On the path to a new EUROPE

Speech by Jacques SANTER

Munich 4.11.2017
(Stand up for Europe)

- (THE SPOKEN TEXT SHALL PREVAIL) -

Right now Europe is in many respects a continent on the move and subject to a momentum that is
making many people feel worried and insecure. This is threatening to awaken those old impulses
which in the past led to those events we are remembering this year in a particularly significant way:

- One hundred years ago, on 28 July 1914, the First World War began, the primal catastrophe for
Europe, which changed the continent and world order profoundly, and became the trigger of further
wars and conflicts.

- Also, it was 75 years ago, on 1 September 1939, that the Second World War broke out,
subsequently leaving most of Europe in ruin, with millions of people dead and Jewish life wiped out
across a large part of the continent. Out of this evolved the realisation that only a politically united
and solidary Europe founded on human rights could secure peace between its nations and thus
prevent a repetition of these catastrophes.

- 25 years ago we saw the fall of the iron curtain which divided Europe in the wake of the Second
World War. This allowed the beginning of a re-unification of Europe and also led to the expansion of
the European Union.

For many people, especially the younger generation, peace throughout large parts of Europe
appears to be something that can be taken for granted. But the dramatic events in the recent past
between the Ukraine and Russia and the war in Syria make it clear that peace in Europe cannot be
taken for granted and remains an ongoing task. The importance of European integration as a peace
project is therefore very much still of the moment.

The European Parliament and the European Commission face a series of major challenges and
tasks:

The prolonged economic and financial crisis since 2008 and the ensuing crisis in government debt
makes us aware of the vulnerability and limits of our economic system. Furthermore, member
states have accumulated worryingly high debts which even now curtail the future opportunities of
the younger generation A new policy of moderation is called for. However, this must not lead to a
further widening of the existing gap between the rich and poor in Europe.

Particular attention needs to be paid to tackling the high youth unemployment in Europe. Due to
unemployment, young people are in danger of losing their hopes for the future and their trust in
society and the political system.

Asylum and migration are a persistent challenge for a prosperous European Union committed to
human rights. Responsibility for the life of these people must not lie solely on the shoulders of those
countries in the south and east of Europe which form the external boundary of the European Union.
Europe will need greater solidarity and resolve to prevent further human tragedies such as those
that occurred off the coast of Lampedusa or in southern Italy or Greece.

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People in Europe and worldwide are not the masters of creation but its custodians. Further efforts
are therefore needed to achieve climate goals and establish global responsibility in relation to
climate change. Sustainability needs to be promoted as a fundamental principle of economi c and
development policy as well as in personal lifestyle.

Europe in crisis

Owing to the events of 1989, the European integration process is once again forced to explain its
rationale and demonstrate legitimacy. Since Maastricht the integration process has suffered a
deficit in legitimacy. This deficit in legitimacy is one of the causes of the lack of acceptance of the
EU by its citizens. Acceptance though is necessary if the integration project is not to suffer damage
in the long term." I have taken these propositions from a book whose author already in 2003
without exactly having intended to described the situation that the European Union in fact found
itself only by mid 2005.

I am not revealing any secrets when I say that the European Union ha s been in a crisis since June
2005, i.e. when the French gave a "Non" and the Dutch a "Nee" to the EU Constitutional Treaty. In
the meantime, a lot of ink has flowed in trying to answer the question of exactly what sort of crisis
we are dealing with.

I have a great deal of sympathy for Timothy Garton Ash s interpretive approach. Garton Ash
believes we are dealing with a popularity crisis. This is exactly how I see it too. Europe and here I
mean both the European Union and the policies it makes or simply does not make as regards
common foreign and security policy has over the past years increasingly become an emotive
word or even a word of derision. Or, in the words of the British journalist James Morgan: Europe
stands for everything we cannot stand.

For his part, Tony Blair once stated that the ongoing EU crisis was a crisis of political leadership .
As an 80-year-old man, allow me to say this observation strikes home with me personally, even
though I no longer occupy a political office. So I must indeed pose the question: Where have we
politicians failed? Where have we shown too little leadership or none at all? Why have we failed to
exploit the new dynamism that found its way into European integration policy after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, in such a way that it could catch on with the people of Europe?

Europe was not always so unpopular as it is today. There were times when a large majority of
citizens was in favour of Europe. This was the case in the postwar years for example. At that time
Europe was for many people the embodiment, if not the political slogan, for a new epoch expected
to dawn from then on. And like that time, at the end of the 1940s (and start of the 1950s), one could
also sense a similar enthusiasm for Europe right after the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, this
enthusiasm or euphoria for Europe lasted for only a very short time. Already when negotiating the
Maastricht Treaty (in 1991) it became evident that this initial enthusiasm for Europe had been
merely a flash in the pan. The citizens made it unmistakeably clear to us politicians that: As far as
Europe is concerned we have had enough!

Europes sex appeal which was visible everywhere at the end of 1989 had thus been quickly lost
again. Of course, as Jacques Delors once said, one cannot become too attached to an internal
market. But the European Union in the meantime has indeed many other character traits some of
which, at least so we politicians thought, ought to arouse the support of its citizens. However today,
twenty five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we must unfortunately draw a rather sobering
conclusion. Neither monetary union nor expansion eastward, nor the admittedly still very
rudimentary common foreign and security policy, nor the EU Constitutional Treaty have become
true "mobilising projects", on the contrary. Certainly: These important steps towards integration
have united the Europeans. But unfortunately not in the way that we politicians had imagined,
expected and hoped, because: They have led to the founding of a second European Union, namely
the union of citizens who OPPOSE the European Union!

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For me, the sad thing about this is that Europe has apparently become a victim of its own success.
Its a fact that the euro, which meanwhile serves as the national currency in 19 member states, is
perceived almost exclusively as expensive in the EURO-group countries. With the expansion
eastward instead of a guarantee of lasting stability and peace in Europe it is connotated chiefly
by terms such as: criminality, illegal immigration, delocalisation of companies, etc. The failure of the
common foreign and security policy in the Yugoslavian conflict also did not particularly help
strengthen the EUs role as an important international player. And the debate over the EU
Constitution led to more insult and ignominy over Europe than any other earlier integration project.

The EUs current crisis is therefore also a crisis of legitimacy. And here it is not primarily democratic
legitimacy that is of concern, i.e.: that European policy is allegedly not adequately legitimised
democratically. It is instead about the fundamental legitimation of European integration policy. And
this also then explains why new Europe debates arise, such as the one regarding new gu iding
principles for Europe.

Thus what we are dealing with here is a relatively normal, indeed almost natural, evolution. If the
old guiding principles for legitimating a policy are no longer suitable, the call for new principles
inevitably arises. Yet the call for new guiding principles for Europe is by no means as new as one
might now believe. On the occasion of the 30 th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome,
Prof. Werner Weidenfeld maintained that the motivations of the founding fathers of th e European
Community had in the meantime lost their once cohesive effect and their initial driving force and
former dynamism. Today, Prof. Weidenfeld could publish his text from 1987 again without leaving
out one iota. So again, one ought to agree with what he says.

But agreeing with Werner Weidenfeld would then mean branding all of the motivations of the
founding fathers as obsolete and banishing them as relics from the past. One could do this for one
of these motivations without further ado: for a long time now the European integration policy has not
been a bulwark against Bolshevism. But what about the other motivations of the founding fathers?
Is European integration policy nowadays no longer a peace policy by other means?
Does the argument of a generation-spanning benefit community no longer have a role to play?
Do we no longer need to ensure that Europe once more maintains a position that reflects its
historical and political importance in the international sphere?

Allow me to deal with this straight away: The motivations of the EU s founding fathers, which at that
time formed the actual basis for the guiding principles of European integration policy, have not all
become obsolete. It is true they are no longer as effective and have lost some of their o riginal
driving force. But it would be wrong to discard them and simply replace them with new guiding
principles. On the contrary, I believe they should be reactivated. And by reactivate I mean they
should be adapted to suit the circumstances of the 21 st century. Such adaptation of the old guiding
principles to current times certainly does not rule out the search for new guiding principles though.
Indeed, both tasks could be realised in parallel without further ado!

However, in my view, the reactivation of the old guiding principles and the search for new ones only
makes sense if both tasks are flanked by an absolutely fundamental debate about the interests of
Europe and the European Union. And participants in this debate should include academics as well
as representatives of civil communities and in any case especially young people.

The interests of the European Union

When we talk about the interests of Europe or those of the European Union, we should first draw a
distinction between two categories of interests.

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Firstly: the macro interests, i.e. those interests that other member states or communities of states
also consider to be their own. This means all those questions and challenges which Peter Opitz
plainly and simply referred to as global problems, i.e:
Peace and stability in the international system
Climate change and environmental problems
Sustainable development and
Political approaches for shaping globalisation.
These are problems and challenges that call for global approaches to a solution, which can only be
tackled and solved at an international level in my view within the framework of the much-touted
Global Governance.

Secondly, the micro interests, i.e. the specific European interests, that is the Europeanised
"national" interests of the EU:
Developing Europe into a dynamic economic are that remains competitive (Lisbon strategy)
Adapting the European economic and social model to the new circumstances of an
increasingly globalised world
Re-intensification of transatlantic relationships
The eminently important problem of European demographics must also ultimately be
addressed more intensely. We cannot resolve this by increasing parental allowances in some
EU member states or by offering EU membership to nations happy to promote a high birth rate.

I would now almost be inclined to say there would in fact be enough potential for the creation of a
new guiding principle. But guiding principles, especially political guiding principles, only fulfil their
purpose when people are able to identify with them.

If we now view the interests I have mentioned through the eyes of the EU s founding fathers, we
notice relatively quickly that their motivations to initiate the process of European integration at the
start of the 1950s have not at all become obsolete today.

The Tolstoy question of War and Peace is just as relevant now as it was then. Apropos new wars,
new in that experts foresee they will now be asymmetric rather than symmetric as in the past, the
main motivation of the EUs founding fathers is still reason enough for continuing the process of
European integration unwaveringly. I believe and one can already draw this interim conclusion
the guiding slogan Peace is still a slogan under which further European integration policy c an be
made. So we can retain this guiding principle and simply need to reactivate it. Reasoning: peace is
so much taken for granted by young people that you won t at first be able to get them enthusiastic
about Europe with this argument.

Just like it says in the bible, one needs to have "Faith, Hope and Love" and it then stresses: "But
love is the most important of them all". There is also a clear hierarchy in the motivations of the
founding fathers. The most important though is peace.

Certainly: The European policy of integration has brought Europe the longest period of peace that
this complicated continent has ever known in its history. And it has made military conflicts between
the member states of the European Union an impossibility. Nevertheless we must remain attentive
because: threats still exist such as recent events in the Ukraine.

In actual fact: In the past weeks we have seen pictures containing dramatic scenes. The turmoil in Commented [RK1]: we would suggest changing this to
the Ukraine has not only dominated the headlines and grabbed the attention of people in Europe "past two years"
but also shocked us profoundly. At first the week-long protests and dramatic wrestling for sovereign
power in Kiev and then also in the other parts of the country, followed by the Russian invasion of
Crimea in contravention of international law, then attempts to separate Crimea from Ukraine and
integrate it into the Russian Federation. All of this cannot leave us unmoved for a number of
reasons.

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For one thing, the events in Crimea have plunged Europe into its most difficult foreign policy
situation in a long while. Who would have believed that we would fall back into cold -war logic so
quickly or that in Europe we would once again be faced with the annexation of territories

The radical change in the Ukraine was also an involvement in the European orientation of the
country. This ought to make us reflect on how in the past years we have focussed on ourselves and
on the challenges in the financial and commercial spheres. Of course this sovereign debt crisis was
also a difficult one but the existential questions of the Ukraine are on a totally different scale.

This pro-European involvement in the Ukraine and the willingness to belong to a political Europe
challenge us since we are already members of the European Union. What is the level of our
commitment to Europe? The democratic movement in the Ukraine makes it clear to us once again
that the achievements of our free and democratic Europe cannot be taken for granted but instead
need the continued support of our citizens and peoples.

We must talk at every opportunity about the necessity (which is a European one) of striving for
peace which is our task in Europe and throughout the world. This is also the reason why we are still
respected worldwide. For many people know: after the Second World War the Europeans achieved
something which other parts of the world were unable to achieve. This was not our generation but
that of our fathers and mothers, the war generation who returned from the front lines along with
those released from concentration camps. The eternal post-war motto of Never again war
became their prayer and while this soon faded away, they went on to build a political programme
that bears fruit up until this day.

One of the major dangers that I see is the increasing and more frequently observed fragility of
social peace in Europe. The civil-war-like situations in some member states could certainly be just
the harbingers of conflicts which the European Union will increasingly be confronted with in the
coming years. I agree with all those European politicians such as Jean-Claude Juncker, for
example who never tire at emphasising that Europe needs to be more social. What is meant
though is not Europeanisation of the social system of individual EU member states, rather: great er
consideration of the social components in economic-political EU decisions.

The best social policy though is still a wise economic policy. The EU Constitutional Treaty reflects
this philosophical approach. It was also drafted, among others, as an instrument for political co-
determination of globalisation. It is to be regarded as a type of European vade mecum for the
political shaping of globalisation. Unfortunately, citizens have not perceived the EU Constitutional
Treaty as such. Critics and opponents of the EU Constitutional Treaty have repeatedly complained
that the social components are given too little consideration therein. This interpretation though
definitely falls short and has too little regard for the philosophy or spirit of this treaty. But i f one
starts from the premise that the best social policy needs to begin with a wise economic policy, the
EU Constitutional Treaty is significantly more social than is generally assumed.

With a view to Europes future viability, I think it is in any case irresponsible, if not dangerous, if we
intentionally or unintentionally continue to reinforce people in their belief that social justice
consists merely of state organised redistribution. Socially just is also for example that performance
is again better rewarded. For it is only above-average performances that generate the additional
value that makes a socially just redistribution at all possible. And if the above-average
performances are only rendered outside of Europe, in ten or twenty years the qu estion of
redistribution and hence of social justice for us in Europe will no longer arise.

The current relevance of another motivation of the founding fathers also cannot be denied, namely:
To give Europe a strong voice in the concert of nations. Especially in questions of foreign and
security policy, the European Union will only be able to protect its interests and be respected, if it
speaks with one voice. The chaos surrounding the Iraq war and the Middle East showed us this
very clearly.

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

The fundamental question for me is this:

Why has the 'European idea' lost much of its original spark and dynamism? "Why has the European
concept lost a lot of its force and initial impetus? I believe that over the years the European public
has lost a guiding light, namely the political consensus between our countries on our reasons for
undertaking this joint task and the characteristics with which we wish to endow it. We must first of
all restore this common vision if we wish to have European Union." I did not write these words; they
come from the introduction by Leo Tindemans, then Belgian Prime Minister, to his Report on the
European Union, which he gave to his colleagues on the European Council on 29 December 1975,
over 40 years ago. And yet, don't his conclusions still have relevance today?

The integration of Europe has certainly proven to be the right strategy. Even setbacks and crises do
nothing to change the fact that the European Community has been an anchor of stability both within
and without for over 60 years now, and has been instrumental in maintaining freedom, security,
well-being and social peace. Today, the Community that has evolved into the European Union
through the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties is one of the most politically attractive and
economically successful regions in the world. No member state of this Union is able or willing to
jeopardise this success.

Nevertheless, the fierce debates that raged around the European Constitution and the referendums
that were held in France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have shown that in part the Union is
facing considerable lack of acceptance among the population. There is no doubt that the
uncertainties and concerns highlighted by the above are not due solely to the public's image of the
Community, but the result of a general loss of trust in politics, which can be witnessed in almost all
states of Western Europe. The European Union is tasked with overcoming the rift that has opened
up between it and the people. The present ambivalence among the public to the process of
integration does not make implementation of the submitted reforms any easier, but it does, on
closer examination, make it more urgent. If we do not succeed in winning citizens over to the
European cause, the EU risks erosion from within.

Today, we have to reflect on what kind of Europe we want in future. We should be able to answer
these three questions:

- How much Europe do we want? In other words, how far should integration go?
- Where are the borders of the European Union?
So, how much expansion can we cope with?
- What is Europe doing to secure our future? How do we ensure well-being and social security?

First and in my opinion foremost, these questions sum up the Union's final political and
geographical objectives.

To me, one thing is clear: the future Europe will not be the 'superstate' that the British tabloids
never tire of conjuring up to scare their readers. We are not going to construct Europe using the
United States of America as our drawing board. The national and cultural identities of the individual
members will be preserved. As Jacques Delors once said: the European Union will be a Federation
of Nation States. But is this not a contradiction in terms? Europe will become a n association of
states, and will remain so for a long time. The remaining question then is: how can I organise this
association, and what should it do?

I believe the Draft Constitution answers this question with suitable compromise proposals.

Also, we should not think that Europe has to do everything. Sometimes, less is better. This was the
slogan during my time on the Commission, and in one fell swoop I withdrew 240 proposals from the
table, much to the chagrin of members of the European Parliament.

In addition to our final political objectives, the question about geography Europe's borders is of
vital importance. French historian Jacques Le Goff clearly demonstrated that there can be no

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European identity without geographical boundaries. Here, we have to ask ourselves whether we
were perhaps a little hasty in dealing with the Turkish question, for example, without first drawing up
a strategy for development in other states of our Continent.

One thing seems obvious to me, at any rate: the further we expand Europe's borders, the greater
and more urgent becomes the question regarding a 'core Europe'.

It is strange that thoughts about a core Europe a concept from the so-called Schuble-Lamers
plan of 1994 that provoked great political debate in Europe are currently enjoying a renaissance.
Today, this concept is being rediscovered by all those politicians who have drafted future plans for
further developing the new Europe.

Indeed, since the fall of the Iron Curtain a quarter of a century ago and the resulting surge in
globalisation, the number of members of the EU has risen from the original six to 15 and more
recently to 28 states, primarily in East-Central and Eastern Europe. This has not been good either
for the Union's internal homogeneity or its cohesiveness. The changed membership of the EU and,
to an even greater extent, the new political, ideological and economic global environment in which
Europe finds itself have necessarily changed the course of integrated Europe.

The trigger for this resurgence in the multi-speed Europe debate was the new Treaty provision on
"Increased cooperation". The question it seeks to answer is this: Should the convoy (of currently
28 member states) go at the pace of the slowest in future? Or should those who want to go faster
go ahead and do it? The objective is a strong core Europe, which must naturally be open to every
member that is willing and able to meet its requirements.

We have to answer some vital questions: "What European model do we want for the 21 st century?"
or in other words: "What do we Europeans want to achieve together?"

Economic growth, productivity and employment in Europe are largely unsatisfactory. And they are
being joined by new challenges such as ageing populations and the pressure to adapt due to
advancing globalisation. Here, Europe has failed. It was presumptuous of us in 2000 to broadcast
to all the world that we would make Europe "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge -based
economy in the world" by 2010. This so-called Lisbon Strategy failed miserably; it contributed
greatly to political disenchantment and damaged the credibility of the European institutions. Here,
we need a new approach and a new momentum.

Europe must not simply be a large market or an enhanced free-trade zone. We need a Europe that
is not merely a spectator but takes action, that defends our interests and values, that protects its
citizens by offering them more security both inside and outside its borders.

We want a Europe that exploits all the potential of its vast single market, and shares common
policies. For policies are what bring citizens added value on everything from the economy,
currency and cohesion, on environmental protection, agriculture, trade and competition, on fishing
and traffic; and we now hope for new common policies on energy and climate change. The same
applies to migration policy.

Since we are discussing the internal dimensions of European politics and the internal structural
problems of the EU first of all, do not assume that the external dimensions of the European
integration project are less important. On the contrary! The key issues are balance both inside
Europe and on the global political stage and working, through integration, to make Europe a force
for unity. Quite simply, it is about Europe's standing in the world. In 2001, the world came to a
turning point in its history, which fundamentally transformed the nature of the threats facing us, and
the distribution of power. With the terrorist acts of September 11, Islamic fundamentalists,
supported by transnational networks of Jihadists, became a political challenge to the domestic and
international order.

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How does the EU respond to these new global challenges? How can Europe, as a "force for unity"
(Monnet) act in these new international conditions and actively help to shape international
relationships? And how do the EU's answers affect Europe's place in the world?

This is why we need a political Europe that speaks with one voice, with one Foreign Minister and a
common diplomatic service, responsible for a joint foreign, security and yes defence policy,
such as was envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty 25 years ago.

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So far, Europe has been most attractive when it was efficient. We need strong, democratic and
efficient institutions, which enable joint actions and policies whilst recognising the principle of
subsidiarity.

It was already difficult enough to make joint decisions with 15 member states. With 27/28 members,
how can we achieve unanimity without running the risk of constant paralysis? Europe must retain or
regain its power to act, if it is to have any say in the global arena.

Geopolitical challenges and the Islamic terrorist threat 'compel' the European states and the EU to
define our European interests and advocate them with one voice. If the EU, using the methods
already mentioned, is able to act as a geopolitical entity in its own right, it will become a v aluable
strategic partner for cooperation and leadership also with the United States, in particular.

We all feel that our society is in a state of nervous anticipation and protest that must herald a time
of great change. New and sometimes contradictory values are evident in all areas of society. In this
age of comprehensive globalisation, it is the responsibility of today's generation to manage the
transition to a post-industrial society that respects the fundamental values of our civilisation and
reconciles the rights of the individual with the rights of the community. If we fail, we will put our
democracies at risk and our children will inherit a decadent society.

Finally, I would like to conclude with a quotation from Jean-Claude Juncker, the current President of
the Commission:
"We have no right to undo what our predecessors have built up because the generations that follow
will need a political Europe. If it is not political, it will lose its way. They need and want a Europe of
solidarity, a social Europe, a competitive Europe, a strong Europe, both at home and in the world.
So, old Europeans and convinced Europeans, lets go! Courage!"