusionofpopularsectors
and consolidated the control of an always cohesive political elite, the national bourgeoisie, and the military.
Withcohesiveandconservativeeliteswhoweredeterminedtorepresssocialprotest,ChileandColombiawere,
not surprisingly, the first countries to implement consistent economic reforms in the 1980s, thereby avoiding
great shocks during the LatinAmerican debt crisis. Finally, unitary actors exhibited the aforementioned fea
turesinthelastdecades:executivelegislativerelationswheremorecooperativepresidentsdidnotbecomede
legative,whilepartysysteminstitutionalizationremainedhighandpresidentialcriseswereabsent.
and economic policies (Levitzky and Roberts 2011). Thissection has shown that those con
clusionscouldbeextendedtoforeignpolicyaswell.
4 AQualitativeAnalysisoftheNeoclassicalRealistHypothesis
Inthefirstsection,thisarticleconsideredasinglevariableorconditionwithwhichtoexplain
SouthAmerican foreign policies: national capabilities.A second section amended this sim
plisticviewbyaddingthreemoreconditions:partysysteminstitutionalization,government
stability,andpresidentialcharacter.Thissectionoffersafarmorecomplexunderstandingof
regional politics, considering every other explanatory variable in a comparative test of the
papershypothesis.
Fromanintuitiveperspective,theaboveexplanationofSouthAmericanforeignpolicies
seems to coherently describe the regional subsystem during the three decades of Brazilian
unipolarity.However,adetailedandsystematicexaminationofthisargumentshouldbeun
dertakeninordertotesttheinternalandexternalvalidityoftheaforementionedhypothesis.
So far, a relationship between the alleged cause and effect has been detected, but two
thingsarestillunknown:whetherthepresumedcausedoestemporallyprecedetheeffect20
and whether there are alternative explanations for this same phenomenon. A comparative
testisconductedheretosolvethesecondoftheseremainingpuzzles.
AsisusuallythecaseinIR,thenumberofcasesthenineSouthAmericanneighborsof
Brazil is not sufficient to apply statistics. Among the comparative methods for smallN
analysis,fuzzysetqualitativecomparativeanalysis(fsQCA)alsorequiresmorethan25cases.
Therefore,crispsetqualitativecomparativeanalysis(csQCA)seemstobethemostsuitable
methodtotestforalternativehypotheses(RihouxandRagin2009).
BasedonBooleanalgebraandsettheory,csQCAisasimpleconfigurationalcomparative
analysisofdichotomousvariablesconditionsthatareeitherpresentornotpresentfora
small number of cases. If every alternative hypothesis has been introduced to the analysis,
then this method compares on a casebycase basis, giving a solution in terms of an INUS
conditionthatis,theinsufficientbutnecessarypartsofaconditionwhichisitselfunneces
sarybutsufficienttoexplainacertainoutcome.Therefore,iflowpartysysteminstitutionali
20An important contribution of this article has been to overcome theoretical underspecification and allow for
replication and testing by developing a more observable account of causal mechanisms determining South
Americanstatesforeignpolicystabilityandrationale.However,thesemechanismsarefarfromproven.Even
ifitiswellknownthatasetofSouthAmericancountrieshasevolvedsimilarlywithregardtotheirpartysys
temsandpoliticaleconomy(cf.FloresMacas2012;Roberts2012),therearecompetingexplanationsforthese
resemblances, and the link between these countries paths and foreign policy behavior is far from evident.
Processtracing methodology (Beach and Pedersen 2013) could be used to check for the actual existence of
thesemechanisms,witheachSouthAmericancountrytakenasacasestudy.However,thiswouldbeimpossi
bletodowithinasinglearticle.
zation,governmentinstability,andhyperpresidentialismremainthebetterconfigurationfor
explaining foreign policy when all other explanations are controlled, this would lead us to
acceptthenonspuriousnessoftheaforementionedrelationship.
Thequestiontobeaskedisthefollowing:Forwhatotherreasonsbesidesthesedomestic
variablesmightChile,Colombia,andUruguayhavebehavedintheaforementionedway?In
other words, why have Chile and Colombia integrated their economies with extraregional
powersandmaintainedthehighestmilitarybudgetsinSouthAmerica?OrwhyhasUruguay
beensounproblematicforBrazil,incomparisonwithothersmallstatesintheregion?
There are possible alternative explanations for such behaviors. For example, liberals
wouldarguethatregimetypes,thelevelofeconomicinterdependence,andthepresenceof
internationalinstitutionscouldaffectbilateralcooperation(Keohane1989).InTable3below,
these alternative explanatory variables are introduced into a broader test that considers
democratic scores (Freedom House 2014), membership in intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs)(SIPRI2014),andexportsasashareofGDP(WorldBank2014).
Additionally,sincemilitaryspendingisadimensionofourdependentvariable,thepower
ofthemilitary,theexistenceoflatentterritorialdisputes,andthepresenceofinternalsecurity
problems could be said to affect the level of expenditure (Isacson 2011). Therefore, the
csQCAanalysisalsoconsiderstherelativestrengthofthemilitarywithintheMinistryofDe
fense (PionBerlin 2009: 580), the number of dormant territorial disputes for each country
(cf.Mare2001),andthelevelsofinternalviolence(UNODC2011).
Furthermore,sincetradeflowstoBrazilareanotherdimensionofourdependentvariable,
it could be said that the presence of protectionist interest groups may affect trade volumes.
Therefore,thestrengthoftradeunionsisintroducedtotheanalysisbyconsideringtradeunion
densityandtradeunionconcentrationscores(Roberts2002:15;cf.Kitscheltetal.2010).
Finally,geopoliticalfactorslikethePacificorAtlanticorientationofeachcaseaswellas
itsgeographicalproximitytotheUnitedStatesarealsoincludedinthetest.
Table3containsseveralalternativeresponsestothemainquestionposedbythisarticle.
However,acsQCAanalysisoftheseconditionspresentsalimiteddiversityproblemsince
therearetoomanyconditionsfortoofewcases(RihouxandRagin2009:27).21Therefore,we
proceedwithtwoanalyses.
21Conditions(14)exceedthenumberofcases(9).Thismakesitimpossibletocontrolforeverycombinationof
conditions:thereare214=16384logicalpossiblecombinationsandtherefore2149=16375logicalreminders.
Table3:PresenceorAbsenceofContestingConditions(FirstTest)
Governmentstability
Institutionalizedpartysystem
Representativepresident
Weaktradeunionism
Unconstrainedmilitary
Lowdemocraticscore
LimitedIGOmembership
Inwardorientedeconomy
MemberofthePacificAlliance
MemberofMERCOSUR
ProximitytotheUnitedStates
Pacificorientedcountry
Internalsecurityconcerns
Manylatentdisputes
RealistbehaviortowardsBrazil
Notes: Government instability, electoral volatility, and delegative democracies data was transformed into di
chotomous data to permit csQCA analysis. Countries are considered to have weak trade unionism if
they score less than 6.5 in the aforementioned index based on Kenneth Roberts (2002). Countries are
consideredtohaveanunconstrainedmilitaryiftheyscore2orlessinPionBerlins(2009)index.Alow
democratic score represents a score of 3 or more in Freedom Houses Freedom in the World index
(2014).MembersofeightorfewerIGOsareconsideredtohavelowmembership(SIPRI2014),andthose
countries that export less than 30 percent of their GDP are considered inwardoriented (World Bank
2014).Countrieswherehomicideratesareover12deathsforevery100,000inhabitantsareconsideredto
have internal security concerns (UNODC 2011), and states with three or more boundary conflicts are
consideredtohavemanylatentdisputes(Mares2001).
Sources: Georgetown Political Data of the Americas database (2014), delegative democracies index (Gonzlez
2013), labor strength index (Roberts 2002), defense ministries classification (PionBerlin 2009), hemi
spheric boundary disputes (Mares 2001), World Bank database (2014), Freedom House (2014), SIPRI
(2014),UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(2013).
First, we analyze every single alternative hypothesis versus our main hypothesis, including
fourconditionsineachtest.WhenthetestisrunwiththeKirksoftware(ReichertandRubin
son 2013), the results remain consistent. Government stability, institutionalized party sys
tems,andaconstrainedpresidentremainnecessaryconditionsforneorealistbehaviorwhen
anyothersingleexplanationisconsidered.Furthermore,thecombinationofgovernmentin
stability with low partysystem institutionalization and the combination of government in
stability with hyperpresidentialism are both INUS conditions for foreign policies to be un
concerned with the distribution of material capabilities in the region. However, the disad
vantageofthisapproachisthatevenifitallowsfortherejectionofasinglealternativehy
pothesis,itwillnotbeabletodiscardthepossibilitythatacombinationofthesefactorscould
alsoexplainneorealistbehavior.
Giventhefactthatacombinationofotherconditionscouldstillexplaintheoutcome,we
proceed with a second analysis, combining all liberal explanations and all militaryrelated
explanationsintotwonewcategoriesandtestingwhetherthesecombinedexplanationscan
competewithourmainhypothesis.22
Table4:TruthTable(SecondTest)
Unified Strengthof NoLiberal N Cons. Outcome Observation Observation
Elite theMilitary Constraints Consistent Inconsistent
True True True 1 1.00 True COL
True False True 1 1.00 True URU
False True True 1 0.00 False VEN
False False True 1 0.00 False BOL
True True False 0 n/a Rem.
True False False 1 1.00 True CHI
False True False 1 0.00 False ECU
ARG,PER,
False False False 3 0.00 False
PAR
Notes: For this test the categories government stability, institutionalized party system, and representative president
areallcombinedintothenewlabelunifiedelite,whichispositivewhenatleasttwooftheprevious
categorieswerepositivetoo.Applyingthesamerule,lowdemocraticscores,lowIGOmembership,andin
wardoriented economy are all combined into the category no liberal constraints. Finally, all military
relatedexplanationsunconstrainedmilitary,internalsecurityconcerns,andlatentdisputesarecombined
intoonecategorylabeledstrengthofthemilitary.
Sources: Georgetown Political Data of the Americas database (2014), delegative democracies index (Gonzlez
2013),laborstrengthindex(Roberts2002),defenseministriesclassification(PionBerlin2009),WorldBank
database(2014),FreedomHouse(2014),SIPRI(2014),UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(2013).
WhenthissecondtestisrunwiththeKirksoftware,theresultsareconsistentagain.Anecessity
test shows a unified elite that is, government stability, institutionalized party systems,
andrepresentativepresidentscombinedastheonlynecessaryconditionforneorealistbehav
ior.Becausetherearezerocaseswithaunifiedelite,astrongmilitary,andliberalconstraints
thatis,thetrue/true/falseconfigurationisalogicalremainderasshowninTable4wecannot
besurethatthisisasufficientconditionforsuchbehavior.However,thetestalsoshowsthat
a divided elite is a sufficient condition for nonneorealist behavior. Inother words, a suffi
ciencytest,whenaskedforaparsimonioussolution,alsoshowsunifiedeliteastheunique
INUSconditionwithfullconsistencyandcoverage(1.00).
22IwouldliketothankAnbalPrezLinfortheideaofundertakingthisoverarchinganalysisbycombining
previouscategoriesintothreebroadhypotheses.
5 Conclusion
Inrecentdecades,manyhavearguedthatneorealistinterpretationsofinternationalpolitics
have not applied to SouthAmerica after democratization. However, this article shows that
thebalanceofpowerlogicstillapplies,thoughitisfilteredbyspecificdomesticconstraints.
Thepapersargumenthasbeencarefullydeveloped.Thefirstsectionanalyzedtheques
tionofwhetherthereareinternationalincentivesforsecondaryregionalpowerstobalanceor
tobandwagon,reachingtheconclusionthatceterisparibusthatis,intheabsenceofanex
plicitthreatthedistributionofcapabilitiesgeneratesnoclearincentivestoallywithBrazil.
SinceBrazilsprimacyisoverwhelmingandsteadilyincreasingthereareinsteadincen
tivestobalanceoratleastsecuremilitaryandeconomicautonomy.Forsmallstates,thereare
incentivestobandwagonwithBrazil.
Having identified Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay as consistent neorealist players, the
secondsectionarrivedattheconclusionthatgovernmentstability,partysysteminstitution
alization,andrepresentativepresidentsasopposedtodelegativepresidentsorhyperpre
sidentialismarenecessarytoexplainneorealistbehavior.Thesefindingsweretested,inthe
thirdsection,againstalternativehypothesesusingcsQCAanalysis.Theresultsheld,show
ing that government stability, institutionalized party systems, and a constrained president
areINUSconditionsforexplainingforeignpoliciesconsistencywithneorealism.
However, csQCA methods have important shortcomings. First, they do not allow for
generalization, which means that these results are valid only for South American interna
tionalpoliticsfromdemocratizationonwards.Second,intheprocessofdichotomizinginde
pendent variables or conditions, much information has been lost. Third, much work still
needs to be done to better specify the causal mechanisms connecting the aforementioned
conditionswithforeignpolicymaking.Inthissense,thisarticleisintendedsimplyasastart
ingpointforadebateonhowtheregionalsubsystem,togetherwithdomesticpolitics,affects
internationalrelationsinSouthAmerica.
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Appendix
TableA1:RawDatafortheVariablesDichotomizedintheQCAAnalysis
Presidentialcrises 3 0 0 2 1 3 3 2 0
Electoralvolatility 49.9 29.7 31.1 55.6 53.2 46.7 30.8 14.1
Delegativedemocracy 6.6 0.5 3 4.5 6.2 2.6 3.9 4.6 0
Pres.Leg./power(K)* 7 14 11 13 7 5 14 6.5
Pres.party/power(K) 3 1 2 2 3 2 1 3
Militaryexpenditures 0.9 2.1 3.3 1.3 1.0 1.5 3.4 1.8 1.9
Laborstrength 15 7 0.9 7.5 7.9 7.4 2.7 0.9 6.2
Laborstrength(K) 15 7 0.9 7.5 7.9 7.4 2.7 0.9 6.2
IGOmemberships 14 10 9 10 9 7 9 8 8
FreedomHouse 2 1 3 2 5 3 3 3 1
Civilmilitarycontrol 2 1 3 1 3 3 3 3 1
Exportsas%ofGDP 20 34 18 26 26 45 31 50 26
ExportstoBrazil 20.7 5.5 3.1 6.1 2.2 33.3 4.2 14.2 20.4
ImportsfromBrazil 29.5 8.3 5.0 6.4 8.6 18.1 4.5 26.3 21.1
Homiciderates 6.9 3.5 52.8 17.5 35.3 6.5 17.5 14.6 6.2
Borderdisputes 2 2 4 1 4 1 1 0 1
*Forthisindicator,ahighvaluemeansalowlevelofpresidentialpower.
Sources:Rawdataforthevariablesusedinthisarticle.Sourcesarelistedundertables1,2and3.Kstandsfor
datafromKitscheltetal.(2010).
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2015 The Brazilian Rise and The Elusive South American Balance PDF

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GIGA Working Papers serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publicaton to encourage the exchange

of ideas and academic debate.

Elusive South American Balance

Luis Leandro Schenoni

Rise of an external threat social fragmentation (cohesion) + government or regime

Very concrete empirical questions can be addressed to determine whether SouthAmerican

ARG CHI COL PER VEN BOL ECU PAR URU

ARG CHI COL PER VEN BOL ECU PAR URU

Electoralvolatility 49.9 29.7 31.1 55.6 53.2 46.7 30.8 14.1

Delegativedemocracy 6.6 0.5 3 4.5 6.2 2.6 3.9 4.6 0

Laborstrength 15 7 0.9 7.5 7.9 7.4 2.7 0.9 6.2

Laborstrength(K) 15 7 0.9 7.5 7.9 7.4 2.7 0.9 6.2

All GIGA Working Papers are available free of charge at <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers>.

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