Islam and Islamism in Turkey - A Conversation With İsmail Kara - Maydan

31.10.
2017 Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with smail Kara - Maydan
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Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with
smail Kara
BY MAYDAN EDITORS // OCTOBER 24, 2017
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Trkiyede slam ve slamclk: smail

Q: To the best of our knowledge, Kara ile Mlakat
Ismail Kara is arguably the foremost this is the first time you are giving
academic expert on Turkish an interview for the Western
Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A
Islamism. Although he is a proli c academic world. Since this is the
Conversation with smail Kara
writer and a public intellectual, his case, would you mind quickly October 16-22
work is little known among non- introducing yourself? What has
Turkish speaking audiences.The been your academic journey? Wed Creating an Independent Kurdistan:
following interview with Kara aims to like to learn a little about the
The History of a Hundred-Year-Long
close this gap. Micah Hughes, a academic issues that you are
Dream
doctoral candidate at University of grappling with. October 9-15
North Carolina, Chapel Hill translated
the original text of the interview from smail Kara: This could be
Turkish into English under considered my first interview for the
supervision of Cemil Aydin (UNC academic world, although however SUBSCRIBE TO OUR NEWSLETTER
Chapel Hill). Interview questions were rare, Ive given some interviews for
Email
prepared by Cemil Aydin, Huseyin Western journals and newspapers
Yilmaz (GMU), Ahmet Selim
It doesnt please me at all to introduce First Name
Tekelioglu (GMU), Peter Mandaville
myself, but out of a sense of duty Ill
(GMU) and Ahmet Koroglu (Istanbul
say a few things: I came to Istanbul Last Name
University). Ahmet Koroglu provided
from a rural area. My father was the
visual material from Istanbul as well
local imam at the bigger mosque of a
as spearheading the project. Kara's SUBSCRIBE
village; he was fond of studying and
detailed bio information and a list of
teaching. I am a product of an Imam
his publications are presented at the
Hatip school. I did my advanced
end of the interview text. The Turkish
education in theological studies
original of this interview can be
(lahiyat) and history. During my
accessed on Maydan.
student years, I was introduced to
Nurettin Topu (1909-1975) and the
journal Hareket. My interests in the areas of modern Islamic thought and
modern Turkish thought, which until 1924 were entwined and centered in
Istanbul, started during those student years. I accordingly prepared myself
https://www.themaydan.com/2017/10/islam-islamism-turkey-conversation-ismail-kara/ 1/36
31.10.2017 Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with smail Kara - Maydan
academically. I had wanted to work on the subject of kalam.
Upon completing my advanced

I came to Istanbul from a education, I worked for Dergh
rural area. My father was the

Publishing for a long time as an editor
and publishing director. There my
local imam at the bigger interests both developed and deepened.
mosque of a village; he was I taught classes on religion at a French

language high school in Istanbul. You
fond of studying and teaching. could say that I became affiliated with a
I am a product of an Imam university later in life. I had produced my

first works even before my academic
Hatip school. studies had started. My doc
toral dissertation was in the

field of political science, but
the reason for this was that I
could not find an adviser in the
subject I wanted to work on.
The fields Ive wanted to work
in since my childhood and
that I have worked in are still
not considered to be
1997. Kara with his parents and siblings.
significant or profound topics
in Turkish academia. Or, let
me say that in my estimation, the state of academic research on modern Islamic
thought in Turkey is much behind what it should be in a country like Turkey.
Lets hope that quantitative growth of academic books and articles also
stimulates qualitative growth in terms of better understanding this important
topic.
the state of academic research on modern Islamic thought in Turkey is

much behind what it should be in a country like Turkey.
My first big work was the anthology Trkiyede

slmclk Dncesi [Islamist Thought in
Turkey] (3 vol., 1986, 1987, 1994). I decided to
edit and republish major works of Islamic
thought so as to consciously form a new
foundation for scholarship by re-familiarizing the
Turkish public with overlooked texts. Because I
realized early on that the scholarly and
intellectual, maybe even ideological, basis I
found in the fields of modern Islamic and
Turkish thought were full of very partisan,
problematic, rigid, and provocative
Trkiyede slmclk Dncesi- methodological shortcomings and mistakes. In
Metinler/Kiiler [Islamist Thought in Turkey: order to do things in this new manner and with
Texts/People, (3 volumes, 1986, 1987, higher accuracy, in other words approximating
1994)] historical truth, it was necessary to put forth
basic, foundational texts that were not in
circulation in a clear chronology and system. As
a next step, a new methodology was required to make sense of the legacy of
modern Islamic and Turkish thought in terms of its priorities and points of view.
Q: What was the reaction to/reception of this approach? Was it

appreciated in academia and the wider public?
K: As a person who has been in the publishing world for many years, the
responses I am looking for are slightly different. If you look at sales, then this
anthology was significant and successful; one could comfortably say that there
was a serious interest in it. The first print of the first two volumes 5,000 copies
sold out before the year was up. If you take into account the books volume
the large version was 500-odd pages and that it was the authors first book,
this is a high figure for a short amount of time. However, whether there has
been a scholarly or intellectual response, or if you are asking whether a new
foundation for a better understanding of Islamic thought which I was hoping
for has come about, to that I cant entirely say yes.
Q: In the Western academy, the study of modern Islamic thought has been
a very lively subject. However, these studies generally have been heirs to
books on the subject like Charles Adams 1933 study, Islam and
Modernism in Egypt. What I mean is that they have praised Muhammad
Abduh and the forms of Islamic modernism that followed, seeing it as a
type of Protestant reformation like in Christianity. Since the 1980s you
have started to work from an alternative perspective to dominant
paradigms. You have also established a scholarly tradition that critically
evaluates Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Ottoman modernist
Islamism, which developed parallel ideas and whose extensions were
reflected in the Republican period, but you also attempt to show
problematic elements of projects like this.
K: There are a few important

interrelated questions here.
Orientalists were interested in
modern Muslim thought with
many different
assumptions and agendas.
Maybe rightly so according to
their own subjective
perspectives and interests. 2015, Dergah Publishing House.
However, for us, their points of
view and priorities do not
come off as accurate or acceptable and they shouldnt. From my perspective,
the most important and problematic question is how the Ottomans and Turkey
were removed from the centers of modern Islamic thought as most of the
scholarship shifted its center to Egypt and secondarily to South Asia. Thus, we
can say this ended up creating a reality that is itself contrary to reality. I suppose
it would not be wrong or unjustified to say that these orientalist studies, in
addition to being academic, were related to political and ideological
operations, such as British interventions and projects. You know that Albert
Hourani, who was a Christian Arab, admitted as much at the end of his life. The
name of his book is Arabic Thought (Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-
1939) despite the fact that almost all of the individuals that he touched upon in
his book were Ottoman citizens.
Its name is not Modern Islamic Thought. Ottoman modernization and Turkey
are excluded from the content. How come? Just to give another example: look
at the Turkish translation of a book

From my perspective, the written by John Esposito and John
most important and

Donohue, Islam in Transition: Muslim
Perspectives (1986). It includes texts
problematic question is how and commentaries on twenty-one
the Ottomans and Turkey were Muslim thinkers from al-Afghani to Imam
Khomeini without including anything
removed from the centers of from the Ottoman Empire and Turkey or
modern Islamic thought as by Turkish intellectuals. How can we

explain this blatant omission, unless it is
most of the scholarship done on purpose? We may find all kinds
shifted its center to Egypt and of excuses, such as not knowing
Turkish. I find it equally intriguing and
secondarily to South Asia. interesting that the translators and
publishers of both Albert Houranis
Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, and various books of John Esposito are
Islamists who are called radical due to their admiration for the Iranian revolution
and other Islamist movements of Pakistan and Egypt. These Islamist publishers
translate books on modern Islamist thought by European or American writers
without feeling the need to make any comments, objections, or criticisms
concerning the neglect of Islamic thought in Turkey in these works. But does
that narrative of Islamic thought make sense?
In fact, this attempt to shift the center away

from Istanbul, according to my reading of In fact, this attempt to shift
the center away from
it, is a powerful and programmatic aspect
of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire
and Turkey, followed by distancing it from Istanbul, according to my
Islam and the Muslim world. For reasons
reading of it, is a powerful and
we are familiar with, it was easy for
intellectuals and elites of Arab origin to programmatic aspect of the
internalize this new post-1924 narrative.
dissolution of the Ottoman
There was Arab nationalism; there were
independence pursuits from the Ottomans; Empire and Turkey, followed
additionally there were direct and indirect by distancing it from Islam
demands and serious efforts in this
direction by colonialist and occupying and the Muslim world.
European states, especially by the British.
It is partly surprising that Turkish intellectuals, the Turkish political elite

(including founding members of the Republic), Turkish academics, and even
Islamists radicals of the 1960s were appropriators of, apologists for, and as a
result, instruments of the very view that did away with themselves, removed
themselves from the central position in the formation of modern Islamic thought,
and distanced themselves from the Muslim world. The reasons for this are
multiple and deep, of course. I say partly shocking because we know, in fact,
that Republican ideology put forward and advocated a similar withdrawal from
the story of Muslim experience in the modern world, but with different
justifications and impositions. In Turkey, some New Salafi (Yeni Selefi) and
radical Islamist ideas on this subject, at least in terms of their thinking that
Arabs and some South Asians are the authentic representatives of Modern
Muslim thought, come close to secularist Republican ideology. This is an
interesting, yet unnoticed, phenomenon.
It is partly surprising that Turkish intellectuals, the Turkish political elite

(including founding members of the Republic), Turkish academics, and even
Islamists radicals of the 1960s were appropriators of, apologists for, and as
a result, instruments of the very view that did away with themselves,
removed themselves from the central position in the formation of modern
Islamic thought, and distanced themselves from the Muslim world.
Secondly, positive views of

Western scholarship and
intellectual circles on modern
Islamic thought and Islamist
movements, i.e. seeing them
from a lens of
Protestantization
(protestanlama) and
modernization (modernleme),
have not always been the
most dominant ones.
Distortions of this Protestant
thesis on Muslim modernism Nurettin Topu-Hayat ve Bibliyografyas [Nurettin Topu: His
indicate an incentive for Life and Bibliography (2013)]

development and stimulation
for a supposedly declined
Muslim world. Certainly, there are correct sides to this observation as some
aspects of reformist Muslim thought itself were inspired by the model of the
Protestant Reformation. But, we also know that, depending on the state of
affairs and context, subject matter, or geography, the same person, idea, or
movement (which may be praised as a modernizing force) whether in one
period or in different time periods, are taken as a serious threat, a danger
surrounding the world: reactionary positions, radicalism, fundamentalism, or
terror. Notice how New Salafism associated with Rashid Rida, and once
praised by Western scholarship, has been recently seen as the root of the
Muslim Brotherhoods radicalism and anti-Westernism. There are clear shifts in
the political assessments of central concepts of modern Islamic thought
including jihad, Pan-Islamism, the Caliphate, anti-colonialism, and opposition to
impiety. They could be praised or condemned depending on how this fits
dominant Western political interests. The distinctions drawn between official
Islam/folk Islam, political Islam/cultural or moderate Islam, traditional
Islam/liberal Islam can acquire changing moral and political values. Depending
on the context, the part that is emphasized, seen as positive or as negative, or
condemned changes. [For example, folk Islam in Central Asia was seen as
reactionary compared to new modernist Islam (i.e. the jadid movement) during
imperial Russia. But when we came to the Cold War and Soviet period, Western
scholarship began to praise folk Sufi Islam as a basis of Muslim resistance to
Soviet rule. We all know how the
viewpoints on Afghan jihad dramatically Notice how New Sala sm
associated with Rashid Rida,
changed within 10 years from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s]. You can see
reflections of these things in the same or and once praised by Western
highly similar forms in Turkey and other
scholarship, has been recently
Muslim countries. The same political
reevaluation of the key Islamic concepts is seen as the root of the Muslim
not peculiar to Western Orientalism. New
Brotherhoods radicalism and
Salafi and radical Islamist movements
have similar shifting positions especially anti-Westernism.
when they make a distinction between
real and authentic Islam versus historical Islam, which allows them to reject
any aspect of contemporary Muslim practice that serves their political agenda.
Scholarly Interventions I: Modern Islamic Thought
Q: More or less 30 years have passed since your first publications and
critical interventions in this subject. Meanwhile, have scholarly
approaches to modern Islamic thought changed? How do you find these
new studies?
K: I can say that these partial

changes and improvements are not
at a level that I would consider
significant, neither methodologically
nor in content, especially taking into
account the length of time that has
passed. Personally, I think there are
more problems in these studies in
Turkey. If you consider the increase
2005, Kara in his home office.
in the percentage of conservative
and religious (dindar) people
located in universities, intellectual
life, and in the media, I think there is a deeply negative correlation and a real
distance between their positive contributions (or labor) and the the depth of their
pursuit on these issues. Im of the opinion that solely numerical and institutional
developments on this issue are misleading.
Q: What about the critical inquiry that you started Did this line of
thinking continue in the scholarship of others?
K: From my perspective, modern Islamic thought, is, on one hand, a

rejuvenating part of Islamic thought generally, and on the other hand, it points to
a serious differentiation from Islamic thought or occasionally even a breakdown
and departure from it. It expresses both a new idea of existence and defensive
struggle under new conditions as well as a transformation of itself, an attempt at
its own destruction at the same time. I think both sides of this are important.
Strengths and weaknesses are nested together in a field that opens up to
serious problems, but also some possibilities as well. Traditional circles in
Turkey and the Islamic world see modern Islamic thought only as a deviation, a
weakness, but for Islamists and radical circles it is once again a leap forward,
an awakening, and a revival towards real Islam (gerek slma doru). These
two viewpoints do not show the whole truth or the whole event to us. We
emphatically need a new viewpoint and a new idea of criticism.
Modern Islamic thinkers distinctions between real Islam versus historical

Islam are problematic and far from philosophical profundity both in terms of
methodology and content. The idea of a return to an ideal time of the Prophet
Muhammad (Asr- Saadet) and to original resources is an example of this.
However there is an attractive element and in some areas even a refreshing
side to it. Psychologically speaking, there are also calming elements for large
crowds psychological healing can be seen as a positive thing.
But this is not the whole story; I think

Modern Islamic thinkers that the degree to which new ideas or
distinctions between real

new interpretations developed by Muslim
intellectuals depend on their claim and
Islam versus historical Islam assertion that they represent a return to
are problematic and far from real Islam should be questioned. The
philosophical profundity both sources and evidence of this assertion

are open to debate. Modernist Muslim
in terms of methodology and thinkers want to condemn themselves
content. The idea of a return and us to a literal reading (literal/lafzc)

of Islamic texts, deprived of depth and
to a Golden Age (Asr- Saadet) breadth, and to a uniform understanding
and to original sources is an of religion. To put this in terms favorable

to their intention, modernists see the
example of this. salvation of Muslims (or some kind of
exit from the decline of Muslim societies)
in this new interpretation.
There is a whole set of problems in the modernists attempt to seriously

separate out real Islam from the Islamic historical experience, or from
weakened institutions, styles, Islamic scholarly traditions, and art forms that
spread over vast periods of time and diverse geographies. Modernists thus
developed a fragmented vision of science, culture, and history that is deprived
of integrity because it denies the whole historical experience of Muslim societies
and their future-oriented claims to go back to early Islamic authenticity. Their
capacity to understand modern European experience and Orientalist
scholarship, as well as the way they communicate with them, is also highly
problematic and subpar. In this view, the particular and universal are left
undifferentiated.
By taking into account the last two to three

centuries of Muslim experience and The way that modern Islamic
thought has been addressed
accepting it as part of our own experience,
I maintain that it is necessary to submit it
to new kinds of criticism and evaluation in the West as well as in the
and sometimes I do this in a manner that
Islamic world, or to put it
can be considered harsh. The way that
modern Islamic thought has been another way, the writing of
addressed in the West as well as in the
modern Islamic thought, lies
Islamic world, or to put it another way, the
writing of modern Islamic thought, lies within my eld of criticism
within my field of criticism and analysis. I and analysis.
am saying that existing methodologies,
viewpoints, the main topics [of study] and their hierarchical orderings, and/or
their prevalent interpretations are neither sufficient nor correct. However, my
critique is a process, and with the scholarly-intellectual environment in such a
weak place, we cannot expect to find the immediately desired or sought after
response to these critiques and new propositions because a scholarly critique
means new proposals and possibilities.
I can say this: I know that Western scholars working according to a certain
academic and political paradigm, and think tanks or Muslim scholars trying to
gain ground in the West persistently avoid my invitation to change the
paradigm, or purposely ignore my critiques and try not to quote me, even
though they do use some of my scholarship and draw from my perspective. This
is a matter of politics of scholarship and I do understand that.
Q: In your newly published The Problem of Islam in Republican Turkey

vol. II (Cumhuriyet Trkiyesinde Bir Mesele Olarak slm 2), there are
important themes such as secularism and democracy that you have been
addressing for some time as central to modern Islamic thought. The
problem of secularism is the most important one. Similarly, the concept of
democracy is still being debated from many vantage points. Since the
beginning, you have stated that modernist Islamist thought has

experienced and instigated its own secularization process, yet one that is
separate from Kemalist secularism in the Republican period. If we look at
debates on Modern Islamist thought specific to Turkey, how have these
debates acquire a sense of certainty or determination? Or have they been
brought to a state of ambiguity or insolubility? What are your views on
this topic with reference to the work you have done?
K: There is a vein of modern Islamic thought, Islamism, and the discourse of

true Islam that has been amenable and open to notions of secularism and
secularity.[1] Isnt it ironic that what looks like a demand for more Islamization
(slmlama) and religiosity (dinlik), and a demand to be against secularism
and modern Western thought ends up complicit in the secularization process?
This is a powerful paradox, but it is something the extent of which is left
unanalyzed and unrealized. There are many reasons for and sources of the
interrelations of religiosity (dinlik) and secularism (laiklik). Perhaps first is the
idea and claim that Islamism, like other intellectual movements in the Muslim
world, was capable of and needed to bring the processes of religion and
modernization together, because for the Islamic world modernization that is,
the idea of reform was acceptable to the extent that it was an absolutely
necessary tool for the salvation and survival of religion and state.
The transcendental aim of Islamic reform

was not acceptable by itself, but rather Isnt it ironic that what looks
like a demand for more
what it was supposed to serve, namely the
revival and salvation of Muslim polities,
made it acceptable. So, at the same time Islamization (slmlama) and
as the Muslim reformist of that era is
religiosity (dinlik), and a
seeking to establish harmonious relations
with modern European thought, there was demand to be against
also opposition to the colonial West, or
secularism and modern
Europe, which was considered to be
diyar- kfr or darl-harp.[2] We can Western thought ends up
put it another way: the idea of Europe as complicit in the secularization
an enemy developed alongside the idea of
Europe as an authoritative object of process?
imitation; opposition and hostility
functioned together in the same lines of harmony and integration. The second
reason was the proximity of some strands of Islamism to the idea of reform in
religion. However, it is not important whether one says this openly or not. I
address the issue of reform together with strands of secularism in the book.
The transcendental aim of Islamic reform was not acceptable by itself, but
rather what it was supposed to serve, namely the revival and salvation of
Muslim polities, made it acceptable.
I often put forward a few slogans as examples [of the double function of
Islamism and secularization] in my publications and in my courses: Our
constitution is the Quran, Sovereignty belongs to God, Islam is a rational
and logical religion, Market economy in Islam, Islam is in harmony with
science, or The Islamization of knowledge/science, the sun of Islam rises on
Europe, meaning Islam brought modern Europe to light and is therefore not
foreign to Islam. So, we should ask: are these powerful slogans, which were
popularized by modern Islamic thought and their movements, religious or are
they secular?
The establishment and maintenance of Islamist thought and Islamist

movements increasingly since the twentieth century was influenced at least in
transformations of language and logic by intellectuals, litterateurs, academics,
and teachers, e.g. by those who were products of modern (or secular!)
educational institutions rather than religious schools (medreseler) or Sufi lodges
(tekkeler). It is necessary here to recognize the very close proximity of radical
and intellectualist Islamist movements to Marxist parlance since the Second
World War and in Turkey since the 1960s as another explanation of their
powerful influence.
Q: The experience of Modern Islamic

It is necessary here to thought or Islamist thought in Turkey,
recognize the very close

whether at the level of people or of
texts, doesnt seem to be too well
proximity of radical and known in Western academic circles.
intellectualist Islamist We have talked about the reasons for

this at some length. With this in mind,
movements to Marxist what might you put forward as a
parlance since the Second possible roadmap for what is missing

and what can be done in the future?
World War and in Turkey since
K: There is much work that can be done
the 1960s as another on the topic. Specifically, Turkish
explanation of their powerful academics working in the West need to
gradually produce more studies. We
in uence. have been hearing for a while that there
were reserved funds for a variety of
efforts from organizations like the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of National
Education, and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TKA), but I
dont know whether they were used or where they were used. Perhaps these
organizations can be contacted. Translations of intellectual and academic
studies, alongside literary works, must be carried out through the translation of
original sources. In fact, new anthologies and research compilations should be
prepared in accordance with the needs and realities of the linguistic and cultural
resources awaiting translation. What is important here is to see the significant
gaps e.g. first, identify them in advance and then subsequently fill them in as
accurately as possible.
For example, there are Turkish research

centers in America that are financed by New anthologies and
research compilations should
direct or indirect contributions of Turkish
businessmen. Isnt it striking that even up
to today these organizations have not be prepared in accordance
shown any serious interest in the issue of
with the needs and realities of
translation from Turkish?
the linguistic and cultural
In fact, one area that Turkish academics
and intellectuals should pay attention to resources awaiting
and work on is that similar translation work translation.
should be done first into Arabic, and then
Persian, Urdu, and Russian. It is not only America and Europe that is unfamiliar
with Turkey and the resources of modern Islamic thought there, the entire
Islamic world either doesnt know about or is unfamiliar with these resources.
Actually even those in Turkey do not know about this scholarship, especially
since 1924 There are some translations based in Egypt, but these are very,
very limited and are not at the level of sufficiently providing ideas or of
transferring what has been accumulated.
As you know, this is somewhat related to the market and the atmosphere at
the moment. For example, one would expect foreign scholars who work on
Turkey to care about translation work. For the most part, however, they work on
Turkey, yet they dont do anything significant about the issue of translation from
Turkish to their own language or to transfer information into their own academic
fields. Why?
Islam in Turkey
Q: In the newly published second volume of your book, just like in the first
volume, it seems as if a basic claim comes to the fore; you occasionally
mention it in various places: You say, We cannot talk about anything in
Turkey without either making religion the center or skipping over it. What
do you mean exactly? Is this situation only specific to Turkey? Or is it
possible to talk about relations between religion and state more generally
in these terms? Maybe if we pare it down, can we at least say this about
Islamic countries?
K: Yes, this is an important issue. There are historical and cultural reasons for
this. Turks in Turkey have no histories outside of Islam and Muslims in Anatolia.
For them it is Islam which is the constituent and sustaining element of their
experience in Anatolia. The establishment elite that founded the Republican
ideology was cognizant of this even when they sought to isolate Islam. Thus, in
population exchanges brought about by the Treaty of Lausanne, groups of
people in the eastern Black Sea region who were Turkish speaking, ethnically
Turk, but non-Muslim (gayrmslim) were sent to Greece; yet tens-of-thousands
of people from the Balkans and the Aegean islands who were not Turks, many
of whom didnt know Turkish, yet were Muslims, came to Anatolia where they
settled and became equal citizens.
Turks in Turkey have no histories outside of Islam and Muslims in Anatolia.

For them it is Islam which is the constituent and sustaining element of their
experience in Anatolia.
Look, in Arab nationalist movements, Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs were
able to come together; it was also like this in Albanian nationalism. In Turkish
nationalism, there was not a strong strand like this, and Muslim-ness defined
Turkish-ness. Outside of a few token, unconventional exceptions there is no
basis to be found for a non-Muslim Turkish national identity. Our national
struggle was not a national struggle, but a religious one; it was jihad. Despite
this fact, much has changed with secularization policies in Turkey over half a
century, the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation (military intervention by the Turkish
government in Cyprus against the unification of Cyprus with Greece) showed
the role of Islam in the secular Turkish military.
In those days actions taken by Turkish

the 1974 Cyprus Peace soldiers were all called jihad, including
Operation (military
the pilots in flight, the captains at sea,
and the soldiers on the fronts. There
intervention by the Turkish were many oral legends about saints
government in Cyprus against who came to their aid, saved them from
death, or secured their victory. I followed
the uni cation of Cyprus with these stories closely and with great
Greece) showed the role of interest both in Istanbul and in rural

areas. When I did my military service ten
years later in 1983, secular and
Islam in the secular Turkish Kemalist officers who had participated

in the Cyprus operations were still
military. talking about these stories.
It was not without reason that the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyeti Hareket
Partisi) under the leadership of Alpaslan Trke (who came from a Racist-
Turanist line[3]) revised their party slogan in 1969 to We are as Turkish as the
Mountain of God (Tanr da) and as Muslim as Mount Hira.[4] Even in the
period of secular politics that saw its most crude and lowest level during the
Republican period, the elites facilitated the circulation of notions such as
Turkish Muslim identity (Trk Mslmanl), The Prophet Muhammads
Turkishness (Hz. Muhammedin Trkl), and the Turkish Quran (Trke
Kuran) and allowed it to exist in official discourse.
There are more practical examples as well: when and if you cannot get a fatwa
for family/population planning, for organ donation, or for interest-free financial
institutions (whatever that means!), or when you cannot give Friday sermons in
mosques on these issues which requires the blessing of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, you dont have legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
In Turkey there is no other source of

legitimacy that is as big or as In Turkey there is no other
source of legitimacy that is as
encompassing as religion and Islam not
even today. We must clearly understand
and conceptualize this as a matter of fact big or as encompassing as
that comes from historical experience. Of
religion and Islam not even
course, not every Muslim country is this
way, because the historical, geographical, today.
and cultural conditions are different. Post-
eighteenth century is there any other Muslim country that receives Muslim
migrants from very different geographies and from all walks of life like Anatolia?
Why is it like this? And how does Anatolia easily incorporate such vastly
different elements when their only common ground is that they are Muslim?
This exceptional situation needs to be mulled over. The latest big example of
this is the Syrian refugees. Take a look at how many Syrian refugees other
Islamic countries were able to take and also why they couldnt take them
Q: If we look at the debates on the concept of jihad, we see that it is of

central importance in both Western Orientalist controversies on Islam and
internal debates within Islamic movements in the 20th century. Yet,
despite this, jihad does not seem to be significant or controversial theme
for Islamism in Turkey. How did the evolution of the idea of jihad occur in
Turkey before and after the Iranian Revolution and the Afghan jihad
against the Soviet invasion? What is the trajectory of this term in Turkish
Islamic thought, both in scholarly writings and non-scholarly public
perception?
IK: There is a close correlation between the rise and decline of Islamist thought
on the one hand, and the strength or weakness of the ideal of Jihad on the
other hand. This is not only true for Turkey, but for the whole Islamic world. If I
can over-generalize a little, I can say this: When the oppositional, resistance-
based, and radical strands of Islamism are on the rise, we see more
significance given to the concept of jihad, highlighted in the struggle against and
resistance to imperialism, oppressive regim
es, and infidel rule. But when

there is so much oppression
that the opposition can not
even raise its voice, or when

there are other reasons for
integration or compromise with
the system, slogans of jihad
are subdued and become
weaker. Instead of being
utilized as an ideal of struggle
against oppressive infidelity, 2006 with Halil Inalcik, Ahmet Yasar Ocak and Mujdat
jihad is then interpreted as a Ulucam.
struggle against ones ego and

ambition, as mentioned in a
hadith.
We can follow these two interpretations of jihad in Turkish history. During the
War of Independence and Second Constitutional period, the concept of jihad
was very popular. It was used as a strong weapon against occupying forces,
colonialists, and infidel invaders of the country. There are tens of books,
hundreds of articles, and thousands of media reports and writings on jihad from
this period. Yet, during the one-party, authoritarian rule of the Republic, it was
not even legal or legitimate to talk about jihad, and thus it was not a lively
concept. Then, only after the 1960s, we see a revived interest in the concept of
jihad parallel to the development of radical and intellectualist Islamism and the
successes of conservative/Islamist groups in politics. Most of the publications
about the topic of jihad after the 1960s were actually translations from the
writings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan.
Perhaps this period ended with the September 12th coup, although the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 energized and radicalised Islamists and kept the idea of
jihad relevant for several additional years. The very fact that most of the Islamist
groups, tariqas, and religious communities supported ANAP (Anavatan Partisi,
or the Motherland Party) as the governing party led by Ozal during the 1980s
and into the early 1990s shows that they were not interested in a militarist
notion of jihad at all and that they were trying to integrate into the system.
There were sporadic and occasional

The very fact that most of spikes in discourses on jihad with
the Islamist groups, tariqas,

reference to the legitimacy of the
resistance in Afghanistan and in Bosnia,
and religious communities but overall, the general mood has been
supported ANAP (Anavatan accommodationist and participatory for

the political context of Turkey. When you
Partisi, or the Motherland think about it, there is nothing surprising
Party) as the governing party about seeing someone advocate

moderate Islam, cultural Islam, liberal
led by Ozal during the 1980s Islam, democratic Islam, or even secular
and into the early 1990s Islam, or those who have good relations
with business and financial elites to
shows that they were not interpret jihad as only a struggle against
interested in a militarist ones ego and ambitions.
notion of jihad at all and that I think we can see the interpretation of
they were trying to integrate

jihad in modern Islamic thought as a kind
of litmus test to predict the political
into the system. orientation of a group and then use it to
figure out what is the dominant political
vision at that particular moment. Yet, we should not forget that this is a tactical
strategy. Interpretation of jihad as a military struggle can weaken in a certain
period, but then it never disappears and can be revived again in a new context.
We need to think about why these shifts in meaning occur, (which is mainly
about the fact that jihad has a place in both the Quran and the tradition of
Prophet Muhammad) and what contexts and conditions prompt a difference of
interpretation.
I want to add a last point about this issue: The shifting meaning of jihad in
modern Turkey its militarist and pacifist interpretations is happening among
political activists, young Islamists and some pious people. For the majority of
Turkish society, there is not much affinity or engagement with this concept, and
their knowledge is limited to what they hear in Friday prayer sermons and the
speeches of politicians.
Scholarly Interventions II: Islamism and Its Paradoxes
Q: You are working on modern Islamic thought generally and Islamist

thought in Turkey specifically, and you have written and published quite a
lot in this area. In Turkey, when someone says Islamism, yours is the
first name to come to mind in academia. We want to ask you some
questions in reference to this. Islamism has been heavily debated in
Turkey for over a century and it seems that this will continue. When you
look at the past from todays vantage point, what did Islamisms journey in
Turkey generally offer? What were the questions posed in earlier periods,
and why have todays questions changed? Were they resolved for social
or intellectual reasons, or were they abandoned because the conditions
changed?
K: In my opinion, Islamism emerged out of questions and subsequent answers

to how the Islamic world and Muslims could remain themselves yet survive
that is how to maintain their existence, continue to spread, in whatever form,
their determination and resolution to the entire world, and protect themselves
and Islam in an environment in which modern Europe was strengthened by both
its ideational and material power and its politics. The first place one looked for
answers was undoubtedly in Islam, but this was a new understanding and
interpretation of Islam that tried to reframe itself in connection with the earliest
generation of Muslims and through the Quran and sunna, the prophetic
traditions, as its main sources.
The second place was modern Western

thought, specifically in science and One of the issues that I argue
is that Islamism represents
technology. This was because defeat at
the hands of the West, the colonialism that
followed, and the multifaceted forms of and o ers a new, bold,
political and cultural oppression had a
holistic, and modern, even
powerful impact on Islamism, as in all of
the philosophies that emerged in the modernist, interpretation and
Islamic world in the modern period. The
practice of Islam.
separation between culture and civilization
is born from these two sources. Therefore, one of the issues that I argue is that
Islamism represents and offers a new, bold, holistic, and modern, even
modernist, interpretation and practice of Islam. On one side, [Islamism] is turned
towards the early period of Islam, on the other, it faces modern Western thought
either implicitly or explicitly. In the most general sense we can say that these
are intertwined, opposing branches of Islamism that simultaneously seek some
harmonious coexistence. Of course, there is also a bifurcation and a kind of
cleavage that emerges here even within a struggle to find a solution amidst
these contrasting tendencies.
Islamism redefined, via instrumentalized interpretations, the meanings of many

concepts and practices in Muslim societies, such as the tradition of Israiliyat,
superstition (hurafe), folk belief (btl inan), innovations in matters of religious
tradition (bidat), pre-Islamic narratives (estrl-evveln), and associating
partners with God (irk). In this new interpretation of Islam, Islamic history and
the experiences of Muslims for thirteen centuries were by and large bracketed
and relegated to irrelevance within the new reinterpretation of the Islamic
intellectual tradition; the colossal heritage of Islamic science, culture, arts, and
institutions lost their reputation and significance, and were pushed out of
contemporary vocabulary of Muslim life. Certainly, this is true for only Islamist
thought. In more traditional Muslim structures and forms of thinking or practice,
their existence and weight was maintained.
These changes were not all in the

same period or occurring at an
equal level. Most probably, the first
crisis and interpretations came into
being in the field of science and
scholarship. The reason for this was
the positivist and secular
understanding of science that came
with the new military schools, and
2015, with Mustafa Kutlu at Dergah Publishing House.
quickly embraced and internalized
by Muslims as a solution to their
problems, though they led to new
problems due to serious changes that they brought forth. Even today, ideas of
progress and development accompany central themes in modern Muslim
thought. Discourses about the need to bring together factory chimney stacks
(science, industry and technology) with minarets (namely beliefs, ethics and
faith) is its vulgar outcome in the modern Turkish political scene.[5]
Following the seemingly benign adoption of Western science, debates about the
appropriateness and reform of systems of government began. Here, there is a
line running from the changing Caliphate-Sultanate system to abolishing it in
order to create the constitutional, republican, and democratic systems. Political
thought and institutions as well as political methods have all been undergoing
important changes in Muslim societies since the nineteenth-century. Following
that, or perhaps parallel to it, we see new religious interpretations; Islamist
thoughts insistence on making the distinction between real Islam and
historical Islam became the foundational intellectual move to justify these
changes.
In recent history, and even today, Islamism is not of one type, color, or on
one frequency.
New interpretations of Islamic ethics and pursuits of new forms of everyday life
have followed these earlier changes, producing dramatic transformation in
terms of womens rights, dress codes, observing privacy in gender relations,
architecture, personal and public etiquette (adab- muaeret), cities, houses,
eating and drinking habits, educational institutions, and methods of education.
Orientalist writings on Islam, and the ideas of new Muslim intellectuals,
journalists, and littrateurs who have studied the West in their own countries or
in Europe have made serious contributions as well as having a negative
influence on these processes. These were already the educated classes that
are new, influential, and transformative in Muslim societies.
Q: And the change of questions
K: The questions and problems that were deemed urgent and essential
changed over time as well as the answers given during the last two centuries.
This is a natural consequence of major political, economic and social turbulence
and transformations, dramatic shifts in climate of opinion, and economic
necessities, which highlighted some new concepts and ideas while making
others lose popularity and appeal. In recent history, and even today, Islamism is
not of one type, color, or on one frequency. Yet, I dont think that the reasons
for its emergence, its approximate forms, or its style of interpretation have
categorically changed.
If you look at this issue from the perspective of ordinary religious people (dindar
halk) or more traditional-conservative structures like religious communities
(cemaatlar) and Sufi orders (tarikatlar) that are resistant to Islamist
interpretations, understanding of religion, and lifestyles, it seems that they are
outside of Islamism, even in opposition to some of its viewpoints. You must be
cautious when following this partially true case about the resistance of
traditional Muslim structures against Islamist agendas, because, at once, these
structures are the main sources and support of Islamist thought and
movements, whether directly or indirectly, and at the same time, on some
occasions, they may offer a view that is in accord with Islamism and will make
alliances with Islamists. Whether they accept this or not, traditional Muslim
groups and ordinary Muslims are open to innovation and renewal. For instance,
rumor has it that in Konya new styles of cutlery were first used in Mevlevi Sufi
Order of that city and then spread to the rest of the population.
Yet, there is something more; currents

there are commonalities outside of Islamism in the Islamic world
between Islamists and leftist

also have Islamist ideas and strains. In
Turkey for example, we can see in
movements in Egypt, Algeria, Westernist and Turkist-nationalist
and Iran. Even if their movements some of these ideas are

shared by Islamists concerning
priorities and goals di er, we progress, reform and reinterpretation of
should see this indirect and Islam. Or, there are commonalities
between Islamists and leftist movements
implicit relationship (and in Egypt, Algeria, and Iran. Even if their
alliance) between Islamists priorities and goals differ, we should see
this indirect and implicit relationship (and
and other modernist alliance) between Islamists and other
intellectual currents as an modernist intellectual currents as an
aspect that strengthens Islamisms
aspect that strengthens appeal in those societies.
Islamisms appeal in those
Scholarly Interventions III: Studying
societies. Islamism in Turkey
Q: If we now come to academic studies done on Islamism in Turkey up to

today, at what phase are they? Qualitatively and quantitatively, how would
you evaluate these studies?
K: This is a large issue, but lets touch on it briefly. From the perspective of
Islamist thought, after 1924 Turkey broke from the rest of the Islamic world, from
its shared experiences with the Islamic world, and all that it had accumulated. It
might seem as if Turkey reestablished connections [with the Islamic world] in
the 1960s and 1970s, but I dont think that this connection was at a level
comparable to what it was before 1924, or it had any impact in recovering the
memory and tradition of Turkeys own Islamist thought tradition. There was in
fact a rupture in the tradition of Islamist thought from Caliphate-era to post-
Caliphate, Republican-era.
Beginning with the move to the multi-party system in Turkey (1946-1950),

studies on Islamism really came to life. Simultaneously, studies produced
outside Turkey also began. As for today in Turkey, we can talk about two key
strands of engagement with Islamism. The first strand is that of academic
scholarship, which continues to influence contemporary thinking, that sees
Islamism as a threat to secularism and attempts to condemn Islamism by
associating it with stigmatized labels like pro-Sharia (eriatlk), pro-ummah
(mmetilik), and reactionary politics (irtica); it also tries to render it illegitimate,
pull it down, and place it in opposition to Republican ideology. These
interpretations also asserted that democracy and multiparty life would clearly
empower Islamism and the Islamist threat enabling them to grow with each
election. Thus, this stigmatized interpretation or demonisation of Islamism is
used to control pro-democracy movements and the democratic process in
Turkish politics by fueling an eternal fear of Islamisms reactionary politics,
hoping to persuade democrats to ally with authoritarian Kemalism. Tark Zafer
Tunaya can be given as one example in the academy of that strand that seeks
total fidelity to Republican ideology and which sees the survival of Kemalist
secularism as the only criteria by which to evaluate Islamism. Unfortunately, in
this strand there has not been much analytical depth or scope of content or
academic contribution other than polarizing Turkish society as good secularists
versus evil Islamists, and hardening each side against the other by creating
distance between them.
When I published my book on Islamist thought in late Ottoman period in

mid-1980s, Islamists in Turkey at that time were surprised to see the
richness, diversity, and content of their predecessors in their own country.
Sometimes early Islamist thought in Turkey was downplayed and rejected in
order to open a space for Cold War-era imported Islamism from Egypt,
Pakistan, or Iran.
The second main strand is composed of radical, intellectualist, Islamist

interpretations of Islamism that emerge in the 1960s and are sustained by
translated texts coming from the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistans Jamaat-e-
Islami, and later from Iranian Islamists. It is unquestionable that this strand
engendered
an interest in the revival of Islamism in

Turkey, but it is at least open to debate
whether it established a connection
between Islamism and Turkey. These
individuals did not seek a historical
rootedness or sources coming from within
Turkey. This is because this strand
prioritizes the Islamist historical narratives
of authenticity articulated in Egypt, Iran,
and Pakistan, which all had amnesia and
a deliberate obfuscation of the late
Ottoman period as well as the Caliphate.
Turkeys Islamists during the Cold War Trkiyede slmclk Dncesi-
themselves were cut off from late Metinler/Kiiler [Islamist Thought in Turkey:
Ottoman-era Islamism due to language Texts/People, (3 volumes, 1986, 1987,
reform and alphabet change, and they 1994)]
were not even familiar with the basic texts

of Ottoman Islamism. Thus, aspects of
Islamism that had a history with roots in Turkey did not enter into the new
academic narratives of global Islamism or Islamism in Turkey. When I published
my book on Islamist thought in late Ottoman period in mid-1980s, Islamists in
Turkey at that time were surprised to see the richness, diversity, and content of
their predecessors in their own country. Sometimes early Islamist thought in
Turkey was downplayed and rejected in order to open a space for Cold War-era
imported Islamism from Egypt, Pakistan, or Iran. Perhaps for these reasons,
after the 1980s, many Islamists of the post-1970s period would struggle to
adjust their ideas to notions of democracy, human rights, secularism, liberalism,
postmodernism, and capitalism with new fusions and syntheses without being
aware of the long intellectual traditions of Islamist writing on these concepts for
over a century.
There are other scholarly and intellectual traditions of interpreting Islamism

between and beyond these two main strands. On one side, there are those like
Nurettin Topu, Necip Fazl, and Sezai Karako that nourished and influenced
nationalist conservative thought as well as Islamism. They are outside of and
above these two main lines of Kemalist secularism versus Cold War Islamism
[that weve been tracing]. mam Hatip schools and those who frequented circles
of the High Islamic Institutes (Yksek slm Enstitleri) and Theology Faculties
(lahiyat Faklteleri) were relatively distant from radical, intellectualist forms of
Islamism in terms of conservatism,

all the while being close to them in
terms of their interpretation and
understanding of religion. On the
political stage, perhaps there is a
strand from the National Salvation
Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, or MSP)
1984. With Mustafa Kutlu and Ismet Ozel.
and Erbakan[6] that we can extend
as far as the Justice and
Development Party (JDP, Adalet ve
Kalknma Partisi). They are considerably close to the modernists and the
capitalist world on topics of love of technology and science, progressivism
(ilerlemecilik), developmentalism (kalknmaclk) while holding to typical
nationalist, conservative, and religious thought.
The more nuanced scholarly writings of Sabri lgener and erif Mardin should
be considered separately in academia as they tried to engage Islamism within
the field of religion in social and political analyses as a significant component for
understanding Turkey. I am saying that despite what I have said about the level
of their academic sophistication their usage of source materials and methods
of observation but ultimately their conclusions were still very limited.. It could
be said that these two scholars, Mardin and lgener, did not have any serious
followers who continued their line of inquiry or revised and advanced their
scholarship. In my opinion, the most significant and distinct recent contribution
to interpretations of Islamism in Turkey, methodologically and in terms of
content, comes from smet zel, also perhaps with the interpretations of the
traditionalist school (via translations of Rene Guenon and Seyyed Hossein
Nasr). All of these different strands need to be evaluated individually as well as
comparatively. It hasnt happened as of yet, unfortunately.
Secularism and Islamists
Q: In your publications you often address the relationship between

religion and state in Turkey. We understand that taking up and
understanding this relationship both has many layers horizontally and
vertically, doing this is, in fact, not very easy. When you look at the Islamic
world, what do you think about the nature of religion-state relations and
the ways things are going, specifically in reference to Turkeys
experience? Is it in a position where creative yet realistic paths can be
found?
K: I would emphasize this: the relationship between religion and state in Turkey
cannot only be understood as [a choice between] secularism and its opposite,
either pro-sharia positions (eriatlk) or new Salafi Islam and interpretations
of Islamism. Beginning with March 3, 1924, and constitutionally since 1937,
Turkey has really been a kind of secular country. From this perspective, it is the
only example of its kind in the Islamic world. But, today we are asking: Is Turkey
really a secular country?
Why didnt the administration and

the relationship between ideology of the Republic choose a path
religion and state in Turkey

that separates matters of religion from
matters of state and politics instead of
cannot only be understood as adopting a style where religion and state
[a choice between] secularism coexist while suppressing and controlling

religion? Why does Turkish-style
and its opposite, either pro- secularism stand in a place where
sharia positions (eriatlk) ambiguity and confusion prevail? I

discuss these problems in the chapters
or new Sala Islam and on the Diyanet and secularism in
interpretations of Islamism. [volume one of] my book Cumhuriyet
Trkiyesinde Bir Mesele Olarak slm.
We need to comprehend this particular form of secularism by focusing on its

religious and cultural-historical background. Once we comprehend this, we see
that in the interpretation of Sunni Islam and in Turkish political culture religion
and state are essential component parts of each other. Theoretically you can
separate these two elements, but historically and culturally, separating them or
thinking of them separately is impossible. Said another way, culturally when you
cut religion out, the states legitimacy and standing is lost and religion is left
empty. I think the particular form of Turkish secularism adopted by the
Republican administration has merit in its core idea, although I do not think this
solution had the capacity to respond to Turkish societys needs or to fulfill its
vision. I find it significant in this context, that since 1924, no state official has
uttered a sentence such as the Turkish State has no religion. Whereas, these
same state officials have been very impolite and harsh in their pronouncements
about religion and religious people. In Western, secular cultural settings a
sentence such as this would come across as normal, but in Turkey and in
Turkish it has no legitimacy (meruiyet) or intelligibility (anlalabilirlik). How
come?
This subject has not really preoccupied the

minds of defenders of secularism or I think the particular form of
Turkish secularism adopted by
Islamists; they are content with hackneyed
phrases or with approaching the
exclusionary ideological language of their the Republican administration
opponents from the reverse. At times,
has merit in its core idea,
there are symbolic and emotional yet
meaningful ideas like Necip Fazls although I do not think this
Supreme Sovereign State (Baycelik

solution had the capacity to
Devleti), but in terms of content, they are
highly abstruse and problematic. respond to Turkish societys
Q: And what about the same issue of needs or to ful ll its vision. I
secularism in the rest of the Islamic nd it signi cant in this
world?
context, that since 1924, no
K: Other Muslim countries outside of
state o cial has uttered a
Turkey are not constitutionally secular but
in truth they are either secular or in limbo. sentence such as the Turkish
Concerning relations between religion and
State has no religion.'
state, I dont think that there is any
particularly interesting development or
interpretation that requires specific attention. The idea of Islamic democracy,
which developed in the line of constitutional monarchy, republicanism, and
democracy (merutiyet-cumhuriyet-demokrasi) became stronger after the
abolition of the Caliphate.
Because these ideas about harmony

The idea of Islamic between Islam and democracy have not
democracy, which developed

sufficiently or seriously considered the
long, Muslim, political thought tradition,
in the line of constitutional its innovations, or its principles, they
monarchy, republicanism, and didnt go very far in terms of finding

appropriate solutions or gaining larger
democracy (merutiyet- appeal. It repeats itself with almost the
cumhuriyet-demokrasi) same arguments. Meanwhile, the pro-

Caliphate movement of today, which
became stronger after the runs on a much more emotional basis,
abolition of the Caliphate. only finds a response within the
discourse of marginal groups, like Hizb
ut-Tahrir,[7] or in some traditional structures like madrasa circles, without much
awareness of the long and rich historical experience of the Caliphate. Thus,
contemporary discourses and emotions in regards to the Caliphate has largely
broken off from historical experience and actual political thought of Muslim
societies in the last several centuries.
Nativism, Islamism, and Globalization
Q: Youre speaking about modern Islamic thought generally? Because

your area of study is much more about Turkey, we are trying to ask
questions connected to Turkey, but it seems as if the same problems are
very much interconnected and related even across the Islamic world. At
this stage, your arguments about the local/native (yerlilik) come to
mind. To what degree are the problems of the local or the particular
(yerlilik) and the national (millilik) an important dimension of modern
Islamic thought? How do we deal with discussions of the national and
the local in a time when these problems are globally debated and
interacting with each other?
K: This issue has a few sides to it. First and foremost, the categories of the
universal (evrensellik) and the particular are presented as opposites of each
other, but to show them as alternatives and to position them as such at the
beginning of a work is to go down the wrong path. This is an oft-made and very
clear mistake. Something may be local and national as well as universal. In fact,
it can even be said that whatever is defined or shown to be universal today has
particular and national sides as well. Going one step further, something may be
global precisely because it has a strong national core. What about the seven
wonders of the world, for example are they national or global? Which one is
first? What about the houses in Safranbolu,[8] the Sleymaniye Mosque
complex, or the poems of Yunus Emre, the city of Berat,[9] znik tiles, recitation
of the Quran in the Istanbul style
Secondly, a gradual perspective can also consider these two sets as different
degrees of the same thing. In this case, the distance between them is not a
matter of content but of degree. You start with the native and particular, but
eventually try to universalize your experience.
Additionally, who can say that what is global is more significant or valuable than
what is local or national, and how? In Turkey, those who formed an ideology
based on the superiority of the universal over the particular-native rendered
themselves, their concepts, and their place in Turkey undefined and weak. This
happened first with socialist and Marxist language, then with radical Islamist
language they pulled themselves down and lost their appeal by putting the
global in front of and against the local and national. There is a serious
procedural error or perhaps even a deliberate political strategy at play here, like
equalizing the local and particular through nationalist ideology, or trying to
weaken and dissolve the local and the national through rejection of nationalism
on behalf of the universalism of Islamic and left internationalism.
How can one who does not know his or

her own self and society or culture In Turkey, those who formed
an ideology based on the
recognize the universal? This question
remains before us. Is it ideology?
superiority of the universal
Q: How local is Turkeys Islamist
thought? In other words, how deep over the particular-native
does its roots lie? As with rendered themselves, their
Westernization, can we talk of Islamist
thought as if it has broken off from the concepts, and their place in
local, become Arabized, made Iranian, Turkey unde ned and weak.
etc.?
K: This is a difficult and delicate question. We said at the beginning of our

discussion: normally, the center of Islamist thought was Istanbul. Until about
1924, other important centers lets say Muslims in Egypt, India, Iran, and
Russia were influenced by Istanbul, they looked to Istanbul, they moved with it
in mind; we can even say that some parts opposed Istanbul while looking at and
being inspired by it. Yet, unfortunately, this is something unknown and forgotten,
or purposely subjected to amnesia by those who actually know this fact. To that,
Id say: Despite all of its internal problems, Islamism in Turkey surely had local
roots and arteries; it kept its links and openings to developments in the rest of
the Islamic world and the world more broadly. But in the single-party years and
in the wake of the Second World War, these local roots and native currents of
Islamist thought would occasionally be remembered from a political point of
view, but its significance weakened and dwindled. In the years following the
Second World War, especially in the 1960s, Islamism was revived in a different
form according to the conditions of the time, mostly under the influence of
translations from Arab, Iranian, and South Asian Islamists. What did not
happen, but in fact should have happened, was that new Islamists could have
read, translated, appropriated, and benefitted from translations in other
languages of Islam outside of Turkey, all the while searching for their own local
sources and undergoing constructive criticism.
Despite all of its internal problems, Islamism in Turkey surely had local
roots and arteries; it kept its links and openings to developments in the rest
of the Islamic world and the world more broadly.
This rupture brought on by changes in language [i.e. from Ottoman to modern

Turkish written in Latin script known as the harf devrimi] was an important
obstacle for Republican-era Islamists to inherit the legacy of earlier Muslim
thought. Yet, this obstacle could have been overcome. It is clear that there are
other political, intellectual, or psychological reasons; either the slogans and
sentiments of the new Islamist versions would predominate, or they would be
concerned that otherwise the nationalist/conservative/right-wing strand would
be strengthened. Even the Risle-i Nur community, which hangs on to almost
every word and gesture of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, wouldnt sufficiently know
or even be able to read or understand the texts he wrote before 1924. Even if
they were able to read and understand Nursi before 1924, in order to save and
preserve themselves and the community they could easily fall into willful
misinterpretation.
Of course, at some level or another, international circles had influence over

Ankara in strengthening these new strands that have broken with their own local
intellectual traditions and sources. Thats why there are still serious issues
before Turkey today, such as communicating with local strands of Islamism.
How far can Islamist thought in Turkey go with translations from other
countries Islamist groups? I also doubt the accuracy of these translations
from the Muslim Brotherhood or Pakistans Jamaat-e- Islami or from Iran,
as many ideas remained untranslatable. As a result, contemporary Islamist
thought in Turkey is unable to place its roots locally, and many of its followers
cannot understand how they relate or correspond to what is happening in
Turkey. In regards to this problem, it is important to focus on just how similar
radical Islamists were to leftists on the issue of integration into the system and
ties to capitalist liberalism, especially in the post-Cold War period and in the
aftermath of the September 12th coup. The Islamists substantial advantage was
that they were Muslims and were at least potentially open to channels of
communication with broader religious and ethical concerns of their society in a
certain way. But it is necessary for those who are educated and ambitious to
realize the depth of this amnesia and to work on it under todays circumstances.
Islamism, The JDP, Glen, and Post-Islamism
Q: When you consider developments in Turkey over the past four to five
years, what would you like to say about the future of this umbrella-like
category of Islamism and all that has accumulated underneath it?
K: Im one of those who do not distinguish between the fate, future, and
possibilities of Turkey and those of Islam, Muslims, and Islamism. Therefore,
the actual course of events moving for Turkey in a harmonious direction
towards integration to capitalist liberal hegemony and world order do not seem
very promising from my point of view neither in terms of ideals nor in terms of
practical results. However, Turkeys potential today, as always, still carries hope
for us, the Islamic world, and for humanity.
Q: In the last 3-4 years, there have been some unprecedented dramatic
changes occurring in Turkey that will reshape the dominant character and
future of the relationship between the state and religious groups. What we
have been witnessing seems to be a kind of rupture, especially with
regard to the relationship between the Turkish government and followers

of Fethullah Glen
It all started with a conflict and disagreement between an elected AK Party

government and the Glen community, but ended with with a very bloody
coup and subsequent suppression. These events are of great significance
in terms of your life-long research interests, namely the issue of
secularism and Islam in Turkey. In your 2008 book, titled The Problem of
Islam in Republican Turkey (Cumhuriyet Trkiyesinde Bir Mesele Olarak
slam, volume 1) you elaborate on the question of the Turkish states
complex relationship with religious communities. Even though we are still
in the midst of a rapidly evolving set of events, do you have any new
considerations on this topic in light of what happened between the
government and the Glen community in recent years? Would not this
experience bring about a departure from earlier modes of relations and
the beginning of new political sensibilities with long term repercussions
on the practices of Turkish secularism?
K: There are two interrelated aspects of your questions which I want to

separate: First is about the question of religious communities and tariqas in
Turkey, their problems, and their future position in Turkish politics. The second
aspect is about followers of Glen and the grave situation and sad political
destiny with which this community ended up.
Even though Sufi tariqas and other religious

associations in Turkey may have a long history
traceable to the Ottoman period, their current
state took shape during the one-party rule of the
Turkish Republic from 1924 to 1950 when they
were under difficult conditions of state
oppression and were officially banned. All the
peculiar characteristics of Turkish religious
communities such as their fear of state
intervention, their timid and precocious attitude
in demanding their rights from the central
government, their special fine-tuned political
Cumhuriyet Trkiyesinde Bir Mesele strategies, and their double embrace of both
Olarak slm [The Problem of Islam in tradition and a kind of republican modernity can
Republican Turkey (2 volumes: 2008, all be understood in the context of their
2016)]. formative experience of single party
authoritarian rule of the Turkish Republic. Thus,
if we see some problems and pathologies in the
political vision of these groups, it is not just because of their own ideas, but was
due to an oppressive Republican secular ideology and various policies that the
central Turkish government implemented with regard to religious communities.
Let alone the highly naive attitudes of Republican-era universities, intellectuals,
military and civilian bureaucrats, and the Turkish press towards religious
communities, which shaped the political mood of the religious community. The
existential reasons and main goals of these communities can be summarized in
two points. The first is to preserve their own traditions and their own
understanding and practice of religion, to increase the number of their followers
and sympathizers. The second, which is for them necessarily linked to the first
goal, is their belief that they need to preserve their religion, and help people to
be better believers and better Muslims.
The dominant political
As part of this second goal, they tried to
spread religious culture in society, teach behavior of religious
communities in Turkey, which

people how to read the Quran, and thus
tried to create a society that is more pious
while respecting religious tariqas and is shaped by their negative
communities and supporting and
experiences and existential
protecting them. The dominant political
behaviour of religious communities in goals, often involved a
Turkey, which is shaped by their negative compromising attitude
experiences and existential goals, often
involved a compromising attitude towards towards state authority, and a
state authority, and a desire to get close to desire to get close to
government to receive favour. For
example, even though Turkeys religious government to receive favor.
communities disapprove of state
secularism and the Diyanet (Turkish Religious Affairs directorate) as an organ of
this secularism, they nevertheless try to infiltrate these institutions and
undertake their activities under state patronage without directly challenging
official ideology or the state itself. It is because of this state-infiltrating and
compromising status of Turkeys religious communities that I have been arguing
that they never represent what people call civil society.
At the same time, the Turkish state and the Diyanet administration similarly
have a dual and paradoxical strategy towards these religious groups. The state
bureaucrats criticize the vision of religion represented by tariqas and religious
communities, but instead of completely banning them, they try to transform and
reshape them, to deform them with their interventions, and they often prefer that
these groups function under their watchful eye of their patronage so that they
can be controlled. This complex relationship created situations whereby sheikhs
or imams of various Sufi tariqas and religious communities, as well as their
members working within the Diyanets state sanctioned religious bureaucracy,
were paid with government salaries. Both the pious citizens and state
authorities are aware of this collusion between tariqas and the Diyanet. I found
this mutually distrustful yet symbiotic relationship between state and religious
communities very unhealthy and problematic for both sides, and I think what we
have been seeing in terms of their long-term effects confirms these negative
results.
Yet,
Even though the relationship we
between religious
can
not
communities and state organs
like the Diyanet improved
after the transition to multi-
party politics in 1950, the
pathologies of this peculiar
relationship has continued up
to present.
Cumhuriyet Trkiyesinde Bir Mesele
Olarak slm [The Problem of Islam in
look down on this complicated Republican Turkey (2 volumes: 2008,
arrangement and compromise reached by 2016)]
both the state and religious communities; it

is better to try to understand how it works
and what results it produces for both sides. Even though the relationship
between religious communities and state organs like the Diyanet improved after
the transition to multi-party politics in 1950, the pathologies of this peculiar

relationship has continued up to present. After all, tariqas are still illegal in
Turkey, and all the religious communities function without any legitimacy
according to Turkish law. In order to avoid the awkwardness of banned tariqas
having relationships with the secular state, their sheikhs are now addressed by
a vague term such as public opinion leaders/moral guides (kanaat nderleri).
Whatever that term means is a mystery to me.
Nevertheless, my observation on this problematic relationship between religious

communities and the Turkish state does not change the fact that they functioned
as important agents of religious life, religious thought, public piety, and the
institutionalization of religion in the Republican period. More importantly, these
groups played a crucial role during the process of mass internal migration from
rural areas to urban centers after the 1950s. Poor and more pious new
emigrants to big cities found opportunities for socialization, education, economic
empowerment, and social mobility thanks to the networks provided by these
religious communities. Eventually, they perpetuated a pious life-style in urban
environments and led to the strengthening of conservative and later Islamist
political groups in new poor suburbs of the big cities, thus transforming Turkish
bureaucracy and business communities during this process. We have to
recognize the different aspects of this phenomenon.
Q: What about the position of Glen Community within this spectrum?

How are they different?
K: Yes, until very recently the Glen community, which was seen a faction of
the larger Nur community, behaved and were perceived as very similar to other
tariqas and religious communities in Turkey. As far as I can observe the
particular path that the Glen community took, which brought them to their
current despicable condition, started after the September 12 (1980) coup in
Turkey; this was particularly influenced by the strategic alliances and moves of
the late Cold War and post-Cold War period. They began to establish branches
and initiated activities with encouragement from bigger Cold War political forces
in Central Asia, the Balkans, and former Soviet Republics. They were blessed
by the support and protection of various political authorities both within Turkey
and internationally. They received serious support from foreign powers and
groups, especially from the US and England.
As far as I can observe the particular path that the Glen community took,
which brought them to their current despicable condition, started after the
September 12 (1980) coup in Turkey; this was particularly in uenced by the
strategic alliances and moves of the late Cold War and post-Cold War
period.
Of course, this international support was not given to them as a charitable and
humanitarian act. They were expected to fulfill some roles and functions. As the
Glen community became more and more powerful with this international
support, this led to a toxic confidence and corruption among the members and
leaders of this community. They assumed that their global spread and influence
was due to their own efforts and strategic genius, denying the fact that sources
of that power belonged to others encouragement and promotion. Especially
after 2013, I could make sense of their arrogance, corruption, and their
confidence that they have all the global power they need and thus do not need
to compromise with others and with the Turkish state. This was a serious
departure from their own historical modes of behavior and political sensitivity,
and from common patterns of behavior of other tariqa political strategies. The
Glen community eventually became a giant force that does not respect any
rule of law or legitimacy, believing that all the support they received is because
of their own achievements and thus under their own control. Their ambition
made them more blind. Thus they went out of control and ended up committing
all the horrible crimes of the coup. This is as horrible and grave result for them.
Q: What do you think will happen next

then? As the Glen community
K: I think the destiny of this group in became more and more
Turkey is sealed and they will not have an
powerful with this
important role or future here after what
they did in recent years. At least for the international support, this led
next couple of decades. But, their future to a toxic con dence and
outside of Turkey is not yet
corruption among the
certain. I am worried that they will turn into
an important diasporic community working
members and leaders of this
against the interests of the Turkish state. community.
There are also repercussions
and side effects of this Glen
experience for other religious
communities in Turkey. The
relationship between these
communities and the state
have always been problematic
and difficult. Now, after the
Glen incident, this situation
will be further troubled and 1985, at Dergah Publishing house with Ezel Erverdi and
deformed. For example, we Metin Erksan.
can say that Diyanet
institutions eventually made
peace with Bedizzaman Said Nursi, and even published his works after the
1980s, yet only after many decades of criticizing his ideas and his religious
vision. This was a positive change. But we may expect the Diyanet to return to a
more negative attitude towards non-state sanctioned religious leaders in Turkey.
I think the destiny of this group (Gulenists) in Turkey is sealed and they
will not have an important role or future here after what they did in recent
years. At least for the next couple of decades. But, their future outside of
Turkey is not yet certain.
I have been hoping that the Turkish public will reach a level of maturity when we
can finally discuss serious issues of religious life and tradition, reflect on past
mistakes, and allow for a deliberative and healthy conversation among different
actors. I think this will not be possible in the near future due to what happened
with the Glen community, and we will keep having short sighted conversations.
Q: When you look at Recep Tayyip Erdoans political exploits, how and
from what perspective do you evaluate his representation of Islamism.
K: Erdoan and the JDP strand is one possible continuation and actualization
of the potentials available within Islamism in Turkey in the post September 12,
1980 coup. JDPs links to multiple anticipated possibilities of Turkeys 1980s
Islamism must be seen. This is a version of Islamism that is leading in terms of
integration and has made peace with the system. Erdoan himself expressed
this idea with a metaphor. He described it as, removing the shirt of National
Vision (Milli Gr),[10] and thus abandoning the radical critique of the system
to create a more Islamic utopia. As you may know, I dont think that it was
Erdoan and the JDP who were the first to step away from and abandon the
Islamist project of National Vision that inspired many people during the 1980s. It
was instead Necmettin Erbakan himself and the Welfare Party leadership who
departed from confrontation with the secular establishment, and tried to reform
themselves by making peace with the system.
As you may know, I dont think that it was Erdoan and the JDP who were
the rst to step away from and abandon the Islamist project of National
Vision that inspired many people during the 1980s. It was instead Necmettin
Erbakan himself and the Welfare Party leadership who departed from
confrontation with the secular establishment, and tried to reform
themselves by making peace with the system.
In fact, the entire history of Islamism has been the history of the intertwined
alternation between an opposition strand that challenges the existing secular
order, and an integration/collaboration strand, both of which either move
together or follow each other. Perhaps one of the factors that promotes the
durability and appeal of Islamism is this flexibility and capacity to adapt to
existing political conditions. Certainly the periods of integration into and
collaboration with the system are more problematic intellectually and
philosophically, creating a low profile in terms of ideas and visions in return for
success in the national political system. Because the visibility of actual and
political achievements of JDP are much higher, this intellectual weakness is not
sufficiently recognized. However, both pragmatic political success and
coexisting poor ideas need to be evaluated together, because there is a social
and cultural, even psychological, context and background to it.
Q: Could you give us your views on how, in some studies, certain

movements are being described as post-Islamist, and how, in some
circles, the concept of Islamism is being put forward as a pejorative term?
K: This is nothing new. In the West, since the second half of the nineteenth
century, this strategy was used to condemn pan-Islamism, Islamism, and maybe
even Muslims (mslmanlk), to show them to be dangerous, illegitimate, and
concomitantly to demonize Muslim leaders and administrations as a threat to a
civilized West. Pejorative labels are attributed to Islamism claiming that they are
fanatically interested in imposing sharia, or that they are counter-Republican
reactionary groups, both of which are examples of conceptualization and
description that would reject and condemn Islamism. For the period after the
Cold War, terror and violence would be comfortably used (and is still used) for
some Islamist groups. It has come to a point where politicians, academics, and
journalists almost use the same dehumanizing language about Islamists. Above
all, in periods of crisis, this conceptual alliance against Islamism seems as if it is
gaining strength. There were also occasional moments or periods in which
Islamism was presented in a good light by outside observers, building a
reputation and receiving support, explicitly and implicitly, from foreigners and
from different imperial and national regimes. Civil Islam, cultural Islam, and
moderate Islam are terms that are being used to give Islamism a good name.
All of these naming strategies need to be evaluated in their political contexts,
taking into account their backgrounds and the processes that created them.
Recently, there has been a debate in Turkey under the slogan-like title
Islamism is dead, precisely because JDPs achievements integrated
former Islamist-oriented citizens into supporters and beneficiaries of the
Turkish state. Those who started this debate threw it out there in order to
oppose the JDP policies. What they did was an overt display of reductionism
and political provocation. There was nothing analytical and scholarly behind it; it
was empty and unpersuasive. Those who embraced this slogan that Islamism
is dead could not recognize the fact that, at no point in Islamisms history could
the visionary content of Islamism be limited by its political successes or defeats.
This critique, of course, led to self-reflection and critique of JDP and other
Islamist groups, and it was effective in producing a kind of pessimism and
intellectual dead-end. Yet, these outcomes cannot eliminate Islamism, because
all of the problems and issues that produced and maintained the conditions for
the emergence of Islamism, especially those of colonialism, occupation, and
Orientalism, still exist and continue to shatter the lives of many Muslims. In
short, I think propagating pejorative and demonizing language around Islamism
aims to justify repression of Islamism and attempts to intellectually distort it or
push for its absorption into the system with the hope that under this intellectual
pressure, Islamism will weaken and become deformed.
Q: Do you think that Islamism has the potential to provide a meaningful

political alternative in multicultural, multi-religious places, especially
where Islam is a minority religion?
K: Look, until very recently in a large swath of the Ottoman Turkish and Islamic
world, many non-Muslim populations lived together alongside different religious
groups or alongside those from different traditions and of different dispositions;
this has already been actualized.
Until very recently, members of

other religions and non-Muslims
could direct their lives according to
their own particular laws, which has
approximately been the experience
of those in different parts of the
Islamic world. This has been the
case in history for a long time and in
1994, from an interview Kara gave to journalist Rusen Cakir different places, including the period
for Pazar Postasi. in which the politics of pan-Islamism
(ttihad- slm politikalar) were
being implemented. While these
things were taking place in Muslim societies, those who did not belong to
dominant religious traditions in the Christian West were marginalized, placed in
prisons, pushed into ghettos, and destroyed. Today, these structure and forms
of intercommunal relation, which were established by Islam and Islamic culture,
does not really exist in large measure due to the removal of significant Islamic
forms of governance including the Ottoman State, but Islam certainly has an
advantage in its ability to protect the rights of minorities because of this
historical experience. Dont forget that important strands of Islamist thought
were intensely preoccupied with how to totally equalize relations between non-
Muslim citizens and Muslims under new conditions.
Equality as well as the politics and ideas of

equality in modern Muslim thought are Dont forget that important
strands of Islamist thought
essentially comprised of this
preoccupation with the rights of others. It
could be said that this orientation toward were intensely preoccupied
creating norms of equality meant opening

with how to totally equalize
Islamist thought to all of humanity and the
world. In fact, under the culture-civilization relations between non-Muslim
distinction that became popular for
citizens and Muslims under
Islamists, there has been an ongoing
search for new legitimate lines of new conditions.
communication based on mutual respect
and equality between separate intellectual worlds and civilizations. Even the
highly problematic modernist idea of the universality of Islam is partly about
rethinking conditions of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
modern age.
The situation is a little bit different in places where Muslims are a minority. With
regards to Islam in these places, those who are effective in proselytizing or
creating respect for Islam are Muslim individuals and groups who live in modest
conditions and, to some extent, are
from structures of Sufi orders (tarikat) and

other congregations (cemaat) who arent
openly advertising themselves and not the
activist Islamists who maintain high levels
of visibility. I once heard an anecdote
about an elderly [Turkish] woman in a
German town who didnt know a word of
German, but had received the admiration
of the whole neighborhood by offering
them kuru fusulye (a white bean dish).
Islam embodied in a way of life and a
prophetic style In a world where visibility,
such as a fist in the air and a loud voice, Din ile Modernleme Arasnda ada
often prevail over modest behavior, I can Trk Dncesinin Meseleleri [Problems in
say that I value [that womans style] and Modern Turkish Thought between Religion
find it to be very important. In Europe, and Modernization (2003)]
behind efforts to equate Islam and
Muslims with violence and terror, I actually
think that the opposite is the case; the majority of Muslims live their lives in
modesty, peace, and dignity. It seems like the contemporary media has no
interest in showing this exceptionally peaceful picture of the majority of Muslim
minorities in the West.
Moreover, we need to separate out the situation and psychological state in

regions where Muslims have lived as minorities for a long time (like China) from
more recent experiences of Muslim minorities in Europe or in America
composed of colonial and postcolonial-era immigrants. Both are minorities, but I
think that between the two there are many differences.
Q: Does Islamist thought have anything on the agenda outside of Islam

and Muslims? For instance, what does it have to say about global
problems involving humanity, such as global warming, pollution of the
environment, sustainable urban planning, child workers, womens rights,
etc.? Similarly, to what degree is it related to or in conversation with social
activism and with intellectual, academic, and cultural circles outside of
Muslim ones?
K: It is undeniable that Islamists are concerned with issues like that. It can only
be discussed if it is adequate and balanced. What makes this question plausible
and a necessary inquiry is that Islamism is the product of an essentially
defensive mechanism. This defense causes it to close up and turn inward. In a
situation like this, opening up means more of a fragmentation and gives

indications of weakness. While this is the situation, it is unthinkable that, when it
comes to Islam, one can see it as indifferent to humanity and totally broken off
from peoples problems. This is because the idea of success, victory, or
salvation, whether in this world or in the next, by necessity invites one to save
and serve. There is no such thing as salvation by oneself. What needs to be
saved is generally the one across from you, the enemy, or the problems faced
by other people. In this context, proselytization, guidance, and the call to take
the right path confronts us as a strong impulse. The direction of Islamism, which
extends from individual humans to humanity to modern human problems,
ferments here.
Q: Lets continue on this topic: How

Islamism is the product of authentic and original are Islamist
an essentially defensive
thoughts criticisms of and reactions
to global problems like imperialism,
mechanism. This defense income inequality, poverty, etc.?
causes it to close up and turn K: The question of originality is relative

inward. and open for debate between you and
me, Im not one for narratives of
originality or authenticity. It comes across to me as a language and vehicle of
domination, whether it is coming from inside or outside it makes no difference.
But we must not forget that almost all of the Islamist movements have continued
to be, at the same time, movements fighting injustice as well as movements of
solidarity with and protection for the oppressed. This attention to injustice and
inequality in the rest of the world increased precisely in periods when Muslim
societies own needs and impossibilities seem to be increasing. To see this, I
think it is enough to look at elements of pan-Islamist thought and politics.
But in order to comprehend this in another way, we need to look at the big
picture as well. Its like this: the modern world and modernity, which claims to be
secular and distant from all religions, carries the Eurocentric stamp of Judaism
and Christianity on it. For this reason and for others, modernity and modern
World order contains within itself an antagonism towards Islam. Islam and
Muslims have been the victims and opponents of this world order and global
modernity. I do not think the situation is much different today. If Muslims are
alienated and distant from the problems caused by the very nature of global
modernity and the modern world order, then all of this needs to be understood
in connection with this historical background of exclusion and alienation. You
mentioned imperialism, injustice, and poverty as our shared global problems.
Islamists and other Muslims are victims of these destructive and negative
forces, and even when they are focused on their own issues, they are, of
course, dealing with global problems that are faced by others.
Q: How come Islamist thought is so politics-centric? Has it always been

this way?
K: It is only partially true that Islamist thought is politics-centric, partially this is

manipulative labeling by others, and partially a stigmatization. The part that is
true is: the idea of Islamism started to emerge at a time when the Islamic world
was politically weak, defeated, and overwhelmed, and it continued like that.
According to [the Islamists] interpretation, the reason for this negative situation
of decline did not originate in religion and in Islam. It was a result of
misunderstanding Islam, the inadequate practice of Islam in daily life, and the
incomplete implementation of Islam. At the same time there was a strong notion
that the survival and empowerment of the Muslim state (whether empires or
nation-states) was necessary to defend the rights of Muslims, and it depended
on a true understanding of religion. This idea of the Muslim states preservation

from the hostile assaults of the Christian, imperialist Western powers (or their
domestic collaborators) necessitated the search for a new strength, power, and
potential in politics and foregrounded this as normal for the political arena. This
encouraged highlighting practical and pragmatic elements. Philosophical and
theoretical approaches, deep intellectual pursuits, and big picture interpretations
of religious traditions were all left aside or given secondary priority. Islamism
was a quest for immediate solutions.
What we call New Sala sm incorporates all areas related to religion, from
faith to ethics and from worship to law; these ideas and beliefs largely
overlap with Islamism. If you look at it this way, politics stays in the
background.
These things are true, but its not

everything that happened. Islamism
is a new kind of interpretation of
Islam and Muslim history that
wanted to encompass all spheres
of, or the entirety of modern Islamic
thought. What we call New
Salafism incorporates all areas
2006, Istanbul.
related to religion, from faith to
ethics and from worship to law;
these ideas and beliefs largely
overlap with Islamism. If you look at it this way, politics stays in the background.
It is understandable why national and international centers may only read
Islamism from the perspective of the political and thus see them as a threat at
their door. This is nothing new and will most likely continue. The concept of
political Islam was created, fabricated, and fictionalized for this purpose. Yet, if
scholarly and intellectual analysts persist in reading Islamism from the
perspective of politics alone, overlooking its other cultural, religious, and social
dimensions, they can only produce manipulative analysis with a particular
political agenda and not a genuine attempt at understanding.
Q: How competent is Islamist thought vis--vis the traditions of thinking it

has placed itself in opposition to? How informed is Islamist thought when
you think about it in the context of general categories like the West,
Europe, Orientalism, the Enlightenment, Christianity, Zionism, and the
world system?
K: It seems youve kept the difficult questions for last; whereas journalists save
the interesting and surprising questions for the end and even take their
headlines from there. You have all but returned to the beginning. Anyways!
This is a valid and suitable question. It is absolutely the case that Islamists have
long been trying to understand and be familiar with these new concepts and
movements. They talk and write about these topics, and try to make their
perspectives dominant so as to challenge Western perspectives. As you know,
there are many texts written and many talks given on these subjects. More
attention needs to be given to it in terms of creating a discursive tradition and in
gaining legitimacy in the hearts and minds of Muslim populations while keeping
their consciousness and sensibilities alive about injustices in the modern world.
In terms of the functionality of these Islamist discourses and their effect on their
enemies and global problems, they are, no doubt, very successful. But if we
come to the question of interpreting, knowing, and encompassing these

concepts and intellectual traditions (such as the West, Orientalism,
Enlightenment, nationalism, etc.) with competence and rigor, I have doubt about
its quality and success. I think it is beyond dispute that there is a huge gap
between the Islamists current level of intellectual competency and the level
where they should be when Islamists talk about these rival ideologies and
movements. This gap existed in the past and it continues to be a problem still
today.
Of course, there are exceptional Islamist

intellectuals who did offer brilliant analysis I think it is beyond dispute
that there is a huge gap
of the West or the Enlightenment. What
comes to my mind in terms of
incompetency and low intellectual level between the Islamists current
now, for example, is interest-free banking;
level of intellectual
if you look at the literature on this, you can
see how the issue has been addressed on competency and the level
an instrumental and passive level as a
where they should be when
technical matter limited to Islamic
jurisprudence (fkh). You can also see that Islamists talk about these
it has been discussed as a consequence rival ideologies and
of a lack of depth and systematic thought
about global capitalism, financial systems, movements.
and historic changes in the nature
of money, trade, commerce, and
consumption. But Islamist
discourses on interest-free banking
expressed the search for a quick
solution; we can sympathize with
this desire for practical and
immediate solutions. Islamist
2012, Babil Sahaf in Istanbul.
writings on the issues of science,
technology and enlightenment have
similar superficiality born out of the
necessity to find ready answers and the desire to talk back to Western
Orientalism. Islamist discourses on Zionism, above all, are highly insufficient in
terms of theoretical and analytical grasp in terms of what they need to know
about it! There could be an independent study, or even a thesis topic, on why
Islamists all over the world, including in Turkey, talked so much about Zionism
without engaging a comprehensive analysis and deeper study of it.
Islamist writings on the issues of science, technology and enlightenment

have similar super ciality born out of the necessity to nd ready answers
and the desire to talk back to Western Orientalism. Islamist discourses on
Zionism, above all, are highly insu cient in terms of theoretical and
analytical grasp in terms of what they need to know about it!
Q: To what degree does Islamist thought reflect the ideological and

cultural diversity of Muslim societies both in Turkey and in the world?
K: My answer somewhat depends on how you draw the framework of Islamism.

The answers you give when you equate Islamism with either radical or
intellectualist Islamism, or when you confine it to a narrow framework, will likely
be different from the answers you would give when you add structures and
popular practices of Sufi orders and congregations, mosques, Friday

gatherings, minarets in Turkey, and tomb visitations to the discussion. I think
that generally the
capacity of Islamism to reflect the diversity of

Muslim societies is high. At minimum, one can say
this: the idea or movement that has the highest
capacity for representing diversity in their
societies, in the broadest yes, broadest sense,
in Turkey and in the Islamic world is Islamism. I
dont know whether you will see that as
problematic with what we talked about already, but
if you ask me, even an attempt at creating Islamic
democracy, Islamic secularism, Islamic liberalism,
Quranic Islam, Islamic socialism, or Islamic
humanism reflects and adds to diversity. All of
eyhefendinin Ryasndaki Trkiye these different versions of modern interpretations
[Turkey in the Dream of the Shaikh of Islam sustain and keep Islamism alive. This
(essays, 1998)] must be seen. Of course, at the same time,
diverse, divergent, and even competing
ideological inclinations of these movements
weaken Islamism. One of the subjects that I work on, as you know, are the
serious problems that these modern tendencies such as democracy, socialism,
etc., produce for Muslim faith and intellectual traditions. But to do justice to your
question, we can try to keep my reservations about these new ideological
interpretations and their challenges to Muslim tradition on a separate side for
now. I had said this somewhere in our conversation in the modern Islamic
world and in Turkey there is an Islamist program present even in Westernist
(batclk), nationalist, and socialist movements. For example, there is Ziya
Gkalps book titled Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization (Trklemek
slmlamak Muasrlamak), where he evaluated the nationalist-Turkist-Turanist
line. Today, we remember Ziya Gkalp as a secular nationalist and pro-Western
intellectual but why did he write about Islamization? The author who wrote the
most voluminous work on the subject of pan-Islamism (ttihad- slm) and
evaluated it, Celal Nuri Ileri, was a leading intellectual of the Westernist and
secularist current. Another question: Is the Turkish National Anthem, which was
penned by Mehmet Akif [Ersoy] in the spring of 1921 that is in the early
Republican period a religious text or a nationalist one? Who or which strand of
thought would be content with that piece of poetry that turned into the secular
Turkish nations national anthem? In the national parliament in Ankara during
the Independence War, those deputies who accepted Mehmet Akifs poem as
the national anthem and who were in agreement about its content and
symbolism were members of different ideologies, but they all agreed to pick this
very Islamist looking poem as the national anthem; these people were even
activists on behalf of these different ideas from the ulema, the sheikhs, the
Islamists, the Westernists, the socialists, and some from the small group of
military staff around Atatrk that founded the Republic.
I think that generally the

And yet, once again in regards to your capacity of Islamism to re ect
questions, we are left in an ambiguous and
vague place. I think the origin of this the diversity of Muslim
ambiguity is that Islamism and Islam societies is high. At minimum,
(Mslmanlk) are formations irreducible to
each other. Here we can talk about the
one can say this: the idea or
problem of inadequate representation. But movement that has the
it must not be forgotten that the strong

highest capacity for
relationship between Islamism and Islam
has sustained and kept both alive. representing diversity in their
Maydan: Professor Kara, thank you very societies, in the broadest
much for answering our questions. We yes, broadest sense, in
hope to continue this conversation in the
coming months. Turkey and in the Islamic
world is Islamism.
Biography:
smail Kara was born in Gneyce/Rize, Turkey in 1955. After completing

primary school, he studied and memorized the Quran with his father, who
was known locally as Kutuz Hoca. In 1973, he completed his studies at
Istanbul Imam Hatip school and (after completing additional coursework)
in Rize High School. He graduated from the Istanbul High Islamic Institute
(stanbul Yksek slm Enstits) in 1977 and from the Department of
History at Istanbul Universitys Literature Faculty in 1986. After receiving
his education at the Istanbul High Islamic Institute, he began working at
Dergh Publishing, where he was editor and publishing director. He also
served on the board for various publications such as the journal Fikir ve
Sanatta Hareket [Action in Art and Thought], Trk Dili ve Edebiyat
Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of Turkish Language and Literature], slam
Bilgiler Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of Islamic Knowledge], and the
journal Dergh [Sufi Lodge]. Between the years 1980-1995, Kara worked
as an instructor in religion at the French Sainte Pulcherie All-Girls school.
In 1987, he completed his MA in Political Science at Istanbul Universitys
Social Sciences Institute. He wrote his doctoral dissertation The
Constitutional Administration According to Islamists (1908-1914)
[slmclara Gre Merutiyet daresi (1908-1914)] in the same program in
1993. He was given a position as Instructor in the Faculty of Theology at
Marmara University in 1995. He was promoted to Associate Professor in
the History of Turkish-Islamic Thought in 2000 and then to Professor of
Islamic Philosophy in 2006. He retired from the Faculty of Theology at
Marmara University in 2015. His research areas include modern Turkish
and Islamic thought. His research on Ottoman-Turkish intellectual history,
the relations between religion and modernization, and religion and politics
have been published in various journals such as Hareket, Dergh, Tarih ve
Toplum, Toplum ve Bilim, slam Aratrmalar Dergisi, Marmara
niversitesi lahiyat Fakltesi Dergisi, Kutadgubilig, slamiyat, Toplumsal
Tarih, Trklk Aratrmalar Dergisi, Diyanet lm Dergi, and Derin Tarih.
Selected Works:
Trkiyede slmclk Dncesi-Metinler/Kiiler [Islamist Thought in Turkey:

Texts/People, (3 volumes, 1986, 1987, 1994)], slmclarn Siyasi Grleri
[Political Opinions of Islamists, 1994], eyhefendinin Ryasndaki Trkiye
[Turkey in the Dream of the Shaikh (essays, 1998)], Amel Defteri [the Book of
Deeds (essays, 1998)], Biraz Yakn Tarih Biraz Uzak Hurafe [ Recent History,
Distant Superstition (essays, 1998)], Kutuz Hocann Hatralar-Cumhuriyet
Devrinde Bir Ky Hocas [Memories of Kutuz Hoca: A Village Teacher in the
Republican-era (2000)], Bir Felsefe Dili Kurmak-Modern Felsefe ve Bilim
Terimlerinin Trkiyeye Girii [To Establish a Philosophical Language:
Introduction of Modern Philosophical and Scientific Terminology into Turkey
(2001)], Gneyce-Rize Szl-Bir Dou Karadeniz Kynn Hafzas ve
Ntkas [The Gneyce-Rize Dictionary: Memory and Speech of an Eastern
Black Sea Town (2001)], slm Siyas Dncesinde Deime ve Sreklilik-

Hilafet Risleleri [Continuity and Change in Islamic Political Thought: The
Caliphate Letters (6 volumes 2002-2014, 2 volumes forthcoming)], Din ile
Modernleme Arasnda ada Trk Dncesinin Meseleleri [Problems in
Modern Turkish Thought between Religion and Modernization (2003)], Sz
Dilde Hayali Gzde [The Word is on the Tongue, Imagination is in the Eye
(portraits, 2005)], Ara
makla Bulunmaz [It Cant Be Found

By Searching (essays, 2006)],
Hanya/Girit Mevlevihanesi eyh
Ailesi Mtemilat Vakfiyesi
Mbadelesi [The Mevlevihane of
Hanya/Crete: The Family of the
Shaikh Waqf Annex Exchange
(2006)], Cumhuriyet Trkiyesinde
Mslman Kalarak Avrupal Olmak-ada Trk
Bir Mesele Olarak slm [The
Dncesinde Din Siyaset Tarih Medeniyet [Being European,
Problem of Islam in Republican
Remaining Muslim: Religion, Politics, History, and Civilization
Turkey (2 volumes: 2008, 2016)],
in Modern Turkish Thought (2017)].
lim Bilmez Tarih Hatrlamaz-erh
ve Haiye Meselesine Dair Birka
Not [Ignorant of Knowledge,
Forgetful of History: Some Notes on the Problem of Islamic Commentaries
(2011)], Nurettin Topu-Hayat ve Bibliyografyas [Nurettin Topu: His Life and
Bibliography (2013)], Mslman stanbula Mahsus Bir Gelenek: Mahya [A
Tradition Specific to Muslim Istanbul: Messages on Minarets (2016)], Mslman
Kalarak Avrupal Olmak-ada Trk Dncesinde Din Siyaset Tarih
Medeniyet [Being European, Remaining Muslim: Religion, Politics, History, and
Civilization in Modern Turkish Thought (2017)]. In addition to these, Dr. Kara
has prepared and edited many other works.
[1] [Translators note:] Kara uses both a French cognate laiklik which I
translate as secularism as a gloss on lacit, and an English cognate
seklerlik a less common form that I translate as secularity: laiklie ve
seklerlie alan bir damar var. There is not a hard distinction between the
two in Turkish, with laiklik connoting both state secularism as well as secularity.
However, the word sekularizm exists in Turkish as a cognate as well, which
forces the reader to consider the possible differences between the uses of
seklerizm and seklerlik, yet the possibility stands that Kara is using both
interchangeably.
[2] diyar- kfr and darl-harp (literally, land of the unbelief and abode of
war) are Islamic legal categories that refer to those lands, territories, or peoples
that are not under control of Muslim rulers and thus are considered licit objects
of warfare, treaties, and other forms of legal relations.
[3] For more on the issue of Turanism and Pan-Turkism, see Landau, Jacob.
Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1995; Atabaki, Touraj. Pan-Turanism in Encyclopedia of Islam and the
Muslim World, ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference
USA, 2004. pp. 521-522; Kayal, Hasan. Pan-Turkism in Encyclopedia of the
Modern Middle East and North Africa, ed. Philip Mattar. Vol. 3. 2nd ed. New
York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. pp. 1800-1801. See also Yusuf Akura
(1876-1935), Tarz-i Siyaset, published in 1904. For an English translation,
see: David S. Thomas http://vlib.iue.it/carrie/texts/carrie_books/paksoy-
2/cam9.html
[4] The Mountain of God, or Tanr Da, is a peak in a mountain range in Central
Asia and China, which supposedly played a significant role in pre-Islamic Turkic
mythology. The cave in Mount Hira is where the Prophet Muhammad was
reported to have received the first revelations from the angel Gabriel.
[5] During the 1970s, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) led by
Necmettin Erbakan argued that his party would merge a return to Islam with a
radical overhaul of Turkish economy by building hundreds of heavy industry
facilities such as steel production. The slogan of harmonizing mosque and
minarets with heavy industry factory chimneys became popularized during this
period.
[6] Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) was a leader of multiple Turkish Islamist

parties and the the first politician within this tradition to hold high office. He is
credited with bringing Turkeys peripheral Muslims to the center of political,
business, and social circles. MSP was the first party to be founded which gave
birth (often as a result of political arm-twisting) to multiple off-shoots. JDP is
seen as the most recent off-shoot of this tradition, formed as a result of
disagreements with Erbakans political choices and style of leadership. For
more information, see: Hale, William. Erbakan, Necmettin, in Encyclopaedia of
Islam, Three, Edited by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krmer, Denis Matringe, John
Nawas, Everett Rowson. Brill Reference Online, 2016; Glalp, Haldun. Political
Islam in Turkey: the rise and fall of the Refah Party, The Muslim World vol. 89,
no. 1 (1999), pp. 2241.
[7] Established in 1953, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) is a transnational, pan-

Islamic organization that is best known for advocating and propagating the
establishment of a caliphate. While the group is banned in multiple countries, it
is a non-violent group. For more information, see: Hanif, Noman. Hizb ut Tahrir:
Islams Ideological Vanguard, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 39,
no. 2, (2012), pp. 201-225; Pankhurst, Reza. Hizb ut-Tahrir : The Untold History
of the Liberation Party. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2016;
Mandaville, Peter. Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma.
London: Routledge, 2002.
[8] Safranbolu is a city in the Black Sea region of Turkey known for its old
Ottoman structures. It has been an UNESCO World Heritage site since 1994.
[9] Berat is a city in Albania and an UNESCO World Heritage protected site.
[10] Milli Gr (National Vision) was a religious and political movement started
by Necmettin Erbakan, which sought to unite Islamist parties in Turkey as well
as globally. The movements title comes from a 1969 publication of the same
name. Turkish: Milli Gr gmleini karmak, or to take off the cover of
National Vision, as one does a jacket or shirt, means to dispense with the
formers goals and method of bringing religion and politics together.
TAGS
GULEN MOVEMENT, ISLAM IN TURKEY, ISMAIL KARA, JDP, PROFILES, TURKEY, TURKISH ISLAMISM
MAYDAN
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SEE ALL PROFILES

Trkiyede slam ve slamclk: smail

academically. I had wanted to work on the subject of kalam.

Upon completing my advanced

rural area. My father was the

mosque of a village; he was I taught classes on religion at a French

I am a product of an Imam university later in life. I had produced my

toral dissertation was in the

the state of academic research on modern Islamic thought in Turkey is

My first big work was the anthology Trkiyede

Q: What was the reaction to/reception of this approach? Was it

K: There are a few important

at the Turkish translation of a book

most important and

modern Islamic thought as by Turkish intellectuals. How can we

In fact, this attempt to shift the center away

It is partly surprising that Turkish intellectuals, the Turkish political elite

It is partly surprising that Turkish intellectuals, the Turkish political elite

Secondly, positive views of

indicate an incentive for Life and Bibliography (2013)]

Scholarly Interventions I: Modern Islamic Thought

K: I can say that these partial

K: From my perspective, modern Islamic thought, is, on one hand, a

Modern Islamic thinkers distinctions between real Islam versus historical

But this is not the whole story; I think

distinctions between real

philosophical profundity both sources and evidence of this assertion

content. The idea of a return and us to a literal reading (literal/lafzc)

and to original sources is an of religion. To put this in terms favorable

There is a whole set of problems in the modernists attempt to seriously

By taking into account the last two to three

Q: In your newly published The Problem of Islam in Republican Turkey

beginning, you have stated that modernist Islamist thought has

K: There is a vein of modern Islamic thought, Islamism, and the discourse of

The transcendental aim of Islamic reform

The establishment and maintenance of Islamist thought and Islamist

Q: The experience of Modern Islamic

recognize the very close

intellectualist Islamist We have talked about the reasons for

parlance since the Second possible roadmap for what is missing

For example, there are Turkish research

Turks in Turkey have no histories outside of Islam and Muslims in Anatolia.

In those days actions taken by Turkish

Greece) showed the role of interest both in Istanbul and in rural

Islam in the secular Turkish Kemalist officers who had participated

In Turkey there is no other source of

Q: If we look at the debates on the concept of jihad, we see that it is of

es, and infidel rule. But when

even raise its voice, or when

jihad is then interpreted as a Ulucam.

struggle against ones ego and

There were sporadic and occasional

the Islamist groups, tariqas,

supported ANAP (Anavatan accommodationist and participatory for

Party) as the governing party about seeing someone advocate

they were trying to integrate

Scholarly Interventions II: Islamism and Its Paradoxes

Q: You are working on modern Islamic thought generally and Islamist

K: In my opinion, Islamism emerged out of questions and subsequent answers

The second place was modern Western