G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs.
Desierto temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
March 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on
June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of
the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff
from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose Velarde a
grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on
November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the
impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate
and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd
continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and
left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well
as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations
joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the
Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the
beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that
he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty
verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap
presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the
same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of
the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
president, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle
to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he
countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If
justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did
he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the
Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government
was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in
defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government
entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the
president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the
previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent
to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is
important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his
leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the
Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of
Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis
on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned from suits,
the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from
suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner,
as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his
alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during
which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during
1
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner VS. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity
as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES et.al, respondents
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, respondent
FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior
and subsequent to the event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections,
Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as president
and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration
began when For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released
his expos that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received
large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of different groups and many
personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which
are the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene
Pimentel, Archbishop of Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos,
and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make the supreme
self-sacrifice. Respondent also resigned as Secretary of the Department of
Social Welfare and Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4
senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and then Speaker Manny
Villar, together with 47 representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny
Villar had transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On
November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial
with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one for
the ages. It was a battle royal of well known lawyers. But then came the
fateful day, when by the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not
open the second envelop allegedly containing evidence showing that the
petitioner had a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde
containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2 nd envelop resulted to the
people going to the streets and the public prosecutors withdrawing from the
trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes marched to EDSA
shrine and declared on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong
members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing
our support to this government. PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
together with some Cabinet members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started
for the peaceful transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took
oath as the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his
family left Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement:
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with
many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the
following letter:
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
2
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said resolution confirmed the authority given by
the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened on January
20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of
the Philippines. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the
full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her
Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines. It also
approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending
its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a
partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution.
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice
president. On February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which
confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the
Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been terminated. Several cases were filed against
the petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by
Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and
corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed
by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct;
(4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November
28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de
Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No.
0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for
plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired
by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty.
Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel
issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer
to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed
with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-
00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is
over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment
confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on
the same day, February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon
within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February
13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No.
146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m.
of February 15.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of
resolution and press statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman
filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January
20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the
Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the
Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any
comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are
still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases
pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and
subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the
respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against
petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and
academic.
ISSUES:
3
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. the Court finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial distinctions which
are the following:
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether
petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Aquino Arroyo
Acting President.
Government was a result of a Government was a result of a
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition successful revolution peaceful revolution
precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative
and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune In the Freedom constitution, it was Arroyo took the oath of the 1987
from criminal prosecution. stated that the Aquino government Constitution. She is discharging the
was instilled directly by the people in authority of the president under the
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the defiance of the 1973 Constitution as 1987 constitution.
ground of prejudicial publicity. amended.

DECISION: It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a

I No. The case is legal not political.
II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting
president, he is not entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution
successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that
government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. But this would
not apply as the Court finds substantial difference between the 2 EDSA
Revolutions. It would show that there are differences between the 2
governments set up by EDSA I and II. This was further explained by the
Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.

IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the EDSA I EDSA II
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Extra-constitutional. Hence, Xxx IN Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath
RATIO/REASON: DEFIANCE OF THE 1973 of the respondent as President
CONSTITUTION, AS AMENDED includes the protection and
1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political question cannot be subject of judicial review upholding of the 1987
Constitution.resignation of the
President makes it subject to judicial
Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria review
Macapagal Arroyo became a President through the People power revolution.
Her legitimacy as president was also accepted by other nations. Thus, they exercise of the people power of exercise of people power of
conclude that the following shall serve as political thicket which the Court revolution which overthrew the whole freedom of speech and freedom of
cannot enter. government assembly to petition the
government for redress of
The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by our Court grievances which only affected the
as those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the office of the President
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the Political question Legal Question
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure. In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.

Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be

treated similarly with the Aquino administration. Respondents propose that
the situation of the Arroyo and Aquino administrations are similar. However, 1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President

4
Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. There is no required form of
resignation. It can be expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true that
respondent never wrote a letter of resignation before he left Malacanang on
June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court would use the totality test or
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The Court
knows the amount of stress that the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink
of an eye, he lost the support of the legislative when then Manny Villar and
other Representatives had defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo
Reyes had already gone to EDSA. PNP Chief Director General Panfilo
Lacson and other cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking into
the Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the petitioner had suggested a
snap election at May on which he would not be a candidate. Proposing a
snap election in which he is not a candidate means that he had intent to
resign. When the proposal for a dignified exit or resignation was proposed,
petitioner did not disagree but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner
had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind
was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in
the palace. It was a matter of time.
The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer of power.
It was already implied that petitioner would resign. The negotiations
concentrated on the following: (1) the transition period of five days after the
petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and
his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate
the name of the petitioner. Also taken from the Angara diaries, The President
says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very
tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I
will go. The quoted statement of the petitioner was a clear evidence that he
has resigned.
The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating of the
clauses which were proposed by both sides. The second round of
negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will
be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation
of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled
points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period.
When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready
to be faxed by Angara, the negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes,
called to Angara saying that the SC would allow respondent to have her oath
taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik
from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1)
he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to
serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the
office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence.
This is evidenced by a letter which reads as follows:
Sir
5
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the
week long crisis. It would be very easy for him to say before he left
Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to govern, thus, he is leaving
Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter
cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was
prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his
resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later
act. If, however, it was prepared afterthe press release, still, it commands
scant legal significance.
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is RA 3019
which states:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against
him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery.
During the amendments, another section was inserted which states that:
During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as
section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign
or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar
to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his
incumbency.
The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2 nd paragraph of section
15. Nonetheless, another similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became
section 13. There is another reason why petitioners contention should be
rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned
on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman
were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-
00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman
refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for
the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the
Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases
whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative
investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
resigning. The Court holds otherwise. The impeachment proceeding may be
arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding is administrative, it
cannot be considered pending because the process had already broke down.
There was also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the
impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was postponed indefinitely. In
fact, there was no impeachment case pending when he resigned.
1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as
President
This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to then
Speaker Fuentebella and then Senate President Pimentel. Petitioners
contention is that he is a president on leave and that the respondent is an
acting president. This contention is the centerpiece of petitioners
stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an
Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that
no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
6
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in
session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without
need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration,
or, if not in session within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left
Malacanang, it is very clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is
not temporary. The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to
review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. The Court says that they
cannot, for such is an example of a political question, in which the matter has
solely been left to the legislative,
1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes,
what is the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him
before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not
been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second,
he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. The
immunity the petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.
The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed
in the performance of his official duties. He is liable when he acts in a case
so plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have
exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to
act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for
damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is
without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is,
the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In
other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his
authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of
his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that
position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority
to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its
determination.
The Court rejects the petitioners argument that before he could be
prosecuted, he should be first convicted of impeachment proceedings. The
impeachment proceeding was already aborted because of the walking out of
the prosecutors. This was then formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution
#83) which declared the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates
in the Constitutional Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, proper civil and
criminal cases may be filed against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner
as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada
are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that
immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity from civil damages only
covers official acts.
1. V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from
conducting an investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already
developed a bias against the petitioner. He submits that it is a violation of
due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of
thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus,
English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an
accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect
of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. During cases
like such, the test of actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The
Court rules that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent
7
Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of
the Ombudsman. The petitioner alleges that there were news reports which
said that the Ombudsman had already prejudged the cases against him. The
Court rules that the evidence presented is insufficient. The Court also
cannot adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves
to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the finding
of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of
assailing it before the proper court.
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers are
the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be
increased or reduced by legislative enactment.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the
same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his
continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of
his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his
criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative
investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as
pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been
placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Ombudsman v. CA
Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials
and employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the
Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the
Certiorari and prohibition
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then
Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica,
Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona;
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept.
2. Mulcting money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden
1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the petitioner,
Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the
simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form
P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal
and substance on grounds that she was denied due process and that the
Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-
said resolutions violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment
0316, were dismissed.
proceedings for impeachable officers. Court dismissed the petition.
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before
Facts:
this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first
of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for
session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and
certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules,
spouses Pestao (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against
ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2,
Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution?
Arlene Bag-ao
27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House
RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions
Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules
of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not
to include it in the Order of Business
an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the
3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John
commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry
opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of
Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein
them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2,
petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casio, Mariano,
Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the
8
Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus
HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the
complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the
Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business
11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the
House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both
complaints sufficient in form
2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of
the 15th Congress was published
After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the
two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance
Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging
Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process
and that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment
proceedings
Issue/s:
1 Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
2 Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of
Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process
to the Petitioner
3 Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the
Constitution
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1 1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION
Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the
judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable standards
for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review
1 2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of
promulgation the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?
(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the
impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJs,
Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan
Presumption of regularity
The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express
grant of rule-making power in the HOR
the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional
requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or
resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of
facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee
The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of
promulgating the Rules.
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
politic, and not for the punishment of the offender
1 3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE
(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on
July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July
22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred
to public respondent.
INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice)
IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate
Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the one-year bar is
two-fold: 1)to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the
legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that
once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer
rekindle the candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp., 575 SCRA 23 (2008)
FACTS:
9

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at
55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum
tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to effectivity of RA
7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More
(all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was
passed, these cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent
has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad
faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who
dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise
even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
4 Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the
functions of his/her office
5 Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38,
Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads
is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is
by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done
in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may
arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a
superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability
may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by
willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be
validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional
right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it
being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative
Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act
by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has
been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by
the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which
the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason
sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the
alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act
was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that
defendant acted without evil intent.
10

Facts
Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subject to ad
valorem [accdg to value] tax [20-45%]. Two days prior (1 Jul '93) to RA
7654's effectivity, VC [Comm., BIR] issued the RMC reclassifying the brands
as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to 55% AV
tax (brands were subjected to RA 7654, Sec. 142 (c)(1) before it took effect).
On 2 Jul, BIR Deputy Comm sent a copy of RMC to Fortune via fax. It was
only on 15 Jul when Fortune received a certified photocopy of the RMC.
Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC's recall but it was
denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV tax deficiency (9M~) was
demanded within 10 days. Fortune filed a petition for review with the
CTaxApp (CTA) which issued an injunction enjoining RMC's implementation
(defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the CA, and SC
in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of the requirements for a valid
admin issuance.
Fortune filed a complaint for damages against VC in her private
capacity in the RTC, saying that she should be held liable for damages under
NCC 32 (RMC issuance violated right against property deprivation without
due process + equal protection of the laws). VC filed a motion to dismiss
since she issued RMC in the performance of her fxn, within authority, and
said that being an agent of RP, the latter is the one responsible for her acts,
and that the complaint did have a cause of axn because there was no
allegation of malice/bad faith.
RTC denied VC's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed the case as well,
saying that under NCC 32, liability may arise even if defendant did not act
with malice/bad faith. CA also said that Admin Code is the general law on
puboff's civil liab while NCC 32 is the special law governing this case, and
that malice/bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. VC
filed this complaint, saying that what shld be applied is the Admin Code [liab
attaches only when there is a clear showing of bad faith / malice / gross
negligence] and said that Admin Code is the special law, and that NCC is the
general law.
Issues and Holding
6 WON a puboff be sued in his private capacity for acts done in connection
with the discharge of ofc fxns. YES, when [#3]
GEN RULE: PubOff not liab for damages which another suffers
from just performance of official duties, within scope of
tasks + RP not amenable to judgment for monetary claims
without its consent
HOWEVER, puboff not immune from damages in personal
capacity for acts done in bad faith (not protected by
mantle of immunity) [See cited Admin Code
provision + Sec 39 of the same]
Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA - puboff who in/directly violates
another's consti rights may be sued for damages
under NCC 32 even though there is no malice /
bad faith
SO: puboff may be sued [...]
when there is malice, bad faith, negligence
when he violated a consti right of plaintiff
7 NCC 32 or Admin Code Sec. 38, Book I? NCC 32
LegMeth knowledge - gen, special law shld be harmonized if
possible; special law prevails; the circ that special law is
passed before or after gen law does not change principle
Discussion of Code Comm (Dean Bocobo)
There was a proposal re NCC 32 that puboff be held liable
for consti right violation only if there is malice / bad
faith but he said that Code Comm opposes this
Nature of NCC 32 - wrong may be civil or criminal
To make such a requisite would defeat main
purpose (effective protection of individual
rights)
Object is to put an end to abuse by plea of good
faith; in US the remedy is in the nature of
tort
NCC 32 patterned after Am law tort - WRONG, TORTIOUS ACT
DEFINED AS THE COMMISSION/OMISSION OF ACT BY
ONE, WITHOUT RIGHT, WHEREBY ANOTHER RECEIVES
SOME INJURY IN PERSON, PROPERTY, OR
REPUTATION
Liab in tort not precluded by the fact that defendant acted
without evil intent
Aberca v. Ver - With NCC 32, principle of puboff acctability under
Consti acquires added meaning, assumes larger dimension
Admin Code - bad faith, malice, negligence vital elements to make
puboff liable for damages; subject is general ("acts" done in
performance of duties, without specifying action/omission
that may give rise to civil suit)
IN CONTRAST TO NCC 32 which specifies clearly the
acts that may give rise to axn for damages (tort for
impairment of rights, liberties)
8 WON VC may be held liable for damages. YES (no explicit / direct answer
on this though)
11
Complaint brought under NCC 32 which does not require bad faith and never the Social Secretary of
malice, so the failure to allege it will not amount to failure to state cause of Imelda Marcos, but only an employee in the office of the Social Secretary;
action that the properties acquired
while Luz Bakunawa was employed in the Government were purchased with
honestly earned money and
their acquisition was well within their legitimate income; that their family
owned and controlled five closed
family corporations, namely: (1) Hi-Tri Development Corporation; (2) 7-R
Republic v. Bakunawa, et. al., G.R. No. 180418. August 28, 2013
Development Corporation; (3) 7-
R Heavy Equipment, Inc.; (4) 7-R Sales Company, Inc.; and (5) 7-R Ranch,
Inc.; that their public works
FACTS: contracts were awarded to them in accordance with law; that their acquisition
of the heads of cattle were
Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, legal; and that they did not commit any breach of trust while in public office,
restitution and damages and did not possess illegally
brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel acquired funds that rendered them liable under constructive trust in favor of
Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel the Republic.
Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for having The
allegedly acquired and Sandiganbayan
accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other property "in rendered its decision in favor of respondents for failure to prove the essential
unlawful concert with one allegations in the complaint.
another" and "in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as The Republic sought the
public officers, with grave reconsideration
abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the decision, arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred in
of the Republic of the holding that it did not show the Bakunawas link with the Marcoses, and in
Philippines, thus resulting in their unjust enrichment." ruling that it did not prove that
The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz the Bakunawas had abused their connections or close association with the
Bakunawa) had served as Imelda Marcoses, which was denied.
Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was d ISSUE/S:
uring that period of her W/N petitioner was able to establish that the Bakunawas acquired and
incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel accumulated ill-gotten wealth
Bakunawa had acquired assets,
funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her HELD:
salaries and their other lawful NO
income; and that Luz Bakunawa, "by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Preponderance of evidence is required in actions brought to recover ill-gotten
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, wealth
influence and connection with the The Republic correctly submits that only a preponderance of evidence was
latter Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order needed to prove its demand
to prevent disclosure and for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth. That is quite clear from
recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and Section 1 of E.O. No. 14-A,
stratagems. which provides:

In their amended answer, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa was
12

Section 1. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic
Act No. 1379 or for restitution,
reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other
damages or any other civil actions under the
Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close
and/or business associates, dummies, agents
and nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and
may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to
that of the other side. Essentially, preponderance of evidence refers to the
comparative weight of the
evidence presented by the opposing parties. As such, it has been defined as
"the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side," and is usually considered to
be synonymous with the
term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible
evidence. It is proof that is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.
Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find
for and to dismiss the case
against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is
nothing in the evidence that tilts
the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of proof
has failed to establish its
case, and the parties are no better off than before they proceeded upon their
litigation. In that situation,
the court should leave the parties as they are. Moreover, although the
evidence of the plaintiff may be
stronger than that of the defendant, there is no prepond
erance of evidence on the plaintiffs side if its
evidence alone is insufficient to establish its cause of action.
The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten
nature of the
Bakunawas wealth
Paragraph (4) of E.O. No. 2 further required that the wealth, to be ill-gotten,
must be "acquired by them
through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the conversion of funds
belonging to the Government
of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks
or financial institutions, or
by taking undue advantage of their official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to the grave damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines." Therefore, ill-gotten wealth would not
include all the properties of
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates but
only the part that originated
from the "vast resources of the government."
In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc., this Court described "ill-gotten
wealth" as follows:
"Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal
use of or the conversion of funds
belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or
by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence, resulting in unjust
enrichment of the ostensible owner and grave damage and prejudice to the
State. And this, too, is the sense in which
the term is commonly understood in other jurisdiction."
All these judicial pronouncements demand two concurring elements to be
present before assets or
properties were considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have
"originated from the
government itself," and (b) they must have been taken by former President
Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, and close associates by illegal means.
It is well to point out, consequently, that the distinction laid down by E.O. No.
1 and its related issuances,
and expounded by relevant judicial pronouncements unavoidably required
13
competent evidentiary close associate within the
substantiation made in appropriate judicial proceedings to determine: (a) context of E.O. No.1. According to Republic v. Migrio, the term subordinate
whether the assets or properties involved had come from the vast resources as used in E.O. No. 1 and
of government, and (b) whether the individuals owning or E.O. No. 2 referred to a person who enjoyed a close association with
holding such assets or properties were close associates of President Marcos. President Marcos and/or his wife
The requirement of similar to that of an immediate family member, relative, and close associate,
competent evidentiary substantiation made in appropriate judicial or to that of a close relative,
proceedings was imposed because the business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee. Indeed, a prima facie
factual premises for the reconveyance of the assets or properties in favor of showing must be made to show
the government due to their that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or
being ill-gotten wealth could not be simply assumed. relation with President Marcos
Governments Right and Duty to Recover All Ill and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served during the
-gotten Wealth administration of President Marcos
The factual premises of the Executive Orders cannot simply be assumed. as a government official or employee.
They will have to be duly The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was
established by adequate proof in each case, in a proper judicial proceeding, able to establish, at best, that
so that the recovery of the ill- Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacaang Palace during the
gotten wealth may be validly and properly adjudged and consummated; Marcos administration, and did
although there are some who not establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having
maintain that the fact abused her position or
employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case. Consequently,
that an immense fortune, and "vast resources of the government have been Luz Bakunawa could not be
amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, considered a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the
relatives, and close associates context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O.
both here and abroad," and they have resorted to all sorts of clever schemes No. 2.
and manipulations to It is true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued.
disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions But the pursuit should not be
mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that
is within the realm of judicial notice, being of so extensive there be sufficient competent
notoriety as to dispense with proof thereof. Be this as it may, the requirement evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or persons
of evidentiary substantiation charged with the illegal
has been expressly acknowledged, and the procedure to be followed acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or subordinate of the
explicitly laid down, in Executive Marcoses who took
Order No. 14. advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich themselves. In that effort,
Accordingly, the Republic should furnish to the Sandiganbayan in proper the Republic carries the
judicial proceedings the heavy burden of proof, and must discharge such burden fully; otherwise, the
competent evidence proving who were the close associates of President effort would fail and fall.
Marcos who had amassed
assets and properties that would be rightly considered as ill-gotten wealth.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing pronouncement, evidentiary
substantiation of the allegations of
how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
purpose, the mere holding of
196232, January 28, 2014
a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a
14

Gonzales III v Office of the President
FACTS:
There are two petitions that have been consolidated because they
raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise
of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the
protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office
to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
1st case -> G.R. No. 19623: Petition for Certiorari which assails on
jurisdictional grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered
by the Office of the dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III,
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices, upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of
Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the
President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
2nd case -> G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated
Order requiring petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written
explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting
serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement
entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7,
2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office of
the President the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition
likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No.
6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Cause of 1st case: Hostage Drama involving Rolando Mendoza and
Hong Kong nationals in a tourist bus. Rolando Mendoza demanded
his reinstatement. Sometime in 2008, a formal charge for Grave
Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical
injuries) was filed against him and other police officers.
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission
turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all
relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative
adjudication
The administrative case against Mendoza was dismissed upon a
finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not
been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment
of respondents of the offenses charged.
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III,
a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police
officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration followed by a Supplement to
the Motion for Reconsideration. The pleadings mentioned and the
records of the case were assigned for review and recommendation
to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who
released a draft Order for appropriate action by his immediate
superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and
forwarded said Order to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27,
2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6,
2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the case records,
for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose
office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp.
Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in
the police service.
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC): found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more
than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration
in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking
Case was elevated to OP. OP instituted a Formal Charge against
petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in
the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other
pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for
Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
OP Dismissed Gonzales from his office.
2nd case: the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife
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 Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and
Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and
Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office
of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in
the law.
Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the
power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled
within three months after they occur.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for
in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 of the same
Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the
removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for
that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a
gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or
existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes
Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.
The Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the
power to remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law
expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is
expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In
some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from
the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme
Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress
(Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by
the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its
personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and
Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B),
the Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission
on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the
President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article
XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the
President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority
that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint
the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the
power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not
resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is
tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested
with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
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constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution
secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians." 52 And so it was that
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared the creation of the
independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and
his Deputies, who are described as "protectors of the people" and
constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government Section 12,
Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of
seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in
salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict qualifications for
the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the
exercise of constitutional functions Section 12 and 13. The cloak of
independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's
institutional strength to effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of
government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It
certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled
acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the
Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the
executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of
such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the
removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided
for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of
due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section
2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No.
6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the
same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment,
namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be
rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or
compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of
the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their
duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
Marcos, Jr. et. al., v. Republic, G.R. No. 189434 & G.R. No. 189505,
March 12, 2014
Marcos, Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines (2014)
Petitioners: Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.
Respondents: Republic of the Philippines
Topic: Privileges and salary of the President
SUMMARY: Proceedings for forfeiture of properties in a single suit may
proceed separately for each property, and the Sandiganbayan need not
acquire territorial jurisdiction over the proceeds of a foreign-registered
dummy registered to contravene anti-graft laws to enforce its decisions.
FACTS:
On 25 April 2012, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision affirming
the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the
assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-
graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by
the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to
their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were
unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth,
pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379. Petitioners
seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition, raising the issues
below.
ISSUE/S:
WoN the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment because a) the Republic had earlier stated that
it will file a separate forfeiture action regarding the assets of Arelma
and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated
o NO. This issue has already been raised and exhaustively
discussed in our 25 April 2012 Decision. In fact, the
discussion on the first issue is merely a restatement of
petitioners original assertions that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction to render summary judgment over the assets
of Arelma.
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 o The said Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a o NO. The execution of a Courts judgment is merely a
corporate entity by the name Arelma, Inc., which ministerial phase of adjudication. The authority of the
maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as
York, and which was purportedly organized for the purpose ill-gotten cannot be conflated with petitioners concerns as to
of hiding ill-gotten wealth. how the ruling may be effectively enforced.
o Respondent Republics success in obtaining summary o R.A. 1379 is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed
judgment over the Swiss accounts (see immediately under this law are actions in personam, not in rem.
preceding case Republic vs. Sandiganbayan) does not mean o In any case, the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the
its preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact that
different subject matter covered by the same petition for the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule
forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No. 0141 pertains to the otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and
recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1) indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public
holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other assets abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and their
investments; (2) landholdings, buildings, condominium units, recovery by the State.
mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills amounting to
Php 27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, NOTES:
foreign currencies and jewelry seized by the United States None.
customs authorities in Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million
in the custody of the Central Bank in dollar-denominated
Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real
estate in the United States, among others. The ruling of the
Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a separate
judgment, and allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5
of Rule 36.
o Petitioners further insist that Civil Case No. 0141 does not
involve the Arelma account because the respondent
unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate forfeiture
petition concerning it. However, petitioners failed to prove
that such a reservation was made, and never even
substantiated how such reservation could operate to deprive
the State of its right to file for separate judgment. There is
nothing in Republic Act 1379 or in the Rules which prohibits
the graft court from taking cognizance of the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment only because of statements
allegedly made by one party.
WoN the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over
the Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced

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