09/10/2017.

Dr S Connell: Hist of Phil: Lecture notes on Plato: Problems with a Theory of Forms

From the last lecture:

Platos Theaetetus: although ends with no answer, is committed to the possibility of

knowledge and that this requires a grounding in objective reality (and not Heraclitean flux).
Platos later dialogues might lead us to wonder how committed he was to his middle period
doctrines. Where is the theory of Forms? (TOF)
Later dialogues more concerned with how to do philosophy; presenting us with puzzles

Plan of Lecture 3 on the first part of Platos Parmenides (126a-134e).

(1) Introduction to themes, content, characters

(2) Review of Platos middle period TOF
(3) Parmenides criticisms of the Forms
(4) Conclusion: what can this tell us about Platos views?

(1) Introduction

Themes: critique of TOF. Why would Plato write a critique of his own theory? Interpretative
strategies:

a. ignore the dialogue as perverse

b. find solutions of the difficulties presented to preserve the TOF; conclude that Plato himself
saw ways to clarify and strengthen TOF.
c. Decide that Plato did not adhere to any TOF, that he either had another way to ground
knowledge (e.g. second part of Parm.) or he was sceptical about it.

Content:

a. Prologue (126a-130b): Zeno is reading his book which supports Parmenides. Socrates is very
young. Zeno and Socrates discuss the TOF.
b. Challenges to the TOF lead by Parmenides (130b-134e).
c. Introduction to and exposition of the deductions (135a-166c). Important to NeoPlatonists.

Characters:

a. Parmenides of Elea: In The Way of Truth (which is contrasted with the Way of Seeming or
Opinion) there are strict rules about what you can know.
You cannot know what is not you cannot think or speak of what is not only of what is.
Being (the only object of knowledge) is unitary, never changing, always the same as itself.
b. Zeno of Elea: Supported Parmenides by showing the absurdities the follow (RAA) if you
presuppose a plurality paradoxes of motion, time and division.

The truth is that the book comes to the defence of Parmenides argument against those who try to
make fun of it by claiming that, if it is one, many absurdities and self contradictions result from that
argument. Accordingly, my book speaks against those who assert the many and pays them back in
kind with something for good measure, since it aims to make clear that their hypothesis, if it is many,
would, if someone examined the matter thoroughly, suffer consequences even more absurd than
those suffered by the hypothesis of its being one. (128c-d)

c. Young Socrates: inexperienced. An artificial setting due to importance of these 2 Eleatics.

1
E. Anscombes [From Parmenides to Wittgenstein 1981] all philosophy is footnotes to Parmenides.

(2) Review of Platos middle period TOF: Forms are similar to the Parmenidean One - always
the same as themselves, never changing, unitary, hold their predicates absolutely, eternal,
perfect objects of knowledge. Metaphysical pluralism: Forms of beauty, goodness, justice,
chair (?), unity, equality etc. On the other hand: Forms the One; particulars the many.

Without TOFs all thought and language would be impossible

Parm. 135 b5-c2: If someone, having an eye on all the difficulties we have just brought up
and others of the same sort, wont allow that there are forms for things and wont mark off
a form for each one, he wont have anywhere to turn his thought, since he doesnt allow
that for each thing there is a character that is always the same. In this way he will destroy
the power of dialectic/conversation (dialegesthai) entirely.

Zenos initial questions elicit TOF. Forms are posited to solve the problem of co-presence of
opposites in particulars how a thing can both be X and not X simultaneously

There is a form, itself by itself, of Likeness and one of Unlikeness. Particular entities, which
we call many, share in these forms; and because of this participation or sharing, we call
them like or unlike. Whats astonishing about that? Socrates asks (129a).

TOFs in other Platonic dialogues:

Meno Socrates constant what is X questions lead to positing that the grounds for claims of
knowledge are to be located in the unchanging knowledge located in our souls.
Meno 86b1-3: Then if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be
immortal so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do
not know at present that is, what you do not recollect

Phaedo The Equal itself is different from equal things (74c).

The Form is absolutely F; particulars strive to reach F (75b)
The Forms are unvarying, remain the same as themselves; particulars never in any way
remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other (78d-e)
The Forms are grasped by the mind; the particulars by the senses (79a)
[The particular] is F because it shares/partakes (metechein) in the Form F (100c); A particular
is F by sharing the form F; not-F by sharing in Form of not-F. A particular has F in it (102d).
The Form itself has the character which it imparts to particulars (102e).
The Form F causes particulars to be F (100c)

Symposium 210e-211a-c: The Form of Beauty is beautiful, eternal, uniform, not relative to anything
else, no dependent on anything, unaffected by particulars.
It is unique (monoeides) (211e)
Particular beautiful things partake in (metechein) the Form (of Beauty) (211b).

Republic V-VII, X:
Forms are unqualifiedly F; particulars can be both F and not-F (479-80; 523a-24d)
Forms are objects of knowledge/mind; particulars are objects of belief/senses (480)
Form of bed/table singular. There are many beds and tables in world (596b; 597a).
God makes the Form of bed. It is unique (597c).
The Form is one/singular (597b)

2
Timaeus: Forms are paradigmata (models); particulars are like forms i.e. likenesses (eikn).

Recurrent themes:

(a) Forms are objects of knowledge (Pheado 79a, Rep. 480f.)

(b) Forms bear their predicates absolutely: the Large cannot endure itself to be small (Ph.
102e5). The Rep. and Sym.: the form of Beauty is supremely beautiful, never ugly. (Rep. 479-
80; 523a-24d).
(c) Forms are unvarying, same a self (Sym. 210e, Phaedo 78d-e).
(d) Forms are unique, singular (Sym. 211e, Rep. 596b, 597b-c).
(e) Forms are separate (Ph. 74c).
(f) Particulars are both F and not-F simultaneously: Rep. 479b8: each of them will always
partake of both. Particulars are never the same as themselves (Ph. 78d-e).

Rep. V. 478e6-479a9: I want to address a question to our friend who doesnt believe in the
beautiful itself or any form of the beautiful itself that remains always the same in all respects
but who does believe in the many beautiful things the lover of the sights who wouldnt
allow anyone to say that the beautiful itself is one or that the just is one or any of the rest.
My dear fellow well say, of all the many beautiful things, is there one that will not also
appear ugly? Or is there one of those just things that will not also appear unjust? Or one of
those pious things that will not also appear impious?

Phaedo 102b2-4: when you say that Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than
Phaedo, do you not mean that there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? I do.

(g) Particulars that bear same name participate or share in Forms (Pheado 199c, 102d; Sym.
211b).
(h) Forms as paradigmata models (particularly Timaeus and Rep. X).
(i) Forms and particulars are like each other, resemble (Tim, Rep X).

(3) Parmenides Criticisms (130b-134e):

1. Scope of Forms (130b-e).
2. Whole-Part Dilemma (130e-131e).
3. Largeness Regress (132a-e)
4. Forms are Thoughts (132b-c)
5. Likeness Regress (132c-133a)
6. Separation Argument (133a-134e).

1. Scope of forms? This points out how variously Socrates/Plato has evoked the Forms to
solve different kinds of problems, and so representing different ideas.

Group 1: likeness, oneness, plurality

Group 2: Justice, Beauty, Goodness
Group 3: Human being, fire, water
Group 4: Hair, mud, dirt

Different motivations for positing Forms include:

i. To avoid contradiction in co-presence of opposites (groups 1 and 2)

ii. To represent models of created objects (groups 3 and 4)
iii. As a universal: one over many (applicable to all groups).

3
Is there a form itself of human being, or fire, or water? Parmenides, Ive often found myself in
doubt whether I should talk about those in the same way as the others or differently

Socrates needs to decide what the Forms are for

Rejection of Group four:

These things [hair, mud] are in fact just what we see. Surely its too outlandish to think there is a
form for them. Not that the thought that the same thing might hold in all cases hasnt troubled me
from time to time. Then, when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into
some pit of nonsense and come to harm; but when I arrive back in the vicinity of the things we
agreed a moment ago have forms, I linger there (130d).

Why couldnt there be Forms of hair and mud?

Hair could be defined in terms of protection (e.g. Aristotle PA II.14, 658b5). It seems there
could be a Form of hair.
Mud? Perhaps the problem is with the Form having the quality muddy?
He rejects these because: he is young and philosophy has not gripped him yet (130e).

Not a knock down criticism a call to decide what to include and what to exclude and give grounds
for this. E.g. The Sophist: Being, Sameness, Difference, Motion and Rest (248-258).

The rest of the challenges (2-6) are about ontological and epistemology relationship between
particulars and Forms

Epistemology: A Form grounds our knowledge: holding its predicate absolutely and never
changing, it stands as the proper object of knowledge (e.g. Ph. 79a, Rep. 480). Particulars we
have views about must have an understandable relationship to Forms.
Ontology: Parmenides challenges are somewhat sophistical in that they do not seem to take
into account any metaphysically nuanced meaning of share but assume it is just like
physical sharing, e.g. sharing around some cake.

(2) The Whole-Part Dilemma (130e-131e).

Relation of particulars to Forms:

i. Particulars sharing in Forms (two terms in the Parmenides: metechein: to partake;

metalambanein to get a share).

Nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of (parousia), or the sharing in (kiononia),
or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on
the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful
(Phaedo 100d-e).

ii. Forms are the cause/reason/explanation of why particulars (have the quality they do;
Ph. 100c).

Looking at (i) do particulars share in (a) a part or (b) the whole of the Form?

(a) A part: then form is divided, not unitary examples: like places share a day; like
items shaded by same sail share that shade (131b).
Day comparison is problematic since it is unlike a Form; Tuesday has no causal relation to
London or Cambridge.
Sail comparison: causally connected but too physical. Forms are immaterial, non-spatial.

4
Implications for sharing relations with respect to Forms of Largeness and Smallness;

The Large will be small, because its parts which exist in the particulars will be smaller than it.
The Small will be large because the whole of smallness will be larger than its parts.
(humorous?)

Well suppose one of us is going to have a part of the Small. The Small will be larger than part of
it, since the part is a part of it: so the Small itself will be larger. And that to which the part
subtracted is added will be smaller, not larger, than it was before (132d-e)

This violates two traits of Forms: self predication and absence of opposing qualities. Could hold
opposing predicates in an abstract and innocuous manner (see Sophist).

(a) The whole: Form will be in many places at same time and will be separate from
itself (Parm. 131b2). It will be a plurality rather than unity.

Defence: this challenge is too narrow an understanding of how sharing in and participation work.
It makes the Forms material and spatial. The whole Form could be in a particular without it being
there physically.

How does participation work? Socrates exclaims: it is not easy to determine (131e5).

(3) The Largeness Regress (or Third Man Argument)

I suppose you think each Form is one on the following ground: whenever some number of
things seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one character, the same as
you look at them all, and from that you conclude that the Large is one (Parm. 132a)

The Form and the particulars share in the common character, so there will have to be another Form
over and above the first Form to cover what it shares with particulars.

What about the Large itself and the other large things? If you look at them all in the same
way with the minds eye, again wont some one thing appear large, by which all these
appear large?...So another Form of largeness will makes its appearance, which has emerged
alongside largeness itself and the things that partake of it, and in turn another over all these,
by which all of them will be large. Each of your Forms will no longer be one but unlimited in
multitude (Parm. 132a-b)

Largeness (3)

Largeness (2)

Largeness (1)

An Elephant The Sun Trumps ego (and all the other large things in the world)

A challenge to the UNITY (or uniqueness, singularity) of each Form an unlimited in multitude

Aristotle calls this the third man argument (TMA) (Metaphysics 990b17) if the form of man
stands over all men, then a third man must stand over the first form and the other particular men

5
The traditional strategy to deal with TMA: undercover suppressed premises of TOF which clash to
produce the TMA; revise or get rid of one of them. Suppressed premises:

1. One Over Many (OOM): Forms are a universal or common character which all things called
by a common name share (e.g. Rep. 596a6-7).
2. Uniqueness (U): for any property F, there is exactly one Form of Fness (e.g. Sym. 221e, Rep.
597c1-d3).
3. Self Predication (SP): The Form has the character which it imparts to particulars.
4. Non Identity (NI): If something has the character F then it is not Identical with the Form of F.

Best strategy is to understand better 1-4, to qualify these.

1. OOM: If a number of particular entities are all called by one name then there must be a Form
corresponding to that name all beautiful objects the Form Beauty. This allows us to understand
this quality as firm and separated intellectually. But it only applies to particulars.

It was agreed that each of the Forms existed, and that other things acquired their name by having a
share in them (Phaedo 102b-c).

Aristotle on Plato: He called them Ideas and held that all sensible things are named after them
and in virtue of their relation to them; for the plurality of things which bear the same name as the
Forms exist by participation in them (Metaph. 987b7-11).

3. SP: predicating is modern terminology The Form bears the epithet that it bestows on other
things but it does not do so in the same manner. It is only particulars that need a Form.

If there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason
than that it shares in that Beautiful (Ph. 100c).

The Beautiful is not beautiful for the same reason that particulars are by sharing in a Form
(E.g. Forms could bear their predicates as identity statements (X is X) rather than attributive
ones (A is X), Meinwald 1992).
Dissimiliarity of particulars and Forms important to TOF, e.g. Phaedo reminders:

Whenever [lovers] see a lyre, a garment or anything else that their beloved is accustomed to use,
they know the lyre, and the image of the boy to whom it belongs comes to their mindcan a man
seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre recollect a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect
Cebes? Or seeing a picture of Simmias, recollect Simmias himself?...recollection is occasioned by
things that are similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar (Ph. 73d-74a).

The reminders bear some relation to what we are reminded of but this neednt be because
they have the same character or at least not in a way that would require another Form to tie
them together.

4. NI. If something has its character by participating in a Form then it is not that Form so will need
another Form but Form has its character without participating in a Form so avoids this problem.

The criticism misunderstands the metaphysics of the Forms conceptualising them as like
particulars it is a call to work at thinking about how different transcendent reality is.

Socrates attempt to remove himself from this difficult (he is bright but very inexperienced/young):

(1) Forms are Thoughts: they exist in our minds or souls (132b)
(2) Forms are patterns in nature (134d1-2)

6
(1) Thoughts do not have predicates in the same way as material objects and so TMA avoided. But
this proposal is wrongheaded, ridding the theory of its metaphysically appealing aspects taking
away ontological status of Forms. Thoughts in someones mind cannot explain the objective
qualities of things.

Parmenides objections show that he is still treating Forms as if they would have to be shared
themselves out physically: (Socrates has not managed to object to this).

Given your claim that other things partake of forms, wont you necessarily think either that
each thing is composed of thoughts and all things think, or that, although they are thoughts,
they are unthinking (132c)

(2) This suggestion is more promising both in terms of epistemology (explaining why particulars are
like Forms) and ontology (explaining why Forms are not like particulars and why particulars are
causally dependent on Forms).

The craftsperson has in mind a form which then she crafts the object to be like (e.g Rep. X).
Particulars resemble because they are likenesses (not because they share the same common
character which leads to The 1st Regress). (132d)
There also is a clear distinction between Forms and particulars forms are models;
particulars are not models.
There is a non-transitive relation of resemblance copies/particulars resemble or are
likenesses of models/Forms but models/Forms do not resemble and are not likenesses of
copies/particulars. The queen is not a likeness of her portrait on my coin.
Ontological dependence of particulars on Forms goes only one way.

But this solution supposedly leads to a second regress:

5. Likeness Regress (132c-133a).

There must be a form of Likeness/Sameness and it is what will make a Form like its particulars so
for every Form there is going to be a second Form of Likeness and then another and so on.

Therefore nothing can be like the Form, nor can the Form be like anything else. Otherwise
alongside the Form another Form will always make its appearance, and if that Form is like
anything, yet another; and if the Form proves to be like what partakes of it, a fresh Form will
never cease emerging (Parm. 132e5-133a3).

Likeness (3) [and so on.]

Likeness (2)

Largeness (1)

The London Eye Saturn A megabyte (+all the other large things in the world)

This can be avoided also by understanding in what sense particulars are like Forms (and the
non-reciprocality of that).

7
 However, it does highlight difficulties with Forms of comparative terms and very abstract
concepts.
Forms of things like likeness or sameness will need careful handled as Plato goes on to do
in his work The Sophist.

(6) Separation Argument (133a-134e): without a viable way to relate Forms and particulars, all
thought and speaking will be impossible.

Two problems cited: we will have no relation to Forms particulars will only be related to
particulars; gods will have no relation to us and will not be able to know particulars, only Forms.

Separation is a question from the outset [Separation (E.g. Ph 75c11-d2; 100b6-7; Rep.
476b10, 480a11): Form is separate itself by itself from particulars].

And do you think that likeness itself is something, separate from the likenesses we have?...Is there
a Form, itself by itself, of just, and beautiful, and good, and everything of that sort?...What about a
form of human being, separate from us and all those like us? (130b-c)

Then you see, Socrates, how great the difficulty is if one marks things off as forms, themselves by
themselves? (133a)

The theory becomes astonishing (thaumaston): Particulars will get back to having
contradicting properties and now the Forms will too.

129d7-130a1: If someone first distinguishes as separate the Forms, themselves by themselves, of the
things I was talking about a moment agoand then shows that in themselves they can mix together
and separate, I for my part, would be utterly amazed (thaumastos), ZenoI would be much more
impressed if someone were able to display this same difficulty, which you and Parmenides went
through in the case of visible things, also similarly entwined in multifarious ways in the Forms
themselves

Problems are not insurmountable. Main difficulties will be with opponents and nonbelievers.

whoever hears about [the Forms] is doubtful and objects that they do not existand in saying this
he seems to have a point; and , as we said, he is extraordinarily hard to win over. Only a very gifted
man can come to know that for each thing there is some kind, a being itself by itself; but only a
prodigy more remarkable still will discover that and be able to teach someone else (Parm. 135a2-
b2)

A Platonist must find a viable way to describe how particulars are related to Forms

(4) Conclusion: what can this tell us about Platos views?

a. Middle dialogues introduce Forms without technical details the Parmenides is part of
Platonic pedagogy.
b. Plato is sceptical, still seeking a way to ground knowledge: a TOF was never completely
figured out by Plato. Positing them leads to deep and difficult problems that stimulate
discussion and dialectic. In part the Forms and their relationship with particulars are posited
to challenge us to say why it is not so easy to posit them; his writing is never exactly
dogmatic. There is always a counterargument and this is what philosophy is about as
exemplified in the character of Socrates. Nobody, including Socrates, ever gets to knowledge
of the Form of the Good which would ground all other knowledge the question is whether
Plato actually thought that anyone ever would.