CONDITION ASSESSMENT - RIVER WATER SYSTEMS

George J. Licina
Structural Integrity Associates
3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24
San Jose, CA 95118

James J. Drasler
Nebraska Public Power District
Cooper Nuclear Station
1200 Prospect Road
Brownville, NE 68321
 CONDITION ASSESSMENT - RIVER WATER SYSTEMS

George J. Licina
Structural Integrity Associates
3315 Almaden Expressway, Suite 24
San Jose, CA 95118

James J. Drasler
Nebraska Public Power District
Cooper Nuclear Station
1200 Prospect Road
Brownville, NE 68321

Abstract

Nebraska Public Power Districts Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), a single unit, 800
MWe General Electric Boiling Water Reactor that began commercial operation in 1974 ,
uses untreated Missouri River water for both circulating water and service water
systems (SWS). The water is high in silt and the systems that are cooled by the river
experience a broad spectrum of flow conditions that range from continuous flow, to
seasonal intermittent flow, to long periods of stagnation; essentially long term wet lay-
up.

The plant has experienced a few small leaks and thinning of carbon steel lines as well
as minor fouling of heat exchangers from a combination of silt and biofilm. In high
flow regions, the high concentrations of the fine silt from the river have caused solid
particle erosion in the SWS. In low flow areas, the heavy silt loading has produced
significant deposition and apparent microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC)
beneath the deposits.

As a proactive approach to these types of degradation, the plant commissioned a study

of the degradation of all river water systems. The primary objective was to define
appropriate actions to assure that the system will economically achieve its 40 year
design life and be in a position to achieve a 10 or 20 year life extension. Results of the
study, including detailed analysis of several degraded components, are summarized.
Introduction

The nuclear power industry has learned that the service water system is a critical part
of the infrastructure of the plant, safety related or not. While the service water system
does not provide cooling to the core directly, the SWS supports the cooling or
lubrication of virtually all of the equipment that is critical to normal operation and
safety. Service water system failures present a small but finite risk of core damage.

Downtime for large nuclear plants costs of the order of $250,000 to $1,000,000 per day
depending upon the plants size and location. During the 1980s, O&M costs for nuclear
plants increased significantly, due, at least in part, to continuing problems with corrosion in
all systems of the plants, including the service water system. Those costs include treatments
(including the costs of the treatment chemicals, delivery systems, and storage and discharge
permits; alternative protection systems such as cathodic protection), maintenance (planned
and unplanned), inspections, repairs, and replacements. Several plants have undertaken
partial or complete replacements of their service water systems. Service water system
replacements are extremely expensive, approximately $30,000,000 per unit, not including
the cost of downtime. Typically, the cost of the material used in the replacement system is a
minor factor.

Background

Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) is a single unit General Electric Boiling Water Reactor rated
at 800 MWe. The plant began commercial operation in 1974. Cooling water for both
circulating water and service water systems comes from the Missouri River. The chemistry
of that water ranges from slightly scale forming to slightly scale dissolving and, on average,
is approximately neutral in terms of calcium carbonate scaling potential. Silt loadings are
high.

The plants service water system (SWS) and circulating water systems are both once-
through designs that take suction from the Missouri River. The service water system
provides cooling water for Reactor Equipment Cooling, Turbine Equipment Cooling,
Diesel Generators, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and various other systems in the
plant. The circulating water system provides cooling water to the main condenser and
flows whenever the plant is on line.

The carbon steel service water system piping and the SWS heat exchangers experience a
full spectrum of flow conditions including continuous flow, intermittent flow, and long
periods of stagnation; essentially long term wet lay-up. The requirement for diverse
and redundant cooling streams in nuclear plants places many parts of the service water
system in a situation where their most common operating condition is a periodic flow
or functionality test. Further, piping and heat exchangers for many systems are sized
based upon cooling requirements for an accident condition with the most unfavorable
cooling water temperature conditions. As a result, the piping and heat exchangers are
over-sized, often grossly over-sized, for normal operation and typical flows are very
slow.

Cooper has experienced some small leaks and operational difficulties in river water
systems. In high flow regions, the high concentrations of the fine silt from the Missouri
River have caused solid particle erosion in the SWS. In low flow areas, the heavy silt
loading has produced significant deposition and apparent MIC beneath the deposits.
In addition, fouling and equipment binding have also been experienced as a result of
the silt accumulation. The plants perception is that the number of such problems in
these river water systems is increasing.

Objectives

The objectives of the project were to:

evaluate the long term integrity of piping that is exposed to Missouri River
water, both for the nominal 40 year design life of the plant and for life
extension to 2034

assess all integrity and operational concerns associated with silt, erosion, and
corrosion,

review the history and evaluate the present condition of the system

review current industry experience and technologies

define additional information that may be required to adequately characterize

system condition and identify methods for collecting the required additional
information, and

define candidate solutions to the problems, taking into account technical,

economic and other considerations.

Industry Experience

Corrosion and deposition in cooling water systems became a major concern to utilities
during the 1980's. Concerns with microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) have
prompted a Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin [1],
an Information Notice [2], and an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Significant
Event Report [3]. Generic Letter 89-13 from the NRC [4] outlines requirements for
monitoring service water system performance, including the influences of corrosion. A
number of plants have experienced severe general corrosion, pitting, underdeposit
corrosion beneath corrosion products and sediment, and MIC in a wide variety of
systems; some of them related to the safe shutdown of nuclear plants. The life of many
components has been significantly degraded in raw waters and improperly treated
waters in very short times.

Cooling water systems in many of these plants have been designed with minimal
corrosion allowances; a reasonable approach for the materials used, exposed to what
would normally be expected to be relatively benign environments. However,
penetration of the metal due to localized attack, proceeding at a rate one or more orders
of magnitude greater than the general corrosion rate, has been observed in copper base
alloys, carbon steels and stainless steels.

The nuclear power industry has learned that the service water system is a critical part
of the plant infrastructure - safety related or not, irrespective of the code of
construction. While the service water system does not provide cooling to the core
directly, the SWS supports the cooling or lubrication of virtually all of the equipment
that is critical to normal operation and safety. Reference 5 explored the potential
impact of SWS failures on core damage generically by examining a number of cases
considered in the Probabilistic Risk Assessments for several plants. That report
concluded that the probability of core damage due to service water system failures was
of the order of 10-5 to 10-6.

Cooper Experience

General

A brief review of service water system failures showed:

There has been a limited number of leaks in the service water system.

Microbiological characterizations, performed for water and deposit samples,

have shown that viable and diverse microbial populations exist in the river
water and well water systems and indicate that systems wetted by such
environments could be susceptible to MIC.

Some failure analyses have concluded that MIC is operative in locations such as
the RHRSW piping, Diesel-Generator piping, and radiation monitor return line.

Those diagnoses of MIC appear to be reasonable, however, the evidence for MIC
was not overwhelming. Further, those reports did not discuss the evaluation (or
elimination) of other mechanisms that may have produced the observed attack.
The presence of microbes does not, however, imply that MIC has occurred or
will occur in those systems.
 Sulfate reducing bacteria (SRB) do not seem to be a problem.

The precise flow conditions and flow history that are most closely associated
with plant failures is not obvious.

All of the service water system headers seem to be free of silt or corrosion
problems, in contrast to the smaller, more accessible, and more thoroughly
inspected lines.

Siltation and Corrosion- Examples

The following section provides a sampling of failure reports and examinations.

A 1993 failure in a 3" Service Water Radiation Monitor Sample Return line (fairly
constant low flow at 2-3 gpm), revealed scale and corrosion products, and surfaces that
were randomly covered with large tubercles, to 2" diameter. The tubercles had hard
shells with red and black corrosion products and debris. Preliminary lab analysis
indicated the presence of sulfides. Pitting, generally less than 0.050 inches deep, was
observed directly beneath some tubercles. The radiation monitor sample return piping
was subsequently replaced with SCH80 stainless steel.

A drain line from the 18" service water system header revealed that the pipe was
partially occluded with sand and contained very small tubercles but no pitting of
significant depth.

The suction piping to a SW Booster Pump was also found to be approximately 75%
blocked with silt; the discharge piping about 50%.

A 1 " horizontal dead leg exhibited broad, shallow corrosion, and a few large
tubercles.

The 1" vent and drain lines that were examined showed essentially no corrosion and a
few small tubercles.

In July 1993, a leaking weld in a 6" SW booster pump minimum flow recirculation line
was discovered. The failure occurred where the 6" line joins the 18" SW REC heat
exchanger return line (weld-o-let to pipe joint with a backing ring).

A 6" tee in SWS piping, part of the D-G supply, has experienced failures, apparently
due to through-wall corrosion, several times during a five year period (1981 and 1990
in #1 line; 1982 in #2). Analyses of one of these failures concluded that MIC was the
root cause. There are dramatic differences in the appearance of each of the branches of
the tee (Figure 1). A detailed failure analysis of such a tee is presented later.
The valves at the RHR heat exchanger discharge (18"-SW-MOV-89A and 89B)
experienced erosion of the valve bodies, apparently from solid particle erosion, early in
plant life. Those valves provide throttling of the service water so that the service water
pressure is higher than that of the RHR. Modifications to the valves and trim were
made to alleviate the damage to the pressure boundary material. Currently, the trim in
those same valves is subject to erosion damage, however, the valve bodies are no longer
degraded. A detailed description of investigations of those valves appears in this same
conference [6].

In contrast, the circulating water system piping has been essentially free from silt
deposition. Examinations of piping and condenser tubes only reveals a very thin, non-
adherent deposit during visual inspections.

The fire protection system currently uses water from the water treatment plant. That
water is free from silt, is very low in conductivity, however high levels of iron and at
least some microbes are present. The system no longer receives its water from the river
although it once did. River water continues to serve as the back-up source.

1998 Outage Assessments by Structural Integrity Associates

4"Service Water Line REC Heat Exchanger A Discharge. A short section of the
4" service water line from the discharge of REC Heat Exchanger A was removed
because of excessive thinning (0.108" thick vs. tmin = 0.158"), detected as a part of the
plants expanded Erosion-Corrosion inspection program. The section was examined
visually at the site, and samples were prepared for microbiological and chemical
analysis. Corrosion product samples were also prepared for analysis by X-ray
diffraction (XRD) to determine the nature of the corrosion products and their
crystallographic nature. The remainder of the sample was shipped to SI in San Jose for
a detailed failure analysis.

Visual examination revealed that the ID surfaces were covered with a thick, non-
uniform, red-brown corrosion product. At the location of the sectioning, the corrosion
appeared to be almost completely through-wall at one location (Figure 2) at about the 8
oclock azimuth looking downstream. The UT inspection had also revealed a second
thin spot that corresponded to the location of the largest tubercle on the ID at
essentially the bottom dead center location.

Microbiological and chemical samples were collected from the corrosion product at the
point of the deepest penetration and from the large tubercle. Samples were taken from
the upper (outermost) portion and approximate mid-thickness locations of that
tubercle.
Four corrosion product samples from this piece were sent to Camet Research (Goleta,
CA) for X-ray diffraction analysis. The results of the XRD analysis are shown in Table
1. Iron oxides and hydroxides were the major constituents of the corrosion products for
all samples. Quartz was detected in all samples, probably a residual from silt
deposition. No sulfides or other iron-sulfur compounds were detected. XRD revealed
a minor or trace indication of siderite (iron carbonate) in some samples. This
constituent is fairly typical in waters or soils that contain some carbonate. In general,
the oxides and hydroxides that would be expected for general corrosion of carbon steel
in an aerated environment or localized corrosion under the influence of a differential
aeration cell or lowered pH were observed.

Table 1

X-ray Diffraction Analysis of Corrosion Products from 4" Service Water Line

REC Heat Exchanger A Discharge

Sample FeOOH Fe2O3 FeOOH FeCO3 -SiO2

Description (goethite) (maghemite) (lepidocricite) (siderite) quartz
Deepest Major1 - Major Minor Minor
penetration
Oxide at Major Major Minor - Major
surface, above
deepest
penetration
Large tubercle Major Major - - Minor
surface
Large tubercle Major Major Trace trace Minor
mid-depth

1
Major >35%, minor <35%, trace <10%

The microbiological and chemical analysis revealed the presence of general aerobic and
general anaerobic bacteria (typically 1,000 to 10,000 cells/ml), high numbers of acid
producing bacteria (10,000 to 100,000 cells/ml), and little or no SRB. No filamentous
iron oxidizing bacteria were detected by microscopic examination. At the point of the
deepest penetration, a chloride concentration of 26,000 ppm was detected. In the large
tubercle, only 670 ppm chloride was measured. Typical river water chemistry shows a
seasonal maximum of about 13 ppm chloride. Sulfates were also concentrated at the
point of the deepest penetration (17,000 ppm vs. 1,800 ppm in the tubercle vs. a
maximum of about 20 ppm in the water).
Following photographic documentation of the pipe section, the pipe was split axially
along a line at about the 1 oclock and 7 oclock positions.

An initial bead blasting removed a layer about " thick that consisted of silt and soft
corrosion product, revealing a layer of hard, dense, brown to yellow-brown corrosion
product. A thin piece was cut from the axial sections to square up the edges. This cut
also revealed the thinnest area and the thicker corrosion product nearby. Subsequent
bead blasting was done to remove the corrosion product completely and reveal the
condition of the underlying metal. The adherence of the corrosion product made
corrosion product removal by bead blasting alone difficult. The corrosion product was
gouged away using an awl. Bead blasting then successfully removed the remaining
corrosion product.

Most of the material exhibited very little metal loss and a fairly uniform ID profile. The
thinnest spots were found easily. UT thickness measurements done in the laboratory
showed that along most axial lines, that metal loss was minimal. However, the thinnest
spot, including a minor area of localized attack that corresponded to the large tubercle,
were readily detected. The thickness values determined in the laboratory were in good
agreement with those from the plant.

The conclusion reached from this examination is that material is corroding away
generally and to a lesser extent locally under the influence of an oxidizing
environment. Any acidification of the local environment, for example, through the
action of APB, will tend to accelerate the process.

18" Service Water System Line Downstream of REC Heat Exchanger. This
horizontal run of piping was also removed because of excessive localized thinning
identified by the plants Erosion-Corrosion inspection program. The piping was
covered with a high density of large tubercles. None of the pipe was available for
detailed metallurgical analysis by SI because radioactivity levels did not permit the
material to be released from the site. Samples for detailed microbiological and
chemical analysis were collected by plant personnel. The samples were collected at the
bottom and mid-level of a large tubercle that was identified from the photographs
provided by the plant. During sampling, Ken Fike of CNS reported that he observed
tiered pits (pits within pits) with no particularly deep pitting.

Results of chemical and microbiological samples were generally similar to what had
been observed for the 4" service water line at the REC A heat exchanger discharge.
That is, the microbiological population was dominated by acid producing bacteria with
large numbers of general aerobic and anaerobic bacteria present. Minimal counts of
SRB were detected. In general, microbiological counts were about an order of
magnitude higher for the mid-level of the tubercle than at the metal-tubercle interface.
Unlike the 4" line, many filamentous iron/manganese bacteria were detected in the
sample from the mid-level of the tubercle, while none were detected at the base of that
tubercle. About 6,600 ppm of chlorides and 3,300 ppm sulfates were detected at the
tubercles mid-level; 27,500 ppm chloride and 28,500 ppm sulfate were found at the
base of the tubercle. Some sulfide was found for both samples.

Diesel-Generator. Historically, this system has been where much of the degradation
seems to have been. For example, the 6" tee at the inlet to the lube oil coolers for both
diesel-generator units has failed or been replaced because inspection has indicated that
a significant area was at a thickness less than the allowable minimum. A pitting failure
has also been observed in a 2" reducer in this system.

A detailed visual examination was performed on a diesel-generator inlet tee removed

previously. As noted above, the tee in this location, both in Trains 1 and 2, has been
removed numerous times, either due to perforation or thinning detected by the E-C
program. The thinning of the tee has always been in the same spot, on the bottom of
the inlet end. The tee is oriented in a horizontal plane with the inlet end connected to
an isolation valve (an air operated butterfly valve) via a flanged connection. The run
goes to the intercoolers for the same diesel. The branch supplies service water to the
inlet side of the diesel generator lube oil cooler. A 6"-8" concentric reducer, actually an
expander here, is welded to the branch of the tee. When the isolation valve opens, the
service water is admitted to both the branch and the run. Rated flows are 1400 gpm in,
1200 gpm through the branch, and 200 gpm to the intercoolers (100 gpm to each of
two).

All of the attack observed in the tee that was examined was at the bottom, 6 oclock
position (Figures 3 and 4). The backing ring on the inlet side was also degraded, again
only at 6 oclock. Pitting was the worst immediately downstream of the backing ring
(Figure 5). The branch had one or two large pits of significant depth on the bottom.
The outlet end (a run) has a thin layer of fairly uniform corrosion product. There were
some small tubercles here, also at the bottom (Figure 6). The corrosion at the outlet
end is what would be expected for carbon steel exposed to this type of environment.

A very limited visual and tactile examination of the inlet tee for the Diesel-Generator #2
currently in place was performed following removal of the air-operated inlet valve.
Examination of the valve itself revealed that it was in great shape and confirmed that
the flow is diverted downward into the tee. Pits were readily detected in the lower
upstream run of the tee and the flange neck. Examination with a mirror and flashlight
showed that there were several fairly straight sided and flat bottomed pits at the
bottom of the fitting. The weld was easy to find by feel. The absence of a backing ring
may have contributed to lower local velocities and, maybe, less attack immediately
downstream of the weld than was observed on the sample that had been removed from
service. The flange neck also had a few pits. The area immediately downstream of the
butterfly valve was a gun metal gray, not shiny and smoothed like a freshly eroded
surface, but with no corrosion product on it. The piping immediately upstream of the
valve had a thin layer of corrosion product and the typical rough and non-uniform
surface that would be expected for carbon steel piping exposed to Missouri River water
for a long time. It looked, actually felt, very much like the outlet end of the tee.

The configuration of the valve and tee appears to be a major contributor to the failure
mode and location. High local velocities immediately downstream of the butterfly
valve, which opens at the bottom, later confirmed by examination of the valve, and
high velocities from turbulence induced by the backing ring appear to contribute.

Essentially all of the flow through the tee, 1200 of the 1400 gpm, goes out through the
branch. The average velocities at each end of the fitting, a standard 6 tee, indicated
that the average fluid velocity through the inlet is about 15.5 fps, through the branch is
13.3 fps, and out the other run is 2.2 fps.

There are definitely erosion and corrosion elements to this degradation. It is not
purely erosion. A likely mechanism is that erosion from the high velocity water
removes the protective corrosion product during the quarterly operability
demonstrations, leaving bare metal which corrodes at a higher rate than metal which
has a protective film. The attack at the bottom of the tee may be the worst because of
corrosion under silt or microbiological deposits, placed there primarily by gravity
during the stagnation periods.

Conclusions

River water systems at Cooper Nuclear Station are exposed to untreated Missouri River
that is high in silt. These systems experience a broad spectrum of flow conditions.

The carbon steel piping has experienced some leaks.

The silt is known to produce solid particle erosion in high velocity lines and is believed
to produce deposits that are conducive to microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC)
in low velocity lines. In addition, silt deposits have caused a number of operational
difficulties.

A variety of degradation mechanisms appear to be operative in river water systems at

Cooper. General corrosion is occurring at manageable rates, the localized corrosion that
has been observed is over reasonably large areas (vs. pin holes), and that the rates of
the most rapid attack is not high.

Underdeposit corrosion, due to differential aeration cells with some microbiological

involvement from acid producing bacteria, appears to be the primary driving force for
the localized attack. Aerated conditions appear to be a significant contributor and may
be necessary for any of the corrosion to occur. All of the localized corrosion appears to
occur in systems that never go completely anaerobic.

The plants existing inspection program has detected a number of thinned locations,
those areas have been evaluated, and actions have been taken where required. That
inspection program has provided valuable baseline data on metal loss and metal loss
rates for the more than 100 locations that are included in the program.

Wide-scale biocide treatment of CNS river water systems is not recommended. The
water treatments most likely to be effective are the dispersants. Dispersants can provide
a slow but gradual clean-up of silt and corrosion products, especially loose corrosion
products, that will serve to eliminate sites for localized corrosion. Any water treatment
program must include a dispersant or biodispersant unless the system is mechanically
or chemically cleaned first.

Mechanical cleaning, for example, by hydrolazing, may be beneficial for selected

systems where corrosion damage is most serious. The cleaning will remove local
corrosion cells and encourage slower general metal loss.

References

1. Microbiologically Induced Corrosion of Containment Service Water System, IE

Information Notice No. 85-30, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office
of Inspection and Enforcement, April 19, 1985.

2. Examination of the Cooper Nuclear Station Water Treatment Plant for Evidence of
Microbiological Accumulation and Growth, Bioindustrial Technologies, Inc., 5-29-
92.

3. Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC), Institute of Nuclear Power

Operations Significant Event Report SER-73-84, 1984.

4. Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, Generic

Letter 89-13, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 18, 1989.

5. D. C. Bley, Service Water Systems and Nuclear Plant Safety, NSAC-148, May
1980.

6. Dwight Vorpahl, "Solving Silting Erosion Problem on RHR SW Isolation Valves,"

EPRI Service Water System Reliability Improvement Seminar, 1999 (to be
published).
Figure 3-1. Drawing of Corrosion Products in Diesel-Generator Inlet Tee
Figure 2. 4 Service Water System Line Removed from REC Heat Exchanger A
 Figure 3. Overview of Diesel-Generator Inlet Tee View from Inlet

Figure 4. Overview of Diesel-Generator Inlet Tee View from Branch

Figure 5. Close-up of Pitting at Inlet End - Diesel-Generator Inlet Tee

Figure 6. Minimal Attack at Outlet Run - Diesel-Generator Inlet Tee