Criterion Vol 12 No 3

July/September 2017
Volume 12, Number 3
Articles
Hindutva: Its Past & Future A. G. Noorani 3
Radicalisation Patterns and Efficacy Air Com. (R) Khalid Iqbal 16

of Contemporary Counter Narratives
Sindh and Partition Yasser Latif Hamdani 39
Challenges and Opportunities in a Post ISIS Ozer Khalid 61

Territorial World An Ongoing Global Menace
Essays
North Koreas Chemical & Biological S. Mushfiq Murshed 95
Weapons Proliferation
OIC Origin, Record and Prospects! Khalid Saleem 99
Shanghai Cooperation Organization comes of age M Saeed Khalid 110
Realignments in the Region: Fauzia Nasreen 120

Challenges for Pakistan
World disorder and Pakistan Javid Husain 128

Hindutva: Its Past & Future
HINDUTVA: ITS PAST & FUTURE
A. G. Noorani*
Abstract
(Hinduism is a noble and ancient faith. Hindutva is a modern and
fascist concept Under Modi the gloves are off. Hindutva has acquired
a menacing lease on life.- Author.
In this article, A.G. Noorani references and analysis the rise of Hindutva
in India based on a central theme - rejection of the very concept of
Indian nationalism; i.e. territorial nationalism. And the formulation
of the concept of cultural nationalism which the Bharatiya Jan
Sangh and its successor the Bharatiya Janata Party swear by. Cultural
nationalism is a deceptive cover for Hindu religious nationalism.
Editor and Quotes from Author)
The term Hindutva was coined by V.D. Savarkar in his seminal

essay Hindutva, published in 1923. But its roots went back over half
a century earlier. He made it plain that Hindutva is not identical with
Hindu Dharma. He was right. Hinduism is a noble and ancient faith.
Hindutva is a modern and fascist concept.
The Arya Samaj was founded by Swami Dayanand in Bombay on

10 April 1875. He began as a reformer of Hinduism and its religious
practices but his exclusiveness proved harmful. His ideas paved
the way for the emergence of the ideology of the Hindu Nation and
Hindu Nationalism Dayanand injected an element of militancy and
zealotry in Hinduism (Dr. B. R. Purhot; Hindu Revivalism and Indian
Nationalism; Madhupriya, Bhopal; 1990; a neglected work rich in
insights).
* The author is an eminent Indian scholar and expert on constitutional issues.
CRITERION July/September 2017 3

A. G. Noorani
Prof. Chetan Bhatt demonstrates how the seeds sown by Dayanand
sprouted. In 1989, Lajpat Rai published an article for the Indian National
Congress in the Hindustan Review in which he declared that Hindus are
a nation in themselves, because they represent a civilization all their
own. However, for Lajpat Rai, this idea was directly influenced by a
conception of Hindu nationalism in the aftermath of the purification
of Hinduism by the Arya Samaj. In 1902, Lajpat Rai entered a debate
occurring in the pages of Hindustan Review and Kayastha Samachar
between an anonymous Hindu Nationalist and Pandit Madhao Ram
about the basis for creating Hindu Nationalism (A Study of Hindu
Nationalism in Lajpat Rai 1966: 37-44).
A question has often haunted us, asleep or awake, as to why is it that

notwithstanding the presence among us of great, vigorous and elevating
truths, and of the very highest conception of morality, we [Hindus] have
been a subject race, held down for so many centuries by sets of people
who were neither physically nor spiritually nor even intellectually so
superior to us as a fortiori to demand our subjection.
It was precisely this question that preoccupied both B.S. Moonje and
K.B. Hedgewar, from which they derived the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) as the answer. In a densely fascinating way, a logic was
started that severely minimized British colonialism within a much
longer historical frame of Hindu resistance to what were conceived
as all foreign invaders. This logic culminated in Savarkars Hindutva
(1923) and Swami Shraddhanands Hindu Sangathan Saviour of a
dying race (1926), both written in the midst of one of the most violent
troubled periods of anti-colonial agitation during the first manifestation
of a genuinely mass anti-colonial movement, but which can be read
with barely any indication within them that British colonialism was
even present. (A similar theme preoccupied later Hindutva ideologues:
the British colonial period was effectively dismissed or conceived as
relatively being, even civilizing and moral in character in comparison
with the early or high medieval periods of Mughal rule, which were
seen as periods of ruthless oppression and genocide of Hindus). (Hindu
Nationalism; Berg, Oxford; pp. 50-53). It is a war on history and a
revenge on the Muslims of today for imagined wrongs of the past.
4 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

Nor must one forget the role played by Bankimchandra Chatterjee
in the spread of the concept of Hindu nationalism as opposed to Indian
Nationalism. He wrote the novel Anandamath (1882) in which occurs
the poem Bande Matram which was anti-Muslim. It was promoted by
some as Indias National anthem and has proved to be a virtual anthem
for the contemporary Hindutva movement (ibid.; p.27).
Interestingly it was none other than Lala Lajpat Rai who noted the
growth of Hindu revivalism in the 9th of the series of 13 articles he wrote
for The Tribune in 1924. In their own way, Hindu revivalists have left
nothing undone to create a strictly exclusive and aggressive communal
feeling. Early in the eighties of the last century some of the Hindu
religious leaders came to the conclusion that Hinduism was doomed
unless it adopted the aggressive features of militant Islam and militant
Christianity. The Arya Samaj is a kind of militant Hinduism. But the
idea was by no means confined to the Arya Samaj. Swami Vivekanad
and his gifted disciple Sister Nivedita, among others, were of the same
mind. The articles which she wrote on aggressive Hinduism are the
clearest evidence of that mentality.
It must be remembered in this connection that Western knowledge,

Western thought, and Western mentality took hold of the Hindu mind
at a very early period of British rule. The Brahmo Samaj was the first
product of it. In the early sixties the Brahmo Samaj was a non-Hindu
body, and under its influence Hindu scholars, thinkers, and students
were becoming cosmopolitans. Some became Christians; others
took to atheism and became completely westernized. Thus a wave
of indifferentism about Hinduism spread over the country. The Arya
Samaj movement, and aggressive Hinduism, was a reaction against that
un-Hinduism and indifferentism. Most of the early Hindu leaders of
the Indian National Congress were in this sense non-Hindus. What did
Mr. S. N. Banerjea or Lal Mohan Ghosh or Ananda Mohan Bose care
for Hinduism? Even Mahadev Govind Ranade was but an indifferent
Hindu. G.K. Gokhale was not a Hindu at all. Intellectual integrity here
went hand in hand with communal bias. In 1899 Lajpat Rai asserted
that Hindus are a nation in themselves. On 14 December 1924 he
advocated in the Tribune partition of India and partition of Punjab.

A. G. Noorani
J. N. Farquhar recorded that from 1895 to 1913 a frightful portent
flamed up in India, anarchism and murder inspired by religion that
in all the best minds the new feeling and the fresh thought are fire by
religion, either a furious devotion to some divinity of hate and blood,
or a self consecration to God and India. He went further to connect
this anarchism with the work of Dayananda, Vivekananda and others.
It is as clear as noonday that the religious aspect of anarchism was
merely an extension of that revival of Hinduism which is the work of
Dayananda, Ramkrishna, Vivekananda and the Theosophists.
Dr. Purohit opined: One may not wholly agree with such views,
yet there is some element of truth in them. That truth is that Hindu
revivalism had a powerful influence upon the Revolutionaries of India.
Bankimchandra Chatterjees Anand Math had a very powerful impact
upon the revolutionaries of the day. His depiction of future Mother
India was singularly religious; future Mother India was Durga, the
goddess with a resplendent face, wearing all sorts of weapons of force in
her hands, and in the left hand seizing the hair of the Asura, her enemy,
and in the right hand assuring all not to be afraid. The revolutionaries
who moved incognito as Sanyasins were like the characters in the
Anand Math. Durga, the goddess and the mother, became one with
the country, the greater goddess and the mother. His Bande Mataram
became the hymn for the revolutionaries.
Hindu revivalism has influenced the development of Indian

nationalism both positively and negatively. We reach a stage here when
it must be pointed out that the positive contribution of revivalism to
Indian nationalism becomes feeble and the negative role of revivalism
becomes more prominent. With the growth of the Mahasabha and RSS
ideologies, a new current of nationalism the Hindu Nationalism grew
powerful in the country. Hindu nationalism, instead of supplementing the
forces of Indian nationalism, tried even to supplant it. The opposition of
Indian nationalism by Hindu Rashtravad was detrimental to the steady
growth of the former. Hindu revivalism reached its high water mark
under the aegis of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh. (B. R. Purhoit; 1990; pp. 171-173).

These forces organized themselves. The Hindu Sabha were formed
in many cities, especially in Punjab, in Aryas Samajist stronghold. In
1909 a Provincial Hindu Conference, held at Lahore, was attended by
Lajpat Rai who made a speech on the Desirability of Feeling of Hindu
Nationality and Hindu Unity, during which he reiterated his earlier
statement of 1902 about Hindus constituting a distinct and separate
nation. In 1913, the Hindu Sabha undertook to form an India-wise
(Sarvadeshik) Hindu Sabha to safeguard the interests of the Hindu
Community throughout India and the following year, the first Akhil
Bharatiya (All India) Hindu Mahasabha Conference was organized at
Hardwar during the Kumbh Mela. Further meetings were held during
1915 that defined the objectives of the All India Hindu Sabha.
The Sabha framed its objective of loyal cooperation with the colonial
government. Indeed, the All India Hindu Sabha did not organize annual
national meetings during the mass satyagraha and boycott periods of
1919 or 1920, partly because it was by then a moribund organization but
also because it tended to remain aloof from the explicit non-cooperation
strategy of Congress. However, in its session of April 1921, during
which the Sabha was renamed the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, the
objective of loyal cooperation was appended with the aim of evolving
a united and self-governing Indian nation.
The influences upon and leadership of the Hindu Mahasabha from

1924 included N.C. Kelkar, Lajpat Rai, Madan Mohan Malaviya and B.S.
Moonje, important figures in the next phase of the development of Hindu
nationalist ideology and practice. Under Malaviya, the Mahasabha
had made significant inroads into the political machinery of Congress,
opposing both the Gandhian and Swarajist factions and their (divergent)
strategies of non-cooperation. By 1926, the Mahasabha had not only
claimed the right, within Congress, of its local Sabhas to nominate their
own candidates for local elections but had attempted to get Congress
to abstain from provincial elections where the Mahasabha proffered an
alternative candidate representing Hindu interests. From the early
1920s, the attention of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha turned towards
the issue of religious conversions and shuddhi, and the formation of the
All-India Shuddhi Sabha in 1923 under the aegis of the Arya Samaj.

A. G. Noorani
This had two aspects: campaigns to reclaim neo-Christians and neo-
Muslims, and eventually any Muslims, into Hinduism; and campaigns
to purify, uplift and return to the Hindu fold those belonging to
untouchable or adivasi (tibal) groups. (Chetan Bhat; pp. 59-60).
As the Mahasabha went into a decline, another more powerful

body cropped up. It was the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). It
was founded at Nagpur by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar who maintained
close ties with the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha - B.S. Moonje and
Savarkar (Walter K. Andersen and Shridhar Damle; The Brotherhood in
Saffron; 1987; p.39).
Hedgewar died in 1940 after designating M.S. Golwalkar as his

successor. By the time Golwalkar died in 1973 he had built up the RSS
not only as a formidable force organizationally but also enunciated for it
an ideology which, he admitted, drew upon Savarkars Hindutva.
Together three important Hindu texts poisoned the atmosphere and

debased public discourse. They form a coherent whole based on one
central theme rejection of the very concept of Indian nationalism; i.e.
territorial nationalism. Every one born in the territory of India does
not belong to the nation. The concept of an Indian nation is a British
construct. Savarkar formulated the concept of cultural nationalism
which the Bharatiya Jan Sangh and its successor the Bharatiya Janata
Party swear by. Cultural nationalism is a deceptive cover for Hindu
religious nationalism. A person must share Hindu culture and outlook
before he is accepted as part of the Hindu nation which Lajpat Rai had
conceived two decades earlier.
The Jan Sangh was set up by the RSS in 1951. In 1977 it dissolved
itself and merged with other opposition parties to form the Janata Party.
It seceded in 1980 to revive the Jan Sangh as the BJP. Every election
manifesto of the BJP swears by cultural nationalism.
Savarkars doctrine in his book Hindutva (1923) reads: We Hindus

are bound together not only by the tie of the love we bear to a common
fatherland and by the common blood that courses through our veins and

keeps our hearts throbbing and our affections warm, but also by the tie
of the common homage we pay to our great civilization our Hindu
culture, which could not be better rendered than by the word Sanskriti
suggestive as it is of that language, Sanskrit, which has been the chosen
means of expression and preservation of that culture, of all that was best
and worth-preserving in the history of our race. We are one because we
are a nation a race and own a common Sanskriti (civilization).
To every Hindu, from the Santal to the Sadhu this Bharat bhumi
this Sindhusthan is at once a Pitribhu and a Punyabhu fatherland and
a holy land. That is why in the case of some of our Mohammedan or
Christian countrymen who had originally been forcibly converted to a
non-Hindu religion and who consequently have inherited along with
Hindus, a common Fatherland and a greater part of the wealth of a
common culture language, law, customs, folklore and history are not
and cannot be recognized as Hindus. Their mythology and Godmen,
ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. Consequently their
names and their outlook smack of a foreign origin they do not look
upon India as their Holyland.
But the non-Hindus are free to become Hindus. Ye, who by race,
by blood, by culture, by nationality possess almost all the essentials of
Hindutva and had been forcibly snatched out of our ancestral home by
the hand of violence ye, have only to render whole-hearted love to our
common Mother and recognize her not only as Fatherland (Pitribhu) but
even as a Holyland (punyabhu); and ye would be most welcome to the
Hindu fold.
Savarkar elaborated on the theme: These are the essentials of

Hindutva a common nation (Rashtra) a common race (Jati) and a
common civilization (Sanskriti). All these essentials could best be
summed up by stating in brief that he is a Hindu to whom Sindhusthan
is not only a Pitribhu but also a Punyabhu. For the first two essentials
of Hindutva nation and Jati are clearly denoted and connoted by
the word Pitribhu while the third essential of Sanskriti is pre-eminently
implied by the word Punyabhu, as it is precisely Sanskriti including
sacraments, that makes a land a Holyland.

A. G. Noorani
The second text is Golwalkars, We or Our Nationhood Defined,
published in 1939. The BJP tried to disown it, unsuccessfully. It was
reprinted in 2006 (Pharos Media & Publishing P. Ltd., Jamia Nagar,
New Delhi 110 025). It pays obeisance to the Divine Mother the
Hindu Nation.
His thesis is startling; applying the modern understanding of

Nation to our present conditions, the conclusion is unquestionably
forced upon us that in this country, Hindusthan, the Hindu Race with its
Hindu Religion, Hindu Culture and Hindu language, (the natural family
of Sanskrit and her offsprings) complete the Nation concept; that, in
fine, in Hindusthan exists and must needs exist the ancient Hindu nation
and naught else but the Hindu Nation. All those not belonging to the
national i.e. Hindu Race, Religion, Culture and language, naturally fall
out of the pale of real National life.
We repeat; in Hindusthan, the land of the Hindus, lives and should

live the Hindu Nation satisfying all the five essential requirements of
the scientific nation concept of the modern world. Consequently only
those movements are truly National as aim at re-building, re-vitalizing
and emancipating from its present stupor, the Hindu Nation. Those only
are nationalist patriots, who, with the aspiration to glorify the Hindu
race and Nation next to their heart, are prompted into activity and strive
to achieve that goal. All others are either traitors or enemies to the
National cause, or, to take a charitable view, idiots.
Golwalkar offers them a grim choice. There are only two courses
open to the foreign elements, either to merge themselves in the national
race and adopt its culture, or to live at its mercy so long as the national
race may allow them to do so and to quit the country at the sweet will
of the national race. That is the only sound view on the minorities
problem. That is the only logical and correct solution. That alone keeps
the national life healthy and undisturbed. That alone keeps the Nation
safe from the danger of a cancer developing into its body politic of the
creation of a state within the state. From this standpoint, sanctioned by
the experience of shrewd old nations, the foreign races in Hindusthan
must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect

and hold in reference Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of
the glorification of the Hindu race and culture, i.e., of the Hindu nation
and must lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race, or may
stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu Nation, claiming
nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment
not even citizens rights.
Advocates of Indian nationalism are roundly denounced. The

Educated class of Hindus became in truth slaves of the English, as
the late Dr. S.V. Ketkar has aptly described them. They had cut their
traces, lost their footing in the National past, and became deculturised,
denationalized people. But they also formed the bulk of the Congress
and found no difficulty in eagerly gulping down, the extra-ordinary
absurdity, that their country was not theirs, but belonged to the strangers
and enemies of their Race equally with them. These creatures took upon
themselves the burden of leading the people, to what they considered,
following the false start, as the National regeneration. And today the
same old tale of the blind leading the blind is going on, necessitating
trumpet calls of correction from right minded Patriots, following whose
resounding footsteps we have compiled this little work, towards the
same end of arousing power National Consciousness among the Hindus
in the country.
The third text was also sought to be disowned. It is Golwalkars

Bunch of Thoughts, published in 1966. These extracts from the RSS
bible reveal its outlook. In fact, we are Hindus even before we emerge
from the womb of our mother. We are therefore born as Hindus. About
the others, they are born to this world as simple unnamed human beings
and later on, either circumcised or baptized, they become Muslims or
Christians. All the requisites for making a full-fledged nation are thus
fulfilled in the life of this great Hindu people. Therefore, we say that
in this land of ours, Bharat, the national life is of the Hindu people. In
short, this is the Hindu Nation.
The question before us now is what is the attitude of those people

who have been converted to Islam or Christianity? They are born in this
land, no doubt. But are they true to its salt? Are they grateful towards

A. G. Noorani
this land which has brought them up? Do they feel that they are the
children of this land and its tradition, and that to serve it is their great
good fortune? Do they feel it a duty to serve her? No! Together with
the change in their faith, gone are the spirit of love and devotion for the
nation.
Nor does it end there. They have also developed a feeling of

identification with the enemies of this land. They look to some foreign
lands as their holy places. They call themselves Sheikhs and Syeds.
Sheikhs and Syeds are certain clans in Arabia. How then did these people
come to feel that they are their descendants? That is because they have
cut off all their ancestral national moorings of this land and mentally
merged themselves with the aggressors.
Golwalkar launches on his programme of purification. Everybody

knows that only a handful of Muslims came here as enemies and
invaders. So also only a few foreign Christian missionaries came
here. Now the Muslims and Christians have enormously grown in
number. They did not grow just by multiplication as in the case
of fishes. They converted the local population. We can trace our
ancestry to a common source, from where one portion was taken
away from the Hindu fold and became Muslim and another became
Christian. The rest could not be converted and they have remained
as Hindus.
It is our duty to call these our forlorn brothers, suffering under

religious slavery for centuries, back to their ancestral home. As honest
freedom-loving men, let them overthrow all signs of slavery and
domination and follow the ancestral ways of devotion and national life.
All types of slavery are repugnant to our nature and should be given
up. This is a call for all those brothers to take their original place in our
national life.
Golwalkar rejected the view that Hindus in this land stand on the
same footing as the Muslims. This lies at the very heart of the thesis
of Sangh Parivar (family). The land belongs to the Hindus; none else.
That explains the ghar wapsi (return to home) campaign which spread

under the BJP Government headed by Narendra Modi. In the 1920s it
was called the shuddhi (purification) movement.
One must not overlook the fact that Savarkar expounded his ideas
on Hindutva once again when he became President of the Mahasabha in
1937. He spoke of Hindu Nation well before Mohammed Ali Jinnah
did. Savarkar said: Yes, we Hindus are a Nation by ourselves. Because
religious, racial, cultural and historical affinities bind us intimately into
a homogenous nation and added to it we are most pre-eminently gifted
with a territorial unity as well. Our racial being is identified with India
our beloved Fatherland and our Holyland, above all and irrespective of
it all we Hindus will to be a Nation and, therefore, we are a Nation. None
has a right to challenge or demand a proof of our common nationality
when some thirty crores of us Hindus are with it.
It is absurd to call us a community in India. The Germans are the

nation in Germany and the Jews a Community. The Turks are the Nation
in Turkey and Arab or the Armenian minority a community. Even so
the Hindus are the nation in India in Hindusthan, and the Moslem
minority a community.
Alarmed by this ideology, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said: If Hindu Raj

does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this
country. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost (Pakistan or the
Partition of India; 1946; pp. 354-355). He was against majoritarianism
which in the Indian context meant unbridled rule of the majority
community, the Hindus.
Ambedkar wrote in a Memorandum on the Rights of States

and Minorities, dated 24 March 1947, which he submitted to the
Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights set up by the Constituent
Assemblys Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities,
etc.: Unfortunately for the minorities in India, Indian nationalism
has developed a new doctrine which may be called the Divine Right
of the Majority to rule the minorities according to the wishes of the
majority. Any claim for the sharing of power by the minority is called
communalism, while the monopolizing of the whole power by the

A. G. Noorani
majority is called nationalism. Guided by such political philosophy the
majority is not prepared to allow the minorities to share political power,
nor is it willing to respect any convention made in that behalf as is evident
from their repudiation of the obligation (to include representatives of
the minorities in the Cabinet) contained in the Instrument of instructions
issued to the Governors in the Government of India Act of 1935. Under
these circumstances there is no way left but to have the rights of the
Scheduled Castes embodied in the Constitution. (B. Shiva Rao; Select
Documents; Volume 2, page 113). The majority abuses the democratic
process to alter the character of the State.
That has now come to pass. In 1990 the BJP President L. K. Advani
said: Henceforth only those who fight for Hindu interests would rule
India L. K. Advani on 19 November 1990. Secular policy is putting
unreasonable restrictions on Hindu aspirations - Advani on 20 October,
1990. It would not be wrong to call the BJP a Hindu party - Advani to
BBC as quoted in the Organiser of 5 August, 1989.
Under Modi the gloves are off. Hindutva has acquired a menacing
lease on life. As Prof. Donald Eugene Smith warned in his classic,
India as a Secular State (Princeton University Press; 1963), Nehru
once remarked that Hindu communalism was the Indian version of
fascism, and, in the case of the RSS, it is not difficult to perceive certain
similarities. The leader principle, the stress on militarism, the doctrine
of racial-cultural superiority, ultra-nationalism infused with religious
idealism, the use of symbols of past greatness, the emphasis on national
solidarity, the exclusion of religious or ethnic minorities from the
nation-concept all of these features of the RSS are highly reminiscent
of fascist movements in Europe. Fascism, however, is associated with a
concept of state-worship; the state as the all-absorbing reality in which
the individual loses himself and in so doing finds ultimate meaning.
This conception has no counterpart in RSS ideology; in fact, the Sangh
explicitly rejects the notion that its objectives could be attained through
the power of the state. Its aim is the regeneration of Hindu society, which
must come from within. However, it is impossible to say how the RSS
would respond if political power ever came within reach, either directly
or through the Jana Sangh. The implementation of certain aspects of its

ideology (the policy toward Muslims and other minorities, for example)
presupposes extensive use of the machinery of the state. (p.468).
Modi has been systematically altering the ethos of public life and
subverting the secular character of the State by a series of executive
measures (cow slaughter and the rest) and by willful neglect of Muslims.
Not one Muslim was given the BJP ticket in the UP Assembly elections.
The future seems bleak. The divided opposition parties show no

signs of giving battle to Modis regime. Though Civil Society speaks
up, it is, hard to predict what all this spells for Indias secularism and
for its democracy.

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
RADICALISATION PATTERNS AND

EFFICACY OF CONTEMPORARY
COUNTER NARRATIVES:
A select sampling from South Asia, Europe and the
Middle East
Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal TI(M)*
Abstract
(Despite an unprecedented international effort to understand and counter
radicalism, the phenomenon appears only at the formulation stage, and
hence least understood; or to be exact, grossly misunderstood. Scores of
flawed studies and half-baked narratives have not been able to scratch
the issue beyond skin-deep. Some of such narratives have actually
contributed to a rise in radicalism. This calls for a paradigm shift in
global counter radicalizationstarting from redoing the narrative.
This paper studies radicalization processes in South Asia, Europe

and the Middle East; and scrutinizes some leading counter narratives
alongside course correction recommendations. Author)
Introduction
Contemporary usage of the term radicalisation and its associated

conceptual framework are products of the post-9/11 period.1 Before
9/11, scholars of terrorism did not use this concept while developing
models of terrorist causation.2 For example, the most influential pre-9/11
academic study of the causes of terrorism is Martha Crenshaws 1981
paper The causes of terrorism, in which she argues for a three-level
account, involving factors of: individual motivation and belief systems;
* The author is an independent analyst of international security systems. He chairs

an online think-tank Pakistan Focus.

Radicalisation Patterns and Efficacy of Contemporary Counter Narratives
decision-making and strategy within a terrorist movement; the wider
political and social context with which terrorist movements interact.3
Post 9/11 radicalisation models neglect the second and third of these
levels and focus all their attention on the individual level.4 The study
of radicalisation, ostensibly in investigation of the causes of terrorism
has, since 9/11, become, by and large, limited to a narrower question:
why do some individual Muslims support an extremist interpretation
of Islam that leads to violence?5 Such interpretations of radicalisation
emphasize the individual alongside his associated ideology and the
group; and significantly deemphasizes the wider circumstances the
root causes.6
In the broader perspective: prevalence, articulation and adoption

of specifically violent radicalism include: living in a perceived hostile
society; disenfranchisement and heightened political consciousness;
anti-imperialism sentiment; lack of social justice; struggle for revivalism,
emancipation and the personal search to be a good person; and adherence
to symbolics as a means for liberation.7
In the age of Daesh, while there are a number of different definitions,

radicalization generally refers to the process by which individuals
come to approve of and ultimately participate in the use of violence for
political or religious aims.8 Some make a distinction between cognitive
radicalismwhere a person believes violence is justifiedand
behavioural radicalismwhere someone wants and seeks to commit
violence. The academic consensus is that radicalization is a dynamic
process with no single cause or personality type that leads someone
down the path to terrorism.9 There are many pathways into radicalization,
and each pathway can be affected by a variety of factors ranging from
personal grievances and poverty to thrill seeking and group identity
which pushes an individual towards a commitment to violence.10
Traditional trans-national and trans-regional ethno-sectarian fault

lines are the readily available vehicles for proliferation of radical
thinking;11 after gathering critical mass, which may be a slow process,
it spreads like a wild fire, ruthlessly submerging saner narratives and
moderate options; hence creating a now or never frenzy. Many nations

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
have been through the pangs of radicalization, and the silver lining is that
most of them were able to float viable counter narratives and implement
meaningful counter radicalization programmes successfully.12
South Asia
Asia in general and South Asia in particular are confronting the

challenge of radicalization. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and
the Maldives are prone to radicalization of one shade or the other. Sri
Lanka has recently overcome the decades long spell of most ruthless
reign of terrorism unleashed by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE).13 Adjoining regions of Middle East, South East Asia, Central
Asia and West Asia are also affected by the genie.14 Afghanistan
presents a text book case incorporating all phases of transition from
radicalism to terrorism or committal of violence for declared political
objectivesthe eviction of foreign occupation system and evolution of
Islamic political structures and systems. South Asia offers trans-regional
connectivity between all regions of Asia. Hence any event taking place
in any region/sub-region of Asia is likely to have its impact on South
Asia; likewise, anything happening in South Asia radiates aftershocks
in its neighbourhoodradicalism is no exception.
Some of the contemporary processes of radicalism within and

around South Asia are: the arc of instability arising out of Islamist
political thought process at non-state levels;15 politico-militancy
focused resistance to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan;
the Red Corridor comprising of the Maoist insurgency in India and
Nepal; spill over of the Afghan conflict to Pakistan through its Federally
Administered Tribal areas (FATA); political rise of Hindu radicalism in
India and the ensuing hype in anti-minority sentiment; anti-Rohingya
violence in Myanmar; remnants of ethnic driven LTTE sentiment in Sri
Lanka, etc.16
Prominent entities that radiate radical sentiments in South Asia are:17

the Tehrik-i-Taliban (Pakistan & Afghanistan chapters), Al-Qaeda,
the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic State (IS), Shev Sena and numerous

Afghan militant factions. South Asia has the highest concentration of
militant groups in the worldmost of these have well-articulated radical
manifestos. India tops the list with more than 50 active or dormant
terrorist organizations.18 Despite group rivalries at State level, many of
these regional outfits have ties with international organizations.
The landscape of processes leading to radicalism in South Asia is

diverse and dynamic. Not only has the menace of radicalism grown in
intensity, it has afflicted new sub-regions and become more advanced
technologically. An examination of South Asian radical profile
reveals that it is becoming increasingly biased toward more grisly and
indiscriminate actions. South Asia, which had experienced very low
levels of organized terrorism until the early 1980s, has undergone a
dramatic transformation to become the scene of the bloodiest terrorist
violence in the world.19 In terms of casualties, it ranks as the worlds
most terrorism- battered region, followed by the Middle East. It is now
being state patronised in India, Myanmar and Bangladesh.20
The Indian government systematically encourages its hardliner non-

government entities to whip-up anti-minority sentiment, often resulting
in communal riots leading to loss of property, life and sacrilege of
sacred monuments. Inquiry into such incidents is hardly meaningful
thus radiating a sense of perpetual impunity for the perpetrators of such
crimes. Pakistani sportspersons, artists and intellectuals visiting India
are harassed by entities like Shev Sena, and often are not able to fulfill
the objective of their visit.21 The worst kind of Indian state terrorism
is being practiced in Indian occupied Kashmir where nearly a million
security personnel routinely practice state terrorism, under the impunity
cover provided by over half a dozen draconian laws; this has virtually
turned the occupied territory into an open cage,22 radiating a sense of an
all pervasive insecurity.
Myanmars attitude of indifference towards the plight of its

Rohingya minority is a form of state condoned terrorism.23 Bangladesh
is whipping up sham war trials24 as a tool to discredit its political rivals
which amounts to politically motivated state terrorism. The opportunity
to destroy the al-Qaeda leadership was lost in late 2001 when they fled

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
into Pakistan where the chase ran cold.25 Acts of terrorism in Pakistan
are, overwhelmingly, a fallout of the Afghan conflict and a global cold
war between Saudi Arabia and Iran on the turf of a Sunni-Shia fault
line.26 Financial and training linkages of most terrorist entities operating
in Pakistan are often traced back to neighbouring countries, especially
India and Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda released a video on September 04, 2014 announcing

the establishment of a new branch on the Indian subcontinent.27 In
the video statement, the Qaeda leader vowed to crush the artificial
borders established by the English occupiers to divide the Muslims.28
Though there is no organized presence of Daesh in South Asia,29 some
individuals and entities in Afghanistan have been conducting terrorist
activities in its name. Daesh presence and influence is on a decline in
Afghanistan as well.30
Combating radicalism has become the biggest political challenge

for national leadership as well as societies of South Asia. And if present
trends are any indicator, radicalism may remain the main political
problem in the region for quite some time. The efficacy of radicalization
processes is reflective from the fact that the chocking of recruitment for
terror generating agencies in not in sight.31
Europe
Daesh claimed attacks in Istanbul, Paris and Brussels, as well as the

downing of the Russian civil airliner over Sinai desert. This presents
the emerging format of terrorist threat to Europe and its peripheries.32
Therefore issues of radicalisation/ deradicalisation continue to be
a serious item in contemporary European thought process.33 A vast
majority of the Muslim populations of Europe are also members of a
visible ethnic minority.34 Their experiences are therefore likely to be
shaped by experiences such as xenophobia, lower employment and
educational levels and, more recently, Islamophobia.35
The rise of post 9/11 radicalism in Europe mainly emanated

from Europes unconditional support to the US36 and acceptance

of the interpretation of terrorism and its chief underlying cause as
ideological radicalism. Hence, emerging official European narratives
about radicalism themselves became a cause of further radicalization in
European countries.37
For example, one driver for radicalism in Europe is an official British

stance whereby extremism is defined as opposition to British values;38
and resolve that government should intervene to stem the expression
of extremist opinionsradicalismby demanding allegiance to British
values.39 A growing body of academic work holds this position to be
fundamentally flawed, at best partial and at worst counterproductive,
because factors which lead someone to commit acts of terrorism are
complex and cannot be reduced to holding a set of values deemed to be
radical.
The UKs Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programme that

seeks to stem radicalisation is not based on solid evidence but rests
upon the assumption that extremist speech and beliefs are the most
significant factors in causing terrorism.40 The Prevent Policy based
on this single cause has, in fact, further fed the process of radicalism
in Europe. The December 2013 report of the British Prime Ministers
Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism illustrates that
there remains an assumption that al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism is caused
by particular kinds of religious ideology, what it calls a poisonous
extremist ideology that can lead people to violence.41 Another linked
argument, made consistently by governments is that the extremism
underpinning terrorism is encouraged by a failure to celebrate and
promote the values upon which European society is seen as resting. In
addition, lack of allegiance to these values, according to the European
official understanding, creates a cultural and psychological environment
in which proliferation of radicalism, extremism, and as a corollary,
terrorism is more likely.42
This flawed argument linking terrorism to questions of values

and identity received its definitive statement with Prime Minister
David Camerons muscular liberalism speech to the Munich Security
Conference in 2011.43 There, he stated that behind Muslim terrorism lay

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
a question of identity; that the passive tolerance of recent years had
to be abandoned in favour of a much more assertive defence of British
values against Islamist extremism; and that British Muslims had to
give priority to their Britishness over their global allegiance to other
Muslims.44
After 9/11, European experts and officials started referring to the

idea of radicalisation whenever they wanted to talk about what goes
on before the bomb goes off.45 In the highly charged atmosphere, it
was through the notion of radicalisation that a discussion about the
political, economic, social and psychological forces that underpin
terrorism and political violence became an accepted norm.46 The
concept of radicalisation became central to the emerging analysis of
the causes of terrorism in European security circles.47 The aim was
to develop models that could explain the process by which ordinary
people, including members of European societies, became willing to
carry out acts of mass violence, even against their fellow citizens.48 This
distorted the public discourse, legitimized the erosion of civil rights
and fostered social divisions, in turn, causing societal frustrations. This
resulted in patchy studies and contributed toward a rise in radicalism.49
Following the neoconservative paradigm, most models of

radicalisation assumed that extremist religious ideologies drive
terrorism.50 Within this broader context, most of these models focused
overwhelmingly on acts of violence carried out by Muslims51 and
rarely address political violence and terrorism more generally; starting
from Islamism or Salafism which are thought to be capable of
capturing the minds of Muslims and turning them into terrorists.52 This
stereotyping became a cause of proliferation of terrorism.
For some radicalisation analysts, the role of extremist religious

ideology in this process is akin to a conveyor belt that mechanically
pushes an individual into terrorism.53 This implies that, once someone
has adopted radical views, terrorism is likely to follow sooner or later.
For others, this process is more complex and depends not only on
ideology but also on psychological factors, such as the experience of a
recent traumatic event.

There is a wide range of domestic policies in European countries
whose introduction has been significantly encouraged by acceptance
of the official British narrative on the causes of terrorism, like
surveillance of the political and religious lives of Muslims to
identify indicators of radicalisation. The Terrorism Act of 2006
binds Muslims to share information on perceived risks with police
counter-terrorism units.54 It criminalises individuals for expressing
extremist opinions. Moreover, the Act required suspected extremist
individuals to undergo de-radicalisation programmes. Financial
restrictions were imposed on Muslim individuals and charities
thought to be radical or involved in extremism. These policies,
alongside aggressive removal and denial of entry to foreign nationals,
are another radicalising influence.
A flawed understanding of processes of radicalism in Europe,

as in America and elsewhere, fostered social divisions, undermined
civil liberties and counter-productively made terrorism more likely.
Initially, policy-makers focused on community structures, such as
mosques, as the locations where extremist ideology had to be blocked;
later, focus turned to prisons and universities; more recently, the
focus has been on the circulation of extremist ideology through
social mediaall piece meal approaches which show absence of a
comprehensive approach.
Surprisingly, the official European articulation implies that, once

an individual has adopted an extremist religious ideology, terrorism
will result, irrespective of the political context or any calculation on the
part of an organisation or social movement. Advocates of this approach
argue that, since the 1990s, there has been a transformation in the way
terrorism works what scholars refer to as the new terrorism thesis
so that the intellectual tools used to analyse political violence in the past
are no longer applicable.55 Policies that result from such models, which
ignore much of what causes terrorism to occur, are a source of fresh
wave of radicalism.
Over the last ten years, scholarship on terrorism has

increasingly challenged the radicalisation models that have informed

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counter-terrorism policy-making in the UK, finding them to be
reductionist56 and insufficiently grounded in empirical evidence. It is
clear that the role of ideology in driving terrorism was exaggerated
in the early years of the War on Terror. Yet, among counterterrorism
practitioners and policy-makers, there remains an unwarranted faith in
this, now discredited, analysis. The emerging approach acknowledges
that the social psychological process by which Muslim individuals
become active in radical Islamist groups is not all that different from
moderate, non-violent Muslim groups or from non-Islamic social
movements, even if the content of the ideology differs.57
The internet has brought extensive change in peoples lives. This

has led to important changes in the organisation and functioning
of society, and as violent extremists and terrorists form part of this
society, it is widely assumed that the internet plays a particular role
as a tool of radicalisation.58 The internet had been a key source of
information, communication and propaganda for extremist beliefs.
The internet may act as an echo chamber for extremist beliefs; in
other words, the internet may provide a greater opportunity than
offline interactions to confirm existing beliefs.59 The internet appears
to facilitate this process, which, in turn, may or may not accelerate
extremism and terrorism. The internet allows radicalisation to occur
without physical contact.60 The internet increases opportunities for
self-radicalisation.61
Although circumstances and views still somewhat vary from

country to country, it is possible to observe some common trends across
Europe. Few governments today believe that the majority of terrorists
are deviants, sociopaths or psychopaths who were born terrorists or
that once a terrorist, always a terrorist.62 On the contrary, it is now
widely believed that, in perhaps a majority of cases, the radicalization
processes that lead people to carry out acts of politically motivated
violence can be prevented or even reversed.63 Working from these
revised assumptions, over the last few years, several countries have
created counter radicalization programmes that differ markedly in their
extent and aims.64

Middle East
The Daesh brand process of radicalization is essentially a Middle East

and North Africa (MENA) grown and globally sustained phenomenon.65
It has mainly been triggered by the contemporary wrong wars/ extra
regional interventions in the region; and uncontrollable undesired effects
of the Arab spring.66 Even though the upheaval of Arab spring itself was
a result of radical youth venting their dissatisfaction with the incumbent
regimes, the hijacking of the anticipated benefits by pro status quo
forces quickly changed the tenor of radicalization in MENA. From a
peaceful movement, it has now transformed into a combatant struggle.
Due to unsurmountable hurdles in the way of peaceful processes, the
wave of militant radicalism has over whelmed the youth, which is duly
impressed by the ability of Daesh to run a dfacto state, at least for the
time being.
While Daesh ideology appropriates concepts found in Islamic

thought, often characterised as Salafi, it is an overtly political ideology
that has been developed outside of Islamic jurisprudence. Violent radical
narrative reconstructs jihad as a permanent obligation and attempts
to dilute the authority /propriety of the state in terms of declaration of
Jihad, hence creating and sustaining forceful waves of radicalism at a
non-state level.
Daesh, though on decline in the Syria-Iraq landscape, is in the process

of replicating its Syria style state model in Libya as well. Expanse of
its extra-regional activities indicate that this brand of radicalization is
effective and kickingat least for the time-being. Moreover, appeal of
this process is almost global. Some older jihadist organizations across
the Middle East and even in South Asia have, at least nominally, begun
announcing their support for the Islamic State; these include Al-Qaeda
in Yemen and some groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, a few individuals of the Pakistani Taliban and small factions
of the Afghan Taliban.
Daesh is now considered as the largest and richest of militant outfits

in the world, radiating militant radicalism globally. It has gained strength

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from anarchy. Its a combination of split warring factions. The MENA
region has become a magnet for attracting foreign fighters. Daesh has its
recruiters all over the Western world seeking out new members through
social media. According to the United Nations Al-Qaeda-Taliban
Monitoring Team, around 15,000 foreign fighters had joined terrorist
groups, mainly Al-Nusra Front and ISIL by the end of 2015; they came
from more than 80 States, including the UK, the US, Balkans, Australia,
Canada, the Netherlands, etc.67
To a greater extent than any prior jihadist movement, Daesh

supporters are committed to an interpretation of IslamSalafism
whose sectarian and literalist interpretations were first articulated
centuries ago.68 It is this originalism that defines the direction and aims
of Daesh and gives its caliphate a sense of authenticity amongst its
followers.69 A key aspect of Salafisms appeal among its followers is
its claim to represent the original and authentic version of Islam as
practiced by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) himself.70
Salafism rejects not only modern Western institutions and processes

(nation states, elections, and parliament) but also traditional Sunni ones,
like the Islamic schools of law, canonical texts, and institutions of
official Islam such as al-Azhar. Salafis perceive these structures as
agents of local governments.71 This approach of exclusivism-inclusivism
dynamism is the major underwriter of radicalism in the Middle East.72
Proposed counter narratives
Despite an unprecedented international effort to understand and

counter radicalism, the phenomenon appears only at the formulation
stage, and hence least understood; or to be exact, grossly misunderstood.
Scores of flawed studies and half-baked narratives have not been able
to scratch the issue beyond skin-deep.73 Some of such narratives have
actually contributed to a rise in radicalism. This calls for a paradigm shift
in global counter radicalizationstarting from redoing the narrative.
National circumstances and domestic political considerations

influence the choice of policy responses, so a one size fits all approach

does not work. However, the problem of online radicalisation crosses
national borders and will require a concerted international response.74
A typical de-radicalization process should be triggered by a credible

narrative, taking in to account all contributory factors. A widely
accepted narrative creates a shield to prevent vulnerable individuals and
communities from radicalizing; and provides incentives for rehabilitating
those who wish to renounce radicalism.75
Managing a narrative for countering radicalism is like a game of

chess. It requires political will, perseverance and a composite state-
societal effort.76 This means understanding the traditional fault lines
leading to societal fragility and the ensuing threat of mass radicalization.
Another pre-requisite is to comprehend the enemy and his methods;
and be able to anticipate and thoughtfully respond to how it changes
and adapts. This requires an approach strategy that uses reason and
astuteness, not just brute force.
A key dilemma in formulating the narrative is whether the end

objective should be disengagement or deradicalization of militants.77
Disengagement entails a change in behaviour, but not necessarily
a change in beliefs. Deradicalization is the process of changing an
individuals belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and
embracing mainstream values.78 Deradicalization may be necessary to
permanently defuse the threat posed by these individuals. Limiting
the objective for disengagement leaves the vulnerable groups and
individuals liable to relapse. It should focus at breaking the militants
affective, pragmatic, and ideological commitment to the radical
group.79
While European narratives focus on inclusiveness and integration

efforts, most Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian narratives employ
a form of theological dialogue in which mainstream scholars and,
sometimes, former radicals challenge extremists in discussions of
theology in an effort to convince the militants that their interpretation
of religion is wrong. A narrative should leave space for responding
to overtures from radical group leaders who have already begun to

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
reconsider their positions and then engage these leaders to facilitate
their process of disengagement.
As of now, most international counter radicalism narratives are not

evidence based, rather, these are politically motivated.80 No wonder,
despite years of vigorous efforts, counter-radicalization narratives
remain despairingly underdeveloped with little empirical evidence of
success. This calls for a paradigm shift in the global counter radicalization
effort by addressing the underlying causes leading to radicalism through
realistic narratives and practical steps. As the state is the implementing
entity for all policies, each country facing the issue of radicalization
should formulate its own narrative, keeping local conditions and
sensitivities in mind.81
There are numerous case studies from democratic European

countries, where authorities have implemented ambitious counter
radicalization strategies for over a decade, even though most of these
have been inherently flawed. In the US, New York City has had some
success in countering radicalized individuals through its Community
Affairs Bureau.82
Saudi Arabias counter-radicalization strategy is known as

the Prevention, Rehabilitation and After-Care (PRAC) approach.
It is predominantly known for its rehabilitation programme.83 The
programme is premised on the notion that Islamist extremists have
been lied to and deceived into following a misinterpretation of Islam.
It therefore focuses on removing a detainees radical understanding of
Islam and reintroducing the official state version of the faith. This is
achieved through a complex process of religious dialogue with official
clerics, psychological counselling, and extensive social support for the
detainee and his family.84 Once detainees are released, the government
provides a stipend, a car, housing, and often a government job. The Saudi
government claims to have an 80 percent success rate, with less than 5
percent of released detainees rearrested.85 It is essentially a Saudi solution
for a domestic deradicalization programme based on Saudi Arabias
official version of Islam, and thus may not be suitable for replication,
however, a suitably adapted version could be used in Islamic countries.86

The UKs counter-radicalization programme PREVENT, focuses
on partnering with police, local governments, and NGOs to challenge
radical Islamism and increase the capacity of communities to intervene
in the radicalization process.87 The programme has 5 components: 1)
countering radical Islamist ideology by bolstering moderate Islamic
leaders; 2) impeding and criminalizing efforts to radicalize others in
mosques, schools, prisons, and on the Internet; 3) increasing local
communities resilience to radicalization efforts by bolstering moderate
religious leaders; 4) eliminating grievances by reducing inequality and
discrimination; and 5) intervening with vulnerable individuals through
mentorship and training programmes. To achieve the last component,
the UK government instituted the Channel Project, a local programme
that relies on communities to identify individuals who are radicalizing
and then help them to return to a better path.88
In June 2011, the UK government revamped its Prevent programme

to de-securitize its efforts to integrate Muslims into British society
in order to prevent the alienation of Muslim communities. The results
for the UK programme have been mixed. Though the programme is
comprehensive and sophisticated, it has received significant pushback
from Muslim communities that feel targeted for discrimination and spied
upon by their government. The most successful element of the UKs
strategy has been the governments partnership with Muslim NGOs,
particularly organizations, which promote moderate interpretations
of Islam and use former de-radicalized terrorists to engage at-risk
individuals.
The Dutch government views radicalization primarily as a youth

phenomenon that occurs when isolated individuals are searching for
identity, rather than as a distinctly religious issue. The Dutch counter-
radicalization programme therefore specifically aims to enhance
social cohesion by integrating alienated individuals back into society.
Launched from 2007-2011, the Dutch Polarization and Radicalization
Action Plan89 places responsibility on local governmentsincluding
local youth workers, truancy officers, police and other local authorities
to prevent, identify, and intervene in cases of potential radicalization.
Local authorities are given broad discretion to develop their own

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
programmes, though all are expected to focus on strengthening the link
between individuals and society.90
A typical narrative should also take into account that it may not
always be possible to convince someone to give up an ideology, but it
can still convince someone to give up violent elements of that ideology.
Moreover, it should allow for experimentation and innovation at local
levels, particularly in developing channels for community outreach.
Narrative and policy should be careful not to stigmatize communities

or alienate community leaders, since the community is vital for identifying
at-risk individuals. It should support international, foreign counter-
radicalization programmes with regional countries through sharing best
practices, facilitating intelligence and information sharing and providing
financial support. More often than not, success at domestic level depends
upon the success of regional counter-radicalization programmes. Each
country should substantially support the regional countries as they
develop their own programmes; and understand that context matters and
various programmes of each nation may look different.
A typical narrative should also encourage group deradicalization

where it seems feasible and facilitate the public disclosure of the writings
and arguments of militants who renounce extremism. A broader theme
should also incorporate the likelihood of collective deradicalization
through political co-option because this is the most efficient way to
change the behaviour and beliefs of a large number of militants at once
and ultimately discredit extremist ideology.
Near-term objectives of a narrative should focus on preventing

would-be violent extremists from becoming active91 through closer
intelligence sharing, more rigorous local law enforcement programmes,
and working with social services and community outreach programmes
to identify and track signs of radicalization and at-risk individuals;
particular emphasis should be on assumptions about the resonance of
the ideology among recruits. Medium-term objectives should focus on
trust-building with local communities through partnerships between
state and society. Long-term objectives should aim at countering the

extremist narrative and ideology by working through NGOs and
scholarly communities to challenge radical interpretations of religion
and establish coherent and credible institutions of religious authority
and instruction in order to, more effectively, disseminate moderate
interpretations of Islam.
The narrative should take into account that grievances, real or

perceived, result in the employment of violence; and these are not
irrational i.e. not subject to rational analysis, but supported by
ideological frameworks with a view of perceived problems, a vision of
the future and a prescription for action.
Focus should be on developing a multi-layered counter-narrative

strategy, incorporating many different elements designed to appeal to
a wide variety of people.92 Looking back at cases where individuals
have voluntarily left terrorist organisations, two themes seem to emerge
that should be included in any counter-narrative campaign: portraying
terrorists as criminals who fail to live according to their religious
principles; and focusing on the difficult, financially unstable, fear-filled
life of a terrorist.93
Beyond carefully crafting the counter-narrative, governments must

also be mindful of how they deliver the counter-narrative.94 Utilising
former terrorists may prove quite advantageous given their ability to
directly connect with and counter the terrorists narrative. In addition,
terrorists family members have, more often than not, successfully
persuaded recruits, as well as active radicals, to leave behind extremist
organisations. Conjoint working by state and society with terrorists
families, therefore, may enable the governments to effectively transmit
their counter-narrative.
Counter-radicalisation efforts should be increasingly coordinated

across national boundaries, thereby, enabling individual programmes to
be strengthened through international cooperation.95 Better understanding
of not only why people join but why they leave terrorist organisations
is key to developing a message that resonates with those considering
joining these groups, and perhaps even those already on the inside. Until

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
all aspects of the radicalisation cycle are better understood, including
the reasons for abandoning the extremist cause, it will be difficult to
develop an effective strategy to defeat the terrorist narrative and win the
softer side of the fight against terrorism.
Conclusion
Confusion on what is radicalism and who is a radical and the

ensuing narratives was quite evident from the concurrent post Brussels
attack remarks by the then President Barack Obama and the then
candidate Donald Trump. Obama urged Americans not to stigmatise
Muslims following the deadly attacks in Brussels, saying that doing
so is counterproductive in the fight against terrorism.96 Obama said
Muslim-Americans are our most important partners in the nations
fight against those who would wage violent jihadIt plays right
into the hands of terrorists who need a reason to recruit more people
to their hateful cause.97 Donald Trump, repeated his demand for the
government to temporarily bar all Muslims from entering the US.98 This
widely polarized understanding of what is and what is not radicalization
sets into motion a trainload of faulty narratives that need to be derailed
and offloaded.
References
1 Mohammed Elshimi, De-radicalisation interventions as technologies of the self:
a Foucauldian analysis. Critical Studies on Terrorism (Volume 8, 2015 - Issue
1). Published online on April 09, 2015. p. 110-129. http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2015.1005933?journalCode=rter20
2 Terrorism, Encyclopedia.com http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-
and-law/political-science-and-government/political-science-terms-and-
concepts-92
3 Professor Arun Kundnani Arun Kundnani, A Decade Lost Rethinking
Radicalisation and Extremism, (Claystone January 2015. http://docplayer.
net/15237324-A-decade-lost-rethinking-radicalisation-and-extremism.html
4 Ibid.
5 Arun Kundnani, Radicalisation: the journey of a concept First Published
September 18, 2012 Research Article. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1
177/0306396812454984?journalCode=racb
6 Basia Spalek, Radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation in

relation to families: Key challenges for research, policy and practice, Security
Journal (University of Derby: February 2016, Volume 29, Issue 1) p. 3952.
Original Article First Online, December 29, 2015. https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1057/sj.2015.43
7 Dr Sadek Hamid, Studies into violent radicalisation: The beliefs, ideologies
and narratives, Academia, https://www.academia.edu/718793/Studies_into_
violent_radicalisation_The_beliefs_ideologies_and_narratives . This study has
been produced by the Change Institute for the European Commission (Directorate
General Justice, Freedom and Security). This study does not necessarily reflect
the opinions and views of the European Commission or of the Change Institute,
nor are they bound by its conclusions.
8 John Hay, Developing Counter-Radicalization Programs Against ISIS, John
Hay Initiative January 14, 2016. http://www.choosingtolead.net/john-hay-
blog/2016/1/14/developing-counter-radicalization-programs-against-isis-1
9 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a
Terrorist and Why? A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the
Federal Research Division. (Library of Congress: September 1999). https://fas.
org/irp/threat/frd.html
10 John Hay, Developing Counter-Radicalization Programs Against ISIS
11 Air commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal, Deconstructing Terrorism: A Holistic
Approach. Criterion Quarterly, (Vol 10, No 2). Posted on July 26, 2015. http://
www.criterion-quarterly.com/deconstructing-terrorism-a-holistic-approach/
12 Ibid.
13 Eugene Chausovsky, In Sri Lanka, the Wounds of War Are Healing, Stratfor
Worldview, January 8, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/sri-lanka-
wounds-war-are-healing
14 Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal, Countering Regional Extremism and
Terrorism: Pakistans Perspective Criterion Quarterly (Vol 10, No 3), Posted
by admin on August 1, 2015. http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/countering-
regional-extremism-and-terrorism-pakistans-perspective/
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Animesh Roul, South Asia: Hotbed of Islamic Terrorism, Appears in Aspects
of Islamism in South and Southeast Asia, August 2008, The National Bureau of
Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=136
19 Muhammad Feyyaz, Putting terrorism and response in perspective, University
of Management and Technology (Pakistan),January 2006. ResearchGate,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275019506_Putting_terrorism_and_
response_in_perspective
20 Ibid.
21 L K Sharma, Of sacred cows and profane men, OpenIndia, June 07, 2017,

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openindia/l-k-sharma/of-sacred-cows-and-
profane-men
22 Everyone Lives in Fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir, Human
Rights Watch, September 11, 2006. https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/09/11/
everyone-lives-fear/patterns-impunity-jammu-and-kashmir
23 Maryam Ishani, Myanmars minority Muslims under attack, Daily News
Egypt, July 02, 2017, https://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/07/02/myanmars-
minority-muslims-under-attack-2/
24 Julfikar Ali Manik, Al-Badr Commander Mir Quasem to Die, Dhaka Tribune,
November 3, 2014, in War Crimes Prosecution Watch, Volume 9 - Issue 17,
November 17, 2014. http://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/
wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/WCPW_111714_master.html#bang2
25 Bruce Riedel, Al-Qaeda Five Years After the fall of Kandahar, Article,
Brooking, January 18, 2007. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2007-
01-01/united-states-iraq-and-war-terror
26 Lee Kuan Yew, The United States, Iraq, and the War on Terror, Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2007 Issue. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
iraq/2007-01-01/united-states-iraq-and-war-terror
27 Allen Barry, Al Qaeda Opens New Branch on Indian Subcontinent, New York
Times, September 04, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/asia/
al-qaeda-announces-new-branch-on-indian-subcontinent.html
28 Ibid.
29 Ayaz Gul, Pakistan Investigating Suspected IS Militants, VOA, December
31, 2015. https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-investgating-suspected-is-
militants/3125676.html
30 Borhan Osman, The Shadows of Islamic State in Afghanistan: What threat
does it hold? Afghan Analysts Network, February 12, 2015. https://www.
afghanistan-analysts.org/the-shadows-of-islamic-state-in-afghanistan-what-
threat-does-it-hold/
31 From Rehabilitation to Recruitment, ISSU, (The Macdonald-Laurier
Institute: 2014), July 21, 2014. https://issuu.com/macdonaldlaurier/docs/
fromrehabilitationtorecruitment
32 French President to Meet with Pres. Obama Next Week, WSAZ News
Channel, The Associated Press, November 17, 2015. http://www.wsaz.com/
home/headlines/Police-At-Least-26-Dead-in-Acts-of-Violence-Throughout-
Paris-347897071.html
33 Tahir Abbas & Assma Siddique, Perceptions of the processes of radicalisation
and de-radicalisation among British South Asian Muslims in a post-industrial
city, Journal Social Identities, (volume 18, Issue 1: 2012) 119-134. Tylor &
Francis Online. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13504630.2011.6
29519?src=recsys&journalCode=csid20
34 John L. Esposito, The Challenges in Defeating ISIS, Huffington Post, http://

www.huffingtonpost.com/john-l-esposito/the-challenges-in-defeati_b_5722118.
html
35 The Challenges in Defeating ISIS, World Observer Online, June 27, 2015.
http://worldobserveronline.com/2015/03/27/the-challenges-in-defeating-isis/
36 Pter Krek and Lrnt Gyri, Dont ignore the left! Connections between
Europes radical left and Russia, openDemocracy, June 13, 2016.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/peter-kreko-lorant-gyori/don-t-
ignore-left-connections-between-europe-s-radical-left-and-ru
37 Adrienne Ou, Hearts and Minds: A Comparison of Counter-Radicalization
Strategies in Britain and the United States, Cornell International Affairs Review
Volume 11, No. 2) (Cornell University: 2016) 1/3. http://www.inquiriesjournal.
com/articles/1413/hearts-and-minds-a-comparison-of-counter-radicalization-
strategies-in-britain-and-the-united-states
38 Moving Target: UKGCC Relations and the Politics of Extremism, Research
paper, Chatham House, September 14, 2016. https://reader.chathamhouse.org/
moving-target-uk-gcc-relations-and-politics-extremism#
39 Sadia Habib, A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism, The
Sociological Imagination, January 6, 2015. http://sociologicalimagination.org/
archives/16655
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron, BBC News, 5 February
2011. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12371994
44 Ibid.
45 Sadia Habib, A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism.
46 Ibid.
47 Garvin Heerah, Does T&T have a counter Terrorism Strategy?, Guardian,
June 07, 2017. http://www.guardian.co.tt/columnist/2017-06-07/does-tt-have-
counter-terrorism-strategy
48 Sadia Habib, A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism.
49 Ibid.
50 Matthew Francis, Does ideology really contribute to radicalisation?,
Radicalisation Research, 6 Jul, 2015. http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/
debate/francis-ideology-radicalisation/
51 Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a legal definition and framework,
Columbia Law Review, Volume 116. http://columbialawreview.org/content/
islamophobia-toward-a-legal-definition-and-framework/
52 Salafi movement, WikiVisually, http://wikivisually.com/wiki/Salafism
53 Garvin Heerah, Does T&T have a counter Terrorism Strategy?
54 The terrorism act, https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/terrorism/the-
terrorism-act.php

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
55 Florian Schneider, How to Do a Discourse Analysis, Politics East Asia, May
13, 2013. http://www.politicseastasia.com/studying/how-to-do-a-discourse-
analysis/
56 Terrorism Contest and cohesion, April 16, 2009, OpenDemocracy, https://
www.opendemocracy.net/taxonomy/term/5225/0/feed
57 Arun Kundnani, Radicalisation: the journey of a concept, SAGE Journals,
September 18, 2012. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0306396812
454984?journalCode=racb
58 Matthijs van der Mijn(uploaded by), Radicalisation in the Digital Era, Rand
Corporation, https://www.scribd.com/document/318901968/Radicalisation-in-
the-Digital-Era
59 Kriti Singh, Digital Terrorism: Choreographing the Terror, Centre for
Air Power Studies, India, Forum for National Security Studies, February
16, 2015. http://www.academia.edu/10963854/DIGITAL_TERRORISM_
CHOREOGRAPHING_THE_TERROR
60 Radicalisation in the Digital Era, RAND Europe, http://www.rand.org/
randeurope/research/projects/internet-and-radicalisation.html
61 Ibid.
62 Lorenzo Vidino & James Brandon Countering Radicalization in Europe,
(ISCR, Kings College London: 2012).
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Middle East and North Africa Economic Monitor October 2015 World
Bank Publications, ISSUU, October 19, 2015. https://issuu.com/world.bank.
publications/docs/9781464807350
66 Arab Spring, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring
67 Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent
Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist
Fighters, United Nations, Meetings Coverages and Press Releases. http://www.
un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm
68 Developing Counter-Radicalization Programs Against ISIS, John Haley
Initiative, January 14, 2016. http://www.choosingtolead.net/john-hay-
blog/2016/1/14/developing-counter-radicalization-programs-against-isis-1
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Marianne Moyaert, Fragile Identities Towards a Theology of Interreligious
Hospitality, Brill, http://www.brill.com/products/book/fragile-identities
73 Air Commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal, Countering Regional Extremism and
Terrorism: Pakistans Perspective, Criterion Quarterly, Volume 10, number
3, August 01, 2105. http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/countering-regional-
extremism-and-terrorism-pakistans-perspective/

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Zora A. Sukabdi, Terrorism In Indonesia: A Review On Rehabilitation And
Deradicalization, Journal of Terrorism Research, The Centre for the Study of
Terrorism and Political Violence. http://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/
jtr.1154/
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Stop Feeding Terrorism with Blood of Our Youth, Jordans Crown Prince
Tells Security Council during Debate on Violent Extremism, United Nations
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, April 23, 2115. http://www.un.org/press/
en/2015/sc11872.doc.htm
81 Homeland Security 4.0: Overcoming Centralization, Complacency, and
Politics. Homeland Security Report, August 23, 2011. http://www.heritage.
org/homeland-security/report/homeland-security-40-overcoming-centralization-
complacency-and-politics
Initiative, January 14, 2016.
83 Abdulrahman al-Hadlaq , chapter 2: Saudi Efforts in Counter-
Radicalisation and Extremist Rehabilitation in Terrorist Rehabilitation A
New Frontier in Counter-terrorism. http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/
abs/10.1142/9781783267446_0002
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Uploaded by Aleksandra Markovic (Uploaded by), Preventing and Countering
Youth Radicalism in EU A study for the LIBE Committee, Directorate
General for Internal policies, European Union, 2014. https://www.scribd.com/
document/323236564/Preventing-and-Countering-Youth-Radicalism-in-EU
88 Ibid.
89 James Brandon, Lorenzo Vidino, European Experiences in Counter
radicalization, Combating Terrorism Centre, June 21, 2012. https://ctc.usma.
edu/posts/european-experiences-in-counterradicalization
90 Ibid.
Initiative, January 14, 2016.
92 Invitation for a Seminar on Islamic Perspective to Root-out Violent Extremism
and Measures to Counter Radicalization, Indialogue Foundation, http://
indialogue.in/announcements/invitation-for-a-seminar-on-islamic-perspective-
to-root-out-violent-extremism-and-measures-to-counter-radicalization/
93 Challenges in the Transmission of Counter-Extremism Narratives, Acritical

Khalid Iqbal TI (M)
Look at the Social Media Platform, Institute of Diplomacy and International
Studies, University of Nairobi. http://idis.uonbi.ac.ke/node/188489
94 Rachel Brigs, Sebastien Feve, Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of
Violent Extremism, DOCPLAYER, http://docplayer.net/4673424-Review-of-
programs-to-counter-narratives-of-violent-extremism.html
95 Tunis Agenda, The US Department of State, https://2001-2009.state.gov/e/
eeb/rls/othr/2005/57997.htm
96 Stigmatising Muslims plays into hands of terrorists: Obama, Express
Tribune. W, March 26, 2016. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1073272/stigmatizing-
muslims-plays-into-hands-of-terrorists-obama/
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.

Sindh and Partition
SINDH AND PARTITION
Yasser Latif Hamdani*
Abstract
(Most accounts of partition of India revolve around either the all India
dimension of the politics during British Raj or to the politics of Punjab
and Bengal as the two largest Muslim majority provinces, which were
ultimately partitioned themselves. Much less attention is paid to either
NWFP or Sindh, which were relatively new provinces given that they
had been separated from Punjab and Bombay Presidency respectively
much later. This article focuses on the politics in Sindh leading up
to independence and creation of Pakistan and shows how Jinnahs
role constantly was that of a firefighter between different factions. In
particular this article concentrates on how G M Syed, the great advocate
for Pakistan turned against the Muslim League and was progressively
alienated so much so that today he is remembered in Pakistan as a
Sindhi separatist and a traitor to Pakistan despite his stellar record
in the Pakistan Movement. Author)
Sindh was, in that sense, the newest province being only created
as a separate province in earnest on 1 April 1936 after the Government
of India Act 1935 went into force. The separation of Sindh from the
Bombay Presidency was a long-standing Muslim demand as is reflected
in Jinnahs 14 points.

Sindhs legislative assembly had 60 seats out of which 35 seats were
Muslim seats.1 The Muslim politicians of the province were divided into
a number of parties including Sindh Azad Party, Sindh United Party,
Sindh Muslim Party as well as Congress and a number of independents.
Before the 1937 elections Jinnah as the leader of the All India Muslim
* The author is a practicing lawyer based in Lahore. He is also the author of the
book, Jinnah; Myth or Reality. His email address is Yasser.hamdani@gmail.
com

Yasser Latif Hamdani
League attempted to create unity in the ranks by organizing a provincial
parliamentary board but the effort was largely unsuccessful. As a result
the Muslim seats were divided along the following lines: Sindh Azad
Party 3, Sindh United Party 21, Sindh Muslim Party 3, Congress 1
and Independents 7. The 25 Non Muslim seats were shared by Sindh
Congress and Hindu Independent Party. Sindh United Party that emerged
as the largest party was led by Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto and Sir Abdullah
Haroon, both of whom lost their own seats, however, thus creating an
opening for a coalition ministry.
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayetullah of the Sindh Muslim Party

became the first premier of Sindh in 1937 by cobbling up the Democratic
Coalition Party, with the support of the Hindu Independent Party, Sindh
Congress and some members of the Sindh United Party.2 The Sindh
Muslim League meanwhile was cobbled together in February 1938
under the leadership of Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi of the Sindh Azad
Party. Hidayetullahs ministry meanwhile fell because Congress, Hindu
Independent Party and Sindh United Party members withdrew their
support. This brought the young Allah Bux Mohammad Omar Soomro
to power as the second premier of Sindh. Soon afterwards this coalition
was also in doldrums following a vote of no confidence. Owing to this
situation of unstable government in Sindh, a fresh opportunity to make a
Muslim League led government presented itself forcing Jinnah to take a
trip to Karachi and hold a conference there with major leaders. Jinnahs
objective was to unite all Muslim legislators under one umbrella. At
the eve of the conference Jinnah pledged that he would not chalk out
a programme which would in any way, in words or deeds, go against
the legitimate rights of the Hindus appealing at the end for all Sindhis,
Hindus and Muslims, to help raise the head of Sindh before other
provinces of India. 3
During the marathon meetings that took place the Sindhi Muslim
leaders agreed with Jinnah that there should be a united Muslim party.
In his statement of October 13 1938, Jinnah stated the following:
On my arrival it was made clear to me that there was a universal

desire for solidarity among the Muslims of Sind. Whoever came to see

Sindh and Partition
me expressed most fervently the desire to bring about unity That was
the prevalent sentiment not only among Muslims but also among the
thinking men of other communities: Hindus, Parsis and Europeans.
They all desired that there should be a stable government in Sind. I may
at the outset deprecate the false and discreditable propaganda carried
on by a section of the Press and Congress men that we were aiming
at constituting a purely Muslim Ministry in Sindh. In the first instance
we thought of bringing unity among the various Muslim groups in the
Assembly, as there were at least four such groups and once we were
able to put our house in order we could approach the other groups in the
assembly.
In response to the universal desire I carried on conversation with

Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, who had come to see me and his colleague
Pir Illahi Bux. He also endorsed the view that there should be one solid
united Muslim party and most cordially assured me that he desired
nothing else if that could be achieved, that he did not wish to continue
as Chief Minister and that he did not care for any office I gathered that
there were about seven or eight members with the Chief Minister and
his colleague. Thereafter I saw Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayetullah and
he also expressed the same views and assured me his full support. His
group consisted of thirteen members. I next saw Mir Bundeh Ali Khan,
leader of the Baluch group, which consists of about seven members.
Lastly I saw Mr. G M Syed who has a following, it is understood, of six
members.4
On October 9, all four groups met Jinnah along with Sikandar Hayat,
the Premier of Punjab and Fazlul Haq, Premier of Bengal, and signed an
agreement which was as under:
(1) One solid party of Muslim members of the Sind Assembly

should be formed as the Muslim League Party within the
legislature and all members who join the Party will become
members of the Muslim League and sign the creed and accept
policy and programme of the Muslim League and sign the usual
pledge.

(2) In order to facilitate the formation of a new Ministry, the present
Muslim ministers agree to tender their resignations and the
resignations will be tendered to the Governor simultaneously
with the proposal of the Leader of the Muslim League Party to
constitute the new Ministry.
(3) A meeting of those members, who have already joined the

League or who may agree to join the League Party should take
place on October 12 and those members who are not in Karachi
at present are to be requested to Karachi- there are already 27
members present in Karachi.
(4) Khan Bahadur Allah Bux and Sir Ghulam Hussain are to
intimate those Muslim members who are in Karachi already
and ask them to attend the meeting fixed for October 12.
(5) The Leader of the Party should be elected by the unanimous

vote of the party: in default, he should be nominated by Mr.
Jinnah and the party will abide by his choice.
(6) The personnel of the Ministry to be formed shall be determined

according to the same principle; namely, the party should accept
it unanimously; in default the party should abide by the decision
of Mr. Jinnah as to the Muslim personnel of the Ministry that
the leader should submit to the Governor.
(7) With regard to differences of opinion relating to the question

of assessment and the revision settlement within the Barrage
area, the matter is to be referred to Sikander Hayat Khan to
examine the question and advise on the course and attitude
which the party should adopt that the proposal be placed before
the meeting of the party on October 12 and the party should
accept the findings and recommendations that may be made by
Sir Sikander Hayat Khan.
With the prospect of the Muslim League ministry now looming large,
the Sindh Congress party leadership wired Congress high Command

Sindh and Partition
asking for permission to vote individually and not as a party. This was
done to show that Congress was now ready to play ball with the Premier
Allah Bux Soomro. Upon finding this change in attitude, Allah Bux
Soomro went back to the League leader on October 12 and told the
assembled members that the only way he would join the League ministry
was if they would agree to elect him as the leader, thereby going back on
the agreement he had signed. This was considered an unjust demand by
the members but after a day of deliberation 27 members agreed to the
condition. Nevertheless, Soomro refused to play ball thereafter because
by then the Congress had already assured him of their support.
Jinnahs objective had been clear. He wanted to bring together a solid

group of Muslim legislators and then cooperate with other parties. The
result would have been a stable government in Sindh, but so obsessed
was the Congress High Command with destroying Muslim solidarity
that they essentially took back their own vote of no confidence. The
impact of this must have been great on the All India situation where, in
UP and Bombay, Congress majorities had disdainfully kept the Muslim
League out of power despite having allied with them in the elections of
1937. To Jinnahs mind this meant that Congress would effectively call
the shots, not just in provinces where Muslims were in a minority, but
where they were in a majority.
Khan Bahadur Allah Bux Soomro was facing another crisis, which
threatened to alienate his Hindu supporters, which was the Om Mandli
incident. Lekhraj Khubchand Kriplani, a Hindu reformer, had established
a spiritual organization called Om Mandli in 1932. This body promoted
womens empowerment and asked Hindu women to be less submissive
to their male family members. The Hindus in Sindh were up in arms.
Indian National Congress denounced the movement as a disturber of
peace and so did other Hindus. G M Syed writes:
Another noteworthy event that occurred about the time of the

budget session of 1939 was the Om Mandli affair, which drew the
attention of the whole province and even threatened the life of the Allah
Bux ministry. The Om Mandli was a novel type of institution sponsored
and conducted by Dada Lekhraj, a retired Sindhi work merchant of

Hyderabad. The Mandli professed to serve as a religious and educational
centre and a benevolent asylum of ill-treated women, young and old.
It seemed to attract such large numbers of widowed, married and
unmarried women of the Bhaiband community of Hyderabad that an
organized opposition sprang up, which soon made its weight felt upon
the government in order to have the Mandli banned and closed down. 5
Even though Soomro was personally opposed to taking sides in the

matter, he ultimately made a deal with the Hindu opposition to save his
ministry. Then came the Manzilgah Mosque issue. Masjid Manzilgah
was allegedly an old mosque established during the time of Emperor
Akbar in Sukkur, near a Hindu Temple Island of Sadhbelo. The mosque
had not been used for a long time and the British were using it as a
godown. The British position was that this building was actually a rest
house and not a mosque. This had become a bone of contention for
the two communities ever since because the Hindus feared that a large
number of Muslims coming to pray in the mosque would affect their
worship in Sadhbelo.
Now it was time for Muslim League to use the issue to bring down
Allah Bux Soomros ministry. The Manzilgah agitation was blatantly
used to mobilize public opinion against the Soomro ministry, which
ultimately fell after the Indian National Congress voted with the Muslim
League in the vote of no confidence. Soomro was hoist with his own
petard.
Soomro ultimately did come back to power but with an interregnum

of Mir Bandeh Ali Khan. About Mir Bandeh Ali Khan, Governor
Graham wrote the following letter:
Dear Lord Linlithgow
The present ministry was sworn in at a critical time in

parliamentary procedure shortly before the end of March and
you will remember that we had some anxious correspondence
on the subject of getting financial provision for the year.
That all passed quite smoothly, mainly because I had taken

Sindh and Partition
the speaker and leader of the opposition, my late C.M. into
confidence. Both of them had made a series of mistakes in
procedure and they were not sorry to have their faces saved
by the method proposed by me. My new ministry consists
of four Muslims, three of whom are Muslim Leaguers and
fourth is a traitor to the old Muslim party, headed by Allah
Bakhsh; in addition there are two Hindus. I do not need to
go into the change of ministry except to say that the present
premier assumed office deeply stained with treachery to
the late premier. I have never been able to understand how
so incompetent a person as Mir Bandeh Ali Khan was
recommended to me by the combination of Independent
Hindus and Muslim Leaguers. I presume that the Muslim
Leaguers had to accept Mir Bandeh Ali because the Hindus
refused to accept a Muslim Leaguer as premier.
Yours sincerely
L. Graham6
Mir Bandeh Ali Khan joined the Muslim League and there was
speculation that it had been done to ensure his continuity as the premier.
In any event Allah Bux Soomro made it back to the post of the premier
in 1941 after Soomro was assured support of the Congress and the Hindu
members again.
This ministry, tragically Allah Buxs last, was itself momentous

as before. One of the issues that came up was of the Hurs, led by Pir
Sibghatullah Rashdi, the sixth Pir of Pagara. The Pir of Pagara had
started an armed struggle against British rule and this had led to several
legal troubles. The Pir had, before turning 30, already spent years in a
British prison. In 1941 he was arrested again on charges of sedition and
armed insurgency, which only provided a stronger impetus for the Hurs
to mount violent attacks on the Raj.
Khadim Hussain Soomro writes in his book Path not taken:

The British established concentration camps for the Hurs and their
families. Arrests of respectable persons under martial law orders were
a daily routine. The Hurs showed great tenacity in facing the actions of
the administration. They counterattacked in a ferocious way. Several
persons whom they suspected of having links to the administration
were executed. Trains were derailed and the son of the Home Minister,
Munawar Hussain, was slain. The Sindh Premier, Allah Bux Soomro,
narrowly escaped a targeted train attack after Jam Jan Mohammed, a
member of the Sindh Legislative Assembly, informed him at Hyderabad
Railway Station about the plot. Soomro promptly left the train. 7
The Sindh Premier chose to leave the train but somehow did not
make any effort to stop its derailment. Nevertheless the Hurs now
considered him an enemy and he, in turn, made several speeches against
the Hurs after the murder of a member of the Sindh Assembly, Seth
Sitaldas. The Hur Act was introduced in April 1942 by Allah Bux
Soomros government to control the Hur disturbances. In October 1942
Soomro gave up his British titles and honours in support of the Quit India
movement, leading to his dismissal by the Sindh Governor, Hugh Dow,
which brought Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayetullah back into power. The
Sindh Muslim League, against strongly worded advice to the contrary
from Jinnah at the center, joined the Hidayetullah Ministry. G M Sayed
also managed to maneuver a resolution in the Sindh Assembly endorsing
the Lahore Resolution - 24 to 3. This was the first time a legislature in
British India had endorsed the Pakistan demand.
The Hurs meanwhile did not give up their hatred for Soomro and
learning of the Pirs execution on 23 March 1943, murdered Allah Bux
Soomro on 14 May 1943. Ayub Khuhro, the Muslim League leader,
was also accused of having plotted with the Hurs to murder Soomro,
laying the foundations for long standing rivalry between the Soomros
and Khuhros in Sindh. The alleged Khuhro connection came through
the testimony of Mohammad Khan, a Hur turned Police Informant and
approver who said that Hur Party in Khairpur State in Sindh were visited
by one Wali Mohammad and Daresh, Ayub Khuhros Kamdar, who
told them that Khan Bahadur Ayub Khuhro wanted Allah Bux Soomro
dead.8

Sindh and Partition
Judge Paymaster, the presiding Sessions Judge, did not find the
testimony of either Mohammad Khan or Daresh reliable, having been
arrived at through an approver. It also could not find sufficient motive on
part of Khuhro, but did find the alternative theory, that in fact the Hurs
were acting on their own in vengeance for the death of Pir Sibghatullah
Rashdi.
That Khuhro was embroiled in the murder conspiracy was apparently

itself a conspiracy hatched by Hashim Gazdar and G M Syed. G M Syed
had gone to Khuhro in jail and had confessed as much. The idea was to
remove Khuhro from his pre-eminent position in the Muslim League.
The factional politics within the Muslim League had started before
Soomros murder and continued through 1943 and 1944. Khuhro was a
minister in the Hidayetullah Ministry but also had taken up the position
of the Muslim League.
In June of 1943, when Jinnah visited Sindh to help patch up the

differences, he made it a point to declare that a minister could not at the
same time hold office in the Sindh Muslim League. We get a glimpse
of Mr. Jinnahs own antipathy towards Khuhro in the following letter:
18th June 1943
Dear Lord Linlithgow
Mr. Jinnah appears to have no public engagements here but

is making himself thoroughly familiar with local political
feeling, and is making his influence felt in Muslim League
circles. I have myself had a long and friendly discussion
with him, almost entirely devoted to matters of local interest.
I think he is doing a good deal to defalcate Khan Bahadur
Khuhro, of whom he clearly has no very high opinion.
The decision which he has enforced that no member of the
ministry should be an office-bearer of the provincial Muslim
League is recognised as being aimed at Khuhro, who since
the death of Sir Abdullah Haroon has been acting president,
and has not scrupled to use his position to put pressure on his

more moderate colleagues in the ministry, Jinnah appears to
recognise that Khuhros restlessness and unscrupulousness
is the principal danger to the solidarity of the ministry which
Jinnah certainly does not want to see go out.
Yours sincerely
H. Dow
In the divide, therefore, Jinnah came out on the side of G M Syed

who was then, at Jinnahs insistence, made President of the Sindh
Muslim League. This apparently emboldened Syed and Hashim Gazdar
to hatch a conspiracy to sideline Khuhro from power and the Muslim
League. Again we find a hint of this in correspondence between Hugh
Dow and the Viceroy in a letter after Khuhros acquittal:
..MohbatBehanis one of the absconders wanted in connection with

the murder of AllahBaksh, the late Premier. I do not pay great regard
to the report ... that he has made a statement implicating the late Home
Minister,Gazdar. If the report is anything more than election propaganda,
it would seem thatMohbatBehanhas taken theKhuhrocase to heart,
and hopes to gain free pardon by implicating someone more important.
It is true however that my Premier [Hidayetullah] was greatly excited
by theserumours, and asked for a special interview with me. But by
the time he arrived, he would do no more than make vague insinuations
about his fear that high police officers were concerned in spoiling the
case againstMohbatBehan. He gave me the impression that he knew
more about the truth than, on second thoughts, he was willing to confide
in me, and that he feared thatGazdar, with his back to the wall, might
reveal things which both he and Sir Ghulam are in present conditions
agreed to be better covered up.9
G M Syeds meeting with Ayub Khuhro, as mentioned above, in jail

also indicates the same. Hamida Khuhro writes:
One of the earliest visitors Khuhro had in jail was one of his bitter
opponents at this time, G. M. Syed. Writing to Jinnah on 4 October
Yusuf Haroon mentions the fact:

Sindh and Partition
When I was away to Bombay, Mr. G. M. Syed was at Karachi and
then left for Sukkur to meet Khan Bahadur Khuhro in Jail. I have heard
that Mr. Syed has made up his mind to help Khan Bahadur in his trial.
Syed had come to Khuhro to say mea culpa and ask forgiveness.
He admitted to Khuhro that he had conspired with Gazdar to remove
him from the cabinet and had promised Gazdar Premiership, but he said
that his intention had only been to remove Khuhro from power and not
to put his life at risk. Syed said that he would now do everything in
his power to help Khuhro. Knowing well the mercurial and emotional
nature of Syed and also his basic honesty, Khuhro could not hold any
grudge and readily forgave him.
In the trial Syed gave good supportive evidence showing that

there could not possibly be any political rivalry between Soomro and
Khuhro and that personal relations between them were good. He said
that after Soomros dismissal the chances of his returning as Premier
were almost non existent and that therefore there was no question of
his being a potential rival to Khuhro. Also Khuhro had the support
of Muslim League members and Soomro the support of Hindu and
Congress members, so they were not vying for the same support. Also
that it was Hidayetullah who had been called to form the Government
after Soomros dismissal and not Khuhro who had Jinnahs as well as
Syeds own support. The question of any personal or political motive
for Khuhro to get rid of Soomro did not arise. He also admitted in his
evidence that he was politically close to Gazdar and against Khuhro
and that the Inspector in charge of the case (Ghulam Akbar) was a close
friend of Gazdar.10
During Ayub Khuhros absence, tensions between the party

organization and the ministers came out even more openly. G M Syed
meanwhile was in open rebellion against the ministry at this time. G M
Syeds immediate differences with Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayetullah
were based on the latters choice for candidates for elections as well as
his choice for ministers. Jinnah was, once again, called to be a mediator
between them, who seemed to be siding with G M Syed as usual.

We get a hint of the brewing differences between Syed and
Hidayetullah in a letter from Lord Wavell to Amery:
Provincial politics are quiet except in Sindh. Ghulam Hussain

Hidayatullah sticks to his plan for increasing the number of ministers
to nine. His main object seems to be to get his son elected to the Sindh
Assembly in a vacancy in the Shikarpur constituency. In order to
capture the Provincial Parliamentary Board of the Muslim League, and
consolidate himself against the enemies within the League, he has to
make use of patronage. Dow says that with so much waiting to be done
for the benefit of the province, the constant political intrigue, usually
with small personal objects in view, is most troublesome, and makes
efficient administration impossible. There are signs that Ghulam Hussain
Hidayatullah is not getting on too well with Jinnah. The appointment of
Thomas as a minister, though welcome locally, has been criticised both
by Muslim and by Hindu newspapers outside Sindh.11
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayetullah wanted his son Anwar Hussain

to be the candidate of the Muslim League in Shikarpur. G M Syed, as
the president of the parliamentary board, favoured Ghulam Nabi Pathan
who was ultimately given the ticket. So severe were the differences, that
both Hidayetullah and Syed were summoned to Delhi to meet Jinnah and
settle their differences. All the central leader could do was paper over the
differences. But the differences persisted. G M Syed was maneuvered
by Hidayetullah into withdrawing the ticket from Ghulam Nabi Pathan
and instead awarding it to Khan Bahadur Nizamuddin, a relative of the
premier. Then on the insistence of the premier, Nizamuddin withdrew
in favour of Khan Bahadur Maula Bux Soomro, the brother of late
Allah Bux Soomro. G M Syed and his group then launched an election
campaign in support of Rahim Shah, the brother of the late Pir of Pagara
but it was unfruitful. Nevertheless, the Sindh Muslim League had been
torn asunder by the rival politics of Syed and Hidayetullah. The same
thing was repeated in Tando Mohammad Khan, where Syed supported
a young Muslim Leaguer candidate against the premiers candidate
Hussain Bux Talpur. The latter won through the help of premier and his
supporters.

Sindh and Partition
Sir Hidayetullah, now smelling blood, went for the jugular and
asked Hashim Gazdar to resign who, in turn, appealed to Jinnah. Jinnah
refused to intervene and one by one all of G M Syeds supporters and
allies were progressively sidelined from the Sindh government. Even
Jinnah, who had been sympathetic to Syed earlier, failed to intervene
causing Syed to ultimately chart a course away from the Muslim League.
Hugh Dow, the Sindh Governor, now reported to the Viceroy as

under:
Government House Karachi

9th February 1945
Dear Lord Wavell
S.B. Hussain Bux, father of deceased member and uncle

of my home minister, has been declared successful in the
Tando Mohammed Khan election. This must be viewed as
another defeat for the Muslim League, for though he will
no doubt support the present ministry. S.B. Hussain Bux
had refused to accept the League ticket and his opponent
was strongly backed by G.M. Sayed and Gazdar with the
party machinery of the provincial Muslim League and all
the Pirs and Maulvis that they could boat up. The election
was fought with great bitterness. It is probable that the home
minister took full advantage of his official position. On the
other hand, if he had not done so, the election would hardly
passed without grave disorder and bloodshed. A good deal of
credit is due to the local officials who preserved order in very
trying circumstances.
Jinnah doesnt come of these proceedings too well, when

G.M. Sayed and Gazdar came out in open revolt against
the premiers authority, Jinnah should have realised at once
that it was necessary for him to come down one side or the
other, and since neither Gazdar nor G.M. Sayed can have
any political future apart from the Muslim League, where

Sir Ghulam is capable, at any moment, of resigning from
the Muslim League and taking half of the Muslim MLAs
with him, it should have been clear which side he must take
if he wished the League government in Sindh to continue.
For the moment, it appears that with Mr. Isas assistance,
peace has been patched up and the G.M. Sayed group has
been ordered to support Sir Ghulam Hussains government.
But in the process, the Muslim League has unnecessarily lost
two elections, the hollowness of the League facade in Sindh
has been well advertised, and both factions are shouldering
with resentment not only against each other but also against
Jinnah himself.
There is still trouble to come over Jinnahs determination

not to allow a coalition of any Muslim group, other than
the Muslim League. Jinnahs bungling has strengthened the
non-League Muslims, particularly by the addition of the
late premiers brother, K.B. Maula Bux who has ambitions
to be a minister, and will be formidable in opposition. K.B.
Maula Bux is not vindictive, and if admitted into the ministry
would, I think, after a decent interval, be prepared to join the
Muslim League. But out of respect for his brothers memory,
he can hardly be expected to join the League as a condition
of taking office. Jinnah will probably be obstinate on this
point, and so forces Maula Bux and his supporters to remain
in opposition, and if this happens, Sir Ghulam may have
difficulty in getting safely through the budget session, even
with an expanded cabinet.
Pir Rahim Shah, brother of the late Pir Pagaro whose

activities I mentioned last week had been served with an
order confining him to Sukkur for a period of two years. At
the same time, my ministers, against my advice, issued an
order confining G.M. Sayed to his village for three months.
Although the ostensible reason for this order was an attempt
by G.M. Sayed to stir up agrarian trouble in another district. It
would have been quite clear to the public that the real object

Sindh and Partition
was to prevent him from taking part in the Tando Mohammed
Khan election and in the budget meeting of the Assembly.
However between issue and the execution of the order, the
ministers got cold feet, and recalled the order. The fact that
an order had been issued (but not that it had been recalled)
became known to the local press, probably because ministers
cannot hold their tongues and the newspapers are carrying the
usual controversy of assertions and denials without daring to
reveal the sources of their authentic information.
Yours sincerely
H. Dow12
From this it can be seen that the British were also actively supporting
the premier and were hoping to breach the Muslim League ranks
by turning ministrys ire against GM Syed, who in fact they wanted
detained in his village because he was considered such a threat. Jinnah,
they calculated, wanted desperately to have a Muslim League ministry
in Sindh to bolster his claim to speak for all Muslims in the subcontinent.
That the Perfidious Albion had his own role to play in the whole matter
becomes quite clear when we consider the letter above.
The first public break between G M Syed and Jinnah came a few
weeks later. G M Syed, along with Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi attempted
to bring a cut motion against the Premier. This motion was defeated. In
response to these latest developments, Jinnah cabled to G M Syed:
You have precipitated crisis broken party discipline, caused split,

and shaken solidarity Sindh Muslims notwithstanding your assurance to
me at conclusion our Bombay talks and against my advice. You have
ignored Committee of Action, Central Parliamentary Board, League
Machinery, Constitution, Rules and Regulations, though by means of
which you could have secured full redress of just any grievance but
instead you have wrongly resorted to methods which are calculated to
undermine basic structure League organisation, its aims and objects. This
course of action on your part is highly improper, detrimental Muslim
interests, Muslim League. Futile give advice instructions more.13

In response to this G M Syed stated his position in a long passionate
letter in which he argued the following points:
1. Hidayetullah was doing all he could to undermine the Muslim

League in Sindh.
2. Hidayetullah had overruled and worked against the Muslim
League parliamentary board and brought on board non-League
ministers.
3. Hidayetullahs ministry was absolute evil which would mean
nothing but disintegration of Muslim Leagues authority.
4. There was a conspiracy brewing against the Muslim League
and the man responsible for it was none other than Hidayetullah
who had colluded with enemies of the League in ensuring that
the League lost successive elections.
By June 1945, G M Syed was in open revolt. He had won the

presidency of the provincial council of the League and almost immediately
set about raising the banner of his revolt by passing a resolution against
the All India Muslim League. This resolution is produced here in full:
The Council of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League does not fully
agree with the convention established by the All India Muslim League,
which aims at divesting the provincial Leagues of all their inherent
powers of control and supervision over Provincial Assembly Parties and
ministries. This policy, in the opinion of the Council, is unworkable,
prejudicial to the interest of the provinces and one, which must be
revised in view of the following grounds and circumstances:
1. Elections to the provincial legislatures are fought through the

agency of the Provincial Leagues. It is mainly through the
latters efforts that the League Assembly members gain their
entry into the legislature. It is unfair and detrimental to the
interests of the Provincial League, that as soon as the elections
are over, the elected members should cease to owe any direct
responsibility to it.

Sindh and Partition
2. In the course of electioneering campaigns, the Provincial
League naturally give certain undertakings to, and incurs
certain responsibilities towards, the electors, on behalf of the
organisation, and also on behalf of the candidate concerned.
Implementation of such undertakings, and honouring of such
responsibilities become impossible unless the Provincial
League wield full powers of control over, and regulating of the
conduct of the elected members even inside the legislatures.
3. The conduct of the League MLAs inside the Assembly directly

reacts on the reputation and popularity of the Provincial League,
and the latter falls into an unenviable situation and position if
it enjoys no direct powers to correct the course of events in the
legislatures through direct control upon the League Assembly
Parties.
4. It encourages centralisation to an excessive degree, which is

not conducive to the promotion of the spirit of democracy;
on the contrary, it definitely militates against the principle of
provincial autonomy.
5. The Provincial League is a body present on the spot and

consequently in a better position to guide, regulate and control
the working of the local Assembly Parties, and to maintain
a state of coordination and balance between the provincial
electorate and the provincial party.
6. The Central Parliamentary body exercises original powers of

control in this matter. It is practically impossible for the Board
to look after properly, effectively and efficiently the working of
the Parliamentary Parties, throughout the subcontinent of India.
In view of these and other grounds, the Council urges upon the
All-India Muslim League to revise the policy, and procedure, so as to
avoid the provincial Leagues being reduced to a position of absolute
impotency in the matter.

While this was happening Hugh Dow, our erstwhile perfidious
Albion, was hatching another conspiracy to limit and sideline Jinnahs
influence in Sindh. On 2nd July, he sent the following telegram to Wavell:
2 July 1945 No.111-S.C. Your telegram No. 155-S.C. of

30th June. In my opinion if Jinnah is intransigent, attempts
should be made to form an Executive Council without
the Muslim League. Difficulties of this are recognised,
but alternative appears to be carrying on as to present, in
which case bitter resentment and hostility both of Congress
and Muslim League has to be faced and intensification of
communal feeling which would probably manifest itself in
sporadic outbreaks of violence. Much of Jinnahs influence
depends on feeling that he is going to be successful, and
will disappear if you make it clear that he is not going to get
away with it. Incidentally, his hold on Sindh is very tenuous
and I believe my Premier would require little persuasion to
break away from the League, in which case certainly one and
probably two of my other Ministers would join him, and I
should have no difficulty in running a non-League coalition
ministry in Sindh. Jinnahs reference to successes in by-
elections does not apply to Sindh, where in one recent election
a Muslim League candidate withdrew to avoid certain defeat
and in another election could put up no candidate, while in
both elections the candidate who had unofficial support of
Muslim Leaguers was defeated.
Your sincerely
H. Dow14
Jinnah came twice to Karachi during the year to mediate the

differences and yet again failed. He attempted to re-constitute the
parliamentary board and as a result further alienated G M Syed who till
this point had been his loyal ally in Sindh. G M Syed bitterly complained
of the attitude of other Sindhi Muslim League leaders who had through
out tried to sideline him. His version of events is as under:

Sindh and Partition
Here I was face to face with the Quaid-i-Azam of the
Muslim India, storming and raging; just because I had tried
in my own humble way to live up to those ideals for which
he praised me once; just because I was vigilant in protecting
the honour and prestige of the provincial organisation, he
had once asked me to guide; just because I was vain enough
to strive and express the inarticulate voice of the Muslim
masses whose interests the Congress had already failed to
represent; and just because I was earnest enough to rise and
defend the glory of Quaid-i-Azam in whose name lacs of
Sindhi Muslims had been taught to love and honour and
identify with their own salvation. But in reality the Quaid-
i-Azam was angry and furious, because his will had been
thwarted. He was unequivocal in his censure of me. He
dismissed the whole band of League workers represented
in the Provincial Council, as a mere mob. He denied the
provincial organisations all rights and privileges concerning
its very existence and its prestige in the eyes of the people of
this province. He was angry because he was the leader and his
commands possessed the sanctity of inviolable law. No, this
was not a conflict between two highly assertive personalities
who were determined to have their own way, this was rather
the inevitable conflict between two essentially different
attitudes and ideologies, that had gathered its momentum as
years had rolled by. He was the mighty angel from the top
that viewed the surface with an indifferent sweep, and whose
unchallengeable authority could not be dictated; mine was
the humble view from the bottom, working its way from the
concrete realities of my province. I felt confident that my feet
were planted on solid earth and this conflict had arisen out of
the very real problems that had cropped up within my range
of experience. These problems had to be solved first before
there could be any bigger problems demanding solution15
On 2 January 1946, the Muslim League finally expelled G M

Syed from its party organization, a move that G M Syed denounced
as unconstitutional and a violation of provincial autonomy. Ultimately

during the elections Jinnahs candidate withdrew in favour of G M Syed
and allowed the latter to secure a foothold through his Syed League,
which he had fashioned as a progressive forward bloc of the Muslim
League.
G M Syed meanwhile gave his views to the Cabinet Mission in

April of 1946. These were reported as under:
Mr. Sayed said that he believed in the independence of

areas with Muslim majorities. In Western India such areas
should be joined in a Federation, of which each constituent
state should be represented in the Federal Government on an
equal basis and not in proportion to population. There should
be similar Federation of Muslim areas in Eastern India. Apart
from these two Muslim Federations, the remaining Provinces
of what is now British India should form a Hindu Federation
and there should be a fifth Federation consisting of such of the
larger States as might be able to retain a measure of autonomy.
The smaller States should be merged either in the Muslim
or Hindu Federation or in the larger State. A separate Sikh
State was impracticable unless there was extensive transfers
of population, since the Sikhs were not in a majority in any
district. Each of five Federations in the future India would
have its own constitution-making body; or there might even
be a separate Constituent Assembly for each of the existing
Provinces. Once the five Federations were established
they should agree to delegate their powers in respect of
foreign affairs and defence to a common central agency for
a period of ten or fifteen years. At the end of this period
the constituent Federations would have the right to secede
from the common centre, though it was to be hoped that they
would remain together. It depended upon the wishes of each
of the Constituent Federations how far they delegated further
powers (e.g. in respect of communications or customs) to the
common centres and in theory it was certainly desirable that
they should do so. But for the time being the feeling among
the Muslims against any sort of Federation with Hindu India

Sindh and Partition
was so strong that it would be a great concession on their part
for them to be brought to agree to a common centre of foreign
affairs and defence only. Speaking as one who stood outside
the two main parties, he deplored the intransigent attitude of
both Congress and the Muslim League. Each was taking up a
very strong stand on its own principles and would not listen
to those who, like himself, urged more moderate views. At
the Simla Conference each side had refused to compromise
on points of secondary importance, for example, the right of
the Muslim League to speak for all Muslims. So long as this
attitude persisted there was no possibility of a settlement.
The arbitrary dictates of the party High Commission were
destructive not only of Provincial Autonomy but also of the
freedom and welfare of the Indian people. Nevertheless,
Congress and the Muslim League had the Indian masses
behind them, and it was essential that they should come to
terms. There was no possibility of the Indian problem being
solved without a settlement between them. If the Muslim
League were bypassed, the Muslims would stand solidly with
Mr. Jinnah and disturbances would result. His own group
agreed with Mr. Jinnahs aim, though they differed from him
on question of method and of economic organization. On
the latter issue they were in favour of a Socialist India and
held that both the Congress and the Muslim League were
dominated by capitalists.16
Ultimately the historic Cabinet Mission Plan embodied many of

these proposals and Jinnah accepted them. The centralizing tendency
on part of the Congress ultimately led to its rejection. An excellent
opportunity of saving some semblance of Hindu-Muslim Unity and a
United India was thus lost.
Meanwhile the problems that were brought to fore by Jinnah and G

M Syed continued to plague the Muslim League even after G M Syeds
departure. After partition Ayub Khuhro became the first Chief Minister
of Sindh. As the chief executive of Sindh and the leader of the Muslim
League he soon came into a confrontation with central authority. The

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan wanted to separate Karachi and make
an independent capital territory a position that was unacceptable to
Ayub Khuhro. Jinnah overruled his objections. In the power struggle
that ensued, Ayub Khuhro was ejected from his position as the Chief
Minister less than a year after assuming that office and was replaced by
a more pliable Pir Ilahi Bux, setting a negative tone for center and unit
relations in Pakistan.
References
1 Afzal, M.R., 2013.A History of the All-India Muslim League, 1906-1947. Oxford
University Press. Page 393.
2 Ibid Page 394
3 Jinnah, M.A. and Ahmad, W., 1992.The Nations Voice, Towards Consolidation:
United we win: annotated speeches and statements March 1935- March 1940.
Quaid-i-Azam Academy. Pages 279-281
4 Ibid Page 297
5 http://www.gmsyed.org/path/path_not_taken.pdf
6 Ibid
8 Case record. Crown v. Ayub Khuhro, recounted here: http://the-reporter.info/
feb07/bookreview/index.htm which is an excerpt from Mohammad Ayub
Khuhro by Hamida Khuhro.
9 http://the-reporter.info/apr07/bookreview/index.htm an excerpt from Mohammad
Ayub Khuhro, the Iron Man of Sindh.
10 http://the-reporter.info/jan07/bookreview/index.htm
11 Letter from Wavell to Amery 15 November 1944
12 Hugh Dow to Wavell 9 February 1945
13 Jinnah to G M Syed Telegram 28 February 1945
14 Hugh Dow to Wavell 2 July 1945
16 Meeting of the Cabinet Delegation with G M Syed, April 1946 Simla

Challenges and Opportunities in a Post ISIS Territorial World
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

IN A POST ISIS TERRITORIAL
WORLD AN ONGOING GLOBAL
MENACE*
Ozer Khalid
Abstract
(A few years back ISIS unleashed a Fourth Reich, a Pandora`s box on
our planet evolving from a Paper State to a Caliphate.1 Now that
they are territorially banished a whole host of challenges and threats
unleash and unravel in the flammable tinderbox that is the Middle East,
a historical haven for war after war. Author)
Life after ISIS The Need for Cautious Optimism

In June 2014 ISIS unleashed a Pandora`s box on our planet, a
veritable Fourth Reich, by evolving from a Paper State to a Caliphate.
Much has changed since then, as ISIS is being dealt definitive territorial
blows in a now liberated Mosul, and as Kurdish2 troops valiantly reclaim
Raqqa3 from the tyrannical clutches of IS terrorists.
Though the physical war against ISIS, by and large, has been
won, on a geographical and territorial basis, the ideological war to be
waged on the battlefront of ideas must ensue for generations to come
if we are to render radicalism`s ideological appeal intellectually defunct
and unappealing. Ideological ideas are, after all, bullet-proof and take
generations to quell, contain, weed and filter out.
* Opinions expressed herein are a collation of thoroughly researched empirical and
expert views, and do not necessary reflect the author`s nor Criterion Quarterly`s
editorial stance.
The author is a geo-strategist, a senior management consultant, a development
sector specialist and a journalist. Twitter follow @ozerkhalid; e-mail
ozzerkhalid@gmail.com

zer Khalid
This intellectual challenge, against extremism is the real
ideological war after the physical war that besets us all. It requires
the international community to evolve from solely deploying hard
power of military might towards exploring the suasion of soft power
against extremism. By course of necessity, deploying soft power in
counter radicalization involves sensitization, rehabilitation, education,
community resilience, refugee repatriation, civil society push-back and
inter-faith bridge-building.
The forces which territorially unraveled ISIS were the historical

Fatwa4 of the main Iraqi Shiite Leader, Ayatollah Sistani, overwhelming
support by Iran, aerial attacks by Russia followed by the U.S. and allies,
Kurdish military campaigns by, inter alia, the YPG and Peshmerga, the
great uprising of the Iraqi nation, the White Helmets, and Syrian fighters
against IS, especially the SDP and the controversy laden Nusra Front.
The military victory over ISIS hinders the terrorist`s recruitment

prowess. IS spewed a ruthless, deadly and ambitious narrative of
momentum and military might. Now aspiring radicals are reticent to
enlist themselves with perceived losers. IS`s cheap sloganeering of
expansion ignited misguided passions in many vulnerable, maligned
and marginalized youth who bought into IS baloney. As the faux
Caliphate crumbles, that same zest and zeal to join their ranks isnt
present. IS`s potency and call-to-arms and action has irreversibly
diminished.
Even though many IS members now lack faith in IS, as many have
defected or surrendered, still, careful and cautious optimism is counseled.
What we are likely to now witness are the most virulent battle-hardened
brain-washed IS zealots eager to execute an aggressive covert guerilla
insurgency in Syria, Iraq and in an expansive international theater.
The noteworthy territorial victories vis--vis ISIS, will not deter

many remaining IS fighters to venomously worm their way into far-
flung lands under the Machiavellian guise of posing as refugees, even
manipulating children or widows to repatriate to the EU or other safe
havens, to unleash fresh hell.

A territorially squeezed ISIS will increasingly seek safe sanctuary
and hide-outs in Northern Africa (already a terror hotbed), and Central
and South Asia,5 whose arteries are deeply clogged and congested with
existentialist extremist threats, as Sehwan Sharif, Quetta6 Parachinar7
and Lahore`s horrid 24 July 2017 Ferozepur Road suicide bomb8
massacre gruesomely attest. An instructive and alarming case in point
is the new formation of al-Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS).
Hammering the Final Nail in IS`s Territorial Coffin Complete

Evisceration once and for all ?
Despite momentous victories over IS in Mosul, Raqqa9, Tabqa,

Manbij and al-Bab10 (as exhibited below), especially in the countrys
north-east, it is unwise to immediately celebrate the demise of ISIS. The
next plan of action must include militarily recapturing the strategically
quintessential Deir Ezzor in eastern Syria11, the last remaining urban
bastion of ISIS dominance in Syria.

zer Khalid
Assad and his cronies have been elbowing in to target Deir Ezzor
and mount a stealthy assault against IS, inching Assad strategically
closer to Iraq`s border a paramount prerogative for Iran, his prime
ally. Assad`s proximity to the Iraqi border is untenable for the Trump
administration, which seeks to counter Tehran`s regional heft. The
bitter truth is that for many short-sighted politicos, ISIS always was
a neutralizing force against Iran`s Shiite influence. Even many in
the West deployed superficial anti-IS Orwellian double-speak12 non
authentic language when secretly they saw IS as a counter hegemonic
force against Iran.
An ISIS defeat in eastern Syria`s Deir Ezzor is a final nail hammered

in the territorial coffin of ISIS. The SDF are reticent to attack Deir
Ezzor since Washington`s allied Free Syrian Army factions in southern
Syria are now enfeebled and incapable of mounting a major offensive
leaving Assad and his allies (Iran and Russia) as the sole plausible
contenders.
Thus, in the instant aftermath of IS`s territorial loss in eastern Syria,

the up-and-coming victors will be the Syrian regime and their allies

in Tehran and Moscow. The continuing agreement with the Kurds in
Raqqa13 and Manbij is fleeting for now and is likely to crumble, spawning
continued insecurity in Syria with viral spill-over effects into Iraq and
the broader Middle East. While it is improbable that IS will have any
territorial execution capabilities in Syria after the current campaign, the
unending challenges of seething ethnic and sectarian tensions will keep
fuelling the flames of radicalism, possibly even paving way for the next
reincarnated mutation of IS to re-emerge in Syria and Iraq and further
afield.
ISIS` Strategic Reorientation and a Digital Caliphate - 2017 and

beyond
It was under Mosuls14 iconic al-Hadba minaret at al-Nuri Mosque,

that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, with delusional fundamentalist frenzy,
declared his Caliphate and now it has been demolished by IS itself
in the context of the Iraqi security forces assault.

Although its endeavors in state-building have ceased, ISIS will
carry on existing, terrorizing and wreaking havoc: maybe under a new
guise, brand or umbrella. Its hedonistic hell of death and destruction,
of blood and butchery will become more sinister as IS goes under the
radar. A reorganized and rebranded covert ISIS that does not dominate
territory presents a plethora of unforeseen challenges.
As ISIS operatives go underground, they are alarmingly becoming

less traceable to intelligence and law enforcement through deployment of
fluid guerrilla warfare maneuvers15 and fifth generational asymmetrical
tactics contingent upon deep deception. Such tactics are likely to involve
geographically dispersed attacks against civilians on a vulnerable
densely populated planet. Therefore war after the war against IS will
not only be ideological but also an intelligence security based one.
ISIS has ample resources, strategically evolving toward mafia-esque
techniques. Laundering and white-washing its copious cash reserves
through deceptive legal businesses such as currency exchanges that act
as fronts.

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There are alleged reports that the self-appointed and self-deluded
Caliph, Al-Baghdadi, is dead. However, hearsay is a hazardous game
in geo-politics. Reports had similarly declared Taliban`s Mullah Omar
to be dead and it took a tenuous two years to receive actual confirmation.
Even if Baghdadi is dead, remember that bullets cannot kill ideas, which
remain bullet proof. For instance, the death of Bin Laden did not end al
Qaeda, au contraire these terrorist groups are Hydra-headed snakes, in
that one dies and multiple more spring up from the woodworks.
The death of Mullah Omar, for instance, did not end the Taliban,
they are in fact gruesomely emboldened in South Asia, most recently
taking credit for the stomach-churning suicide bombing near Ferozepur
Road on July, 24, 2017 in Lahore.
Another key example of an ISIS strategic reorientation can be seen

from their poisonous propaganda media outlet, Dabiq,16 now rebranded
as Rumiyah (denoting Rome) which is where ISIS are intending to take
the battle toward (Western cities). Rome, being the historical heart of
Western civilization (invoking the medieval Roman Empire of yore),
and other cities will now become prime targets.
Such propaganda force-feeding to lure ripe new recruits will take

place via online recruitment and social media radicalization. ISIS
will keep exploring new sinister depths of depravity, to shock and
awe humanity. They now encourage many fighters to camouflage
themselves as refugees17 and snake their fangs back to safer shores, to
other countries in the Middle East, Turkey and the EU (their Rumiyah),
who are likely to target soft civilian targets. Orphans and widows
whose husbands died on the daunting battlefields of Iraq and Syria are
especially vulnerable.
ISIS are not even sparing children. They are grooming and raising
these children like the blood-diamond child soldiers of Sierra Leone.
ISIS is deliberately forcing children (up to 50,000 according to numerous
statistics) to the frontlines in the heat of battle. Children and women,
whose fathers/husbands fought for ISIS and have since died, are being
used as covert weapons of war.

Hauntingly, a British four year old, Isa Dare18, the son of a Jihadi
bride from London, was shown in an IS propaganda video with his
hand on a detonator blowing up a car with three men to smithereens.
Isa, was taken to Syria by his mother, Grace Khadija Dare, and egged
on to join IS` delusional depravity. Isa was seen clad in combat fatigues
and a black headband. There are thousands of Isa`s worming their way
back to their countries of origin, waiting to unleash a harbinger of hell
on earth.
Parenthood must immediately be revoked from such so-called

guardians like Khadija. What happens to these children? ISIS has
segmented an entire new child-based radicalized faction labelled Junior
Jihadis19 or ISIS Cubs. At their unhinged Al-Farook Institute,
orphaned children and widows are conditioned, with Pavlovian20
precision, brain-washed into memorizing global Western landmarks,
taught how to reintegrate back into society, especially Western
communities, and thereafter wait a few years only to blow up these
infidel pagan symbols (tourist landmarks).
Such gruesome incidents involving tender children whose youth

has forever been stolen from them, and women have been happening for
quite a while. A dozen teenagers were caught in Belgium plotting terror
in 2016 and a 12 year old boy in Germany last Christmas was caught
red handed trying to detonate a bomb. Many of these children are below
the age of criminal responsibility in strict legal terms. Lawyers will
need to decide whether these children should be treated as victims of
grooming, child soldiers or criminals. Such challenges will pose legal
and policy conundrums for legislators accepting these child soldiers
onto their soil.
Large swathes of IS sympathizers, though notionally abandoning

IS, are trickling into Turkey21 - an exodus with a proclivity to wreak
havoc in South Eastern Turkey. Turkey is where the memories
of Suruc, the Istanbul Airport attack and the Ankara train station
terror are still painfully raw in our memories. Via Turkey, these IS
sympathizers will also spill-over into Europe and spew radicalization,
especially in vulnerable sanctuaries such as prison cells, where

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alienated prey disillusioned with life and living can be swayed
over to the dark side.
This is exactly why deradicalization in civil society as well as

in the most sensitive of institutions, prisons, schools and sanctuaries
of worship remains paramount. International donor funding can be
of great use. It can be placed to resourceful counter-extremist efforts
from rehabilitation to grievance counseling to cultural sensitization to
peaceful picketing.
Many IS militants who joined the Godless death cult since 2013
have now contacted their embassies seeking to return home. Police
and law enforcement will vet each case and seek to determine the extent
of criminality.22 Many may face life in prison. Many others will require
grief counseling and rehabilitation. Many, however, ideologically
firebrand members may still, despite counseling, pretend to be cured
but camouflage their true intentions just to fit in in order to exact a
ruthless IS revenge, avenging the crumbling Caliphate and terrorizing
soft civilian target strikes on the continent as was recently the case in
Sweden, Manchester and London Bridge.
The characteristics of the battle against IS will strategically alter

into an intelligence war. Keeping closer surveillance on former IS
members who surrender themselves or present themselves at their
embassies of country of origin is a must. This, however, must be done
without alienating minorities, especially the broader Muslim moderate
majority community - a tightrope to tread in the best of times. The
hazard foreign fighters pose upon returning to their nations should
never be underrated.
Herein lies perhaps the most sensitive counter extremism

challenge of all - how to monitor offenders without turning society
into an overbearing Orwellian23 police state. Where to strike the
balance between civil liberties and national security? To what extent
will the catchall convenient phrase of national security be used as
a state ruse to silence critics and breach human rights, especially
in developing countries? A lot of legal sagacity, human rights

advocacy and soul-searching is needed to answer these seemingly
intractable queries.
Western intelligence authorities affirm that well known radicals

of ISs external operations wing teamed up with IS from numerous
European countries, including Germany, Britain24, Belgium, France
and Australia. A minimum of 300 ideologically driven foreigners are
estimated to have been smuggled, via Turkey after crossing a now
tightly controlled Turkish Syrian border, to Europe from late 2014 until
mid-2016.25
Turkish law enforcement conducted arrests in 2017 that they

assert dislocated hitherto established smuggling routes, some via
Bulgaria and others through Greece. Regional intelligence officers,
however, suspect that certain of those routes remain operational in
spite of the clamp down. A globally stricter intelligence apparatus
around people smuggling needs to take root, with vital co-operation
between Interpol, Europol and the Five Eyes. Europe, therefore,
must keep its guard up26 as the IS infiltration menace is likely to get
worse before it gets better over the next few months as the territorial
strain on IS heaps on.
Though territorially contained, many more similar sinister incidents

are likely to unfurl as ISIS, prima facie, aims at socially engineering
new recruits and converts to their cause. A key IS initiative will be
online grooming via a digital27 Caliphate - an idea ISIS top brass have
had to reconcile to - which is where the next frontier in the battle against
terror will be waged.
IS already demonstrated their cyber stealth when in 2015 they

hacked British servers. Though the ISIS state crumbles like a cookie
before our very eyes, it`s sinister ideology will be passed on and it will
thus remain a terrorist group in the hearts and minds of potential
recruits - ripe for the plucking, from the forgotten fringes of society.
Such recruitment will intensify online, on the deep dark cyber web.

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Hence the importance of ideological stealth campaigns against
online extremism through better digital surveillance, cyber security
teams as well as social media advocacy and online peace activism
such as Australia`s I will ride with you hashtag and similar forms
of digitally inclusive advocacy must gain funding, policy attention
and donor traction. After all, there is only so much that military might
can achieve, there are tangible limits (not to mention devastating
humanitarian implications) to the ravages of warfare.
It is from warfare and botched invasions in the meaningless pursuit

of climate destroying fossil fuels that social dislocation, power vacuums,
political upheaval and theological radicalization are born. Alas, history
repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce.
It is within this context of historical tragedy and farce, with

painful irony, that many post-ISIS future terror outfits are being,
advertently or inadvertently, funded by the Western coalition and
NATO forces, to combat ISIS itself. The controversy surrounding
the money trail leading to Nusra Front28 (al Qaeda29 in Syria and
Iraq) bear this out. Moscow`s recent talks with the Taliban and
Chechen rebels to assault ISIS strongholds (including in Afghanistan)
are another case in point. Granted, politics makes the strangest of
bedfellows, however such misguided momentary distinction of
good extremists versus bad extremists is exactly what lead to
APS Peshawar and many other genocides.
By bank-rolling the Nusra Front for instance, Western powers are

pouring money into the hands of former al-Qaeda fanatics. Filtering
between good extremists and bad extremists as the lesser of two
evils is short-sighted myopia with historical amnesia. A deceptive
anesthetic. A deadly maneuver.
Iraq And Syria Post-ISIS - Competing And Conflicting Regional

Interests
Post ISIS, to prevent manifold tensions resurfacing in Iraq, Syria

and the broader region, requires pro-active U.S., allied coalition forces

and UN peacekeeping engagement focused on averting escalation,
reducing sectarian strife and improving sustainable governance models,
especially in areas recently liberated from ISIS.
The situation in Syria is even more fragile and fragmented than

in Iraq. Festering social war-torn wounds of Syria remove any easy
formula for piecing together that fragile fragmented broken state back
into a nation. It has become a Dickensian30 inferno of dirt-poor, deeply
disturbing rubble and squalor. Humanity`s wasteland. A living breathing
Dystopia, if there ever was one.
A post-ISIS nation-rebuilding calculus would involve ground troops

as well as peacekeeping missions. Over the medium haul, American, Arab
and Russian diplomats must enter a deep dialogue, strike compromise
and seek policy realignments to figure out how `spheres of influence`
and strategic interests can best converge to mutually accommodate
competing interests. This must crucially involve violence lowering
measures so that refugees can safely be repatriated home with the key
assistance of the UN Refugee Agency, Crisis International, Red Cross/
Crescent and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Post-ISIS international coalition`s main concern must be tasked

with brokering peace amongst various warring factions, sects and tribes
in Syria and Iraq (admittedly never an easy challenge), repatriating and
reintegrating refugees, revitalizing democracy and institutional nation
building over the long haul. The absence of a truly representative
and accountable government in these failed states will ensure their
withering decay. In the absence of the above, attempts at nation-building
are doomed to futile failure.
Competing powers must, at all costs, avoid propping up puppet tin

pot dictators (again), who serve narrow neo-colonial interests, rather
than their populations at large. Such tyrants see themselves less as
men and more as messiahs, surrounding themselves with obedient
yes men31. It is such leader gurufication that unraveled Iraq and
explains Syria`s unforgivable strife.

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Whilst easy to recommend on paper, the above are extremely tough
to implement in practice as such seminal challenges are immersed
in conflicting and competing priorities and internecine national self-
interests. So for the foreseeable future, even after ISIS, in the Middle
East, it will tragically be business as usual. Let us explore why.
For multiple anti-ISIS international coalition partners, sadly, the

war against ISIS was never a main priority. Securing regional interests,
resources and raw materials, however, are. Even as Western countries
stated that this civilizational struggle against ISIS was an international
priority, the coalition countries (for the most part) toed the line -
repeating its alarm, making hefty declarations and drafting fancy paper
tiger recommendations - often diverting their gaze the other way, as
red lines were being breached with reckless abandon. It is only when
the attacks repeatedly struck EU soil and since Trump`s Presidency that
a sense of urgency forcefully now drives the global Counter Terrorism
(CT) agenda.
A most bitter irony is that the counter-ISIS campaign or the war

against terror mutated into a war of terror. Such duplicity remains
an imperfect mask hiding the more sinister self-interests steeped in
power jostling, interest muscling and mineral resource grabbing. With
ISIS now in the rearview mirror, naked self-interest will increasingly
unveil herself.
The Struggle for Syria
As ISIS territory recedes, Washington and Tehran-linked forces in

Syria might turn their guns on a faulty perception of the most imminent
threat remaining each other. However, a whole raft of conflicting
geo-political interests and complex dependencies, relationships and
money trails mire prospects for peace and stability in the Middle East
post-ISIS.

Source: Institute for the Study of War (2017) Russian Airstrikes in Syria: Pre-and
Post-Ceasefire

The Russian air force is restructuring its aerial advances in Syria
to prompt Washington into partnership with Moscow32 as the Kremlin
knows all too well that Uncle Sam cannot single-handedly decimate
militants, counter Iran`s ascendance and establish parameters for a
palatable peace settlement. In June and July 2017, Russia launched high
profile airstrikes, cruise missiles33 and bomb runs against ISIS in Homs,
eastern Hama, and Deir ez Zour to bolster war-criminal Assad`s iron-
fisted regime.
This is all part of the Kremlin`s design to seduce the Trump

administration to cede to a de-escalation zone in Southwest Syria.
Washington agreed to this on July 7 following a meeting between Trump
and Putin. Russia masks its strategic intention cloaked as a dependable
anti-ISIS ally for the U.S. in Syria. Trump`s decision to terminate support
for certain anti-Assad factions34 will inevitably catalyze Moscow`s
greater authority over the Syrian conflict and circumscribe U.S. clout
in Syria.

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What further complicates the equation is that the Washington led
campaign against ISIS is contingent upon an improbable stakeholder in
Syria, notably the Peoples Protection Units (YPG). This army formation
has intimate ties with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a radical
outfit constantly inflicting terror on Turkey - a vital NATO member
hosting the strategic US airbase at Incirlik.
The YPG controls Washington35-backed Syrian Democratic Forces

(SDF36), which support Assad`s regime, reign over much of northern
Syria, and leverage their relationship with the White House to shield
themselves from attacks by a mighty Turkish military. If Washington
prematurely withdraws from Syria, the YPG, especially their PKK
terrorist cohorts, pose an existential menace to regional Turkish stability.
Simmering tensions between Turkey and the YPG could further

throw the region into disarray, strife and social imbalance. The YPG37
banks upon the White House to shield and shelter them via legal and
military guarantees which would solidify their independence in
territories under YPG autonomy within a possible forthcoming federally
apportioned Syria.
This risky gambit makes the YPG prove their worthiness to

Washington38 by combating ISIS in Raqqa and further afield, far away
from its Kurdish strongholds. However, the rich irony being that victory
over ISIS would offer Washington an exit strategy rendering the YPG
exposed. Syrias Kurds, anxious of being negated by the U.S. once their
utility in the anti-ISIS combat ends, position themselves as long-term
safeguards countering Iranian and Turkish influence while Ankara39
paints those same Kurds with a broad terrorist brush.
Favoring Turkey might seem desirable to a Trump government

seeking to lower foreign expenses and avoid further denting its strategic
relationship with NATO40 allies in Ankara.
For Ankara, what matters most is to combat the Kurds, especially

their deadly terrorist PKK partners. For the Kurds the concept of self-
determination remains key. PKK`s terror in South Eastern Turkey,

especially in cities like Diyarbakir, are well documented. The YPG
must, at all costs, influence the PKK to unequivocally renounce violence,
which, given the PKK`s track record, is wishful thinking.
After the souring of relations between President Trump and

Rouhani, the Geneva talks and diplomacy now imperiled and a possibly
jeopardized nuclear deal, the intensified Iranian hegemony in northern
Syria is prominent factor to be weighed in. If the White House seeks
to retain influence in Syria vis--vis Iran and Russia, while avoiding
explicit confrontation, it may envision a strategic interest in continuing
to bankroll the YPG and possibly other unsavory militants.
Post-ISIS, another hindrance to regional stability is that Tehran

and Riyadh are at perennial loggerheads, as usual, in their regional
rivalry for spheres of influence where Shiaphobia41 and genocide keeps
growing. Recently appointed hawkish monarchs in Riyadh indicate
that the Saudi42-Iranian rivalry is set to simmer. As if that were not
enough, within the Sunni Arab world itself, more hardline conservative
governments such as Qatar and Turkey43 are asserting influence over
more liberal governments like Egypt44 and the United Arab Emirates;
among Iraqis, a sectarian and ethnic thirst for post-war spoils bear
primacy.
A Game of Thrones in the Gulf
A weighty roadblock for regional stability is how Saudi Arabia and

Qatar45 are at each other`s throats. The Qatar crisis is actually about
taming the one Gulf monarchy with the wherewithal to outperform the
Saudi kingdom and determine the conclusion of the Syrian war.
This Qatar crisis empowers the Saudi former defence minister,

and now Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), to control the
GCC to do his bidding.
Qatar, has increasingly mounted a proxy assault on ISIS by playing

a pivotal role in the Syrian conflict. Doha retains a discreet relationship
with Assad (assisting to liberate held hostages by Nusra in Syria) and

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bears intimate ties with the Lebanese intelligence agencies. What sorely
irks Riyadh is that Doha made proxy overtures with the pro-Assad Shia
Hezbollah in Lebanon whilst also bankrolling the Sunni Palestinian
Hamas.
Qatar recently announced its aim to raise liquid natural gas output
by 30 per cent, augmenting production from its Northern Field which it
shares with Iran. Iran, as oil tycoons know all too intimately, is content
with augmenting output on its side of the North Field. It is little wonder
the Saudis are fuming. A post-ISIS conflict-rived Syria may allow Qatar
to run a pipeline across its land onto the Mediterranean and into Europe,
reducing Russian oil and gas dependency and routes. Qatar, therefore,
now (momentarily) sees more strategic utility with Tehran than it does
with Riyadh.
So masquerading with allegations of terrorism, the Saudis,

Emiratis, Bahrainis and Egyptians have turned against this for them
very lethal little Emirate. How can the Saudi Monarch maintain
a conflict with the Shia of the Middle East especially Yemen if
Qatar is bed-fellows with Tehran, Nusra and Assad? In addition, Qatar
is assisted by Kuwaiti negotiators - who themselves are no enemies of
Tehran - and the Omanis who are sending vital assistance to Qatar and
who engaged in naval exercises with the Iranians in March 2017.
For the rest of the world, the Gulf crisis solely shames the Arabs.
The palestinians are forgotten (as usual) as the conflict in Syria (and
Iraq) rages on and the world is naively transfixed by the infantile and
tribal quarrels of some of the wealthiest Monarchs on earth46.
Such age-old hegemonic Games of Thrones, bitter rivalries and

Machiavellian monarchic maneuverings are anathema to Arab stability
and serve as a calculated distraction against real counter terrorism
efforts. Saudi Arabia and Qatar will eventually reconcile, as is always
the case. Such bilateral spats often occurred in the past. Doha`s recent
rapprochement with Tehran47, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood
will (selectively) be forgotten by Riyadh.

Such deep-seated rivalries and bitter competing interests over
spoils, dominion, influence, power and authority illustrate that nation,
institution and identity building in a post-ISIS Iraq and Syria will be an
uphill long-term generational struggle.
Salting such wounds further, the Arab League, OIC, GCC48, D8

and ECO need to reform and evolve from paper tiger talking shops
to direction-setting organizations of effectiveness and enforceability.
These organizations often contradict each other, lack the wherewithal to
catalyze change and are not as pro-actively involved to stabilize Syria
and Iraq and the Middle East as they can and should be.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE`s mistaken war against Yemen`s

Houthis further distracts and delays urgent counter terrorism efforts.
Saudi Arabia, via back-channel diplomacy, sold the Yemen war to the
international community as pushback vis-a-vis Iran along with an urge
to bring Doha to its knees. Such an illegal blockade49 violates Qatar`s
sea-routes and air space (view hereunder) and contravenes Article 33 of
the Geneva Convention.
Saudi Arabia justifies such illegal blockades as an attempt to

curtail Iran`s sphere of influence. Egypt, the birthplace of the Muslim
Brotherhood, also deceptively frames its arbitrary bigotry of many
religious people as a holy combat against terrorism and jails suspected
terrorists without due process.
Saudi Arabia, Russia, the UAE and Egypt all officially welcome
U.S.intervention under Trump which was lacking during Obamas
perceived passivity, though, unofficially, they are all positioning
themselves to cater to latent deeper-seated agendas. They know their
target audience. They play to it.

Essay
Under such layers of deception, the rational realpolitik for

Washington is not to take sides in intractable intensified conflicts over
which Washington ultimately has scant say. Unnecessary partisanship
is likely to let loose sectarian strife and anarchy from which IS was born
and on which it not only survives but thrives.
Washington should aim to de-escalate proxy wars50, swiftly

mediate the Saudi-Qatari crisis, staunchly insist for a culmination to
the slaughtering of Yemenis, retain a balanced stance toward political
Islam, and, very importantly, reduce enmity between Riyadh and Tehran
indeed, between themselves and Iran also.
The above recommendations are not what Washingtons regional

allies seek. Yet, if they genuinely yearn for vision and direction, better
to lead them where the White House believes they should go rather than
where, obstinately, they are already headed.

The trigger-happy war lobby is too swift to attack yet too premature
when pulling out, leaving power vacuums and irreconcilable warring
factions to fight tooth and nail, as radicalism takes root and society rots.
Such rot gives birth to the ISIS`s of our world. Genuine intervention is
scarcely ever justified unless intervening forces are willing to stay the
course, liberate the people, build institutions, repair societies and allow
the seeds of democracy to ripen.
The Next Wave of Terrorism Radicalization in a Post ISIS World
The demise of ISIS in no way signals a weakening of transnational

Salafi terrorism worldwide. It could be that the damage inflicted upon
ISIS catalyzes al Qaeda`s51 regional reassertion as an unchallenged
leader of Takfiri terror. It could even be that al-Qaeda and forlorn IS
terrorists (momentarily) shelve their disagreements and collaborate to
fuel the flame of terror.
It must be cautioned that al-Qaeda, whilst now being a former

shadow of its original self, is still highly capable of absorbing smaller
militant factions with a discreet approach of attracting populations who
waver on the precipice of doubt and subverting local conflicts to its own
ill-begotten ends. Al Qaeda still commands considerable sway over a
network of partnerships stretching from Northern Africa to the South
Asian sub-continent.
Al-Qaeda`s recently ruptured ties with its most influential affiliate,

Syrias Nusra Front (now rebranded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as radicals
inevitably always do), is a hedonistic example of a winning `hearts-and-
minds` strategy but has cost both insurgents dearly.
The Nusra Front cut the umbilical cord from their mother
organization, salting the previous wounds of al Qaedas having lost its
former Iraqi partner in crime, the former `Islamic State` of Iraq, which
went on to rebrand52 itself and declare the notorious `Caliphate`. None
of this exemplifies long-term strategic thinking. However, no analyst
can ever rule out that these militants, even discretely behind the scenes,
may reconcile their differences, forge mutually beneficial momentary

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alliances, collectively plan new attacks and operationally consolidate
techniques - thus remaining a force to be reckoned with.
Militants have a sinister capacity of regrouping and rebranding.

After all the Mujahideen metastasized into the Taliban and then into al-
Qaeda, which in a dark Kafkaesque53 manner metamorphosed into IS.
Post IS, Al Qaedas zealot Zawahiri perversely perseveres with the

poisonous propaganda that attacking the West remains a key imperative.
However, recent attacks such as Manchester and London Bridge prove
that logistical wherewithal to pull off heinous attacks still reside with
ISIS - ever-more sinister since they will now go underground.
There is no love lost between ISIS and al Qaeda. These terrorists and
their sycophants revileone another. Al Qaeda adherents dismiss ISIS
as extremists, Kharijites and takfiris.54 ISIS, in turn, retaliates by
labeling al Qaeda devotees as the Jews of Jihad and disciples of the
Sufi sacrilegious Taliban.55 Such divergence remains rooted in deep-
seated religious differences dating back to decades.
Al Qaeda, Nusra Front, ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah will remain

deeply divided. Each will, however, continue to hatch plans for dominion,
death and destruction in their respective spheres of influence - ISIS
being the most fluid of all due to its non-territorial lack of traceability.
Many smaller militant factions will be co-opted and absorbed by these
larger terrorists. ISIS, if not by name then certainly by nature, has
been around in previous incarnations since 2006 and will most certainly
keep plotting, planning and dividing communities against each other as
they frightfully go underground, where they may not merely survive
but thrive.
The power/control vacuum left behind by ISIS will be filled up

by eagerly awaiting radical bastardized off-shoots, of which there are
many in Syria and Iraq. Militant resurgence from ISIS` predecessor, al
Qaeda in Iraq, vividly exemplified how radicals can rebound quickly
iffundamental threats to social stability are left unaddressed.

In any case the Taliban, Al Qaeda, the Nusra Front, (an al Qaeda
offshoot in Syria and Iraq), LeT, Boko Haram, Jamat ud Dawa, Jamat
Al Ahrar, AQAP, Al Shabab, Al Muhajirun and other terror misfits will
not vanish into thin air. If and when their expiry date approaches they
will regroup and reform in an increasingly saturated, ever consolidating
global terrorist marketplace operating as new Multi-National Terrorist
(MNT) organizations, who ironically in a very capitalist manner cultivate
blind adherent loyalty and marketplace control.
Premised on the aforementioned, it is fair to state that ISIS`s

territorial setback is a Pyrrhic victory at best a deep deception at worst.
A nominal victory that raises a myriad of queries about the stability of
Arab states and the very future of the Middle East, per se.
A pressing concern remains as to how to ideologically curtail the

ultra orthodox, misguided and politically motivated Takfiri Khawarajite
misrepresentation and political distortion of Islam which drives ISIS
type outfits. As long as the intractable sectarian Sunni Shia divide burns,
the flames will bedevil the entire Middle East and reverberate in South
and Central Asia and in the world in general. 56
Such terror flames will burn fiercer and ignite further due to
mass migration, rampant rabid Islamophobia on the rise in the West
(witnessed recently with horrid European-wide acid attacks on innocent
Muslims and the targeting of mosques such as UK`s Finsbury57 Park
Mosque) and the rise of Far Right Fascist58 populism. Western arm-
chair audiences are psychologically conditioned, with almost Pavlovian
precision, to feel satisfied with hackneyed half-hearted assurances from
politicians, whilst millions of refugees risk life and limb, kith and kin
and yet remain languishing at the precipice of Europes ever-closing
borders.
The rise in anti-minority hate crimes in the aftermath of Brexit is also

apace with alarming alacrity. Such hatred undermines the Wests moral
authority as lesson-givers. Media coverage purposely underplays hate
crimes when it comes to Muslims, which is a move beyond bias towards
pure propaganda.

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Iraq`s Future Conundrums
As the Iraqi armys operation to reclaim the final bastions of ISIS in

Iraq are underway, political actors, both inside and outside of the war-
59
torn sectarian-straddled country, gear up for a post-ISIS Iraq. As the

common cause of trouncing ISIS takes a back-seat60, seething conflicts
amongst Iraqs multiple political stakeholders may tip to boiling point.
Simmering disagreements over territory in Northern Iraq are likely to
flare up.
The top echelons of Shia Arab and Turkmen paramilitary

organizations aligned with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF),
indigenous community leaders, Iraqi Kurdistan, Sunni Arab tribal
insurgents, and regional actors will fiercely compete for intensified
influence in crucial hotspots such as Nineveh, Kirkuk and towns
strategically straddling a now porous Iraqi-Syrian border.

In Baghdad, an internal Shiite supremacy struggle between PM
Haider al-Abadi, former PM Nouri al-Maliki, and the Shia Imam
Muqtada al-Sadr sets to split open. The intra-Shia rivalry bears geo-
strategic ramifications for the dynamics of the USIran relationship in
Iraq. Tehran and Washington will not see eye to eye regarding what is
in Iraqs `best interests`61.
Washington and Tehran`s objectives openly clash here: Iran (with

tacit Russian approval) will endeavor to bolster Maliki and high-level
PMF leaders like Hadi al-Ameri, Qais Khazali, and Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis, whereas, Washington will seek to fortify Abadi. The Abadi-
Maliki-Sadr power struggle is catalyzed by a growingly distressed
populace that nowbelievescorruption, rather than sectarianism, is the
main reason for ISIS.
Sectarian strife will remain the heaviest burden. The casualty, as

always, will be innocent civilian lives, just as in Syria. Iraqs Kurdish
leaders have their own scores to settle and spheres of influence to
secure. They primarily concentrate on leveraging sway and legitimacy
within the Kurdistan Region62, instead of forming a robust Iraqi state.
The Sunnis, on the other hand lacking any strong political party to
forge forward their interests bear scant influence in Baghdad and must
accept more confined, limited and local resolutions.
For Iraq to surmount these challenges, it must reinforce local and

federal state institutions to take on the muscle of vicious non-state
actors and seek a consensus on local power sharing. Only then will
Iraqi institutions tackle the root causes for the ascendance of ISIS and
strive to transform contemporary army victories into long-term political
agreements to assure that Iraq is not destined for yet more bouts of
extremism, sectarianism and militancy.
The upcoming national and provincial Iraqi elections in 2018

represent a renewed opportunity to cease the cycle of collapse and chaos
that dilutes national unity initiatives and provides a chance at reclaiming
citizens faith in government institutions.63

zer Khalid
The mood in Iraq right now is one of understandable skepticism,
despair and cautious conservative optimism. Although Iraqis view
state institutions more favorably as compared to the Saddam era, they
are deeply concerned that the root causes giving birth to IS have not
satisfactorily been tackled. They are right.
As such, officials must focus not only on vanquishing IS but on

countering corruption via the tenets of successful state-building and
good governance. The latter is witnessed in the breadth and intensity of
the reformist, cross-sectoral protest initiative.
Iraq`s Shia power brokers are likely to be in control after 2018,

however, internal fissures will further fragment them. As already
discussed above, the three major political stakeholders have palpably
diverse interpretations of statehood: Ex-PM Nouri al-Maliki
intimately linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces positions himself
as the strongman required to bring about a robust state; his long-time
nemesis, the populist Imam Muqtada al-Sadr, is leveraging the protest
movement to promote strong and stable institutions; whereas, the
serving PM, Haider al-Abadi, often entangled in political maneuvering
between and against al-Maliki and Sadr, has invested his reputational
capital in amplifying state security.64 All will hastily claim credit for the
`liberation` of Mosul from ISIS.
It is doubtful that one sect or party will win by a landslide in Iraq`s

2018 election65. The effort for authority over main ministries, and the
future of the constitutionally mandated independent commissions is
likely to be an indispensable indicator of the potential power balance
and roadmap for state building (nation building itself being a longer-
term aspiration).
As the military branch of ISIS draws its last gasps in Iraq, the
ideological ISIS perilously hovers over a deeply divided region. Till
its last breath ISIS will leave no stone unturned to further destabilize
an extremely distracted, internally conflicted and territorially non-
contiguous Middle East, where blood and brutality will remain visible
for the foreseeable future. Thus far, only two million displaced Iraqis

have returned to their houses. Safely repatriating millions more remains
a daunting challenge for the UN and INGO`s.
The Next Frontier - the War after the War - An Ideological Battle
National unity and reconciliation in Syria and Iraq and peaceful

coexistence amongst warring sects have to be preserved and protected to
contain and neutralize the specter of cross-border transnational terrorism
(let us be very realistic: terrorism can never fully be eliminated but at best
curtailed and contained). A new Social Contract with the people must
be forged. Moral pressure by the Gulf, Washington, Tehran, Moscow,
Ankara and Doha, can lead to a constructive role in regional and global
conflict resolution, relying on their respective standing and spheres of
influence in the region.
ISIS` Salafist Takfiri ideological core extremism amply nourishes

itself on the rise of Fascist White Supremacy. Both mutually reinforce
each other. Both need to be rendered defunct through civil society, social
outreach, education, cultural sensitization and community-building
initiatives coupled with inter-faith resilience.
It is easier to address the symptoms of terror through hard

power and military might. It is much tougher to deeply probe and
counter the long-term root-causes of terrorism via soft power, which
includes setting up more counter extremism think-tanks which are more
representative of Islam rather than merely peons of agenda-laden vested
interests.
Soft power66 lobbying, genuine grass-roots education, asserting

liberal peaceful verses of the Holy Quran, founding Sufi spiritual peace-
driven institutes, hosting inter-faith cross-sectarian delegations, youth
activism at university campuses, prison reform, curriculum updating,
peacefully inclusive Islam and social media online activism and hashtag
campaigns driven by bloggers are just some of the ways with which to
render radicalism`s appeal as defunct as racism fifty years ago.

zer Khalid
The voice of moderate Muslim majorities must be amplified from
the tongues of true statesmen, scholars and students. Muslim youth have
very few moderate role models to look up to. Branding new non-clerical
mainstream modern role models is something international donors,
Islamic Relief, the OIC, GCC, ECO and Muslim majority countries
have to start carefully considering and campaigning toward.
Change in the Middle East, even in the face of seemingly

insurmountable challenge is possible. Any society worth it`s salt,
is judged by how it treats and upholds the inalienable rights of its
minorities. These rights were detestably violated under IS reign, who
left not an iota of moral legitimacy during their tyranny. No matter what
the future power constellation in Iraq and Syria (post-ISIS) holds, it is
their minorities and refugees who deserve the foremost humanitarian
attention. Just as they did during the life of the Benevolent Holy Prophet
Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).
In the short-term institutional state building followed by longer-haul

nation rebuilding must intensify. This was previously proven woefully
wanting and lackluster due to a premature departure of monitoring and
peacekeeping troops. Long-term post-conflict nation-building in Syria
(with a minus one formula: the minus being chemical war criminal
Bashar Assad in this case) is imperative67.
The territorial physical victory over ISIS should not end Western
involvement in the Middle East.68 Western presence, development aid,
institution building and, most importantly, empowering indigenous
Syrian and Iraqi civilians and institutions will be needed.
Armies on the ground would have to be retained to ensure a

peaceful transition. New elections with international oversight bodies
and enforceable monitoring mechanisms must be present.
A war after the war has to be waged by mentors, well-meaning

community leaders, humanitarian advocates, teachers who can act
as role-models in class-rooms (both physical and virtual), online and
blogger forums and university campuses. This war has to be waged

from the grassroots and not from the bully pulpits of Presidential and
Monarchical Palaces, nor from the microphones of hardened clerics
and certainly not from dubious shady think-tanks acting as fronts for
rabid militants. Only then will fundamentalism, one day, become as
intellectually unpopular as other historically haunting isms such as
Nazism or racism.
After the victory in Deir Ezzor, the warfare against IS enters a new
phase. A phase that I refer to as the `triple I` phase - a war of intelligence,
intellect and ideology against militants worldwide. Spiritual support by
peaceful community elders69, the restoration of self-confidence among
Iraqi and Syrian forces and inclusive economic opportunities are the
way forward. Failing to achieve this, unemployed anguished citizens
are likelier to fall into the arms of IS reincarnations, whatever name and
nomenclature they go by.
Today, as ISIS has evolved into an ideology from an army, soft

power such as diplomacy and civil society engagement becomes more
urgent than ever before. It is during such times of `transition` that
societies are made or broken. International conflict resolution panels
can be involved to reconcile regional problems and power struggles. We
also need social, economic, academic and political mechanisms.
Europeans and Western nations, following the inclusive Canadian

or Scandinavian template, should also cautiously, on a case-by-case
basis of course, become more accommodating with their borders, whilst
balancing surveillance with civil rights and security with human rights.
Such delicate balancing acts over the long haul will counter the radical
menace and narrative.
Whilst not exhaustive, I have listed suggestions (below) to

ideologically counter the appeal of radicalization in 2018 and beyond
through soft power on the most important battlefield of all: that of
intellectual ideas. Through the implementation of these, threats may
become opportunities and challenges may evolve into long-term
intellectual victories.

zer Khalid
References
1 A turn of phrase conceptually borrowed from Cole Bunzel (2016) a Ph.D.
candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and
the author of From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State.
2 Kurdish-led forces capture new district in Raqqa city, kill scores of ISIS
militants.ARA News. 19 June 2017.
3 US expands air base in northern Syria for use in battle for Raqqa. Stars and
Stripes. 3 April 2017.
4 Islamic juridical scholarly ruling.
5 Ozer Khalid, of Criterion Quarterly, in Volume 12 Number 2, exhaustively
documented the presence of ISIS in South Asia rebranded as Daesh al-Khorasan
for how the terrorists are making inroads into Pakistan and Afghanistan consult:
Khalid, Ozer (2017) ISIS in Pakistan & Afghanistan: From Rhetoric to Reality.
Criterion Quarterly, Vol 12 No. 2 June 22, 2017.
6 In June 2017 right before Eid lives countless lives perished in Quetta For more on
Quetta related terrorism review Tanveer (2016)93 mourners dead after bomb
explodes at hospital in Pakistan, Metro UK, 10 August2016.
7 In Parachinar a blast kills at least 21 in Pakistan vegetable market in January and
then again during Eid in JUne 2017 a terrorist assault occured targeting mostly
Shias. For more Afzal, Hussain (2017).Carnage at Parachinar market; 25
killed, 87 injured.Dawn newspaper.22 January2017 and Agencies & Ali Akbar
(2017).Blast in Parachinar vegetable market kills 25. Dawn News.January
21,2017.
8 Several Islamic scholars have rendered Fatwas (scholarly juridical rulings based
on Shariah principles) declaring suicide bombings as being totally against the
very tenets of Islam. Dr. Tahir ul Qadri, a Canadian based cleric of Pakistani
origin`s 500 page Fatwa against suicide bombings in 2010 springs to mind.
9 Great War for the liberation of Raqqa begins (2017)Hawar News Agency. 6
June 2017. View also Swinford, Steven (2017)Operation Raqqa: British RAF
pilots to switch bombing raids to the heart of Isil.The Daily Telegraph.16
January2017.

10 Recaptured by Turkish-allied Syrian troops in July 2017.
11 Josie Ensor (2017).Islamic State launches major offensive to take Syrian
city. The Telegraph.16 January2017 and Raydan, Noam; Alakraa, Nour
(2017).Islamic State Gains in Remote Syria Outpost via Wall Street
Journal.17 January 2017.
12 Orwell, George (1949).Nineteen Eighty-Four. A novel. London: Secker &
Warburg.
13 As attacks to counter ISIS gain momentum in the main urban bastions of Raqqa
in Syria and Mosul in Iraq, ISIS intensified the use of drones as surveillance
equipment to drop air-based bombs on attacking troops. Sophisticated armed
drones have been a prominent feature of the Isis defence of Tabqa, to the west
of Raqqa, a battle which has now culminated given the victory of US-backed
Kurdish forces. The very fact that ISIS got their stained hands on such drones is
cause for alarm and concern.
14 Gul, Ayaz (2017).Mostafa, Mohamed (2017).Islamic State drones, rockets
kill 11 civilians, including school kids, in eastern Mosul. Iraqi News.20
February2017.
15 Similar tactics to those deployed by the Fidayin in Palestine and the FARC in
Colombia. In Colombia`s case, Santos` agreement with the narcotics mafia has
brought FARC to the negotiating table.
16 Dabiq is a Syrian city, which according to IS sycophants is where the Apocalyptic
battle to mark the end of ages would be waged.
17 Official sources state that up to 30,000 foreign fighters reached Syria to take up
arms on behalf of Isis. The US government estimates that 25,000 of them have
since died in combat. That still leaves 5000 fighters who will join other terror
networks or camouflage their way into other countries and exact revenge.
18 Dearden Lizzie (2016) Isis propaganda video shows British four-year-old Isa
Dare blowing up car with prisoners inside in Syria, The Independent, 11
February, 2016.
19 The term is itself a misnomer ss the word Jihad, in its true essence, denotes an
internal struggle against the egotistic self, a journey of renewal and constant
inner growth and challenge.
20 Social psychologist Ivan Pavlov carried out well documented experiments on
how living entities can be conditioned (Skinner believed this also) and behavioral
patterns can be `learnt` leading to psychic reflexes of alertness based on
external stimuli. For more on this fascinating topic cast a gaze upon: Pavlov, Ivan
P. (1927)Conditioned Reflexes. Trans. G. V. Anrep. London: Oxford University
Press.
21 Accentuated further given the porous border between Turkey and Syria which
in 2017 has become more closely monitored and guarded after all the terror
incidents of Turkey in 2016.
22 In the UK for instance those tried under the Terrorism Act could face life
imprisonment.
23 Orwell, George (1949).Nineteen Eighty-Four. A novel. London: Secker &

zer Khalid
Warburg
24 Circa 900 British fighters have joined IS or other radical entities such al-Nusra
Front and in some cases the war against the regime of the Syrian leader, Bashar
al-Assad. It is believed around half of these fighters have returned to the UK and
around 200 have died.
25 These figures are according to Britain`s Guardian newspaper reporters.
26 As per Shiraz Maher, deputy director of the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation at Kings College, University of London.
27 Europe - Frances TV5Monde targeted in IS group cyberattack.France 24.
View alsoFrance probes Russian lead in TV5Monde hacking: sourcesReuters.
10 June 2015 andSafi, Michael (2015)Isis hacking division releases details
of 1,400 Americans and urges attacks the Guardian. and Perry, Keith.ISIS
hackers intercept top secret British Government emails.
28 Time Magazine (2012) Interview with Official of Jabhat al-Nusra, Syrias
Islamist Militia Group.Time Mgazine. 25 December 2012.
Hudson, Valerie (2017)The Hillary Doctrine. Columbia University. p.154.
Retrieved15 January2017.
29 Tomson, Chris (2017)Islamist rebel group joins Al-Qaeda franchise in Syria.
Al-Masdar News.21 May2017.
30 Most of Charles Dickens` novels are steeped in dark and desolate despair, from
dirt poverty to squalid living conditions.
31 This is, of course, not just confined to the Middle East. Stalin, Kim Jung Il,
Kim Il Sung, Pinochet, Pol Pot and the military junta in Myanmar are but a few
examples of how the tyranny of dictatorship is a disease that afflicts our entire
world, irrespective of age, society or geographical location.
32 Eichenwald (2017) The only possible means by which Trump could have
come across the misattributed quote was purposeful collusion with the Russians,
and that the Wikileaks documents themselves had been altered from its
website after settling a defamation and libel lawsuit withSputnikeditor Bill
Moran NewsWeek(2017-07-21) and Baldor, Lolita (2017). Mattis: US not
ready to collaborate militarily with Russia. ABC News. Associated Press.
February 16, 2017.
33 Launched from the Eastern Mediterranean.
34 Haberman, Maggie (2017)Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO
Allies Against Attack.The New York Times.July 21,2017.
35 Daniels, Jeff (2017). Pentagon delivers plan to speed up fight against ISIS,
possibly boosting US troops in Syria, 27 February, 2017.
36 Warplanes carried out a massacre in the stronghold of the Islamic State
organization and the Syria Democratic Forces continue advancing in the eastern
countryside of Al-Raqqah.SOHR. 20 February 2017
37 Bonsey, Noah (2017) Syrias Kurds Gamble on Washingtons Staying Power,
Foreign Policy, July 10, 2017.
38 US expands air base in northern Syria for use in battle for Raqqa. Stars and
Stripes. 3 April 2017 and US deepening involvement in Syrias war against

ISIS. 23 March 2017.
39 Deniz, Sinan (2017)Raqqas fall will bring the end of Erdoan.ANF News.26
January2017.
40 Haberman, Maggie.(2017)Donald Trump Sets Conditions for Defending
NATO Allies Against Attack.The New York Times.July 21,2017.
41 Shiaphobia is a term coined by this author especially in light of the Shia genocide
in Yemen and the never-endingly gruesome Hazara and Parachinar attacks.
Yazidis and Christians have also been targeted, of course, in the Middle East
with reckless abandon.
42 5Car filled with explosives rocks Qatif in Saudi Arabias eastern province.Iraqi
News. 1 June 2017. 4 June2017.
43 Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan claims ultimatum issued to Qatar is against
international law.The Independent. 25 June 2017.
44 44 Egyptian personnel killed in bomb blast.Middle East Monitor. 1 June
2017.3 June2017.
45 J.O (2017).Self-defense fighters join Wrath of Euphrates.Hawar News
Agency5 February 2017 and Dohas Actions May Destabilize the Region:
Saudi Minister.Newsweek ME. 14 June 2017 and Iran sends five plane loads
of food as Kuwait says Qatar ready to listen. 11 June 2017.
46 Fisk, Robert (2017) Qatar crisis has verything to do with war in Syria, The
Independent, July 8, 2017.
47 Iran: Hassan Rouhani condemns siege of Qatar. Al Jazeera. 26 June 2017.
48 The Gulf Cooperation Council, the GCC is an amalgam of six Gulf Arab nations,
nursed into life by the United States amid two previous crises: the USSR`s
invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution.
49 Gaza too suffers from an illegal blockade.
50 Pakistan is often a victim of Saudi and Iranian remote controlled proxy power
plays.
51 Antonopoulos, Paul (2017)Al-Qaedas deputy leader killed in Idlib drone
strike 26 Febuary 2017 and War On Terror: Who Is Abu Khayr al-Masri? Al
Qaeda Second In Command Killed In Drone Strike In Syria. 26 February 2017.
52 Tomson, Chris (2017).Islamist rebel group joins Al-Qaeda franchise in Syria.
Al-Masdar News.21 May2017.
53 Kafka, Franz (1912) The Metamorphosis.
54 Both being uber orthodox Wahabi Salafist brands of religious inkling.
55 Even though former ISIS combatants in South Asia entered into a marriage of
convenience with the Taleban, so such acrimony is never set in stone.
56 Lusher, Adam (2017).What is the truth behind claims Muslims are being
targeted by right-wing acid attackers in London?. The Independent 13
July2017.
Bulman, May (2017).East London acid attack suspect John Tomlin smiles and
blows kisses in court.The Independent.13 July2017.
Lusher, Adam (2017).What is the truth behind claims Muslims are being
targeted by right-wing acid attackers in London?.The Independent.13

zer Khalid
July2017.Siddique, Haroon; McKee, Ruth (2017).Acid attack on two Muslim
cousins in London being treated as hate crime.The Guardian11 July2017.
57 Dewan, Angela; Jordan, Carol; Halasz, Stephanie; George, Steve (2017).London
mosque attack suspect named, according to media outlets.CNN.20
June2017.Berlinger, Joshua; Masters, James.London mosque attack: Latest
updates.CNN.19 June2017.Dodd, Vikram; Taylor, Matthew (2017).London
attack: Aggressive and strange suspect vowed to do some damage.The
Guardian..24 June2017.
58 France`s National Front, Britain`s UKIP, Golden Dawn, Austria`s Freedom Party
being but a few cases in point.
59 ISIS is the third generation of al-Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq.
60 In July 2017 ISIS controls a mere 4 percent of Iraq. Whereas in 2014, IS occupied
40 percent of Iraq.
61 Mansour, Renad (2017) `Iraqs Power Struggles Are Just Beginning`,
ForeignPolicy, July 10, 2017
62 An independent Kurdistan runs contrary to Syrian, Iraqi and Turkish national
self-interests.
63 The previous opportunity to achieve this presented itself momentarily in 2008
2010, only for transient piecemeal success to wither away in 2014, when IS
captured a third of Iraqs land.
64 Mansour, Renad (2017) Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State,
Chatham House, April, 2017.
65 Much like the recent British elections where Theresa May barely held on to her
majority.
66 The Chinese are exerting soft power through their multiple Confucius centers
to rebrand themselves and make their way of life more globally palatable to
discerning political and media savvy audiences.
67 Although for now the Trump administration has ceded to Kremlin back-channel
diplomacy of retaining Assad the tyrant who is akin to Tyrion Lannister in the
Game of Thrones.
68 Abrams, Elliott (2017), The United States Cant Retreat From the Middle East,
Foreign Policy, July 10, 2017.
69 Known as Jirgas in Pakistan.

Essay
Essays

Essay

Essay
NORTH KOREAS CHEMICAL

& BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
S. Mushfiq Murshed*
The focus on the Korean peninsulas nuclear crisis has ignored a

core feature of North Koreas weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
arsenal. Various sources suggest that the country possesses one of the
largest stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in the
world.
North Koreas chemical weapons program commenced in the late

1950s, soon after the Korean War. Till 1979, it was estimated by the US
Defense Intelligence Agency that North Korea had only a defensive
CW capability. The scenario, however, changed in the 1980s. The
1987 South Korean Ministry of National Defense report estimated that
North Korea possessed up to 250 metric tons of chemical weapons.
The 2009 International Crisis Group had pegged the quantity of chemical
weapons in North Korea to between 2,500 and 5,000 tons. The 2010
South Korean Ministry of Defense Report contained the same estimates
as the International Crisis Group report.
Since World War II a few countries have used chemical weapons.

The Egyptians used chemical weapons like choking and mustard
agents in Yemens civil war (1963, 1965 & 1967).The Soviets used
chemical arms such as mustard and incapacitating agents against the
Afghan Mujahideen (1978-1992). In 1987 chemical weapons were
used by Libya against rebels in Chad. However, the most extensive
use of chemical weapons was in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).
* The author is an editor of the journal.

Essay
Saddam Husseins regime then went on to use chemical weapons
against its own people, the Iraqi Kurds. In Halabjah (1988) an
estimated 5000 people were killed through such an attack, many
of them civilians. On 21 August 2013 the Syrian President, Bashar
al-Assad attacked his own citizens in Ghouta through rockets
containing Sarin, a nerve agent. It is estimated that well over 1000
people perished in this attack. And, Once again, Bashar al-Assad
used chemical weapons on 14 April 2017 on Khan Sheikhoun in the
Idlib province of Syria.
An interesting point to ponder upon is that most cases of CBW

attacks by states after WWI have been associated with countries that
were under despotic regimes. The fact that no country with a democratic
government has used CBWs in warfare since WWI indicates that the
intolerance of the people towards the use of such heinous weapons is
real.
Any way one looks at it, North Korea fits the profile of a country
with a high probability of using chemical and biological weapons. A
micro-glimpse of this was revealed in Malaysia when VX was used to
assassinate Kim Jong-Nam, the half brother of North Korean leader,
Kim Jong-Un. The use of this chemical in a crowded international
airport clearly displays, yet another despotic regimes disregard for the
consequences of exposing the general public to such weapons.
North Korea is a signatory of the Geneva Protocol and the Biological

and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) but not the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). The Geneva Protocol prohibits the use
of Chemical and Biological weapons but does not forbid the production
and stockpiling of the same. The BTWC and the CWC were established
(in 1972 and 1993, respectively) in order to complement, and further
enhance the Geneva Protocols. The BTWC, however, without a
proactive office (such as the OPCW for the CWC), remains ineffective
in implementing its articles.

Essay
The one convention that is intrusive and effective is the CWC. The
political instability in the Korean Peninsula, coupled with Kim Jong-
Uns proclivity of threatening South Korea and the probability that he
possesses one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world
makes it imperative that diplomatic efforts converge on pressuring
Pyonyang to accept and sign this convention.
In 2013, Syria filed its papers and became a signatory of the CWC.
Even Russia, its longstanding ally, could not help. International outrage
over the Syrian governments use of chemical weapons against rebel
groups clearly illustrated that any strategy that provides space for
chemical or biological weapons in a countrys arsenal is flawed and will
not be tolerated. Despite this, chemical weapons were used yet again
by Bashar Al-Assad in April 2017. The Russians, due to their constant
support to the Assad regime have led many to believe that they were
complicit in these disgraceful attacks.
In North Koreas case, China remains the sole country that has
any measurable influence. In a paper titled, The China-North Korea
Relationship published by the Council on Foreign Relations, Eleanor
Albert states, China provides North Korea with most of its food and
energy supplies and accounts for upwards of 90 percent of North Koreas
total trade volume. Conversely, Chinas purchases from its neighbor
include minerals, seafood, and manufactured garments. In the first
quarter of 2017, ChinaNorth Korea trade was up 37.4 percent from the
same period in 2016.
China will most definitely not want to be in a similar situation as

Russia is in Syria and be accused of complicity if an untoward accident or
attack with North Koreas chemical weapons was to occur. Beijing will
have to use its substantial economic leverage to convince the leadership
in Pyongyang to adopt certain steps to alleviate global concerns. In 2003,
the Chinese Prime Minister, Hu Jintao, cut off oil supplies to North
Korea, which resulted in a dialogue between the Americans and the
North Koreans in Beijing over Kim Jong-Ils nuclear policy. Recently,

Essay
Chinese President Xi Jin Ping banned all coal imports from North Korea
soon after Pyongyang tested a new intermediate-range missile.
Similar, if not more aggressive measures need to be applied on

North Korea for them to become signatories of the CWC and accept
the assistance of the OPCW to eradicate all chemical and biological
weapons stockpiles from the peninsula. Nothing less than this will
suffice as the repulsion to this form of warfare has been internalized in
the psyche of individuals and nations, alike.

Essay
OIC ORIGIN, RECORD AND

PROSPECTS!
Khalid Saleem *
The Muslim World today continues to be in a state of sixes and sevens.

Hardly any part of the Muslim World is free from violence or the threat
of violence. The Ummah, the unity of which was once the coveted goal
of all Muslims, is in a sorry state of internecine strife: Muslim pitted
against Muslim. In this sorry pass, the one hope for redemption was the
OIC. And yet this Organization has never lived up to its promise.
This paper attempts to take a dispassionate look over the shoulder
in an attempt to find out what went wrong and why.
PART I.
Would a common resident in an Islamic country today even sense

that an organization like the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)
may still be in existence? It is apparent that even casual mention of this
Islamic forum has disappeared from the front pages of the world press.
Meanwhile, a host of - mainly depressing - developments have taken
place, most of them in the Muslim world. The OIC appears to have gone
into a stupor of sorts, as if it does not exist or worse still it does not
care. Take the case of unwarranted aggression against Muslim lands
leading to wanton killings therein. Or, then, the large scale violation of
human rights in Muslim lands under unlawful occupation. Or, to be a
bit mundane, what about the poverty and economic deprivation of large
segments of the Ummah, given that a small minority is wallowing in
petro-dollars! Does one hear a squeak out of an Organization that prides
itself as being the champion of the aspirations of Muslims around the
world?
* The author is a former Ambassador and former Assistant Secretary General of

OIC.

Essay
Arguably the worst thing that can happen to an International
Organization is the prospect of losing its relevance. A look back over
the past few years tumultuous years for the Muslim World points
to the signal failure of the OIC on three counts: 1) Furthering of the
Islamic Causes; 2) Countering the Western campaign against Islam
and Muslims; and 3) Coming to the defense of Muslim states facing
danger to their independence and sovereignty. In this state of affairs, one
should wish to leave the following question for the perspicacious reader
to ponder over: does the OIC have any relevance and/or credibility left
in the Muslim World?
In order to better understand the OIC and what it stands for, it will be
necessary to look over the shoulder and spare a thought over its origins.
The Organization had its nascent beginning in 1969, in an epoch when
the Muslim World was already in a state of sixes and sevens. The First
Islamic Summit Conference was convened in Rabat in the month of
September of that year in the aftermath of an abortive arson attack on
the Al-Aqsa mosque in Al-Quds al Sharif in occupied Palestine. It is a
moot question whether this summit could have met at all had the arson
attack not roused strong feelings all over the Muslim world, but that is
another story.
As it happened, it was an exceptionally successful Summit

Conference in that it was personally attended by Heads of State/
Government of almost all the invited states. The only rub was that the
points of view of most important participants about the raison ddetre of
the congregation could hardly have been more diverse.
- The Palestinian leadership looked at it as a welcome opportunity

to rally the Muslim world behind the cause of Palestine; they
were virtually oblivious to the happenings in the rest of the
Muslim world.
- The Saudi Arabians and some Gulf States wished to assert the
clout conferred on them due to the vast deposits of black gold
in their territories.

Essay
- The North African Arab states particularly Egypt under Nasser
and Algeria under Boumediene had dreams of furthering their
socialist agendas.
- Sub-Saharan African states wished to seize the opportunity for

recognition of their plight and obtain some economic cushion.
- Iran under the Shah had ambitions all of its own.
- States of Asia Pacific notably Indonesia and Malaysia craved

a place in the sun.
- States like Turkey, with secular pretensions and diplomatic ties

with Israel, had reservations all of their own.
- In so far as Pakistan was concerned, we appear to have

entered the Summit armed with no more than half-baked
ideas about Islamic unity and support for Islamic causes
and ideals. It soon became apparent that we had regrettably
neglected to do our homework before embarking on our
journey to Rabat.
Given the great diversity of opinion and objectives, the birth of

what was to emerge as the OIC can best be classed as cesarean rather
than normal.
What took place after the Conference was convened left its mark
on the assembly. The host King Hassan of Morocco backed, among
others, by King Feisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hussein of Jordan
proposed that India be invited to join the Summit. Inexplicably, there
was no reservation from Pakistans side and the proposal was approved
by acclamation. Indias plaque appeared and the Indian Ambassador to
Morocco incidentally a Sikh joined the proceedings. He attended till
the meeting rose for the day late at night. Quite out of the blue, the next
morning, the Pakistan delegation conveyed its decision to boycott the
proceedings unless the Indian delegate was removed. The day was lost
in wrangling and recriminations. Ultimately, the proceedings resumed

Essay
only after India was persuaded to withdraw. One would hope that some
research scholar would delve deeply into this episode to dig up the
hidden secret behind this episode.
The aforementioned are the bare facts. What went on behind the
scenes is not public knowledge. The late Mr. Agha Shahi who was
a member of the Pakistan delegation at Rabat - could have shed some
light on this mystery. It is a pity that he chose not to do so. This incident
is mentioned merely to elucidate that the initiating Conference did not
have a smooth sailing.
PART II.
To move on, the convening of the second Summit meeting had to

wait five years until the 1974 Lahore Summit. Meanwhile, a Secretariat
had been set up in 1971 and the nascent body given the rather unlikely
name of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
Tengku Abdul Rahman, the retiring Prime Minister of Malaysia,

was appointed as the first Secretary General. He was a strong and well
respected Secretary General and endeavored to give the Body a sense of
direction. His legacy the Charter has proved something of a millstone
round the neck of the Secretariat since it vests all powers in the single
hand of the Secretary General, leaving other elected officials high and
dry. This aspect has not received the attention it deserved over the years,
though it may well be the underlying cause of the failure of the OIC to
live up to its ideals.
The Charter of the OIC that governed the conduct of the Organization
and also the Rules of Business had several incongruities that have
impeded smooth sailing over the years. Some of these are:
- The Charter concentrates all powers financial, political and

administrative in the hands of the Secretary General alone.
Experience has shown that successive Secretaries General -
most of them, barring the first, were light-weights did not trust
their colleagues and exhibited utmost reluctance to delegate any

Essay
authority or responsibility to them. Apart from the Secretary
General, there are three elected Assistant Secretaries General
one from each Group. Logically the FOUR should be forming
the core of the General Secretariat, but in practice this has never
been so. Everything revolves around the person of the Secretary
General.
- The Charter specified that the permanent seat of the General

Secretariat would be Al-Quds al-Sharif. Pending its liberation,
Jeddah had been designated as the interim Headquarter. In the
absence of a Headquarters Agreement, the officials of the
Secretariat have been denied due status by the Saudi Arabian
administration. In addition, Saudi law disbars ladies from
working in offices, thereby automatically shutting off half the
population of member states from making any contribution to
the work of the Secretariat.
- There are three designated Groups among the member states:

(a) African Group, (b) Asian Group, and (c) Arab Group. The first
two are based on geographical criteria, while the third happens
to be on ETHNIC lines. Why was it considered necessary to
recognize just one ethnicity, while the remaining member states
were bunched together in geographical groupings? This is not
clear and would bear investigation.
- The Islamic Development Bank that came into being as a

subsidiary of the OIC has since broken loose from its moorings.
The OIC has hardly any control over the Bank or its policies. By
the way, the Bank now enjoys wider recognition and, indeed,
greater esteem than the OIC itself. It is also housed in an imposing
structure, quite unlike the OIC General Secretariat.
The Secretary General and the elected Assistant Secretaries General

of the OIC enjoy no special protocol status that should be due to the
top echelon of an International Organization. As compared to this,
Secretaries General of the Arab League and OAU receive appropriate
protocol.

Essay
The RULES OF BUSINESS are even worse offenders. Year after
year, more or less the same Resolutions are tabled and adopted by
consensus ad nauseam. There is no mechanism at all to oversee their
implementation. Lengthy, often colourful, speeches are delivered at
each session. Most statements contain mere platitudes and have little in
nature of concrete proposals. The rule of consensus (and nothing but) is
the bane of decision-making process in conferences. Member states opt
not to break the consensus on decisions, but subsequently show little
enthusiasm when it comes to implement them. Some even go to the
extent of undermining the decisions.
Most decisions - that are arrived at by consensus - are subsequently

lost in implementation, so to say. A fundamental error committed
by most member states is to believe that the Islamic Conference of
Foreign Ministers (ICFM) is a sort of mini- UN General Assembly.
The governments, consequently, abandon the ICFM to the mercy of
their so-called UN Experts, who love nothing more than listening to
their own voices, while being oblivious to where they are leading to,
if anywhere.
What the policy makers of member Islamic states fail to appreciate

is that the UN General Assembly is intended to be no more than a talk
shop- a fact that is taken advantage of by the mafia of diplomatists of
the multilateral genre to add luster to their individual reputations.
Year after year, this debilitating exercise is repeated without a

thought as to what results would, or should, accrue from these efforts.
The resolutions adopted, thereby, are meant essentially to adorn the

front pages of local newspapers of the countries of the origin of the
multi-lateral diplomats who designed to table them. Such resolutions
and the eloquent speeches that accompany them represent no more than
mere window-dressing, meant essentially for the benefit of the domestic
media. Regrettably, the same scenario is evident in every Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers as well as in each Islamic Summit
Conference.

Essay
PART III
The OIC has not distinguished itself in either fighting for Islamic
causes or, in deed, in living up to its ideals. The first thing that strikes an
impartial observer is the bizarre facelessness of the OIC. In other words,
there is a total absence of a recognizable visage of the Organization
- one that was intended to put Islamic Identity on the world map. An
international organization is recognized through its successes. OIC has
none to boast of. Ask any citizen of a Muslim state about the OIC and
chances are that you will draw a blank. In the city of Jeddah that houses
the Headquarters of the General Secretariat, barely a handful of persons,
if that, even know of its existence. If a visitor were to land in Jeddah and
engage a Taxi to go to the OIC Headquarters, chances are that he may at
best be driven to the building of the Islamic Development Bank.
What makes matters worse is that these are not normal times,
particularly in so far as the Muslim World is concerned. The Muslim
World (Ummah?) is living through a daunting period of tribulation and
crises over the past decade and more. Islam and Muslims across the
world have been singularly targeted and maligned. What a pity then
that, far from realizing the gravity of the state of affairs, the OIC a
body with a membership of some 57 countries as well as its member
states appear to be content with playing ducks and drakes with local and
regional issues that have long lost their relevance.
The issues of life and death that face the Muslim World today
are being conveniently brushed under the proverbial rug. It is about
time that the member states of the OIC woke up to the realization that
mere adoption of innocuous resolutions does not absolve them of their
responsibilities. Actions speak louder than words, be they cover endless
sheets of parchment.
Just to take a few stray examples, by way of illustration:
- Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and its aftermath found the

OIC wanting at every step. OIC allowed the USA to highjack
the drama without it being taken into confidence.

Essay
- Developments in the aftermath of nine/eleven; US-led invasions
first of Afghanistan and subsequently of Iraq (both member
states of the OIC) highlighted the lackadaisical attitude of the
OIC in the face of challenges faced by the Muslim World.
- The absence of a common, coordinated response has allowed
the powers-that-be freedom to pick on Muslim countries one by
one with impunity.
- Issues of life and death that face the Muslim world today are
conveniently swept under the proverbial rug.
- Where did the OIC stand vis--vis the US- Iran stand-off on the
nuclear issue and subsequent dtente in their ties?
- What was OICs reaction to the Arab Spring or to wanton
killings in Muslim lands?
- What about the wide spread violation of human rights in Muslim
lands under occupation?
- To be more mundane, should the OIC not take cognizance of
poverty and economic deprivation of large segments of the
Ummah?
CASE STUDY
In order to better appreciate the OIC style of effort in emergency

situation, it may be in order to have a close look at its reaction (or the
absence thereof) to a crucial development impacting on a member state
and, as it turned out, the Muslim World as a whole. For a case study,
one has selected the impact of the United States attack on Iraq, circa
March 2003.
The intention of US President George W. Bush, with the

blessings of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, to carry out (what
turned out to be a disastrous) attack on Iraq in mid-March 2003
was no secret in the region. In Jeddah (where the author was then
stationed as Assistant Secretary General of OIC), the subject was
open talk of the town.
The local press was awash with comments. In an editorial titled

Ides of March, Saudi Gazette on 04 February, 2003, inter alia, said,

Essay
The impending Iraq war will probably go down as the most talked
about and pre-analyzed conflict in the history of war.
Another editorial in the same paper, dated 13 March 2003, talked of

the rush to apportion the spoils of the Iraq war to select US companies.
Further editorials in the same Paper dated 27 March and 19 April

2003 further elaborate on the shape of things to come.
The above mentioned editorials in the Saudi Gazette are a must read
for the researcher.
Now, to a bit of personal history! Having been deeply affected

by the impending catastrophe, the author felt strongly that the OIC
had a duty to at least put on record its anguish and protest at this plan
to attack a member state on evidence that appeared to be flimsy at
best. The author then drafted a Press Release proposed to be issued
by the Secretary General expressing disquiet at the development
and hoping that wiser counsels would prevail to avert a catastrophe.
The only snag in the way was the fact that the Secretary General was
nowhere to be found. Discreet inquiries revealed that the great man
was on a tour of the Philippines to secure the release of a German
national allegedly kidnapped by rebels there. He returned to Jeddah
in his own good time. So much for the priorities of the OIC! Since
the Charter had no provision for an acting Secretary General, there
the matter rested.
Tailpiece I
The brave talk of revitalizing the OIC some years back caused
a mild flutter and did generate a hope of sorts. A council of eminent
persons was conjured up to formulate a set of changes in an effort to
bring the organization in line with the demands of the times. Despite
the time, effort (and not inconsiderable investment) expended on this
exercise, the end result was no different from other ministrations of
the OIC.

Essay
Nothing tangible emerged out of the lengthy exercise, save for some
essentially cosmetic changes. The effectiveness of the OIC remained
stuck in the rut that was! What the OIC has been in need of is not
superficial emollient but drastic surgery. The eminent persons could
deliver only if they had shown the courage to recommend surgery of
drastic proportions, which they evidently failed to do.
Tailpiece - II
A word about the role of the OIC vis--vis the Jammu and Kashmir
issue may be in order. Despite the hullabaloo in our media, OICs role
has been limited to an innocuous resolution, coupled with a wishy-
washy contact group. Neither is of much consequence. Much has been
made about the fact that the Secretary General had designated a Special
Representative on Jammu and Kashmir. Each year it is announced that
the Special Representative has once again been denied a visa by the
Indian government and there the matter rests. The standard resolution
is duly adopted by consensus, rejected by India, and forgotten by all.
No prizes for guessing why India has conveniently got away with its
negative attitude for so long.
Tailpiece III
The lot of the Palestinians has shown little sign of improvement

despite the well-worded but innocuous resolutions of the Islamic
Conferences of Foreign Ministers and the Islamic Summits. If anything,
the Palestinian issue appears to have been lost in the verbiage of the
colourful and emotional speeches delivered in these meetings. The
Palestinians have reason to feel bitter because it was an attack on the
Al-Aqsa mosque that provided the raison detre for the birth of the OIC.
Subsequent developments connected to the OIC have hardly provided
any hope to the aspirations of the Palestinians.

Essay
PART IV
The question that presents itself; begging for an answer is: what sort
of future can the OIC and the Muslim Ummah look forward to, given
the omens?
The facts speak for themselves, though. The OIC hardly appears to
have any future prospects not for the Muslim World anyway. It will
not be allowed to die out, however. The powers-that-be find its existence
useful for their selfish ends. They will not allow the OIC to die: they find
it expedient to let it live, albeit on a respirator.

Essay
SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION COMES OF AGE
M Saeed Khalid*
The six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has

registered a quantum leap by admitting Pakistan and India as full
members. Few would have missed the irony of South Asias feuding
neighbours taking seats at the organizations summit held in Astana
(Kazakhstan) in June 2017, because they hardly see eye to eye on
any issue. Despite this challenging situation, China, Russia and their
four Central Asian partners - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan - have accepted Pakistan and India to lend greater credibility
to the SCOs vision of Asian peace and harmony.
In addition to the eight members, the SCO has four observer

states - Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia and Belarus. Six other countries -
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey - have
been accepted as dialogue partners. Turkmenistan enjoys guest status as
do the UN, CIS and ASEAN.
The expanded SCO, with 3.5 billion inhabitants, represents 40%

of the worlds population and a quarter of its GDP. It also covers 60%
of the Eurasian land mass. Yet, high expectations from or fears of the
loose association on global economic and security parameters would
be premature if not farfetched. Similarly, claims of SCO becoming a
double game changer with CPEC for Pakistans economic prosperity
are loud wishes at best.
Both India and Pakistan need to do some soul-searching about

their commitment to the objectives and goals of the SCO as listed in
its Charter and the SCO Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighbourliness,
* The author is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.

Essay
Friendship and Cooperation. There is a huge obstacle in so far as the
BJP has embarked on a campaign to isolate Pakistan, in the region and
globally, as demonstrated in Delhis shameless arm twisting of smaller
neighbours to torpedo the SAARC summit scheduled to be held in
Pakistan in 2016.
The Indian lobby in Washington has been working overtime to

undermine the tenuous Pak-US ties by accusing Pakistan of sheltering the
Taliban and Haqqani commanders and supporting Kashmiri militants.
The Indian planners behind these moves obviously underestimate

the intelligence of its interlocutors who should be aware of Indias terror
campaign in Pakistan in league with the Afghan intelligence, confirmed
by Kulbushan Yadav, Indian naval officer commanding operations from
Chahbahar in Iran and now on death row in Pakistan.
China is likely to continue to be the locomotive pulling the SCO with

support from Russia and the four Central Asian members. It would also
be the main beneficiary of economic links to emerge among the member
states. Beijing is already well placed to step up its slowing economic
growth with the help of its Belt and Road Initiative encompassing all
SCO members with the exception of India. Pakistani industrialists have
drawn their governments attention to the threat that Chinese investments
under CPEC might pose to the countrys manufacturing sector, teetering
from unfair competition from countries offering unfair advantages to
their industries.
The Shanghai Five was launched on 26 April 1996 with the signing
of the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in border Regions by the heads
of state of China, Russia and three central asian states of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. A year later, the Shanghai Five signed
the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. At the
Dushanbe summit in 2000, the members agreed to oppose intervention
in other countries internal affairs on the pretext of protecting human
rights or humanitarianism. They also committed to support the efforts
of each other in safeguarding their national independence, sovereignty,
territorial integrity and social stability.

Essay
In the annual summit of 2001, held in Shanghai, the five welcomed
Uzbekistan as their sixth member. The six heads of state signed on June
15, 2001 the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization aiming
to take the grouping to a higher level of cooperation. The next summit
in Saint Petersburg in July, 2005 led to the adoption of the SCO Charter
which encompassed the organizations purposes, principles, structures
and forms of operation.
The SCOs main goals are: strengthening mutual trust and

neighbourliness among its member states; promoting cooperation in
politics, trade, economy, culture, research, technology, as well as in
education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection, and
other areas; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security
and stability in the region; and moving towards the establishment of a
democratic, fair and rational new international and economic order.
Proceeding from the Shanghai Spirit, the SCO pursues its internal
policy based on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,
mutual consultations, respect for cultural diversity, and a desire
for common development, while its external policy is conducted in
accordance with the principles of non-alignment, non-targeting any
third country, and openness.
The SCO has an elaborate executive structure with the Heads of

State Council as its supreme decision making body. It meets once a
year and adopts decisions and guidelines on all important matters of the
organization. The SCO Heads of Government Council also meets once a
year to approve cooperation strategy, programmes as well as the budget
of the organization. The SCO secretariat is based in Beijing while its
Anti-terrorist Structure is based in Tashkent. Russian and Chinese are
the official languages but greater room will have to be made for English
with the entry of India and Pakistan.
There is also a mechanism for meetings between heads of parliament,

ministers of foreign affairs, defence, economy, transport and other areas
of mutual interest.

Essay
The SCO embarked on major projects related to transportation,
energy and telecommunications and held regular meetings of security,
defence, foreign affairs, economic and cultural officials from the member
states. The primary impulsion to erect a super structure of SCO probably
was to check western intervention in the Asian heartland and coordinate
efforts aimed at containing militant Islam after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the rise of Islamic militancy in member countries.
Some western observers hastened to label the creation of the SCO

as a bid to counterbalance NATO and in particular to avoid conflicts
that would allow the United States to intervene in areas bordering both
Russia and China. They also took note of the hard line Iranian president
Mahmoud Ahmadinejads references to the United States during his
speeches at the SCO summits.
Iran has been accepted as an observer at the SCO but an application

by the U.S. for the same status was turned down in 2005.The 2005
summit also requested the U.S. to set a clear timetable to withdraw its
troops from SCO member states - Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This
was followed by Uzbekistans request to the US to vacate its airbase
established to provide logistic support to its military operations in
Afghanistan.
The emergence of the SCO has led to a revival of geopolitical

theories about the importance of Central Asia in the wider power game.
Reference has been made to Zbigniew Brzezinskis theory that control
of the Eurasian landmass is the key to global domination and control of
Central Asia is the key to control of the Eurasian land mass. According
to Iranian writer Hamid Golpira, Russia and China have been paying
attention to this theory by launching the SCO in 2001, ostensibly to
curb extremism in the region and enhance border security, but most
probably with the real intention of counterbalancing the activities of the
United states and NATO in Central Asia.
A declaration of the SCO heads of state at their 2005 meeting indirectly

rejected the western particularly the U.S. mode of domination, by calling
upon the international community, irrespective of its differences in

Essay
ideology and social structure, to form a new concept of security based
on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equity and interaction. The Russian
Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov followed up by proclaiming that
Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides us a unique opportunity
to take part in the process of forming a fundamentally new model of
geopolitical integration. He emphasized that the SCO is working to
establish a rational and just world order.
The Peoples Daily of China claimed that the SCO Declaration

points out that the SCO member countries have the ability and
responsibility to safeguard the security of the Central Asian region,
and calls on Western countries to leave Central Asia. That is the most
noticeable signal by the Summit to the world.
The 17th SCO summit held in Astana (Kazakhstan) in June 2017

welcomed Pakistan and India as full members thus marking the entry of
two major countries with democratic systems to a grouping characterized
by one party systems with centrally planned economies. Both countries
pledged to adhere to the Shanghai spirit and the SCO Charter that calls for
security cooperation and fight against terrorism and violent extremism,
besides envisaging multiple spheres of cooperation across Eurasia.
Imtiaz Alam, a longtime observer of regional issues, argued that

the admission of Pakistan and India in the SCO has created the bridge
between South Asia and Central Asia, making the SCO the largest
Eurasian economic and security arrangement. According to him, Unlike
SAARC that remains a hostage to bilateral disputes between India and
Pakistan, SCO has the flexibility of allowing bilateral and multilateral
cooperative relationships. The SCO is not SAARC, it allows India and
Pakistan yet another regional forum to explore possible avenues of
cooperation including against terrorism if they agree to bring mutually
destructive proxy wars to an end.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Hua Chunying expressed

the hope prior to the summit that Pakistan and India would improve
bilateral relations after becoming the full members of SCO. We hope

Essay
that Pakistan and India will inject new impetus to the development of
SCO.
The SCO framework envisages political, economic and military

cooperation and seeks to enhance member states role in the evolving
post cold war world order. Central Asia is poised to play an important
role both on account of its natural resources as well as a region both
China and Russia want to secure from extremist movements springing
from the post jihad turmoil in Afghanistan. Both Afghanistan and Iran
enjoy observer status hoping to accede as full members of the SCO.
Central Asian republics hope to consolidate their economic links with
both powers while looking for a security network in support of their
stability.
In his address at the summit, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif lauded the
SCOs contribution to regional stability, and described it as a powerful
platform to promote peace, build trust and spur economic development
for shared prosperity. He said the organization helps to combat terrorism,
reduce arms race, eliminate poverty, fight epidemics, deal with natural
disasters, tackle climate change, and ensure water security.
Pakistan has been stepping up its association with SCO, working

with institutions like the SCOs Business Council, Inter-banking
Consortium and Regional Anti-terrorist Structure.
The member states have agreed to take all necessary steps for strict
border management. They will regularly hold military exercises along
their border regions to check arms smuggling and monitor activities of
militant organizations. An exercise conducted by Chinese and Kyrgyz
forces along their border in June 2017 was observed by representatives
from all SCO countries. China has been deeply concerned about the
threat from militant separatists, in particular from the East Turkestan
Islamic Movement. The recent exercise saw simulated actions by
helicopters, armored jeeps and 700 border police officers from the
neighboring countries in Xinjiangs Kyrgyz prefecture.

Essay
Nawaz Sharif welcomed President Xis proposal on the need for a
treaty of good neighbourhood for the next five years. He said:
As leaders, we should leave a legacy of peace and amity for our

future generations; not a toxic harvest of conflict and animosity. Instead
of talking about counterweights and containment, let us create shared
spaces for all.
Pakistan sees its membership of the SCO - along India and

Afghanistans presence as an observer - as a framework to address
bilateral issues with both countries. Sharif said that Pakistans becoming
full member of the SCO would help in resolving bilateral disputes with
India and give impetus to efforts for greater regional connectivity and
economic prosperity.
While Pakistan is fully committed to the goals and objectives of

the SCO, Indias role as a US partner to counter China, places certain
restraints. Indias open hostility to China Pakistan Economic Corridor
and lukewarm attitude to the greater Belt and Road Initiative raise
questions about Indias goal of connectivity with the Central Asian
states. India has launched the Chahbahar port project on Irans coast
to bypass Pakistan for trade with Afghanistan and beyond. That will
however pale into insignificance when pitted against a shorter route
through Gwadar and the CPEC road network.
While Mr. Modi was attending the SCO summit with India joining
the organization as a full member, the countrys army chief claimed that
his forces could deal with China and Pakistan at the same time. Gen
Bipin Rawat blamed Pakistan for stoking unrest in Indian Held Kashmir,
but believed that the situation there would normalize soon. He said India
was on course to keep pace with Chinas defence modernization. Indias
belligerence toward China and Pakistan casts further doubts about New
Delhis real intentions in making a positive contribution to the SCOs
goals of peaceful good neighborly relations among the member states.
Indian Express noted that the SCO provided a rare occasion for
India and Pakistan to take part in a joint military exercise. The Astana

Essay
summit, the newspaper wrote, fulfilled Indias long time desire to attain
full membership of the organization. That would strengthen Indias
position in Central Asia and also help the countrys aim of regional
integration and promote connectivity and stability across borders. India
wanted to use the framework to achieve regional and global stability
and prosperity but Pakistans inclusion in the SCO poses potential
difficulties in Indias plan.
In his address at the summit, Mr. Modi reiterated that terrorism is a

major threat to humanity, and asked for coordinated efforts to counter
that menace. He voiced support to projects for greater connectivity
but stressed that state sovereignty and territorial integrity were the key
factors. This, among others, means Indias continued objections to the
ambitious China Pakistan Economic Corridor that runs through the
Northern Areas along Pakistan-China border.
President Xi of China sounded a note of caution on the menace of

terrorism by stating that recent acts of terrorism in this region show that
the fight against three forces (of terrorism, separatism and extremism)
remains a long and arduous task. This is in sharp contrast to some other
countries using the fight against terror as a propaganda tool, as seen in
the form of an orchestrated harangue by Kabul, Delhi and Washington
asking Pakistan to do more while sweeping under the rug, terrorist acts
against Pakistan coordinated from the Afghan territory.
The SCO summit proved to be conducive for an in depth exchange

of views between Prime Minister Sharif and President Ghani with a
view to evolve a mechanism to address each others complaints and
improve border management and coordination against terrorism.
The mechanism could be placed under the supervision of the

Quadrilateral Monitoring Group of Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and
the US.
Some in India claim that the SCO is both a threat and an opportunity
but Indias joining is imperative if only to prevent Pakistan and China
from making SCO a platform for a one-way discourse on Kashmir.

Essay
Further, New Delhi is keen to ensure that it is not kept out of the heartland
power perimeter in a China-Russia coalition that includes Pakistan.
According to FIRSTPOST, a web-based Indian paper, Modis

other focus was greater connectivity and access to regional resources
in Central Asia, bypassing the obstructionism of Pakistan. India also
gets the chance to share its concerns on terrorism in a bloc that was
formed primarily as a reaction against the cesspool of violence created
by radical Islam. Modi used the opportunity to make repeated references
to the menace of terrorism and the need of making concerted efforts to
prevent radicalization, terrorist recruitment, training and financing.
C Raja Mohan wrote that India could shape its SCO strategy in
three ways: to prevent Pakistan and China ambushing Delhi on the
Kashmir question; intensify engagement with Central Asian states; and
seize potential shifts in SCO politics over the long term keeping a low
profile for now.
Indian observers have identified areas of discord with China;

Indias bid for membership of the NSG and designation of Masood
Azhar as a terrorist by the UNSC. China, for its part is frustrated by
Indian reticence over the Belt and Road Initiative launched by China.
Modis meeting with Xi in Astana was seen as focusing on areas of
Indo-China convergence and avoiding the issues of divergence except
in broad terms. Strangely, India sees itself in a role to counter Chinas
rising influence, aligning India to the US grand design in Asia, without
attempting to analyze the fallout on bilateral ties with China.
Somewhat like Indian obsession with isolating Pakistan, Indian

analysts are focused on ways to counter Chinas growing influence in
Asia. Overall, Delhis attitude toward SCO is fashioned more by Indias
vision of relations with China and Pakistan rather than contributing to a
mechanism of good-neighbourliness.
The SCO has been primarily focused on security related threats

from terrorism, separatism and extremism. The Regional Anti-terrorism
Structure (RATS) was established in 2004 with its secretariat in

Essay
Tashkent. In 2006, the SCO announced plans to fight cross border drug
crimes under the counterterrorism rubric. These goals are understood
to lead to greater cooperation among the armed forces of the member
states without the organization becoming a military bloc.
The SCOs activities have expanded to include increased military

cooperation, intelligence sharing, and counterterrorism. A number of
joint military exercises have taken place over the years.
The SCO is also aiming at greater cooperation on cyberspace

activities deeming the dissemination of information harmful to the
spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other states as security threats.
An accord adopted in 2009 defined information war as an effort by a
state to undermine anothers political, economic and social systems.
Other ideas for greater cooperation under the framework of SCO

relate to trade, banking, energy and culture.
Conclusion
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that has its origins in

the shared concerns of Russia, China and the Central Asian countries
over threats from terrorism, separatism and extremism is shaping up
as an important Eurasian concert aimed at multifaceted cooperation
network in the decades ahead. The SCO has also served as a network
led by China and Russia to resist the US and NATO extending their
sphere of activity into Central Asia. China evidently is the largest and
most important player in this strategy. Viewed in conjunction with the
Belt and Road Initiative, SCO is a pillar of support in Chinas plans to
emerge, gradually but surely, as a leading Asian and global player.

Essay
REALIGNMENTS IN THE REGION:

CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN
Fauzia Nasreen*
Introduction
Paradigm shifts in the global and regional orders since the end of the
Cold War have seen new alignments in different important regions of
the world. These changes are on-going as the world continues to witness
re-crafting of interests of various powers and actors. The emergence
of Central Asian states, rising power of China, reassertion of Russia
in world politics, the intense conflict in the Middle East as well as
growing geopolitical significance of Asia have had a deep influence on
the redefining of objectives and goals of states both in the regional and
global contexts. However, the continuity and change manifest within
the world order is embedded in geo-economics in which resources,
markets, multinationals and financial architecture exercise dominant
influence over state behaviour. Among the security challenges for the
last few decades terrorism and extremism have dominated geopolitics.
In the configuration and reconfiguration of inter-state relations, the

crucial questions remain about the contours of alignment where broadly
speaking the US and the Arab world have consolidated their ties; and
China, Russia and Iran seem to be coalescing. India claims to follow
a neutral policy in West Asia yet it is attempting to court both Iran
and Saudi Arabia. The challenge for Pakistan is more acute in terms of
its historical and religious affinity with Saudi Arabia and geographical
linkage with Iran. The conundrums for Pakistan are: maintaining a
balance between commitment to the Saudi-led military coalition and
ties with Iran; mollifying Afghanistans misplaced concerns allowing
better access to Central Asia; constructively engaging with India in the
* The author is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.

Essay
wake of uprising in Kashmir, LOC violations and radical ideological
moorings of the BJP-led Modi government. With the SAARC summit
deadlocked, can the success of the 13th ECO Summit be translated
into concrete and practical outcomes and could Pakistan and Indias
membership of SCO transform the pattern of their relationship.
Historically, understanding of the world order has been contextual,

seen through the prism of alignments of major powers within the realist
perspective of polarity. Since the end of the Cold War the discourse on
polarity has ranged between a unipolar to a multipolar world order. This
debate has more or less defined the texture of convergence and divergence
of interests and worldviews of different countries. It is also believed
that no one true world order has ever existed in world history. There
have been a variety of world orders within the international system.1
But, in the 21st Century the process of globalization, trans-nationalism,
information technology revolution and rapid communication has added
complexity to the interaction among various world orders. Consequently
the split on the question of national and geographical boundaries and the
mapping of various regions has ignited more violence and grievance
at the popular level, particularly in the Middle East. The crises within
the Islamic world have been exacerbated by ideological and doctrinal
difference,2 as well.
The very concept of the Westphalia state system has come under
stress as Daesh (Islamic State) claims to fight for establishing a cross-
boundary Pan-Islamic caliphate unleashing the wave of sectarianism. It
would be too simplistic to seek explanation in the sectarian divide alone.
The Muslim Brotherhood and its populist ideology3 have also irked
countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE. Further complicating the
situation is Hamas, an affiliate of Brotherhood being espoused by Qatar
and Turkey4 and their closer ties with Iran. Ironically, President Trumps
May 20-24, visit to the Middle East instead of uniting the Islamic world
against terrorism, has fuelled more discord and fractured the semblance
of unity among the GCC countries. For Pakistan, these developments
pose diplomatic and relationship challenges with countries in West Asia
starting from Iran to Saudi Arabia and its allies and Qatar. Afghanistans
tilt, for obvious reasons, will have to be towards the US inclinations

Essay
though Kabul can ill afford to overlook Iranian concerns. What the
impending shifts bode for the Chabahar enterprise which symbolized
the Iran-India-Afghanistan nexus only time will tell, particularly in the
wake of tightening of the India-US-Israel nexus.
Pakistans Geopolitical Dilemma
Pakistans desire to enter into mutually beneficial cooperation with

the Central Asian states is over a couple of decades old. The forward
initiatives for tapping the markets of these newly independent states
were frustrated by geopolitical developments in the region. The civil
war in Tajikistan which ended in 1996 and Taliban-Northern Alliance
character of political dispensation of Afghanistan accentuated the state
of regional instability. The flux in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations marred
the prospects to a large extent. Together with the entrenched interests of
outside powers and competition for influence among the regional actors,
the outcome has been a complex power contest. Despite commitment to
such economic projects as IPI, TAPI and CASA-1000 and other projects
the progress on their realization has been tardy if not negligible.
Under these circumstances, the new levels of deep engagement

between China and Pakistan seem to have transformed the regional
undercurrents. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that links Kashgar
and Gwadar through land route has provided the much needed alternate
outlet to Pakistan in reaching Central Asia and beyond through the Silk
Road of One Belt One Road (OBOR). Having acquired a new dimension,
the trajectory of Pakistan-China relations in the 21st Century has put
increased focus on economic ties, infrastructure development, energy
sustainability, water security and other such areas. This elevation of
mutual ties has caused disquiet as it upsets the designs of some players
to shape the regional order to suit their interests. This has generated
additional urgency for Pakistan policy makers, particularly in view of the
convergence of interests reflected in the 27 June 2017 Trump-Modi joint
statement. The emerging challenges where the Indo-US concert aims to
contain China reemphasizes the need for stronger strategic partnership
with China. CPEC provides an opportunity not just for economic gain
but for strategic leverage.5

Essay
China has emerged as a crucial balancer in the region. It has an
international stature, financial power and strategic interests in the
stability and development of its surrounding regions. Beijings vital
objective is in bringing about tranquility and prosperity in its less
developed provinces, particularly the Xinjiang province. Through
development, soft power and economic diplomacy Chinas aim is to
combat the three evils: extremism, terrorism and separatism. Within
this framework, peace and security in the periphery of China is
critical. By invigorating infrastructure development and connectivity
projects Chinas vision is to spur growth in the markets and induce
economic activity in the less developed regions. For this, China has
created financial institutions with heavy investment of its own and
contributions from other countries and organizations. This could mean
that China will become a pivotal factor in the way regional alignments
would consolidate.
For the US, Asian regions have immense geo-strategic importance. In

addition to its desire to maintain active global presence as a super power,
the hydrocarbon resources along with the sea lanes of communication
in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are of vital interest and concern
to Washington. The US engagement and dissuasion policies towards
China have a bearing on Pakistan-US relations given the tight relations
between China and Pakistan. The US, under Trump presidency, has
embraced India as a strategic partner defining these ties as based on
shared values and convergence on regional issues. The consolidation of
US-Israel-India nexus is becoming more evident with the multifaceted
cooperation agreements signed during the June Washington and July
Tel Aviv visits of Mr. Modi. The supply of weapons to India by both
US and Israel will pose serious questions for strategic stability in South
Asia as well as endanger the fragile security environment. The visit of
Senator McCain and his congressional delegation to Pakistan in early
July have helped little to assuage Islamabads concerns as the assurances
have been negated by the subsequent statements made by him in Kabul.
Either there is confusion and incoherence in US state policies on South
Asian issues or a deliberate approach aimed at deepening intra-regional
mistrust.

Essay
Russias resurgence and deepening involvement in the Middle
East and watchful disposition towards South and Central Asia adds
another dice in the geopolitical game. Moscows reassertion as a player
with significant clout is not restricted to Eurasia alone. Moscow has
become a dominant player in the Middle Eastern chessboard and, as
Washington analysts say, is calling the shots6 as evidenced in its role
in creating de-escalation zones with the support of Iran and Turkey.
With the tension becoming more pronounced between the US and China
on the North Korean issue and the widening gap between Moscow and
Washington, both the Russian and Chinese leadership consulted each
other in advance of the G-22 summit held in mid-July. The Trump-Putin
meeting at the Summit, at the geopolitical level led to an agreement
on the ceasefire zones in Syria. However, their parleys deepened the
fissures at the domestic level, leading to the Congress bill imposing
sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea.
How these complexities will translate into Pakistans immediate

neighbourhood is a crucial question for Islamabad policy makers.
Given that a bill has been proposed in Congress that calls for tough
restrictions on Pakistan the general sentiment of the US politicians
is clearly evident. Moreover the US Country Reports on Terrorism
(annual assessment of the State Department) has toed the oft repeated
line of Do more, reiterating the demand about the Haqqani network.
The general assessment is that in view of the likely troop surge in
Afghanistan, Pakistans cooperation will be essential. It has been made
clear to the commanding officer General Nicholson by the Chief of Army
Staff, General Bajwa that the blame game is hurting Pakistans terror
fight7 and negative statements undermine Pakistans counter terrorism
efforts which are vital for the stability and security of both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Much would depend on the US Afghan policy review that
would be finalized sometime in July. The impending increase in troop
level will be a part of the review. It is considered crucial as the Taliban
continue encroaching on government controlled territory and Daesh
threatens the delicate security dynamics. For Moscow and Beijing these
are alarming developments and for Pakistan and the CPEC project they
pose serious challenges.

Essay
Regional dynamics
South Asia is an important piece in the alignment matrix. The tension

ridden relationship between two nuclear states, India and Pakistan has
become even more volatile because of Indian atrocities in Kashmir,
ceasefire violations along the Line of Control and Working Boundary,
suspension of bilateral dialogue and increasing belligerency by India.
The sub-conventional warfare waged in the region is like a tinder-box. It
can potentially flare up and escalate to the level where non-conventional
weapons might come into play. India has built hype about terrorism and
used it to malign Pakistan. Its sponsorship of subversive elements has
now been proven. Within the region its Hindutva ideology manifests
in its desire to subjugate and include in its orbit regions from Kabul
to Rangoon. Its goal is to subdue Pakistan and allow Indian economic
hegemony. For this New Delhi has attempted to reach out to Iran and
Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. Despite repeated offers by Pakistan
and China to join CPEC, India has openly stated CPEC lacked economic
justification.8 Pakistan is of the firm belief that Indias objective of
creating lawlessness in Baluchistan is motivated by designs to damage
CPEC.
There have been far reaching implications of the 1979 Iranian

revolution and the unfolding of the ideological state structure. Since then
relations between Iran and the Gulf countries and Egypt have been frosty.
The Arab spring beginning in 2011 has further disturbed the historical
fault lines. Iran has staked its geostrategic interests and concerns with
the Houthes of Yemen, Hizbollah of Lebanon, Shiites of Iraq and Syria
of Bashar al Asad. Yet another recent complicating factor is the rift
between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Qatar on inter alia Dohas
ties with Iran. The US-Saudi Arabia tightening of defence cooperation
and the emerging new leadership of Crown Prince Muhammad bin
Salman has definitely given an added impetus to the evolving regional
alignments. How these dynamics will impact Pakistan-Iran relations is
a ponderable point especially as the former Army Chief General Raheel
Sharif will command the Islamic Military Alliance which is seen as a
bloc against Iran.

Essay
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing there are numerous uncertainties about

regional alignments. Notwithstanding Indias dependence on Iranian
oil and gas, incentives and pressures would bear upon Indian policy
makers in so far as close cooperation between Tehran and New Delhi is
concerned. The question is where do projects like Chabahar and other
infrastructure development stand in the wake of US-India-Israel nexus.
Notwithstanding Indian belief that Chabahar project is at the heart of
the common vision that India and Iran have for Afghanistan and the
region as a whole9 there are definite spanners in the full realization of
the project for the time being. The connectivity dream and Afghanistans
euphoric ecstasy about other than Pakistan route could be in doldrums.
The real challenge for Pakistan which could grow in magnitude in

the future is to ensure a neutral and balanced role in the intra-Muslim
countries squabbles. While anchoring on China-Pakistan strategic ties,
growing relations with Russia and leveraging its geostrategic location,
Islamabad must approach the US policy objectives in Afghanistan from
a position of strength. US-Pakistan ties are important in the context of
stabilization of Afghanistan and success in meeting the threats emanating
from various elements in the country. Therefore, Pakistan-US ties need
astute handling.
References:
1. Henry Kissinger, World order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the
Course of History, Allen Lane, 2014
2. Munir Akram, A Dark Age Dawn, 11 June 2017
3. Zamir Akram, Trump and South Asia, The Express Tribune, 4 July 2017
4. Stephen Sestanovich, Be Wary of Ptuins Syria Plna, New York Times, 13
May 2017
5. M. Ziauddin, Chinas Case for Joining CPEC, The Express Tribune, 13 May
2017
6. Vijay Prasahd, Indias Iran Policy: Between US Primacy and Regionalism,
Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, November 2013
7. COAS to US general: Blame game hurting Pakistans terror fight, The Express
Tribune, 27 July 2017

Essay
Endnotes
1 Kissinger, Henry, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the
Course of History, Allen Lane, 2014
2 Akram, Munir, A Dark Age, Dawn, 11 June 2017
3 Ibid
4 Ibid.
5 Akram, Zamir, Trump and South Asia, The Express Tribune, 4 July 2017
6 Sestanovich, Stephen, Be Wary of Putins Syria Plan, New York Times
(International Edition), 13 May 2017
7 COAS to US general: Blame game hurting Pakistans terror fight, The Express
Tribune, 27 July 2017
8 Ziauddin M., Chinas case for joining CPEC, The Express Tribune, 13 May
2017
9 Prashad, Vijay, Indias Iran Policy: Between US Primacy and Regionalism,
Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (International
Affairs), November 2013

Essay
WORLD DISORDER AND PAKISTAN
Javid Husain*
Pakistans policy makers are faced with the daunting challenge

of crafting state policies in the best interests of the country keeping
in view the growing disorder and anarchy in international relations in
the 21st century. It is critically important for Islamabad to understand
the characteristics of the emerging global and regional security
environment and its implications for Pakistan to be able to formulate
policies which would safeguard its security, promote its economic well-
being, and preserve its cultural identity in the turbulent times to come.
Pakistan must also draw the right lessons from its past experience in
coming to grips with the challenges of the largely anarchic world of the
twenty-first century. A partial rather than a comprehensive approach
to policy making has been a major flaw from which Pakistans policy
making process has suffered grievously in the past. This flaw of a
partial approach in policy formulation basically reflects the absence
of the concept and practice of a grand strategy that should bring into
a coherent whole the countrys political, economic, security, and
diplomatic policies. The need of the hour for Pakistan is a grand strategy
which takes into account the salient features of the global and regional
security environment, learns from the countrys past experience, and
develops a well-thought-out synthesis of political, economic, security,
and diplomatic policies to overcome the challenges confronting it.
* The writer is a former ambassador and the president of the Lahore Council
for World Affairs. This essay is an adapted version of Chapter 2 of his book,
Pakistan and a World in Disorder---A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First
Century, which was recently published by Palgrave Macmillan from New York.

Essay
Salient features of the World disorder
The end of the Cold War generated unrealistic hopes of a new world
order based on justice, fair play, and the principles of the UN Charter
and international law. Later events belied these hopes as realpolitik
prevailed upon idealism in the US foreign policy and the foreign
policies of other major world powers. Following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the US emerged as the sole superpower. It was inevitable
that the US would use the unipolarity for establishing and strengthening
its global hegemony. An important Pentagon planning document leaked
to the press in 1992 had the following to say on the overarching US
strategic goal in the post-Cold War global scenario: Our first objective
is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival..that poses a threat on the
order of that posed formerly by the Soviet UnionOur strategy must
now focus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global
competitor.1 However, the US-dominated unipolarity proved to be a
short-lived phenomenon. Washingtons drive for global hegemony was
soon challenged by emerging powers.
The world of the 21st century is in quest of a new equilibrium

among the various centers of power, which would establish a rule-
based order designed to promote peace, stability, justice, and human
progress. Unfortunately, the experience of the two decades and a half
since the end of the Cold War shows that mankind is far from that
goal. Instead of an equilibrium, we witness a growing challenge to the
existing US-led and West-dominated world order from the emerging
powers, particularly China, and a re-assertive Russia. The emergence
of a multipolar world with several centers of power to check and
balance one another may provide, in due course of time, the required
equilibrium and stability in international relations. However, it is
debatable whether even this equilibrium would ensure justice and
fair play in international relations. For a world order to be stable,
peaceful, just, and progressive, we require not only equilibrium among
the various centers of power but also the rewriting of international
rules so that they are seen as just and fair by the participants of the
international system and accommodate changes necessary for human
progress. In other words, there has to be the right balance between

Essay
power and principles. Unfortunately, the world currently is far from
that ideal.
Second, major world powers have exhibited a tendency to resort to

unilateralism in blatant disregard of the principles of international law
and the UN Charter when dealing with strategically important issues
of war and peace. The US invasion of Iraq of 2003 is a case in point.
This, of course, is not the only instance where principles have been
sacrificed at the altar of realpolitik. Several other major world powers
have been equally guilty of disregard of the principles of international
law in handling world affairs since the end of the Cold War. A relevant
example is the way the European powers handled the Bosnian crisis in
the 1990s. Third, the absence of a world government and the weakened
authority of the UN in dealing with important world security issues have
served to aggravate the perception of anarchy and the trend towards
unilateralism in international relations.
Fourth, justice and fair play have been the least of the considerations
guiding the conduct of the major world powers in dealing with external
affairs. The denial of justice to the Palestinians and the Kashmiris in their
struggle for independence from the military occupation of Israel and
India respectively substantiates this tendency. With the growing world
disorder, this trend is likely to gather strength and realpolitik would
trump idealism in the foreseeable future. Finally, major world powers
have generally failed to rise above narrow national considerations in
disregard of the progress and welfare of mankind at large, especially
in dealing with such global issues as climate change and international
trade. President Trumps decision to withdraw from the Paris accord
on climate change is the latest instance of ignoring the interests of the
international community as a whole. In view of all of these factors,
disorder rather than order and realpolitik rather than principles would
increasingly characterize international relations in the foreseeable
future. This would be especially true in the consideration of strategically
important security issues.

Essay
The End of History
Several theses have been presented by various scholars to

describe the current trends in the present international system. In the
exuberance of the victory over communism in the Cold War, Francis
Fukuyama argued that liberal democracy might constitute the end
point of mankinds ideological evolution and the final form of human
government, and as such constituted the end of history.2 This point
was contested by others who were not prepared to concede that the
evolutionary process in human history and ideology had come to an
end. Indeed, past experience and the elements of competition and desire
for recognition in human beings suggest that the process of evolution
will continue indefinitely to propel mankind to new and unimaginable
heights. It is inconceivable that the process of ideological evolution or
the evolution of the art of government will remain immune from the
general evolution of mankind.
In particular, it is hard to believe that the liberal democracies have

achieved internally the ideal combination of liberty, egalitarianism,
justice, rule of law, and progress that the governments should aim at. As
noted by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge in their article The
State of the State---The Global Contest for the Future of Government,3
the modernizing authoritarianism pursued by Asian countries such as
China and Singapore poses a serious challenge to the concept of liberal
democracy in the crafting of the best kind of state and the best system
of government. Externally, liberal democracies motivated by economic
greed and quest for power and hegemony, exhibited during the colonial
period but also during the post-Cold War era, have failed to achieve the
ideals of international peace, justice, and progress.
The moral is that being a liberal democracy is no guarantee that a

country would not embark upon acts of aggression or engage in acts
in violation of the principles of international law or the UN Charter
when its perceived strategic interests so demand. Representative
institutions in modern democracies do constitute a substantial advance
over other forms of government so far known to mankind. But there is
no justification for the claim that with them the ideological competition

Essay
among nations has come to an end. The best of mankind, ideologically
speaking, is still ahead.
Clash of Civilizations
Samuel Huntington put forward the thesis in his article The Clash
of Civilizations?4 that the central and the most dangerous dimension
of the emerging politics would be conflict between groups from different
civilizations. The point was elaborated later in his book, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, published in 1996.5
The thesis that clashes between civilizations would be the greatest threat
to world peace in the post-Cold War world undoubtedly has some validity
as a close analysis of the Bosnian crisis, the Palestinian issue and the
Kashmir dispute would reveal. Some of the ideas and policies supported
by President Trump and neocons also substantiate Huntingtons thesis.
There is no doubt that cultural self-identity which leads to identifying
others as enemies is a powerful driving force behind many important
developments in contemporary global politics. It, therefore, helps in
understanding international politics as it is rather than as it ought to
be. However, Huntingtons prognosis of global politics may be too
deterministic as it underestimates the importance of universalistic
ideas, tendencies, and developments in international politics as part of
the process of globalization and as propagated by great religions and
philosophers with emphasis on human brotherhood and the common
destiny of mankind. Further, the danger is that Huntingtons thesis may
become the basis of encouraging policies that ignite or aggravate inter-
civilizational conflicts with catastrophic consequences for mankind.
Huntingtons thesis, therefore, carries the risk of self-fulfilling prophecy.
In short, policy makers need to make use of Huntingtons diagnosis

of global politics with great care and caution. On the one hand, they
must take into account the possibility that inter-civilizational differences
and disputes may be responsible for some of the international conflicts
and tensions. On the other, they need to take into account the impact
of the process of globalization, the growing interdependence of states,
and the message of human brotherhood taught by great religions and
philosophers on the global security environment. In any case, there is

Essay
definitely a need to steer humanity towards dialogue, understanding,
and cooperation away from inter-civilizational conflicts in the interest
of global peace, stability, and progress.
The reality is that no single thesis is able to capture fully the

complexity of the post-Cold War era or of the world in the twenty-
first century. Instead it would be useful to highlight the salient features
of the contemporary world to understand the complex nature of the
global politics of the current century. Some of those features have been
mentioned in earlier paragraphs. But the following features of the global
security environment deserve a little more elaborate treatment.
Gradual Erosion of the US Global Domination
The US emerged as the sole super power with global reach at the
end of the Cold War. However, in retrospect this development proved to
be a unipolar moment in the onward march of human history. There is
no doubt that the US still remains the most powerful state in the world
in military terms. Its military expenditure, estimated to be over US$ 600
billion, surpasses by far the military expenditure of other great powers.
No other country, including China, comes even close to the US annual
military expenditure. The US also enjoys a formidable lead over other
countries in military technology, the sophistication and effectiveness of
its weapons and military equipment, and the global reach of its military
forces.
But the overall power balance changes to the disadvantage of the US

if one takes into account economic power. The US economy with a GDP
of approximately US$18.6 trillion in 20166 was the worlds largest and
accounted for roughly 25% of the worlds total output. But there were
also other centers of economic power such as China, Japan, European
Union, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Korea,
and South Africa. The combined GDP of the EU countries amounted to
US$ 16.4 trillion in 2016. China was the country with the second largest
economy in the world in nominal dollar terms in that year with a GDP
of US$ 11.2 trillion. Japan with GDP of US$4.9 trillion occupied the
third position in world ranking in 2016.7 According to some estimates,

Essay
Chinas GDP would surpass that of the US in nominal terms by 2030.8
According to IMF, the Chinese economy in PPP terms surpassed the US
in 2014. IMF estimates also indicate that in 2017 Chinas GDP in PPP
terms would be US$ 23.2 trillion as against US$ 19.4 trillion for the US.9
So in economic terms the balance of power is steadily shifting against
the US. This in due course will reflect itself in the balance of military
power as China rapidly increases its military expenditure in an effort
to catch up with the US. While the year 2030 would be a critical year
for the shift in the balance of the world economic power, 2050 would
witness a similar change in favor of China and to the disadvantage of the
US in the balance of military power if the current projections hold. The
time lag of 20 years is approximately the period in which China can be
expected to translate its economic ascendancy into its military prowess.
Even if one takes into account the enormous advantage that the
US enjoys in soft power and the addition to its strength because of its
network of alliances in different parts of the world, the overall long-term
trend is toward a multipolar world in the twenty-first century. Other
poles besides the US such as China, the EU, Japan, India, Russia, South
Korea, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, and Turkey will play an increasingly
important role in international politics in the years to come because of
their high levels of economic development and the increase in their
military capabilities. There will be a corresponding decline in the overall
relative power and influence of the US, particularly in the second half
of the current century.
The Primacy of Power Politics and the Dominant Position of the

West
It is worth reiterating that a salient feature of the current international

system is the primacy of power politics as against the principles of
the UN Charter and international law. The positions of major world
powers on strategically important issues are increasingly dictated by
the compulsions of power politics rather than the recognized principles
of inter-state conduct. In such matters, the authority of the UN has been
greatly reduced as evidenced by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 in
the absence of any UN Security Council resolution authorizing it. The

Essay
enunciation of the US doctrine of unilateral and pre-emptive military
intervention in 2002 was another example of the same tendency.
Pending the establishment of a just new world order based on recognized
principles of inter-state conduct, the prospect for which is rather bleak
in the foreseeable future, power will remain the ultimate arbiter of
international strategic issues of peace and security.
In the prevailing environment, the West led by the US enjoys

considerable advantage over the rest of the world. The combined GDP
of the US and other Western countries accounts for almost 55% of the
global GDP. The military power of the NATO countries is unrivalled.
They also exercise enormous influence worldwide in cultural fields.
Their advantage in soft power is a valuable addition to their superiority
in economic and military fields. Therefore, despite the emergence of
new centers of power, the West under the leadership of the US plays the
most influential role in determining the international agenda as well as
the rules of interstate behavior in political, security, economic, cultural,
humanitarian, and environmental fields. Western countries naturally use
their national power and their influence in multilateral institutions to
safeguard their national interests. While so doing, they, in view of the
anarchic nature of the current international environment as pointed out
earlier and as elaborated by John J. Mearsheimer in his widely acclaimed
book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,10 are guided more by the
principles of realpolitik rather than by the rules of international law or
the principles of the UN Charter, particularly in the consideration of
strategic issues of security and economy.
Undoubtedly, the long-term trend is towards greater dispersal of

power in the international system as China gains the top positions in
economic and later in military terms and as other centers of power
emerge in the world. However, this transformation will take place
gradually over a fairly long period of time leading ultimately to
inevitable consequential changes and adjustments in the global and
regional security and economic environment.

Essay
International Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
destruction
From the point of view of global security, issues of international

terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),
particularly nuclear weapons, have been raised by Western countries
to the top of the international agenda because they see in them not just
a threat to international peace and stability but, more importantly, the
germs of a latent or long-term threat to their world supremacy. There
cannot be two opinions about the necessity of fighting and eliminating
the menace of international terrorism defined as the indiscriminate
use of violence against innocent civilians. However, it is not enough
merely to rely on the use of brute force to overcome the monster of
international terrorism. It is imperative that side by side with the use
of force against terrorists, steps should also be taken to eliminate the
root causes of international terrorism. In many cases, this problem can
be traced to policies of aggression and foreign occupation followed by
imperial powers, denial of the right to self-determination of the people
under foreign or alien occupation, economic injustice and deprivation
due to the unjust exploitation of the economic resources of a country
by foreign powers, blatant cultural discrimination, flagrant violation of
human rights, repressive regimes denying political freedoms to their
people, and extremist ideologies.
The need of the hour is for the international community to adopt

a comprehensive strategy covering political, economic, military, and
cultural policy dimensions to deal with the threat of international
terrorism. Reliance on the use of force alone for eradicating international
terrorism so far has not produced satisfactory results as the experience of
Western countries in the Middle East shows quite clearly. Instead it has
aggravated this problem and expanded the radius of its activities. There
are no signs yet that the West is ready to adopt a more sophisticated and
nuanced strategy employing military, political, economic, and cultural
instruments of policy in combating international terrorism. If anything,
the emphasis on fighting the symptoms of terrorism is likely to increase
to the neglect of dealing with its root causes.

Essay
The issue of the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction is
an example of the lack of sincerity and double standards of the Western
countries in dealing with security issues that have serious implications
for the whole world. As far as the issue of proliferation of nuclear
weapons is concerned, the nuclear-weapon states, despite the clear
provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have failed
to implement fully their obligations to make progress towards nuclear
disarmament. At the same time, it has been their expectation that non-
nuclear-weapon states would continue to refrain from the development
and acquisition of nuclear weapons as provided for under NPT. It seems
from the conduct of nuclear-weapon states that the real purpose of NPT
was to retain their monopoly of nuclear weapons so as to perpetuate
a state of nuclear apartheid and maintain their global domination
militarily and politically. The nuclear-weapon states have also violated
their obligations under NPT to facilitate international cooperation in
peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Instead, new restrictions have been
imposed in various ways such as the formation of Nuclear Suppliers
Group to prevent non-nuclear-weapon states from benefitting fully
from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Further, on the pretext of
preventing nuclear proliferation, the Third World countries have been
denied the possibility of acquiring nuclear reprocessing and uranium
enrichment facilities.
The lack of uniformity of the US and other Western countries in

dealing with the issue of nuclear non-proliferation is also evident from
the way in which they connived in the development and acquisition
of nuclear weapons by Israel. In addition, their agreement, under the
US persuasion, to engage in nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes
with India, which delivered a severe blow to the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime through its nuclear explosions of 1998, while
denying the same facility to Pakistan which carried out nuclear explosions
subsequently merely to restore the strategic balance in South Asia. It is
doubtful that the US-led West in the foreseeable future would reconsider
its stance in dealing with the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, which is
motivated by power politics rather than principles.

Essay
Importance of Economic Power
The importance of economic and technological strength in the

calculation of a countrys national power and in the realization of its
national goals cannot be over-emphasized, especially in the modern
knowledge-driven world. The Soviet Union collapsed not because of
the shortage of conventional and nuclear weapons but mainly because
its weak economy could not sustain the enormous burden of its strategic
commitments and heavy military super-structure. It was a classic case
of strategic overstretch. As Henry Kissinger noted, Four decades of
imperial expansion in all directions could not be sustained on the basis
of an unworkable economic model.11 Economic and technological
development is not only an indispensable condition for a countrys
economic well-being but also an important source of strength to its
military power and an essential ingredient in the calculus of its national
security, especially in any long-term military contest.
Paul Kennedy elaborated at length the importance of the relative

economic rise and fall of a Great Power in determining in the long run its
growth and decline as an important military power in his seminal book,
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. He underscored that there is
detectable a causal relationship between the shifts that have occurred
over time in the general economic and productive balances and the
position occupied by individual Powers in the international system.12
Ideally, at the initial stages of its development, a country should assign
a higher priority to the growth of its economic and technological
strength than to building up its military power because a sound military
superstructure can be built up only on the solid foundation of economic
prowess. Reversing the order of priorities can lead a country to disastrous
consequences.
Implications for Pakistan
Pakistan is, thus, faced with an anarchic and extremely competitive

global security environment marked by the domination of power
politics over principles of international law, the diminished authority of
the UN on strategic issues of war and peace, civilizational fault-lines,

Essay
primacy of economic power, importance of science and technology in
the present knowledge-based world in determining the power of states
and its growth, the trends towards globalization and the formation
of regional economic groupings, the rise of new powers like China
demanding the accommodation of their interests in the international
system, and the resultant shifting alliances. It is this world in disorder
with an unpredictable and inhospitable international environment, in
which Pakistan has to operate to safeguard its security and attain the
goal of economic prosperity so that its people may realize their full
potential.
Pakistan needs to evolve a grand strategy which synthesizes its

political, economic, security, and diplomatic policies into a coherent
whole to overcome the challenges of the 21st century and safeguard
and promote its national interests. The analysis of the largely anarchic
international system and the growing world disorder leads one to the
following policy recommendations for Pakistan:
In view of the growing anarchy and disorder in the international

system, Pakistan in the ultimate analysis has to depend on its
own national power to safeguard its national interests. Pakistan
must accord the highest priority to the goal of rapid economic
development while maintaining a credible security deterrent at
the lowest level of armed forces and armaments.
For supporting the supreme goal of rapid economic growth,

Pakistan must adopt a low-risk and non-adventurist foreign
policy with the objective of defusing tensions in relations with
its neighbors and reducing the risk of the outbreak of a major
armed conflict. In such a scenario, Pakistan would be able to
devote maximum possible resources to the massive task of rapid
economic growth. It goes without saying that the goal of rapid
economic growth would be frustrated by wars and major armed
conflicts. Wars are costly affairs consuming huge amounts
of resources, which should instead be allocated to economic
development.

Essay
In the modern knowledge-based world, it is imperative that
Pakistan accords high priority to education, particularly to
science and technology, through allocating resources to these
sectors which are far above the UNESCO norm of 4% of GDP.
In the past, Pakistan has hardly allocated 2% of its GDP to the
education sector.
Pakistans current national saving and investment rates at

about 13% and 16% of GDP respectively are extremely low
in comparison with the corresponding rates of the countries
which have achieved high economic growth rates. In the case
of Pakistan, they must be raised to 30% of GDP or above in the
interest of rapid economic growth. The adoption of the policy
of austerity at the national level is a must for raising the national
saving rate and mobilizing the resources required for a high rate
of national investment which in turn would accelerate economic
growth.
The Government of Pakistan at federal and provincial levels

needs to reform the taxation system to raise the revenues
required for economic development, social welfare, defense,
and other administrative requirements. The tax-to-GDP ratio
must at least be 25% or above as against the current low level
of 13% approximately.
India, in the foreseeable future, would continue to pose a serious

threat to Pakistans security. Pakistan needs to build up its
national power and develop a system of alliances to safeguard
its security and promote its economic well-being. In contrast
with the situation in the Cold War when Pakistan was closely
allied with the US, Washington is now gravitating towards New
Delhi to counter the expansion of Chinas power and influence
in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The development
of Pakistans strategic partnership with China, based on the
convergence of the strategic interests of the two countries, is
a must for safeguarding its vital national interests in this era
of shifting alliances. The CPEC agreement involving over

Essay
$ 56 billion of Chinese investment in Pakistan over the next
few years is a landmark event in the strengthening of Pakistan-
China strategic partnership. At the same time, as far as possible
we should try to maintain friendly relations and cooperation
with the US in various fields in view of its pre-eminent position
globally and its vast economic and military power.
Pakistan must also strengthen its friendly relations with Iran,

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other important Muslim countries to
enhance its strategic clout.
Pakistan should take all possible steps to resolve its problems

with Afghanistan in an amicable manner so as to strengthen
peace and stability in that neighboring country and develop
Pakistan-Afghanistan friendly relations.
In view of the negative role of India in SAARC, we should

downgrade it it in our calculations and assign higher priority to
ECO for regional cooperation purposes.
Islamabad should adopt a long-term policy of building up

bridges of understanding and expanding mutually beneficial
cooperation with Russia. Keeping in view the emerging
strategic trends, our decision to join the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization was a step in the right direction.
Conclusion
The linchpin of Pakistans grand strategy, taking into account the

national situation and the security environment at the regional and
global levels, should be assigning the top priority to the goal of rapid
economic growth and subordinating everything else to the attainment
of this supreme national objective. This would require single-minded
focus on and maximum possible allocation of resources to the task of
economic development. However, this would be possible only if we have
peace in our neighborhood and avoid a major armed conflict allowing
us to allocate the lions share of our resources to economic development

Essay
while maintaining a credible security deterrent at the lowest level of
armed forces and armaments. This in turn would require us to pursue
a low-risk and non-adventurist foreign policy. Over-ambitious foreign
policy goals should be avoided so that we do not fall into the trap of
strategic overstretch and exhaustion in which we are caught at present.
We will also have to strengthen ourselves by entering into alliances with
like-minded countries to safeguard our security.
References:
1. Excerpts from Pentagons Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,
The New York Times, 8 March 1992.
2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, The National Interest, no. 16, Summer
1989, pp. 3-18; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New
York, NY: Avon Books, 1992), p.xi
3. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The State of the State---The Global
Contest for the Future of Government, Foreign affairs, July-August, 2014 issue.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Summer
1993 issue
5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World
Order, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1997)
6. World Economic Outlook Database, IMF, 18 April, 2017
7. Ibid.
8. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), The BRICS and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges
and Opportunities, World in 2050, January, 2013
9. Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects (PPP valuation of country
GDP), IMF, April 2017
10. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York, NY:
WW Norton & Company, 2001)
11. Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2014), p.313
12. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, NY: Vintage
Random House, 1987), p. xxii

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July/September 2017

Volume 12, Number 3

Radicalisation Patterns and Efficacy Air Com. (R) Khalid Iqbal 16

Sindh and Partition Yasser Latif Hamdani 39

Challenges and Opportunities in a Post ISIS Ozer Khalid 61

OIC Origin, Record and Prospects! Khalid Saleem 99

Shanghai Cooperation Organization comes of age M Saeed Khalid 110

Realignments in the Region: Fauzia Nasreen 120

World disorder and Pakistan Javid Husain 128

HINDUTVA: ITS PAST & FUTURE

The term Hindutva was coined by V.D. Savarkar in his seminal

The Arya Samaj was founded by Swami Dayanand in Bombay on

* The author is an eminent Indian scholar and expert on constitutional issues.

CRITERION July/September 2017 3

A question has often haunted us, asleep or awake, as to why is it that

4 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

It must be remembered in this connection that Western knowledge,

CRITERION July/September 2017 5

Hindu revivalism has influenced the development of Indian

6 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

The influences upon and leadership of the Hindu Mahasabha from

CRITERION July/September 2017 7

As the Mahasabha went into a decline, another more powerful

Hedgewar died in 1940 after designating M.S. Golwalkar as his

Together three important Hindu texts poisoned the atmosphere and

Savarkars doctrine in his book Hindutva (1923) reads: We Hindus

8 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

Savarkar elaborated on the theme: These are the essentials of

CRITERION July/September 2017 9

His thesis is startling; applying the modern understanding of

We repeat; in Hindusthan, the land of the Hindus, lives and should

10 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

Advocates of Indian nationalism are roundly denounced. The

The third text was also sought to be disowned. It is Golwalkars

The question before us now is what is the attitude of those people

CRITERION July/September 2017 11

Nor does it end there. They have also developed a feeling of

Golwalkar launches on his programme of purification. Everybody

It is our duty to call these our forlorn brothers, suffering under

12 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

It is absurd to call us a community in India. The Germans are the

Alarmed by this ideology, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said: If Hindu Raj

Ambedkar wrote in a Memorandum on the Rights of States

CRITERION July/September 2017 13

14 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

The future seems bleak. The divided opposition parties show no

CRITERION July/September 2017 15

RADICALISATION PATTERNS AND

Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal TI(M)*

This paper studies radicalization processes in South Asia, Europe

Contemporary usage of the term radicalisation and its associated

* The author is an independent analyst of international security systems. He chairs

16 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

In the broader perspective: prevalence, articulation and adoption

In the age of Daesh, while there are a number of different definitions,

Traditional trans-national and trans-regional ethno-sectarian fault

CRITERION July/September 2017 17

Asia in general and South Asia in particular are confronting the

Some of the contemporary processes of radicalism within and

Prominent entities that radiate radical sentiments in South Asia are:17

18 CRITERION Volume 12 No.3

The landscape of processes leading to radicalism in South Asia is

The Indian government systematically encourages its hardliner non-

Myanmars attitude of indifference towards the plight of its