Effect of Insufficiency of Title in Statutes

Topic: How a title is construed
Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this
act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of
Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199. Section 19 of the amendatory act says
that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 20
also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy
Mediation Commission.
ISSUE:
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the
constitutional provision that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
HELD:
The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject,
which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will
be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
LATIN MAXIM:
24a, 37, d
INSULAR LUMBER CO. V. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
Facts:
These two (2) cases are appeals by way of certiorari from the decision dated July 31, 1969 of
the Court of Tax Appeals ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to the
Insular Lumber Company the amount of P10,560.20 instead of P19,921.37, representing
25% of the specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by said company in
the operation of its forest concession in the year 1963.
Insular Lumber Company (Company for short). a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of New York. U.S.A., and duly authorized to do business in the Philippines is a
licensed forest concessionaire. The Company purchase manufactured oil and motor fuel
which it used in the operation of its forest concession on which specific tax was paid.
The commissioner denied the Company's claim for refund on the ground that the privilege
of partial tax refund granted by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 to those using oil in the
operation of forest and mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years from June
14, 1956, the date effectivity of said Act.
Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08
because the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid
during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, the
Company was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only.
Issues:
Did the Court of Tax Appeals err in its previous decisions (denying the tax exemption to
Insular Lumber Company)?
Ruling:
The Commissioner contends that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 is
unconstitutional. In claiming the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid section, the
Commissioner anchored its argument on Article VI, Section 21(l) of the 1935 Constitution
which provides:
No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill
The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special
Fund." The Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to increase
Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject which is the
partial exemption of miners and loggers.
Partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed
in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather
than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
The Court finds NO MERIT in the arguments.
Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy - the
necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased
specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial
exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax
on oil and fuel, is nor, a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose
of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of
which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation.
Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled,

every presumption favors the validity of the Act. As is true republic in cases presenting other
constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever possible.
Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the legislation
should be sustained.
As regards the second and third assignment of errors, the commissioner contends that the
five-year limitation period for partial refund of specific tax paid for oil and fuel used in
agriculture and aviation provided in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1435 is also applicable to
Section 5 of said Act which grants partial refund of specific tax for oil used by miners or forest
concessionaires.
Section 1: ----
Whenever any of the oils mentioned above are, during the five years from June eighteen,
nineteen hundred and fifty-two, used in agriculture and aviation, fifty per centrum of the
specific tax paid thereon shall be refunded by the Commissioner of International Revenue upon
submission of the following: xxxx
Section 5: -----
Provided, however, that whenever any oils mentioned above are used by miners or forest
concessionaires in their operations, twenty-five per centum of the specific tax paid thereon shall
be refunded by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue upon submission of proof of actual use of
oils and under similar conditions enumerated in subparagraph one and two of section one
hereof, amending section one hundred forty-two of the National Internal Revenue Code: xxxxxx
It is very apparent that the partial refund of specific tax paid for oils used in agriculture and
aviation is limited to five years while there is no time limit for the partial refund of specific
tax paid for oils used by miners and forest concessionaires. We find no basis in applying the
limitation of the operative period provided for oils used in agriculture and aviation to the
provision on the refund to miners and forest concessionaires.
It is very clear from the language of Section 5 that only miners or forest concessionaries are
given the privilege to claim the partial refund. Sawmill operators are excluded, because they
need not be forest concessionaires nor the latter, always are sawmill operators.
Where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous. so that there is no occasion for the
court's seeking legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.
Topic: Effect of Insufficiency of Title
Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez
FACTS:
The House of Representatives enacted into law RA 3836 entitled An Act Amending Subsection
(c), Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Eighty Six, as amended by RA
3096,which will enable members of congress to retire regardless of age
after having served as such for at least twelve years of which not less than four years have been
rendered as electiveofficer. After enactment of RA 3836, PHILCONSA, a non-stock, non-profit
civic organization duly incorporated under Philippine
laws instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor
General of the Philippines and disbursing officers of both congress from passing in audit
vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any
former Senator or members of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation
gratuities pursuant to RA 3836; and likewise restraining the

respondent disbursing officers of both houses, and their successors in office from paying said
vacation and gratuities.
ISSUE:
Is the enactment of RA 3836 constitutional in so far as the said act allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and
sick leave to Senators and Congressmen and to the elective officials of both houses
of Congress.
HELD:
No, the enactment of RA 3836 is unconstitutional as it violates three provisions of the

constitution, namely Art. IV, Sec. 14, the prohibition of increase in the salaries of members of
congress, as the act provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senator and members of
the House of Representatives without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all is
members approving such increase; Art. III, Sec. 1, Par. 1 as it is patently discriminating and,
Art. VI, Sec. 21, Par. 1, the title of a bill shall not have embrace more than one subject as the
title of the said bill is not in any
way related to thesubject of Commonwealth Act186(establishing the GSIS, providing for both
retirement and insurance benefits of its members).RA 3836 is hereby declared NULL
and VOID
Topic: Body of a Statute
People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos
Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63
FACTS:
The Peoples Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the
constitutionality of the Peoples Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which
deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a
provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which
adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for
their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject
of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: W/N the Peoples Court Act was unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. The Peoples Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own
machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions mentioned
were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the Peoples Court Act. The
Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents.
The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its
title.
Topic: Separability Clause
* Greenblatt v. Golden
Topic: Repealing Clause
Williams v. Standard Oil
1 These cases were considered together by the court below and are submitted together here.
In both the validity of a statute of Tennessee is assailed as contravening the federal
Constitution. Appellee in No. 64 is a corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana, and
appellee in No. 65 is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware. From a time long
prior to the passage of the statute, both have been engaged and are now engaged in the
business of selling gasoline in the state of Tennessee.
2 The statute was adopted in 1927. Its purpose and effect are to fix prices at which gasoline
may be sold within the state. A division of motors and motor fuels is created in the
department of finance and taxation and authorized to collect and record data concerning the
manufacture and sale of gasoline, freight rates, differentials in price to wholesalers and
retailers, the cost and expense of production and sale, etc. The information thus collected is
made available for use by the commissioner of finance and taxation in the regulation of prices
at which gasoline may be sold in the state. Permits for such sale are to be issued subject to
the approval of the commissioner but only at the prices fixed and determined. Prices of
gasoline are to be fixed with a proper differential between the wholesale and retail price.
Rebates, price concessions, and price discrimination between persons or localities are
forbidden. The prices first are to be stated by the applicant for a permit, and, if not approved
by the superintendent of the division, are to be determined by that official, with a right of
review by the commissioner and finally by the courts. Chapter 22, p. 53, Public Acts
Tennessee 1927. By a general statute (Shannon's Tennessee Code, 6437) a violation of the
act is a misdemeanor and is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Pressly v. State, 114 Tenn.
534, 538, 86 S. W. 378, 69 L. R. A. 291, 108 Am. St. Rep. 921.
3 Appellees brought separate suits in the court below to enjoin the state officers named as
appellants from carrying out their intention to enforce the act and institute criminal
proceedings for violations of it against appellees, respectively, and to have the act declared
unconstitutional and void. Under the facts alleged, the suits were properly brought. Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214, 44 S. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273
U. S. 418, 427, 428, 47 S. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718.
4 The principal ground of attack, and the only one we need to consider here, is that the
Legislature is without power to authorize agencies of the state to fix prices at which gasoline
may be sold in the state, because the effect will be to deprive the vendors of such gasoline of
their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellees applied for a temporary injunction against appellants, upon which there was a
hearing, and the court below, consisting of three judges (section 266, Judicial Code; 28 USCA
380), granted the injunction as prayed. 24 F.(2d) 455 (D. C.) sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v.
Hall.
5 It is settled by recent decisions of this court that a state Legislature is without

constitutional power to fix prices at which commodities may be sold, services rendered, or
property used, unless the business or property involved is 'affected with a public interest.'
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103, 27 A. L. R.
1280; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra; Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1, 47
S. Ct. 506, 71 L. Ed. 893, 52 A. L. R. 163; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545, 72 L.
Ed. 913. Nothing is gained by reiterating the statement that the phrase is indefinite. By
repeated decisions of this court, beginning with Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77,
that phrase, however it may be characterized, has become the established test by which the
legislative power to fix prices of commodities, use of property, or services, must be
measured. As applied in particular instances, its meaning may be considered both from an
affirmative and a negative point of view. Affirmatively, it means that a business or property,
in order to be affected with a public interest, must be such or be so employed as to justify the
conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby in effect granted to
the public. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra, 273 U. S. 434 (47 S. Ct. 426). Negatively, it does
not mean that a business is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or
because the public are warranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its maintenance.
Id., 273 U. S. 430 (47 S. Ct. 426). The meaning and application of the phrase are examined at
length in the Tyson Case, and we see no reason for restating what is there said.
6 In support of the act under review it is urged that gasoline is of widespread use; that
enormous quantities of it are sold in the state of Tennessee; and that it has become necessary
and indispensable in carrying on commercial and other activities within the state. But we are
here concerned with the character of the business, not with its size or the extent to which
the commodity is used. Gasoline is one of the ordinary commodities of trade, differing, so far
as the question here is affected, in no essential respect from a great variety of other articles
commonly bought and sold by merchants and private dealers in the country. The decisions
referred to above make it perfectly clear that the business of dealing in such articles,
irrespective of its extent, does not come within the phrase 'affected with a public interest.'
Those decisions control the present case.
7 There is nothing in the point that the act in question may be justified on the ground that
the sale of gasoline in Tennessee is monopolized by appellees, or by either of them, because,
objections to the materiality of the contention aside, an inspection of the pleadings and of
the affidavits submitted to the lower court discloses an utter failure to show the existence of
such monopoly.
8 Nor need we stop to consider the further contention that appellees, being foreign
corporations, may not carry on their business within the state except by complying with the
conditions prescribed by the state. While that is the general rule, a well-settled limitation
upon it is that the state may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of
rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Frost Trucking Co. v. R. Com., 271 U. S. 583,
593, et seq., 46 S. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 47 A. L. R. 457, where the applicable decisions of
this court are reviewed.
9 Finally, it is said that even if the price-fixing provisions be held invalid other provisions of
the act should be upheld as separate and distinct. This contention is emphasized by a
reference to section 12 of the act, which declares: 'That if any section or provision of this act
shall be held to be invalid this shall not affect the validity of other sections or provisions
hereof.'
10 In Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 71, 42 S. Ct. 453, 459 (66 L. Ed. 822), it is said that such a
legislative declaration serves to assure the courts that separate sections or provisions of a
partly invalid act may be properly sustained 'without hesitation or doubt as to whether they
would have been adopted, even if the Legislature had been advised of the invalidity of part.'
But the general rule is that the unobjectionable part of a statute cannot be held separable
unless it appears that, 'standing alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the Legislature
intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad should fall.'
The question is one of interpretation and of legislative intent, and the legislative declaration
'provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in determining that intent. But it
is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.' Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290, 44 S. Ct.
323, 325 (68 L. Ed. 686).
11 In the absence of such a legislative declaration, the presumption is that the Legislature
intends an act to be effective as an entirety. This is well stated in Riccio v. Hoboken, 69 N. J.
Law, 649, 662, 55 A. 1109, 1113 (63 L. R. A. 485) where the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals, in an opinion delivered by Judge Pitney (afterward a justice of this court), after
setting forth the rule as above, said:
12 'In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute,
and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is
interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its
removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially
unaffected by the process.
13 Compare Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 528-530, 27 S.Ct. 153,
51 L. Ed. 298; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 501, 28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297; Butts
v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126, 132, et seq., 33 S. Ct. 964, 57 L. Ed. 1422; and
see 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) 362, 363, and note.
14 The effect of the statutory declaration is to create in the place of the presumption just
stated the opposite one of separability; that is to say, we begin, in the light of the declaration,
with the presumption that the Legislature intended the act to be divisible, and this
presumption must be overcome by considerations which make evident the inseparability of
its provisions or the clear probability that the invalid part being eliminated the Legislature
would not have been satisfied with what remains.
15 In the present case, it requires no extended argument to overcome the presumption and
to demonstrate the indivisible character of the act under consideration. The particular parts
of the act sought to be saved are found in sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 10. Section 1, after a preamble
in respect of the importance of controlling the sale of gasoline and a declaration that such
sale is impressed with a public use, creates the division of motors and motor fuels as already
stated. Section 2 requires the superintendent of the division and other employees to make
investigations, collect and record data concerning the manufacture and sale of gasoline, the
cost of refining, freight rates, differ entials in wholesale and retail prices, costs and expenses
incident to the sale, methods employed in the distribution of gasoline, and other data and
information as may be material in ascertaining and determining fair and reasonable prices
to be paid for gasoline. This information is declared to be available for use in the regulation
of prices and for the inspection and information of the public. The superintendent is directed
to issue permits for the sale of gasoline at prices fixed and determined as provided in other
parts of the statute. Section 3 makes it unlawful for anyone to engage in the sale of gasoline
without first having obtained a permit signed by the superintendent and approved by the
commissioner of finance and taxation, for which permit application must be made in
accordance with and in compliance with all the requirements of the act. Section 4 requires
that the application shall set forth whether the applicant proposes to do a wholesale or retail
business, or both, the number and location of the different places where he is to operate and
other like information. He must also set forth the price or prices at which he is at the time
selling gasoline, the cost price thereof, including various items which enter into the price,
and the price at which he proposes to sell. Section 10 imposes a special permit tax of $10 per
annum for each place of sale at wholesale, and $1 per annum for each retail service station
or curb pump. The tax thus imposed is constituted a special maintenance fund to aid in
defraying the expenses of the division of motors and motor fuels.
16 The bare recital of these details shows conclusively that they are mere adjuncts of the
price-fixing provisions of the law or mere aids to their effective execution. The function of
the division created by section 1 is to carry these provisions into effect, and if they be stricken
down as invalid the existence of the division becomes without object. The purpose of
collection the data set forth in section 2 is to furnish information to aid in the fixing of proper
prices. The requirements in section 3 that a permit must be obtained before any person can
engage in the business of selling gasoline and those in section 4 that the application therefor
must state the character of the business, the number and location of the places where
business is to be carried on, the price or prices at which the applicant is then selling gasoline,
the cost price thereof, and the price at which he proposes to sell, obviously constitute data
for intelligently putting into effect the price-fixing provisions of the law or means to that end.
The taxes imposed by section 10 are solely for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the
division of motors and motor fuels, and since the functions of that division practically come
to an end with the failure of the price-fixing features of the law, it is unreasonable to suppose
that the Legislature would be willing to authorize the collection of a fund for a use which no
longer exists.
17 Appellants also insist that certain provisions in respect of rebating and discrimination
contained in section 8 of the act are separable. Those provisions are that it shall be unlawful
to grant any rebate, concession, or gratuity to any purchaser for the purpose or inducing the
purchaser to purchase, use, or handle the gasoline of the particular dealer, and that it shall
likewise be unlawful to discriminate for or against any purchaser by selling at different
prices to purchasers in the same locality or in different localities. It seems clear that these
provisions are mere appendants in aid of the main purpose; but, if treated as separable, they
are unconstitutional restrictions upon the right of the private dealer to fix his own prices and
fall within the principle of the decisions already cited. See especially Fairmont Creamery Co.
v. Minnesota, supra.
18 This interpretation of the various provisions of the act is fortified by a requirement of the
Tennessee Constitution (article 2, 17) that 'no bill shall become a law which embraces more
than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title.' It is fair to conclude, and there is
nothing to suggest the contrary, that in the passage of the present act the Legislature
intended to observe this requirement and confine the provisions of the act to the one subject
of price-fixing.
19 Accordingly, we must hold that the object of the statute under review was to accomplish
the single general purpose which we have stated, and, that purpose failing for want of
constitutional power to effect it, the remaining portions of the act, serving merely to facilitate
or contribute to the consummation of the purpose, must likewise fall.
20 Decrees affirmed.
21 Mr. Justice HOLMES dissents.
22 Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice STONE concur in the result.
Topic: Bills originating from the House of Representatives
Mirasol v. CA
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugar land owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 19
73-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a
Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel
Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latters sugar and to apply the proceeds
to the payment of their obligations to it. President Marcos issued PD 579 in November,
1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for
export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that
the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans
from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked
petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to
PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded
to extra judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if
properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its
stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all
earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9,
1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance and damages against PNB.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional
without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue
for the resolution of the Trial Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executi
ve order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. The purpose
of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him
of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The
rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room
for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree,
order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory. Petitioners contend that
P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and
the prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. Jurisprudence has
laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before
the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second,
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging
the validity of the act must have standing to challenge .Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Case No. 292 G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1994) Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No.
266
FACTS:
Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third
readings were done on the same day. The President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and
the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but
also that of reading the bill on three separate days.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code, has been
constitutionally passed.
HELD:
There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but
not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2)
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation
to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence.
To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the
"unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not
only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except"
clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order
to meet a public calamity or emergency.
National Electification Administration v. COA
Doctrine: The Branches of Government; Executive Department; Powers and Functions of the
President; Control of Executive Departments*
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Date: 2002
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Facts:
Government employee salaries were raised via a Joint Resolution of Congress (No. 01),
urging the President to revise the existing compensation. This was made into a 4-year
program. On 28 December 1996, President Ramos issues Executive Order No. 389 (EO 389)
to implement the final year salary increases authorized by the Joint Resolution. EO 389 called
for a 2-tranche (or 2-part) salary increase: one on 1 January 1997, and another on 1
November 1997.
In January 1997, petitioner NEA implemented the salary increases. However, they
implement such increase in a single lump sum beginning 1 January 1997 (NEA accelerated
the implementation by paying the second tranche starting 1 January instead of 1 November).
Respondent COA issued a Notice of Suspension and Notices of Disallowance. The Notices of
Disallowance were appealed by NEA, but rejected by the Commission en banc. The decision
of the respondent was then challenged in the Supreme Court.
Issues: Did the COA commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disallowing the increased salaries? In other words, is NEA allowed to
accelerate the implementation of the salaries due to availability of funds?
Held:
No, COA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Neither is NEA allowed to accelerate
the implementation.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. COAs decision was affirmed in toto.
Ratio: On NEAs accelerated implementation and its accordance with the law.
The Court ruled that such acceleration was not in accordance with the law. NEA claimed that
Republic Act No. 8250 (General Appropriations Act of 1997) was their legal basis. However,
such law was not self-executory. Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do not
constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the appropriated
amounts as they wish. Itemization of the Personal Services (the appropriation used by
NEA) is prepared after the enactment of the GAA, and requires the approval of the President
(Sec. 23, Chap. 4, Book IV of the Administrative Code, p. 229).
The execution of the GAA is subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the

President, which will be the basis for the fund release (Sec. 34, Chap. 5, Book IV of the
Administrative Code, p. 229).
No portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment of any salary increase,
unless authorized by law (Sec. 60, Chap. 7, Book VI of the Administrative Code, p. 230). Sec.
33 of the 1997 GAA (p. 230) also provides for salary increases subject to the approval of the
President.
In essence, the mere approval of Congress of the GAA does not make the funds available for
spending instantly. The funds must still be collected during the fiscal year. NEA also argues,
from Sec. 10 of EO 389 (p. 231) that adequately funded government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) are exempted. The Court rejected this argument, as Sec. 10 only refers
to GOCCs with insufficient funds. There is nothing in the Section that allows those with
sufficient funds to accelerate their schedule. There is no express or implied authorization in
Sec. 10.
NEA also argues that such acceleration was allowed in a Memorandum of the Office of the
President (7 November 1995, p. 232). However, the Court pointed out that the accelerated
implementation is also allowed upon approval of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). There are also nine terms and conditions, which must be met by the
agency (listed in pp. 233-234, although they are not necessary). NEA did not comply by
seeking approval from the DBM. The Court also pointed out that the petitioner cannot assail
the authority of the President to issue EO 389. The Administrative Code gives the President
such powers (p.234). Joint Resolution No. 01 has also acknowledged such authority (p. 235).
Considering also that it is the fourth and final year, the Court found it odd that NEA did not
question the previous EOs.
NEA also argued that COA did not have the power in determining whether NEA violated the
law. COA exceeded its authority in its inquiry. NEA cited Guevara v. Gimenez. However, the
Supreme Court overturned this decision with Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,
stating that Guevara was not controlling anymore, as it was decided in light of the 1935
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution gives the Commission more powers, as provided in Sec.
2 (D), Art. IX (p. 237). The Constitution and other laws mandate the Commission to audit all
government agencies, including GOCCs.
On the DBMs approval of NEAs proposed budget. NEA also contends that the DBMs approval
of NEAs proposed budget was an approval also of the accelerated implementation. This was
because NEA included such accelerated implementation in its proposal.
The Court again referred to the nine conditions required of them for the approval to actually
take place. In fact, the approval of the proposed budget was only a part of the first phase of
the entire budget process. (There are four phases: Budget Preparation, Budget
Authorization, Budget Execution, and Budget Accountability). Once the proposed budget was
approved by the DBM, it is submitted to Congress for evaluation and inclusion in the
appropriations law. This authorization does not include the authority to disburse.
*On the Presidents control of all executive departments. The Court finally cited the control of
the President over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, as provided by our system
of government. Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for this (p. 239). According
to the Court: The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends to all executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This power
is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation. It cannot be limited nor
withdrawn by Congress. All other executive officials must implement in good faith his
directives and orders. The case would not have arisen had NEA complied in good faith with
the directives and orders of the President. NEAs reasons in disregarding the President were
patently flimsy, even ill-conceived.
Philconsa vs Enriquez
Petitioner: Philippine Constitution Association (PhilConsA)

Respondents: Salvador Enriquez (Secretary of Budget and Management)
Ponente: Justice Quiason
Relevant Article:
Article VII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the President
involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994
Facts:
RA 7663 or the General Appropriations Act of 1994 was approved by the President
but vetoed certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions.
After the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and
Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus.
In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) Section 16 on the
Countrywide Development Fund, (2) the veto on four special provisions added to
items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (3) the conditions imposed
by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the
DPWH and the National Housing Authority (NHA)
G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and
Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as
unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the
special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the
Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994, while in G.R. No. 11388,
Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition,
petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Issues:
1. WON The Countrywide Development Fund is constitutional
2. WON The President has the executive power to impound
Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
PETITIONERS: The power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the
projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects
do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function
given to the Congress by the Constitution
RESPONDENTS: Silent
COURT: The President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the
members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was
set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other projects
planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the
Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
2. YES.
PETITIONERS: Once Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an
appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the
project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on
the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
RESPONDENT: Silent
COURT: In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the President
in effect exercises a veto power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter
of fact, the Constitution does not say anything about impounding. The source of the Executive
authority must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority
of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or
impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as
Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same
provision invoked by petitioners herein.
RULING:
VETO on CDF and debt appropriations invalid, since it is germane to the law. VETO on CAFGU
valid.
Topic: Artcle VI, Section 25 (1) 1987 Constitution
Province of Batangas v. Romulo

Bengzon v. Drilon
1992 Gutierrez
Petitioners: Retired Justices Bengzon, Makalintal, Patajo and Leuterio
Respondents: Drilon (Exec. Sec.), Carague (DBM Sec.), Cajucom (Treasurer)
Facts:
June 20, 1953 RA 910 enacted retirement pensions for retired Justices who served
for at least 20 years in service and attained 70 years old
RA 910 was amended by RA 1792, Sec 3-A says that in case salary is increased or
decreased, such increase or decrease will be deemed the retirement pension
Identical retirement benefits given to Consti. Commissions by virtue of RA 1568
amended by RA 3595. Same given to AFP by virtue of PD 758.
(PD 578, RA 1797 and 3595 now hove automatic readjustment features)
1975 Marcos issued PD 644 repealing Sec 3-A of RA 1797 and 3595. (no more
readjustment features)
Marcos issued PD 1909 issued readjusted pensions for AFP alone.
Realizing the unfairness of this, Congress approved a bill for the reenactment of RA
1797 and 3595 under the impression that PD 644 became a law. They passed HB No.
16297 and Senate Bill 790.
President Aquino vetoed GB No. 16297 because it would erode foundation of govt
to adhere to the policy of standardization of compensation stipulated in RA 67587
it should not grant distinct privileges over other civil servants.
There was a prior case:
o Retired Justices asked for readjustment accdg to RA 1797. Held was PD 644
repealing RA 1797 did not become law as there was no valid publication
(Tanada v. Tuvera).
o Granted. Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill of 1992 the
adjusted pension rates
President vetoed provisions of Sec. 1 and Sec. 4 of General Fund Adjustments of Gen.
Appropriations Act because it allegedly nullified the veto of HB 16927.
Issues
WON the veto of President on provisions of Gen. Appropriations Act is unconstitutional
because:
1. subject veto no an item veto. (Yes)
2. Veto violative of doctrine of separation of powers (Yes)
3. Veto deprives retired justices of rights and pension due them (Yes)
4. Veto impairs fiscal autonomy of courts. (Yes)
Ratio
1.
Veto power not absolute accdg to Sec 27(2) of Art. VI.
When it comes to appropriations, President has item veto power to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation of revenue
measure
Item particular details. Whole item should be vetoed.
President didnt veto item but methods to issue obligations to officials.
Vetoed portions not items but provisions.
In reality, what were vetoed were RA 1797 and the SC resolution.
No President may veto privisions of a law enacted 35 yrs. before
PD 644 never became valid, RA 1797 was not repealed, HB 16297 veto was
superfluous.
Neither may president use veto to repeal RA 1796 this is arrogating legislative
powers to President
2 and 4.
Art 3, Sec 8 judiciary shall maintain fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy is full flexibility to allocate resources.
Veto is violative of independence and separation of powers as it is tantamount to
dictating the judiciary how funds should be utilized.
3.
Retirement laws purpose is to entice competent men and women to enter govt
service.
Rationale that justices are unduly favored is a misimpression since enlisted men in
military are so many, justices so few.
Retirement befits should be interpreted liberally in favor of retiree to provide for
sustenance.
Aurallo v. Aquino
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an
exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by
Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will
also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict
interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors
within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from
unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.
The ascertainment of good faith, or the lack of it, and the determination of whether or not
due diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions of fact. The want of good faith is
thus better determined by tribunals other than this Court, which is not a trier of facts.
FACTS:
In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these
consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the
Courts interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is
defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue.
They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations
constitute savings and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally
recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving
their motion.
On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation
items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond
the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs, activities and
projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be declared
unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
1. Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal
protection, constitutional?
RULING:
1. No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether
the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and
practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision
should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the projects
mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of
the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within
the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be
carried out through legal methods.
Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code refers to the authority of
the President to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any
agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the GAA. When the President suspends or
stops expenditure of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been
established that such funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance,
and that the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been
completed, discontinued or abandoned.
The reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations

savings included pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code22
does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the
Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections,
Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is that
the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the CFAG.
Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the
regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter
expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those
in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Departments
appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-
border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the
Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites
under Section 25(5) are complied with.
* SEE BENGSON V. DRILON
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works
110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
FACTS:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He
claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals
sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned
by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the
same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns
those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta,
on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does
not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property
was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be
expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the
latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard
projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft
projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social
Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are
being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was
then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the
exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before
the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because
it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of
the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to
which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork
barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation
of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,
then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to
get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for
it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify
the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president
veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval
of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of
the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution
on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as
well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for
the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall
be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
* People v. Fernandez
Orden de Predicadores v. Metropolitan Water District this is all I found nothing else sorry :(
Facts: During the construction of the Caniedo water supply for the City of Manila, Sagrada
Orden de Predicadores (Order) donated to Manila certain lands it owned in San Juan del
Monte that were required for bringing water to the city.
In return, the City of Manila decided to furnish, free of charge, water from the Carriedo
waterworks to the Sto. Domingo Convent. The Sto. Domingo Convent enjoyed the free use of
water from 1886 until July 1920. The Metropolitan Water District (MWD), as administrator
and trustee of Manila's water supply system, asked the Order to pay for the water it
consumed from July to September 1920 worth P52.24.
The Order paid the amount under protest and filed the present suit. Lower Court's Ruling:
The CFI absolved the MWD, and directed the Order to pay for the water consumed from
September 1, 1916, up to the third quarter of 1920. Section 3 of the Jone Law prohibits that
any public property or fund be used, without due compensation, for the use, benefit or
maintenance of any church, religious institution or denomination.
Issue: Whether the Sto. Domingo Convent should continue enjoying free water.
Supreme Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the CFI's ruling. General Francisco
Carriedo will provided funds for the construction of a water supply system for the
inhabitants of Manila. One of the conditions for the grant was for the city of Manila to lay
water conduits to the convents of San Francisco, San Juan de Dios, and Sta. Clara. If any other
convent wishes to enjoy the same benefit, it should contribute to the expenses in conducting
the water.
In the present case, the Sto. Domingo Convent donated its lands in San Juan del Monte in
favor of the city for the construction of the Carriedo waterworks. In turn, the city granted
free use of water in the Sto. Domingo Convent. The free water is compensated by the value
of more than 10,000 square meters of donated land. It was error for the CFI to apply Section
3 of the Jones Law. J. Street's Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion: The Order cannot be made to pay for the water used since September
l,1916, and prior to the third quarter of 1920 because the water was voluntarily supplied.
However, the Metropolitan Water District can revoke the privilege given to the Order. J.
Johns' dissent, joined by Jjs. Malcolm and Ostrand: There was no contract or agreement
between the Order and the city. Covenants running with land can only be created by a written
instrument under seal in which they are recited in, and made a part of, the instrument.
Neither the gift of land or of water was dependent upon or connected with the other.
Moreover, the current source of waters are from Montalban, and not from the Carriedo canal.
The free use of waters. if at all. should be confined and limited to the waters of the Carriedo
canal.
Aglipay v. Ruiz
13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201) First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila
of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The
petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member
of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of
the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent
to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence

for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so
far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt
and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare,
and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime
of justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to the Government
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case
at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor
a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an
event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice,
the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937. The
Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Arroyo v. De Venecia
Arroyo v. De Venecia
Facts:
An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House
of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
This was later passed accordingly and brought to the House of Senate. Upon the
interpellation on the second reading, herein petitioner moved for adjournment for lack of
quorum which is constitutionally needed to conduct business. Petitioners motion was
defeated and was railroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.
Issue:
Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate.
Held:
There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce
or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members
betaken every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances upon the
last and the third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the
petitioner to delay the business of the House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on
part of the accused. Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself
conclusive thus legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the
court upheld principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative
branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
US vs. Pons
FACTS:
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of
wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the
other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record
were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers
conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381,
Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381
was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that
his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this
is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with
the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due
weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The
journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles
the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed
upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
Morales v. Subido
Facts:
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila
Police Department. He was designated as acting chief of police of Manila when the former
chief resigned. He was also appointed to the same position by the Mayor of Manila.
Respondent Abelardo Subido, commissioner of the civil service, approved the designation of
petitioner as acting chief but rejected his permanent appointment for failure to meet the
minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position and
instead certified other persons as qualified for the position to be filled. Subido cites sec. 10
of the Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864).
Morales asserted that there were various changes made in House Bill 6951, now RA
4864. According him, the House bill division deleted an entire provision and substituted
what is now section 10 of the Police Act of 1966. He posits that what was approved by the
Senate on third reading was the version as amended at the behest of Senator Rodrigo, not
the present version cited by Subido. Morales submitted the certified photo static copies as
evidences of the drafts of the bill. Under the version he presented, he is qualified for the
position, being only a high school graduate who has served the citys police department for
at least eight years from the rank of captain and/or higher.
It would thus appear that the Bill was changed during the course of the engrossment
of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made not by
Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit
some stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the
petitioner would have the Court look searchingly into the Journal to solve the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon
the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. Wala talagang issue yung case na nakalagay copied this issue
for reference lang just in case
Statutory Construction Rule Used

Principle of the enrolled bill. The text of the act as passed and approved is deemed
importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts
Enrolled bill Doctrine. The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed are conclusive as to its due enactment.
Application of the Rule on the Case

The court held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts". The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy
is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
The Court, however, further adds that it is not to be understood as holding that in all
cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. The Court said: To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each
house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such
matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that
with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
Topic: Enrolled Bill
* SEE ABOVE Morales v. Subido
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito
FACTS:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their
seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each
house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which
has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but
it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or
the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.
Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is
bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD:
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House
and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified
in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity
in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule
of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order
to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and
the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that
if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed
by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed
by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by
the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund
of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues
used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are "urea
and formaldehyde" which are both being imported abroad.
Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, The Central Bank issued Circulars
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued
memorandum establishing the procedure for the applications for exemption from the
payment of said fee as provided by R.A. 2609.
Petitioners paid the required margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of their
transactions through R.A. 2609 they wanted to avail the exemption from the payment of said
fee as provided by RA. 2609. Petitioners filed a refund request to the Central Bank and the
Central Bank issued the vouchers but was not accepted by the Auditor of the Bank. The
refusal was also affirmed by the Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact that the
separate importation of "urea and formaldehyde" is not in accord with the provisions of R.A.
2609. Because section 2 of R.A. 2609 clearly provides Urea formaldehyde and not urea
and formaldehyde
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should
be construed as "urea and formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners contentions that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde"
RULING:
No, because what is allowed in RA. 2809 is urea formaldehyde, not "urea and formaldehyde"
both are different from each other.
The National Institute of Science and Technology defines urea formaldehyde is the synthetic
resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and
formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea and formaldehyde,
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that
the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones
of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.
Farinas v. Executive Secretary
In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14
thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective
official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an
elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for
an elective office while he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy,
was however retained by the Fair Election Act.
Rodolfo Farias, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the
constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue
advantage over appointive officials (discrimination).
The Farias group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that
irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Farias explained that RA 9006
originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting
provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee was created; that
in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the
1st BCC had its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a
conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised
bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how
said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for
signing all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.

On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in
a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure
of the appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take
part in any election except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.
On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the
enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral Conference
Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
FACTS:
Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third
readings were done on the same day. The President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and
the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but
also that of reading the bill on three separate days.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance
its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code, has been
constitutionally passed.
HELD:
There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but
not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2)
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation
to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence.
To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the
"unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not
only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except"
clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order
to meet a public calamity or emergency.
LATIN MAXIM: Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. A

qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent.
Astorga v. Villegas
FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator
Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The
House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the
presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed
it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not
embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate
President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid.
Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is
conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid
HELD:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein,
the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a
journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court
may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that
substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not
been duly enacted and did not become a law.
*See Arroyo v. Devenecia
Topic: Issuances, Rules and Ordinances
Persigan v. Angeles
FACTS:
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in the evening of
April 2,1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur to Padre Garcia,
Batangas. With them are: a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, a permit to
transport large cattle, and three certificates of inspection one from the Constabulary
command, one from the Bureau of Animal Industry and one from the mayor of Sipocot. In
spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at
Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's
police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian.
The confiscation was based on the Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that
henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by
the government to be distributed... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A, which provides for the
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province
to another, may been forced before publication in the Official Gazette.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that the said executive order should not be enforced against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more
than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the
public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before
violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. Indeed, the practice has always been
to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when
approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
publicly promulgated". In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial
veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of
Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been
expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
Ople v. Torres
FACTS:
- Sen. Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate Administrative Order no. 308 also known as
The Adoption of A National Computerized Identification Reference System issued by Pres.
Fidel V. Ramos. The goal of A.O. no. 308 is to provide a convenient way of transacting
business with basic service and social security providers and other governmental
instrumentalities.
- Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized identification

reference system requires a legislative act. He claims that A.O. no. 308 is not a mere
administrative order, but a law, hence beyond the power of the President to issue which
makes the act unconstitutional. He further argued that the appropriation of public funds
for the implementation of the act is also beyond the power of the president for such is
within the authority of the congress. Lastly, Ople asserted that the implementation of A.O.
no. 308 will violate the rights if the citizens to privacy.
- Three main purposes of the ID system presented by the respondents: (1) streamline
and speed up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by
avoiding duplication of service, and (3) generate population data for development planning
. The ID system will use biometrics which requires the use of an individuals physiological
and behavioral characteristic that will be stored in a computer. Each one will be issued a
Personal Identification Number (PIN) and all of his transactions may be recorded.
- Respondents argued that AO 308 was issued within the executive and administrative
powers of the President without encroaching on the legislative powers of the congress
and that fund necessary for the implementation of the ID reference system may be
sourced from the budgets of the concerned agencies ISSUE: Whether or not the
issuance of AO 308 is a usurpation of the legislative power of the congress? HELD: Yes.

- SC held that AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order and usurps the power of the congress to legislate.
- Congress is vested with the power to enact laws (Art. 6 sec.1) while the President
enforces the law (Art. 7 sec.1)
- An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to

specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government (Book 3, Chap. 2, Sec.3
Administrative Code of 1987). It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
AO 308 does not merely implement the Administrative code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such system
requires adjustment of various contending state policies.
AO 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because it
violates the right to privacy Principle of checks and balances: ensures that there is
harmony among the three branches of the government by allowing each branch to
exercise the power to examine if there is an encroachment of the functions of each
respective branch.
Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security Commission
CASE:
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. protested against the circular no. 22 which includes the
bonuses, overtime pay as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration in the
Employee's remuneration.
FACTS:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the
following tenor:
o "Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the
System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other
media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration
or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2- 1/2% contributions will be based,
up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."
Petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security
Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular
No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 which expressly excludes overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium
contributions, and submitting,
o "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the

term `compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their
observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the general
interpretation of the words "compensation", "remuneration" and "wages".
Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of
the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and
for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
The Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that
needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective,
but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy
or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.
* Directory of Forestry v. Munoz
US V TUPASI MOLINA
FACTS:
Frank Tupasi Molina was charged of a crime of perjury, in violation of Section 3,Act no.
1697, when defendant signed a petition to be permitted to take the examination for the
position of municipal policeman and made a false declaration under oath that he was
qualified to the examinations for municipal police and have not been charged of any crime
During trial, prosecution presented evidence that the defendant was sentenced and
imprisoned for disturbing public peace.
Defendant argues that said Act was not applicable in the present case since this Act was
only authorizing the appointment of commissioners, to make official investigations, fixing
their powers, for the payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official
investigations
ISSUE:
WON lower court committed error in applying section 3 of Act 1697.
Held:
No. Under Section 3 of Act No. 1697 it provides that: Any person who, having
taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in
which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath
to be administered that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true, is guilty or perjury, and shall be punished, etc.
Act No. 2169, provides for the reorganization of the municipal police
of the municipalities or provinces and sub provinces, it further provides that subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Police, the Director
of Constabulary shall prepare general regulations for the good government
discipline, and inspection of the municipal police, "compliance where with shall be
obligatory for all members of the organization.
Section 9 of said Act provides that: "To be eligible for examination, a candidate
shall have the following requirements: . . . (6) Have no criminal record.
In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director of Constabulary

prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same time rules for
conducting examinations, which examination manual was approved by the
Secretary of Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of law.
We have, therefore, a law which authorizes the administration of an oath in the present case.
A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government

inconformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation,
constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the
provisions of law.
In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for legislative
department of the Government to provide general regulations for the various and varying
details for the management of a particular department of the Government.
It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department
of the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct, control, and
management of the work of the particular department of the
Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management,
control, and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and regulations
providing for the detail of the management and control of such
department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever
they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes and objects of
the law.
We held in the many cases that said section 3 was a provision punishing the
crime of perjury generally. We find no reason, either in law or in the argument of the
appellant in the present case, to modify or reverse our conclusions in that
case. The defendant was guilty of the crime charged.
DOMINGO B. TEOXON vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OFADMINISTRATORS

FACTS:
The petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former member of a

recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance movement
against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a
permanent, physical disability. For having been permanently incapacitated from work, he
filed his claim for disability pension with the Philippine Veterans Administration under the
Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act No. 65. However, respondents in turn would limit the
amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by them. Petitioner filed his suit for mandamus before the CFI of Manila alleging
that he filed his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights, Republic Act
No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was
first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to the
terms of the basic law as thereafter amended.
His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a
month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month, for each
of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June22, 1957 up to June 30,
1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month, plusP10.00 a month for each of his four
unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. He would likewise
seek for the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
Respondent, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the petition, would
rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having exhausted its
administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government, which
cannot prosper without its consent. The CFI found for respondents. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W.O.N. rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies can prevail

over a statue.
HELD:
Petition is affirmed. CFI is reversed. The Court cited the case of Begosa
v.Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, promulgated just a month before the case
at bar, where it categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is not
to be denied what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment,
which certainly is superior to any regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine
Veterans Administration, presumably in the implementation thereof. It added that the
decision of the CFI where it held that the respondent Board has authority under the Pension
law to process applications for pension, using as guide the rules and regulations that it
adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown clearly to be in rror or against
the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be maintained" is clearly erroneous.
The Court also cited United Statesv. Tupasi Molina, which held that "Of course the
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law
itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying
into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." As well as its ruling in People v. Santos,
wherein it held that an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. "Finally,
the Court said there must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms
must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No
deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative
agency "cannot amend an act of Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if
it could be shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance
with what the Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.
China Bank v. CA, Gotianuy Digest G.R. No. 140687

December 18, 2006
Ponente: Phil. SC Justice Chico-Nazario
Facts:
1. The case stems from a complaint for a recovery of sums of money and annulment
of sales ofreal property and shares of stocks filed by Jose Gotianuy against his son-in-law
George Dee and his daughter Mary Margaret Dee.
2. Gotianuy accused his daughter of stealing his properties, US Dollar deposits with
Citybank amounting to P35M and $864,000. Margaret Dee obtained these amounts through
check issued by Citybank naming her as a co-payee of Gotianuy. She allegedly deposited the
checks with petitioner bank. Gotianuy died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by his daughter Elizabeth.
3. Subsequently, employees of China Bank were sent subpoena to testify

re:bank deposits of Margaret Dee but petitioner invoked RA 1405 (Bank Secrecy Law). The
lower court held that the disclosure of the name only of a depositor does not constitute a
violation of RA 1405. The CA affirms the lower court's decision.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly invoke the bank secrecy law to
prevent the disclosure
HELD:
No.Jose Gotianuy is a co-payee of the checks deposited in China Bank hence, he is deemed
also a depositor. A depositor is one who pays money into the bank in the usual course of
business to be placed to his credit and subject to his check of the beneficiary of the funds
held by the bank as trustee. As such, no written consent from Margaret Dee is needed in
order to inquire into the said deposits. Moreover, there was no issue as to the real source of
the funds since even Marygaret Dee declared that Gotianuy was the source of the Citibank
US Dollar checks. As the owner of the funds unlawfully taken and now deposited with the
petitioner bank, Gotianuy has the right to inquire into the said deposit. Clearly, it was not the
intention of the lawmakers to perpetrate injustice when it enacted the Bank Secrecy Law or
RA 1405.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and THE PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
G.R. No. L-58184 October 30, 1981
FACTS
The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor Code regarding
strikes "affecting the national interest" is assailed in this petition which partakes of
the nature of a prohibition proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers Union.
On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for
unfair labor practices stating the following grounds " 1) Unilateral and arbitrary
implementation of a Code of Conduct, a copy of which is attached, to the detriment of
the interest of our members; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions of our officers
and members as a result of the implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3)
Unconfirmation (sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence
Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in
violation of our Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner
manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all
concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed
be suspended, a position that failed to meet the approval of private respondent.
Subsequently, respondent Minister, on September 25, 1981, certified the labor
dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and
enjoined any strike at the private respondent's establishment. The labor dispute was
set for hearing by respondent National Labor Relations Commission on September
28. 1981.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION
It is the submission of petitioner labor union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so
far as it amends article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister
of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or
certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations
Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining,
is an undue delegation of legislative powers. There is likewise the assertion that
such conferment of authority "may also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the
State to the workers' right to self-organization and collective bargaining.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION
(Wasnt really mentioned. The case only said: Private respondent, following the
lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the
Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite
harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension apparently
the principal cause of the labor dispute. At this stage, as mentioned, it would be
premature to discuss the merits, or lack of it, of such claim, the matter being
properly for the Ministry of Labor to determine.
ISSUE
Whether in the regular course of business, acts of executive departments, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively acts of the
Chief Executive?
HELD
YES.
The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand
the test of scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by
virtue of such principle is for petitioner labor union within the competence of the
President, who in its opinion can best determine national interests, but only when
a strike is in progress.
Such admission is qualified by the assumption that the President "can make law,"
" an assertion which need not be passed upon in this petition.
What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the
President who "Shall have control of the ministries. It may happen, therefore, that
a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To the
extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of
legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government
To the Prime Minister can thus be delegated the performance of the
administrative functions of the President, who can then devote more time and
energy in the fulfillment of his exacting role as the national leader.
A later decision, Villena v. Secretary of Interior greater relevance to this case. The
opinion of Justice Laurel, again the ponente, made clear that under the
presidential system, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive
"Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated
otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court
of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's
alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law
to exercise authority."
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.'
Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is
delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute
when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
Balbuna v. Secretary of Education
FACTS:
1. Members of the Jehovas Witnesses filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before
the CFI of Capiz against the Sec. of Education, et al. It was to prevent the enforcement of Dept.
Order No. 8 issued pursuant to RA 1265 promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct
of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools.
2. The facts are the same with the Gerona case. It allegedly denies them freedom of worship
and of speech, however, new issues have been raised this time such as:
a. the department order has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the
Official Gazette; and
b. it is an undue delegation of legislative power

3. The petition was dismissed. Hence, appeal to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
1. Does it violate freedom of worship and speech?

2. Is it in accordance with the requirements of publication?
3. Is it unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power?
RULING:
1. Issue on freedom of worship and speech. No.

a. the court maintains that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration;
rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom,
liberty and national unity;
b. that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and
allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for;
c. that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations is a
prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in
the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school
they were attending.
2. Issue on publication. Yes.
a. Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930 do not require the publication of the circulars,
regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective;
b. said two acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official
Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the government issuing
the same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
c. while it is true that statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days after publication in the
Official Gazette and it is also true that administrative rules and regulations have the force of
law, the primary factor for this rationale is that such statutes provided for penalties for
violations thereof.
d. in the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those
pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the
provisions of said order; their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to
observe school discipline which the school authorities are bound to maintain.
e. for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were not
being prosecuted under threat of penal sanction; if they choose not to obey the flag salute
regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense
of their fellow citizens, nothing more and having elected not to comply, they forfeited their
right to attend public schools.
3. Issue on undue delegation of legislative power. No.
a. the requirements in Sections 1 and 2 of the department order constitute an adequate

standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National
Anthem.
b. that the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the
validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy
that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency;
c. to require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power
would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.
CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. vs. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC.
FACTS:
Union Cement Corporation (UCC), a publicly-listed company, has two principal stockholders
UCHC, a non-listed company, with shares amounting to 60.51%, and petitioner Cemco
with17.03%. Majority of UCHCs stocks were owned by BCI with 21.31% and ACC with
29.69%. Cemco, on the other hand, owned 9% of UCHC stocks. In a disclosure letter, BCI
informed the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) that it and its subsidiary ACC had passed
resolutions to sell to Cemco BCIs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and ACCs stocks in
UCHC equivalent to 29.69%.
As a consequence of this disclosure, the PSE inquired as to whether the Tender Offer Rule
under Rule 19 of the Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is not applicable
to the purchase by petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC. The SEC en banc had resolved
that the Cemco transaction was not covered by the tender offer rule. Feeling aggrieved by
the transaction, respondent National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc., a
minority stockholder of UCC, sent a letter to Cemco demanding the latter to comply with the
rule on mandatory tender offer. Cemco, however, refused.
Respondent National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint with
the SEC asking it to reverse its 27 July 2004 Resolution and to declare the purchase
agreement of Cemco void and praying that the mandatory tender offer rule be applied to its
UCC shares.
The SEC ruled in favor of the respondent by reversing and setting aside its 27 July
2004Resolution and directed petitioner Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares to
respondent and other holders of UCC shares similar to the class held by UCHC in accordance
with Section 9(E), Rule 19 of the Securities Regulation Code.
On petition to the Court of Appeals, the CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the
SEC. It ruled that the SEC has jurisdiction to render the questioned decision and, in any event,
Cemco was barred by estoppel from questioning the SECs jurisdiction.
It, likewise, held that the tender offer requirement under the Securities Regulation Code and
its Implementing Rules applies to Cemcos purchase of UCHC stocks. Cemcos motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction over respondents complaint and to require Cemco
to make a tender offer for respondents UCC shares.
2. Whether or not the rule on mandatory tender offer applies to the indirect acquisition
of shares in a listed company, in this case, the indirect acquisition by Cemco of 36% of UCC,
a publicly-listed company, through its purchase of the shares in UCHC, a non-listed company.
HELD:
1. YES. In taking cognizance of respondents complaint against petitioner and eventually

rendering a judgment which ordered the latter to make a tender offer, the SEC was
acting pursuant to Rule19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Securities Regulation Code, to wit:
13. Violation If there shall be violation of this Rule by pursuing a purchase of equity shares
of a public company at threshold amounts without the required tender offer, the
Commission, upon complaint, may nullify the said acquisition and direct the holding of a
tender offer. This shall be without prejudice to the imposition of other sanctions under the
Code.
The foregoing rule emanates from the SECs power and authority to regulate, investigate or
supervise the activities of persons to ensure compliance with the Securities Regulation Code,
more specifically the provision on mandatory tender offer under Section 19thereof.
Moreover, petitioner is barred from questioning the jurisdiction of the SEC. It must be
pointed out that petitioner had participated in all the proceedings before the SEC and had
prayed for affirmative relief.
2. YES. Tender offer is a publicly announced intention by a person acting alone or in
concert with other persons to acquire equity securities of a public company.
A public company is defined as a corporation which is listed on an exchange, or a corporation
with assets exceeding P50,000,000.00 and with 200 or more stockholders, at least 200 of
them holding not less than 100 shares of such company .
Stated differently, a tender offer isan offer by the acquiring person to stockholders of a public
company for them to tender their shares therein on the terms specified in the offer.
Tender offer is in place

to protect minority shareholders against any scheme that dilutes the share value of their in
vestments. It gives the minority shareholders the chance to exit the company
under reasonable terms, giving them the opportunity to sell their shares at the same price as
those of the majority shareholders. The SEC and the Court of Appeals ruled that the indirect
acquisition by petitioner of 36% of UCC shares through the acquisition of the non-listed
UCHC shares is covered by the mandatory tender offer rule. The legislative intent of Section
19 of the Code is to regulate activities relating to acquisition of control of the listed company
and for the purpose of protecting the minority stockholders of a listed corporation. Whatever
may be the method by which control of a public company isobtained, either through the
direct purchase of its stocks or through an indirect means, mandatory tender offer
applies. As appropriately held by the Court of Appeals:
The petitioner posits that what it acquired were stocks of UCHC and not UCC. By
happenstance, as a result of the transaction, it became an indirect owner of UCC. We are
constrained, however, to construe ownership acquisition to mean both direct and
indirect. What is decisive is the determination of the power of control. The legislative intent
behind the tender offer rule makes clear that the type of activity intended to be regulated is
the acquisition of control of the listed company through the purchase of shares. Control may
[be] effected through a direct and indirect acquisition of stock, and when this takes place,
irrespective of the means, a tender offer must occur. The bottom line of the law is to give the
shareholder of the listed company the opportunity to decide whether or not to sell in
connection with a transfer of control. x x x
ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs. HOME
DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND
G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000

Facts:
petitioner Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter
PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995, from
the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan.
The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board
Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company
to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, 3 it must have a plan providing for
both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-
IBIG Fund.
PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules
are invalid. In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted
by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise
of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF.
HDMF disapproved PETITIONERs application on the ground that the requirement that there
should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the
phrase and/or, and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal
Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law. The respondent Board was merely
exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use
and only instead of or in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the Pag-
IBIG Fund Law. By choosing and, the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by
the use of and/or in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended.
PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.
Held: YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words and/or.
It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752
intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to
that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the
employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to
qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or.
Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or
suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be
so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as
sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans
is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more
stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By
removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has
exceeded its authority.
It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51
17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules
and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII
of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that
employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees
in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No.
1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996
Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent
repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board.
The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent
with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant
or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only
Congress can repeal or amend the law.
Constitutional Law 1 Exception to Non-

Delegation Doctrine- Delegation to the President
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT
ZONE, Petitioners,
vs.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by its President JOSE T. DIZON,
UNITED AUCTIONEERS, INC., represented by its President DOMINIC SYTIN, and
MICROVAN, INC., represented by its President MARIANO C. SONON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 164172 February 20, 2006

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC), COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC BAY FREE
PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, Petitioners,
vs.
SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO VENTURES CORP., represented by its President YOLANDA
AMBAR,Respondent.
G.R. No. 168741 February 20, 2006

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE CHIEF OF THE LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE, Petitioners,
vs.
MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY FREEPORT, INC., represented
by its President ALFREDO S. GALANG, Respondent.
CASE This instant consolidated petitions seek to annul the decisions of the Regional Trial
Court which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order 156 unconstitutional. Said
EO 156 prohibits the importation of used vehicles in the country inclusive of the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone.
FACTS
On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive
Order 156 entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and
directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing
guidelines." The said provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor
vehicles in the country including the Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone,
subject to a few exceptions.
Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by

Southwing Heavy Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor
Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be
rendered declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal.
The RTC rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1
of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by
the Constitution with Congress and that the proviso is contrary to the
mandate of Republic Act 7227(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital
within the Freeport.
The petitioner appealed in the CA but was denied on the ground of lack of any
statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the
prohibition on the importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police
power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise
thereof by the President through an executive issuance is void.
ISSUE
Whether or not Article2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the Presidents
quasi-legislative power. YES.
SC RULING
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional
limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society.
It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative
boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the
barangay. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative
power which may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to
the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the
provisions of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply
with the following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by
the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and
statutory bases.
Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said
executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by
law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved way for the
issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence of
substantive due process in the issuance of the EO.
In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the
third requisite as administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the
limits of the authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws
authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor
vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to
the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory.
The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs
territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport
where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and
customs laws are in force and effect."
Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is
unreasonable. Since the nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from
the deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds
no logic in all the encompassing application of the assailed provision to the
Freeport Zone which is outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as
the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm
sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise.
The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is VOID insofar as it is
made applicable within the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area
but is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the
Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic
Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres.
Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax and Duty Free Privilege within the Subic
Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine
territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored,
used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot
be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base area.
Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared

VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently
fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its
application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, v HARRY T. SUTTON,
Respondent inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondent made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner
DAR to avail incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657 known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988 took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock,
poultry and swine.
An en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, ruled that land devoted to
livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land.
In view of the Luz Farm ruling, respondent filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted
from the coverage of the CARL. Petitioner ignored their request.
DAR issue A.O No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portion of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded
from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded the A.O fixed
the following retention limits, viz 1:1 animal-land ratio and the ration of 1.7815 hectares for
livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the
operation of the CARL.
DAR Secretary Garilao issue an Order partially granting the application of respondents for
exemption from the coverage of CARL applying the retention limit outlined in the DAR A.O
No. 9. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed
under Compulsory Acquisition.
On October 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.
It ruled that DAR A.O. no. 9 does not run counter to the Luz Farm case as the A.O provided
the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.
Issue:
Whether of not DAR A.O No.9 is unconstitutional?
Held:
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature. They have been
granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law
entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern
governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune
from judicial review. They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they
do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed
by the administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and
regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of
the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to
abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to
enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, SC find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage
of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear
intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-
raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural
activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It
is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the
assailed A.O.
Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in
the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding
capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no
evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the
business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that
respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL
prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the
effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of
respondents.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by

Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the
previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an
earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No.
7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the
definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its
coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With
this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian
laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from
the coverage of agrarian reform.
Maxima Realty Management and Development Corporation v Parkway Real Estate

Development Corporation (2004, Ynares-Santiago)
Facts:
Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium in Makati City is subject of this controversy.
[Summary of this controversy: DEFAULT IN PAYMENT FOR CONDO]
o Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) sold it to Masahiko Morishita
o Masahiko Morishita sold and assigned all rights thereto in favor of Parkway Real
Estate Development Corporation (Parkway)
o Parkway and Maxima Realty and Development Corporation entered into an
agreement to buy and sell, on instalment basis for P3 million. Part of the
stipulation included a default clause that Maxima will forfeit amounts paid by
way of liquidated damages in case of failure to pay.
o Maxima defaulted, and was able to pay P1.18 million because of grace periods.
(Balance = P1.82 million)
o On May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia arranged for a Deed of
Assignment transferring all rights to the condominium in favour of Maxima so
that Maxima has show property to secure a loan with RCBC. Segovia and Maxima
agreed also that the title will be transferred under Maximas name for P58,114
as transfer fees, and other expenses.
o Maxima continued its default with Parkway and Segovia.
o Parkway cancelled its agreement to buy and sell with Maxima, as well as the
Deed of Assignment.
Maxima filed a case with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for specific performance to
enforce the agreement to buy and sell. HLURB Arbiter sustained nullification.
[IMPORTANT FACTS:]
Maxima appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB (Board). At this level,
Maxima agreed to pay the outstanding balance but still failed to pay, and the appeal was
again resolved in favour of Parkway. Maxima received the decision on April 19, 1994.
On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed the Boards decision to the Office of the President,
which dismissed the appeal for being filed out of time.
Maxima brought the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision
of the Office of the President.
Issue:
Was the petitioners appeal before the Office of the President filed within the reglementary
period?
Ruling:
NO. Following the doctrine laid out in SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President, it
resolved the conflict between two rules.
15 of PD 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Degree) and 2 of PD
1344 (Empowering the National Hosing Authority to issue Writ of Execution in the
Enforcement of its Decision under PD No. 957), the period to appeal the decision of the
Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the assailed decision.
While the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure suggest a 30-day period of appeal under
Section 27, the same stipulation also provides for following Administrative Order No.
18 series of 1987, which starts with Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special
laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from
receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or
appealed from.
This Administrative Order qualifies such 30-day period, and because of the two PDs
mentioned above that falls squarely on the controversy (a sale of a condo), the 15-day
period applies.
In fact, Sec. 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in
conflict with the provisions of the aforementioned presidential decrees. For it is
axiomatic that administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that
they are intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with [the]
statute itself is null and void.
In the case at bar, the 15-day period applies, so if the adverse decision was received on
April 19, 1994, the appeal to the Office of the President should have been filed on May 4,
1994. May 10 was beyond the reglementary period.
Peralta v. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 95832. August 10, 1992]
FACTS
Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon the
Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations
for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission interpreted
provisions of Republic Act No. 2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted
a policy that when an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on
a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also considered on leave
of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by
the said policy, questioned the said administrative interpretation.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Civil Service Commissions interpretative construction is:
(1) valid and constitutional.
(2) binding upon the courts.
RULING
(1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in
accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that
government employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full pay exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. The law speaks of the granting of a right and the
law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave
credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such
right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.The fact remains that
government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not
required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not
be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered
absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary
corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay
on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A different rule
would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.
(2) NO. Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding upon the courts.
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. When an administrative or executive agency renders an
opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and
the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means.
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal
contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.
To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to
claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated
CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local
governments considering the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also,
administrative and practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will
have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the
respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this
problem with justice and equity to all affected government employees.
G.R. No. 143596, December 11, 2003
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), HON. GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR, COMMISSION
ON AUDIT and HON. SALVACION DALISAY, PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes, is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. His salary and representation and transportation
allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. Besides that,
petitioner also received a monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds of the Municipality
of Naujan starting 1984.
On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved a resolution increasing

petitioner judges monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting
May 1993. This supplemental budget was approved by the municipal government (the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan) and was also likewise approved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and Management of
Oriental Mindoro.
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment
of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner judge and to require the immediate
refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She reasoned that
the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA
the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court. Petitioner judge appealed the
matter to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of
Provincial Auditor Dalisay.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro can validly provide RATA to its
Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides:
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants . . ., and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective
municipal government, and in this connection shall:
xxx
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for additional
allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school
teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the
municipality; (emphasis supplied)
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section has been repealed, modified or
amended by NCC No. 67, RA 7645 (the General Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No.
53. A review of the two laws, however, shows that this was not so. Section 36 of RA 7645
merely provided for the different rates of RATA payable to national government officials or
employees, depending on their position, and stated that these amounts were payable from
the programmed appropriations of the parent agencies to which the concerned national
officials or employees belonged. Furthermore, there was no other provision in RA 7645 from
which a repeal of Section 447(a) (l)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied. In the absence,
therefore, of any clear repeal of Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160, it cannot be presume to be
such intention on the part of the legislature.
The NCC No. 67 on the other hand, seeks to prevent the dual collection of RATA by a national
official from the budgets of more than one national agency. It is in fact an administrative tool
of the DBM to prevent the much-abused practice of multiple allowances, thus standardizing
the grant of RATA by national agencies. It was issued primarily to make the grant of RATA to
national officials under the national budget uniform. In other words, it applies only to the
national funds administered by the DBM, not the local funds of LGUs.
Now, though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within the ambit of the President's
power of general supervision over LGUs, the SC ruled that Section 3, paragraph (e) thereof
is invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, clearly provides that provincial, city
and municipal governments may grant allowances to judges as long as their finances allow.
Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting
allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by the national
government or (2) similar to the allowances granted by the national government, violates
Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991. As already stated, a circular
must conform to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or amend it. Moreover,
by prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances granted by the
national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically prohibits LGUs from granting
allowances to judges and, in effect, totally nullifies their statutory power to do so. Being
unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and
being violative of their autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of
LBC No. 53 is hereby declared null and void.
ART. VIII Section 5 (5) 1987 Constitution
First Lepanto Ceramic v CA
Facts:
1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular,
1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of
cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).
2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor
tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same
nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition
for review with CA.
4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any
preliminary injunction.
5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA
does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular
1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order
or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of
Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein
runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders
of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between
B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been
resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27,
1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed
directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
FABIAN V. DESEIRTO
295 SCRA 470 Political Law Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court
Remedial Law Civil Procedure Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial Bodies
FACTS:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with
a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so
to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman
but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to
the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian
appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented
to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was
intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction
of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over final judgments and orders of lower
courts, that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the
quasi-judicial bodies or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements
and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted
to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS,
respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-
monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value
added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only
the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home. Sometime
in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker,
asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of
gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the
business.
January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the
management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of
taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same
were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.
As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment.
ISSUE:
1. the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring
that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his
office had no jurisdiction over the case.
2. private respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC remanded the case to LA. MR was filed by
the petitioner which was denied.
RULING:
1) HISTORY: the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor
by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be
appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect
six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which
was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy
coordination only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an
aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor,
but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No
appellate review has since then been provided for.
the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and
formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review
thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power
of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep
the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the
reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day
period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of
the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the
reglementary period under Rule 65.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil
action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted
could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here
is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of
this Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the
intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
2) Appeal.
-review of NLRC Decision is through Rule 65.
-jurisdiction: SC AND CA
-by way of hierarchy: the review shall be initially filed before CA.
Legislative Power of Local Government Units
LAGCAO V. LABRA Eminent Domain of Local Government in Legislation

October 13, 2004 | Corona, J.
FACTS: The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the mayor of Cebu
City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of lot (1029) of petitioners
Diosdado, Doroteo and Ursula Lagcao.
In 1964, Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu, one of which is the lot 1029.
1965, petitioners purchased said lot on installment but in late 1925, these 210 lots reverted
to the Province of Cebu. The latter tried to annul sale which resulted to the filing of the case
of the petitioners. RTC and CA ruled in their favor and as such a deed of sale was executed
and a TCT was issued in their favor. When they tried to take possession of the land, they
found out that it was occupied by squatters. Thus, they instituted ejectment proceedings
which was later on granted by the MTCC and affirmed by RTC. However, Mayor Garcia wrote
letters requesting the deferment of the demolition since the city was still looking for a
relocation site for the squatters; this was granted. During the suspension the Sang.
Panlungsod of Cebu passed a resolution and 2 ordinances (all about the lot 1029). Ord. No.
1843 likewise appropriated the amount of 6, 881, 600 for the payment of subject land; this
was approved by the Mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exercise of eminent domain is valid in the case at bar.
HELD: NO, it is NOT VALID. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character. Govt. may not
capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this
case, there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation
by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance
no. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a socialized
housing project. Moreover, under RA 7279, private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted
to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Thus, the ordinance in question
is likewise null because: (1) it is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of RA 7279 and
7160 (LGC); (2) the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression
masquerading as pro-poor ordinance; (3) the fact that the land was singled out manifests
partiality against petitioners; (4) it failed to show that there was reasonable relation
bet. the end sought and the means adopted.
Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14
FACTS:
Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation
of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overtaking a truck. Petitioner initiated
an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary
injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid.
HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992.
However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and
Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over
an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it must not contravene
... the statute for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status
and subordinate to the laws of the state.
LATIN MAXIM:
Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.
Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of the statute there should be no
departure.
Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. Later statutes repeal prior ones which
are repugnant thereto.
H. VALIDITY OF STATUTES
i. Juducial Review
Francisco, Jr. V. Nagmamalasakit na mga Mananananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc.
Facts:
-On June 2, 2003, former President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide, Jr. and seven Associate Chief Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable
violation if the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. Such complaint
was grounded on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund.
-The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first complaint was sufficient in form but
insufficient in substance. Committee Report was not sent to the House in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
-A second impeachment complaint was filed four months and three weeks since the filing of
the first complaint, by Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella. Such complaint was grounded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
-Instant petitions arose against the HOR, most of which contend that the filing of the second
impeachment is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Issues:
1) WON the offenses alleged in the Second Impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offense under the Constitution
2) WON the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4),
Article XI of the Constitution.
3) WON the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconsitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
4) WON Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Impeachment adopted by the 12 th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating privisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
5) WON the second complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Discussion
Issue 1: The discussion of the issue of impeachable offense would require the SC to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such determination of a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the discretion of the legislation.
While Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution gives six grounds for impeachment,
two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, still need a clear cut
definition. The issue is a non-justiciable political question beyond the scope of judicial power.
Issue 2: The second impeachment complaint was not filed in accordance with Section 3(4),
Article XI of the Consitution.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third
of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
The verified complaint or resolution of impeachment was not filed by at least ine-tihrd of
all the Members of the House. In order for the second impeachment to become the Articles
of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to bein, the verified complaint must be filed, not
merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the members of HOR.
There should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution
of impeachment.
The Resolution of Endorsement/ Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of HOR as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one member
or any citizied with a verified impeachment complaint.
Issue 3: This issue is far from the validity of the second impeachment complaint. The
resolution of the said issue would require the SC to form a rule of constitutional law touching
on, the separate matter of legislative inquiries in egenral, which would thus be broader than
is required by the facts of the consolidated cases.
However, one argument is wort mentioning. Alfonso, et al. argues that the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it resulted from a Resolution calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF. This is unconstitutional for being: a) a violation of the rules and
jurisprudence on investigation in aid of legislation, b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers, c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary. D) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.
Issue 4: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating privisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
Respondent HOR SC and amicus curiae

It does not violate. Section 16 and 17 of The HOR has already initiated the
Rule 5 of the House Impeachment Rules impeachment proceeding. The beginning
do not violate Section 3(5) of Article XI or the initiation is the filing of the
of the Constitution. The HOR has the complaint and its referral to the Committee
exlusive power to initiate all cases of in Justice.
impeachment. The term initiate does Furthermore, the impeachment is deemed
not mean to file; Filing can be initiated when the Justice Committee
accomplished in 3 ways votes in favor of impeachment or when the
1)Verified complaint for impeachment House reverses a contrary vote of the
by any member of the HOR; or (2) by Committee. Therefore, the inititation
any citizen upon a resolution of happened earlier.
endorsement by any member; or (3) by Initiation of impeachment proceeding starts
at least 1/3 of all the members of the with the filing of the complaint.
House. The impeachment complaint had
not been initiated by the HOR. To the Impeachment case legal proceeding that
HOR, filing and initiating are two must be decided by the Senate
different things.
Impachment proceeding process that
must be done before an impeachment case
can be passed to the Senate
Issue 5: The second complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
The initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House of Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period, following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Ruling
Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
Position of respondents/ HOR: The impeachment is a political action which cannot

assume a judicial character. Any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of
the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.
The Senates sole power to try impeachment cases: (1) exluceds the application
of judicial review over it; (2) includes the Senates power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.
Judicial review over impeachment proceedings runs counter to the framers

decision to allocate to different for a the powers to try impeachments and to
try crimes. It disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary.
Political question a question of policy; questions that are to be decided by the

people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
Justiciable question a question that is appropriate to be tried and settled in a court

of law.
Judicial power includes the duty of courst of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government. This remains
the overlying principle by which the courts determine whether or not an issue is
justiciable, and has led to the establishment of the justiciability doctrines. These
doctrines are used to determine whether a case or controversy actually exists, and if
one does then the issues are considered justiciable.
Political questions can either be 1)truly political question, or 2) not truly political
question
Truly political questions are beyond judicial review
Not truly political questions can be reviewed under Section1 , Article VIII of the
Constitution
However, it must be noted that even if we were to assume that the issue presented
to us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving I tunder
the expanded jursidiction conferred upon us that now covers even the political
question.
Test of justiciability: Are there constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon a certain political body? If yes, judicial review is
warranted. If none, non-justiciable political question.
Test of justiciability (American concept)

o Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department?
o Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it?
o Is it impossible to decide without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-juridical discretion?
Mutuc vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32717
November 26, 1970
Ponente: Fernando, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner Amelito Mutuc filed his candidacy for the position of delegate to the
Constitutional Convention. Herein respondent, COMELEC, through a telegram, informed the
petitioner that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from
using jingles (recorded or taped voice of a singer) in his mobile units and loud speakers.
Finding the order violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech, Mutuc filed a
special civil action for prohibition and prayed for preliminary injunction.
Respondent Commission invoked a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act
(R.A. 6132) which states that it is unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce request or
distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like whether of domestic or foreign origin to justify its prohibition
to use jingles, as they are also tangible propaganda materials within the ambit of the above
enumeration .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed order of the respondent Commission is unconstitutional.
HELD:
Case
The respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside
of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.
In an unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgement of free speech
or a free press. It has been the Courts constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all
the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
What COMELEC did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil

against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify
its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be
free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the
constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say,
but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances.
If the Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be
distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate
indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures.
Principle
The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it
is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest
the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The
Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its
task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the Judiciary is called upon
to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial
review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount.
It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is
a recognition of its being the supreme law.
Wherefore, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the
use of political taped jingles.
Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The
procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of
this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof;
Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may
taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared
Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control
over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The
Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code
had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to
submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of
the LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section
5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality
upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also
emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful
hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first
carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them
to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to
sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing
that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or
both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also
be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render
a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall
not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the
sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not
replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it
was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for
the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,
he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That
section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not
merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been
observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was
never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the
same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality
or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein
of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax
measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing,
no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into
Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not
been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only
five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25
exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the procedural
requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-
2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita
and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance
was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993
issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission
does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the
text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to
the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local
government unit and not to tax ordinances.
Philippine Assoc. of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education

95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws
sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these
laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person
may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary
of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools.
It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from
being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice
abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted
to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the
Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary
amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show
that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers
granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates
certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties
of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino
morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period
only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising
the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint
visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary
equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian
authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of
the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution.
Gonzalez v. Narvasa
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the PreparatoryCommission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of
implementing them.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case
Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen
and taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a
favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining
anypersonal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights
or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to
any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought
only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation
of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The
appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds
used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of
the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to
determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.
City of Baguio, ET AL. vs. PIO R. MARCOS, ET AL.

FACTS
On April 12, 1912, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted
the reopening of cadastral proceedings (a land registration/ titling proceeding) Civil Case
No.1. A decision on November 13, 1922 was rendered; the land involved (Baguio
Townsite) was among those declared public lands.
On July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned cadastral court to reopen said civil case. He claims
that the land (Baguio Townsite) be registered in his name upon the grounds that 1.) he and
his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish times 2.) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus were not able to file their
claim to the land in question.
On the other hand, Francisco G. Joaquin Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Teresita J. Buchholz,
as tree farm lessees of the land in question, opposed the reopening. Their contentions are as
follows: 1.) The reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided by
R.A. 931 2.) Petition to reopen the case was not published 3.) as lessees of the land, they
have a standing to appear in the reopening proceedings
ISSUE/S:
Statcon issue here is whether the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period
provided by R.A. 931 (enacted June 20, 1953). Joaquins group contests that the title of
the said act is in conflict with section 1 of the same act, thus invalidating the petition of
Lutes to reopen the civil case.
Title of the act reads:
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN

CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN
DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED WITHIN THE
FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 of the act provides:
SECTION 1. in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby
granted
HELD:
The court allowed the reopening of the case since the case was filed within the 40-year period
imposed by the act.
Joaquins group believes that the difference between the title (BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL
DECISIONS RENDERED and in section 1 (by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted), is
material. If the title is to be followed, the date November 13, 1922 should be the date used
in reckoning the period (which is still within the 40-year period; counted from the date of
the enactment of R.A. 931 which is June 20, 1953). But if the wordings of the title are to be
followed, the date April 12, 1912, which is the date the Director of lands instituted the
reopening of the case, would render the petition invalid since it is already outside the 40-
year period.
The rule on statutory construction provides that laws should be construed liberally (see page
12 of statcon book). The spirit or the intent of the law should be looked upon and should
prevail over its letter. In this case, R.A. 931 clearly gives an opportunity to any person who
has any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as public land to present his
claim within the time prescribed. This act is a piece of remedial legislation; its intent provides
a mode of relief to landowners who, before the act had no legal means of perfecting titles.
Therefore, the court cannot see an inconsistency between the title and its section.
The title of the act is indisputably clear, as it expresses the very substance of the law itself.
The constitutional jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title,
breathes the spirit of command because the constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill.
Therefore, by the statute, the petition of Lutes to reopen the case, decision on which was
rendered on Nov. 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
Sotto v COMELEC
Facts:
V. Sotto filed for a review for the decision of COMELEC declaring E. Javier as the true and
legitimate Pres. of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party. Sotto contends that he is the
President.
Issue:
W/N the Supreme Court(S.C) can review Sottos petition under sec.9 of the Commonwealth
Act 657 w/c states that any decision, order or ruling of COMELEC may be reviewed by the SC
by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or w/ such rules as may be
promulgated by the SC
Held:
No. The words may be reviewed by writ of certiorari does not refer to the special civil
action of certiorari. Sotto filed a special civil action of review of decision w/c means that the
SC can only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions
when it acted in excess of his/its jurisdiction (not the review of the actual decision of the
lower court w/c should be filed as an appeal)
(STATCON PRINCIPLE: NECESSITY OF DECIDING CONSTITUTIONALITY)
A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide on it unless it is raised by
the parties. If a constitutional question is raised, it should present some other ground upon
w/c the court may rest its judgment. The constitutional question will be left for consideration
until a case arises in w/c the decision for it is inevitable.
Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order

J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.
S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years
of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not
be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that
the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore,
class legislation.
His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who
was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie
nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.
He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as

authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art.
XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fidecandidate for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also
attacked the term of office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6,
and Sec 1 of BP 52.
Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?
Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted
Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial
review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question
a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his
disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely
affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the
issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be
dismissed.
However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the
imminent elections.
2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of

equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated
and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65
years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not
so compulsorily retirable.
The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a

reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason
to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in
the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for
the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of
the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does
it permit such denial.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all
legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments.
The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid
"even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies.
Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running from public office on the ground alonethat charges have been filed against him
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts
of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime
with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the
right to hold office during the term of the sentence.
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore,
may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted

for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.
IN RE CUNANAN 94 PHIL. 534

FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The
title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to
and including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the
title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953
to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based
under the following reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World
War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the
said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice
law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will
not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facts of the case
The Tennessee Valley Authority was a government corporation established as part of the
New Deal to improve the economy of the state. For example, projects of the TVA included
improving navigation on the state's rivers, constructing flood control projects, and
generating hydroelectric power. Shareholders in a private Tennessee power company sued
to prevent the TVA from acquiring over half of the company's property and equipment. The
proposed contract which detailed the sale would allow the government agency to allocate
electric power to consumers.
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), U.S. government agency established in 1933 to control
floods, improve navigation, improve the living standards of farmers, and produce electrical
power along the Tennessee River and its tributaries. The Tennessee River was subject to
severe periodic flooding, and navigation along the rivers middle course was interrupted by
a series of shoals at Muscle Shoals, Ala. In 1933 the U.S. Congress passed a bill establishing
the TVA, thus consolidating all the activities of the various government agencies in the area
and placing them under the control of a single one. A massive program of building
dams, hydroelectric generating stations, and flood-control projects ensued. The fusion of a
broad range of specific powers with a sense of social responsibility to the region made the
TVA significant as a prototype of natural-resource planning. Its jurisdiction is generally
limited to the drainage basin of the Tennessee River, which covers parts of seven
states: Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
The TVA is a public corporation governed by a board of three directors appointed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate. The constitutionality of the TVA was
immediately challenged upon the agencys establishment, but it was upheld by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) and in later decisions.
Issue
Did Congress exceed its power in implementing and administering the TVA?
Ruling
No. The Court held that Congress did not abuse its power with the TVA. Justice Hughes
argued that the Wilson Dam, the location where the TVA was in the business of generating
electricity, had been built originally in the interest of national defense: it produced materials
involved in munitions manufacture. The government could sell excess electricity to
consumers without violating the Constitution. This case is especially important for the
concept of judicial review as expressed in Justice Brandeis's concurrence.. Brandeis
articulated a set of "rules" governing the appropriateness of judicial review to wit:
1. The substantive law - Within recognized limits, stockholders may invoke the judicial
remedy to enjoin acts of the management which threaten their property interest. But
they cannot secure the aid of a court to correct what appear to them to be mistakes of
judgment on the part of the officers. Courts may not interfere with the management
of the corporation unless there is bad faith, disregard of the relative rights of its
members, or other action seriously threatening their property rights. This rule
applies whether the mistake is due to error of fact or of law or merely to bad business
judgment. It applies, among other things, where the mistake alleged is the refusal to
assert a seemingly clear cause of action, or the compromise of it.
2. Second. The equity practice - Even where property rights of stockholders are alleged
to be violated by the management, stockholders seeking an injunction must bear the
burden of showing danger of irreparable injury, as do others who seek that equitable
relief. In the case at bar, the burden of making such proof was a peculiarly heavy one.
The plaintiffs, being preferred stockholders, have but a limited interest in the
enterprise, resembling, in this respect, that of a bondholder, in contradistinction to
that of a common stockholder. Acts may be innocuous to the preferred which
conceivably might injure common stockholders. There was no finding that the
property interests of the plaintiffs were imperiled by the transaction in question, and
the record is barren of evidence on which any such finding could have been made.
3. Third. The practice in constitutional cases - The fact that it would be convenient for
the parties and the public to have promptly decided whether the legislation assailed
is valid cannot justify a departure from these settled rules of corporate law and
established principles of equity practice. On the contrary, the fact that such is the
nature of the enquiry proposed should deepen the reluctance of courts to entertain
the stockholder's suit. It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a
legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the
human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility
4. Fourth. I am aware that, on several occasions, this Court passed upon important
constitutional questions which were presented in stockholders' suits bearing a
superficial resemblance to that now before us. But in none of those cases was the
question presented under circumstances similar to those at bar. In none were the
plaintiffs preferred stockholders. In some, the Court dealt largely with questions of
federal jurisdiction and collusion. In most, the propriety of considering the
constitutional question was not challenged by any party. In most, the statute
challenged imposed a burden upon the corporation and penalties for failure to
discharge it, whereas the Tennessee Valley Authority Act imposed no obligation upon
the Alabama Power Company, and, under the contract, it received a valuable
consideration. Among other things, the Authority agreed not to sell outside the area
covered by the contract, and thus preserved the corporation against possible serious
competition. The effect of this agreement was equivalent to a compromise of a
doubtful cause of action. Certainly the alleged invalidity of the Tennessee Valley
Authority Act was not a matter so clear as to make compromise illegitimate.
5. Fifth. If the Company ever had a right to challenge the transaction with the Tennessee
Valley Authority, its right had been lost by estoppel before this suit was begun, and,
as it is the Company's right which plaintiffs seek to enforce, they also are necessarily
estopped. The Tennessee Valley Authority Act became a law on May 18, 1933.
Between that date and January, 1934, the Company and its associates purchased
approximately 230,000,000 kwh electric energy at Wilson Dam.
6. Sixth. Even where by the substantive law stockholders have a standing to challenge
the validity of legislation under which the management of a corporation is acting,
courts should, in the exercise of their discretion, refuse an injunction unless the
alleged invalidity is clear. This would seem to follow as a corollary of the long
established presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
ii. Topic: Effects of Invalidity
Manila Motor Co., Inc. vs. Flores (1956)
Facts:
The Manila Motor Company filed a complaint in Municipal court of Manila to recover from
Manuel Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which fell due in
September 1941. -Defendant pleaded prescription: 1941 to 1954 (Note: Prescription is
acquiring/losing ownership/real rights thru the lapse of time).
The complaint was dismissed. -Manila Motor appealed to CFI, with thw contention:
Petitioner's Contention:
1. Moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that
deducting the time during the operation of the law (moratorium law runs only for 3 years &
eight months). Hense the 10-year term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued in 1954.
Defendants Contention:
1. Moratorium laws did not suspend the period of limitations because it is unconstitutional
(He based this on the case Ruther vs. Esteban).
2. When a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never been

passed, and no rights can be built upon it.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the moratorium law suspended the period of prescription.
RULING:
The court decided in favor of the petitioners. Although it has been ruled in the Esteban's case
that the moratorium law is unconstitutional, there are several instances wherein courts, out
of equity, have relaxed its operation or qualified its effects 'since the actual existence of a
statue prior to such decleration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored' and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine.
Doctrine Used:
Effect of Unconstitutional Statutes:
The actual existence of statutes prior to its decleration as unconstitutional, is an operative

fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. / Doctrine of Operative
Fact: The law is recognized as uncostitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law
prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play.
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953]

INVALIDITY DUE TO CHANGE OF CONDITIONS
Facts:
On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for
P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows:
P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest
at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first
mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two
installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted
an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint
also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban
claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed
his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a
consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment
of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was
dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non- impairment clause grounds.
Held:
Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state
through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police
power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not
whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but
whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are
reasonable and appropriate to that end.
However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes
to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the
continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect.
This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason
considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the
suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
Barrameda v. Moir
PARTIAL INVALIDITY
take note of the following:

(1) Use of the word all and exclusive
(2) Statute void and valid in part Petitioner: Juan Barameda Respondent : Percy M.
Moir et.al (Judge of First Instance)
FACTS:
1.Original case: Petitioner was a defendant in a suit brought before a Justice of Peace to try
a title to a parcel of land, he lost. 2.Appeal: Petitioner appealed to the Court of First
Instance. The case was dismissed with directions to the justice of peace to execute
judgment. 3.Current case: Original application for a writ of mandamus. Petitioner also
requested for a preliminary injunction be issued to stay the execution of judgment and that
Moir be ordered to proceed the case on appeal.
ISSUE: Was Moir correct in dismissing Barramedas case?
ARGUMENTS Respondent (Judge Moir) Complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action Petitioner (Barameda) The basis of the demurrer is that Acts
no. 2041 and 2131, conferring original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to try title to
real estate,are inconsistent with and repugnant to the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 therefore
there was no basis in dismissing the case.
Act No. 2041 Sec 3 Justice of Peace shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate questions
of title to real estate or any interest therein when the value of the property in litigation does
not exceed two hundred pesos, and where such value exceeds two hundred pesos but is less
than six hundred pesos the justice of peace shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the Court
of First instance
Act no. 2131, Sec1, amended Act No. 2041 by substituting exclusive original jurisdiction for
exclusive jurisdiction
Sec 9 of the Philippine Bill on jurisdiction of CFI all civil actions which involve the title to or
possession of real property, or of any interest therein except in forcible entry and detainer
cases
*demurrer- a claim by the defendant in a legal action that the plaintiff does not have sufficient
grounds to proceed *Understanding ART 2041 and Sec 9 Sec 9 uses the word ALL
which means that there is no case involving real estate which Courts of First Instance are not
authorized to hear and determine under the Organic Law, and that being supreme, any Act
of the Philippine Legislature which attempts in any manner to curtail such jurisdiction must
be held void.
Art 2041 and 2131 three parts (1) confer original jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to
try title to real estate (2) it shall be exclusive in cases where the value of the property in
litigation does not exceed 200 pesos (3) when more than two hundred but less than 600 it
shall have concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance
DECISION: Writ denied, injunction made permanent The preliminary injunction granted
by this court, staying the execution of the judgment, will be made permanent, and the writ of
mandamus prayed for must be denied.
RATIO:
1.Jurisprudence: In Weigall v Shuster it was held that the Jurisdiction of the SC and the
Court of First Instance, as fixed by Section 9 of the Philippines Bill,may be added to but not
diminished by the Philippines Legislature. Therefore, there will be sufficient reasons for
declaring Acts No 2041 and 2131 contrary to the Philippine Bill and void if they attempt to
curtail the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance where the title to realty is involved.
2.Acts 2041 and 2131 deprives CFI of their original jurisdiction to try cases where the title
to realty value at not more than 200 is involved. Therefore, inconsistent with Sec9, Philippine
bill HOW?
ART 2041 grants Original Exclusive Jurisdiction to Justice of Peace. Exclusivity means that
all other courts must be barred from exercising jurisdiction in such cases. In such a way that
hold another court has jurisdiction also in such cases is to destroy the grantof exclusive
jurisdiction given to the other court. It is no longer exclusive when shared by another court,
but merely concurrent.
3.The second part of Art 2041 is also void (that part of concurrent jurisdiction). Why? The
second part was only supplemental and ancillary to the exclusive jurisdiction over cases not
exceeding P200. It is therefore inseparable from and absolutely dependent upon the exercise
of that exclusive jurisdiction which has already been declared void. (Based on statcon
principle explained in next number)
4. STATCON PRINCIPLE: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as
repugnant to Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from
the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so
far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presumed that the Legislature would
have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the
other. Independent means that enoughmust remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid
statute which carries legislative intent and removal of void would not affect the effectiveness
of the valid part.
5.The judgment of the justice of the peace which it is desired to have the respondentjudge in
this action review is an absolute nullity. The respondent judge acquired jurisdiction of the
case only for the purpose of dismissing it and directing justice of the peace to proceed with
execution of the void judgment, Moir was in error.
Tatad v. Secretary of Dept. of Energy
Facts:
The petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 An Act Deregulating
the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process has
two phases: (a) the transition phase and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO
No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide
a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry,
and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of
crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange
rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one subject
requirement of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of power.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition
Discussions:
1. The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or
catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general
subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.
2. Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the Court states
that:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do
is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
3. A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons
or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular
business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole
supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only
a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a
combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or
more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form
of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade
and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production, distribution and
price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority.
Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the
end.
Rulings:
1. The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has adopted a
liberal construction of the one title one subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b)
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on
imported petroleum.[20] We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision
when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.
2. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that
full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of
any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive
has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete
on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997.
Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in
the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to
the US dollar is stable.
3. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the
aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: The State shall regulate or
prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Topic: Effect and Operation

Article 2 of the CC
Section 18, Chapter 5 Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code
Taada v. Tuvera, (1985)
Chapter I, Preliminary Title, New Civil Code, Effect and Application of Laws When
Laws Take Effect
Facts:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish
and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would
be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force
and effect.
Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in
any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh
Facts of the case:
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the
Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government
under the Japanese).
The court resolved three issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation
were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared
that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts
and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts
could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto
government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of
the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,
supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or
changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of
a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it
would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating
them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of
any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and
judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de
facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been
liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes,
which would be in violation of international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or
great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that
such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and
unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets
and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to
mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other
governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in
use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts
of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws
and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until
changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE
OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and
the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and
laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it
follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases
pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished
or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said
government.
DECISION:
Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him
to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue
even during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on
judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
Kinds of de facto government:
1. established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the
voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)
2. through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of
paramount force)
3. through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants
of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Effect of Insufficiency of Title in Statutes

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Effect of Insufficiency of Title in Statutes

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Topic: How a title is construed

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