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Dharmakrti Pramavrttika 1.4:

Language has validity regarding the speakers state of mind, not factual states of affairs.

Manorathanandin (commentator) thereupon:

Languages validity [prmya] means: being an inferential marker [ligatva]. The meaning
is: a mental construct of the intensioned referents is inferred from language when spoken.

likantha Prakaraapacik, Ntipatha (Second prakaraa):

Human language, being subject to doubt about its factuality, does not generate certification
about its referents at its moment of origin (lit: merely when heard).

The sentence, as an inferential marker, gets [us] to the state of mind of [the speaker] whom [we]
judge [as truthful in the form:] his language corresponds to what he has determined.

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When the referents are certified in the [inferentially arrived at awareness episode of the
speakers state of mind], subsequently when the [same] referents are certified in [their]
linguistically derived awareness episode; at that point, the awareness episode from language is
epistemologically redundent

[Language] functions first as an inferential marker to the speakers state of mind, since the
sentence produced by the speakers state of mind is its effect.

Everyone accepts that a cause can be inferentially proved from its effect

But in the case of the Vedas, for which we do not remember any creative agent, which produce
awareness episodes of referents unamenable to other modes of valid cognition, there cannot be
inference of a creative agent on grounds of being a sentence, for no creator/agent could produce
[valid] language about other-worldly results.

Gautama Nyyastra 1.1.3:

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The (distinct) mechanisms for generating valid cognitions are: perception [pratyaka], inference
[anumna], comparison [upamna], and language [abda].

Udayana Nyyakusumjali, stabaka three:

1. [] ,

If [you object:] Determination of the speaker being trustworthy is necessary [to certify] human
language.
[We reply:] No, because [we ascertain that] language has the capacity, even without that
[determination], to communicate its referents.

If [you object:] because of deviation 1 in the case of the speech of an untrustworthy speaker, the
causal apparatus [for language], albeit equal, gets dislodged.
[We reply:] No, because in the case of visual perception, etc., despite a suspicion [of deviation]
on the grounds that [we] do, [in some cases], go wrong, [nevertheless] [we still] see the arisal of
that [visual perception] from the awareness causal apparatus.

2.

[]

1
I.e., because someone can lie and say: there are fruits on the riverbank despite this state of mind not
corresponding to a factual state of affairs.
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Since a person who knows the denotative capacity [of language] has an immediate
ascertainment of the meaning, the inferential marker alone would be a reiteration due to the time
lapse involved in remembering the pervasion relationship.
For how would the causal apparatus of Vedic language, operating in human language too, not
make [us] cognize its referents/meaning?

3. ,

[]

If [you object:] This might be the case. [However], we dont say that being trustworthy is a
precondition to the cognition of linguistic referents, rather that the exclusion of suspicion about
being untrustworthy [is a precondition], [and this] arises in some cases (i.e., Veda) from a
determination of [the text] being authorless, [and] arises in other cases (i.e., human language)
from a determination of the [speaker] being trustworthy.

[We answer:] Then what about before [you] cognize [the Veda] as authorless or when you have a
doubt [about it]? [] If [you say] about the Veda that the doubt will cease from an external
source, as in the case of visual perception, then that should be the same in human speech too, as
[they are] the same. Otherwise, there would be the undesirable entailment that the Veda too
would be a reiteration.
To explain:
When it is determined that those referents [factually] construe [with each other] on the basis of
being recollected by words devoid of suspicion of human fallibility, how would that not be the
case for the Veda too?
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Gagea in lead-up to his primary interlocutor:

[] ,
[]

The old Hermeneutists (i.e. likantha), however, say that whereas, in human language, when
the sentence-referents are proved on the grounds of an inference of the speakers state of mind,
or an inference of the factual connection [of referents] behind the inference of the [speakers
state of mind], the cognition from language [itself] is a reiteration (provides no new information),
[in contrast], in the Veda, there is independent validity, due to the absence of that (i.e., a speaker
behind language).

That is wrong, because [we] cognize the factual connection [between referents] in human
language from the same causal apparatus as in the Veda, otherwise the very reiteration would not
be possible. Even if the inferential marker comes first, there would be a delay in the [cognition
of the speakers state of mind], because of the time-lapse involved in the rememberance of the
pervasion relationship. To explain: by words devoid of suspicion of human fallibility []

Mahrava in Tattvacintmai abdprmyavda:

[]

Therefore, on grounds of logical economy, being in possession of a purport corresponding to a

factual state of affairs is the instigator of linguistic certification, and that amounts to having as its
purpose the cognition of sentence-referents corresponding to factual states of affairs, [and this is]
common to both human language and Veda.

[], [] []
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And purport is got at in the Veda by hermeneutic reasoning [], whereas in human language,
purport is governed by human intention.

[]

There is the inference: This sentence is produced by an awareness episode which is either an
error etc. or a [correct] qualified cognition, due to being a sentence. Then, when there is the
exclusion of error, etc., by deduction []

[]

[There is then the inference:] this sentence is caused by a single awareness episode which has
as its content referents possessing semantic-syntactic expectency, due to communicating those
referents given that it is uttered by a trustworthy speaker, like my sentence. Then: these
referents are truely mutually connected in because of being the content of one awareness episode
with semantic-syntactic expctency, like the contents of an awareness episode of real silver. In
this way, when the speakers sentential referents corresponding to factual states of affairs is
inferred, then through context, etc., [we get] an awareness of [the language] being intent upon
the cognition of factually corresponding referents intended by the speaker. [Only] then, [do we
get] a cognition of the referents via the same causal apparatus as the Veda; language is a
reiteration.

*Commentary thereupon says: []

By another way spoken by Mahrava []

Gageas conclusions:

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On this [we] say: being intent upon a sentential cognition corresponding to a factual state of
affairs, does not, when known, generate certification; this is the postulation of an unnecessary
causal factor, and this is not able to be known first, due to being determined by the sentence-
meaning, as the [sentence meaning] is something new.

[]

Without knowing the sentence-meaing, we cannot determine that this man is erroneous on this
point, as the fact of his cognition being not produced by error, etc., is not able to first be
ascertained, due to [him] being a [fallible] human. [Further], this [level of validity] is
ascertained at a subsequent time by going and checking the factual state of affairs []

[] , ,

[]

If [you object:] [] on the grounds of suspicion as to whether [the sentence] has factually
corresponding referents or not, there is no certification of its referents from [the sentence] merely
[being uttered], for something generating suspicion does not generate certification, therefore
something extra is necessary.
[We respond:] No, because a suspicion about the language referents factuality nor non-
factuality does not thwart a valid awareness episode. For, despite such suspicion in the case of
fire, [we] ascertain its referents through perception, inference, etc. Otherwise, there would be the
loss of all valid awareness episodes []
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, ,

Therefore, [the properties of] being uttered by a trustworthy [speaker], being not produced by
error etc., having its meaning blocked, or being intent upon cognition of a sentence-meaning
corresponding to a factual state of affairs, when known, although recursive, are not the cause [of
sentential awareness episodes], as [they are] not cognized first. Rather, hermeneutic reasoning
(in the case of the Veda), context, etc. (in the case of human language) which are accepted as
cognizers of purport, being recursive, [are the cause of sentential awareness episodes]. Similarly,
a determination of semantic-syntactic expectancy [kk] and proximate mental presentation
[satti] [are causes].

Gageas conclusion in aprvavda:

[] []

But in reality, when [we accept] that suitability (yogyat) is the absence of a certified
obstructive [awareness episode], then the very fact of being an awareness episode, common to
awarenesses under suspicion, is the instigator of [suitability], and thus there is only the absence
of sentential cognition in the case of a certified obstructive [awareness episode], thus [in the case
of one desirous of heaven should sacrifice [svargakmo yajeta]], due to a suspicion of
suitability, there is no obstruction of [the verbal suffixs referent] construing in the act of
sacrifice (yga). Even if aprva is expressed [by the verb], due to the unresolved doubt about
aprva being a means to heaven, there will only ever be suspicion about its suitability.
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One desirous of heaven should sacrifice

One should bring heaven into being through sacrifice