Charges Upon the CPG
the payment of litis expensas
Art. 121, FC. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1. support: spouse, common children, legitimate children of
either spouse; support of illegitimate children governed by the provisions
of on Support
2. all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage a. by
the designate administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, b. by both spouses c. by one of the with the consent
of the other
3. debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited
4. all taxes, liens, charges and expenses including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property
5. all taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse
6. expenses to enable their spouse to commence or complete a
professional, vocational or other activity for self-improvement
7. ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family
8. value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor
of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other
activity for self-improvement
9. expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit is
found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, the spouse shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties.
- Same as those in Art. 94
- Family must be understood as limited to include only the spouses and
their legitimate children
- The partnership is not relieved of the obligation to support by the mere
fact that the spouses do not live under the same roof.
- Amounts advanced by third persons for the subsistence of the wife and
for funeral expenses (construction of a tombstone or mausoleum) upon
her death are chargeable against the property of the CPG.
- Expenses of litigation in the interest of children had by one spouse in a
former marriage cant be charged upon the CPG because they are not
considered family
- If only one contracts obligation, it shall only bind the property of the
debtor-spouse unless it has benefited the family
- If spouses agree that one of them is the manager of the CPG, such
manager can act alone without the consent of the other. Debts contracted
by him will bind the partnership because there is a presumption that he is
acting for the partnership.
- Presumption may be rebutted (1) when the husband manifests
clearly that he is acting privately for his exclusive interest and
that the partnership should not be considered as obligated or
(2) when the nature of the contract or transaction itself may be
such as to indicated that it is for the private interest of the
husband (ex.: when he borrows money for gambling or for
political campaign expenses beyond the maximum limit set by
law, or for donations to strangers)
- Debts contracted by the administrator for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family
is charged upon the CPG.
- When husband mortgages conjugal property to secure the indebtedness
of a third person, the CPG is not liable for and deficiency judgment and
when the mortgaged property is sold to pay the third persons debt, the
CPG, as the owner of the property, may recover from the real debtor such
damages as it may have suffered.
- Useless and unjust demands of the wife cannot be obligate the CPG to
- Expenses incurred by the wife in litigations concerning herself alone are
her exclusive responsibility if she has sufficient means. In case she is poor,
litis expensas may be demanded from the CPG by application of Art. 122,
FC.
- If expenses are incurred in the production of the fruits on separate
property of a spouse, and then the fruits are destroyed or are not
sufficient to even cover such expenses, the loss must be borne by the CPG.
If there is a net remainder in the fruits, it belongs to the CPG. The CPG is a
usufructuary of the separate property of the spouse so it must suffer the
losses in the production of the fruits.
- Only minor repairs (those required by the deterioration caused by the
natural use of the thing and are indispensable for its preservation) on the
separate property are chargeable against the CPG. Major repairs (those
occasioned by extraordinary events, such as floods, storms, earthquakes,
fires, etc., affecting the substance of the thing and not merely its
enjoyment) are chargeable against the owner-spouse.
Art. 122, FC. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or
the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may
be enforced against the partnership assets, after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who
is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient;
but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
- Nothing is said about personal debts contracted during the marriage but
Tolentino believes that the rule on personal debts before the marriage
should be applied because it would be prejudicial to the creditors of the
spouses, when the latter have no property, to be absolutely deprived of
any recourse against the partnership properties, upon the existence of
which they may even have relied in extending credit to the spouses.
- Provision was merely copied Art. 163 of the Civil Code which was
deficient for not including personal debts of the spouses incurred during
the marriage.
- Pecuniary indemnities upon one of the spouses are not chargeable
against the CPG notwithstanding that the innocent spouse was present on
the occasion of the commission of the wrongful acts by the other spouse.
- There are cases, however, which such indemnities must be chargeable
against the CPG. Where the wrongful act benefited the partnership, it is
unjust to make the partnership keep the benefit and impose the duty of
indemnification exclusively upon the spouse who committed the act.
- ex.: (1) if a husband, by using trust funds to support the family,
has committed estafa, the indemnification to the injured party
must come from the conjugal funds; otherwise the CPG would
be unjustly enriched at the expense of the husband. (2) The
harboring of a vicious dog by a husband and wife for purposes
of protecting the home from intruders, as an act for the benefit
of the partnership, and where, as a result of such act, injury is
suffered by another, under the circumstances which render the
harborers of the dog liable, the liability is a partnership liability.
- After a decree of legal separation, the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share in the profits earned by the conjugal partnership.
Art. 123, FC. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
change, or in betting, sweepstakes or any other kind of gambling whether
permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall
form part of the CPG.
DBP v. Adil, May 11, 1989
Facts:
On February 10, 1940, spouses Particio Confesor and Jovita
Villafuerta obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank, now the DBP, in the sum of P2,000. This is evidenced by a
promissory note of the same date where the spouses bound themselves
jointly and severally to pay in 10 equal yearly amortizations. As the
obligation remained outstanding and unpaid after the lapse of the 10-year
period, Confesor execute a secondary promissory note on April 11, 1961,
expressly acknowledging the loan and promising to pay on or before June
15, 1961 and agreeing to the foreclosure of the mortgage upon his failure
to pay.
The spouses again failed to pay on the specified date so the DBP
filed a complaint against the spouses for the payment of the loan.
The trial court ruled in favor of the DBP. The spouses appealed
and the same court reversed its decision and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
W/N the promissory note which was executed in consideration
of a previous promissory note, the enforcement of which had been barred
by prescription, is valid.
Held:
Yes. Under Art. 1112 of the Civil Code, the right to prescription
may be waived. When Confesor executed the second promissory note, he
effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the
prescription of the action covering the first promissory note.
The Court held that this is not a mere case of acknowledgement
of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The
consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing obligation
under the first promissory note.
Furthermore, the lower court erred in holding that in signing the
promissory note alone, Confesor cannot thereby bind his wife citing Art.
166 of the New Civil Code which provides that unless the wife has been
declared a non compos or a spend thrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
Under Art. 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership and as such, all debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ayala Investment v. CA, February 12, 1998
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corp. (AIDC). As
added security, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of
PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC.
PMB failed to pay the loan so AIDC subsequently filed a case for
the sum of money against PBM and Alfredo. The trial court ruled in favor
of AIDC and ordered the respondents to pay. Upon AIDCs putting up of an
P8,000,000 bond, a writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner
Magsajo, Sr., the appointed sheriff of the case caused the issuance and
service upon spouses Ching of a notice of sheriff sale of their conjugal
properties. Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties
levied.
The respondents filed a case for injunction against petitioners to
enjoin the auction sale alleging that the petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The lower court issued a restraining order in favor of the respondents.
AIDC then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA issued
a TRO in favor of respondents allowing for the scheduled auction to
proceed.
AIDC, being the only bidder in the auction sale, was issued a
Certificate of Sale by Magsajo and upon expiration of the redemption
period, Magsajo issued the final deed of sale.
CA, however, issued a decision granting the petition for
certiorari and affirming the lower courts issuance of a TRO in favor of the
respondents.
AIDC filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the petition had
become moot and academic with the consummation of the sale. The lower
court denied the motion and proceeded with the trial. The trial court then
promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null and void. The
CA also promulgated the lower courts decision.
Issue:
W/N a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor
of his employer within the contemplation of Art. 121 and 122 of the Family
Code.
Held:
No. If the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of
loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family.
Moreover, PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the
family of the spouses. The debt was clearly a corporate debt and AIDCs
right of recourse against Alfredo Ching as surety is only to the extent of his
corporate stockholdings.
Also, in decisions involving accommodation contracts of the
husband, the requirement is that there must be a showing of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits
to his family or that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the
family. The petition did not show proof of any.
Art. 122 (1) also provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by either spouse before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family. In this case, the loan was for the sole benefit and
advancement of PBM and not for the benefit of the family. The salaries
and benefits that petitioners claim as the benefits that the respondents
would anticipate because of the loan are not the benefits contemplated
by Art. 121 and 122 of the Family Code. The benefits contemplated by the
provisions is that benefit derived directly from the use of the loan. The
alleged benefits here are incidental and speculative.
Lastly, signing as surety is not an exercise of an industry or
profession. No matter how often an executive acted as a surety for his
employer, this should not be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked
in the business of suretyship or guaranty. The loan is a corporate loan and
not a personal one. Hence, signing as a surety is not an exercise of an
industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the
family.
Carlos v. Abelardo, April 9, 2002
Facts:
In October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Teresa Carlos-
Abelardo approached and requested the petitioner to advance the
amount of $25,000 for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and
assist the spouses to conduct their married life independently, the
petitioner issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of
the property, who acknowledged the receipt thereof.
When petitioner asked the spouses in July 1991 about the status
of the loan, they acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they
were not yet ready to make a definite settlement of the loan. Thereafter,
respondent expressed violent resistance to the petitioners inquiries and
went as far as to making death threats.
Petitioner then made a formal demand for the payment but the
spouses again failed to comply with their obligation so the petitioner filed
a complaint for the collection of the money.
As they were separated in fact for more than a year, the spouses
filed separate answers to the complaint. The wife admitted securing a loan
together with her husband but claimed that the loan was payable on a
staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded
immediate payment of the full amount.
Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that he devoted all his
efforts and skill in reviving the dormant construction firm of the plaintiff
and that the said amount was never intended as a loan but was his share
of income on contracts obtained by him for the construction firm.
Petitioner presented as evidence an instrument executed by the
wife acknowledging the loan but the husband did not sign the instrument.
Issue:
W/N the CPG is liable for the loan.
Held:
Yes. First, the check that petitioner issued in the amount of
$25,000 was drawn from his personal account and not from the account
of the construction firm. Thus, respondents argument that the amount
was his share of income is devoid of merit.
Second, Art. 121 of the Family Code provides that the conjugal
partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations by either spouse for
the benefit of the family. While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgement executed and signed by his wife, the loan redounded
to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and
lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family
Carandang v. Heirs of Quirino de Guzman, November 29, 2006
Facts:
Issues:
Held:
Ros v. PNB, April 6, 2011
Facts:
Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000 from PNB Laoag on October
14, 1974 and as a security for the loan, Ros executed a real estate
mortgage involving a parcel of land. Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale
thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB Laoag as he highest
bidder. After one year without the property having been redeemed, the
property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB Laoag.
Claiming that she has no knowledge of the loan nor has she
consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property, Estrella
Aguete, the wife of Ros, she filed a complaint to annul the sale of the
property. She adds that her signatures on the documents were forged and
that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
Issue:
W/N the CPG is liable for the loan.
Held:
Yes.
With regards to Aguetes claim that her signatures on the
documents were forged, the same were acknowledged before a notary
public, hence they are public documents. The execution of a document
that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by mere
denial of the alleged signer. Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB
for no one can come before the courts with unclean hands. In their
memorandum before the trial court, petitioners themselves admitted that
Ros forged Aguetes signatures.
Furthermore, the application for the loan shows that it would be
used exclusively for additional working capital of buy and sell of garlic and
virginia tobacco, which Arguete confirmed was the business engaged into
by Ros. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not
know where he wasted the money. Debts contracted by the husband for
and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes
to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and
private debts.
Administration and Disposition of the CPG
Art. 124, FC. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting souse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
- under the Civil Code, the husband was the administrator.
- same as Art. 96 on the administration of the ACP
- absence of consent to the sale of property is void ab initio. Merely being
aware of a transaction is not consent.
- under Art. 97, either spouse may dispose by will his or her interest in the
ACP but here, no similar provision is made but the same rule should apply.
Art. 125, FC. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership
property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may,
without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the
conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family
rejoicing or family distress.
- donations must be made jointly
- donations made by the husband, without the consent of the wife, would
be subject to attack as a fraudulent alienation, or an alienation impairing
the interest of the wife if the conjugal partnership property, under Art.
173.
- its nullity may be declared at the instance of the wife.
- a donation made by the husband after the death of the wife is void as to
the half that pertains to her in said property.
Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, February 16, 1983
Facts:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. They bought
several pieces of land between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-1962, the lands
were divided into three lots.
In 1951, Gimena sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and
Hermogena Felipe without the consent of Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo, namely his widow and
their children, filed a complaint alleging that they were the owners of the
three lots and that they had orally mortgaged the same to the spouses
Felipe and that an offer to redeem the mortgage has been refused so they
filed the complaint in order to recover the three parcels of land.
Spouses Felipe maintain that they had acquired the lots by
purchase and subsequent delivery to them by Gimena.
Issues:
(1) W/N the sale of lands belonging to the conjugal partnership
made by the wife without the consent of the husband has legal effect.
(2) W/N the petitioners acquired the land by acquisitive
prescription.
(3) W/N the right of action of Maximos children is barred by
the statute of limitations.
Held:
(1) No. The law in effect back then was the Civil Code. Under Art.
165, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and
under Art. 172, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husbands consent, except in cases provide by law.
Under Art. 1390, however, the sale was not a void contract but
a voidable one. The provision states that a contract is voidable where on
of the parties is incapable of giving consent. Gimena had no capacity to
give consent to the contract. That capacity belonged to both spouses.
(2) The CA was correct when it held that petitioners could not
have acquired the lots by prescription because of bad faith which was seen
when Vicente Felipe, the son of petitioners, attempted in December 1970
to have Gimena sign a ready-made document purporting to sell the lots to
his parents. This was a clear indication that petitioners knew that the lots
still did not belong to them
(3) The childrens cause of action accrued from the death of their
father in 1959 and they had thirty years to institute it under Art. 1141.
They filed the action in 1976 which was well within the period.
Tinitigan v. Tinitigan Sr., October 30, 1980
Facts:
On March 25, 1975, petitioners Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc.
(Pentel) and Teofista Payuran Tinitigan (Payuran) entered into a contract
lease of a residential house whereby for a year of 4 years, Payuran shall
lease to Pentel the house at a rental of P1,500 per month with option to
buy the same within the term of the lease for P350,000.
On April 22, 1975, Payuran and her three children, Efren, Elsa,
and Severino Jr., leased to United Electronics Corporation a factory
building together with the portion of the land on which it is erected.
In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr.
(Tinitigan Sr.), husband of Payuran and respondent, was not secured. On
May 22, 1975, Tinitigan Sr., as a conjugal partner and shareholder of
Molave Development Corporation which is a family corporation, filed a
complaint seeking to annul the contract of lease executed by Payuran in
favor of United Electronics Corporation and was later amended to include
restraining his relatives from encumbering or disposing properties in the
name of Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of the
spouses Tinitigan.
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction, the issue with the
lease of United Electronics Corporation was settled amicably. Tinitigan Sr.,
however, subsequently filed a motion seeking judicial approval of sale of
a two-storey residential house and lot which are conjugal properties. The
house is tenanted by Quintin Lim who is President and General Manager
of Pentel.
Tinitigan Sr. contends that the proposed sale for P300,000 to
Quintin Lim, who was given priority right to purchase, was necessary to
pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue in the amount of
P256k and to forestall the foreclosure of the mortgaged conjugal
properties. The same property had been earlier leased by Payuran to
Pentel with an option to buy at P350,000.
CFI or Rizal granted the motion. Payuran and their children then
filed an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that the sale would
result in substantial and tremendous losses because the property sought
to be sold is a suitable condominium and/or hotel site and would
command a higher price.
Two days later, Payuran filed against her husband a complaint
for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership. The Pasay
Court after noting that the parties had agreed to the continuation of the
administration of the conjugal properties by Payuran, appointed her
administratix of the conjugal properties subject to certain conditions.
The CFI of Rizal, however, denied their motion for
reconsideration and by a deed of absolute sale, Tinitigan Sr. sold the
property for P315,000 not to Quintin Lim but to Chiu Chin Siong (Chiu).
Issue:
W/N Tinitigan Sr. had the authority to sell the premises, they
being under the administration of Payuran.
Held:
Yes. Art. 165 of the New Civil Code provides that the husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership. The judicial decree
appointing Payuran as administratix of the conjugal partnership cannot be
treated as an exception because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal
had granted Tinitgan Sr. the authority to sell the disputed property.
Besides, the appointment of Payuran as administratix was not absolute as
it was made subject to certain conditions.
Being administrator, however, does not give him outright
authority to alienate or encumber conjugal assets as this kind of
transaction requires the express or implied consent of the wife subject to
certain exceptions. But this was precisely why Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial
approval of the sale of the property. As the evidence warrants, the sale of
the property was necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability which
might endanger the familys economic standing.
Guiang v. CA, June 26, 1998
Facts:
Respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz were married on
December 24, 1968 in Bacolod and have three children. Sometime on
February 14, 1983, the couple, with Gilda as vendee, bought a 421-square
meter lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo.
 Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of
their lot to the petitioners. The latter have since occupied the one-half
portion and built their house thereon making them adjoining neighbors.
Gilda left for Manila sometime in June 1989 to look for work
abroad but unfortunately became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal
recruiter. She wasnt able to go abroad and stayed for some time in
Manila. Her departure for Manila to look for work was with the consent of
her husband.
After Gildas departure, Judie seldom went home to the conjugal
dwelling and stayed most of the time at his place of work. Their daughter
Harriet went to school but was working at the same time as household
help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not
working. Her younger sister Jodie was going to school. Gilda sometimes
sent them money.
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet learned that Judie intended
to sell the remaining one-half of their land, including their house, to the
spouses Guiang. Harriet then informed Gilda who then objected to the
sale. Harriet, however, did not inform Judie but instead gave the letter to
Mrs. Guiang so that Mrs. Guianf would advise Judie.
But Judie pushed through with the sale and sold the land for
P30,000. Junie and Harriet signed the document as witnesses. Four days
later, to cure the defect in the sale, Mrs. Guiang executed another
agreement over the land with Manuela Callejo, the widow of the original
owner of the land, who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.
Judie signed as a witness to the sale. The new sale describes the lot sold
as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the evidence that
the correct lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the lot earlier sold to
spouses Corpuz.
Gilda returned on March 11, 1990 and found her children
staying with other households. She gathered her children and stayed at
their house Judie was nowhere to be found. She was told by her children
that he already had a new wife. For staying at her house, she was
complained against by spouses Guiang before the Barangay authorities.
Subsequently, the parties signed an amicable settlement.
Issues:
(1) W/N the contract of sale was merely voidable.
(2) W/N such contract was ratified by Gilda when she entered
into an amicable settlement with the petitioners.
Held:
(1) No. The contract was void.
Petitioners contend that the questioned Deed of Transfer was
validly executed by the parties in good faith and for valuable consideration
and that the absence of Gildas consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1390, however, refers to contracts visited by vices of
consent. In this case, Gildas consent was totally inexistent and the
contract falls within Art. 124 of the Family Code which provides that in the
absence of authority or consent of the other spouse, the disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property shall be void.
The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of
Gildas consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent. In this case, the third
element is missing.
(2) Petitioners insist that the contract was ratified through the
subsequent amicable settlement between them and Gilda.
The trial court correctly held that the Deed of Transfer of Rights
cannot be ratified even by an amicable settlement. The participation by
some barangay authorities in the amicable settlement cannot validate an
invalid act. The amicable settlement was another contract that was the
direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Art. 1422 of the Civil
Code provides that a contract which is the direct result of a previous
illegal contract, is also void and inexistent. Hence, both the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and the amicable settlement are null and void.
Neither can the settlement be considered a continuing offer
because it did not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer.
Relucio v. Lopez, January 16, 2002
Facts:
On September 15, 1993, respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed
a petition for appointment as sole administratix of conjugal partnership
properties against Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. Lopez
alleged that sometime in 1968, Alberto, who is legally married to her,
abandoned her and their four legitimate children and arrogated unto
himself full and exclusive control of their and administration of the
conjugal properties, spending and using them for his sole gain and benefit
to the total exclusion of Lopez and their children, and that after
abandoning his family, cohabited with Relucio since 1976.
Alberto and Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since
1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-
owned or controlled corporations and several other properties. These
properties, which are under the name of Alberto and Relucio, have been
acquired principally through the actual contribution of money, property,
and industry of Alberto with minimal actual contribution from Relucio.
Alberto, in order to avoid his obligations as a father and
husband, excluded Lopez and their children from sharing or benefiting
from the conjugal properties and its fruits and placed substantial portions
of these conjugal properties in the name of Relucio.
Lopez also averred that in the 25 years since Alberto abandoned
them, he has sold and removed properties, assets, and income belonging
to the conjugal partnership and spent the proceeds for his sole benefit and
that of Relucio and their two illegitimate children.
Issues:
(1) W/N respondents petition for appointment as sole
administratix of the conjugal property against her husband established a
cause of action against petitioner.
(2) W/N petitioners inclusion as party defendant is essential in
the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy.
Held:
(1) No. The elements of a cause of action are (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created, (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect
or not violate such right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against
petitioner. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of
respondent as administratix of the conjugal partnership. Petitioner is a
complete stranger to this cause of action. There is no right-duty relation
between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of
action.
The second cause of action is for an accounting by Alberto. The
accounting is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with
their marriage.
The third cause of action is for forfeiture of Albertos share in
the co-owned property of him and Relucio. It does not involve the issue of
validity of the co-ownership between Alberto and Relucio.
(2) No. Petitioner is not a real party in interest in this case
because she would not be affected by any judgment. If she is not a real
party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. Nor can she be a
necessary party because Lopez would be accorded complete relief if
Alberto were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership
property with Lopez, give support to Lopez and their children, turn over
his share in the co-ownership with Relucio, and dissolve his conjugal
partnership with Lopez.
Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, January 23, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner was interested in buying two properties and
negotiated for their purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso
Ereno, authotized by respondent spouses. Petitioner made a visual
inspection of the properties with the real estate broker and was shown
the tax declarations real property tax payment receipts, location plans,
and vicinity maps relating to the properties. Petitioner then met with the
vendors (respondent spouses). She made a definite offer to buy the
properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and
conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the
real estate broker. Petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the price and the
mode of payment. The agreement was handwritten by petitioner and
signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of
the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wifes conformity and consent
to the sale.
The following day, petitioner, the real estate broker, and
Edilberto met in the latters office for the formal signing of the typewritten
Contracts to Sell. After signing, petitioner delivered two checks to
Edliberto in the presence of the broker and an employee in Edilbertos
office. The contracts were then given to Edilberto for the formal affixing
of his wifes signature.
The following day, petitioner received a call from Norma
requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. During
the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell,
so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the
formal signing of the contracts.
When they met again, petitioner was surprised when
respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the
agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the
consideration. Petitioner reminded the spouses that the contracts to sell
had already been duly perfected and that Normas refusal to sign would
unduly prejudice her. Norma still refused to sign prompting petitioner to
file a complaint.
Respondents argue that the agreement between petitioner and
Edilberto was that the sale was still subject to the approval and conformity
of Norma and when Norma refused to give her consent, her refusal was
duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner. The checks issued by
petitioner were returned and respondents claim that her acceptance of
the returned checks signified her assent to the cancellation of the sale.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it entered into
a summary judgment in favor of respondents there being a genuine issue
of fact, that the issue of whether the contracts to sell between petitioner
and respondents was perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial
on the merits.
Issue:
W/N the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property
without the wifes written consent.
Held:
No. The law requires that the disposition of the conjugal
property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires
the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Art. 124
of the Family Code provides that in the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were
conjugal. Hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of
both spouses must be present.
Even granting that Norma actively participated in negotiating for
the sale which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by
law for its validity. Norma may have been aware of the negotiations but
being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
Lastly, petitioners assertion that since Norma unjustly refuses
to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under
Art. 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
The argument is bereft of merit because court authorization
under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not
give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and
prove that Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts.
Villanueva v. Chiong, June 5, 2008
Facts:
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married
sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975.
During their marriage they acquired a lot in Dipolog. Sometime in 1985,
Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for
P8,000 payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed the
petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house
thereon. After their last installment payment, petitioners demanded from
respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera,
however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
Issues:
(1) W/N the subject lot is a conjugal property.
(2) W/N the sale by Florentino without Eliseras consent valid.
Held:
(1) Petitioners contend that the lot is the exclusive property of
Florentino because respondents were already separated in fact at the time
of the sale and that the share of Elisera had previously been sold to
spouses Castro and Cuenca, and that while there was no formal liquidation
of their properties, their separation in fact resulted in its actual liquidation,
and that assuming arguendo that the lot is still conjugal, the transaction
should not be entirely void as Florentino had one-half share over the lot.
Elisera counters that the sale of the lot without her knowledge,
consent, or authority was void because the lot is conjugal property. The
sale was neither authorized by any competent court nor did it redound to
her or their childrens benefit. As proof of the conjugal nature of the lot,
she presented several documents which she and her husband had
executed.
Respondents separation in fact neither affected the conjugal
nature of the lot nor prejudiced Eliseras interest over it. Under Art. 178 of
the Family Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The conjugal
nature of the lot was also admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute
Sale where he declared his capacity to sell as co-owner of the subject lot.
(2) The sale by Florentino without the consent of Elisera is not
void ab initio but merely voidable. Without the wifes consent, the
husbands alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code is not void but merely voidable. Art. 166 of
the Civil Code provides that the husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
Art. 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife may, during the marriage,
and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her
consent, when such consent is required.
Applying Art. 166, the requisite consent of both Elisera and
Florentino is necessary for the sale. In this case, the requisite consent of
Elisera was not obtained when Florentino sold the lot. And accordingly,
applying Art. 173, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at
Eliseras instance.
Petitioners contention that assuming arguendo the property is
still conjugal, the transaction should not be entirely voided as Florentino
had one-half share over the lot lacks merit. It has been held before that in
a case involving the annulment of a sale executed by the husband without
the consent of the wife, the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and
not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is
concerned.
Flores v. Lindo, April 13, 2011
Facts:
On October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan from petitioner
Arturo Flores amounting to P400,000. To secure the loan, Edna executed
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage covering a property in the name of Edna
and her husband Enrico Lindo, Jr. Edna also signed a Promissory Note and
the Deed for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All
checks, however, were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting
petitioner to file a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage with damages
against respondents.
The trial court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage because the deed was executed by Edna
without the consent and authority of Enrico. The deed was executed on
October 31, 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was executed
by Enrico on November 4, 1995. The trial court, however, also said that
petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he
could file a personal action against her.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for sum of money with
damages against respondents.
Respondents admitted the loan but claimed that it only
amounted to P340,000 and that Enrico was not a party to the loan because
it was contracted by Edna without his signature. Respondents prayed for
the dismissal of the case on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata,
and forum-shopping.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, but the CA ruled in
favor of respondents.
Issue:
W/N the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing the
complaint for collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of
suits.
Held:
Yes.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action
against a mortgage-debtor, which is to recover the debt. The creditor has
the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money
or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. An
election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there would be
multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue
to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the
residence of the parties.
The Court also took into consideration other circumstances in
deciding the case.
First, the trial court rules that petitioner was not entitled to
judicial foreclosure because the deed of real estate mortgage was
executed without Enricos consent. Accordingly, since the deed was
executed by Edna lacks the consent or authority of Enrico, the deed is void
pursuant to Art. 96 of the Family Code. This means that the petitioner can
only recover the loan by instituting a personal action against Edna which
should be filed where petitioner resides or where the respondents reside.
Also, the subsequent special power of attorney cannot be made
to retroact and validate the mortgage.
In an invalid mortgage, the obligation still matures and becomes
demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. What is
lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage and in case of nullity, the
mortgage deed remains as evidence of a personal obligation of the debtor
and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
The trial courts erred when they ruled that Ednas liability is not
affected by the illegality of the mortgage. Art. 124 of the Family Code
states that a transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. In this case, the execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the
other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract
between the parties, making the deed a valid contract.
However, as the CA noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of
the trial courts to become final and executory without asking for an
alternative relief and merely relied on the declarations of those courts that
he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules
on multiplicity of suits, closing his avenue for recovery of the loan.
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law under
the principle of unjust enrichment provided by Art. 22 of the Civil Code.
The principle is applicable in this case since Edna admitted obtaining a loan
and the same has not been fully paid without a just cause. And the
principle of unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail
over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits.
Dissolution of the CPG
Art. 126, FC. The conjugal partnership terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138.
- all the provisions from 116 to 125 will cease to apply
- whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse after the dissolution of the
partnership by death, or by either spouses after the termination of the
partnership for other reasons, whether the acquisition be made by his or
her labor or industry, or whether by onerous or lucrative title, forms a part
of his or her own capital, in which no one can claim a share
- an obligation incurred by the surviving spouse after the death of the
other can no longer be charged against the property of the conjugal
partnership which had been dissolved by such death
- after the death of a spouse, any portion of the community property can
be sold if it is necessary in order to pay outstanding obligations of the
partnership as long as such sale is made in the manner and with the
formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of property of the
deceased
- any sale or transaction effected without said formalities shall be null and
void except as regards the portion belonging to the vendor
- applies not just to sale but also to mortgages
- the law recognizes the validity of transactions that are null and void so
long as they do not exceed the portion which pertains to the surviving
spouse who made the contract
- dissolution must be recorded in the registry of property for the benefit
of third persons
- when the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property, upon
the death of the wife, he becomes a trustee of the highest order and is not
permitted by law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to
those whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administrator
- if after the death of one spouse and there is no liquidation, but the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse keep the properties
undivided, it doesnt mean that the conjugal partnership continues. The
parties in such a case impliedly establish a co-ownership among
themselves and rights are then governed by the rules on co-ownership
Art. 127, FC. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the
other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property,
the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the
fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
- same as Art. 100
Art. 128, FC. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or
for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership
property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may
impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or
has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
- same as Art. 101
- separation of property may be ordered if the husband abandons his wife
Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities
Art. 129, FC. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each
spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment
of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the
conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her
exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the
conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall
be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets,
the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of
Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the
family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be
paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years
are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children.
Methods of Liquidation
1. Extrajudicial partition between the husband and wife or their heirs
2. By an ordinary action for partition
3. By testate or intestate proceedings
- any of the three may be followed when the CPG is dissolved by death.
- if the dissolution takes place by annulment of marriage, legal separation,
or judicial separation of property, only the first two are legally applicable.
- they are alternative, and not cumulative, in the sense that they cannot
be availed of at the same time, inasmuch as a chaotic and anomalous
situation would result if the conjugal property were administered,
liquidated, and distributed at the same time in an intestate or
testamentary proceeding and in an ordinary action for liquidation and
partition of property.
- no funds or property may be adjudicated to the heir or legal
representation of the deceased without the liquidation being first
terminated
- an extrajudicial partition of the inheritance made among themselves by
the widow and the heirs of the deceased husband who are of legal age,
pending an action for the acknowledgment of a natural child brought
against the predecessor during his lifetime, and his heirs, by substitution,
after his death, is illegal and void, for the reason that such action implies
a claim for inheritance.
- the liquidation of the partnership is implied in the action for partition.
- if there are debts upon the death of one of the spouses, and the parties
interested cannot agree on the settlement of said debts, the liquidation of
the partnership can take place only in a judicial administration proceeding.
it is in an ordinary action for liquidation and partition, or a testamentary
or intestate proceeding that all questions regarding the character of the
various kinds of property, whether paraphernal, husbands capital,
conjugal, or subject to collation, should be raised and determined.
Steps in Liquidation
1. The formation if the inventory, separately listing the conjugal properties
and the separate properties of the spouses.
 - only the actual property existing in the community at the time
of the partnership is terminated can be included in the inventory as
partnership assets
- in the following cases, an inventory of the conjugal partnership
property is not necessary:
a. when one of the spouses, or his heirs, should
renounce the benefits of the partnership. But when the
renunciation is prejudicial to creditors, the latter may require an
inventory to be made so that they may enforce their clams on
whatever share may be adjudicated to the debtor
b. when separation of property has preceded the
dissolution of the marriage. Since there would have been a
liquidation already, there would be no need for another
liquidation.
c. when the partnership is dissolved by death of one
of the spouses, and the deceased leaves no heir except the
surviving spouse.
d. when the dissolution is cause by legal separation,
and the share of the guilty spouse is forfeited to the innocent
spouse, there being no children.
2. Mutual restitutions
- equilibrium in the patrimony of the spouses and the conjugal
partnership is to be maintained so that one would not be enriched at the
expense of the other.
- does not involve the actual transfer of properties, but only the
crediting or inclusion of the value to be restored as assets of the conjugal
partnership or assets of the spouse who was made the advance, in the
computation.
3. Payment of debts
- if the conjugal partnership property is not enough to pay for
the partnership debts, the separate properties of the spouses, remaining
after the payment of their own creditors, shall be solidarily liable.
4. The net remainder of the conjugal properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs, unless a different
proportion has been agreed upon in their marriage settlement, or unless
the surviving spouse or the heirs of the deceased renounce their shares.
5. The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall then be
delivered, to be taken from the total properties.
6. Whatever remains after all the payments and deductions shall be
delivered to the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
- if a spouse is a creditor and at the same time a debtor of the conjugal
partnership, compensation should take place, and only the balance will be
either payable to or by such spouse.
- same as Art. 102
Art. 130, FC. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially
or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made,
any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership
property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
- for mortgages during proceedings, the fact alone that in the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse the entire conjugal partnership
property is under administration is not sufficient to invalidate a mortgage
in its entirety. The heirs as co-owner have each full ownership of his part
and he may alienate, mortgage, or assign it.
Art. 131, FC. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person
before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the
respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be
determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules
of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different
partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each.
- the conjugal properties of the first marriage shall first be liquidated so as
to determine the share of the first wife, which shall pass to the children of
the first marriage, and the share corresponding to the deceased husband.
- likewise, the conjugal properties of the second marriage shall be
liquidated, so as to determine the half corresponding to the surviving
widow, and the other half corresponding to the deceased husband.
- the properties corresponding to the deceased husband in the first and
second marriages, constitute his estate which will be distributed among
his heirs and legatees.
- in the absence of proof showing the conjugal property belonging to each
of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the property in all
the partnerships shall be divided among such partnerships on the basis of
a double proportion: (1) on the basis of duration of each partnership and
(2) on the basis of the separate property brought to the marriage by the
respective spouses.
=
Art. 132, FC. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of
deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property
of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly
determined in this Chapter.
Art. 133, FC. From the common mass of property support shall be given to
the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the
inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from
this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds
the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
- under the Rules of Court, the widow and minor or incapacitated children
of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive,
under the direction of the court, allowances as are provided by law
- while the Rules of Court limit the right to allowance to the widow and
minor or incapacitated children, the Family Code refers to surviving
spouse and children without qualification. Thu Code thus gives allowance
also to the widower and to children of age, or married, or even gainfully
employed without distinction.
- Art. 132 prevails over the Rules of Court as it points out that the Rules of
Court apply only as to matters not expressly determined in the Family
Code.
- the right to allowance recognized in the Family Code is substantive in
nature and cannot be qualified by the Rules of Court, which refer only to
procedural matters
- grandchildren are not entitled to allowance as this is limited to children.
But in the absence of legitimate children, parents may be given support
during the liquidation
- in the case of other compulsory heirs other than those already
mentioned, such allowances are considered advances on their legitimes.
- if the allowance given exceeds what pertains to them, such excess is
considered as an advance upon such shares.
- the widows right to support during the settlement of the estate of the
deceased husband depends entirely upon whether or not she has any
share of any right at all in the estate under administration.