Art 48

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELERINO CASTROMERO, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Rape is consummated by the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum. Complete penetration is
not required. The rapist is likewise liable for the injury suffered by the rape victim as a result of her attempt to escape the assault.
The Case
This is an appeal from the August 17, 1994 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 10 2stationed in Balayan,
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 3509 finding appellant guilty of rape with serious physical injuries.
The Complaint 3 against Appellant Celerino Castromero reads:
The undersigned offended party under oath accuses Celerino Castromero of the Complex Crime of Rape with Serious
Physical Injuries, defined and penalized under Article 335, in relation to Article 48 and 263 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of February, 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, at Barangay Tanggoy, Municipality
of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a knife (balisong) and by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the offended party Josephine Baon against her will and consent and as a
consequence thereof, the said offended party suffered serious physical injuries which injuries required medical
attendance and incapacitated her from performing her customary work for a period of more than ninety (90) days by
jumping down through the window of her house.
Contrary to law.
The Complaint 4 was treated as the Information with the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Carmelo Q. Quizon, after Fourth Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Rolando E. Silang added his sworn certification that a "preliminary investigation was conducted in accordance" with law. When
arraigned on July 20, 1993, the accused-appellant, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Hermogenes De Castro, pleaded not guilty. 5
After a pre-trial conference, trial ensued in due course. Subsequently, the trial court rendered the assailed Judgment, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Celerino Castromero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
With Serious Physical Injuries and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim Josephine Baon in
the sum of P40,000.00, to pay Josephine Baon the sum of P20,378.95 representing actual damages and to pay the costs.
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he shall be credited with the period of his detention during his
preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Josephine Baon, the victim; (2) her husband, Esmeraldo Baon, who testified on the
medical expenses for the injuries his wife suffered because of the crime; and (3) Felipa Baon. The facts gleaned by the trial court from their
testimonies are as follows:
Felipa Baon is the mother-in-law of the alleged victim and was presented to prove circumstances of the incident which
form part of the "res gestae." She testified that the accused is her nephew because the accused's father is her first
cousin. On February 6, 1993 at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning while asleep in their house in Barangay Tangoy,
Balayan, Batangas, she was awakened by a scream of her daughter-in-law whose house is situated just five (5)
armslength away from theirs. When she came out to help her daughter-in-law (Josephine Baon), the latter was lying in
front of the window so, she and her husband carried Josephine into their house. Thereat, Josephine related what
happened to her. According to Josephine, the accused forcibly entered her room, placed himself on top of her and
made his penis touch her vagina for several times. The accused was then holding a knife. When Josephine was able to
free herself from the accused, she jumped out of the window where she fell into the ground. Thereafter, the assistance of
Barangay Captain Codizal was sought who reported the incident to the police. Felipa Baon executed a sworn
statement when investigated by one SPO2 William C. Dimaala in the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital where Josephine
was confined for treatment.
The next witness was the private complainant who gave her testimony while lying on a bamboo bed. She averred that
she knows the accused because the latter is the nephew of her mother-in-law. On February 6, 1993, at around 2:00
o'clock in the morning while asleep, she was awakened by the slam of the kitchen door. She rose and went out of the
bedroom to check what happened and outside the room she met the accused. The accused pointed a knife at her
and warned her not to shout or else she would be killed. She got scared.
The accused, while holding a knife on the right hand, embraced her behind the neck, kissed her cheek, and touched
her breasts. Then he pulled her panty until the garter got loose and touched her private parts. Next, accused pulled
down his jogging pants and brief. She kept herself still because of the accused's threat to kill her. Accused then removed
her skirt, placed himself on top of her, and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Because of the accused' movement
sideways and her struggle, his penis touched her private parts.
When she noticed that the accused was no longer holding the knife, she pushed him away. As she rose up, the accused
grabbed her hands and was about to stab her. So, she immediately jumped out of the window. When she fell down, she
yelled for help from her in-laws who responded and carried her to their house because she could not move her feet. She
requested her mother-in-law to bring her to the emergency hospital because of the intense pain she was then suffering.
Her in-laws reported the incident to the barangay captain who looked for the accused and to whom the accused
surrendered.
From the emergency hospital, she was later transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital. Upon examination, it was
found out that her spinal column was broken which required her to undergo surgical operation. (Exhs. "E", "E-1" to "E-5").
On cross-examination, private complainant averred that it is her habit to sleep at night with lights on in and out of her
room especially when her husband is not around. In the night of February 5, 1993 she slept with the lights on together with
her children, namely: Joanna Marie and Romualdo. It was at around 2:00 o'clock the following morning when she was
 awakened by a slam of the door, reason for her to rise-up to check what happened and she met the accused just
outside her room as she went out. The accused then pulled her and pointed a knife on the left side of her neck and
touched her private parts while they were both standing with the accused in front of her.
When she was already lying down (upon the orders of the accused) the accused went on top of her embracing her with
his right arm which also held a knife and touched her private parts. The accused tried to insert with his left hand his penis
into her vagina.
As the knife was pointed at her, the accused warned her not to shout or she would be killed. It was the accused's left
hand that touched her breast because his right hand held the knife. The accused used both hands in removing her
panty with the knife still on his hand. The accused removed his jogging pants and brief and the knife was still pointed in
her neck. When the accused tried to insert his penis, it touched her vagina as she put up resistance and as both of them
moved sideways.
The next witness was Esmeraldo Baon, the husband of the offended party whose gist of the testimony relates to the civil
aspect of the crime charged. He testified on the hospital and surgical expenses and cost of medicines incurred on
account of the injury suffered by the offended party caused by her jumping out of the window. The witness also
identified the receipts and other relevant documents in support of the expenses incurred. Although he claimed having
incurred expenses in the amount of P242,198.00, the witness was able to present receipts covering P20,378.95 only (Exhs.
"D-1" to "D-25"). 7
Version of the Defense
Raising denial and alibi, the defense presented two witnesses in the person of Appellant Celerino Castromero and his wife Juliana. The
appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office, narrated the following version of the
facts: 8
Juliana Castromero testified that she is the wife of the accused. She said that at around 6 o'clock in the evening of
February 5, 1993 she was with her husband (accused) and their three (3) children at their house in Tanggoy, Balayan,
Batangas. They took their dinner. At about 7 o'clock of the same night her husband went out. Her husband returned
before midnight and slept right away. She was awake till 1 o'clock because one of their children had a stomach ache.
When she woke up at 5 o'clock in the morning, her husband was still sleeping. Her husband woke up at 6:00 A.M. After
taking his breakfast, her husband went to his work in Dalig, Balayan, Batangas. Her husband is a threshing machine
operator. While her husband was on his job, some policemen came to their house and were looking for him. Her
husband was being suspected of entering other's (sic) dwelling. (TSN, pp. 2-8, April 7, 1994 and pp. 2-9, April 28, 1994)
Celerino Castromero testified that at around 6 o'clock in the evening of February 5, 1993 he took his supper together with
his wife and children. At about 7 P.M. he left and played (or gambled) in a nearby house. At 11:30 P.M., he went home.
After his arrival at their house, he went to sleep right away. He woke up at 5 o'clock of the following morning. He
reported for work in Dalig, Balayan, Batangas being a threshing machine operator. When he went home at 12 o'clock
noon, their barangay captain arrived and informed him that he was being suspected of having committed a crime. The
police invited him to the police station. And at the police station, the police did not conduct any investigation. He was
merely placed or locked up in the jail. He went to the police station, together with their barangay captain, to explain his
side and not to surrender. He denied vehemently to have committed any crime. (TSN, pp. 2-18, May 19, 1994).
Error Assigned
The defense raises one error; " the court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant of the crime charged." 9 Appellant denies the
accusation against him and insists that he was inside his own house at the time of the alleged rape.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious.
Credibility of Witnesses
In his brief, the appellant simply denies the charge of rape with serious physical injuries and insists on his alibi. 10He also alludes to the
following as indications of his innocence: he voluntarily went to the police station with the barangay captain; 11 he pleaded not guilty to
the charge; 12 and he vehemently denied committing the crime. 13 Finally, he adds, "if a reasonable doubt exists, the verdict must be one of
acquittal." 14
In deciding this appeal, we are guided by the following principles formulated specifically for the review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of
rape, while easy to make, is difficult to prove and even harder for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) because rape, by
its very nature, involves only two persons, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with the greatest caution; (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and must not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. 15 On the other hand, the complainant's credibility assumes paramount importance because her testimony, if
credible, is sufficient to support the conviction of the accused. 16
After a thorough review of the records in the case at bar, we see no reason to reverse the trial court's factual finding and conclusion on the
credibility of Josephine Baon's testimony; 17 we are likewise unpersuaded by accused-appellant's asseverations. "Well-settled is the rule that
the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. Findings of the
trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted." 18
Josephine Baon's testimony on how her honor was defiled by appellant that early dawn was clear, direct and honest. 19 Josephine never
wavered in her account of the rape in spite of the long browbeating she received during her cross-examination. 20 Her identification of
Appellant Castromero as her violator cannot be disputed because she personally knew appellant who, aside from being a neighbor, was
also a relative of her mother-in-law. Moreover, she had the opportunity to identify her assailant, since the crime scene was illuminated by
the lights inside and outside her room which she usually left on, specially in the absence of her husband as was the case that
night. 21 Besides, it is inconceivable that complainant, a decent 26-year old married Filipina with two young children, would suffer the
embarrassment of having to reveal intimate details of her violation and to undergo all the difficulties and indignities of a rape prosecution,
if her sole motivation was not to have the real culprit arrested and punished for the outrage committed against her. Indeed, a rape victim
"will not come out in the open if her motive [is] not to obtain justice." 22 In any event, it was not shown that complainant had any ill motive to
falsely testify against Accused Castromero. The accused himself and his wife Juliana both admitted during trial that they had no
knowledge of any "bad blood" between them and Josephine Baon or her family. 23
Hence, Josephine's testimony, which we find credible and worthy of belief, is sufficient to convict the accused-appellant of the crime
charged. The reliability and credibility of her testimony are bolstered by her narration of the sordid incident immediately thereafter to her
mother-in-law, Felipa Baon. Based on the foregoing, we are convinced that appellant sexually assaulted Complainant Josephine Baon.
Appellant Castromero's defense of denial and alibi is inherently weak and certainly insufficient to outweigh Josephine's positive and
categorical assertion of her violation by the former. 24 Furthermore, "(f)or alibi to serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear
and convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly met. Appellant must convincingly demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." 25 Appellant's evidence falls far short of
this requirement because his house, where he was allegedly sleeping at the time the crime committed, was a mere fifty meters from the
crime scene. 26 Hence, it was not at all physically impossible or even difficult for appellant to have been at complainant's home at the time
of the crime. It seems to this Court that the defense of denial and alibi was routinely raised faute de mieux.
Was Rape Committed?
In determining whether the rape was consummated or merely attempted, we observe that in this case there was no complete or perfect
penetration of the complainant's sex organ. The salient portions of her testimony are as follows:
Q While he was on top of you, what was he doing?
A He tried to insert his penis to my vagina
Q When he was trying to insert his private part to your private part, what happened?
A His penis touched my vagina.
FISCAL CASTILLO:
May I request Your Honor, that the Tagalog word "Ang kanyang pag-aari ay lumapat sa aking pag-
aari)."
Q What happened next?
A Because of the movement sideways his penis touched my private parts. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
On cross-examination, Eden stated further:
Q Mrs. witness, you testified that while the accused was on top of you, he tried to insert his penis, did
the accused insert his penis on your private part?
A Yes sir, the opening of my vagina was touched. 28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Felipa Baon, on the other hand, declared:
Q When Josefina Baon asked your help and the first time you see (sic) her at that morning, what was
her physical condition?
A She was lying in front of the window.
Q And what did she tell you if she told you anything?
A Josephine Baon told me that the accused forcibly enter her room and placed himself on top of her
and the penis of the accused was made to touch the vagina for several times. "Idinuldol ng idinuldol
ang kanyang pag-aari sa harap, ni Josephine Baon". 29(Emphasis supplied.)
To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the complainant's private organ is not essential. Even the slightest penetration by
the male organ of the lips of the female organ, or labia of the pudendum, is sufficient. 30 In People vs. Dela Pena, 31 this Court held that
"the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of the consummating the sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge."
Josephine's testimony that appellant's organ touched the opening of her vagina can lead to no other conclusion than that the appellant's
manhood legally invaded, however slightly, the lips of her private organ. Clearly, rape was consummated in this case. Because the sexual
assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation, Appellant Castromero is thus guilty of rape pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person
who creates in another's mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other
person may consequently suffer. 32 In this case, Josephine jumped from a window of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a
result, she suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than
ninety days. This being the case, the court a quo correctly convicted Appellant Castromero of the complex crime of rape with serious
physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. However, the indemnity in favor of Josephine Baon is hereby
INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in line with current jurisprudence. 33
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
G.R. No. 153559 June 8, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE and DANILO LOZANO, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder in an
information which reads:
That on or about the 6th of August 1995, at Brgy. San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and
by means of treachery and evident premeditation, availing of nighttime to afford impunity, and with the use of an explosive, did
there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lob a hand grenade that landed and eventually exploded at the roof of the
house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly shrapnels that hit and killed one ROBERT AGBANLOG, per the death certificate, and
causing Jerry Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo Eugenio, Rey Camat, Emelita Agbanlog and Elena Agbanlog to suffer shrapnel
wounds on their bodies, per the medical certificates; thus, to the latter victims, the accused commenced all the acts of execution
that would have produced the crime of Multiple Murder as consequences thereof but nevertheless did not produce them by
reason of the timely and able medical and surgical interventions of physicians, to the damage and prejudice of the deceaseds
heirs and the other victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, appellants pleaded "not guilty".2 Trial on the merits then ensued.
As culled from the records, at around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, 3 Rey Camat
and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Roberts father, Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog,
situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the
conversation of the companions of his son.4
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof
of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.5
The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe,
Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.6 They were all rushed to the
San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital.7
Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Robert Agbanlog, certified that the wounds
sustained by the victim were consistent with the injuries inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the direct cause of death was
hypovolemic shock due to hand grenade explosion.8 The surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog and Gerry
Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.9
SPO3 John Barraceros of the Lupao Municipal Police Station, who investigated the scene of the crime, recovered metallic fragments at the
terrace of the Agbanlog house. These fragments were forwarded to the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Division in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, where SPO2 Jesus Q. Mamaril, a specialist in said division, identified them as shrapnel of an MK2 hand grenade. 10
Denying the charges against him, appellant Antonio Comadre claimed that on the night of August 6, 1995, he was with his wife and
children watching television in the house of his father, Patricio, and his brother, Rogelio. He denied any participation in the incident and
claimed that he was surprised when three policemen from the Lupao Municipal Police Station went to his house the following morning of
August 7, 1995 and asked him to go with them to the police station, where he has been detained since. 11
Appellant George Comadre, for his part, testified that he is the brother of Antonio Comadre and the brother-in-law of Danilo Lozano. He
also denied any involvement in the grenade-throwing incident, claiming that he was at home when it happened. He stated that he is a
friend of Rey Camat and Jimmy Wabe, and that he had no animosity towards them whatsoever. Appellant also claimed to be in good
terms with the Agbanlogs so he has no reason to cause them any grief.12
Appellant Danilo Lozano similarly denied any complicity in the crime. He declared that he was at home with his ten year-old son on the
night of August 6, 1995. He added that he did not see Antonio and George Comadre that night and has not seen them for quite sometime,
either before or after the incident. Like the two other appellants, Lozano denied having any misunderstanding with Jaime Agbanlog,
Robert Agbanlog and Jimmy Wabe.13
Antonios father, Patricio, and his wife, Lolita, corroborated his claim that he was at home watching television with them during the night in
question.14 Josie Comadre, Georges wife, testified that her husband could not have been among those who threw a hand grenade at the
house of the Agbanlogs because on the evening of August 6, 1995, they were resting inside their house after working all day in the farm.15
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and convicted appellants of the complex crime of Murder with
Multiple Attempted Murder,16 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentencing them to suffer the imposable penalty of
death;
2. Ordering Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Robert
Agbanlog P50,000.00 as indemnification for his death, P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages;
3. Ordering accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay jointly and severally Jimmy Wabe,
Rey Camat, Gerry Bullanday and Jaime Agbanlog P30,000.00 as indemnity for their attempted murder.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Appellants contend that the trial court erred:
(1) when it did not correctly and judiciously interpret and appreciate the evidence and thus, the miscarriage of justice was obviously
omnipresent; (2) when it imposed on the accused-appellants the supreme penalty of death despite the evident lack of the quantum of
evidence to convict them of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) when it did not apply the law and jurisprudence for the
acquittal of the accused-appellants of the crime charged.17
Appellants point to the inconsistencies in the sworn statements of Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday in
identifying the perpetrators. Wabe, Camat and Eugenio initially executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 7, 1995 at the hospital
wherein they did not categorically state who the culprit was but merely named Antonio Comadre as a suspect. Gerry Bullanday declared
that he suspected Antonio Comadre as one of the culprits because he saw the latters ten year-old son bring something in the nearby store
before the explosion occurred.
On August 27, 1995, or twenty days later, they went to the police station to give a more detailed account of the incident, this time
identifying Antonio Comadre as the perpetrator together with George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.
A closer scrutiny of the records shows that no contradiction actually exists, as all sworn statements pointed to the same perpetrators,
namely, Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano. Moreover, it appears that the first statement was executed a day after
the incident, when Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were still in the hospital for the injuries they sustained. Coherence could
not thus be expected in view of their condition. It is therefore not surprising for the witnesses to come up with a more exhaustive account of
the incident after they have regained their equanimity. The lapse of twenty days between the two statements is immaterial because said
period even helped them recall some facts which they may have initially overlooked.
Witnesses cannot be expected to remember all the details of the harrowing event which unfolded before their eyes. Minor discrepancies
might be found in their testimony, but they do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should they
reflect adversely on the witness credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was perjured.18 Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial
matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case, the crime is
shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.19
Moreover, it was not shown that witnesses Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday had any motive to testify falsely
against appellants. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists, and their testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit.
The trial court is likewise correct in disregarding appellants defense of alibi and denial. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.20
Apart from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses from that of Jaime Agbanlogs residence, appellants were unable to give
any explanation and neither were they able to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime. Hence, the
positive identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday prevails over their
defense of alibi and denial.21
It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to
identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of
the house and the moon was bright.22
Appellants argument that Judge Bayani V. Vargas, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 38 erred in
rendering the decision because he was not the judge who heard and tried the case is not well taken.
It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record for the trial judge might have died, resigned,
retired, transferred, and so forth.23 As far back as the case of Co Tao v. Court of Appeals24we have held: "The fact that the judge who
heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did not have the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous." This
rule had been followed for quite a long time, and there is no reason to go against the principle now.25
However, the trial courts finding of conspiracy will have to be reassessed. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in
the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of
encouragement or performed any act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere presence of George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
provided encouragement and a sense of security to Antonio Comadre, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.
We disagree.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the
rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.26
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy
transcends companionship.27
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must
therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to
establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination
of the trial court that "their presence provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio," is devoid of any factual basis. Such
finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.28 There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must
answer for the crime.
Coming now to Antonios liability, we find that the trial court correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime. For
treachery to be appreciated two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method and form of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such means, methods and form of execution was deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the adoption of ways to minimize or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up
by the offended party.
Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting victims were having a drinking spree. The
suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous combustion and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the
victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus insuring the execution of the crime without risk of reprisal or
resistance on their part. Treachery therefore attended the commission of the crime.
It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information also alleges the "use of an explosive" 29 as an aggravating circumstance.
Since both attendant circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,30 we should determine
which of the two circumstances will qualify the killing in this case.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not
only does jurisprudence31 support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this
attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance.32
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No. 829433 which also considers the use of explosives as an aggravating
circumstance, there is a need to make the necessary clarification insofar as the legal implications of the said amendatory law vis--vis the
qualifying circumstance of "by means of explosion" under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is the
issue of which law should be applied in the instant case. R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the onerous and anachronistic penalties imposed
under the old illegal possession of firearms law, P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the tumultuous years of the Marcos dictatorship. The
amendatory law was enacted, not to decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and explosives, but to lower their penalties in order to
rationalize them into more acceptable and realistic levels.34
This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction of the corresponding penalties for illegal possession of firearms, or
ammunitions and other related crimes under the amendatory law. Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties for unlawful possession of
explosives are also lowered. Specifically, when the illegally possessed explosives are used to commit any of the crimes under the Revised
Penal Code, which result in the death of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only as
an aggravating circumstance. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 8294 now reads:
Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives. The penalty of prision mayor in
its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle
grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to "pillbox," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other
incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any
person.
When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special law with the use of the aforementioned
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devises, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (shall be punished with
the penalty of death is DELETED.)
xxx xxx x x x.
With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of the term "xxx as an aggravating circumstance," the unmistakable import is to
downgrade the penalty for illegal possession of explosives and consider its use merely as an aggravating circumstance.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty for illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Also, Congress clearly
intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms and explosives
when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the use of
explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing "any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code." The
legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of
unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the aggravating
circumstance of "explosion" in paragraph 12, "evident premeditation" in paragraph 13, or "treachery" in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new
aggravating circumstance added by RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made applicable in this case. Before the use of unlawfully
possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established that the possession
was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This follows the same requisites in the
prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm35 which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof
does not obtain in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, but no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to
show that the possession by appellant of the explosive was unlawful.
It is worthy to note that the above requirement of illegality is borne out by the provisions of the law itself, in conjunction with the pertinent
tenets of legal hermeneutics.
A reading of the title36 of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the qualifier "illegal/unlawful ...possession" is followed by "of firearms, ammunition, or
explosives or instruments..." Although the term ammunition is separated from "explosives" by the disjunctive word "or", it does not mean that
"explosives" are no longer included in the items which can be illegally/unlawfully possessed. In this context, the disjunctive word "or" is not
used to separate but to signify a succession or to conjoin the enumerated items together.37 Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. 8294,38 subtitled:
"Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives", clearly refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale,
or possession of explosives.
What the law emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. Thus, when the second paragraph of Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA
No. 8294 speaks of "the use of the aforementioned explosives, etc." as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of crimes, it refers to
those explosives, etc. "unlawfully" manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired, disposed or possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of
the same section. What is per se aggravating is the use of unlawfully "manufactured or possessed" explosives. The mere use of explosives
is not.
The information in this case does not allege that appellant Antonio Comadre had unlawfully possessed or that he had no authority to
possess the grenade that he used in the killing and attempted killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was not proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires the averment of aggravating
circumstances for their application.39
The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made manifest, the crime committed is Murder committed "by means of explosion" in
accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The same, having been alleged in the Information, may be properly
considered as appellant was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusation against him.40
The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is
a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor
the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who
commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different
acts and several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct
offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is
imposed because the offender was impelled by a "single criminal impulse" which shows his lesser degree of perversity.41
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case.42Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most
serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
Three justices of the Court, however, continue to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty.
Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert Agbanlog civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, P35,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages. Pursuant to existing jurisprudence 43 the award of civil indemnity is proper.
However, the actual damages awarded to the heirs of Robert Agbanlog should be modified, considering that the prosecution was able to
substantiate only the amount of P18,000.00 as funeral expenses.44
The award of moral damages is appropriate there being evidence to show emotional suffering on the part of the heirs of the deceased,
but the same must be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing judicial policy.45
With respect to the surviving victims Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday, the trial court awarded P30,000.00
each for the injuries they sustained. We find this award inappropriate because they were not able to present a single receipt to
substantiate their claims. Nonetheless, since it appears that they are entitled to actual damages although the amount thereof cannot be
determined, they should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00 each.46
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 39 in Criminal Case No.
L-16(95) is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P18,000.00 as actual damages and likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, Jaime Agbanlog,
Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday, P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for the injuries they sustained. Appellants Gregorio
Comadre and Danilo Lozano are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered
immediately RELEASED from confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for another cause. Costs de oficio.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the
records
of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ.,
G.R. No. L-1935 August 11, 1949
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELADIO BALOTOL, defendant-appellant.
Baltazar M. Villanueva for the appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Luis R. Feria for the appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an appeal from a sentence of the Court of First Instance of Samar convicting the appellant of double murder and sentencing him to
suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Potenciano Sabasido and Bernardino Lacambra in the sum of P2,000,
respectively, and to pay the costs.
In 1941 the deceased Potenciano Sabasido wounded the appellant. He was prosecuted for less serious physical injuries, pleaded guilty,
and was sentenced to suffer fifteen days of imprisonment.
On the afternoon of May 24, 1942, the appellant saw Potenciano Sabasido for the first time since the latter was released from jail, at a
cockpit in the barrio of Silaga, municipality of Santa Rita, Samar. According to the witnesses for the prosecution Sabasido was standing
outside the ring close behind Bernardino Lacambra with his two hands holding the shoulders of the latter, witnessing a cockfight. The
appellant approached Sabasido from behind and stabbed him with a bolo in the back. The weapon pierced thru the body of Sabasido at
the abdominal region and wounded Lacambra also. Sabasido fell face downward and the appellant stabbed him again in the back near
the right shoulder, the bolo again piercing thru his body. Sabasido died instantaneously and Lacambra, seven days later.
The appellant admits having cause the death of Potenciano Sabasido but denies having wounded of Bernardino Lacambra. "I do not
know who caused wound of Bernardino Lacambra," he testified. According to him, while he was walking around the ring of the cockpit
looking for a bet, Potenciano Sabasido saw him and said to him: "So you are the one who filed a complaint against me. I am going to kill
you." At that very moment, he said, Sabasido stabbed him and hit him on the left forearm above the elbow; that Sabasido again stabbed
him and hit him on his left buttock; that then he held the right arm of Sabasido with his left hand and stabbed Sabasido on the right side of
his body, "which is a little bit to the back. Sabasido released my hand which was holding his right arm and then stabbed me from left to
right. Then I held his right wrist with my felt hand and pushed same towards Sabasido's body and I trust him on his abdomen." After that he
ran away, he said.
The accused called two witnesses, Celso Palo and Basillo Lacambra, to corroborate his story. These two witnesses testified in substance to
the same effect as the accused, except that they added that it was the deceased Potenciano Sabasido who wounded Bernardino
Lacambra accidentally while the accused was running away and Sabasido was pursuing him.
The trial court did not believe the testimony of the accused and his witnesses and believed that of the witnesses for the prosecution.
After a careful and thorough study of the record we agree with the trial court. The nature and the position of the wounds of Potenciano
Sabasido completely belie the theory of the defense. Both wounds pierced thru the body from back to front and could not have been
inflicted by the accused in the manner claimed by him, that is to say, in a face-to-face fight. Moreover, the story of the witnesses for the
defense as to how Bernardino Lacambra was wounded, namely, that Sabasido accidentally hit him while he was pursuing the appellant
after the latter had wounded him twice, is unbelievable. No man with two bolo wounds thru his body, one thru the abdominal region and
the other thru the thorax, could possibly run in pursuit of another. Those wounds were necessarily so fatal as to cause instantaneous death.
On the other hand, the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution as to how both Sabasido and Lacambra were wounded, is confirmed
by the nature and the position of the wounds of the two victims.
The crime committed by the appellant was double murder, defined and penalized in article 248, in relation to article 48, of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 48 provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. Since under article 48 this penalty must be applied in its maximum period, the appellant should be sentenced to death. However,
in view of the lack of the necessary number of votes to impose the death penalty, we are constrained to apply the penalty next lower in
degree, which is life imprisonment.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 131116 August 27, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, ARTEMIO AVERION, LANDRITO "DING" PERADILLAS and LUIS CORCOLON, accused,
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ and ARTEMIO AVERION, accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
What is before this Court is an appeal from the decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig City,1 finding accused Antonio L. Sanchez,
Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas and Artemio Averion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder committed Nelson
Pealosa and Rickson Pealosa, and sentencing each of the accused, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused Antonio Sanchez, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas, Luis Corcolon, and
Artemio Averion GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under ART. 48 of the Revised Penal Code
and hereby sentences each of said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally, the heirs
of the victims each the sum of P100,000.00 for the death of Nelson Pealosa and Rickson Pealosa, P50,000.00 as actual damages
and moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
City of Pasig.
December 27, 1996.
(s/t) MARIANO M. UMALI
Judge2
On March 1, 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios filed with the Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, an information for double
murder against accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon y Fadialan, Landrito "Ding" Peradillas and Artemio Averion, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about April 13, 1991, at about 7:45 p.m. more or less, in Barangay Curba, Municipality of Calauan, Province of Laguna,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding
one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with the use of a motor vehicle, at night time, all the accused then
being armed and committed in consideration of a price, reward or promise and of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously shoot with the use of automatic weapons inflicting multiple gunshot wounds upon Nelson Pealosa and
Rickson Pealosa which caused their instantaneous deaths to the damage and prejudice of their heirs and relatives.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On March 16, 1994, the case was raffled to Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna.4 On March 17, 1994, the court ordered the
arrest of accused Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon and Ding Peradillas. On the same date, Artemio Averion voluntarily surrendered to the
court, which ordered Averion's transfer to the provincial jail, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.5
Thereafter, the trial court committed the accused to the custody of proper authorities.6
Upon arraignment on April 10, 1995, all the accused pleaded not guilty.7 The trial of the case thereby ensued. On December 27, 1996, the
trial court convicted all the accused of the complex crime of double murder, as charged, the dispositive portion of which is set out in the
opening paragraph of this opinion.
On February 27, 1997, all the accused, except Ding Peradillas, were present for the promulgation of the decision. Peradillas was a member
of the Philippine National Police and was under the custody of his superiors. The trial court ordered his custodian to explain accused's non-
appearance. On March 14, 1997, P/C Supt. Roberto L. Calinisan, Chief, PNP-PACC Task Force Habagat, denied any knowledge of the
murder case against Peradillas. Hence, Peradillas was not suspended from the service pending trial. However, at the time that Peradillas
was to be presented to the court for the promulgation of the decision, he had disappeared and could not be located by his
custodian.8 The promulgation of the decision as to him was in absentia. Peradillas and Corcolon did not appeal from the decision.
Accused Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion filed their respective appeals to this Court.
The facts are as follows:
On April 13, 1991, at around 10:00 in the morning, state witness Vivencio Malabanan, team leader of a group of policemen, went to the
Bishop Compound in Calauan, Laguna, as part of the security force of mayor Antonio L. Sanchez. After a while, accused Ding Peradillas
arrived and asked for mayor Sanchez. Peradillas informed mayor Sanchez that there would be a birthday party that night at Dr. Virvilio
Velecina's house in Lanot, Calauan, Laguna, near the abode of Peradillas. Peradillas assured mayor Sanchez of Nelson Pealosa's
presence thereat. Dr. Velecina was a political opponent of mayor Sanchez for the mayoralty seat of Calauan, Laguna, Mayor Sanchez
then replied, "Bahala na kayo mga anak. Ayusin lang ninyo ang trabaho," and left the premises. Peradillas immediately called Corcolon
and Averion and relayed the message "Ayos na ang paguusap at humanap na lang ng sasakyan." All the accused, including
Malabanan, understood it as an order to kill Nelson Pealosa, one of the political leaders of Dr. Velecina.9
Afterwards, Peradillas, Corcolon and Averion made arrangements to acquire two-way radios and a vehicle for the operation. At around
2:30 in the afternoon, Malabanan and the three accused went their separate ways and agreed to meet at mayor Sanchez' house at 6:00
in the evening. Malabanan returned to his detachment area at Dayap, proceeded to the municipal hall, then went home where Peradillas
fetched him at 6:00 p.m. They proceeded to mayor Sanchez' house where they met Averion and Corcolon, with the car and two-way
radios.10
At around 7:00 in the evening, Malabanan and the three accused boarded the car and went to Marpori Poultry Farm in Barangay Lanot,
near Dr. Velecina's house. Peradillas alighted and walked towards his own house, near Dr. Velecina's house, to check whether Nelson
Pealosa was at the party.
Thereafter, using the two-way radio, Peradillas informed the occupants of the car that Nelson Pealosa's jeep was leaving the Velecina
compound. Accused Averion immediately drove the car to the front of Peradilla's house and the latter hopped in the car's back seat.
Corcolon sat in the front seat beside him; witness Malabanan sat at the left side of the backseat and Peradillas stayed at the right side of
the back seat. The group pursued Pealosa's jeep. When the accused's car was passing Victoria Farms, located about 100 meters from
Pealosa compound, Corcolon ordered Averion to overtake Pealosa's jeep. As the car overtook the jeep, Peradillas and Corcolon fired at
Pealosa's jeep, using M-16 and baby armalite rifles, executed in automatic firing mode. There were three bursts of gunfire. Based on the
sketch prepared by Malabanan, illustrating the relative position of their car and Nelson's jeep at the time of the shooting, the assailants
were at the left side of the jeep.11
Rickson Pealosa, son of Nelson Pealosa, fell from the jeep. The jeep, however, continued running in a zigzag position until it overturned in
front of Irais Farm. After the shooting, the accused proceeded to the house of mayor Sanchez in Bai, Laguna, and reported to mayor
Sanchez that Pealosa was already dead.12
Together with his superior SPO4 Lanorio and photographer Romeo Alcantara, policeman Daniel Escares went to the crime scene. There, he
saw the body of Nelson Pealosa slumped at the driver seat of the owner-type jeep. They recovered the body of Rickson Pealosa
slumped on a grassy place not far from where they found Nelson Pealosa. After all the evidence and photographs were taken, they
brought the cadavers to Funeraria Seerez. Daniel Escares submitted his investigation report of the incident to the Provincial Director,
Laguna PNP Command.13
Dr. Ruben B. Escueta, Rural Health Physician, Rural Health Unit, Calauan, Laguna, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Nelson and
Rickson Pealosa. Nelson Pealosa suffered massive intra-cranial hemorrhage and died of cranial injury due to gunshot wounds. Rickson
Pealosa died of massive intra thoracic hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.14 Dr. Escueta, as a defense witness, testified that based on
the points of entrance and exit of the wounds sustained by the Pealosas, it was not possible for the assailants to be at the left side of the
victims.15 It contradicted Malabanan's testimony that they were at the left side of the victims when the shooting took place. He further
stated that based on the wounds inflicted on the victims, the assailants were either in a sitting or squatting position when they shot the
victims. Some of the wounds indicated an upward trajectory of the bullets.
On September 15, 1993, Janet P. Cortez, PNP ballistician, completed the ballistic tests conducted on the twelve (12) empty shells found at
the crime scene and the M-16 baby armalite surrendered by Corcolon.16 She concluded that the 12 empty shells were fired using three (3)
different firearms, one of which was the M-16 baby armalite.17
On August 18, 1995, Adelina Pealosa, common law wife of Nelson Pealosa and mother of Rickson, testified that the whole family was in
mourning and could not eat after what happened.18 She testified that the family incurred P250,000.00 for funeral expenses, but failed to
present the appropriate receipts. She also stated that Nelson Pealosa was earning one (1) million pesos per annum from his businesses.
However, no income tax return or other proofs were shown to substantiate the statement.19
The accused interposed the defense of alibi and denial.
Luis Corcolon stated that he spent the whole day of April 13, 1991, until 8:30 in the evening, supervising the poultry farm of his employers,
Edgardo Tanchico and Orlando Dizon. He denied that he was in the company of Averion and Peradillas that day, and that he participated
in the Pealosa killings. He denied that he was ever assigned as a security guard of mayor Sanchez. He claimed that the murder charges
were concocted against them for his refusal to testify against mayor Sanchez in the Gomez-Sarmenta case. He alleged that he was
maltreated, tortured, electrocuted and forced to implicate mayor Sanchez in the Gomez-Sarmenta rape-slayings. He denied that he
owned the M-16 baby armalite used in killing the Pealosas.20
Detention prisoner George Medialde corroborated Corcolon's statement that they were implicated in the Pealosa killing for their refusal to
testify against mayor Sanchez. He claimed that Malabanan confessed to him that the latter had killed the Pealosas, but with the aid of
CAFGU men and not herein accused. He averred that Corcolon and Averion were wrongfully implicated in the murder charges in
deference to the wishes of the investigators.21Zoilo Ama, another detention prisoner, claimed that Malabanan confessed that he killed the
Pealosas, but did not mention the involvement of Corcolon, Averion and mayor Sanchez.22
Accused Artemio Averion, a godson of mayor Sanchez, denied that he was involved in the Pealosa slayings. On April 13, 1991, he claimed
that he was in Lucena City, attending to his ailing father. He stayed there until April 15, 1991. He maintained that he was wrongfully
implicated in the Pealosa killings for his refusal to testify against mayor Sanchez regarding the Gomez-Sarmenta rape-slayings. Malabanan
asked for his forgiveness for falsely incriminating them in the Pealosa case.23
Jesus Versoza, PNP Officer, Camp Crame, denied the allegations of Medialdea and Averion that they were tortured and forced to testify
against mayor Sanchez.24
Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez stated on April 12, 1991, he went to Anilao, Batangas, with his family. Around 1:00 in the afternoon of
April 13, 1991, his family went to Tagaytay City and stayed overnight at Taal Vista Lodge. Around 10:00 in the morning of April 14, 1991, they
went home to Calauan, Laguna. After reaching his abode in Calauan around 12:00 noon, mayor Sanchez learned of the ambush-slayings
of the Pealosas. He immediately ordered an investigation of the case. He denied any involvement in the killing of the victims.25
The trial court ruled that the prosecution's evidence clearly and convincingly established the participation of the four (4) accused in killing
the Pealosas. Malabanan gave a sincere, frank and trustworthy account of the circumstances surrounding the killing. Furthermore, the trial
court explained the discrepancies between Malabanan's recollection of how the victims were shot and Dr. Escueta's conclusion on what
transpired based on the injuries sustained by the victims.
The trial court stated that the doctor's conclusion was based on the assumption that the victims were in a sitting position inside the jeep.
However, it was possible that after the first burst of gunfire, the victims were hit and fell. During the second burst of gunfire, the victims were
lying down or in a crouching position. Thus, the entry-exit points of the bullets did not entirely correspond to Malabanan's account, which
was based on the assumption that the victims did not change their positions during the shooting incident.
The trial court ruled that the accused conspired in committing the crime. Treachery was present, thereby qualifying the crime to murder. It
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, nighttime and use of motor vehicle.
The trial court considered the crime as a complex crime of double murder punishable under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, at the time of the commission of the offense on April 13, 1991, there was a constitutional proscription on the imposition of the
death penalty. Thus, each of the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and to pay damages to the heirs of the victims, as earlier
quoted.
Accused mayor Antonio L. Sanchez and Artemio Averion jointly appealed from the decision to the Supreme Court.
In their sole assignment of error, accused mayor Sanchez and Averion contended that the trial court failed to recognize the material
inconsistencies between Malabanan's testimony and the physical and scientific evidence presented before it. They pointed out the
following inconsistencies, to wit:
1. Malabanan testified that a) when they fired at the victims, they were about the same elevation;26 b) they used two (2) guns in
killing the victims;27 c) they were at the left side of the victims when the shooting incident occurred.28 However, Dr. Escueta's
autopsy report revealed that: 1) the assailants were at a lower elevation; 2) three (3) kinds of guns were used; and 3) based on
the injuries, assailants were on the right side of the victims.
2. Malabanan's affidavit "Exhibit V" made on August 16, 1993, and sworn to on August 17, 1993, bears two (2) signatures of the
affiant Malabanan and dated September 15, 1993. However, during cross-examination, Malabanan stated that he executed and
signed the affidavit on one occasion only, August 15, 1993.
3. Aurelio Centeno testified in the case of Gomez-Sarmenta slayings that Malabanan only responded to the report that Pealosa
had been killed. He averred that contrary to Malabanan's report, the latter was not at the crime scene.
The two accused further averred that the material inconsistencies between Malabanan's testimony and the autopsy and laboratory
findings and conclusions seriously affect his credibility. They stressed that Malabanan has sufficient motive to implicate mayor Sanchez and
Corcolon in the Pealosa killings due to threats of mayor Sanchez. They alleged that although generally alibi is considered a weak defense,
there are times when it is worthy of credence, such as in this case.
The Solicitor General supports the trial court's ruling that the prosecution adequately established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Malabanan positively identified the accused as the perpetrators. He testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner. The defense failed to satisfactorily show that Malabanan had an ill motive to testify falsely against the
accused. The alleged threat to Malabanan's life was not adequately established or sufficient for him to falsely implicate the accused. As
regards the supposed inconsistencies between Malabanan's account of the events vis vis the autopsy and ballistic reports, the Solicitor
General pointed out that both vehicles were running at the time of the ambush. It was a matter of instinct for the victims to shift positions as
they were fired upon. Thus, contrary to Dr. Escueta's conclusion, it was not impossible that the victims were hit from the right side of their
bodies, even if assailants were physically situated at the victim's left side. Hence, the apparent inconsistencies do not affect witness
Malabanan's credibility.
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, we agree with the trial court that the prosecution adequately established accused's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Malabanan gave a detailed account of the planning, preparation and the shooting incident. He narrated the participation of each of the
accused, to wit: (1) the order given by mayor Sanchez to execute Pealosa; (2) Averion's acquisition of a vehicle and two-way radios to be
used for the operation and in driving the car; (3) Peradillas' act of relaying the information that Nelson Pealosa's jeep was leaving the
Velecina compound; 4) the way they pursued the victims; and 5) Corcolon and Peradilla's act of firing and killing the Pealosas.
The accused concentrated mainly on the seeming contradiction between the narration of Malabanan on how the victims were shot, and
the physician's report on the location of injuries sustained by them. However, as the Solicitor General stated, both vehicles were running at
the time of the shootout. It was unlikely that the victims drove in a straight line parallel to that of the assailants. In fact, Malabanan testified
that while being fired at, Pealosa's jeepney was running in zigzag manner.29 It was a natural reaction for Pealosa to evade the assailants
as much as possible and to try to dodge the bullets. Furthermore, the assailants fired the guns in automatic firing mode. Thus, the bullets
burst out in different directions simultaneously. Hence, it was not impossible for the victims to be hit in different parts of the body.
"This Court has held time and again that any minor lapses in the testimony of a witness tend to buttress, rather than weaken, his or her
credibility, since they show that he or she was neither coached nor were his or her answers contrived. Witnesses are not expected to
remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall."30
Furthermore, the fact that the trial court relied on the testimony of a single witness does not effect the verdict of conviction. Criminals are
convicted, not on the number of witnesses against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even one witness, who is able to
convince the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of doubt.31 What witness can be more credible than someone who was
in the planning, preparation and execution of the crime.
The inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of Malabanan is too minor to affect his credibility. At any rate, we have held that
affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to open court declarations. Affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the
declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same
have been read to him.32
Accused-appellants raised that Malabanan's delay in reporting the involvement of the accused in the crime casts doubt on his credibility.
However, jurisprudence teaches us that delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness, especially where such witness gives a sufficient explanation for the delay.33 It was natural for Malabanan to keep
silent during that time for, aside from being a co-conspirator, mayor Sanchez was a powerful opponent.
Consequently, we find that accused-appellant's defenses of alibi and denial are bereft of merit. The defenses of alibi and denial are
worthless in the face of positive testimony of a witness showing the involvement of each of the accused.
However, we disagree with the trial court that the accused committed a single complex crime of double murder. Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
of committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed.
The question is whether the act of shooting the victims using armalites in automatic firing mode constitutes a single act and, thus, the
felonies resulting therefrom are considered as complex crimes. We rule in the negative.
In People v. Vargas, Jr., we ruled that "several shots from a Thompson sub-machine, in view of its special mechanism causing several
deaths, although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are considered several acts. Although each burst of shots was caused by
one single act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machinegun, in view of its special mechanism the person firing it has only to keep pressing
the trigger of the sub-machinegun, with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should
be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them." 34 In the instant case,
Malabanan testified that he heard three bursts of gunfire from the two armalites used by accused Corcolon and Peradillas. Thus, the
accused are criminally liable for as many offenses resulting from pressing the trigger of the armalites. Therefore, accused are liable for two
counts of murder committed against the victims, Nelson and Rickson Pealosa, instead of the complex crime of double murder.
Evidently, treachery was present in the execution of the crimes. The attack against the victims, who were unarmed, was sudden, catching
them unaware and giving them no opportunity to defend themselves.35 The presence of treachery qualifies the crimes to murder.
Conspiracy is likewise adequately established. Notwithstanding the fact that mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, we are
convinced that he was not only a co-conspirator, he was the mastermind of the ambush slayings or the principal by
inducement.36 Malabanan testified that Nelson Pealosa was killed upon order of mayor Sanchez. After the commission of the crime, the
assailants reported to mayor Sanchez. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim.
What is important is that the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim. Conspiracy renders appellants liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.37
The trial court properly appreciated the existence of evident premeditation. The prosecution clearly showed the presence of the following
requisites: a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to
their determination; and c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the
consequences of their acts.38 As clearly as 10:00 in the morning, the accused had conspired to kill Nelson Pealosa. They even looked for
two-way radios and a vehicle to be used for the operation. Indeed, sufficient time had lapsed to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of their actions.
Accused specifically used a motor vehicle to execute the crime. Thus, the aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle must be
appreciated.
However, we cannot appreciate the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime; while the crime was committed at night, the
prosecution failed to show that the malefactors specifically sought this circumstance to facilitate the criminal design.39 The fact that the
crime happened at 7:00 in the evening does not indicate that accused made use of the darkness to conceal the crime and their identities.
At the time of the commission of the crime on April 13, 1991, the penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Considering the presence of aggravating circumstances, the accused should be
sentenced to the death penalty for each murder. However, in view of the constitutional proscription of the death penalty at that time,
each of the accused is sentenced to two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua.
Regarding the civil liability of the accused, the trial court ordered the accused to pay the heirs of Nelson and Rickson Pealosa each, the
sum of P100,000.00, P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the
costs.
The P50,000.00 award as actual damages should be deemed as indemnity for the untimely demise of the victims. We have held that only
expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have been actually expended in connection with the death of the victims may be
allowed.40 No proof was presented to sustain the award of actual damages.
Similarly, we can not award damages for loss of earning capacity. All that was presented in evidence was the testimony of the common
law wife, Adelina Pealosa, that Nelson earned P1,000,000.00 a year. We have held that "for lost income due to death, there must be
unbiased proof of the deceased's average income. Self-serving, hence unreliable statement, is not enough."41
Considering the attendance of aggravating circumstances, we sustain the award of exemplary damages of P30,000.00, per victim, in
accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code.42
As regards moral damages, we affirm the P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of Rickson Pealosa.43 His mother, Adelina Pealosa, testified to
the suffering caused by his death.44 We also sustain the award of moral damages to the heirs of Nelson Pealosa. His common law wife
testified to the mental anguish suffered by the family due to Nelson's death.45 Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the spouse, legitimate
and illegitimate descendancts and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased. However, the common law wife is not entitled to share in the award of moral damages.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 160, Pasig City, and finds accused-appellants Antonio L.
Sanchez and Artemio Averion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder, and sentences each of them to suffer two (2)
penalties of reclusion perpetua, and each to pay jointly and severally the respective heirs of victims Nelson and Rickson Pealosa, as
follows:
1) Indemnity for death - P50,000.00

2) Moral damages - 50,000.00

3) Exemplary damages - 30,000.00

Total - P130,000.00
=========
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-37396 April 30, 1979
MARCELINO LONTOK, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO GORGONIO, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, respondent.
Marcelino Lontok, Jr., in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the propriety of an information containing the charge of "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries".
On March 29, 1973, Marcelino Lontok, Jr. was charged with that delito compuesto in the municipal court of San Juan, Rizal. In the
information, it was alleged that on November 14, 1972, while Lontok was recklessly driving his Mercedes Benz car, he bumped a passenger
jeep and caused damaged to it in the sum of P780 and that the bumping also caused physical injuries to three passengers who were
incapacitated from performing their customary labor for a period of less than ten days (Criminal Case No. 26116).
Lontok filed a motion to quash that part of the information wherein the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence is charged.
He contended that, because that offense prescribes in two months and it was committed on November 14, 1972, the last day of the sixty-
day period for filing the charge as to that offense was January 14, 1973. He prayed that the information be amended by excluding that
light offense.
The fiscal opposed the motion to quash. The municipal court denied it. Lontok pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. But instead of going to
trial, he filed in this Court on August 30, 1973 a petition wherein he prayed that the amendment of the information be ordered by deleting
the portion thereof wherein the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence discharged.
The Solicitor General in his comment agrees with Lontok's view that damage to property through reckless imprudence cannot be
complexed with a light offense, that the light offense had already prescribed, and that two informations should have been filed. He
manifested that he would ask the prosecuting fiscal to amend the information. Nevertheless, he concluded that since Lontok did not raise
any jurisdictional issue, his petition for certiorari was not proper and, therefore, it should be dismissed.
The issue is whether Lontok, over his objection, can be tried by the municipal court on an information charging the complex crime of
damage to property in the sum of p780 and lesiones leves through reckless imprudence.
We hold that he should be tried only for damage to property through reckless imprudence, which, being punished by a maximum fine of
P2,340, a correctional penalty, is a less grave felony (Arts. 9, 25 and 26 and 365, Revised Penal Code). As such, it cannot be complexed with
the light offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence which, as correctly contended by Lontok, had already prescribed since that
crime prescribes in sixty days.
There is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when a grave or less grave offense is a
means of committing another grave or less grave offense.
As originally enacted, article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provided that the crime is complex when a single act constitutes two or more
crimes, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other. Commonwealth Act No. 4000 amended article 48 by substituting
the words "grave or less grave felonies" for the word "crimes" in the original version, thus eliminating a light felony as a component part of a
complex crime.
Parenthetically, it may be noted in passing that the concept of complex crime was applied in criminal negligence or quasi offenses
(People vs. Lara, 75 Phil. 786 and People vs. Agito, 103 Phil. 526, regarding multiple homicide through reckless imprudence; People vs. Rodis,
105 Phil. 1294, regarding malversation through falsification by reckless negligence; Samson vs. Court of Appeals, 103 Phil. 277, regarding
estafa through falsification by reckless negligence; Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151; Lapuz vs. Court of Appeals, 94 Phil, 710 and People vs.
Vendiola, 115 Phil. 122, regarding homicide, grave physical injuries and grave damage to property, all through reckless imprudence.).
In all the foregoing cases, it is assumed that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but is simply a way of committing a crime and it
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. Negligence becomes a punishable act when it results in a crime (People vs. Faller 67
Phil. 529).
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light. there is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as a separate or
the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both
resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are
separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 5 7 SCRA 363, 365).
A chief of police likewise did not err in filing separate complaints for slight physical injuries and grave oral defamation committed on the
same occasion by one person against the same victim (Manduriao vs. Habana, L- 28069, August 18, 1977,78 SCRA 241).
Where a complaint for slight physical injuries and grave threats was filed in the justice of the peace court under the old Judiciary Law, the
said court had jurisdiction to try the slight physical injuries case and could only undertake the preliminary investigation of the latter offense
(People vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 586. See People vs. Acierto 57 Phil. 614 and People vs. Benitez, 73 Phil. 671).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that case the negligent
act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore,
constituted a complex crime
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been
charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already
extinguished (Arts. 89151, 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f] Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light offense.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 21 and July 12, 1973 are set aside. It is ordered to try Lontok only for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. The information need not be amended, it being understood that Lontok has no more culpability for the
offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence charged therein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando C.J. (Acting ), Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur,
Abad Santos, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as
Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed
into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis
supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the blood relatives of his
wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage
which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother
Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese
national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12th
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs.
No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of
Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the
possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,]
who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn
that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their
father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a
Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of
which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because
William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely
blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato,
our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sisters widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that they were in connection with her
taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy
Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of
Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente
B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were not the true and
actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her grandmothers properties. She attests that Anita
Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No.
3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my
mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true
amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her fathers orders.
 12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney fraudulently secured from my
mother, which total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as
Administratrix of my mothers estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with
my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3
Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de
Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint.4 On appeal, however, the Secretary of
Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information
against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:6
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then
and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the
said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and
thumbmark a special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making
her believe that said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722,
Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721,
Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and
other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate
of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in
possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.7
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000,
the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person
allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his
mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of
the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not
erase the fact that accused and Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-
law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and
descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence
even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by a grandson against his
grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA
40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecutions motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11
Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband,
private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1)
of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence
supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between Manolita and private
respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that
notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner
administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created
havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondents daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her
aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side
of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line"
under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent
Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the
courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The courts could only
distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the
courts would merely give effect to the lawgivers intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not
include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of
the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the
Revised Penal Codes simple language is most favorable to Sato.14
The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B.
Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from
criminal liability is that the law recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party. Here,
the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Satos wife), died on
January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have
arisen only after her mothers death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of
protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the
crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and
mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaidas mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing
in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioners claim that Zenaidas death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and
Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation
sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332s provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from
criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of
the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of
the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law,
stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief
against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his
stepson;20 by the grandson who steals from his grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son
who steals a ring from his mother.23
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and
family relations.
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of ones spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the
death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts
acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two
views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some who believe that
relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26).
However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children
and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution
of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in whose veins the blood of the
parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs.
Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death
or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.26 Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply
coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage
that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by
affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving
issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties
is commingled.28
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the
deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or
not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death
of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-
laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one
of the married parties.30
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second view is more consistent with the
language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
 First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest.31 On the other hand, the
continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the
purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under
the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in general language. The
legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of ones deceased child
(in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the
Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous social institution are
policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a
State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to
preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.35 The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the
parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In
dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused
shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.37
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible
interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption
of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court
should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity
view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving
spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The
same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code
and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief.
Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As
an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the
option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language
of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any
of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.39
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the
Information, not by the designation of the offense.40 What controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of
the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is
or what it is named.43 The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is
not binding on the court.44
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded
Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her to sign and thumbmark the
same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it was in fact a special power of
attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolitas properties in
Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted
for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of
Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution
of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolitas acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that
document were the very expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were
the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have
read) because of Satos representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita
showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her taxes.
Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Satos proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for
the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita
signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the
SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko
Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
 (2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified
document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of
damages from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This
meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale
was only P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolitas properties.45 This also
meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of
consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public
documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.
Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document is required for a proper
conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means
that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to commit
the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex
crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply
because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said
provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime
for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply
Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a
separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges
of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public
document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain
family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed
authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply
concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended
party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension
and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act
that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is
removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to
consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of
documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal
liability.48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a
single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which
violates the right to property),49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each
of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are
considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more
component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal
intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the
concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a
single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as
in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.54
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the elements of both estafa and
falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for
falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach
would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly
disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be
punished individually.
Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even Under Article 315 (3[a])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the document be falsified for the
consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit
the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit
another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary
means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of
falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a "necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more
effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to
unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a
necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the
same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document. 59 In other words, the crime
of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial
document to defraud another is estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.621avvphi1
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of public document was
consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection
with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only
when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale.
Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of
Manolita at the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the falsification of
the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties
either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the
execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa. 63 On the
other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be
prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime
of falsification.64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused
with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. L-46428 April 13, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IRINEO TUMLOS, defendant-appellant.
Marcelo Nubla for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Acting Assistant Attorney Kahn for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendant Irineo Tumlos appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding him guilty of the crime of
theft of large cattle defined and punished in article 310, in relation to article 309, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of from two months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, with the accessories prescribed by law and costs, by virtue of an information reading as follows:
The undersigned acting provincial fiscal accuses Irineo Tumlos of the crime of qualified theft committed as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1937, in the municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, said defendant, wilfully and without using force upon things or violence or intimidation against person, took, with intent to
gain and without the consent of their owner, five cows valued at P39 and belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis.
An act punishable by law.
Iloilo, July 11, 1938.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the only error allegedly committed by the lower court in the aforesaid judgment its failure
to sustain the defense of "autrefois convict" or double jeopardy, interposed by said defendant.
On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega and five belonging to his son-in-law, Ambrosio Pecasis,
then grazing together in the barrio of Libong-cogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, were taken by the herein defendant without the
knowledge or consent of their respective owners. The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July 11, 1938, an information against the said defendant
for the offense of theft of the eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega, which resulted in his being sentenced on July 15, 1938, to an
indeterminate penalty of from one year, eight months and twenty-one days to five years, five months and eleven days of prision
correccional, with the accessories prescribed by law and costs. In the information filed in the present case the same defendant is charged
with the theft of five cows belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis, committed on November 21, 1937, the date of the commission of the theft to the
eight cows of Maximiano Sobrevega charged to the previous information.
The question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the conviction of the accused for the theft of the eight cows belonging
to Maximiano Sobrevega constitutes a bar to his conviction for the theft of the five cows belonging to Ambrosio Pecasis, which were
grazing together with the aforesaid eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega in the same place from which they were stolen at the
same time, under the legal procedural principle of "autrefois convict" or double jeopardy.
The theft of the thirteen cows committed by the defendant took place at the same time and in the same place; consequently, he
performed but one act. The fact that eight of said cows pertained to one owner and five to another does not make him criminally liable for
two distinct offenses, for the reason that in such case the act must be divided into two, which act is not susceptible of division.
The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found grazing in the
same place. As neither the intention nor the criminal act is susceptible of division, the offense arising from the concurrence of its two
constituent elements cannot be divided, it being immaterial that the subject matter of the offense is singular or plural, because whether
said subject matter be one or several animate or inanimate objects, it is but one.
Therefore, as the five cows alleged to be stolen by Irineo Tumlos were integral parts of the thirteen cows which were the subject matter of
theft, and as he had already been tried for and convicted of the theft of the other five.
Wherefore, as he had already been put in jeopardy of being convicted of the theft of the five cows in question when he was tried for and
convicted of the theft of the eight which together with the five from an integral part of the thirteen which were the subject matter of the
offense, the conviction of the herein defendant Irineo Tumlos for the said five cows in the present case would be the second, in violation of
his constitutional right not to be punished twice for the same offense; hence, he is acquitted of the charge, which is dismissed, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and Moran, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-28547 February 22, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN GORRICETA, accused. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, and FRANCO
BRILLANTES, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-
appellee.
Sixto P. Dimaisip for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
which convicted them of robbery with homicide, sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay solidarily the
sum of six thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of fighting
cocks (Criminal Case No. 11082).
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock in the evening of January 9, 1966, Gorriceta, who had just come
from Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front of the
Elizalde Building on J. M. Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the
truck. Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred. He told Jaranilla that he
(Gorriceta) was on his way home.
Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's place.
So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao.
Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla,
Suyo and Brillantes alighted from the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction of the plaza.
After an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared. Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.
Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another district of the
city) on the same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.
It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the
extreme left. Next to him on his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.
While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the
road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman Jabatan
had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policeman.
Jabatan approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They did not heed
the injunction of the policeman.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened
Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city. Jaranilla kept on
firing towards Jabatan.
Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house. Gorriceta parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned Gorriceta
not to tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his name and asking him
to come down. Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the morning of the following day that he
decided to come down. His uncle had counselled him to surrender to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters. He
recounted the incident to a police investigator.
Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before
midnight of January 9, 1966, he conducted a friend in his car to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at Mandurriao.
As he neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford
pickup truck parked about fifty yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he espied the three men carrying
roosters. He immediately repaired to the police station at Mandurriao. He reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just
witnessed. The two policemen requested him to take them in his car to the place where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon
arrival thereat, the men and the truck were not there anymore.
Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. On reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the
policemen left the car and crossed the runway which was a shortcut. Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trespeces turned his car
around in order to return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He stopped and again turned his car in the direction where
shots had emanated. A few moments later, Patrolman Castro came into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces for help because
Jabatan, his comrade, was wounded. Patrolman Castro and Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the hospital.
Trespeces learned later that Jabatan was dead.
Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police department, conducted an autopsy on the remains of
Patrolman Jabatan. He found:
(1) Contusion on left eyebrow.
(2) Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior axilla, directed diagonally downward to the right,
perforating the left upper lobe of the lungs through and through, bitting the left pulmonary artery and was recovered at
the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic cavity was full of blood.
Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.
Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock in the morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered that
the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops (Exhs. A and A-1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the ground. Upon
investigation he found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop contained six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and
wood with nipa roofing. Each coop had a door which was locked by means of nails. The coops were located at the side of his house,
about two meters therefrom.
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of detectives came to his house together with the
police photographer who took pictures of the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days later, he
was summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily
identified it as one of the six roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop (Exh. B).
Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor
vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state witness.
Hence, the case was dismissed as to him.
On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had commenced the presentation of its evidence,
Jaranilla escaped from the provincial jail. The record does not show that he has been apprehended.
The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo and Brillantes on October 19, 1967 when it was read to them in court.
They signed at the bottom of the last page of the decision.
There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated, escaped from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).
However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio erroneously included Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not
been promulgated as to Jaranilla, he could not have appealed. His appeal through counsel cannot be entertained. Only the appeals of
defendants Suyo and Brillantes will be considered.
In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was
robbery and that Patrolman Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview of article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Gorriceta was the one who shot the policeman and that
Jaranilla was driving the Ford truck because Gorriceta was allegedly drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they further contend that the
taking of roosters was theft and, alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery
was already consummated when Jabatan was killed.
After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who was driving the truck and who shot policeman, this Court finds that
the trial court did not err in giving credence to Gorriceta's declaration that he was driving the truck at the time that Jaranilla shot Jabatan.
The improbability of appellants' theory is manifest. The truck belonged to Gorriceta's sister. He was responsible for its preservation. He had
the obligation to return it to his sister in the same condition when he borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw Brillantes, Jaranilla and Suyo
and when he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is no indubitable proof that Jaranilla knows how to drive a truck.
The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If, according to the appellants, Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the truck
because he (Gorriceta) was drunk then that circumstance would be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan. Being
supposedly intoxicated, Gorriceta would have been dozing when Jabatan signalled the driver to stop the truck and he could not have
thought of killing Jabatan in his inebriated state. He would not have been able to shoot accurately at Jabatan. But the fact is that the first
shot hit Jabatan. So, the one who shot him must have been a sober person like Jaranilla.
Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in concealing the fighting cocks, it was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who would
have the motive for shooting Jabatan. Consequently, the theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the truck
appears to be plausible.
Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence that in taking the six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of
Baylon's house violence against or intimidation of persons was employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
invoked.
Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada),
public building or edifice devoted to worship. The coop was not inside Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency thereof within the
meaning of article 301 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having shown the inapplicability of Articles 294 and 299, the next inquiry is whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by article 302 of
the Revised Penal Code which reads:
ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other
than those mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the same
be broken open elsewhere.
xxx xxx xxx
In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original
reads:
ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.El robo cometido en un lugar no habitado o en un edificio
que no sea de los comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299, ... . (Tomo 26, Leyes Publicas 479).
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term which may be confounded with the expression
"uninhabited place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is different from
the term lugar no habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or
dependency, where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the
building (casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon
things. (See Albert, Revised Penal Code, 1932 edition, p. 688).
Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches
therefrom, the crime was theft and not robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the store. (People vs.
Adorno, CA 40 O. G. 567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a member of this Court). *
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of article 302.
Not being a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five
circumstances enumerated in article 302.
The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article
299 (meaning not an "inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and
safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The
unnailing of a strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force
within the meaning of article 512, now article 302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).
The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the Supreme Court of Spain that a railroad employee who, by force, opens a
sealed or locked receptacle deposited in a freight car, does not commit robbery. He is guilty of theft because a railroad car is neither a
house nor a building within the meaning of article 302 which corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code. Article 302 refers to
houses or buildings which, while not actually inhabited, are habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of article 302. The
stealing of hogs from a pig sty is theft and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers to habitable buildings. (Guevara,
Revised Penal Code, 1939 Edition, pages 555-6, citing II Hidalgo Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn cites the decisions of the Spanish
Supreme Court dated March 2, 1886 and April 25, 1887). **
As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1) Baylon's coop, which is known in the dialect as tangkal or kulungan, is about five
yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a
person of average height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard.
A person cannot be accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that
compartment. The taking was effected by forcibly opening the cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the
accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The
taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of theft (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain dated July 13,
1894 and 36 C. J. 799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320; People vs. Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7, 1953).
Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused
intentionally sought the cover of night and used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People vs. Tan, 89
Phil. 647, 660; People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the
information. They admitted their previous convictions for theft (130, 132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal Code).
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3],
Revised Penal Code). That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present (Art.
64[3], Revised Penal Code).
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act
No. 4103).
With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the
malefactor who shot that unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The
treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted by the offender (U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs. Tumaob,
83 Phil. 738; People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771).
The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The
killing should be characterized as a direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code) complexed with
homicide. The two offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs. Lojo, Jr., 52
Phil. 390).
The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They
conspired to steal the fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the theft. They went to the scene of
the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by
Gorriceta.
The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that
the thief carry, more or less far away, the thing taken by him from its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 476; U.S
vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754).
It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who would forestall the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the
fruits of the crime, was part of their plan. There is no evidence to link appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the
circumstance that they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do
anything when Jabatan approached the right side of the truck and came in close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right.
Brillantes pulled his revolver which he did not fire (47, 53-55 tsn). Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a
person a co-principal thereof.
Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan. Instead of taking the witness stand to refute the testimony of
Gorriceta, Jaranilla escaped from jail. That circumstance is an admission of guilt.
The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568 where the victim was killed on the occasion when the accused took his
chickens under the house. It is distinguishable from the People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs. Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670 (both
cited by the Solicitor General) where the robbery was clearly proven and the homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the robbery.
As already noted, theft, not robbery, was committed in this case.
The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 where the homicide committed by a
member of the band was not a part of the common plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable
for robbery with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.
There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the participation of Suyo and Brillantes in the killing of Jabatan by Jaranilla. As
already stated, no robbery with homicide was committed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants have any
responsibility for Jabatan's death. Their complicity in the homicide committed by Jaranilla has not been established.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes of robbery with homicide is reversed.
They are acquitted of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a) each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum and (b) ordered to indemnify
solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct assault upon an agent of authority, trial court should render a new
judgment consistent with this opinion (See Sec. 19, Art. IV, Constitution).
So ordered.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal
Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified
from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez,
205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was
intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of
the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on
November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for
arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that
petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The motion stated that while the information
alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked
a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not
properly plead and prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the arraignment to
a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for
the bill of particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated categorically that they would file only
one amended information against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to
admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his
disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32 Amended Informations and ordering
petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32
Amended Informations was set for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice
Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from
enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from
proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of
the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he has subconsciously
drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star,
criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected
a "perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would stop Miriam
Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the most
perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any
kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is
kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind
of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to travel, whether the
Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at Immigration
or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged
before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection
with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in
violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby
causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens in the
discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the
hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity
and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure
permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would
have been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices
in each division. Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The
collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
Re: Claim of denial of due process
Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was
filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the
part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the complexity of the issues
involved. The act complained of in the original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the
January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first
assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special
Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charges
on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it
reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because
the official acts complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau
of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens"
even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her
motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ).
Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in good
faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified
for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue injury to any party, including the
Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including
the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act
of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the
 offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there may be instances where
both elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations
against petitioner, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also
noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the original
information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which
petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one
information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous
crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been
a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of
penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are
united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of
the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same time and at the same
period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time
(People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a
client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The
collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts
of collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other
from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two different
occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said offenses committed
in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one
resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the installments
for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v.
Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on
different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special
laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v.
Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence,
legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses has troubled also
American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the
same or different owners, at the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny
doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government
has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd
1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81
Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the
same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could
be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her approving the
application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law Executive Order No. 324
dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in
the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they would file only one amended information
embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
 On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the accusation against Miriam
Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign
nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the concerns of
the accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo,
p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The
strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke
of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or
injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:
. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is concerned, the
same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the
stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its
Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information
charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25,
1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:

While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago
vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of
foreclosing the issues there involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply directing, for the reasons expressed for the
Court by
Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that opinion directed the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and
18402) into one Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations, for that court seriously erred in
not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my
dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205 SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg
leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing
undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to the said aliens in
the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of Executive Order No. 324
approved applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. The
information takes the position that the Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April
13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for
waiver of passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other things,
that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously
in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January
1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter being alien spouses or
parents who had entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of
passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 to apply for waiver of passport requirements and, after
compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive
Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links up
Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was expressly
authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner
was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the
application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the
exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably,
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation may waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of individual aliens
for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become public
charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates to a
single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security and
members of subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under the
Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest."
Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry
into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this
Act. 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion
may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted official acts
of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no question
that the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were
admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the
said alien spouses and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph
12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner
had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had
acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324
either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9
expressly authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor children below
21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith
and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered absolutely
no basis for such an allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words
"wilfully, unlawfully and criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts
disclosed in the preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver of passport
requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by
petitioner to Executive Order
No. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children,
arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984
and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for
humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring family unity there would be no "injury," let alone an
"undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's
interpretation of Executive Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or
implementing regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a
stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many instances
deferred to such interpretations rendered by such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central
Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of
law by this Court, the official responsible for such interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally,
whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who
has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt
personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As
noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal
question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to prevent this
Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart
from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that
before this Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go
through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of
the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
 I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts
which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the
administration of law and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal information here
would appear to be that public officers interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at
the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such
interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case
No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still going
on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on
the legal question which petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be terminated by now,
one way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation,
humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations.
Romero, J., concurs.

# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago
vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of
foreclosing the issues there involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply directing, for the reasons expressed for the
Court by Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that opinion directed the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and
18402) into one Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations, for that court seriously erred in
not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my
dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205 SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg
leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing
undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to the said aliens in
the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of Executive Order No. 324
approved applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. The
information takes the position that the Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April
13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for
waiver of passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other things,
that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously
in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January
1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter being alien spouses or
parents who had entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of
passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 to apply for waiver of passport requirements and, after
compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive
Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links up
Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was expressly
authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner
was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the
application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the
exercise of judgment and discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably,
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
 11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation may waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of individual aliens
for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become public
charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates to a
single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security and
members of subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under the
Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest."
Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry
into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this
Act. 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion
may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted official acts
of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no question
that the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were
admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the
said alien spouses and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph
12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that petitioner
had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had
acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324
either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9
expressly authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor children below
21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith
and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered absolutely
no basis for such an allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words
"wilfully, unlawfully and criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts
disclosed in the preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver of passport
requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by
petitioner to Executive Order
No. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children,
arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984
and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for
humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring family unity there would be no "injury," let alone an
"undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's
interpretation of Executive Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or
implementing regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a
stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many instances
deferred to such interpretations rendered by such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central
Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of
law by this Court, the official responsible for such interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally,
whether civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who
has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt
personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As
noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal
question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to prevent this
Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart
from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that
before this Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go
through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of
the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime. Indeed, if the acts
which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the
administration of law and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal information here
would appear to be that public officers interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at
the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such
interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case
No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still going
on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on
the legal question which petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be terminated by now,
one way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the aggravation,
humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations.
Romero, J., concurs.
# Footnotes
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
1 Gutierrez, Grio-Aquino and Romero, JJ., joined in the dissent. Melencio
Herrera, J. wrote a separate opinion, but adopted the substantive points made in my dissenting opinion.
2 It is also pertinent to note the following classes of excluded aliens:
(10) Persons who are members of a family accompanying an excluded alien, unless in the opinion of the Commissioner
of Immigration no hardship would result from their admission;
(11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who is helpless from mental or physical disability or infancy, when the
protection or guardianship of such accompanying person or persons is required by the excluded persons, as shall be
determined by the Commissioner of Immigration;
(12) Children under fifteen years of age, unaccompanied by or not coming to a parent, except that any such children
may be admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration, if otherwise admissible;
xxx xxx xxx"
(Section 29 (a), C.A. No. 613, as amended; emphasis supplied

G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994

GERUNCIO H. ILAGAN, CLARO PION and ROSENDO PION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. ROMERO, SALVADOR Q. QUIMPO and HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Rony A. Cirilos for petitioners.
Andres L. Tuaa for Hometrust Development Corp.

REGALADO, J.:
This case presents another instance of the mode of advocacy that bedevils our criminal justice system, evoking thereby the jeremiad of
herein respondent corporation against the abuse of certiorari for unnecessary delay in the resolution of a mere interlocutory order. Indeed,
considering its revelations and the supporting annexes to its comment, 1 this appeal as initially resolved by the First Division was advisedly
accepted by the Court En Banc so that we may write finis to such a simple incident as a motion to quash which for years has regrettably
held up the adjudication on the merits of the main criminal actions.
The records show that on July 21, 1992, eight informations were filed and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-40482 to C-40489 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kalookan City, charging herein petitioners Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Pion and Rosendo Pion as co-
conspirators in the crime of estafa.
The information in Criminal Case No. C-40482 2 contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about covering the period from July, 1990 up to December, 1991 in Kalookan City, MM, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused bei(ng) then the President, Finance Manager and
Sales Director, respectively, of the Apple Realty and Development Corporation, a Corporation duly appointed Agent of
the HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by its Manager, one SALLY S. GO, defrauded and
deceived the latter in the following manner, to wit: said accused conspiring and confederating with one another, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to the prospective lots and houses and
lot buyers, namely: Erlinda Sayasa, Rogelio Damasco, Gina G. Teston, Filomena Lanoz(o), Natividad Diaz, Florida
Gargoles and Marce(l)ita Ranara, that is, by representing themselves that they are authorized to collect/receive and
issue receipts of payments from said buyers, accused knowing fully well that they are not authorized to do so, induced
and convinced herein buyers to give and deliver, as in fact, the latter did give and deliver to said accused the total
amount of P353,500.00, Philippine Currency, who instead of remitting the same amount to the Hometrust Development
Corporation, with deliberate intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands
made upon them, refused and failed and still fail and refuse to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Corporation, in the aforementioned total amount of P353,500.00. (Corrections in parentheses ours.)
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. C-40483, 3 the information alleged as follows:
That on or about the first week of June to Nov. 23, 1991 in Kalookan City, MM, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a President, Finance Manager and Sales Director,
respectively, of the Apple Realty and Development Corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another,
defrauded and deceived the HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by its MANAGER, one
SALLY S. GO, in the following manner, to wit: said accused being then duly appointed as Agents of the said Corporation
in a Contract of Agency dated July 30, 1990 and they are authorized to sell lots and/or houses and lots to prospective
buyers on a commission basis with the restrictions however, that herein Agents cannot receive any form of payment from
buyers as well as to issue any receipt therefor, accused knowing fully well of the said agreement the terms and
conditions of which are embodied in the said Contract, induced and convinced one MARCELITA RANARA to buy and
purchase lots and/or house and lots and receive payments and issue receipts therefor, as in fact herein complainant did
give the total amount of P24,000.00 to said accused, representing as the reservation fee/downpayment of the lots
and/or houses and lots purchase price, when in truth and in fact, they are not entitled to do so, much less, have no
personality to collect whatever amount from said prospective buyers, but said accused, once in possession of the said
amount, with deliberate intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate and convert to their own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite repeated demands
made upon them to return/deliver the said amount, failed and refused and still fail and refuse to restitute the same, to
the damage and prejudice of the complainant thereof, in the aforementioned amount of P24,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
Uniformly, all the indictments in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40484 to
40489 4 contained the same allegations as those in Criminal Case No. C-40483, except with respect to the offended party, the date of
commission of the offense, and the amount subject of the offense, thus:
 CASE NO. OFFENDED DATE OF AMOUNT
PARTY COMMISSION
C-40484 Rogelio Damasco April 30, 1991 to P60,000.00
August 22, 1991
C-40485 Gina G. Teston June, 1991 to 169,000.00
November 4, 1991
C-40486 Natividad Diaz May, 1991 to 19,000.00
July, 1991
C-40487 Erlinda Sayasa July 21, 1991 to 133,500.00
October 18, 1991
C-40488 Filomena Lanozo May, 1991 to 19,000.00
July, 1991
C-40489 Florida Gargoles May, 1991 to 29,000.00
July, 1991
I
According to petitioners, on July 30, 1992 they moved to quash the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 on the ground
of duplicity of offenses charged therein. The same was dismissed by the trial court in its order of December 10, 1992 which is hereunder
reproduced:
Acting on the "Motion to Quash" and the "Opposition" thereto, and considering, as urged, that each Information filed
against the accused in Crim. Cases Nos. 40482, 40483, 40484, 40485, 40486, 40487, 40488 and 40489 indubitably show
different private complainants involving different transactions committed on different dates, which assertion is further
reinforced by the averment in the affidavit-complaints executed by the complainants in each (of the) aforesaid criminal
cases, the movant's contention therefore that the ground alleged in the Motion to Quash is within the provision of Sec. 3,
Rule 117, is untenable.
The applicable rule on the question of duplicitous Information is Sec. 2(e), Rule 117, not Sec. 3 of Rule 117 as urged.
As correctly pointed out by the public prosecutor, the duplicitous Information presupposes one or more offenses
contained in one or (a) single Information under Sec. 2(e), Rule 117, Rules of Court.
But read as it should be, each Information here clearly alleges only one offense for one single act, consequently, the
Rule in question does not apply.
Accordingly, the Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED. 5
Unfazed, and obviously for the same purpose since they raised exactly the same contentions, petitioners sought the extraordinary writ
of certiorari and prohibition from the Court of Appeals to set aside the aforesaid denial order of the trial court. In its decision 6 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31021 promulgated on June 22, 1993, said appellate court made short shrift of the pretensions of petitioners in these terse observations:
Petitioners allege that the informations are duplicitous and the trial court should have quashed them. They contend that
the complainants in Criminal Case No. 40482 and the individual complainants in the seven other cases (Criminal Case
No. 40483-40489) are one and the same and that the acts alleged in the first case (No. 40482) to have been committed
during the period July, 1990 to December, 1991 are the same acts charged individually in the other seven cases (Nos.
40483-40489) on dates covered by the same period alleged in the first case. Petitioners argue that in refusing to quash
the informations, the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion.
These contentions are without merit. To be sure, an information is considered duplicitous and therefore subject to
dismissal if it charges more than one offense except in cases in which a single punishment is prescribed for various
offenses. (Rule 117, Sec. 3[e]). In the case at bar, each information charges only one offense of estafa and, therefore,
there is no basis for moving to quash on the ground of duplicity of offense.
Nonetheless, in an apparent gesture of understanding accommodation and by way of guidance to petitioners on the error of their ways
even on such elementary procedural matters, respondent court deigned to proceed further and extended this solicitous explanation to
them:
What probably petitioners want to say is that for the same act alleged to constitute the crime of estafa they are being
held liable to two complainants. For the theory of the prosecution appears to be that during the period July 1990 to
December 1991, petitioners, as agents of the respondent Hometrust Development Corp. defrauded and deceived both
Hometrust Development and the lot buyers by representing to the latter that they (petitioners) were authorized to
receive payments when in fact they were not, and were thus able to collect from the lot owners the total amount of
P353,000.00 which they subsequently misappropriated and converted to their personal use and benefit. For this reason
eight informations were filed against petitioners from which it is clear that the cases involve different parties and amounts
and that the acts alleged to constitute estafa were committed on different dates, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Thus for every single act of misappropriation both those from whom the amounts were received and the Hometrust
Development to which the payments were intended have brought estafa cases against the herein petitioners in (the)
latter's capacity as president, finance manager and sales director respectively of the Apple Realty and Development
Corp., sales agent (without authority to receive payments) of Hometrust Development Corp. It is clear that each
information charges only one offense. 7
That was all, that was enough, and that was correct. In fine, respondent Court of Appeals frontally and succinctly confronted the sole issue
of the alleged multifariousness of the informations which was the same and only ground invoked by petitioners in both the trial court and
the respondent court. It did not digress into the arcanum of the application to said criminal cases of the rule on a delito continuado or the
inapplicability of a supposed non-existent rule of litis pendentia as applied to double jeopardy, as was done during the deliberations in this
case. Rationally, it did not have to and, legally, it could not do so.
For, in no uncertain terms, Section 2, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as intentionally amended for that purpose,
mandatorily provides that "(t)he motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify distinctly the factual
and legal grounds therefor and the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged" (Emphasis supplied).
All the way from the lower court, through the respondent court, and now before this Court, petitioners have at least been consistent in
obdurately cleaving and limiting their plaint to the lone issue of supposed duplicitous informations. We cannot, therefore, conceive of how
the foregoing pithy dispositions of the two courts before us could have failed to put that matter to rest. We also cannot understand why,
despite the aforecited prohibition in Rule 117, this Court should still be expected to consider other grounds intrusive upon the merits of the
criminal cases involved which would disturb the correct pronouncements of the two lower courts, instead of summarily denying this petition.
However, if only to dissipate intransigent reservations on our decision on this incident, and to serve as bearings to the court a quo with
regard to our ultimate resolution thereof, we shall tread on the virtual merits of the estafa cases in question as the facts thereof appear from
the pleadings of record.
II
Indulging all inferences in favor of petitioners, what appears to be the implication in their otherwise defective submissions is that despite the
number of aggrieved parties, they committed only one offense of estafa, and solely against respondent corporation which is now the
subject of Criminal Case No. C-40482. They would postulate that into said case should be deemed integrated the separate offenses
complained of by the seven individual lot buyers, instead of the latter being made the respective subjects of Criminal Cases Nos.
C-40483 to C-40489.
What would seem to be the reason for that theory is that the essential allegations of facts and the specifications of the offenses charged in
the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 are supposedly the same as those stated in the information in Criminal Case No.
C-40482, hence respondent corporation is the offended party in all the eight informations. They would rebuke respondent Court of Appeals
for holding that the seven complainants in the seven other informations are different from the complainant corporation in Criminal Case
No. C-40482. Their thesis would be that since the informations also state that petitioners had defrauded respondent corporation, the
allegations in the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 that the acts of petitioners caused damage and prejudice to the
individual complainants mentioned therein should be treated as superfluities.
Now, the function of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as it is here invoked, would be to annul and set aside a purported grave abuse of
discretion by the prosecutor in filing several informations involving, according to petitioners' theory, one and the same offense. This
argument, however, would completely ignore the fact that the ground of double jeopardy was never raised in a motion to quash, hence
that ground cannot be made the basis for attributing grave abuse of discretion to the prosecutor. It is also inconsistent with the reasoning
advanced during our deliberations that these cases would fall within the purview of the constitutional right against double jeopardy were it
not for the failure of existing rules on criminal procedure to address the instant situation. In ex hypothesi there is no rule on double jeopardy
to govern such situation and, for that matter, it has not even been invoked in the motion to quash, it is then unpardonably absurd to claim
that its non-application by the prosecutor could constitute grave abuse of discretion on his part.
The core issue is, therefore, whether the offenses separately charged in the eight informations actually constitute only one offense or were
correctly considered as eight separate crimes of estafa. No hearing on this issue was ever conducted in the court below as it was never
raised therein; and the sole ground of multifariousness was, since it could properly be, resolved by the court only on the bases of the
allegations in the motion to quash without introduction of evidence aliunde.
The issue of double jeopardy should properly have been raised in and resolved by the trial court in the first instance as it would necessitate
evidence on the terms of the contracts or documentation of the transactions with the lot buyers, the rights and obligations of the parties
thereunder, the binding effects thereof, the resolutory conditions or grounds for rescission, any confirmation or repudiation thereof as may
have been made by respondent corporation, and the like. In any event, the present petition could also have been rejected outright,
without thereby causing any undue prejudice to the parties, even merely on the bases of the present contents and state of the records
before us.
1. The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the
other, are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of
commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated on different occasions, and caused injury
to different parties.
The crime of estafa against respondent corporation was committed through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, specifically as provided
in Paragraph 1(b) of Article 315, Revised Penal Code. The operative act in the perpetration thereof was the failure to turn over or deliver to
respondent corporation the amounts collected by the accused, despite their duty to do so. The felony was consummated on the dates
when and at the places where such amounts were to be delivered to respondent corporation under the agency agreement therefor or
within a reasonable time from receipt of the payments made by the lot buyers. The aggrieved party was respondent corporation which
suffered damages basically to the extent of the sums collected in its behalf but not delivered or accounted for by the accused.
With respect to the lot buyers, the offense of swindling was committed by deceit or false pretenses employed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud, more specifically as provided in Paragraph 2(a) of the same article of the Code, that is, by the accused falsely
pretending to possess the power to collect the payments due from said buyers, despite the peculiar but specific prohibition imposed by
their said principal. The felony was perpetrated through the aforesaid the deceitful misrepresentations which made possible the
unauthorized collections. The offense was consummated upon receipt by the accused of the amounts in the different occasions and
places where the payments were made by the lot buyers. The aggrieved parties were the lot buyers who individually and separately
suffered damages by being deprived not only of their money but primarily of their property rights to and in the lots they respectively
purchased.
In either instance, the requisite ingredients of estafa as separate offenses are present, that is, for respondent corporation the elements of
abuse of confidence and damage, and for the lot buyers the elements of deceit and damage. It has been held that estafa can be
committed with the attendance of both modes of commission, that is, abuse of confidence and deceit employed against the same victim
and causing damage to him. Thus, where an agent deliberately misrepresented to the landowner the real position of the prospective
buyer of the land in order to induce said owner to agree to a lower price and, thereafter, the agent sold the land for the higher amount
which was actually agreed upon by him and the buyer, and he then clandestinely misappropriated the excess, the crime of estafa was
committed under both modes and he could be charged under either. 8 Withal, it has also been held that such estafa is more properly
categorized as one committed through abuse of confidence. 9
With much more reason, therefore, should the offense of estafa against respondent corporation be considered discretely and separately
from those committed against the lot buyers since, inter alia, different modes of commission and different parties are concerned.
Furthermore, to underscore the distinction between the estafa committed against respondent corporation and the lot buyers, in estafa
through abuse of confidence prior demand should be made by the offended party on the accused to comply with the obligation before
the latter may be charged criminally, 10 but there is no such requirement where the estafa was committed through deceit. 11
As earlier stated, the damage sustained by the lot buyers is distinct from that suffered by respondent corporation since, primarily, the injury
to the lot buyers was the deprivation of their rights or the exercise thereof over the properties they respectively purchased. It has long been
the rule that actual damage is not necessary in estafa, as long as it is capable of pecuniary estimation, hence mere temporary disturbance
of property rights is equivalent to damage. 12 Even if the prejudice is temporary, that would suffice for the element of damage in
estafa. 13Here, the lot buyers involved in the criminal cases subject of the present recourse have, as a direct consequence of the acts of
petitioners, been deprived of the exercise of their rights of actual or potential ownership over their properties since 1991 up to the present.
That the names of the seven lot buyers and the amounts they paid are mentioned in the information in Criminal Case No. C-40482 does not
have the significance claimed by petitioners. These were only mentioned therein to explain the source of and the amounts involved, the
totality whereof constituted the element of damage to respondent corporation. On the other hand, the statement in Criminal Cases Nos.
C-40483 to C-40489 that the accused "defrauded and deceived" respondent corporation is the phrase which should be considered as a
surplusage. The information in each of the latter seven cases specifically refers to the individual complainant therein, alleges how the
accused "induced and convinced (the complainant) to buy and purchase lots and/or houses and lots and receive(d) payments and
issue(d) receipts therefor," which amounts they represented "as the reservation fee/downpayment" for the properties sold "when in truth
and in fact they were not entitled to do so . . . to the damage and prejudice of the complainant thereof." Such allegations constitute the
estafa contemplated in Paragraph 2(a) of Article 315, with the respective complainants as the offended parties separately from
respondent corporation.
2. Consequent to the theory of identity of the offense committed against respondent corporation vis-a-vis those against the lot buyers, we
reject petitioners' plea for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. C-40483 to C-40489 which were filed each with one lot buyer as the offended
party therein. While the felonious acts perpetrated against said lot buyers do not constitute a delito continuado, there must be an
explicitation as to whether, under the taxonomy in the Spanish concept of concurso de delitos, the seven acts of defraudation under said
informations constitute material or real plurality, hence there are seven crimes of estafa, or should be considered as in the nature of formal
or ideal plurality, hence there is only one crime of estafa. We rule that said seven cases fall under the category of concurso real, hence
there are seven juridically independent crimes involving said lot buyers.
The series of acts committed against the seven lot buyers was not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit
was employed against each lot buyer on different dates and in separate places, hence they originated from separate criminal intents and
consequently resulted in separate felonies. 14Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the defraudations were pursuant to an identical
design, they were committed over a period of about one and a half years and at substantial intervals both in time and in distance of situs.
More conclusive is the fact that, after the commission of one estafa, the accused could not have had the foreknowledge as to when or
whether they could replicate the same felony against another victim still necessarily unknown. This lack of prevision on their part definitely
proves that the criminal intent entailed in a preceding swindle could not operate as the same criminal intent in futuro as regards another
subsequent estafa. 15 The inescapable conclusion is that, all told, a total of eight crimes of estafa were actually committed by the accused
against different victims.
3. There is, therefore, no cogency in the proposition that the prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion in filing eight separate
charges of estafa, or, for that matter, that the trial court and respondent court are guilty of the same discretional error in refusing to quash
the eight informations.
If, as petitioners seem to apprehend, the adverse actions of two lower courts could create a scenario of multiple prosecutions for the same
offense or, more candidly expressed, of double jeopardy, then this is neither the procedural stage nor the proper occasion to pass upon
that possibility. For, squarely imputable to petitioners is the evident lack of factual basis for and a grossly defective presentation of that issue
for this Court to rule thereon in this proceeding and at this time.
However, this observation would not foreclose relief to petitioners if at the trial of this case the evidence presented and the developments
therein suffice to establish the supervenient fact that indeed there could possibly be a breach of the rule of double jeopardy. Under
Section 8 of Rule 117, they can still hereafter raise that defense of non bis in idem, provided that they can lay the evidentiary bases therefor
and refute from the standpoint of substantive penal law what was earlier said on the nature and the non-identity of the several crimes of
estafa involved which, to repeat, we pronounced purely on the bases of existing records sans the benefit of any evidentiary fact since
none has been adduced.
ACCORDINGLY, the impugned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with treble
costs against petitioners. This judgment is immediately executory and, upon entry thereof in due course, the record of this case is ordered to
be forthwith remanded to the court a quo which is hereby DIRECTED to take appropriate action therein with all deliberate and practicable
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181626 May 30, 2011

SANTIAGO PAERA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This resolves the petition for review 1 of the ruling2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City3 (RTC) finding petitioner Santiago Paera
guilty of three counts of Grave Threats, in violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his constituents use of
communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land
located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of complainant
Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioners scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner
reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.
The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap
from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo,
fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by the parties.
According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!"
(I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water
tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye
ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I dont spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the
nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he
passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo!" ("Even
if you are old, I will crack open your skull!").
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring why petitioner had severed his water
connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.
Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner was the defenses lone witness.
The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC) found petitioner guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to
serve time and pay fine for each of the three counts.4 The MCTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Grave
Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs persistent water tapping contrary to petitioners directive "must have angered"
petitioner, triggering his criminal behavior.5 The MCTC rejected petitioners defense of denial as "self-serving and uncorroborated."6
Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latters finding on petitioners motive. The RTC similarly found unconvincing petitioners denial in
light of the "clear, direct, and consistent" testimonies of the Darongs and other prosecution witnesses.7
Hence, this appeal.
Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the "continued complex crime" of Grave
Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case filed by Vicente as the latters failure to testify allegedly deprived him of his
constitutional right to confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the charges for having acted in defense of the
property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty, justifying circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC.8
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioners concession of liability for the single count of the
"continued complex crime" of Grave Threats. The OSG, however, rejects petitioners prayer for the dismissal of Vicentes complaint, arguing
that petitioners guilt was amply proven by the prosecution evidence, not to mention that petitioner failed to raise this issue during trial.
Further, the OSG finds the claim of defense of stranger unavailing for lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG
notes the absence of regularity in petitioners performance of duty to justify his conduct.9
The Issue
The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.
Due Process Mischief in Raising
New Issues on Appeal
Although uncommented, petitioners adoption of new theories for the first time before this Court has not escaped our attention. Elementary
principles of due process forbid this pernicious procedural strategy - it not only catches off-guard the opposing party, it also denies judges
the analytical benefit uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts generally refuse to pass upon freshly raised theories.10 We would have applied
this rule here were it not for the fact that petitioners liberty is at stake and the OSG partially views his cause with favor.
Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats
To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case to the concept of "continued crime" (delito
continuado) which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.11 To fix the
penalty for his supposed single continued crime, petitioner invokes the rule for complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC imposing the
penalty for the most serious crime, applied in its maximum period.
The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of continued and complex crimes preclude the
adoption of petitioners theory.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the
latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime[.]" This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the
person threatened."12
Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioners threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and crack open Vicentes skull are wrongs on the
person amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were
consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at
different points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.
Petitioners theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had "a single mental resolution, a single impulse, and
single intent"13 to threaten the Darongs assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicentes presence
near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however, belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was
as much surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing petitioner when they chanced upon each other near the water tank.
Similarly, petitioner came across Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly, petitioner crossed paths with
Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner went to the water tank not to execute his "single intent" to threaten Indalecio,
Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of the Darongs presence near the water
tank at the time in question, petitioner could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came
across each of them.
The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of "continued crime" undergirded our ruling in Gamboa v. Court of
Appeals.14 There, the accused, as here, conceded liability to a lesser crime one count of estafa, and not 124 as charged theorizing that
his conduct was animated by a single fraudulent intent to divert deposits over a period of several months. We rejected the claim
15 x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, petitioners intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose only when he chanced upon each of his
victims.
Indeed, petitioners theory holds water only if the facts are altered that is, he threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same
place and at the same time. Had this been true, then petitioners liability for one count of Grave Threats would have rested on the same
basis grounding our rulings that the taking of six roosters16 or 13 cows17 found at the same place and taken at the same time results in the
commission of only one count of theft because
[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which
determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters [and heads of cattle] in the same place and on
the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct
appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.18 (Emphasis in the original)
Having disposed of petitioners theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to extensively pass upon his use of the notion of
complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty scheme. It suffices to state that under Article 48 of the RPC, complex crimes encompass either
(1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another19 and petitioner neither performed a single act resulting in less or less grave crimes nor committed an offense as a means of
consummating another.
 The Prosecution Proved the Commission
of Grave Threats Against Vicente
We find no reversible error in the RTCs affirmance of the MCTCs ruling, holding petitioner liable for Grave Threats against Vicente. The
prosecutions evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two other corroborating witnesses, 20 indisputably show
petitioner threatening Vicente with death.21 Vicentes inability to take the stand, for documented medical reason,22 does not detract from
the veracity and strength of the prosecution evidence. Petitioners claim of denial of his constitutional right to confront witnesses is
untenable as he had every opportunity to cross-examine the four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the presentation of the private
complainant as condition for finding guilt for Grave Threats, especially if, as here, there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its
commission against the non-testifying complainant. Significantly, petitioner did not raise Vicentes non-appearance as an issue during the
trial, indicating that he saw nothing significant in the latters absence.
No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioners
Commission of Grave Threats
There is likewise no merit in petitioners claim of having acted to "defend[] and protect[] the water rights of his constituents" in the lawful
exercise of his office as punong barangay.23 The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, which negates criminal
liability of
[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil
motive.1avvphi1
requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment.24 None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs
committed acts of aggression against third parties rights when petitioner successively threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of
them were performing ordinary, peaceful acts Indalecio was standing near the water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and
Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the
reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third requisite, the records more than
support the conclusion that petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs repeated refusal to follow his water distribution
scheme, causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.
Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof
that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of office.25 Arguably,
petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of basic services" 26 when he barred the Darongs access to the
communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed
weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his office
lay before petitioner27 and his resort to any of them would have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions
outside of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services
justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch
39.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
[G.R. NOS. 136300-02. September 24, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMMANUEL AARON, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and
6732 convicting herein appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity.
The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three counts of rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-
B of the Revised Penal Code,[2] respectively, in three separate criminal complaints filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G.
Grajo, and subscribed and sworn to on January 17, 1998 before 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar M. Lasam. Save for their docket
numbers, the said criminal complaints are identically worded thus:
That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in
having sexual intercourse with the offended party JONA G. GRAJO, against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage and
prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused, Emmanuel Aaron, assisted by counsel of his choice, entered the plea of not
guilty to each of the three complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16, 1998, at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, the private complainant,
Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed (papag) inside her room on the second floor of the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her
brother-in-law, herein appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was covered with a blanket. Sensing that someone
was inside her room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to find Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked. Emmanuel
immediately went on top of Jona and poked a knife on her neck. Jonas attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel quickly covered
her mouth with his left hand.[3]
Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who could only manage to cry. Subsequently,
Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona to lie down on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for the second time with the
knife still poked on Jonas neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie down near the headboard of the papag bed
where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time, still armed with a knife, and continued making pumping motions
(umiindayog).[4]
After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only after Jona told him that she urgently
needed to relieve herself (Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na ang pantog ko.) but not before warning her not to tell anyone about the
incident. Jona quickly put on her panty and hurried down the street in front of the apartment with only a blanket covering herself. Her cries
drew the attention of a neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to go back inside the apartment, to no avail, for fear of
Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another neighbor, a certain Agnes, Jona revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law,[5] the
appellant herein.
Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon the latters arrival from the market and she related the misfortune that had
befallen her. At that instance, Emmanuel approached and warned her to be careful with her words. Then he left for the house of Bong
Talastas.[6]
After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and dressed up. Thereafter, she went to the police station in Balanga, Bataan to
report the incident.[7] Police Officers Rommel Morales and Edgardo Flores proceeded to the residence of the private complainant who
appeared very tense but the neighbors informed them that Emmanuel had left. The police officers then proceeded to the house of Bong
Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, where the victim told them Emmanuel could have possibly gone. On arrival there, they found
Emmanuel conversing with Bong Talastas and they immediately arrested the appellant herein upon ascertaining his identity. [8]
After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police Officers Morales and Flores accompanied Jona to the provincial hospital in
Bataan for physical examination. Thereupon, the attending physician at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D., found
multiple healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 oclock position(s), incomplete type in Jona Grajos private part.
At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her signature [9] appearing on the lower right portion of the medical certificate [10] and affirmed
the medical findings contained therein. The multiple hymenal lacerations sustained by Jona which were respectively indicated in the
medical certificate as 1 oclock, 3 oclock, 5 oclock, 6 oclock and 9 oclock could have been caused by sexual intercourse, masturbation,
strenuous exercises or penetration of any hard object. The appearance of a lacerated hymen could indicate the approximate time when
the laceration was sustained. In the case of Jona Grajo, her hymenal lacerations were completely healed, indicating that the same were
sustained at least one month before she was examined on January 16, 1998. However, it was possible that she had sexual intercourse
immediately before the said examination.[11]
The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape charged. Appellant Emmanuel Aaron testified that he and his wife were
residing in an apartment unit together with his sister-in-law, herein private complainant, Jona Grajo.[12] Jona occupied a room on the
second floor while the couple stayed at the ground floor.[13]
On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he and Jona were the only persons inside the apartment. He had just arrived
from work as a night-shift waiter at Base One restaurant in Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier met Bong Talastas at 7:00 oclock in the morning
as Bong was preparing to leave his house while his wife had gone to the market. Emmanuel changed his clothes upstairs where the cabinet
was located opposite the room occupied by Jona. Emmanuel noticed that the door of Jonas room was partly open so he peeped through
the narrow opening and saw her wearing only a panty. He was about to close the door when Jona woke up and began shouting.[14]
Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She even followed as Emmanuel descended the stairs and she proceeded to
the nearby store of their landlady. Emmanuel went her to the store to caution Jona about her words (Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo) because
she was telling their landlady that he raped her. However, Jona ignored him so he left and decided to see Bong Talastas in San Jose,
Balanga, Bataan to inquire from the latter why Jona was accusing him of having raped her. Emmanuel denied that he was armed with a
knife during the incident, much less threatened Jona with it.[15]
On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,[16] the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act of rape having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided by law. The accused is further required to indemnify the
complainant the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Emmanuel Aaron interposed the instant appeal. In his Brief,[17] appellant raised a single
assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Appellant argues that the account of the private complainant, Jona Grajo, of the alleged incidents of rape appears incredible and
contrary to common human experience. Based on her testimony, the appellant suddenly placed himself on top of her with his right hand
poking a knife on her neck and with his left hand covering her mouth. Subsequently, the appellant removed her panty and succeeded in
inserting his penis into her private part even without previously opening his zipper or removing his pants. Likewise, the private complainant
did not offer any resistance although she could have done so. After the alleged acts of rape, the victim did not even complain to her sister
who, by then, had already arrived from the market. The uncharacteristic behavior of the private complainant could only be explained by
the fact that she admittedly had several sexual experiences in the past with her boyfriend and live-in partner Bong Talastas. The appellant
theorizes that private complainant wanted to get back at him for the embarrassment of being seen by him in her panty after her boyfriend,
Bong Talastas, left the apartment. Appellant downplays the testimony of PO1 Rommel Morales as not worthy of credence for lack of
corroborative evidence. [18]
On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the appellant was already naked even before the private complainant was
awakened by his presence; that the private complainant could not effectively offer any resistance as the appellant was armed with a knife
which he used to intimidate her; and that the private complainants being a non-virgin did not discount rape on January 16, 1998.[19]
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed.-- Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above are present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B of the same Code provides:
Article 266-B. Penalties.Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases, this Court is almost invariably guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with
extreme caution and (3) the evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.[20] In other words, the credibility of the private complainant is determinative of the outcome of these cases for
rape. Her consistency on material points, or lack of it, that can sustain or negate conviction, becomes the single most important matter in
inquiry.[21]
After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private complainant, Jona Grajo, sufficiently established all the elements of
rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who must be a man, had
carnal knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.[22] The gist of private complainants
testimony clearly shows that the appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at around 7:00 oclock in the morning on January 16,
1998. The sexual assault started on the papag bed inside her room on the second floor of their apartment unit. After going on top of the
private complainant, the appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after which he made pumping motions while poking a
knife on her neck. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina two more times on the same occasion after transferring
locations inside the room, with the knife continuously poked on her neck.
We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court of private complainants credibility. Her testimony during the trial was
completely credible as it was given in an honest and straightforward manner. As noted above, she gave a lucid and consistent account of
the commission of the crime and did not waiver in pinpointing her brother-in-law, herein appellant, as the perpetrator thereof. Likewise,
her actuation after the incident vividly portrayed a confused and traumatized woman typical of victims of rape. Thus, after she broke free
of the appellant on the pretense that she urgently needed to relieve herself, the private complainant quickly put on her panty and rushed
to the street with only a blanket to cover her naked body.Her neighbors took note of her obviously troubled condition and admonished her
to go back inside the apartment but she refused, claiming that she had been raped. She sought refuge at the nearby store of their
landlady to whom she confided that she was raped by her brother-in-law. Private complainant hurried back to their apartment to get
dressed only upon making sure that the appellant had already left the place. Without losing time, she proceeded directly to the police
station and lodged a complaint for rape against the appellant.
Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga, Bataan, who was the police officer on duty at the time Jona Grajo came to the
police station, recounted during the trial that the private complainant was crying and trembling on arrival at the Balanga, Bataan police
station on January 16, 1998. Private complainant took time to answer the queries of the police officer since she was crying
uncontrollably. When she finally got hold of herself, the private complainant reported that she had been raped by the appellant who was
subsequently arrested by the police. The actuations of the private complainant immediately after the incident may be considered as part
of the res gestae that substantially strengthens her claim of sexual assault by the appellant.[23]
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his defense is bare denial. He claims that he had just changed his clothes on the
second floor of their apartment where his cabinet was located when he chanced upon the private complainant naked inside her room as
the door was then slightly ajar. He did not do anything further as the private complainant was awakened and she already started
shouting. In view of the positive and convincing testimony of the private complainant, however, the defense of denial must fail. It is well-
settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[24]
The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have inserted his penis into the private part of the complainant without first
opening his zipper or removing his pants. This argument of the appellant is misleading for the reason that, per the testimony of the private
complainant, the appellant was already naked when his presence roused her from her sleep:
PROS. LASAM:
Q: While you were in your room on that time and date, do you remember of any incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident?
A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a person inside my room and when I opened my eyes, I saw that he is my brother-
in-law.
Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom you pointed a while ago. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your room?
A: He was naked sitting beside me. [25]
That the private complainant did not offer sustained resistance despite having been ordered twice by the appellant to change
location inside the room can easily be explained by the fact that the appellant was threatening to stab her if she resisted. The private
complainant was obviously overwhelmed by intense fear when she woke up with a knife pointed at her neck. The continuing intimidation
of private complainant cowed her into helpless submission to appellants lechery. She could only express her disgust over the sexual attack
of her brother-in-law silently in tears. In this connection, it has been ruled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because of fear for her life and
personal safety.[26]
The failure of the private complainant to confide the sexual assault to her sister who, appellant claimed, had arrived from the market
before she (private complainant) went to report the matter to the police is quite understandable and far from being uncharacteristic of a
rape victim, as what appellant would like to make it appear. The workings of the human mind which is under a great deal of emotional
and psychological stress are unpredictable and different people will react differently to a given situation.[27] Besides, the private
complainant did not want to drag her sister into the controversy and hurt her in the process. During the trial, the private complainant
revealed that she kept from her sister the previous sexual advances of the appellant in order not to destroy their good relationship. Private
complainant explained that she did not leave the apartment despite the said harassments of the appellant inasmuch as she had no other
place to go. However, she confided her ordeal to their landlady, a certain Elsa Navarro. At any rate, what is important is that the private
complainant reported the rape immediately to the police.
Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with a certain Bong Talastas[28] and that she was not innocent to the ways of
the world. However, such fact alone does not negate the commission of rape by the appellant against her. Dra. Firmacion testified that
although the lacerations found in the private part of Jona Grajo were completely healed, such fact did not discount the possibility that she
was sexually molested immediately before she was examined on January 16, 1998. We emphasize that moral character is immaterial in the
prosecution and conviction of the offender in the crime of rape. The Court has ruled time and again that even a prostitute can be a victim
of rape[29] as the essence is the victims lack of consent to the sexual act.
Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible motive that could have impelled the private
complainant to testify falsely against him.[30] In a desperate attempt to avoid anyresponsibility for his crime, however, the appellant
theorizes that the private complainant merely wanted to exact revenge from him for the embarrassment she experienced when he
chanced upon her clad merely in a panty inside her room. This alleged motive on the part of the private complainant is too shallow to
merit even scant consideration from this Court. If appellant were to be believed, would not private complainant have instead opted to
keep quiet about the incident to spare herself from further embarrassment? Common experiencedictates that no woman, especially one
of tender age, will concoct a rape complaint, allow a gynecological examination and permit herself to be subjected to public trial if she is
not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[31] Indeed, coming out in the open with the accusation
of sexual assault on her by her brother-in-law inevitably entailed risking her relationship with her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her
sister. However, the rape simply proved too much for her to bear.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of rape. It may appear from the facts that the
appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations occurred during one
continuing act of rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no indication in the records, as
the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be inferred that the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed.
Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, the imposable penalty under
Article 266-B is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant. She is also entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). And
due to the emotional distress suffered by the private complainant who was only nineteen years old at the time of the rape, she is also
entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).[32]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting the appellant Emmanuel Aaron of one count of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private complainant the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said appellant shall pay an additional fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) by way of moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS MACHETE, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CRH.C. No. 03371 affirming the
Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 030763 to 030765,
finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias Machete guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by
means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against him.5Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection Unit, University of the Philippines
Philippine General Hospital (UPPGH), who examined the victim.
The testimonies of the abovenamed prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was
then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were being arrested
for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAAs companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was
apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA
pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAAs plea, however,
remained unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them
alighted from the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a
while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be the
one to bring AAA back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Paraaque City. While on
their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered
AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then
took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie
down and to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina despite the
latters plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once
again, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAAs
vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he
would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a school in Paraaque City. But, before
allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed to
the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected
to physical examination by Dr. Tan,11 which resulted in the following findings:
Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 oclock area with petechiae, fresh laceration at 9 oclock area with eccymosi at
HYMEN
810 oclock area, Type of Hymen: Crescentic

xxx

ANAL EXAMINATION Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 oclock area. No evident injury at the time of examination.
xxx

IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA
was able to identify the appellant as her assailant because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with Barangay Police, as well
as a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuzs direct examination, however, the parties made the following stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the
assigned barangay radio operator on that date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2)
that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 oclock a.m.; and
(3) that when he woke up at 5:00 oclock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these stipulations, Corpuzs testimony was
dispensed with.14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive
complaints from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On
the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that
transpired on that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but he denied that he knew her personally. He
also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for
violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead,
the appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested on
25 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical, straightforward and positive testimony of AAA,
coupled with the medical findings of sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under
paragraph 1(a) of Article 266A, in relation to Article 266B, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus,
decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial courts Decision to the Court of Appeals with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE
ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM
OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellants
conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts
revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAAs vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one after
another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength
would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his
conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective appeal briefs23 filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of
Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation attended the commission of rape. Records
revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive
throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all
the opportunity to escape, which she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on
the veracity of her testimony and on her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAAs medical examination is quite disturbing as it appears that her anal orifice was also
penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5) minutes between each
penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime
importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages awarded in favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and
while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the
intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the complainant. Following the above principles, this
Court is dutybound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason to reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article
266B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These provisions specifically state:
ART. 266A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2)
when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age.26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is
not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force
or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception
and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to
cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is
threatened with death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as observed by the trial court, which the Court of
Appeals sustained, AAAs categorical, straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the
same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life
and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, not only
once but thrice. This happened despite AAAs plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he
would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was
still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the
appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and
was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed
that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within appellants reach,
therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAAs lack of
physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently.
Further, as has been consistently held by this Court, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be established
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace because of fear for
her life and personal safety. The victims failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal
acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual
expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some
may shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAAs credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result
of AAAs medical examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in
her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to appellants advantage and would not in
any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAAs testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical
certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even
though AAA made no mention of any anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the
appellant. As succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing
experience in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her
to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and undress herself at a point of a gun; and successfully
inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first penetration the appellant stopped. After about
five minutes, however, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and
last time, the appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the medical findings showing
fresh hymenal lacerations on AAAs vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma a
disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of
argument that the rape was committed without force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA
was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
the same cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified
the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight.
While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of
the victim,33 as in this case.
Also, appellants alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at
12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
when it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00
midnight, almost the same time the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even bolster the possibility of the
appellants presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any illmotive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against him. This bolsters the
veracity of AAAs accusation since no woman would concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to
herself and her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by
her quest to seek justice for the crime committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellants guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention
fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victims vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the
floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into the victims vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the
victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victims vagina and
continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite
the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to
commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime
was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was
obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we quote with approval the observations of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the
[appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at
an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit
those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several criminal
intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct
criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellants conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that [w]henever the rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As it was properly alleged and proved
that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages
which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral
damages, on the other hand, is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of
AAA.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The award of exemplary damages is justified under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. 39 In this case, since the qualifying
circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CRH.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the
interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Acting C.J., Del Castillo, Mendoza** and Leonen,*** JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by Defendant Appellant Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed on December 22, 1955. A
similar petition, filed on December 28, 1953, had been denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2, 1954. Although not stated in
said resolution, the same was due mainly to these circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is
charged with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital punishment, it is
claimed, may be imposed, although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment. Upon the other hand, the defense
contends, among other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. Inasmuch as the issue thus raised had
not been previously settled squarely, and this court was then unable, as yet, to reach a definite conclusion thereon, it was deemed best
not to disturb, for the time being, the course of action taken by the lower court, which denied bail to the movant. After mature
deliberation, our considered opinion on said issue is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2) Guillermo
Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G. Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes alias Bonifacio, (4)
Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S. alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias
Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias
William, (10) Jacobo Espino, (11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian Lumanog alias Manue, of the crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, arsons and robberies committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one
(31) Defendants charged in criminal cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May
11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their co-conspirators, being then
officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) formerly known as the Committee on
Labor Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central
offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other mass organizations in different places in the Philippines,
and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of the
Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the
Philippines, as the herein Defendants and their co-conspirators have in fact synchronized the activities of the CLO with the rebellious
activities of the HMB and other agencies, organs and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and have otherwise
master- minded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs, and instrumentalities of the
P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines, and being then also high ranking officers and/or members
of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against
the Government of the Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the
Philippines, and of which party the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks), is
the armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command
the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the
Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the
allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or Hukbalahaps have risen publicly
and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and
planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the accused as a necessary means to commit
the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same presupposes the commission of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence, does not
apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
Article 134 of said code reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or
other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code any person, merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or
insurrection or who, while holding any public office or employment, takes part therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. engaging in war against the forces of the government,
2. destroying property, or
3. committing serious violence,
4. exacting contributions or
5. diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated.
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether,
subject to only one penalty prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels by
turning over to them, for use in financing the uprising, the public funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted for
malversation of such funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with malversation of public
funds. The reason is that such malversation is inherent in the crime of rebellion committed by him. In fact, he would not be guilty of rebellion
had he not so misappropriated said funds. In the imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it would even be improper
to consider the aggravating circumstance of advantage taken by the offender of his public position, this being an essential element of the
crime he had perpetrated. Now, then, if the office held by said offender and the nature of the funds malversed by him cannot aggravate
the penalty for his offense, it is clear that neither may it worsen the very crime committed by the culprit by giving rise, either to an
independent crime, or to a complex crime. Needless to say, a mere participant in the rebellion, who is not a public officer, should not be
placed at a more disadvantageous position than the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the movement, or the public officers who join
the same, insofar as the application of Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by engaging in war against the forces of the
government and committing serious violence in the prosecution of said war. These expressions imply everything that war connotes,
namely; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryresort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of
liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake except
that, very often, it is worse than war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and
passion or ruthlessness seldom found in a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of engaging in war and committing
serious violence, said resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more offense,
but only one crime that of rebellion plain and simple. Thus, for instance, it has been held that the crime of treason may be committed
by executing either a single or similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one
single continuous offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.) (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no
occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never in the
past, convicted any person of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of
rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the Defendants were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons,
sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 472; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil.,
151; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLeague vs. People, 73 Phil., 155).
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases of treason, resulting from collaboration with the Japanese during the
war in the Pacific. In fact, said cases went further than the aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the theory of the prosecution to the
effect that the accused in said treason cases were guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder and other crimes was expressly and
repeatedly rejected therein. Thus, commenting on the decision of the Peoples Court finding the accused in People vs. Prieto (80 Phil., 138,
45 Off. Gaz., 3329) guilty of cralawthe crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries and sentencing him to death, and on
the contention of the Solicitor General that Prieto had committed the complex crime of treason with homicide, this court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Tuason, said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses
separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the former
was patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make
treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes, of a
deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for
smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a Defendant be made liable
for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of
treason cralaw . Where murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason cralaw they cannot be regarded separately under
their general denomination. (Italics supplied.)
Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159, we used the following language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The lower court found Appellant guilty not only of treason, but of murder, for the killing of Tomas Abella, and, following the provisions of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code sentenced him to death, the maximum penalty provided by article 114.
The lower court erred in finding Appellant guilty of the murder of Tomas Abella. The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a guerilla, is
alleged in count 3 of the information, as one of the elements of the crime of treason for which Appellant is prosecuted. Such element
constitute a part of the legal basis upon which Appellant stands convicted of the crime of treason. The killing of Tomas Abella cannot be
considered as legal ground for convicting Appellant of any crime other than treason. The essential elements of a given crime cannot be
disintegrated in different parts, each one stand as a separate ground to convict the accused of a different crime or criminal offense. The
elements constituting a given crime are integral and inseparable parts of a whole. In the contemplation of the law, they cannot be used
for double or multiple purposes. They can only be used for the sole purpose of showing the commission of the crime of which they form
part. The factual complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the functional ability of worm multiplication or amoeba
reproduction. Otherwise, the accused will have to face as many prosecutions and convictions as there are elements in the crime of
treason, in open violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. (Italics supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil., 164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the direct participation of
the Defendant therein in the maltreatment and killing of several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Peoples Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as treason with murder. The killing of Amado Satorre and one Segundo is
charged as an element of treason, and it therefore becomes identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. (People vs.
Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See, also People vs. Labra, L-886, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 159.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1, 46 Off. Gaz., 4207. We stated therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders, with the result that the penalty
provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying
circumstances, the court believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killings were murders qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and an armed band.
We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part of the treason. They were in this
case the overt acts which, besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. (Italics supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213, had been convicted by the Peoples Court of the crime of treason
complexed with the crime of murder and sentenced to the extreme penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we
expressed ourselves as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort by
acting as their spy, undercover man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender their
firearms and disclose information about the guerrillas has been fully established. His manner of investigation and maltreatment of some of
his victims like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was so cruel, brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino can commit
and practice such atrocities especially on his own countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunism can and do produce
characters and monster unknown during peace and normal times.
The Peoples Court found the Appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder. The Solicitor General, however, maintains that the
offense committed is simple treason, citing the doctrine laid down by this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, (L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329)
but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, and not compensated by
any mitigating circumstance, and he recommends the imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the
basis of the ruling of this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, supra, the Appellant may be convicted only a treason, and that the killing
and infliction of physical injuries committed by him may not be separated from the crime of treason but should be regarded as acts
performed in the commission of treason, although, as stated in said case, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried
out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs. Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off. Gaz., 4299, in which, through Mr. Justice Reyes
(A), we declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw we find merit in the contention that Appellant should have not been convicted of the so called Complex crime of treason with
murder, robbery, and rape. The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but
as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general
charged they cannot be used in combination with the treason to increase the penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People
vs. Prieto, L-399, January 29, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only. (Italics supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language used was:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw But the Peoples Court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder, because murder was an
ingredient of the crime of treason, as we have heretofore held in several cases. (Italics supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 12, p. 252:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Solicitor General recommends that the Appellant be sentenced for the complex crime of treason with murder. We have already
ruled, however, that where, as in the present case, the killing is charged as an element of treason, it becomes identified with the latter
crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. (Italics supplied.)
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (94 Phil., 477), decided on February 26, 1954. The
facts and the rule therein laid down are set forth in our unanimous decision in said case, from which we quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war and at the time of the filing of the present petition a
lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code in an information filed in the Peoples Court. But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on
January 13, 1947, indicted for violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, before a military court
created by authority of the Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the first and third, were those of
treason consisting in giving information and aid to the enemy leaving to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with
anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the enemy, while the second was that of
having certain civilians filled in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947,
sentenced by the military court to life imprisonment.
With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the Peoples Court, the criminal case in that court against
the Petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges of
treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended information, Petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the
jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the
motion and, after Petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was
filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court different from that charged in the civil court and that even granting
that the offense was identical the military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the Peoples Court had
previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is
urged that the amended information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those charged in
the military court. But we note that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court were not
specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and
one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt act he has done or might have
done for that purpose constitute but a single offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 44. Off. Gaz., 909; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Pacheco,
L-4750, promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the amended information in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga is treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration of additional ovart acts not specifically mentioned in
the indictment before the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a new and distinct
offense from that of treason, and this court has repeatedly held that a person cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also
guilty of overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the
simple reason that those overt acts are not separate offenses distinct from that of treason but constitute ingredients thereof. (Italics
supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on the question whether said crime may be complexed with murder, when
the former was committed through the latter, and it is so alleged in the information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself in the
negative as early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra (L-1240, decided on May 12, 1949), the dispositive part of which partly
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to the offense of
treason with murder. However for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be sentenced to life
imprisonment cralaw ..
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code and the offense of treason with murder, it should be noted that we
affirmed therein the action of the Peoples Court, which, according to the opening statement of our decision, convicted Labra of treason
aggravated with murder. Besides, the applicability of said articles was not discussed in said decision. It is obvious, from a mere perusal
thereof, that this court had no intention of passing upon such question. Otherwise, it would have explained why it did not follow the rule laid
down in the previous cases of Prieto, Labra (August 10, 1948), Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan (supra), in which the issue was
explicitly examined and decided in the negative. Our continued adherence to this view in the subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea,
Pacheco and Crisologo, without even a passing reference to the second Labra case, shows that we did not consider the same as
reflecting the opinion of the court on said question. At any rate, insofar as it suggests otherwise, the position taken in the second Labra case
must be deemed reversed by our decisions in said cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from each other. This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more reason to apply said rule in the crime of
rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing rebellion (Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of engaging
in war and committing serious violence among its essential elements thus clearly indicating that everything done in the prosecution of
said war, as a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised Penal Code) which is
less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority may be committed with physical
injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162), homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690), then
rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in war, serious violence,
physical injuries and destruction of life and property are inherent in rebellion, but not in assault upon persons in authority or agents of
persons in authority or in rape. The word rebellion evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a
bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault upon persons in authority connotes necessarily, or
even generally, either physical injuries, or murder. 1
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of the insurrection is guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, our
attention has been called to Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines, reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente segun las
disposiciones de este Codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como tales los jefes principales de la rebelion o sedicion.
and to the following observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 110), in relation thereto:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comete otros delitos (v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera
responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la
rebelion o sedicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su
solucion ha quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como accidentes de la rebelion
o sedicion cuya criminalidad queda embedida en la de estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente los hechos de
escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypor el contrario, las infracciones graves,
como el asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o de la sedicion.
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal Code of the Philippines has not been included in our Revised Penal
Code. If the applicability of Article 48 to rebellion was determined by the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter
would be indicative of the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was that punished in the Spanish Penal Code, Article 243 of which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta hostilidad contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los
objetossiguientes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o privarles de su libertad personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto
contrario a su voluntad.
2. Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para Diputados a Cortes o Senadores en todo el Reino, o la reunion legitima de las mismas.
3. Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los Cuerpos Colegisladores o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4. Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.
5. Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de tierra o de mar, o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la
obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.
6. Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de sus facultades constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre
ejercicio. (Articulo 167, Codigo Penal de 1850. Veanse las demas concordancias del articulo 181.)
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that rebellion includes the act of engaging in war against the forces of the
Government and of using serious violence for the purposes stated in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of this express statutory
inclusion of the acts of war and serious violence among the ingredients of rebellion in the Philippines, it is clear that the distinction made by
Cuello Calon between grave and less grave offenses committed in the course of an insurrection cannot be accepted in this jurisdiction.
Again, if both classes of offenses are part and parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor, neither law nor logic justifies the exclusion
of the one and the inclusion of the other. In fact, Cuello Calon admits that the difficulty lies in separating the accidents of rebellion or
sedition from the offenses independent therefrom. Ergo, offenses that are not independent therefrom, but constituting an integral part
thereof committed, precisely, to carry out the uprising to its successful conclusion are beyond the purview of Article 244. Indeed, the
above quoted statement of Cuello Calon to the effect that grave felonies committed in the course of an insurrection are independent
therefrom was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the Codigo Penal de
Filipinas, by Jose Perez Rubio, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de 1872, tiene declarado:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que segun los articulos
184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del reformado (1870), los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o con motivo de
ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las disposiciones de los mismos Codigos; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy con arreglo al decreto de
amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas, procesadas o sujatas a
responsabilidad por delitos politicos de cualquiera especie -cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre de 1868; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryQue
el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de Burgos no fue resultado de movimiento alguno politico, sino de un mero tumulto que imprimio el
fanatismo, y cuya unica aparente tendencia era impedir que aquel funcionario inventariase ciertos objetos artisticos que se decian
existentes en la Catedral:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que esto lo demuestran las salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los asesinos
contra la persona del Gobernador; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysin que al ejecutar en el mismo recinto del templo los horrorosos hechos que
aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro grito que el, en aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de Viva la
religion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que la apreciar la Sala sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito de
asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar inaplicable el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido el error de derecho
sealado en los casos 1. 3. del articulo 4. de la ley sobre establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos 250 y 259 del
Codigo Penal de 1870. (Page 239; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics supplied.) (See, also, El Codigo Penal, by Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I, p.
623.)
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue therein on whether murder may be complexed with rebellion or sedition. The
question for determination was whether the killers of the victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or should have been convicted
only of rebellion or sedition. The court adopted the first alternative, not because of the gravity of the acts performed by the accused, but
because they had no political motivation. Moreover, the Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary to said quotation from Cuello Calon
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos contra el orden publico cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella,
no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre 1903, 19 noviembre 1906; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryla resistencia o acometimiento a la
fuerza publica por los sediciosos es accidente de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.
El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto debe penarse como un delito comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872. Sin
embargo, la jurisprudencia, tratandose de ciertos delitos, es vacilante; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryasi, v. g., el acometimiento al teniente
de alcalde se ha declarado en un fallo independiente de la perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir al alcalde el cumplimiento
de sus providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que un hecho analogo se ha considerado en otra sentenda ya citada como accidente de
la rebelion, 3 Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los sediciosos a la fuerza publica es accidente de la sedicion y no uno de los delitos
particulares a que se refiere este articulo, 23 de mayo 1890. Entre estos delitos a que alude el precepto se hallan las lesiones que puedan
causar los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906. (Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 21, II Cuelo Calon, Derecho Penal, pp. 110-111.) (Italics
supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion y sedicion, de una parte, y el de atentado, esta constituida por la
circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros, los cuales, por su indole generica, absorben a los de atentado y
demas infracciones que durante su comision y con su motivo se cometan, y afirmandose como hecho en la sentencia recurrida que el
procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros, el atendado que se le imputa sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su base el
recurso fundado en supuesto distinto. (Jurisprudencia Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzadoz tumultuariamente para impedir al Delegado de un Gobernador civil
el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse constitutivos de un delito distinto del de sedicion, ni ser, por tanto, perseguidos y
penados separadamente.
La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza publica constituye, en su caso, una circunstancia o accidente de la
sedicion y no es delito de los que el Codigo Penal en este articulo (formerly Article 244, now Article 227) supone que pueden cometerse en
ella o con su motivo, los cuales denomina delitos particulares, y manda que se penen conforme a las disposiciones del propio Codigo. (S.
23-5-890; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryG. 23-6-890; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryt. 44; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypagina 671) (II Doctrina Penal
del Tribunal Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics supplied.)
La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los amotinados que agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de
casacion contra la sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la casa y anula, teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250 (numero 3.) del
Codigo Penal;
Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye una verdadera sedicion, sin que sea licito el dividir este hecho y
calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas que agredieron a dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un accidente de la
sedicion, de la cual eran todos responsables, ya se efectuara por los agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo, por ser comun el objeto que
se proponian y no individual; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy al calificar y penar este hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado cralaw, ha
incurrido en error de derecho e infringido los articulos 250 y siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el 263, numero 2., en
relacion con el 264, numeros 1. y 3., por su aplicacion cralaw (Sent. 3 octubre 1903. Gac. 12 Diciembre) (Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola, Tomo xxviii p. 250).
These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which refers, not to all offenses committed in the course of a rebellion or on the
occasion thereof, but only to delitos particulares or common crimes. Now, what are delitos particulares as the phrase is used in said
article 244? We quote from Viada:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycon arreglo a ella, los delitos
particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebelion er sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como
delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este Codigo
se las sealan. Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o sedicion? En
cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno y otro de los objetos
especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera extrao a la rebelion, y si se hallare definido en algun otro articulo del Codigo, con
arreglo a este debera ser castigado como delito particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose como objetos de la misma,
en los numeros 3., 4. y 5. del articulo 250, hechos que constituyen otros tantos ataques a las personas o a la propiedad, cuales se
consideran como accidentes inherentes a la propria sedicion, y cuales deberan reputarse como delitos particulares o comunes? En
cuanto a los casos de los numeros 4. y 5., estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se requiera para la realizacion de los actos en
aquellos comprendidos es el que debe servirnos de norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion de lo que es ajeno o extrao a
ella. Cuando no exista ese objeto politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza ejercido contra los particulares o cualquiera clase del
Estado, y el atentado contra las propiedades de los ciudadanos o corporaciones mentados en el numero 5. del articulo 250, no seran
constitutivos del delito de sedicion, sino que deberan ser apreciados y castigados como delitos comunes, segun las disposiciones
respectivas de este Codigo y por lo que toca a los actos de odio o venganza ejercidos en la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o
sus agentes, estimamos que deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos aquellos hechos innecesarios 2 para la consecucion del fin
particular que se propusieran los sediciosos y como esenciales, constitutivos de la propia sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio o
venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para el logro del objeto especial a que se encaminaran los esfuerzos de los
sublevados. Asi, en el caso de la Cuestion 1 expuesta en el comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se propusieron los
sediciosos fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya cobranza iba a proceder el comisionado; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypero para lograr este
objeto, como lo lograron, fue preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo amenazaron, lo persiguieron y llegaron hasta
lesionarle. Esas amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino como
accidente inherente a la misma sedicion, por cuanto fueron un medio racionalmente necesario para la consecucion del fin determinado
que se propusieron los culpables.
Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir, cuando se mata por matar, el hecho ya, no puede ser considerado
como un accidente propio de la sedicion, sino como un delito especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al mismo correspondiente. (III
Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italics supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como infracciones de un caracter especial distintas de los denominados
delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido la division de los delitos, desde el punto de vista de su naturaleza intrinseca, en delitos
politicos y delitos comunes o de derecho comun.
Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos individuales (v. gr., los delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad,
contra la propiedad, etc.)
La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara. Desde luego revisten este caracter los que atentan contra el orden politico del Estado,
contra su orden externo (independencia de la nacion, integridad del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno (delitos contra el Jefe del Estado,
contra la forma de Gobierno, etc.). Pero tambien pueden ser considerados como politicos todos los delitos, cualesquiera que sean incluso
los de derecho comun, cuando fueron cometidos por moviles politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse como infracciones de esta clase, no
solo las que objetivamente tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan, sino tambien las que, apreciadas subjetivamente,
manifiestan una motivacion de caracter politico.
Asi podria formulares esta definicion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary es delito politico el cometido contra el orden politico del Estado, asi
como todo delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado por moviles politicos. (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated
for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof, then said
offense becomes stripped of its common complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires
the political character of the latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the Defendant in U. S. vs. Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729) an insurgent who killed a
prisoner of war because he was too weak to march with the retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind without endangering the
safety of the latter was dismissed upon the ground that the execution of said prisoner of war formed part of, and was included in, the
crime of sedition, which, in turn, was covered by an amnesty, to the benefits of which said Defendant was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an unorganized group of insurgents was, pursuant to Article 244 of our old Penal
Code, convicted of homicide for having shot and killed a woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex crime of rebellion with
homicide was not considered in that case. Apart from this, the accused failed to established the relation between her death and the
insurrection. What is more, it was neither proved nor alleged that he had been prompted by political reasons. In other words, his offense
was independent from the rebellion. The latter was merely the occasion for the commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court and the Supreme Court of Spain in cases of treason, rebellion and sedition,
are in line with the trend in other countries, as well as in the field of international relations. Referring to the question as to what offenses are
political in nature, it was said in In re Ezeta (62 Fed. Rep., 972):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been determined by judicial authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work,
History of the Criminal Law of England (Volume 2, p. 71), thinks that it should be interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be
surrendered for extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political disturbances. Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the
house of commons, in 1866, while discussing an amendment to the act of extradition, on which the treaty between England and France
was founded, gave this definition:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection,
or political commotion. Hansards Debates Vol. 184, p. 2115. In the Castioni Case, supra, decided in 1891, the question was discussed by
the most eminent counsel at the English bar, and considered by distinguished judges, without a definition being framed that would draw a
fixed and certain line between a municipal or common crime and one of political character. I do not think, said Denman, J., it is
necessary or desirable that we should attempt to put into language, in the shape of an exhaustive definition, exactly the whole state of
things, or every state of things, which might bring a particular case within the description of an offense of a political character. In that
case, Castioni was charged with the murder of one Rossi, by shooting him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona, in the canton of Ticino,
in Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was a member of the state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a citizen of the same canton.
For some time previous to the murder, much dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed by a large number of inhabitants of Ticino at the
mode in which the political party then in power were conducting the government of the canton. A request was presented to the
government for a revision of the constitution of the canton and, the government having declined to take a popular vote on that question,
a number of the citizens of Bellinzona, among whom was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from which they took rifles and
ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested and bound or handcuffed several persons connected with the government, and forced
them to march in front of the armed crowd to the municipal palace. Admission to the palace was demanded in the name of the people,
and was refused by Rossi and another member of the government, who were in the palace. The crowd then broke open the outer gate of
the palace, and rushed in, pushing before them the government officials whom they had arrested and bound. Castioni, who was armed
with a revolver, was among the first to enter. A second door, which was locked, was broken open, and at this time, or immediately after,
Rossi, who was in the passage, was shot through the body with a revolver, and died, very soon afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but
no one else was injured. Castioni fled to England. His extradition was requested by the federal council of Switzerland. He was arrested and
taken before a police magistrate, as provided by the statute, who held him for extradition. Application was made by the accused to the
high court of justice of England for a writ of habeas corpus. He was represented by Sir Charles Russell, now lord chief justice. The attorney
general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the crown, and the solicitor general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert Woodfal, for the federal
council of Switzerland. This array of distinguished counsel, and the high character of the court, commends the case as one of the highest
authority. It appeared from an admission by one of the parties engaged in the disturbances that the death of Rossi was a misfortune, and
not necessary for the rising. The opinions of the judges as to the political character of the crime charged against Castioni, upon the facts
stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need only refer to the following passages. Judge Denman says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of
violence of a political character with a political object, and as part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking part.
Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political offenses, said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a political character done without reason, done against all
reason; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut at the same time one cannot look too hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in
their political excitement. We know that in heat, and in heated blood, men often do things which are against and contrary to reason; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut none the less an act of this description may be done for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political
rising, even though it is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as even cruel and against all reason, by those who can calmly
reflect upon it after the battle is over.
Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already been cited, was one of the judges, and joined in the views taken as to the
political character of the crime charged against Castioni. The prisoner was discharged. Applying, by analogy, the action of the English
court in that case to the four cases now before me, under consideration, the conclusion follows that the crimes charged here, associated
as they are with the actual conflict of armed forces, are of a political character.
The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the congress of Montevideo in 1888, and recommended by the International
American Conference to the governments of the Latin-American nations in 1890, contains the following provisions (Article
23):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external safety of a state or common offenses connected with these, shall not
warrant extradition. The determination of the character of the offense is incumbent upon the nations upon which the demand for
extradition is made; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand its decision shall be made under and according to the provisions of the law which shall
prove to be most favorable to the accused:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis of treaty stipulations between any of the American nations, but the
article cited may be at least accepted as expressing the wisdom of leading jurists and diplomats. The article is important with respect to
two of its features:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) provides that a fugitive shall not be extradited for an offense connected with a political
offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal or external safety of the state; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) the decision as to the
character of the offense shall be made under and according to the provisions of the law which shall prove most favorable to the accused.
The first provision is sanctioned by Calvo, who, speaking of the exemption from extradition of persons charged with political offenses,
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes or offenses, and it is enough, as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a common crime be connected with a political act, that it be the outcome of or be in the outcome of or be in
the execution of such, to be covered by the privilege which protects the latter Calvo, Droit Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
The second provision of the article is founded on the broad principles of humanity found everywhere in the criminal law, distinguishing its
administration with respect to even the worst features of our civilization from the cruelties of barbarism. When this article was under
discussion in the international American conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some observations upon the difficulty
of drawing a line between an offense of a political character and a common crime, and incidentally referred to the crime of robbery, in
terms worthy of some consideration here. He said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the common offenses are necessarily mixed up with the political in many cases. A
colleague General Caamao (of Ecuador) knows how we carry on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving, beef to feed his troops,
etc.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand since he does not go into the public markets to purchase these horses and that beef, nor the arms and
saddles to mount and equip his forces, he takes them from the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is called robbery everywhere, and
is a common offense in time of peace, but in time of war it is a circumstance closely allied to the manner of waging it. International
American Conference, Vol. 2, p. 615. (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (23) on pages 249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello Calons aforesaid work on
Derecho Penal.
En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una definicion de estos delitos. El Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo 58, define
como delitos contra revolucionarios los hechos encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el poder de los Consejos de trabajadores y
campesinos y de los gobiernos de la Union de Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la seguridad exterior de la Union de
Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas economicas, politicas y nacionales fundamentales de la revolucion proletaria. El Codigo Penal
italiano de 1930 considera en eu articulo 8. como delito politico todo delito que ofenda un interes politico del Estado o un derecho
politico del ciudadano. Tambien se reputa politico el delito comun deteminado, en todo o en parte por motivos politicos. En la ley
alemana de extradicion de 25 diciembre 1929 se definen asi:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Son delitos politicos los atentados punibles
directamente ejecutados contra la existencia o la seguridad del Estado, contra el jefe o contra un miembro del gobierno del Estado
como tal, contra una corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos politicos las buenas relaciones con el extranjero. parrafo 3., 2.
La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal (Copenhague, 31 agosto 3 septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente nocion del
delito politico:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la organizacion y funcionamiento del Estado o contra los derechos que de esta
organizacion y funcionamiento provienen para el culpable.
2. Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de derecho comun que constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion de los
delitos previstos en seccion 1.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary como los hechos dirigidos a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito politico o a
permitir al autor de este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion de la ley penal.
3. No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que su autor sea inducido por un motivo egoista y vil.
4. No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la comunidad o un estado de terror. (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as common offenses and assume the political complexion of the main
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following
penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty
could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable
to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe
than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the word of Rodriguez
Navarro:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo. (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as
amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la suma
de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrino Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said
Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed
for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum
period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each
offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result
of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing therein with an offense which is a means necessary for the commission of
another? To begin with, the culprit cannot, then, be considered as displaying a greater degree of malice than when the two offenses are
independent of each other. On the contrary, since one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other, the evil intent is one,
which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than when the two offenses are unrelated to each other, because, in such event, he is twice guilty of
having harbored criminal designs and of carrying the same into execution. Furthermore, it must be presumed that the object of Article 48,
in its entirety, is only one. We cannot assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the single sentence of which said
article consists, was to favor the accused, and that, before the sentence ended, the former had a change of heart and turned about face
against the latter. If the second part of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable to the accused and, hence, the exact opposite of
the first part each would have been placed in, separate provisions, instead of in one single article. If the first part sought to impose, upon
the culprit, a penalty less grave than that which he would deserve if the two or more offenses resulting from his single act were punished
separately, then this, also, must be the purpose of the second part, in dealing with an offense which is a necessary means for the
commission of another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since 1850, when the counterpart of our Article 48 was inserted in the Penal
Code of Spain, or for over a century, it does not appear to have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of murder
committed in furtherance of an insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes committed as a means necessary for the success of a rebellion had to be
prosecuted separately under the provisions of Article 259 of the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244 of our old
Penal Code. To begin with, these articles are part of a substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of prosecution of the
culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain that common crimes committed during a rebellion or sedition, or on the occasion thereof, shall
be respectively punished according to the provisions of this Code. Among such provisions was Article 90 (later Article 71, then Article 75) of
the Spanish Penal Code, and Article 89 of our old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is a
substantial reproduction. Hence, had the Supreme Court of Spain or the Philippines believed that murders committed as a means
necessary to attain the aims of an uprising were common crimes, the same would have been complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as
the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have not escaped our attention. Those cases involved
members of the constabulary who rose publicly, for the purpose of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon the police force of
Manila, and in an encounter with the latter, killed some members thereof. Charged with and convicted of sedition in the first case, they
were accused of murder in the second case. They pleaded double jeopardy in the second case, upon the ground that the facts alleged in
the information were those set forth in the charge in the first case, in which they had been convicted. This plea was rejected upon the
ground that the organic law prohibited double jeopardy for the same offense, and that the offense of sedition is distinct and different from
that of murder, although both were the result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified with, the other was not discussed or even considered in said cases. Besides,
the lower court applied, in the murder case Article 89 of the old Penal Code which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code but this Court refused to do so. Again, simply because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does not follow necessarily
that a person may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other, without violating the injunction against double jeopardy. For
instance, if a man fires a shotgun at another, who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his death, may he, after
conviction for murder or homicide, based upon said fatal injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the non-fatal injuries
sustained by the victim? Or may the former be convicted of the complex crime of murder or homicide with serious and/or less serious
physical injuries? The mere formulation of these questions suffices to show that the limitation of the rule on double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense does not constitute a license for the separate prosecution of two offenses resulting from the same act, if
one offense is an essential element of the other. At any rate, as regards this phase of the issue, which was not touched in the Cabrera
cases, the rule therein laid down must necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the cases of People vs. Labra (46 Off. Gaz.,
Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra), insofar as inconsistent therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex rebellion with murder and other offenses is that war within the purview
of the laws on rebellion and sedition may be waged or levied without killing. This premise does not warrant, however, the conclusion
drawn therefrom that any killing done in furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is independent therefrom, and may be complexed
therewith, upon the ground that destruction of human life is not indispensable to the waging or levying of war. A person may kill another
without inflicting physical injuries upon the latter, such, for instance, as by poisoning, drowning, suffocation or shock. Yet it is admitted that
he who fatally stabs another cannot be convicted of homicide with physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable that treason may be
committed without torturing or murdering anybody. Yet, it is well-settled that a citizen who gives aid and comfort to the enemy by taking
direct part in the maltreatment and assassination of his (citizens) countrymen, in furtherance of the wishes of said enemy, is guilty of plain
treason, not complexed with murder or physical injuries, the later being as charged and proven mere ingredients of the former. Now
then, if homicide may be an ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion? The proponents of the idea of rebellion
complexed with homicide,. etc., have not even tried to answer this question. Neither have they assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned
decisions in treason cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in the
apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money spent
in connection therewith, as well as of the possible implications or repercussions in the security of the State. The careful consideration given
to said policy of a coordinate and co-equal branch of the Government is reflected in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive
research work undertaken, and the many meetings held by the members of the court for the purpose of elucidating on the question under
discussion and of settling the same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, clear to settle justiceable controversies by the application of
the law. And the latter must be enforced as it is with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity not as the judges would have it.
In other words, the courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof as specified in Articles
134 and 135 of the Revised:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Penal Code as constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty
namely, that prescribed in said Article 135. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the penalties provided in our old Penal Code
(Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Life imprisonment to death for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the rebellion, and, also, for subordinate officers who held
positions of authority, either civil or ecclesiastical, if the purpose of the movement was to proclaim the independence of any portion of the
Philippine territory;
2. Reclusion temporal in its maximum period for said promoters, maintainers and leaders of the insurrection, and for its subordinate
officers, if the purpose of the rebellion was any of those enumerated in Article 229, except that mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
3. Reclusion temporal:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) for subordinate officers other than those already adverted to; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (b) for mere participants in the rebellion falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand
4. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period for participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors of the old Penal Code were tempered. Its aforementioned provisions were
superseded by section 3 of Act No. 292, which reduced the penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years and a fine not
exceeding $10,000, or P20,000, for every person who incites, sets on foot, assists or engages in any rebellion or insurrection cralaw or who
gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in such rebellion or insurrection. Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the authors of the
Revised Penal Code. The penalties therein are substantially identical to those prescribed in Act 292. Although the Revised Penal Code
increased slightly the penalty of imprisonment for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the uprising, as well as for public officers joining
the same, to a maximum not exceeding twelve (12) years of prision mayor, it reduced the penalty of imprisonment for mere participants to
not more than eight (8) years of prision mayor, and eliminated the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more significant when we bear in mind it was approved on December 8, 1930 and
became effective on January 1, 1932. At that time the communists in the Philippines had already given ample proof of their widespread
activities and of their designs and potentialities. Prior thereto, they had been under surveillance by the agents of the law, who gathered
evidence of their subversive movements, culminating in the prosecution of Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364), Feleo (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In fact, the first
information against the first two alleged that they committed the crime of inciting to sedition on and during the month of November, 1930,
and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto.
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in 1935, incorporated a formal and solemn declaration (Article II, section 5)
committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic of the Philippines, to the promotion of social justice. Soon later, Commonwealth
Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, was passed. Then followed a number of other statutes implementing said
constitutional mandate. It is not necessary to go into the details of said legislative enactments. Suffice it to say that the same are
predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a good many of the problems confronting the State are due to social and economic evils,
and that, unless the latter are removed or, least minimized, the former will keep on harassing the community and affecting the well-being of
its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with
the laws enforce during the Spanish regime. Such policy has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although the Government has, for the past
five or six years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution the
established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to consider the
merits and demerits of such policy. This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the government the Congress of the
Philippines. However, the following quotation from Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on this subject and the reason that may
have influenced our lawmakers in making their choice:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se reputaban los hechos que hoy llamamos delitos politicos como mas
graves y peligrosos que los crimenes comunes. Se consideraba que mientras estos solo causan un dao individual, aquellos producen
profundas perturbaciones en la vida collectiva llegando a poner en peligro la misma vida del Estado. En consonancia con estas ideas
fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron en
las leyes penales como los crimenes mas temibles.
Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha realizado en este punto una transformacion profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia
politica dejo de apreciarse con los severos criterios de antao quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla general suave y
benevolo.
El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida, a la revolucion que tuvo lugar en Francia en el ao 1830. El gobierno
de Luis Felipe establecio una honda separacion entre los delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una penalidad mas
suave y sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion. Irradiando a otros paises tuvieron estas tan gran difusion que en casi todos los de
regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado a crear un tratamiento desprovisto de severidad para la represion de estos hechos. No solo las
penas con que se conminaron perdieron gran parte de su antigua dureza, sino qua en algunos paises se creo un regimen penal mas
suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio para ellos la pena de muerte. Tan profundo contraste entre el antiguo y el actual
tratamiento de la criminalidad politica en la mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado por las ideas nacidas y difundidas bajo los
regimenes politicos liberalesacerca de estos delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que la criminalidad da estos hechos no
contiene la misma inmoralidad que la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo relativa, qua depende del tiempo, del lugar, da las
circumstancias, de las instituciones del pais. Otros invocan la elevacion de los moviles y sentimientos determinantes de estos hechos, el
amor a la patria, la adhesion ferviente a determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio por el triunfo de un ideal.
Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han beneficiado peligrosos malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun tiempo una
fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV, 3., b), que llego a alcanzar considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo autoritario, y que tambien
ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en las de otros paises de constitucion democratica en los que, especialmente en los ultimos aos, la
frecuencia de agitaciones politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de numerosas leyes encaminadas a la proteccion penal del
Estado. (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law punishing the offense to dovetail with the policy of the law enforcing
agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders are matters which may be brought to the attention of the departments
concerned. The judicial branch cannot amend the former in order to suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without
violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system. In, short, we cannot
accept the theory of the prosecution without causing much bigger harm than that which would allegedly result from the adoption of the
opposite view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against Defendant-Appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said Defendants, as
means necessary 4 for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and a fine of P20,000; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons
amenable to a similar punishment, said Defendant may be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should deny the motion under consideration, because the security of the State so
requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado V. Hernandez is strong.
However, as held in a resolution of this court, dated January 29, 1953, in the case of Montano vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-
6352):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit must also appear that in case of
conviction the Defendants criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court
has been made.
In fact, in the case at bar, Defendant Amado V. Hernandez was sentenced by the lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but to life
imprisonment. Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon
mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of
our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the
framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1)
to the protection of several aspects of freedom. Thus, in line with the letter and spirit of the fundamental law, we said in the
aforementioned case of Montano vs. Ocampo:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural
tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the determination of the
degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.
xxx xxx xxx
In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of
confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to secure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is
authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the Defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather
than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent
of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the Defendants official and social standing and his other personal circumstances,
seem remote if not nil.
This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity that there is an additional circumstance in his favor he has been
detained since January 1951, or for more than five (5) years, and it may still take some time to dispose of the case, for the same has not
been, and is not in a position to be, included, as yet, in our calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for some Appellants other than Hernandez
as well as the brief for the Government, are pending submission. It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed from the opposition
to the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial
release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.
Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of Defendant- Appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon the filing of a
bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and its approval by the court, let said Defendant-Appellant be provisionally released. It
is SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo and Reyes. J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Amado V. Hernandez and others were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies. The body of the information charged that he and his co-Defendants conspired and that as a necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder,
pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and
fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, and recited the different crimes committed by the Defendants. After
trial Amado V. Hernandez was found guilty and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment from which judgment and sentence he appealed.
The appeal is pending in this Court.
Upon the ground that there is no complex crime of rebellion with murder, the penalty provided for to be imposed upon persons found guilty
of rebellion being prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000 only, 1 the majority grants the petition for bail filed by the Appellant.
Section 1, paragraph 16, Article III, of the Constitution provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Italics supplied.)
The pertinent sections of Rule 110 provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After judgment by a justice of the peace and before
conviction by the Court of First Instance, the Defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
SEC. 4. Noncapital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After conviction by the Court of First Instance Defendant may,
upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
SEC. 5. Capital offenses defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of
its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
SEC. 6. Capital offenses not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
SEC. 7. Capital offenses - burden of proof. On the hearing of an application for admission to bail made by any person who is in custody
for the commission of a capital offense, the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution.
SEC. 13. Bail on appeal. Bail upon appeal must conform in all respects as provided for in other cases of bail.
According to this Rule, a Defendant in a criminal case after a judgment of conviction by the Justice of the Peace Court and before
conviction by the Court of First Instance is entitled to bail. After conviction by the Court of First Instance he, upon application, may still be
bailed in non-capital offenses but at the discretion of the court. When the information charges a capital offense the Defendant is not
entitled to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course this means before conviction. After conviction for a capital offense,
the Defendant has absolutely no right to bail, because even before conviction a Defendant charged with capital offense is not entitled to
bail if the evidence of guilt is strong. So that should a Defendant charged with a capital offense apply for bail before conviction, the
prosecution must establish and show that the evidence of the Defendants guilt is strong if the application for bail be objected to. After
conviction of a Defendant charged with a capital offense there is no stronger evidence of his guilt than the judgment rendered by the trial
court. The judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. Until after the evidence shall have been reviewed and the reviewing court shall have
found that the trial court committed error in convicting the Defendant of the crime charged, the judgment and sentence of the trial court
in such criminal case must be taken at its face value and be given full faith and credit by this Court.
Without a review of the evidence presented in the case, the majority has taken up and discussed the question whether, under and
pursuant to the provisions of article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of rebellion with murder may arise or exist or be
committed and has reached the conclusion that murder as an incident to rebellion, is integrated, imbibed, incorporated, or absorbed in,
or part and parcel of, the last mentioned crime. For that reason it is of the opinion that, as the information filed against Amado V.
Hernandez does not charge a capital offense, he may be admitted to bail at the discretion of the Court.
Even if the majority opinion that the crime charged in the information is rebellion only a non-capital offense be correct, still the
granting of bail after conviction is discretionary, and I see no plausible reason for the reversal of this Courts previous stand, because the
security of the State is at stake.
For these reasons I dissent.

MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Unable to agree to the resolution of the majority, I am constrained to dissent therefrom, not so much from the part thereof granting the
motion for bail, as where it holds not only that there can be no complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson, etc., but
that these crimes when committed during and on the occasion of a rebellion, are absorbed by the latter. The new doctrine now being laid
down besides being, to my mind, quite radical and in open and clear contravention of public policy, is fundamental and of far-reaching
consequences, and I feel it my duty not only to voice my dissent but also to state the reasons in support thereof.
The resolution cites and quotes Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code to support its theory that the five acts enumerated therein particularly
those of engaging in war against the forces of the government, destroying property and committing serious violence, cover all the murders,
robberies, arsons, etc., committed on the occasion of or during a rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand it proceeds to assert that the
expressions used in said article, such as engaging in war against the forces of the government and committing serious violence imply
everything that war connotes such as physical injuries and loss of life. In this connection, it is of profit and even necessary to refer to Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code defining and describing how the crime of rebellion is committed.
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection How committed. The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
According to the above article, rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the government for the purpose or
purposes enumerated in said article. In other words, the commission of rebellion is complete and consummated if a group of persons for
the purposes enumerated in the article, rise publicly, take up arms and assemble. It is not necessary for its consummation that anybody be
injured or killed, be it a government soldier or civilian, or that innocent persons be forcibly deprived of their properties by means of robbery
or that their stores and houses be looted and then burned to the ground. Stated differently, murders, robberies, arsons, etc., are not
necessary or indispensable in the commission of rebellion and, consequently, are not ingredients or elements of the latter.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code providing for Penalty for complex crimes reads thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.)
For better understanding, I deem it advisable to ascertain and explain the meaning of the phrase necessary means used in Article 48.
Necessary means as interpreted by criminologists, jurists and legal commentators, does not mean indispensable means, because if it did,
then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient
thereof. That would be true in the offense of trespass to dwelling to commit robbery in an inhabited house, or the infliction of physical
injuries to commit homicide or murder. The phrase necessary means used in Article 48, merely signifies that for instance, a crime such as
simple estafa can be and ordinarily is committed in the manner defined and described in the Penal Code; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, if
the estafador resorts to or employs falsification, merely to facilitate and insure his committing the estafa, then he is guilty of the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification. So, if one desiring to rape a certain woman, instead of waiting for an opportunity where she could be
alone or helpless, in the fields or some isolated place, abducts her by force and takes her to a forest to ravish her; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryor he enters her home through a window at night and rapes her in her room, then he is guilty of the complex crime of
abduction with rape or rape with trespass to dwelling. The reason is that the commission of abduction of trespass to dwelling are not
indispensable means or ingredients of the crime of rape. They are but means selected by the culprit to facilitate and carry out perhaps
more quickly his evil designs on his victim. Says the eminent Spanish commentator, Groizard, on this point:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Una cosa analoga acontece respecto de los delitos conexionados con una relacion de medio a fin. Tambien en ellos la unidad de acto
moral, que da vida al delito, hace logica la imposicion de una sola pena. Preciso es, sin embargo, distinguir el caso en que el delito medio
sea medio necesario de realizar el delito fin, del caso en que sea puramente medio, pero no medio indispensable. En aquel, el delito
medio no es, en realidad, sino una condicion precisa, una circumstancia sine qua non, un elemento integral de la accion punible
concebida como fin. Sin pasar por uno, seria imposible llegar al otro. La voluntad, libre e inteligente, tiene entonces por unico objeto llegar
al delito fin. Si al recorrer su camino ha de pasar, indispensablemante, por la comision de otro hecho punible, no dos, sino un delito habra
que castigar, toda ves que uno fue el mal libremente querido, no siendolo el otro por si, sino en tanto que era necesario para obtener, la
realizacion del mal proposito concebido.
xxx xxx xxx
Asi, hay que reconocer que es plausible que, cuando un delito es medio de realizar otro, se imponga al culpable la pena
correspondiente al mayor en su grado maximo; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypero que no los es si resulta que ha sido medio necesario. Por lo
contrario, para que sea justo el aumento de pena, con arreglo a la doctrina general acerca del delito y las circunstancia agravantes, es
preciso que existan y no se aprovechen otros procedimientos, otros recursos, mas o menos faciles para consumar el delito. Entonces la
responsibilidad se hace mayor eligiendo un medio que sea un delito en si. El que puede, haciendo uso de su libertad y de su inteligencia,
escoger entre varios procedimientos para llegar a un fin, y se decide por uno que por si solo constituye delito, de este delito no necessario
para la realizacion del proyectado como fin, debe responder tambien.
xxx xxx xxx
Ejemplo:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary el allanamiento de domicilio como medio de llegar al delito de violacion. No es condicion necesaria,
para que la violacion pueda realizarse, el entrar en la morada ajena contra la voluntad de su dueo. Sin esa circunstancia, el delito
puede existir. Ahora bien; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysi el criminal acepta como medio de llegar a la violacion el allanamiento de
domicilio, este delito y el de violacion deben ser castigados observandose en la aplicacion del castigo una unidad de penalidad que
guarde cierta analogia con la unidad de pensamiento que llevo en culpable a la ralizacion de ambos delitos. Para estos y analogos
casos, la razon aprueba la imposicion de la mas grave de las penas en su grado maximo. (Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo II, pp.
495-496.)
Applying the above observations to the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134, the same may be committed by merely rising publicly
and taking arms against the government, such as was done on several occasions as alleged in the information for rebellion in the present
case where a group of Hukbalahaps, entered towns, overpowered the guards at the Presidencia confiscated firearms and the contents of
the municipal treasurers safe, exacted contributions in the form of money, food-stuffs and clothing from the residents and maintained
virtual control of the town for a few hours. That is simple but consummated rebellion. Murder, robbery, arson, etc., are not necessary or
indispensable to consummate the crime of rebellion.
But in other cases, this group or other groups of dissidents in order to facilitate achieving their objective to overthrow the government,
according to the findings of the trial courts in several cases of rebellion, resorted to looting and robberies to raise funds to finance their
movement, sometimes killing civilians who refused to contribute or to be recruited to augment the forces of the rebels or who were
suspected of giving information to the government forces of the movements of the dissidents. Sometimes, homes of town and barrio
residents are set on fire and burned to the ground in reprisal or in order to strike terror into the hearts of the inhabitants, so that they would
be more amenable to the rule and the demands of the rebels. At other times, civilians were kidnapped for purposes of ransom, and some
hostages killed when the ransom was not paid or was not forthcoming. In the raid on Camp Macabulos in Tarlac, besides shooting down
soldiers and officers, buildings were set on fire, inducing the hospital, as a result of which, patients including a Red Cross nurse were killed. In
another case, a passenger bus containing about forty civilian passengers in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, was held up by these armed
dissidents; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe passengers were robbed of their money and jewelry and fourteen of them were shot to death.
The party of Mrs. Aurora Quezon while on its way to the town of Baler, was ambushed in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija by the dissidents and
several members of the party, including herself, her daughter, her son-in-law, Mayor Bernardo of Quezon City, and others were killed, and
their persons despoiled of jewelries and belongings. It is clear that all these acts of murder, vandalism, banditry and pillage cannot be
regarded as ingredients and indispensable elements of the crime of rebellion. The aforecited acts and cases, the enumeration of which is
far from complete, are not based on mere suspicion or hearsay. They are alleged as facts in the numerous counts contained in complaints
or informations for rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc. in several separate cases in the Courts of First Instance,
some still pending trial-but quite a number already decided and now pending appeal before us. There must be much truth to these
charges and counts because in the case against Huk Supremo Luis Taruc, William Pomeroy et al., (criminal case No. 19166 C.F.I., Manila)
Pomeroy pleaded guilty to all the thirty counts against him; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryso did Taruc after seven counts had been eliminated
from the thirty contained in the information. Among the twenty three counts remaining to which Taruc pleaded guilty were the holding up
of forty civilians in a passenger bus in Sta. Cruz, Zambales, and the night raid on Camp Macabulos where hospital patients and a Red Cross
nurse were killed.
Since the above mentioned crimes of multiple murder, robbery, kidnapping, etc., are not ingredients of rebellion nor indispensable to its
commission but only means selected and employed by the offenders to commit rebellion and achieve their goal, a complex crime is
committed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Going back to the theory of the majority in the resolution that the phrase engaging in war and committing serious violence used in Article
134, covers the crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed during a rebellion, I emphatically disagree. Engaging in war and levying
war, against the government, are general terms employed in the United States statutes to define rebellion and treason. They are used
interchangeably and have the same meaning in our law on rebellion and treason, (Articles 114, 134, 135, Revised Penal Code) which are
based on Act 292 of American origin. They do not necessarily mean actual killing of government troops, much less of innocent civilians.
Levying War. The assembling of a body of men for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand all who perform any part, however, minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are leagued
in the general conspiracy, are considered as engaged in levying war, within the meaning of the constitution. (Bouviers Law Dictionary,
Vol. 2, p. 1938.)
This Tribunal defines levying war in the case of U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 478-9, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether an armed resistance to the enforcement of a public
law (see Act No. 292, section 5, 1) constituted a levying of war or not, and war or was not treason, yet they were all unanimous in holding
that acts of violence committed by an armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the Government was levying war against
the United States, and was therefore treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr.,
139; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary26 Fed. Cases, 105.)
xxx xxx xxx
As the act of engaging in a rebellion is levying war, and therefore treason, the same act seems to be punished by both sections and in
different ways. (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil., 48-9.)
Just as a citizen can commit treason by adhering to the enemy and committing treasonable overt acts such as pointing out and helping
arrest guerrillas, accompanying enemy soldiers on patrol and giving valuable information to the enemy, without himself killing anyone of his
countrymen, this although Article 114 uses the phrase levying war to define-treason, so, although Article 135 uses the phrase engaging in
war, a group of individuals may also commit rebellion by merely rising publicly and taking arms against the government without firing a
single shot or inflicting a single wound.
But the majority says that serious violence mentioned in Article 134 may include murder. To me, this view is untenable. From serious violence
to the capital offense of murder, certainly, is a far cry. Besides, serious violence can also be on things. In my opinion, the different acts
mentioned in Article 135, among them, destroying property, committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds,
instead of giving license and unlimited leave to rebels and dissidents to engage in mass murder, looting and wholesale destruction of
property, on the contrary, serve to limit and restrict the violations of law that may be included in and absorbed by rebellion. Article 135
mentions those acts which generally accompany a public armed uprising. When rebels raid a town or barrio, manhandling of civilians who
obstruct their movements or fail to carry out their orders such as to lend their carabaos and carts for transportation purposes, or to
contribute food, clothes, medicines, money etc., may be expected. The rebels may employ force to disarm the policeman guarding the
Presidencia and if he offers resistance beat him up or, once inside, break down the door of the treasurers office, blow up his safe and carry
away the money contents thereof. All these acts involve violence, even serious violence on persons and things, including diversion of public
funds. But knowing that these law violations, relatively not serious, are generally unavoidable in public armed uprisings involving hastily
assembled persons and groups with little discipline the law tolerates them, considering them as part of the rebellion. But when rebels rob
innocent civilians, kidnap them for purposes of ransom, even kill them merely because they fail to pay the ransom, and civilian houses are
put to the torch, endangering the lives of the inmates; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarywhen civilians are killed for refusing to contribute, or on
mere suspicion of their giving information to the government, I cannot believe that these brutal act are condoned by the law and are to
be included in the crime of rebellion.
The majority leans heavily on our decisions in several treason cases wherein we refused or failed to convict of the complex crime of treason
with multiple murder. To me, those cases are neither controlling nor applicable for several reasons. Almost invariably, indictment in those
treason cases alleged the killings committed by the indictees as ingredients and elements of treason. They are mentioned as the overt acts
to establish and prove treason. Naturally, the court held that being ingredients of the crime of treason they cannot be considered as
distinct and separate offenses for the purpose of applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Another reason is that, treason being a
capital offense, this court did not see any immediate necessity for considering and applying the theory of complex crime because the
result would in many cases be practically the same. In other words, treason might yet be said to absorb the crime of homicide, even of
murder, because as regards the penalty, they are of the same category. Still another reason, not an unimportant one is that at that time,
opinion among the members of this Tribunal on the question of complex crime of treason with homicide, sedition with murder and rebellion
with murder, arson, robbery, etc., had not yet crystalized, one way or the other. So, we preferred to avoid ruling on the issue, specially since
by considering the commission of murder, robbery, etc., in treason as aggravating the crime, we would achieve the same result as regards
the penalty to be imposed.
But in the case of People vs. Perfecto Labra, G.R. No. 1240, May 12, 1949, this court through Mr. Justice Bengzon, accepted the view of the
Solicitor General that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, Labra was guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder, as shown
by the dispositive part of our decision in that case, which is quoted below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, the verdict of guilt must be affirmed. Article 48, 114 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to the offense of
treason with murder. However, for lack of sufficient votes to impose the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be sentenced to life
imprisonment.
The only reason why the death penalty was not imposed in said case was because of lack of sufficient votes but evidently, the Justices
were agreed as to the application of Article 48 of the Penal Code regarding complex crimes.
Then in the treason case of People vs. Barrameda, 85 Phil., 789, 47 Off. Gaz., 5082, on the strength of our decision in the case of Labra, the
Solicitor General recommended that Barrameda be also convicted of the complex crime of treason with multiple murder and sentenced
to death. This Tribunal accepted the Solicitor Generals recommendation and imposed the death penalty in the following
language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We entertain not the least doubt as to the guilt of the Appellant. His very counsel de oficio who made an analysis of the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution and painstakingly stated them in detail in his brief, agrees that his client is guilty although he prays that the
sentence of life imprisonment be affirmed. The Solicitor General, however, recommends that the penalty of death be imposed upon
the Appellant. Considering that the treason committed by the Appellant was accompanied not only by the apprehension of Americans (U.
S. citizens) and their delivery to the Japanese forces which evidently later executed them, but also by killing with his own hands not only
one but several Filipinos, his own countrymen, and that in addition to this, he took part in the mass killing and slaughter of many other
Filipinos, we are constrained to agree to said recommendation. However, unpleasant, even painful is the compliance with our duty, we
hereby impose upon the Appellant Teodoro Barrameda the penalty of death which will be carried out on a day to be fixed by the trial
court within thirty (30) days after the return of the record of the case to said court.
With the two aforecited cases, it may not be said that the Supreme Court has always held that there can be no complex crime of treason
with murder.
The theory of the majority is that the crime of rebellion with the maximum penalty of twelve years and fine, absorbs the other crimes of
murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., as long as the latter are committed in the course and in furtherance of the former. The idea of
one crime absorbing a more serious one with a more severe penalty does not readily appeal to the reasonable and logical mind which
can only comprehend a thing absorbing another smaller or less than itself in volume, in importance, in value or in category. That is why
Judge Montesa in the three cases, People vs. Hernandez, People vs. Espiritu, and People vs. Medina, criminal cases Nos. 15481, 15479 and
1411 respectively, of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in his decision convicting the accused therein, in disposing of the theory of
absorption, urged upon him by counsel for the defense to the effect that the crime of rebellion absorbs the crime of murder, robbery,
arson, etc., made the following observations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The theory of absorption tenaciously adhered to by the defense to the effect that rebellion absorbs all these more serious offenses is
preposterous to say the least, considering that it is both physically and metaphysically imposible for a smaller unit or entity to absorb a
bigger one. (Montesa, J., People vs. Hernandez G.R. No. 15481, P. 78.)
We need not go into an academic discussion of this question because as a matter of law, my opinion, criminal jurisprudence, expounding
the criminal law namely the Penal Code and the Penal Code of Spain, on which it is based, expressly and clearly declare that the common
crimes of murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed in the course or by reason of rebellion, are separate crimes, not to be merged in or
absorbed by rebellion and should be prosecuted separately. Article 259 of the Penal Code of Spain, of 1870 on which our Penal Code
promulgated in 1887, was based, provides as follow:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebellion o sedicion o con motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente, segun las
disposiciones de este Codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados como tales los jefes principales de la rebelion o sedicion. (Groiazrd, El
Codigo Penal de 1870, Tomo III, Articulo 259, p. 649.)
In commenting on Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, Viada says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser mas justa; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycon arreglo a ella, los delitos
particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebellion o sedicion no deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como
delitos especiales a dicha rebellion y sedicion ajenos, los que deberan ser respectivamente castigados con als penas que en este Codigo
se les sealan. Pero que delitos deberan considerarse como comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o sedicion? En
cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece este cuestion dificultad alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno u otro de los objetos
especificados en los seis numeros del Articulo 243 sera extrao a la rebelion, y si se este debera ser castigado como delito particular.
(Viada, Codigo Penal, Tomo II, 198-199.)
Pea, another commentator, referring to Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Gode, has the following to say:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La disposicion de este articulo es sobradamente justa, pero cuando se entendera que el hecho es independiente de la insurgencia?
Tratandose de la rebelion no hay problema, pues todos los fines que se indican en el Articulo 214 se distinguen facilmente de un asesinato,
un robo, una violacion, etc. El problema puede surgir con la sedicion, en cuyos tres ultimos numeros, dice un autor, se tipifican conductas
que muy bien pueden ser subsimidas en otros lugares del Codigo. El T.S. parece que sigue este principio
general:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary las infracciones graves se consideran como delitos independientes, en cambio los hechos de menor
gravedad puedan ser considerados como accidentes de la rebelion. En este sentido, el T.S. ha declarado que son accidentes de la
rebelion, los desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad y otros delitos contra el orden publico, asi como la resistencia o acometiendo a la fuerza
publica (23 Mayo 1890). El abuso de superioridad tambien es inherente el alzamiento tumultuario (19 noviembre 1906.) (Pea Deredes
Penal, Tomo II pp. 89-90.)
Another commentator, A. Quintano Ripolles, says of Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, counterpart of Article 244 of our old Penal
Code:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La concurrencia de delitos consignada en este articulo no puede ser mas justa, bien que la dificultad persista siempre para determinar
cuales han de ser los particulares accidentales y cuales los integrantes de la propia subversion. Una doctrina demasiado simplista, que ha
sido a menudo seguida por la Jurisprudencia, es la de estimar que, absorbiendo el delito mas grave al que lo es menos, todo el que por
debajo del de rebelion o sedicion sera anulado por este. Para los del la misma naturaleza, la cosa es incuestionable, pero no para los que
la tengan diversa, entendiendo por la estraa e imprecisa expresion de (particulares) a las infracciones comunes o no politicas. (A.
Quintano Ripolles, Comentarios al Codigo Penal Vol. II, pp. 101-102; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycursivas con neustras.)
Another distinguished legal commentator gives his view on the same Article 259:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Se establece aqui que en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, comente otros delitos (v. g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera
responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion. La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de la
rebelion o sedicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y como las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su
solucion ha quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como accidentes de la rebelion
o sedicion cuya criminalidad queda embebida en la de estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente los hechos de
escasa gravedad (v:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryg., atentados, desacatos, lesiones menos graves); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypor el
contrario, las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las lesiones graves, se consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o del
la sedicion. (Cuello Calon, Vol. 2 Derecho Penal p. 110.)
Finally, Groizard, another eminent commentator of the Penal code of Spain, in commenting on the same Article 259 of the Spanish Penal
Code of 1870, says the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se hubiera escrito en el Codigo, harian los Tribunales lo que dice.
Seria necesario para que asi no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas
clases de delitos. (Groizard Tomo 3, 650.)
It will be seen that Spanish jurists and legal commentators are, with reference to Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870, unanimous
in the opinion that this provision of the Criminal Law is just and fair because one should not take advantage of his committing the crime of
rebellion by committing other more serious crime such as murder, robbery, arson, etc., with impunity. The above much commented Article
259 of the Spanish Penal Code has its counterpart in Article 244 of our old Penal Code in practically the same wording and
phraseology:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 24. All other crimes committed in the course of a rebellion of seditious movement, or on occasion thereof, shall be punished in
accordance with the rules of this Code.
If the perpetrators of such crimes cannot be discovered, the principal leaders of the rebellion or sedition shall be punished therefore as
principals.
In this jurisdiction, we have faithfully observed and applied this penal provision. In the cases of U. S. vs. Cabrera, et al., 43 Phil., page 64 and
page 82 for sedition and multiple murder respectively, wherein members of the Philippine constabulary attacked and killed several
policemen in the City of Manila, this Court convicted said soldiers, first, of sedition and later, of multiple murder, clear proof that the murders
committed in the course of and by reason of the sedition were not included in and absorbed by sedition, this despite the fact that our law
on sedition then, section 5 of Act No. 292, uses the words rise publicly and tumultuously, in order to attain by force or outside of legal
methods any of the following objects are guilty of sedition. In the multiple murder case, the sergeants and corporals of the constabulary,
who took part in the killing of the city policemen, were sentenced to death. This court in that case said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarymurder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the authority of the
government, and the general public tranquility; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarymurder is a crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U. S.
vs. Abad (1902) 1 Phil. 437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarymurder at common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace
of the sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of law, however, nearly they may be
connected in point of fact. Not alone are the offenses eo nomine different, but the allegations in the body of the informations are
different. The gist of the information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by force and
outside of legal methods the object of indicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police force of the city of Manila by
firing at them in several places in the city of Manila; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe gist of the information in the murder case is that the
constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder and
serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for sedition; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the Defendants could
not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information. (Phil. Vol. 43, pages 99-100.)
There is an insinuation made in the majority resolution, that the American Law on sedition and rebellion, the origin of our present law on the
subject, is more benign and liberal than its counterpart in the Spanish Penal Code, defining and penalizing sedition and rebellion, and that
under American jurisprudence, rebellion and sedition include crimes like murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed in the course thereof. But
it will be noticed that of the nine Justices who signed the decision in the case of People vs. Cabrera for multiple murder, five, including Mr.
Justice Malcolm, who penned the decision, were Americans, supposed to be steeped in American Law and the common law, and yet
they all held that sedition where force is expected to be used, did not, include murder. It is evident that the insinuation made in the majority
resolution is not exactly borne out by the Cabrera case.
The majority asks why in the past, especially up to 1932, when our Revised Penal Code was promulgated no one had ever been
prosecuted, much less convicted of rebellion or sedition complexed with murder, robbery, etc., if it is true that there is such a complex
crime of rebellion with murder. For that matter, one may even ask why the constabulary soldiers in the Cabrera case were not charged
with the complex crime of sedition with murder. The reason and the answer are obvious. Until 1932, the year of the promulgation of our
Revised Penal Code, our old Penal Code included Article 244, the counter-part of Article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code, to the effect that
common crimes like murder, robbery, arson, committed on the occasion or by reason of a rebellion or sedition, are to be prosecuted
separately. That was why insurgents who committed rebellion or insurrection with homicide or murder during the first days of the American
regime in the Philippines, could not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murder; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that
explains why Cabrera and his co-accused could not be charged with the complex crime of sedition with multiple murder, but were
prosecuted separately for multiple murder.
The majority also asks why the insurgents in the year 1901 and 1902 were charged only with rebellion but never with murder despite the fact
that there was proof that they also had committed murder in the course of the rebellion or insurrection. The reason to my mind was that,
shortly thereafter, came the proclamation of amnesty issued by President McKinley of the United States, which amnesty covered not only
the crime of rebellion but also other violations of the law committed in the course of the rebellion.
Then came our Revised Penal Code promulgated in 1932. It is a revision of our old Penal Code of 1887. One of the purposes of the revision
was simplification, and elimination of unnecessary provisions. In proof of this, while our Penal Code of 1887 contained 611 articles, our
Revised Penal Code contains only 367 articles. Among the articles of the old Penal Code not included in the Revised Penal Code, is Article
244. Does the omission or elimination of Article 244 mean that now, common crimes like murder, robbery, arson, etc., committed in the
course of a rebellion or sedition are absorbed by rebellion or sedition? Hardly. It cannot be that the committee on revision and our
legislators abandoned the idea and the theory contained in said Article 244, because as I have already explained, all the Spanish
commentators and jurists commenting on this particular provision of the Spanish Penal Code are agreed that it is a just and reasonable
provision, so that sedition and rebellion may not be utilized as a cloak of immunity in the commission of other serious crimes. To me, the
reason for the omission is that it was really unnecessary. As Groizard said in his commentary already reproduced, even if that provision were
not embodied in the penal code, the court would still apply said provision:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No necesita ninguno el parrafo primero de este articulo. Aunque no se hubiera excrito en el Codigo, harian los Tribunales lo que dice.
Seria necesario para que asi no sucediera el que fuera la rebelion un motivo de exencion de responsabilidad criminal para las demas
clases de delitos. (Groizard Tomo 3, 650.)
The members of the committee on revision of our old Penal Code who must have been familiar with the opinion and comments of eminent
Spanish jurists, particularly the above comment of Groizard undoubtedly, deemed the provision of Article 244 superfluous and unnecessary,
and so omitted it in the revision. However, this omission of Article 244 of our Penal Code in the new, has an important effect. No longer shall
we be obliged to prosecute murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., committed in the course of and by reason of a sedition or a
rebellion, separately. The prosecution is now free to combine these common crimes with the crimes of sedition or rebellion and charge a
complex crime. And that is what has been done in the prosecution of the numerous cases of rebellion.
This idea, this theory of complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc., is not such a strange, extravagant or fantastic proposition or
idea. We are not the only ones holding this view. Out of seven separate cases, all involving the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and etc., decided in the Court of First Instance, not long ago, cases No. 14070 People vs. Lava; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryNo.
15841 People vs. Hernandez; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryNo. 2878 People vs. Capadocia; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryNo. 10400
People vs. Salvador No. 2704 People vs. Nava; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryNo. 19166 People vs. Pomeroy and the same case 19166
People vs. Taruc, only one judge, Hon. Gregorio Narvasa, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, held that there is no complex crime of
rebellion with murder, and his holding was based mainly if not entirely on the decisions of this Tribunal in the treason cases which as I have
already explained, are not controlling or applicable. In the other cases, five judges of Courts of First Instance, Judges Ocampo, Castelo,
Barcelona, Gatmaitan, and Montesa, held that there is such a complex crime of rebellion with murder and actually convicted the accused
of said complex crime. Again, in the case of People vs. Umali, et al., criminal case No. 11037 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Province, Judge Gustavo Victoriano, convicted the accused of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc. Recently, in
several criminal cases pending in Pangasinan, involving the complex crimes of rebellion with multiple murder, etc., Judge Morfe of the
Court of First Instance of that province acting upon motions to quash the informations on the ground that there was no such complex crime
of rebellion with murder and consequently, the informations were not in accordance with law, for charging more than one offense, in a
well reasoned and considered order, denied the same and held that there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder. Of course, these
opinions of judges of the lower courts are not binding on this tribunal but surely, they are persuasive and cannot be ignored. At least, they
show that there are others, learned in the law, who subscribe to the theory of complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, etc.
Our decision in the case of People vs. Umali, (96 Phil., 185), promulgated on November 29, 1954, is another proof that murders committed in
the course of sedition or rebellion are not absorbed by the latter. In said case, this court in a unanimous decision found
the Defendants therein guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries and sentenced them accordingly.
The question may again be asked, if there is such a complex crime of sedition with murder, arson, etc., why were Umali and his co-accused
not convicted of this complex crime? The answer is found in a portion of our decision in that case which we
quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense or offenses committed. Appellants were charged with and convicted of the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, etc.? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that Appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his
stand asks for leave to incorporate by reference his previous arguments in opposing Umalis petition for bail, counsel
for Appellants considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non- existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature of the
crime committed is of no moment to herein Appellants because they had absolutely no part in it whatsoever. For the present, and with
respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and controversial question, deferring its consideration and
determination to another case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly and squarely raised and both parties given an
opportunity to discuss and argue the question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is
no such complex crime of rebellion with murder; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryetc., and that consequently Appellants could not have been
legally charged with it, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore, be regarded as having charged
more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2(e), of the Rules of Court, but that Appellants having
interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several and separate crimes charged
therein, we have decided and we rule that the Appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter
specified. We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence
we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the court below, which is life imprisonment.
The majority resolution invokes and applies the principle of the so called pro reo in connection with Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code on
complex crimes, to the effect that said article should not be applied when the resulting penalty exceeds the sum total of the several crimes
committed constituting the complex crime. According to the majority, the theory of pro reo is that the principle of complex crime was
adopted for the benefit of the accused and not to his prejudice; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryso, it is to be applied when the maximum of
the penalty for the more serious crime is less in severity or duration of imprisonment than the sum total of the several crimes committed, but
not otherwise. This is a novel theory in this jurisdiction. To my knowledge it has never been advanced before. All along and during all these
years, the courts of this country not excluding this august tribunal had been applying the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
and its source, Article 89 of our Penal Code of 1887, regardless of whether or not the resulting penalty was prejudicial to the accused. As a
matter of fact, in most cases the resulting penalty imposed by this tribunal in complex crimes was much more severe and of longer duration
(imprisonment) than the sum total of the two or more crimes committed. In the numerous cases decided by this court involving the
complex crime of estafa through falsification, the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime of falsification was imposed although
it exceeded the total of the penalties for estafa and for falsification. In cases of rape with physical injuries the maximum of the penalty for
the crime of rape was imposed although it exceeded in duration and severity the total of the penalty for rape and that for the relatively
light penalty for physical injuries. In the case of People vs. Parulan (88 Phil., 615), involving the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, this
tribunal applied the provision of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and would have sentenced the accused to death, were it not for one
dissenting vote based not on the applicability of Article 48, but on the question of jurisdiction. Said this court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
La pena que debe imponerse al acusado Parulan es la del delito mas grave de secuestro en su grado maximo, o sea, pena capital. Pero
el Magistrado Sr. Tuason, consecuente con su opinion disidente en Parulan contra Rodas, supra, no puede confirmar la pena capital
impuesta por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila que segun el no tenia jurisdiccion sobre la presente causa. En vista de este voto
disidente, el presidente del tribunal Sr. Paras y tres magistrados aunque creen que el acusado Parulan, por las pruebas presentadas,
merece pena capital, con todo no pueden votar por la comfirmacion porque el delito se cometio antes de la aprobacion de la Ley de la
Republica No. 296, que solo exige ocho votos para la imposicion de la pena capital. Antomaticamente, por ministerio de la ley debe
imponerse a Parulan la pena inmediatamente inferior a la de muerte, que es la de reclusion perpetua con las accesorias. (88 Phil., p.
624.)
Then in the case of People vs. Guillen * 47 Off. Gaz., 3433, involving the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder
committed by the accused with a single act of hurling a hand grenade at President Roxas, this tribunal in a per curiam decision, ignoring
the aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, applied the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime
of murder in accordance with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced the accused to death. Other instances and cases may
be cited ad libitum to show that in this jurisdiction and in this tribunal, the principle of pro reo was never entertained, much less accepted.
Origin of pro reo principle
Up to the year 1908, the Spanish Penal Code had the following provisions for complex crimes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave, aplicandola en su grado maximo.
The above provisions were copied in our Penal Code of 1887 under Article 89 which reads thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The provisions of the next preceding article are not applicable to cases in which a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or when one
offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
In these cases, only the penalty of the more serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum degree.
On January 3, 1908, the Spanish Penal Code was amended, particularly paragraph 2 of Article 90 thereof so as to add to said paragraph
the following clause:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente ambos delitos.
so that since January 1908, Article 90 of the Spanish Penal Code reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave, aplicandola en eu grado maximo hasta el limite que
represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente ambos delitos.
The amendment is the provision for the so called pro reo rule. But we never accepted much less followed said innovation in the Philippines.
We did not amend Article 89 of our old Penal Code particularly paragraph 2 thereof so as to add the clause:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hasta el limite que represente la suma de las dos que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente ambos delitos.
inserted by the amending Spanish Law of January 3, 1908 to the second paragraph of Article 90 of the Spanish Penal Code. Furthermore,
when we drafted and promulgated our Revised Penal Code in 1932 (Article No. 3815) we ignored and did not accept the amendment to
the Spanish Penal Code that favored one accused of a complex crime as regards the penalty, so that now our law on the subject is
contained in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which as amended by Act No. 4000, reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As
amended by Act No. 4000.)
The majority resolution makes a more or less extensive dissertation and citation of authorities on the law of extradition, intended to show
that common crimes such as murder, etc., committed on the occasion of or in the course of the commission of political crimes like sedition
and rebellion, are not subject to extradition. We believe that these citations and these arguments are neither relevant nor applicable. All
we can say is that a murder committed in the course of a rebellion or sedition may be considered a political crime in contemplation of the
extradition law and that a person accused of said murder is not subject to extradition. But a crime may be considered political from the
standpoint of the extradition law and yet may be regarded by the country where committed as a common crime separate and distinct
from the rebellion or sedition in the course of which it was committed, and, consequently, subject to prosecution. Moreover, the fact that a
murder committed in the course of a sedition or rebellion is excluded from the scope of the extradition agreement between nations, is
proof and argument that were it not for its exclusion, the member nations of the extradition agreement, where murders are committed in
the course of a rebellion or sedition may and would extradite the offenders, on the theory that said murders are separate from and are not
absorbed by the rebellion or sedition; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryotherwise, there would be no need for excluding such crimes of murder,
arson, etc., committed during a rebellion or sedition, from the scope of the extradition law. And among such nations which consider these
common crimes of murder, etc., as separate from rebellion or sedition during which they were committed, are Spain, as shown by Article
259 of its Penal Code, and the Philippines as illustrated in the cases of U.S. vs. Cabrera and People vs. Umali, supra. Groizard lists down
several countries that consider common crimes committed during a rebellion or sedition as subject to
prosecution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Codigo del Canton de Zurich.
S. 75. Si con motivo de la sedicion o como consecuencia fueren cometidos otros delitos, estos seraan castigados conforme a las
disposiciones penales para los mismos fijadas.
Codigo de Peru.
ART. 145. Los reos de rebelion, sedicion o asonada son responsables de los delitos especiales que cometen, observandose lo dispuesto en
el Articulo 45.
ART. 146. Si no pudiese averiguarse quien de los sublevados cometio el delito especial, se hara responsable a los autores del tumulto.
Codigo del Chile.
ART. 131. Los delitos particulares cometidos en un sublevacion o con motivo de ella, seran castigados respectavamente con las penad
designadas para ellos, no obstante le dispuesto en el articulo 129. Si no pueden decubrirse los autores, seran considerados y penados
como complices de tales delitos los jefes principales o subalternos de los sublevados que hallandose en la posibilidad de impedirlos no lo
hubieren hecho.
Codigo del Paraguay.
ART. 380. Los delitos particulares cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de ella, seran castigados con la pena que les corresponda por las
leyes respectivas.
Codigo de la Republica Argentina.
ART. 231. Los que cometen delitos comunes con motivo de la rebelion motin o asonada o con ocasion de ella, seran castigados con la
pena que corresponde a esos delitos.
Codigo de Honduras.
ART. 224. (Como el nuestro.)
(Groizard, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. 3, Articulo 259, p. 650.)
In justice to the Defendants-Appellants in the present case, I wish to explain and make clear that in mentioning and describing the serious
crimes of murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., alleged to have been committed in the course of the rebellion or by reason thereof, I
am not referring particularly to the charge or charges and counts alleged against them. Their case is now pending appeal in this tribunal
and their guilt or innocence of said charges or counts will be decided in due time. And so, I am not imputing or attributing to them the
serious violations of law I have mentioned in this opinion. Rather, I am making general reference to the informations filed in other cases,
especially in the informations against Luis Taruc and William Pomeroy which case is not only decided but also is closed.
In conclusion, I hold that under the law and under general principles rebellion punished with a maximum penalty of twelve (12) years and
fine cannot possibly absorb a much more serious crimes like murder or kidnapping which are capital offenses and carry the maximum
penalty of death. It is hard for the mind to grasp the idea that a person committing one lone murder may be headed for the electric
chair; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut if perpetrates several murders, kidnappings, arsons, and robberies and during their perpetration, was
still committing another crime, that of trying to overthrow his own government by force, then all he gets is twelve years and fine. Since, the
serious crimes like multiple murder, robbery, arson, kidnapping, etc., committed during the rebellion are not ingredients of, nor are they
indispensable to the commission of rebellion, and were but means freely selected by the rebels to facilitate their commission of rebellion or
to achieve and speed up their realization of their object, which was to overthrow the government and implant their own system said to be
of communistic ideology, then under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., was
committed.
Judging by the numerous acts of atrocity contained in the several informations filed against the rebels in different cases, not only
government soldiers and officers, but innocent civilians by the hundreds were murdered. Stores and homes were looted; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarynot only public buildings, like presidencias and government hospitals, but also private buildings and homes were
burned to the ground. And as a result of these acts of terrorism, entire barrios were abandoned and landowners, especially owners of
landed estates, evacuated to the provincial capitals or to the cities for personal security. And it seems that these acts of banditry and
pillage still continue though on a smaller scale.
Settled public policy or the policy of the Government as regards rebellion and the crimes against persons and property committed by the
rebels is clear. With their taxes, the citizens are maintaining a large army to put down the rebellion. Substantial rewards ranging from P500 to
P100,000 are offered for the apprehension of the rebels, specially the leaders. A rebel leader with a P100,000 price on his head, after a
campaign of several years by the army, and after the loss of lives of many soldiers and civilian guides, is finally captured. The government
pays down the P100,000 to those responsible for the capture and charges him with the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
kidnapping, etc., a capital offense. Pending trial, he asks to be released on bail and under the doctrine being laid down by us, he is set
at liberty, free to go back to the hills to resume his dissident activities where he left off, by merely posting a bond corresponding to a
maximum imprisonment of twelve years (P12,000) and a fine the amount of which is left to the discretion of the trial court. If he jumps his bail
and assuming that the full amount of the bond is confiscated, still, the Government which paid P100,000 for his capture is the loser. It will
have to wage another campaign to recapture him and perhaps offer another reward for his apprehension. This would illustrate the wide
divergence between the policy of the Government and the present ruling of the Court. That is not as it should be. The three departments of
the Government, the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Department, though independent of each other, should function as a
team, harmoniously, and in cooperation, all for the public welfare. They cannot work at cross purposes. All three should be guided by the
settled public policy of the state and this applies to the courts. In the case of Rubi vs. provincial board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., pp. 718-19, this
court speaking about the relation between interpretation of the law by the courts and public policy, said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145
is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in
full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter 510) the Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
writes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts
is, in the last analysis, determined on the theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or
by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the
court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle.
Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to
take some chances. (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911] 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the
court must take a chance, it should be, with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental
policy, and with a view to the courts performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make
the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
Now, by the majority resolution, this Court would spread the mantle of immunity over all these serious crimes against persons and property
on the theory that they are all covered by, included in, and absorbed by the crime of rebellion. Under this protective mantle extended by
us, instead of curbing and discouraging the commission of these common serious crimes in accordance with public policy, the commission
of said crimes would be encouraged. No longer would evil-minded men, outlaws, bandits, hesitate to kill and rob and kidnap, because by
pretending to be rebels or to be engaged in rebellion, their acts of atrocity would be covered by rebellion, for which they would get, at
most, twelve (12) years and fine. No longer would the spectre of the death penalty and the electric chair hang sword of Damocles-like
over the heads of would be kidnappers, murderers and arsonists because by merely claiming to have committed another additional crime,
rebellion, under the doctrine laid down by the majority resolution, capital punishment for all capital crimes they have committed or may
commit, is automatically reduced to twelve (12) years and fine. It is evident that the effect of the interpretation by this Court of the law on
complex crimes, in relation to rebellion and the common serious crimes committed during and in the course thereof, runs counter to the
settled public policy on the subject.
Sad, indeed, is the role being played by this Tribunal in laying down a doctrine of such far reaching consequences and in my opinion of
such baneful not to say disastrous effects on peace and order and personal security, diametrically and utterly opposed to settled public
policy, when after all, we have now the opportunity and the choice of accepting and adopting another view, another interpretation of
the law on complex crimes, to be more reasonable, more logical and certainly, more in accordance with public policy, and more in
keeping with peace and order, personal security and the public welfare.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Endencia, JJ., concurs.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I fully agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor in so far as he holds that the complex crime of rebellion with murder
exists under our law. I also concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla in so far as he holds that the petition for bail should be denied
because of the danger that the release of the Petitioner-Appellant may cause to the security of the State. As the Appellant has been
convicted by the Court of First Instance, he may be admitted to bail in the sound discretion of the court. In the interest of security the
discretion should not be exercised in favor of the granting of bail.

Endnotes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. In the Andaya case the victim was a girl twelve years of age.
2. The information in the case at bar alleges that the acts therein set forth were committed as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion.
3. See, also the comentarios el Codigo Penal, by A. Quintano Ripolles (Vol. I, pp. 396-397) and Derecho Penal, by Federico Puig Pea
(Vol. 1, p. 289).
4. In the language of the information.
1. Article 135, Revised Penal Code.
 * 85 Phil., 307.
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS
WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W.
SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen;
none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law
enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information
signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by
a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation
was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally
determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5On March 5, 1990, the
Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously
but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said
return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the
subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore,
it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same
date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or
surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued
without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not
passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and
two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case
that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may
properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral
argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission,
of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or
less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should
be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all
subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by
the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal,
among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a
new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes
penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are
imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11In
thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no
less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the
complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the
Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the
case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that
this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion,
a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus,
said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In
the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75
del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart
of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya
dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo,
hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the
penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties
imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to
our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be
no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that
the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other
purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately.
The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single
act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of
sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more
serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial
court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the
petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding
the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the
crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot
exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in
dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as
the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that
on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense
different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the existence of
probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination,
it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the
respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with
that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's
case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given
the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending
trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke
that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily,
theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under
either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into
the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent
Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been
brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the
respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to
be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that
would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial
court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an
opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial
practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for
the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to
whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the
evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking
their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such
pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it
on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits.
But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of
proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former
and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly
short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What
has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually
Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses
have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941,
that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained
without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative
leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power
and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of
their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large
attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such
unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent
need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its
name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed
lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within
its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against
petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past three decades, remains good law and,
thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that
Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books.
The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the
speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner
could have continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy, which is less
effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of
jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the detention or confinement
is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be
availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the
jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a
deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be
relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under
the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is
non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions
brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas
corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.
The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon
v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to
charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the
validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in
legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5
June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full
force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into
existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder,
the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is
exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases, especially on how the defective informations
filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the
special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in our statute
books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion,
and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one
crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even law students are
aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion
complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative
powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made
it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense
expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree, a
decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of
our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where
the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information were
committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore
the basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple
rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the
neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should
the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of
separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be
punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for
the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the
laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism
are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act
is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The
killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest
which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not
be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it
issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court
should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information
charging a manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible, make it conform
to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years.
Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution.
However, any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial
court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor
General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have
been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-
existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the
legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this
excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance
that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance
is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two
departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to
speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it
says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy.
They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited).
The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded
that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is
the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-
26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First
Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any
probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the
records of the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral arguments during
the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my
query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would be submitted in due
time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any restaurant
owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we
bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings,
fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various
gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-
conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at
the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much
stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent
civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party
in the United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. Here, it is a case of
conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan,
71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is
not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not
escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of
the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative
upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
 sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the
hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right
which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not
denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. This
case did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge
may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense
which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations
for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations charging the
correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz
Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels
that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed
with murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination or
clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines the actual terms of
Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and
the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion
is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e.,
the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of
the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a
listing of acts or particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of
the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful
purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those
"who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of participation in a rebellion by
public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the
indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional modes
of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-
examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or
discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity
principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people
with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific
shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and
the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a
statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and
most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-
existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
[1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The
prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due
process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New
Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that
the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while
it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can
reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to
the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People
v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me that the critical question would be whether
a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48,
second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the
Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an
examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the conclusions reached by the
Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since the
promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of
the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be
deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous
challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to
redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and
jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes
committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go
along with the view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of
the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the
doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted Government not contemplated in
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then,
but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant case, should have further considered
that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or
offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The majority of the Court is correct in
adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another,
which is an element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed
outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court,
however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense,
resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are
absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today.
Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is
merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if and when actually committed,
brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction,
common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered indispensable
overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the
civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring
during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those
resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately
shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the furtherance of the
rebellion, should not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise
attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the
interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing the powers of the
duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup
d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish
a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as
applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators
resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and
the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on the
occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup
d'etat should be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad
application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent
judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the
indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available
to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by
the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and
approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial Court of an
offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas
corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it
is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2,
Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial
court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated
March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending
before the respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before
the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of
our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of
property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3 whether committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the
commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into
a contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion
have been embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the
crime of rebellion is left fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution
of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we
gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the
trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while charging the complex crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court
was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now
celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In the present cases,
on the other hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with
murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had
the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the
prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion
complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be
allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant
thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is
before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even under procedural law,
because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently
from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the
serious consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past three decades, remains good law and,
thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But that
Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books.
The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender
pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the
speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner
could have continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy, which is less
effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of
jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the detention or confinement
is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be
availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the
jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a
deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be
relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under
the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is
non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions
brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of habeas
corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.
The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon
v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to
charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the
validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies in
legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5
June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was "restored to its full
force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into
existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder,
the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is
exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases, especially on how the defective informations
filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under the
special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in our statute
books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion,
and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one
crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even law students are
aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime of rebellion
complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative
powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made
it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense
expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree, a
decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court form part of
our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where
the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information were
committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore
the basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple
rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the
neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should
the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of
separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act cannot be
punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for
the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the
laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism
are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act
is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The
killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest
which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not
be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court. Worse, it
issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong to the prosecution service. A court
should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information
charging a manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible, make it conform
to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years.
Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution.
However, any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court precedent. A trial
court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor
General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have
been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-
existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the
legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this
excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance
that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance
is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two
departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to
speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it
says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy.
They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited).
The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded
that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is
the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
should take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-
26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of First
Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any
probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the
records of the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral arguments during
the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my
query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would be submitted in due
time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any restaurant
owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we
bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity, join weddings,
fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various
gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-
conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at
the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much
stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent
civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party
in the United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. Here, it is a case of
conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution,
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan,
71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is
not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not
escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of
the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative
upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the
hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right
which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not
denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. This
case did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge
may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense
which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations
for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations charging the
correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz
Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the Government feels
that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed
with murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-existent crime.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination or
clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines the actual terms of
Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and
the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion
is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e.,
the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of
the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature,
wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a
listing of acts or particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of
the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful
purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those
"who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of participation in a rebellion by
public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the
indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional modes
of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-
examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or
discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct
offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity
principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people
with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific
shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and
the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a
statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and
most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-
existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420
[1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The
prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due
process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New
Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that
the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while
it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can
reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to
the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People
v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me that the critical question would be whether
a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48,
second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the
Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an
examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the conclusions reached by the
Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since the
promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of
the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be
deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion.

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The numerous
challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to
redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and
jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes
committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go
along with the view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of
the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the
doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted Government not contemplated in
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then,
but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant case, should have further considered
that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or
offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The majority of the Court is correct in
adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another,
which is an element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed
outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court,
however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense,
resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are
absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today.
Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is
merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if and when actually committed,
brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction,
common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered indispensable
overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the
civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring
during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those
resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately
shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the furtherance of the
rebellion, should not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise
attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the
interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing the powers of the
duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup
d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish
a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as
applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators
resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and
the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on the
occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup
d'etat should be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad
application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent
judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the
indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available
to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by
the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and
approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial Court of an
offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas
corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it
is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2,
Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems
reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial
court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated
March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending
before the respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's) appearance before
the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of
our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of
property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3 whether committed in furtherance, of as a necessary means for the
commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into
a contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion
have been embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the
crime of rebellion is left fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our Resolution
of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we
gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful purpose to have the
trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while charging the complex crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court
was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now
celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist. In the present cases,
on the other hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with
murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had
the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the
prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion
complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be
allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant
thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is
before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even under procedural law,
because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it differently
from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the
serious consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.

Footnotes
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State
Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly
obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or
concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's
Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD
No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col.
Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing
the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator
Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is
absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged
co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the component acts of
rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary
investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on
the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently
repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case
gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to
be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or
committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and
comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything
to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in
violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and
birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly
reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of
about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed
December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to
the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is
only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent
prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements
is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v.
Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be
committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958];
People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is
clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis
of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature
partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed
is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the
rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This
argument is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable
under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in
the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence,
are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all
acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in
the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but
also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly
harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common
crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses,
and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot
be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an
independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case
which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in
the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he
pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already
absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a
nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the
petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court,
however, clarified, to wit:
... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for
subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone
or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex
the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829
in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he
harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely
different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part
of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case.
With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining
respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen.
Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., took no part.
Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.

G.R. No. L-42847 April 29, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CECILIA QUE YABUT and HON. JESUS DE VEGA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42902 April 29, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,
vs.
GEMINIANO YABUT, JR., respondent.
Provincial Fiscal Pascual Kliatchko and Office of the Solicitor General, for petitioner.
Z oilo P. Perlas as private prosecutor.
Geminiano F. Yabut for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
Two novel questions of law are presented to Us in these petitions to review on certiorari the quashal orders of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, sitting at Malolos, first, the rule on venue or jurisdiction in a case of estafa for postdating or issuing a check without insufficient
funds, and second, whether the new law on checks punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation.
Private respondent Cecilia Que Yabut in L-42847 was accused of estafa by means of false pretenses before the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, presided over by respondent Judge Jesus de Vega. The information, docketed as criminal case 1404, charges:
That during the period from February 22, to February 26, 1975, in the Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulcan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Cecilia Que Yabut, as treasurer of the
Yabut Transit Line, by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking
Corporation, located and doing business in Caloocan City, prepared issued and make out Check Nos. CB-19035 B, CB-
190396 and CB-190397, dated February 22, 1975, February 24, 1975 and February 26, 1975, in the total sum of P6,568.94,
drawn against the Merchants Banking Corporation, payable to Freeway Tires Supply, owned and operated by Alicia P.
Andan, in payment of articles and merchandise delivered to and received by said accused, gave and delivered the
said checks to the said Freeway Tires Supply, the said accused Cecilia Que Yabut well knowing that at the time there
 was no or insufficient funds in the said Merchants Banking Corporation, and upon presentation of the said checks to the
bank, the checks were dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by the owner of the Freeway Tires Supply to
deposit the necessary funds to cover the checks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, failed and refused to
do so, to the damage and prejudice of Alicia P. Andan, owner and operator of the Freeway Tires Supply, in the total
amount of P6,568.94.
Instead of entering a plea, respondent Cecilia Que Yabut filed a motion to quash on September 1, 1975, contending that the acts charged
do not constitute the offense as there is no allegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or
simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise, the crime of estafa not being indictable ,when checks are postdated or issued in
payment of pre-existing obligation; and the venue was improperly laid in Malolos, Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued
and delivered to, and received by, the complainant in the City of Caloocan, where she (respondent Que Yabut) holds office.
An opposition was interposed by the People, maintaining that the new law on checks (Rep. Act 4885, amending Art. 315, par. 2 (d),
Revised Penal Code), penalizes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of pre-existing obligation and that the Malolos court can
exercise jurisdiction over the case, since the last ingredient of the offense, i.e., damage, transpired in Bulacan (residence of complainant)
after the dishonor of the checks for lack of funds.
Judge Jesus de Vega quashed the information, as prayed for by respondent Que Yabut, on November 10, 1975 for the reason "that the
proper venue in this case is Caloocan City and not Bulacan." Whether estafa lies for postdating or issuing a check in payment of a pre-
existing obligation was not by respondent Judge.
The People's motion for reconsideration of this dismissal order was denied on January 12, 1976.
The other private respondent, Germiniano Yabut, Jr. (L-42902), husband of respondent Cecilia Que Yabut, stood charged in criminal case
1405-M before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, presided over by Judge Edgardo L. Paras, of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2
(d) of the Revised Penal Code in that:
(D)uring the period from February 23 to April 9, 1975, in the municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Geminiano Yabut, Jr., as presided of the Yabut Transit
Line, by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds in the Merchants Banking Corporation and
Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company, located and doing business in Caloocan City, prepared, issued and make out
Check Nos. CB-192042 B, CB-192043 B, 423123, CB-191988 B, 423124, CB-192044 B, CB-192045 B, CB-193737 B, CB-193738 B,
CB-193739 B, CB-199953 B, CB-199954 B, CB-199955 B, and CB-199956 B, dated February 23, 26, 27, March 1, 3, 10, 11, 12,
April 4, 7, 8 and 9, 1975 in the total sum of P37,206.00,drawn against the Merchants Banking Corporation and
Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company, payable to the Free Tires Supply and Free Caltex Station, owned and operated
by Alicia P. Andan, in payment articles and merchandise delivered to and received by said accused, gave and
delivered the said checks to said Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station, the said accused Geminiano Yabut,
Jr. well knowing that at the time there was no or insufficient funds in the said Merchants Banking Corporation and
Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company, and upon presentation of the said checks to the bank, the checks were
dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by the owner of the Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station to
deposit the necessary funds to cover the cheeks within the reglementary period enjoined by law, failed and refused to
do so, to the damage and Prejudice of Alicia P. Andan, owner and operator of the Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway
Caltex Station in the total sum of P37,206.00.
Like his wife, respondent Geminiano Jr. moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) the facts recited do not constitute an offense
because the checks were issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation; and (2) the venue was improperly laid, considering that the
postdated checks were issued and delivered to and received by the complainant in City of Caloocan, where respondent holds office.
On October 13, 1975, Judge Paras quashed the information because "(t)he elements of the crime (issuance of the rubber check,
attempted encashment, and refusal to honor) alleged in the Information all took place within the territorial jurisdiction, not of Bulacan, but
of Caloocan City."
The People moved for reconsideration, but on February 9, 1976, the motion was denied.
Hence, the two petitions for review on certiorari were filed by the People of the Philippines.
We find both petitions to be impressed with merits.
1. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code may be a transitory or continuing
offense. 1 Its basic elements of deceit and damage 2 may independently arise in separate places. In the event of such occurrence, the
institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed
or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." The theory is that a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried
in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed. 3 However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its
consummation occurred in one municipality or province, the court of that municipality or province has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.
The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken
place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction
can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated
in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. That is
the place of business and residence of the payee. The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or
determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the
final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. 4 An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is
revocable. 5 And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee
or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." 6 Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether
actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto. 7 Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision of Art.
315, par. 2 (d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank,
or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check." Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the
issuance and delivery of the worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulcan, conferring upon a court in that locality
jurisdiction to try the case.
Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano Yabut Jr. in Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the
holding of the respodent Judges, be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant Alicia P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the
venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as "payee" or "indorse". And there appears to be no contract of agency
between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before
the investigating fiscal that Yambao is but her "messenger" or "part-time employee." 8 There was no special fiduciary relationship that
permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential, the principal consent of both parties is
essential, the principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so to act. 9 It must exist as
a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but
also its nature and extent. 10 This is more imperative when it is considered that the transaction dealt with involves checks, which are not
legal tender, and the creditor may validly refuse the same as payment of obligation. 11
Furthermore, the place of business of the offended party, the Freeway Tires Supply and Freeway Caltex Station, is at Malolos, Bulacan, from
where the tire and gas purchases were amade by the two private respondents. As a consequence, payment thereof should be considered
effected at Malolos, Bulacan. "(I)f the undertaking is to deliver a determinate thing, the payment shall be made wherever the thing might
be at the moment the obligation was constituted. 12 The receipt by the two private respondents at Caloocan City of the tires and gas
supplies from Malolos, Bulacan, signifies but the consummation of the contract between the parties. It was the result of an
obligation previously contracted at Malolos, Bulacan. 13 The averments in the informations do not indicate that the complainant is an
ambulant peddler of tires and gas, but maintains a fixed and determinate place of business at Malolos, Bulacan. Obligations, therefore,
contracted as regards her business must presumptively be at her place of business.
2. In general terms, a prosecution for issuing a worthless check with intent to defraud is in the county where the check was uttered and
delivered. 14 Thus, where a check was drawn in Merced County and made payable at a Merced County bank, but delivered to a
merchant in Sacramento County by the drawer's agent, the Sacramento County courts and had jurisdiction of a prosecution against the
drawer for uttering a check without funds or credit with intent to defraud. 15 The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was
executed and delivered to the payee. 16 Since in the instant case it was in Malolos, Bulacan where the checks were uttered and delivered
to complaint Andan, at which place, her business and residence were also located, the criminal prosecution of estafa may be lodged
therein.17 As earlier pointed out, the giving of the checks by the two private respondents in Caloocan City to Modesto Yambo cannot be
treated as valid delivery of the checks, because Yambo is a mere "messenger" or "part-time employee" and not an agent of complaint
Alicia P. Andan.
3. The next point of inquiry is whether or not the postdating or issuing of a worthless check in payment of a pre-existing obligation constitutes
estafa under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. We feel, however, that due to the absence of concrete evidence on
the specific nature of the obligation assumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks, resolution of this controversial
issue on the basis of the averments in the criminal informations alone is not yet ripe. As revealed by the pleadings, the parties are at
divergence on the character of the obligation for which the private respondents issued the checks intended as payment thereof. Private
respondents maintain that the obligation is a pre-existing one. The prosecution, on the other hand, represented to the trial courts in its
Opposition to the Motions to Quash: "We will prove by our evidence that said checks are not in payment of a pre-existing obligation." 18 The
deferment of the resolution becomes more imperative when it is considered that the question raised is one of first impression and of
consequential far-ranging effects on transactions in checks.
4. Ad interim, We hold that the facts charged in the informations against private respondents, contrary to their claim, constitute estafa
under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. In considering a motion to quash based on the ground "(t)hat the facts charged do
not constitute an offense," 19 the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the law. 20 The facts alleged in the criminal charge should be taken as they are. 21 An analysis of the
two informations involved in the present case convinces Us that the facts charged therein substantially constitute the integral elements of
the offense as defined in the law. And the averments in the two informations sufficiently inform the two private respondents of the nature
and cause of the accusations against them, thereby defeating any constitutional objection of lack of notice. 22
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed orders of the respondent trial courts ordering the quashal of the estafa informations against the two private
respondents in the petitions at bar are hereby reversed and set aside. The informations, as they are, substantially conform with the crime
charged as defined in the law. Let the arraignment of the private respondents in the criminal cases below be set at the earliest date and,
thereafter, the trial on the merits to proceed immediately. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, and Antonio JJ., concur.
Muoz Palma, J., concur in the results.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur on the ground that the informations expressly allege that the crimes of estafa were committed by respondents-accused "in the
Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan." Respondents' motions to quash on the ground of improper venue, viz, that the checks issued
by them were issued by them and received by complainant elsewhere (in Caloocan City) must yield to the express allegations of the
informations, bearing in mind that what determines jurisdiction are the allegations in the information and that venue is sufficiently conferred
wherein any one of the essential ingredients of the offense charged took place.
A quashal motion raising the question of lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged raises a simple question of law imports on the part of the
accused-movant a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. (Rule 117 secs. 2 and 6; cf. IV Moran's Rules of Court 1970
ed., pp. 224, 238 and cases cited).
The informations actually charge that estafa was committed in two aspects: by obtaining the goods by means of false pretenses and
pretending to have sufficient funds for the checks issued in payment of the goods, and by issuing checks without sufficient funds. (Article
315, pars. 2(a) and (d), Revised Penal Code). The questions of jurisdiction re the first aspects has been duly resolved by upholding the lower
court's jurisdiction under the allegations of the informations. The question raised as to the second aspect, viz, whether the amendatory Act
on checks (Republic Act No. 4885 approved June 17, 1967) now includes the act of issuing a bad check in payment of a pre-existing
obligation in the crime of estafa, has been properly ruled as premature. The question of law raised thereby cannot now be resolved until
the facts, e.g. whether or not the checks were issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, shall have been duly established at the trial.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur on the ground that the informations expressly allege that the crimes of estafa were committed by respondents-accused "in the
Municipality of Malolos, Province of Bulacan." Respondents' motions to quash on the ground of improper venue, viz, that the checks issued
by them were issued by them and received by complainant elsewhere (in Caloocan City) must yield to the express allegations of the
informations, bearing in mind that what determines jurisdiction are the allegations in the information and that venue is sufficiently conferred
wherein any one of the essential ingredients of the offense charged took place.
A quashal motion raising the question of lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged raises a simple question of law imports on the part of the
accused-movant a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. (Rule 117 secs. 2 and 6; cf. IV Moran's Rules of Court 1970
ed., pp. 224, 238 and cases cited).
The informations actually charge that estafa was committed in two aspects: by obtaining the goods by means of false pretenses and
pretending to have sufficient funds for the checks issued in payment of the goods, and by issuing checks without sufficient funds. (Article
315, pars. 2(a) and (d), Revised Penal Code). The questions of jurisdiction re the first aspects has been duly resolved by upholding the lower
court's jurisdiction under the allegations of the informations. The question raised as to the second aspect, viz, whether the amendatory Act
on checks (Republic Act No. 4885 approved June 17, 1967) now includes the act of issuing a bad check in payment of a pre-existing
obligation in the crime of estafa, has been properly ruled as premature. The question of law raised thereby cannot now be resolved until
the facts, e.g. whether or not the checks were issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, shall have been duly established at the trial.
THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186227

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO,* J.
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,
Accused-Appellant. July 20, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision[1] dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN,
affirming the Omnibus Judgment[2] dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250
and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain
Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus,
a buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2)
pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be
in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a
sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the
police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and
handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.

The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B.
Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money,
two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.

After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the items
recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu
which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a
letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline
substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The
request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of
the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory examination revealed
that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance
contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11
of RA 9165, stating the following:

Criminal Case No. 10250

 That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).[3]

Criminal Case No. 10251

That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).[4]

Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment[5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is
hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[6]

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14, 2005
appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the
crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Thus, the present appeal.

Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He also argues that the chain
of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden
of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place. However, based on the testimony of
PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your buy-bust operation at
the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen Mantalaba was
engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that
we will operate this accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request for powder dusting for
our marked moneys to be used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx

Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there should be a pre-arranged
signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.

Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys, approached the guy who was selling
shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
 Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the pre-arranged signal we used a
cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu
and the marked moneys to the suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-
buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already given by the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] substance, we
immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone or did he had (sic) any
companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights and we immediately
handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately searched
in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx

Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso bills as marked moneys.[8]

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of
the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.[9] From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used,
were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic
chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
and that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the result was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the marked money
mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is positive to the test for the
presence of bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x[10]

The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is
a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. [11] It is often utilized by law
enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. [12] In People v. Roa,[13] this
Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:

In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out
a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 86[14] of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of
Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters,"
the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation.
After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113[15] of the Rules of the Court,
which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the
PDEA.[16] A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes[17] is quite instructive:

In People v. Ganguso,[18] it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the
validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to
the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-
bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,[19] that there is no rigid or textbook method of
conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may
decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.[20]

The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because trial courts have the
advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[21]
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is equally guilty of violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the
consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search,
the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[22]
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him. However, based on his cross-
examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from your possession one sachet of
shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found another sachet of shabu also
in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no money was taken from
you because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for ultra-violet fluorescent
powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.[23]

Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of
denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.[24]

Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody of the recovered dangerous
drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers
Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-bust operation.

Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.[25] Its
non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. [26] What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[27] In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were
members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory
examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had
been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation of the buy-bust operation:

Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] in substance, we
immediately approached the suspect.

xxxx

Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?

A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights and immediately
handcuffed him.
 Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately
searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.

xxxx

Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials. Now, when
these barangay officials were present, what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.

Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of P100.00 peso bills as marked
moneys.

Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.

Q: Who picked these marked moneys?

A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.

Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets of shabu; one during
the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the
marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory.[28]

As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item which, in the present case, was
complied with, thus:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking[29] of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they
are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as
reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.[30]

Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of
sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed,
but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005,
when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child
and Youth Welfare Code[31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,[32] the laws that were
applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA
9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

xxxx

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years
at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence
can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age
of 21. The provision states:
 SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with
the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of
RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have
happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the
appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old,
and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already
entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.[34]

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:[35]

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in
a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98[36] of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life
imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be
graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was
enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon,[37] thus:

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special
laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be
applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because
the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which
penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided
by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently
be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of
the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties
by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not
components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of
the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a
legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law,
the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with
its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the
law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both
illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.

xxxx

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in
accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of
execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be
reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68,
can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided
for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty
prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in
degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be
applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
 menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which
must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law
may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law,
which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.[38]

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority[39] can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be
imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the
appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which
is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.[40] The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally
an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue
of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper
imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus
Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA
9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116765. January 28, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JACOB QUITORIO, JAYSON POMIDA and PACIFICADOR CAMPOMANES, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellants were charged with rape with homicide in an amended information filed on 16 April 1993 (and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 129) before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Eighth Judicial Region, sitting in Dolores, Eastern Samar. The
accusatory portion thereof read as follows:
On September 6, 1992 at about 12:00 oclock midnight in Poblacion Dolores, E. Samar and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused unlawfully conspired and helped one another and by means of force and intimidation have [sic] carnal
knowledge with one Elena Dacutanan y Gabane and with the use of deadly weapons inflicted injuries upon said victim which caused the
death of the latter.
Contrary to law.
Dolores, Eastern Samar, April 14, 1993.
(SGD.) CORNELIO M. UMIL II
Prosecutor I[1]
At the arraignment, each accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecution presented the following as its witnesses for its evidence in chief: Benjamin Dongsal, Yolanda Caspe, Dr. Yolanda N.
Bacsal of the Dolores Community Hospital, Gil Sobremonte of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Dolores, Eastern Samar, and Rodrigo
Gabane; while PNP Investigator Albert Donceras testified on rebuttal.
On their part, accused-appellants took the witness stand and each raised the defenses of denial and alibi. To corroborate their alibi,
the following were presented: Gregorio Bantilan, for accused-appellant Jayson Pomida; Basilio Pomarejo, for accused-appellant
Pacificador Campomanes; and Lito Librella, for accused-appellant Jacob Quitorio.
Accused-appellants likewise presented Romeo Campomanes, then Chief of Police of Dolores, Eastern Samar and the brother of
accused-appellant Pacificador Campomanes, Matilde Cardona, Mrs. Patricia Almazan, Artemio Almasan and Engineer Agrifino Senubio.
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the prosecutions evidence, and finding that the People established accused-appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, promulgated its decision[2] on 14 July 1994, decreeing as follows:
Accordingly, this court do [sic] hereby sentence [sic] accused Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida each to Two [terms of] Reclusion
Perpetua and each to an additional imprisonment [term] of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
If reclusion perpetua (though not synonimous [sic] [with] but distinct from life imprisonment and an [being] indivisible penalty) is to be
computed at thirty (30) years, then the total penalty for each of the two accused, Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida would be as it is
hereby ordered to be seventy (70) years as minimum to seventy-seven (77) years and four (4) months, as maximum.
The third accused, Pacificador Campomanes, who at the time of the commission of the crime was only 16 years, 9 months and 9 days
having been born only on November 27, 1975, as evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth found on page 327 and Certification found on
page 49 of the records, is a Youthful Offender.
Considering therefore his age of about 17 years only at the time of the commission of the crime, he shall be entitled to a penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law.
The law provides that: When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. (Last par. of
Art. 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 2638, approved June 18, 1960, and RA 411, approved June 20, 1964).
However, in the case of People vs. Narit, G.R. No. 77087, May 23, 1991:
The Supreme Court considered the death penalty as no longer impossible [sic] in consonance with the provision of Section 19(1), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, hence, the death sentence imposed on the accused-appellant has been automatically commuted to reclusion
perpetua.
As a consequence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua which should have been imposed on the third accused, Pacificador Campomanes,
is hereby reduced to one degree lower pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. That is, to reclusion temporal or 12
years and 1 day to 10 years.
Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the accused Pacificador Campomanes for one count and that is for himself alone is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
But having conspired with the other two accused, Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida in raping and killing the victim Elena Gabane, he is
further sentence[d] to two more [terms of] 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
The total penalty therefore of accused Pacificador Campomanes is thirty (30) years, as minimum to fifty-two (52) years, as maximum.
This court further orders the three accused herein to indemnify joint and several [sic] the heirs of the victim Elena Gabane, the sum
of P50,000.00 as actual damages for the death of the said victim; P75,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00, as exemplary
damages; P7,100.00 also representing the total actual expenses in connection with the death of the victim Elena Gabane; and to pay the
cost [sic], also joint and several [sic], without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency .
The accused, Pacificador Campomanes was released on recognizance while this case was still pending for preliminary investigation before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, but with his conviction his recognizance is hereby ordered cancelled and without anymore force and
effect. This accused, Pacificador Campomanes therefore, should be, as it is hereby ordered detained until this case is finally decided by
the higher court, should there be an appeal by the three accused herein within the 15-day reglamentary [sic] period for appeal.
xxx
After a careful perusal and scrutiny of the records of this case, the same is wanting of an agreement signed by the three accused herein to
the effect that during their detention period, they will abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
So in the event this decision of conviction against the three accused herein is affirmed on appeal, should they appeal, the three accused
shall only be entitled to four-fifth (4/5) of the time during which they have undergone their preventive imprisonment, which commenced on
November 3, 1992, as evidenced by the Receipt of Detainee, found on page 46 of the records of this case.
SO ORDERED.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:
On September 6, 1992, Elena Gabane, a singer-guitarist of the United Pentecostal Church of Dolores, Eastern Samar, told the family of
Benjamin Donsal, a brother pastor with whom Gabane had been staying, that she was going home later that night to Cadayao, Jiabong,
Samar. She was supposed to ride the Roureyjay bus bound for Catbalogan which normally leaves at midnight (TSN, Oct. 26, 1993, pp. 2-3).
At about midnight, Yolanda Caspe was on her way home from the house of her friend Tilde, where they were having a drink. At the corner
of Tegio St. and the provincial road, she saw three male persons carrying or dragging a woman with long hair and wearing a white jacket
and short skirt. She was not able to see the face of the woman who was partly covered but she was able to recognize the three men. The
area was well lighted by the fluorescent lamp in the street and by the moonlight. Pacificador Campomanes was holding the woman by
her left armpit while Jacob Quitorio was supporting her by her right armpit. Jason Pomida was destroying the wire fence of the
school. Upon seeing her, Campomanes beckoned to her. Afraid, Caspe ran way using a different route to her house. (TSN, June 29, 1993,
pp. 2-7).
The following morning, a woman, who turned out to be Elena Gabane, was found dead in the grounds of the Dolores Elementary
School. She was raped and her body bore several fatal stab wounds. The report of Dr. Yolanda Bacsal who conducted a post mortem of
the cadaver, contained the following findings:
CHEST: Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 13 cms depth, clean cut edges, along the 3rd intercostal space, parasternal
area, left, directed downwardly, hitting the heart.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 5 cms depth, clean cut edges, along the 5th intercostal space, parasternal area,
left.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 5 cms depth, 3rd intercostal space, clean cut edges, anterior axillary line, left.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 18 cms depth, clean cut edges, along 5th intercostal space, midclavicular line, left.
Stab wound, 3 cms longest diameter, 8 cms depth, clean cut edges, 2nd intercostal space, midclavicular area, right.
Stab wound 3 cms longest diameter, 18 cms depth, clean cut edges, 4th intercostal space, directed upwardly parasternal
area, right.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 8 cms depth, clean cut edges, 4th intercostal space midclavicular, right.
Stab wound, 2 cms longest diameter, 3 cms depth, 4th intercostal space, parasternal area, right.
GENETALIA: Right labia minora lacerated.
Vaginal canal, admits 2 fingers without difficulty.
Hymen lacerated at 6:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock. 12:00 oclock, compared to the face of the clock, V-shape in appearance.
Caspe was able to identify the body of the victim as the same woman she saw the night before in the company of the appellants because
of her long hair and attire. She easily identified the appellants in a line-up of ten men (TSN, June 30, 1993, pp. 15, 22, 27-28).[3]
The trial court convicted accused-appellants on the basis of the following circumstantial evidence, which, when combined, sufficed
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, to wit:
(1) The positive identification by prosecution witness Yolanda Caspe of accused-appellants, i.e., from a distance of 15 to 20 meters, she
clearly saw Pacificador Campomanes holding the left arm of the victim by her armpit and his right arm holding a weapon; Jacob Quitorio
holding the victims right arm and armpit; and Jayson Pomida destroying and making an opening near the corner of the hog wire fence of
the Dolores Elementary School, Dolores, Eastern Samar.
2) The finding of Dr. Yolanda N. Bacsal that the victim suffered eight (8) serious and fatal wounds and was raped, possibly by more than
one person;
3) The fact that on the morning of 7 September 1992, the police found, within the premises of the Dolores Elementary School, the corpse of
a woman who was later identified as Elena Gabane, the victim;
4) The admission of accused-appellant Jayson Pomida in his affidavit (Exhibit 3-B) that he recognized the victim Elena Gabane as the
woman being carried allegedly by PFC Oscar Renomeron, Danilo Segubio and John Doe on the night of September 6, 1992; and
5) The rebuttal testimony of Albert Donceras, PNP Investigator, that at the PNP Headquarters in Borongan, Eastern Samar, prosecution
witness Yolanda Caspe pointed out Pacificador Campomanes and Jacob Quitorio as the ones holding the left arm and the right arm,
respectively, of the victim Elena Gabane; and Jayson Pomida as the one destroying and making an opening in the hog wire fence of the
Dolores Elementary School; and that these accused did not object after they were so pointed out.
The trial court further ruled that conspiracy among accused-appellants was sufficiently established by their joint acts of carrying the
victim and placing her inside the school compound.In view thereof, the RTC held that each accused-appellant was liable for three
separate crimes of rape with homicide, namely, that personally committed by him and that committed by each of the other two accused.
Accused-appellants then seasonably interposed the instant appeal.
In our resolution of 5 August 1996, we dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant Pacificador Campomanes for failure of his
bondsmen to surrender him, thereby failing to comply with the resolutions of 22 May 1995, 13 December 1995 and 6 March 1996. Judgment
on the bond was thereafter entered. This appeal then proceeds only insofar as accused-appellants Jacob Quitorio and Jayson Pomida are
concerned.
In their Appellants Brief, accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred:
I
IN CONVICTING [THEM] OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE BASED SOLELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS YOLANDA CASPE.
Accused-appellants discuss these assigned errors jointly and, in the main, denounce the credibility of the testimony of Yolanda
Caspe, thus:
Her testimony is unworthy of belief. She does not even know the family name of Tilde whom she considers as her friend (TSN, p. 13, June 29,
1993). She does not really know the actual time she went to Tildes house, the time they started drinking and the time they finished drinking
because she did not have a time piece then (TSN, p. 5, June 30, 1993), and besides she does not know how to tell the time and neither can
she tell how long is one minute or one hour (TSN, p. 8, Oct. 12, 1993). How was she able to tell that they started drinking at 11:00 oclock and
she went home at 12:00 oclock? Was she coached to state that particular time in order that her testimony will jibe with the testimony of Dr.
Yolanda Bacsal, the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination, that the victim died probably at 12:00 oclock midnight or at
about 12:30 oclock? (TSN, p. 12, July 28, 1993)
It is also quite intriguing that a woman, single at that (although she testified on cross-examination that she had children, TSN, p. 8, Oct. 12,
1993) would be out of her house for a drinking spree during such unholy hour when there was even no occassion [sic] to celebrate (TSN, p.
6, June 30, 1993).
Witness Yolanda Caspe went on to testify that on her way home, she saw, at a distance of fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters, the three
accused, namely, Pacificador Campomanes, Jacob Quitorio, and Jayson Pomida. Accused Pacificador Campomanes was holding the
left arm of a woman, whom she later came to know as Elena Gabane; accused Jacob Quitorio was holding the right armpit of Elena
Gabane; and accused Jayson Pomida was destroying and making an opening at the wire fence of the Dolores Elementary School. The
three accused then tried to place the victim inside the wire fence. The accused then noticed her presence and one of them, Pacificador
Campomanes in particular, beckoned her with a weapon and so she took another street and ran home, took her supper and slept.
On cross-examination, she even described the attire of the victim (TSN, p. 27 & 28, JUn [sic] 30, 1993) and each of the accused as follows:
1. Accused Pacificador Campomanes was wearing white shorts, white sando, and white hat;
2. Accused Jacob Quitorio was wearing maong pants, gray T-shirt the sleeves of which were detached, and wearing slippers
(tsenelas); and
3. Accused Jayson Pomida was in fatigue pants cut on the knee with sleeveless white T-shirt. (TSN, p. 25, June 29, 1993)
The foregoing testimony is incredible. If said witness had in fact seen such shocking incident where she herself was frightened by one of the
accused, it is so surprising that she could relate in detail not only each and every act of the accused but even theirrespective attire. Is this
not a [sic] proof of a coached and rehearsed witness? Of a prevaricated story?
Furthermore, if the herein accused were the perpetrators of the crime charged and had in fact noticed the presence of Yolanda Caspe,
will it not be more in harmony with human nature that herein accused would have exerted every effort to eliminate the witness and not
merely frighten her? In this jurisdiction well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a
credible witness but the same must be credible in itself as when it conforms to the common experience and observation of
mankind. (People vs. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680).
xxx
Furthermore, the prosecution failed to rebut the testimony of Patricia Almazan that there was no electric bulb at the area where the
incident happened. This is very material to the prosecution. Considering the time of the incident which is 12:00 oclock midnight and the
distance of the alleged eyewitness from the place of the incident which is about 15 to 20 meters (or even 30 meters, as declared on cross
examination, TSN, p. 9 & 16, June 30, 1993) the illumination coming from the moonlight would not give the witness a clear view of the
incident much less of the identity of the accused. The witness having also consumed two bottles of beer grande together with her friend,
the same surely affected her senses, particularly her vision. As such, there is serious doubt on the identification made of accused-appellants
as the culprits. It has been held that the identity of the offender like the crime itself must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs.
Jalon, supra).
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to affirm the challenged judgment as the guilt of accused-
appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt;further, there is no reason to disturb the findings and conclusion of the trial court as to the
credibility of Yolanda Caspe, who had no motive to falsely implicate accused-appellants. Although there was no eyewitness to the actual
commission of rape and the killing of the victim, the OSG asserts that the following circumstantial evidence clearly linked accused-
appellants to the crime, viz:
(i) a body of the woman was found dead in the grounds of the Dolores Elementary School; (ii) the body bore several fatal stab wounds and
had been sexually molested; (iii) there was no sign of struggle or blood (except where she was lying) in the area where she was found,
indicating she was killed elsewhere; (iv) her death occurred at about midnight of September 6, 1992; (v) at about that time, she was seen
by eyewitness Caspe in the company of appellants in the vicinity of the school where her body was found dead; (vi) appellants were
carrying or holding the woman in a way that created suspicion, as they were holding her by the armpits; (vi) [sic] in the area where the
victim was last seen alive near the corner of the school, blood stains were found; and (vii) appellants were easily identified by Caspe in a
police line-up. All the foregoing circumstances, taken together, point to appellants as the culprits.
A scrutiny of the evidence convinces us that accused-appellants deserve to be acquitted, not necessarily because they did not
commit the crime charged, but in light of the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and inability to overturn the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution.[4] In criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case
with that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind,[5] with evidence which stands or falls on its own merits and
which cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[6]
Indeed, a conviction in this case could only have been had on the basis of circumstantial evidence which, under Section 4 of Rule
133 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient to convict provided the following are present:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person; i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.[7]
In the instant case, we note that only the fact of the victims death was sufficiently proven, as the evidence to prove the commission
of rape is weak. The presence of hymenal lacerations, as found by Dr. Yolanda Bacsal, was not sufficiently shown to be due to the insertion
of the male organ under circumstances that would qualify as rape. In the first place, Dr. Bacsal admitted that her examination of the victim
was the first of this type she conducted since becoming a doctor, and that her only basis for concluding that the victim was raped was the
presence of the hymenal lacerations. Yet, Dr. Bacsal admitted that the mere presence of hymenal lacerations due to sexual intercourse
did not necessarily mean that the victim had been raped.[8] Likewise, the doctors qualification as an expert was unconvincing as she could
not even answer the questions as to her basis for stating that it was possible that more than one person raped the victim; and as to the
period of time that had lapsed from the infliction of the lacerations until she conducted the examination at 10:00 a.m. of 7 September 1992,
thus:
Q What is then your basis in telling the court that the victim could have been raped?
A There were lacerations at 6:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock to 12:00 oclock.
Q Since you became a doctor, this is your first of a medical case, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, you have not yet examine any other victim who have suffered the same thing as the victim in this case, am I correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your findings doctor under exhibit A-3 under the heading Genitalia says that the vaginal canal admits 2 fingers without difficulty
without resistance and the hymen lacerated at 6:00 oclock, 5:00 oclock to 12:00 oclock, compared to the face of the clock, and
V-shape in appearance, according to your testimony you said that the victim was raped, am I correct, doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q If a woman who suffers sexual intercourse with a man suffer hymenal laceration without necessarily been rape?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is again your basis doctor in telling the court in your direct testimony that it is possible that more than 3 or more than 1 person
raped the victim?
A (No answer).
Q Is it also possible that she was rape[d] by only one person?
A Yes it is possible.
Q You told the court that this hymenal laceration were [sic] compared to the face of the clock, V-shape in appearance and when
asked by the Prosecutor you told the court that these are fresh wounds, did I get you right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you determine to the court, how many hours had lapse from the time these lacerations occured [sic] until you conducted your
examination at 10:00 oclock in the morning of September 7 if you remember?
A (No answer).
Q You are not in a position to tell doctora?
A (No answer).[9] (underscoring supplied)
Worse, when asked what her basis was for concluding that the victim was a virgin at the time she was raped, Dr. Bacsal merely
replied, without any further qualification, that the vaginal canal admitted two fingers, thus:
Q Was Miss Gabane virgin at the time she was raped?
A Yes, sir.
Q As an expert witness, how did you come to the conclusion that Miss Gabane was virgin at the time she was raped?
A Because the vaginal canal admits two fingers.[10]
However, that the vaginal canal admits two fingers is hardly proof of a rape victims virginal state.
We now resolve the liability of accused-appellants.
There is only one circumstance which could have linked them to the brutal slaying of Elena Gabane, viz., their having been seen
dragging the body of a woman toward the premises of the Dolores Elementary School, as testified to by Yolanda Caspe. The veracity then
of Yolandas claim depends entirely on her credibility, and accused-appellants, quite understandably, leave nothing to chance to
convince us that Yolandas testimony should not be accorded the slightest bit of credence.
It is settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of witnesses, unless there
appears, on record, some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which the trial court overlooked and which, if considered, would
affect the result of the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical considerations.The trial judge is in a better position
to decide the question of credibility since he personally heard the witness and observed his deportment and manner of testifying.[11] Our
reading of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Yolanda Caspe reveals circumstances that cast serious doubt as to
her truthfulness or greatly impair her credibility.
First. It is doubtful if Yolanda, as she testified during direct examination, was in the house of Tilde at 11:00 p.m. of 6 September 1992. In
her statement[12] taken on 23 September 1992 by PNP officer Albert Donceras, but subscribed and sworn to on 5 October 1992 before
Municipal Circuit Trial Judge Ricardo Lapesura, Yolanda declared that she was, at that hour, in the house of Yolly who invited Yolanda for a
snack because Yolanda was one of the sponsors at the baptism of Yollys child. Yolandas explanation that she did not mention this to
Donceras[13] is lame. Moreover, as Yolanda likewise testified during direct examination, it was not a snack that she partook of, but two
grande (big) bottles of beer. Further, as Yolanda admitted on cross-examination, she was not invited by Tilde nor Yoly; she invited
herself.[14] We find this portion of Yolandas testimony, however, at odds with the test of credibility in light of Yolandas admission that said visit
was her first to Tildes residence.[15]
 Second. We likewise doubt whether Yolanda was in full possession of her physical and mental faculties, given her admission that she
drank two big bottles of beer with Tilde. There is no evidence whatsoever that Yolanda was accustomed to this level of alcohol intake, and
that unlike a normal person, her having imbibed such a prodigious quantity of alcohol did not leave her reeling. Notably, that Yolandas
ability to perceive was affected by the beer she imbibed was evidenced by her confusion as to the number of men she saw. In her sworn
statement,[16]she categorically declared that she saw four men and even mentioned their names, to wit: the three accused-appellants and
one Rommel Padro, with the latter serving as the look-out. Thus her answers to the fifth and ninth questions in the sworn statement:
05.Q Did you recall any incident that occcured [sic] while you were [on] the street?
A. Yes sir, while I was on my way home far from the house of Yolly, who is my friend, and who invited me for a snack because I was one
of the sponsor[s] of her child in the baptismal [sic], and while I was [o]n the street of the bacck of the Dolores Central School
Campus. I saw four (4) persons carrying a woman, one person holding the left arm, one person holding the right arm and a person
was opening the hog wire fencce of the school fence while another person was a look out near the fence.
xxx
09.Q Who was the person holding the right and the left arm[s] and the person who was opening the hog wire fence of the school fence
and the person to be [sic] the look out of those person[s] if you know?
A Pacificador Campomanes was holding the left arm Jacob Quitorio was holding the right arm while Jason Pomeda [sic] was the one
opening the hog wire fence of the school and Rommel Padro was the look out man.
Yet, in her testimony in open court, she mentioned seeing only three men, namely, accused-appellants herein.[17] And when
confronted during cross-examination with her aforementioned answers in her sworn statement, she attempted to justify the inconsistency
by claiming that the aforequoted question and answer No. 05 were not asked of her and were not given by her, respectively, thus:
Q You just identified in court your affidavit which according to you were [sic] sworn before the Municipal Judge and the contents were
read and explained to you, I will read to you question and answer number 5 in our exhibit 1 and I quote, Did you recall any
incident that occured [sic] while you were [on] the street? and your answer is, Yes, sir while I was on my way home from the house
of Yolly, who is my friend, and who invited me for a snack because I was one of the sponsors of her child in the baptismal [sic],
and while I was [o]n the street at the back portion of the Dolores Central School Campus, I saw 4 persons carrying a woman, one
person holding the left arm, one person holding the right arm and a person was opening the hog wire fence of the school fence
while another person was a look out near the fence, do you remember having been asked that same question and having given
the same answer?
A I did not.
Q The question and answer which was just read to you, you just said a while ago that you do not recall having been asked that
question and having giving the same answer, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q In other words, this particular portion of your affidavit was not actually asked from you and you did not give the same answer, is that
correct?
A No, sir.[18]
Worse, aware of the difficulty of extricating herself from her web of falsehoods, Yolanda even had the temerity to suggest that
Donceras (or some other person) supplied the false information that she saw four persons carrying the woman, and had likewise furnished
the name of Rommel Padro, whom she did not even know. Thus, while still on cross-examination, she testified:
Q Did you not say in your direct testimony that you saw these three persons bringing a woman whom you do not know whether it [sic]
was dead or alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q You saw only three accused not four?
A The woman whom they were carrying was the four[th].
Q I am asking you Mrs. Witness along [sic] the woman according to you in your testimony, you saw only three not four?
A Three.
Q So, the fourth person that you saw was the woman?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know one Rommel Padro?
A No, sir.
Q Are you sure?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will read to you question and answer number 6 in your affidavit, exhibit I, the question read this way and I quote, Who were these
persons if you know?, your answer was, It was Jacob Quitorio, Jayson Pomida, Rommel Padro and Pacificador Campomanes, my
question is this, do you recall having asked that question and having given the same answer?
A No, sir I only answered three.
Q So, that answer which was just read to you, the question and answer number 6 on exhibit I of you affidavit is not true because you just
told now that there were three?
A I saw only three.[19]
The denial, simply put, leaves us incredulous. Yolandas statement was taken on 23 September 1993 by PNP officer Albert Donceras
and subscribed and sworn to before Judge Lapesura on 5 October 1992. Donceras was clearly performing his official duty in taking
Yolandas statement; hence, in absence of any showing to the contrary, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
must stand.[20] Yolanda cannot then be heard to say that Donceras did not ask question no. 05 of her and that she did not answer as
therein stated. It is likewise to be presumed that Judge Lapesura, in the performance of his official duty, must have satisfied himself that,
among other things, the answers to the questions propounded by Donceras were indeed made by Yolanda, considering the solemnity of
the oath he administered to her. As a matter of fact, during the preliminary examination,[21] Judge Lapesura directed Yolanda to examine
and read her sworn statement, after which, she explicitly admitted it to be of her making. Despite having been afforded ample opportunity
to correct or complain about any erroneous statements, she failed to disavow any of her statements.
Yolandas inclination to falsehood, however, did not last long. On the second day of her cross-examination she, perhaps unwittingly,
admitted that Donceras did in fact ask her the subject questions and that she so answered them, thus:
Q So Sgt. Donceras conducted an investigation of your person at Borongan, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were asked questions and you gave corresponding answers?
A Yes, sir.
Q And those questions and answers which you made were reduced by Donceras into writing?
 A Yes, sir.
Q And as a matter of fact after it was reduced into writing you were made to sign the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, I am informing you again that this Exhibit I is a sworn statement of Yolanda Caspe taken by Albert Donceras at the Borongan
Provl. Headquarters of the PNP, on Sept. 23, 1992, now my question is, is this the same statement which according to you just now
was made and reduced into writing?
A Yes, sir.[22]
Third. We note yet another set of circumstances that does not augur well for Yolandas credibility as a witness.
Yolanda estimated that she was 20 to 30 meters away when she saw the three or four persons. [23] At that time, even with the
moonlight and the fluorescent light which Yolanda claimed to have illuminated the place,[24] we refuse to believe that she was able to take
special note, not only of the faces of the persons she saw, but likewise, how they were dressed and even to the extent of being able to
discern the color of their clothes, to wit: Jacob Quitorio wore maong pants and a gray T-shirt with detached sleeves; Jayson Pomida had
on fatigue pants cut on the knee and a white sleeveless T-shirt; while Pacificador Campomanes wore white shorts and a white sando.[25] If
even to further tax her credibility, Yolanda added, on cross-examination, that the sando of Campomanes had holes.[26] As to the attire of
the victim, Yolanda narrated that the woman she saw wore a short checkered black skirt and white jacket,[27] despite the fact that earlier in
her testimony, Yolanda admitted she was unable to see the clothes of the woman since her view was obstructed by Jacob Quitorio, thus:
Q You were at a distance of around 20 to 30 meters so much so that you saw the woman wearing a short skirt and a white jacket, did
you not say so?
A Yes, sir.
Q But when you were asked by the Court what you observed on [sic] her dress or clothes you said you did not see because somebody
was covering the woman and this was Jacob Quitorio, did you not say so?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, Jacob Quitorio was in front of the woman, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.[28]
Fourth. Yolanda exhibited conduct or behavior grossly contrary to ordinary human experience. Despite allegedly seeing a woman,
probably dead by the manner her body was being held and dragged, and after even being threatened by one of the womans assailants,
Yolanda simply went home and did nothing but sleep. She then told no one of what she witnessed, although by 7:00 a.m. the following
morning, she already knew that a woman had been raped and had concluded that the rape victim and the woman she had seen the
night preceding were one and the same.[29] This deafening silence, despite the fact that Yolanda knew the barangay captain of the place
where the Dolores Elementary School was located and some policemen of Dolores,[30] is beyond us. Likewise, as declared by her in her
sworn statement and reiterated on cross-examination, she saw policemen inspecting and investigating the crime scene, thus:
Q I will read to you again Mrs. Witness question and answer No. 14 on Exhibit 1 which is your sworn statement, I quote, The following day,
September 7, 1992, what did you observed [sic] from [the] people of Dolores, Eastern Samar? And your answer was, I quote, At
about 7:00 oclock in the morning of that day, I learned from persons that there was a lady about 17 years old, who was killed, and
I saw some Policemen inspecting and investigating the crime scene, and I learned later that the woman was raped. Do you also
recall having been ask[ed] and having given the same answer?
A Yes, sir.
Q I will read again the next question and answer No. 15, I quote, What did you observed [sic] from the Police Investigator, if you
know? Your answer was, I quote, I observed that they inspect[ed] and investigate[d] from [sic] the hog wire fence where I saw the
four persons in [sic] the night before that day of September 7, 1992, carrying a woman. Do you also recall having been ask[ed]
that question and having given the same answer?
A Yes, sir.[31]
Yet, she opted to do nothing. True to form, however, she once more contradicted herself as these answers were diametrically opposed to
those which she had given just two (2) pages earlier, reckoned by the pagination of the transcripts, to the effect that she did not see
policemen investigating the premises of the Dolores Elementary School on the morning of 7 September 1992, thus:
ATTY. GAVAN:
Q Now, you just saw the body of the victim while [sic] being alighted from the patrol car from the answer of yours, am I made to
understand that you did not go to the crime scene on [sic] the following morning?
A I did not go to the school, sir.
Q You are also sure of your answer?
A Yes, sir.
Q So you did not see the policemen at the scene where you saw the accused on [sic] the night before?
A No, sir.
Q Are you sure of our answer?
A Yes, sir.[32]
All told, we can hardly be blamed for harboring grave doubts as to Yolandas credibility as a witness, resulting in our inability to
reconcile our conscience with the verdict of the trial court.
Before we close, however, some observations regarding thr decretal portion of the appealed decision are in order. First, it is the
longest we have seen thus far in cases which have reached us, the trial court discussing therein matters properly belonging in the body of
the decision. In criminal cases, trial judges must strictly observe Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Second, the trial court
erroneously ruled that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was to be computecd at thirty (30) years, and that accused-appellants Jacob
Quitorio and Jason Pomida, each sentenced to teo terms of reclusion perpetua and to an additional penalty of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, should each serve a total of 70 years as minimum to 77
years and 4 months as maximum. Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of reclusion perpetua is a from 20 years and 1
day to 40 years. The thirty-year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code. Third, assuming that the trial court was correct in holding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, for
which reason eacch accused was liable for three offenses, viz: that committed bu him and those committed by each of his two-accused,
then the penalty of accused-appellants Jacob Quitorio and Jason Pomida should each be reclusion perpetua for that committed by
Pacificador Campomanes, and not the penalty imposed on the latter for the crime he committed since his reduced penalty was due to
the mitigating circumstances of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Mitigating circumstances are personal to an
accused in whose favor they are determined to exist and cannot be enjoyed by his co-conspirators or co-accused. Fourth, while the trial
court was correct in ruling that the prescribed penalty for rape was death, but that could not, however, be imposed in view of the
prohibition in Section 19(1) of Article III of the Constitution, the RTC nevertheless erred in reasoning that the prescribed penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua, hence, the penalty next lower in degree was reclusion temporal. In People v. Muoz, we ruled that the
constitutional prohibition did not alter the periods for the penalty for murder for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty, i.e.,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was merely to consider the death penalty automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
same thing may be said as regards rape with homicide. The penalty of death provided under the governing law then was deemed
reduced to reclusion perpetua; however, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death was still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty of accused Campomanes
should have been reclusion perpetua. In any event, this matter has been rendered moot by the passage of R.A. No. 7659, entitled An Act
to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for the Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special
Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 129 of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court, Eighth Judicial Region, sitting in
Dolores, Eastern Samar, is hereby REVERSED on ground of reasonable doubt, and accused-appellants JACOB QUITORIO and JAYSON
POMIDA are hereby ACQUITTED and their immediate release from detention is ORDERED, unless their further detention is warranted for any
other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall submit to this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this decision, a report
on the release of the abovementioned accused-appellants.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with
modifications, an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein
accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape3 committed against AAA,4 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing
the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAAs father
filed a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal
Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the
crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision9 finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the
penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellants Brief11 on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Appellees Brief12 on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,13 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar
as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court," the case was
transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification the
judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and
to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Accused-
appellant filed his Supplemental Brief16 on April 7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed
to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo
near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologos house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAAs cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAAs] shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered
[AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-
down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside
her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed appellants dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs
cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother answered
that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however,
was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did
not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when
her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came
to their house and told [AAAs] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAAs
mother], however did not say anything. At that time, [AAAs] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso,
who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result
of [AAA]s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical
doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]s medical findings are as follows: "negative
for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6)
the finding "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in laymans language, that there was no showing of any scar or
wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or
pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows
[AAAs] parents, because sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His
father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an
agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were
residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag
while his mother is from barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be
an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years
old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high
school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he
would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doa Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her
mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most
surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latters place which is more than half kilometer to their
house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for
which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents who are
related to Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAAs] rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger and
life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months later while he already in detention,
the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn
about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry
when he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the
child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAAs] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA mothers] father, being a second cousin of his
father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his father to the AAAs family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case
against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case No.
7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape
case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the
testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date and time of the
commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why they filed the said case was
"to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAAs father in
filing the said case for rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or
intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and
interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no showing of any
scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAAs and her cousins testimonies as follows: (1) the
cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-
appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-appellant doing the
push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAAs testimony that when accused-appellant
was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the latters mother
what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the
cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there
were only four of them who were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the
veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.19 The
alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two
prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and
straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the
rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,
respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by
their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused
and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom.
Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to recall the exact date when the incident in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the
exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we
already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be
had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if
the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged
was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a
place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The
reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the
fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged
that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In
previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and
the days thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime
in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and
date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAAs] sworn statement mention the month and date but only the year.24
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant. Neither does the delay
bolster accused-appellants claim that the only reason why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction
of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on
May 7, 2000."
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is
common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been
sexually abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victims father as
understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other
circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is
not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAAs parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the
complainants father in the latters testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your wife told you that something happened to
Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that during that time we had no money yet to use in
filing the case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof that he employed force, threats or
intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether
"carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory rape.
There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows: "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor
scars, which means, in layman language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that the
presence of lacerations in the victims sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact
of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.28 What is important is that AAAs testimony meets the test of
credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants defense of denial and alibi.29 The
shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly
convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAAs family file the instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAAs] parents
finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a girl of complainants age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her
family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and
guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.30 Parents would not sacrifice
their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not
motivated by an honest desire to have their daughters transgressor punished accordingly.31 Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on
him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant
committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven
years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the
information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the
death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CAs conclusion that the
accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he
admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could
have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when
the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing
the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial
to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused
regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for
the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically,
Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of damages should be reduced in view of
the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured
party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of moral damages.
We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent
to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the
form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same
direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not
less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over
time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we
held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the
offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the
offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and her
family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time
of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of
proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public
penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of
qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this
Court took in People v. Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the
damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the
accused was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome 40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty
provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages
as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition
of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00 Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the
need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.
However, the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on
qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous
offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following
amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of
moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition
of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence
of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The
requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory
damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the compensatory damages, such
as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be
increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. It is also proper and
appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on
the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00
as moral damages is increased to P75,000.0044 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision
were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-
appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at
Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more
reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine
which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18
years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D.
No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should
apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be
gleaned from the Senate deliberations50 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent
portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may
have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by
the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a
judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in
heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law
is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of
R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-
appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced
in accordance with law.52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award
of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010
SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, convicted the petitioners of murder.1 On December 13, 2005, the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but modified the awarded damages.2
The petitioners contest the CAs affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Monreal because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate
his minority at the time of the commission of the crime. We order his immediate release from prison because he already served his
sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to accord with the
prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Antecedents
On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo)
with murder through the following information, to wit:
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Boga, Municipality of Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent
to kill, armed with handguns, attack, assault and shot one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of Castilla, Sorsogon,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his
legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on November 7, 1994,4 the trial ensued.
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes),
Lawrence Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia).
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona (Llona), her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of
Barangay Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same
barangay; that as they and Jose Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of Desders house, she
heard "thundering steps" as if people were running and then two successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the
prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, thats enough!; that while aiding Llona, she
heard three clicking sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking sounds, saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was
moving backwards and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the shooting; that she
rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona
to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.5
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, 1994,6 based on the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio
R. Dino, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon.
Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back that penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen. 7
Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent P30,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Llona.8
Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the Defense were Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos,
Joseph Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing.
The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay,
Castilla,
Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo had been in the house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay
Tomalaytay, Castilla, Sorsogon drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized to be at the crime scene during the
shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners had been implicated only because of their being employed by their uncle Lorenzana, the
alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.
As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted Danilo, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
Court hereby sentences each of the accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the sum of
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the cost.
Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime charged and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate
release from the provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of other lawful cause or causes.
Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be credited in full in the service of their sentence.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court referred the petitioners direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.10
On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to
suffer the imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered to pay the heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) P30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.11
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration,12 the petitioners now appeal.
Issue
The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness
testimony of Mirandilla despite her not being a credible witness; that some circumstances rendered Mirandillas testimony unreliable,
namely: (a) she had failed to identify them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them shooting at Llona; (b)
she had merely assumed that they had been the assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed mastermind;
(c) the autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a distance, not at close range, contrary to Mirandillas claim; (d) Mirandillas
testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e) Mirandillas account was inconsistent with that of Jesalvas.
Ruling
The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the penalty imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of
damages as civil liability.
I.
Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect
The RTC and CAs conclusions were based on Mirandillas positive identification of the petitioners as the malefactors and on her description
of the acts of each of them made during her court testimony on March 6, 1995,13 viz:
q Who were you saying we sat together?
a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old child to sleep.
q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court the size of the sala and the house you wherein (sic)?
a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position, the sitting arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then Kdg. Llona was infront of me, I was at the right side of Kdg.
Llona
q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was facing the door in otherwords, the door was at his back.
q Was the door open?
a Yes, sir.
q Was the door immediately found Rather was this the main door of the house?
a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
a Yes, sir.
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you have finished assisting the persons in Bongga about the program,
... after that, what were you doing then?
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my child.
q How about Kgd. Jesalva?
a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness.
q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that situation, if there was any incident that happened?
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running and there were successive shots.
q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see the origin or who was responsible for the shots?
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador Atizado.
q Who is this Salvador Atizado?
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona.
q Can you be able to identify him?
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name answered Salvador Atizado.)
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot?
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. Llona sliding downward.
q Then after that what happened?
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible stop thats enough, and I gave assistance to Kgd. Llona.
q Then after that what happened?
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) clicks of the trigger of the gun.
q Then what did you do when you heard that?
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador Monreal but at that time I do not know his name.
q Then what did you see of him?
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was adjusting the cylinder of the gun.
q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the gun, can you see where the gun was pointed at?
a It was pointed towards me.
q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards you?
a Yes, sir.
q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still recognize this man?
a Yes, sir.
q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court?
a Yes, sir.
 q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder?
a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap the shoulder of the person, the person tapped by the witness
answered to the name Salvador Monreal.)
q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was adjusting his revolver and he was moving backward, did you see
other persons as his companion, if any?
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado he was already on the process of leaving the place.
q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
a Danilo Atizado
q And did they actually leave the place at that moment?
a Salvador Monreal was the one left.
Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed, Mirandillas positive identification of the petitioners as the killers,
and her declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt
whatsoever that they had conspired to kill and had done so with treachery.
It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judges evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the witness
testimony is accorded the highest respect because the trial judges unique opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witness
enables him to determine whether the witness is telling the truth or not.14 Such evaluation, when affirmed by the CA, is binding on the Court
unless facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would materially
affect the disposition of the case.15 We thus apply the rule, considering that the petitioners have not called attention to and proved any
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the application of the rule is that Mirandillas positive declarations
on the identities of the assailants prevailed over the petitioners denials and alibi.16
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.17 Yet, the State did not have to prove the petitioners previous agreement to commit the murder,18 because their conspiracy
was deduced from the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act.19 They had acted in concert in assaulting
Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a
crime are liable as co-principals.20 Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in murder.
Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense
or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an
airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might
make.21 For treachery to be attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the
offenders.22 Moreover, treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.23
The CA held that Mirandillas testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim" because
Atizados shooting the victim at the latters back had been intended to ensure the execution of the crime; and that Atizado and Monreals
conspiracy to kill the victim was proved by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a handgun that they had fired
except that Monreals handgun did not fire.24
We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners mounted their deadly assault with suddenness and without the
victim being aware of its imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the
victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their
victim of the opportunity to defend himself.25 Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack that ensured their
unhampered execution of the crime.
II.
Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no
modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with
Article 63 (2) of the RPC.26 But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18
years of age. The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the murder probably because his
birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his
counter-affidavit executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of age.27 Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest
mentioned that he was 17 years old at the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994.28 Thirdly, Villafes affidavit dated June 29, 1994 averred that
Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident.29 Fourthly, as RTCs minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed,30 Monreal was 22
years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999,31 which meant that he was not over 18 years of age when he
committed the crime. And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at the time of the incident.32
The foregoing showing of Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,33 viz:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of
a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the
childs birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a
case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to
determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main
case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at
determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC,34 when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on
Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period.
Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire
period of Monreals detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344,35 the
revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate release from the penitentiary.
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the
welfare of minor offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-
integration, geared towards their development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his sentence. Its Section 68
expressly so provides:
Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense
for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately
released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving heirs of Llona.1avvp++il Their solidary civil liability arising
from the commission of the crime stands,36 despite the reduction of Monreals penalty. But we must reform the awards of damages in order
to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The CA granted only P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. We hold that the amounts for death indemnity and moral damages should each be raised to P75,000.00 to accord with
prevailing case law;37 and that exemplary damages of P30,000.00 due to the attendance of treachery should be further awarded,38 to
accord with the pronouncement in People v. Catubig,39 to wit:
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and other upon the private victim
as it causes personal sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and
by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of
the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is
a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
The award of actual damages of P30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by the record.
WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005 promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following
modifications:
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty from six years and one day of prision mayor, as the
minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;
(b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City to immediately release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully
served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being held for other lawful causes; and
(c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to the heirs of Roger L. Llona P75,000.00 as death
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 as actual damages.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by
personal service. The Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court the action he has taken on this decision within five days from
service.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of
the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and executory only after his disqualification
from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall
still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as
"An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the
Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of the judgment of his
conviction.4
 The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant
was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening more or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx,
province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years old.7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the existence of the following documents:
(1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical
certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito] 12 may be summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFFs house is along the road. That of appellant lies at the back
approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by FFFs house, the frequency of which the latter describes to
be "every minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant
prior to the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time playing at the basketball court near her house,
fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident.14
At about past 6 oclock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy
cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the
house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on
his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left the store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the
house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area or place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held her hand while on the road near the
store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie
down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he mounted her,
and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and
cried.27Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found her face greasy.32 There was mud on her
head and blood was oozing from the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already
turning black.34 She had no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina.35 AAA told him that appellant brought her
from the store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty,
choked her and boxed her breast;38 and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he did to AAA.41Appellant replied that he
was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to
appellant, asked again,44 and boxed him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the house of Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM
arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped
her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of
[MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.51 Appellants aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the
appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees." 52 Julito did found the elbows and knees
of appellant with dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered.54 FFF also had AAA undergo a
physical check up at the municipal health center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical
certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 oclock and 9 oclock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination at the provincial hospital on the following day.
Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29
January 2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and
his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime.60 Luzvilla even went
further to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of
appellants aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of FFFs house.64 He denied that there
was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked
for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him.67
At about 8 oclock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening,
while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session,
appellants uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to return
after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .68
Appellants aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the birthday party; and that appellant went
out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5)
minutes later. She also observed that appellants white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the
rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos.72 From where
she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAAs face was covered and she was
wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she
returned.76Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78AAA was slowly
following behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The
child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that appellant was twice boxed by FFF.
According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed
appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellants uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian
Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening, she was watching the television along with other people at the house of
Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and
forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon
Antonias advice, Julito released her and went out of the house.84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 oclock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of
molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 oclock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested
his daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court
sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs 87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently born on 1 March
1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the
evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and
the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is
ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants Notice of Appeal.92 This Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in
their respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the
evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.97
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused. 98 More so, when the
testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime,100 except when it is
established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.101
I
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of the following
circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c)
by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.102
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of appellants organ into
the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
 Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.103
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA well understood
the information elicited from her, said it all she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is
essential to show that rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.105
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5 oclock and 9 oclock
positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the result of the
repeated battering of the object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ.107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration conclusively established the essential requisite of
carnal knowledge.108
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when the crime was
committed.109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to
her, considering that she could have a good look at him during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life.
Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that it would be impossible for the
child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called "kuya" and who used to play
basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing
and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast
and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses deserves
full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances,
calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been "ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the
private complainants positive identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same
evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latters testimony that he
confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi weak despite the
presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed
the credibility of the appellants very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and
that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she revealed that her husband
was not around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to
their house for the second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy
Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after the appellants errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Glorias statement that her husband was at
work.
Luzvillas testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a
shirt on. This belied Luzvillas claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as
testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt,
Luzvillas recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvillas story that she saw AAA walking towards Ritas house three (3) minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38
in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial courts appreciation in order.
Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first
drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When
the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by
her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her just as Julito Apiki said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by disinterested
witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each
other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for the accused to have been at
the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of the accused when the crime
was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and
its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the crime was considered not physically
impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the
victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather
bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout.126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their company at the time
of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellants part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellants sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched
for the appellants physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellants
house where the rape occurred, was a stones throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire
afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours,
since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr.
Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is,
therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his
house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the
store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the
house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down
the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape
after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncles house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating
witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place of the commission of
the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344] 132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.133 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless
the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be
observed.134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance
includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent
detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellants mental
capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5) years old when
appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7)
years old141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of death in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the
effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty
one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as
maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted
the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury
suffered by the victim and her family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are,
therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the penalty by one
degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral
damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the
age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192
of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child
in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime. 157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may
have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by
the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare
and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial
or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx
(Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law,which reflected the same
position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension
of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law
and Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was
still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with
the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellants confinement in an
agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 199735 October 24, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ASIA MUSA y PINASALO, ARA MONONGAN y PAPAO, FAISAH ABAS y MAMA, and MIKE SOLALO y MILOK, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR.,J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the February 28, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03758, which
affirmed the October 7, 2008 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. 13536-D of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 163 in Taguig City. The RTC
convicted accused-appellants of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 for selling dangerous drugs.
The Facts
An Information charged the accused Aisa Musa y Pinasilo (Musa), Ara Monongan y Papao, Faisah Abas y Mama (Abas), and Mike Solano
y Mlok (Solano) with the following:
That, on or about the 1st day of June, 2004 in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one another and acting as an organized or syndicated crime group,
without being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell and give away to one PO1 Rey Memoracion
one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 4.05 grams of white crystalline substance, which was found positive for
Methamphetamine hydrochloride also known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of facts was anchored heavily on the testimony of Police Officer 1 Rey Memoracion (PO1 Memoracion). From the
findings of the trial and appellate courts, We synthesize his testimony, as follows:
On June 1, 2004, at or about 9:00 p.m., the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operating Task Force of the Taguig City Police received a
report from an informant about the selling of prohibited drugs by Musa and her cohorts at Maharlika Village, Taguig City. The police
immediately organized a buy-bust operation which included PO1 Danilo Arago (PO1 Arago) and PO1 Memoracion as team members. The
police agreed that PO1 Memoracion was the designated poseur-buyer; that five one-thousand peso (PhP 1000) bills with Memoracions
initials were to be used as marked money; and that Memoracions lighting of the cigarette was the pre-arranged signal to signify the
consummation of the transaction. The buy-bust team submitted a pre-operation report to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and
entered it in the police blotter. Thereafter, the buy-bust team, along with the informant, proceeded to a nearby shopping mall (Sunshine
Mall) where the police had arranged PO1 Memoracion and the informant to meet with the alleged drug dealers.
The buy-bust team arrived at the mall at around 9:45 p.m. The informant and Memoracion alighted from the vehicle while the rest of the
buy-bust team waited at the parking lot. The informant then introduced Memoracion, as a potential buyer, to Abas and Solano. PO1
Memoracion then told Abas and Solano that he wanted to score shabu worth five-thousandpesos (PhP 5,000) but the two replied that they
do not have available stocks on hand. Abas and Solano offered to accompany PO1 Memoracion to Musa who was at a nearby
condominium unit at Building II, Maharlika Village. Memoracion agreed and pretended to go to the comfort room in order to inform PO1
Arago regarding the change of venue. PO1 Memoracion also changed the pre-arranged signal from lighting a cigarette to a phone ring
or "missed call" and asked the rest of the buy-bust team to follow them.
Thereafter, the informant, Memoracion, Abas and Solano boarded a tricycle to Musas place. They arrived at the condominium at around
10:30 in the evening and went to the 4th floor of the building while the rest of the buy-bust team remained at the ground floor while waiting
for
Memoracionss call. The four met Musa at the hallway outside Unit 403. Abas introduced Memoracion to Musa as the buyer. Musa then
ordered Ara Monongan (Monongan) to count the money. Afterwards, Musa took from her pocket one (1) heat sealed plastic sachet of
shabu and gave it to PO1 Memoracion. The latter immediately made the call to PO1 Arago who, together with two (2) other police
officers,4 proceeded right away to PO1 Memoracions location, which was about 15 meters away from the ground floor.5
Upon seeing accused-appellants, the police officers made the arrest. PO1 Arago confiscated from Monongan the marked money of five
PhP 1000 bills with Memoracions initials. PO1 Memoracion, on the other hand, marked the seized sachet of shabu with "APM" or the initials
of accused Aisa Pinasilo Musa. He then delivered the confiscated item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City and requested an examination of the substance. The PNP Crime Lab Report showed that the indicated substance
weighing 4.05 grams tested positive for shabu.6
The prosecution likewise presented PO1 Arago, who stood as PO1 Memoracions back-up during the buy-bust operation,7 to corroborate
the foregoing version of events.
Version of the Defense
In defense, each of accused-appellants denied the accusations against them and submitted their respective alibis, as follows:
Accused Aiza Musa claimed that on June 1, 2004, she and her husband, Bakar Musa, went to their friend Sonny Sagaynos house, located
at Unit 512, Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig City, to discuss their forthcoming travel to Saudi Arabia and that while they were inside
Sonnys house, two police officers barged into the house, while their companions stood outside, and searched for prohibited drugs, but
found no shabu. Aside from saying that Ara Monongan was her neighbor, she denied knowing her and Faisah Abas that well.
Accused Ara Monongan averred that from the morning up to 12:00 noon of June 1, 2004, she was with her aunt Habibas house at Unit 403,
Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig City, washing clothes and looking over her aunts children; that at about 12:00 noon of the same day,
a visitor, whose name was Norma, arrived and that at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sonny Sagayno, Faisah Abas and the latters
textmate, Angie, arrived; that at about 3:00 or 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, policemen in civilian clothes barged into the house, searched
for illegal drugs, but found none, and arrested her; that she went to stay in her aunts place only for a vacation; and that it was the first time
she saw Faisah and Angie. She testified that Aiza was her neighbor but disclaimed knowing her; that she was 17 years old at the time of the
complained incident; and that her real name was Ara Nonongan and not Ara Monongan.
Accused Mike Solano alleged that on June 1, 2004 at around 11:00 oclock in the morning, his cousin Faisah Abas requested him to
accompany to Sunshine Mall to meet her textmate, Angie; that while Faisah waited for Angie, Mike went to the 2nd floor of the mall for
window shopping; that Angie arrived together with two pregnant women but left at 12:00 oclock noon to go to a condominium in
Maharlika Village; that after he and the two pregnant women had eaten in Jollibee, a big man sat beside him, introduced himself as a
policeman and ordered him to come with him peacefully and to just explain in his office. He claimed not knowing Aiza Musa and Ara
Monongan and that he saw them for the first time only when they boarded in the same vehicle.
And, finally, accused Faisah Abas claimed that on that particular day, she and her cousin Mike Solano proceeded to Sunshine Mall to
meet Angie; that she accompanied Angie to Building 2 of Maharlika Village where they met Angies cousin, Sonny Sagayno, at the 5th
floor and that they all proceeded to the 4th floor; that when they were inside Sonnys house, she saw Ara Monongan, another female
person and three children; that after they had eaten their lunch, she heard a gunshot and discovered that Sonny was not there anymore;
that shortly thereafter, three persons in civilian clothes barged into the house, introduced themselves as policemen, poked a gun at her
and frightened and handcuffed her; that two of the operatives went inside the room and ransacked some of Aras belongings; that the
policemen accused her of selling illegal drugs; that no shabu was found in her possession.8
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC found all the accused guilty as charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, accused Aiza Musa y Pinasilo, Faisah Abas y Mama and Mike Solano y Mlok, are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Violation of Section 5, 1st paragraph Article II, RA 9165 in relation to Article 62, 2nd paragraph of the Revised Penal Code and
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Ten Million Pesos (PhP 10, 000, 000.00) and to pay the costs.
Accused Ara Monongan y Papao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and, there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstance, is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay a fine of PhP 500, 000.00 and to
pay the costs. The period of preventive suspension is credited in her favor.9
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO1 Memoracion. It found his testimony as "candid, straightforward, firm, unwavering, nay
credible," since it was not shown that PO1 Memoracion was "ill-motivated in testifying as he did in Court against all accused."10 On the other
hand, the RTC rejected accused-appellants defenses of alibi and denial because they failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
establish that it was impossible for them to be at the locus criminis at the time of the buy-bust operation.11
As regards the penalty imposed, the RTC declared each of the accused liable as principal because it found the presence of conspiracy
among all four accused.12 Citing Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code,13 it likewise imposed the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and
a fine of PhP 10 million because of its finding that the offense was committed by an organized/syndicated crime group. However, it
reduced the penalty imposed against Monongan because she was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, all of the accused assailed their conviction and faulted the RTC in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the sale of
dangerous drugs. In their Brief, accused-appellants raised doubts on the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and
questioned the ruling of RTC for rejecting their alibis. They also averred that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the
offense and that the chain of custody rule under RA 9165 was not complied with since no physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items were taken in their presence or in the presence of their counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice and
an elective official. Furthermore, they refuted the findings of the RTC that conspiracy existed among them, and that they were members of
an organized/ syndicated crime group.14
Notwithstanding, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC but modified the penalty imposed on Monongan, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated October 7, 2008 of the trial is affirmed, with modification that the penalty meted upon
accused-appellant Ara Monongan is life imprisonment and fine of P10,000,000, but the case is hereby remanded to trial court for
appropriate disposition under Section 51, RA No. 9344 with respect to said accused appellant.
The Decision is affirmed in all other respects.15
The CA ruled that the RTC erred in reducing the penalty of reclusion temporal in favor of Monongan. It reasoned that the penalty of life
imprisonment as provided in RA 9165 cannot be lowered because only the penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code, and not in
special laws, may be lowered by one or two degrees.16
The Issues
I
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses?
II
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the ruling of the RTC in rejecting accused-appellants denials and alibis?
III
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was compliance with the chain of custody rule as required by RA 9165?
IV
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in imposing the maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ten million pesos (Php 10,000,000)
against ALL of the accused?
The Ruling of this Court
We sustain the conviction of accused-appellants.
In determining the guilt of the accused for the sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution is obliged to establish the following essential
elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
its payment. There must be proof that the transaction or sale actually took place and that the corpus delicti be presented in court as
evidence.17
In finding the existence of these elements, the trial and appellate courts in the present case upheld the credibility of the testimony of PO1
Memoracion, as supported by the testimony of PO1 Arago. In this regard, We find no sufficient reason to interfere with the findings of the
RTC on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses pursuant to the principle that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight and sometimes, even with finality.18 Where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted
some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the
credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. 19 The rationale
behind this principle was explained by the Court in People v. Dinglasan,20to wit:
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should
be respected. The judge a quo was in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them
when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled that the evaluation of the testimony of
the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect, because it had the direct opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in the absence of a
clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if
considered might affect the result of the case. (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, the factual findings of the RTC are strengthened by an affirmatory ruling of the CA. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of
the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.21Absent any indication that the courts a quo committed misinterpretation of
antecedents or grave abuse of discretion, the facts as established by the trial and appellate courts deserve full weight and credit, and are
deemed conclusive.22
As regards accused-appellants denial and claim of frame-up, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that these defenses cannot
stand unless the defense could show with clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired with ill
motives or that they were not properly performing their duties. The defenses of denial and frame-up are invariably viewed with disfavor
because such defenses can easily be fabricated and are common ploy in prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs.23 Here, in the absence of evidence showing ill motives on the part of the members of the buy-bust team, accused-appellants
denials and plea of frame-up deserve scant consideration in light of the positive identification made by PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago.
Similarly, accused-appellants alibis failed to fortify their claim of innocence because, while they insist on their own version of events, they
failed to demonstrate compliance with the requisites of the defense of alibi. In People v. Apattad,24 the Court reiterated the jurisprudential
rules and precepts in assessing the defense of alibi:
One, alibis and denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak.1wphi1 Two, they cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested
witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court unless
patently and clearly inconsistent must be accepted.
It is clear, therefore, that in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused should demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence,
that he or she was somewhere else when the buy-bust operation was conducted, and that it was physically impossible for him or her to be
present at the scene of the crime either before, during, or after the offense was committed.25 It is on this thrust that the alibis made by
accused-appellants failed to convince since all of them admitted that they were within the vicinity of Building 2, Maharlika Village, Taguig
City, which, apparently, was the locus criminis of the offense. Furthermore, considering that alibi as evidence is negative in nature and self-
serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.26
Anent the third issue, accused-appellants demand their acquittal on the ground that the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of RA 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was not complied with. The said section states:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Corollarily, the laws Implementing Rules and Regulations provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied.)
At this juncture, We reiterate that the essence of the chain of custody rule is to ensure that the dangerous drug presented in court as
evidence against the accused is the same dangerous drug recovered from his or her possession.27 As explained in Castro v. People:28
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the presentation and admission of the seized prohibited
drug as an exhibit be preceded by evidence to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent clams it to be. This
requirement is essential to obviate the possibility of substitution as well as to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are
removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements and custody of the seized prohibited item, from the accused, to the
police, to the forensic laboratory for examination, and to its presentation in evidence in court. Ideally, the custodial chain would include
testimony about every link in the chain or movements of the illegal drug, from the moment of seizure until it is finally adduced in evidence. It
cannot be overemphasized, however, that a testimony about a perfect chain is almost always impossible to obtain. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the "perfect chain" is almost always impossible to obtain, non-compliance with Sec. 21 of RA 9165, as stated in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations, does not, without more, automatically render the seizure of the dangerous drug void, and evidence is admissible as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.29
In the present case, accused-appellants insist on the police officers non-compliance with the chain of custody rule since there was "no
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken in their presence or in the presence of their counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice and an elective official."
We, however, find these observations insignificant since a review of the evidence on record shows that the chain of custody rule has been
sufficiently observed by the apprehending officers. Thru the testimonies of the PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago, the prosecution was able
to prove that the shabu seized from Musa was the very same shabu presented in evidence as part of the corpus delicti. The factual findings
of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are elucidating:
Here, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution showed that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
"shabu" was preserved. Contrary to the accused-appellants allegations, the shabu specimen presented in court by the prosecution was the
same item received from accused-appellant Aiza Musa by PO1 Memoracion. The buy-bust operation was conducted about 10:30 in the
evening of June 1, 2004. Immediately thereafter, PO1 Memoracion marked the seized sachet of shabu with his initials "APM" at the masking
tape, and the accused-appellants were turned over to the police station for investigation. At 1:55H of June 2, 2004, PO1 Memoracion
delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, SPD Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, a Request for Laboratory Examination dated June 2, 2004,
together with the sachet of shabu seized form accused-appellant Aiza Musa. Stamped on the right portion of the Request for Examination
shows the time and date of delivery at "01:55H 02 June 04", "RECEIVED BY: Nup Bacayan" and "DELIVERED BY: PO1 Memoracion." Thus:
e) Evidence Submitted
One (1) transparent plastic sachet (heat sealed) containing white crystalline substance suspected to be Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu marked "APM". (item purchased from Aiza Musa)
At 0300H 02 June 2004, the PNP Crime Laboratory Southern Police District Crime Laboratory, Fort A. Bonifacio, Taguig Metro Manila issued
Physical Science Report No. D-439-04S stating that the heat salad plastic sachet with markings "APM" containing 4.05 grams of crystalline
substance yielded positive for shabu.
Also it bears stressing that during the hearing on May 28, 2007, accused-appellants, thru their counsel, stipulated on the testimony of the
forensic chemist, Police Inspector Richard Allan Manganib, with respect to his forensic examination of the subject sachet of shabu. Clearly,
the integrity of the sachet of "shabu" was duly preserved as it was duly marked by PO1 Rey Memoracion and it was the very same item
transmitted to and examined by the PNP Crime Laboratory.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is likewise significant to note that a similar conclusion was reached in People v. Presas 31 where the Court disposed, as follows:
In this case, the failure on the part of the MADAC operatives to take photographs and make an inventory of the drugs seized from the
appellant was not fatal because the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the said illegal drugs. The
concurrence of all elements of the illegal sale of shabu was proven by the prosecution. The chain of custody did not appear to be broken.
The recovery and handling of the seized drugs were satisfactorily established. Farias was able to put the necessary markings on the plastic
sachet of shabu bought from appellant immediately after the consummation of the drug sale. This was done in the presence of appellant
and the other operatives, and while in the crime scene. The seized items were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination
on the same day. Both prosecution witnesses were able to identify and explain said markings in court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the fact that the PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago did not make an inventory of the seized items or that they did not take
photographs of them is not fatal considering that the prosecution in this case was able to establish, with moral certainty, that the identity,
integrity, and evidentiary value of the shabu was not jeopardized from the time of its seizure until the time it was presented in court.
Furthermore, We find enlightenment in People v. Vicente, Jr.:32
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Oft-
repeated is the rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the
contrary. Absent any indication that the police officers were ill-motivated in testifying against the accused, full credence should be given
to their testimonies.33(Emphasis supplied.)
As stated, the records are bereft of any showing that PO1 Memoracion and PO1 Arago were ill motivated in testifying against accused-
appellants. Neither was there any indication that they were in bad faith nor had digressed from their ordinary tour of duty. There is,
therefore, no cogent basis to taint their testimonies with disbelief. Hence, We submit to the presumption that both of them and the other
police officers involved in the buy-bust operation had performed faithfully the matters with which they are charged, and that they acted
within the sphere of their authority. Omnia praesumumtur rite esse acta (All things are presumed to have been done regularly).
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the RTC and CA in finding accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating of Sec. 5, RA 9165 for selling dangerous drugs.
Notwithstanding, We rule that the penalty imposed against the accused-appellants must be modified.
With reference to accused-appellant Monongan, the RTC found her to be a minor or 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense.34 Accordingly, it imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.35 On appeal, the CA increased the penalty of
Monongan to life imprisonment.36
However, We find these impositions contrary to prevailing jurisprudence. In the recent People v. Mantalaba,37where the accused was
likewise 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, the Court held, inter alia, that: (a) pursuant to Sec. 98 of RA 9165, the
penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death when the offender
is a minor; and (b) that the penalty should be graduated since the said provision adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code.38 The Court in the said case established the rules as follows:
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying
the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. The ISLAW is
applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where
ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty. (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, the penalty of imprisonment imposed against Monongan should mirror the ruling of the Court in Mantalaba in the absence of
any mitigating circumstance or aggravating circumstance other than the minority of Monongan. Consequently, the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on Monongan should be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As regards the fine imposed, the RTC sentenced accused-appellants the maximum fine of PhP 10 million on the ground that accused-
appellants sold shabu as members of an organized crime group39 or a drug syndicate. It ruled that Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 23 of RA 7659, mandates that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who
belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.40 These findings were eventually affirmed by CA.41
The records, however, are bereft of any proof that accused-appellants operated as members of a drug syndicate. By definition, a drug
syndicate is any organized group of two (2) or more persons forming or joining together with the intention of committing any offense
prescribed under RA 9165.42 In determining whether or not the offense was committed by any person belonging to an
organized/syndicated crime group, We are guided by the ruling in People v. Alberca43 where the Court, after scrutinizing the deliberations
held by Congress on what is now Art. 62, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, held:
We hold that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant and his companions constituted a syndicated or an organized crime
group within the meaning of Article 62, as amended. While it is true they confederated and mutually helped one another for the purpose of
gain, there is no proof that they were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a
syndicated or organized crime group.
xxxx
What emerges from this discussion is the idea of a group of persons; at least two in number, which is organized for the purpose of
committing crimes for gain." (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying this principle in Alberca, the Court held in People v. Santiago:44
Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7659, mandates that the maximum penalty shall be
imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group. The same article defines an
organized/syndicated crime group as a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another for
the purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
xxxx
While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in selling shabu was duly established, there was no proof that appellants were a group
organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of the aggravating circumstance of
organized/syndicated group under Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
We find the present case similar to Santiago. The existence of conspiracy among accused-appellants in selling shabu was duly established,
but the prosecution failed to provide proof that they operated as an organized group or as a drug syndicate. Consequently, the
aggravating circumstance that "the offense was committed by an organized/syndicated group" cannot
be appreciated. Thus, the maximum PhP 10 million imposed by the trial and appellate courts upon each of accused-appellants should be
modified accordingly.
This is in consonance with the dictum in Criminal Law that the existence of aggravating circumstances must be based on positive and
conclusive proof, and not merely on hypothetical facts no matter how truthful the suppositions and presumptions may seem 45 Aggravating
circumstances which are taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty imposed must be proved with
equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as criminal offense.46
Incidentally, a survey of recent jurisprudence47 shows that the Court has consistently imposed a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (PhP
500,000) for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II RA 9165 in the absence of any aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, The February 28, 2011 CA Decision CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03758 finding accused-appellants guilty of violating Sec. 5, Art. II of RA
9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that: (a) accused-appellant Ara Monongan y Papao is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) each of the accused-appellants shall pay a fine in the amount of five
hundred thousand pesos (PhP 500,000).
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014
ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the best interest of the
child in conflict with the law through measures that will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection,1 and to apply
the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to children in conflict with the law. 2 The mandate
notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with
the law.
Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with homicide under the following information docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife , inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in
his body, thus, directly causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and made an integral part hereof, to the
damage and prejudice of the deceaseds heirs in such amount as may be proven in court.
Acts Contrary to Law.3
The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows: Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in
the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he, together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching the
graduation ceremony if the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however,
appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter. When asked to demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed the
victim, this witness demonstrated that with the appellants left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the victim using a
bladed weapon.
He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the hospital.
Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequitos companion at the time of the incident, corroborated the testimony of Dequito on all material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in front of the [elementary] school and later brought to
the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her son stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son was discharged. Later,
however, when her son went back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that her sons stab wound had a complication. Her son
was subjected to another operation, but died the day after. She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police
authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts she incurred for the wake and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting physician,
was organ failure overwhelming infection. He, further, stated that the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:
He testified that around seven inthe evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High School campus watching the high
school graduation rites. At half past seven, while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged up
by a group of four (4) men.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not able to see or even recognize
who attacked him, so he proceeded home. Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of
the four men who ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in possession
of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that day. He went home after
the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the barangay hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way
to the town proper, he came to know that the person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it.4
Judgment of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.5
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the penalty and the civil liability through the
decision promulgated on July 19, 2006,6 disposing thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide
is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six years of prision
correccionalas minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for
medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of
the victim Jason Espinola. Weaffirm in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA promulgated its amended decision on December 7, 2006, decreeing as follows:7
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision promulgated on July 16, 2006, which is the subject
of the instant motion is, hereby AMENDED such that the judgment shall now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275,
finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for
medical and funeral services, is reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of
the victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for appropriate action on the application for probation of,
herein, appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing the penalty, and for not suspending his
sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the findings of
fact by the lower courts as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the following issues, namely: (1) whether or not the CA imposed
the correct penalty imposable on him taking into consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the Revised Penal
Codeand Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of
sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements.
Ruling of the Court
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporalfor homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a
minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March
30, 2000,8 such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.9
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the
imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence, prision mayor in its medium period eight years and one day to 10 years was proper because there were no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison mayor should be
reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioners insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or
rules support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be to impose an
illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC10 (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the trial and judging in cases
involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the
restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.11 Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the
CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part,
Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake
of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies from probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA
to remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of
a crime, the suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to
wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has wilfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the
suspension of his sentence was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child inconflict with the law as bestowed by
Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.1avvphi1 A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children
in conflict with the law the rightnot to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is
duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition
of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the trial and appellate
courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply
because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his
sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortestduration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action taken herein. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines),14 the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency
(Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty 15 are consistent in recognizing that
imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed asa last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural
camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with
the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender childs best interest. Such service of
sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 29295, but DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the trial court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of
Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control,
supervision and management, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCG.R. Nos. L-11128-33 December 23, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENE ESCARES, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, First Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres, and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for
appellee.
Bienvenido B. Manangan for appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

On September 13, 1950, six separate informations for robbery were filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Salvador Poblador,
Armando Gustillo and Rene Escares. When these cases were called for hearing on March 2, 1951, Rene Escares was still at large and, by
agreement of the parties, they were tried jointly against Salvador Poblador and Armando Gustillo. A decision was thereafter rendered
against them finding them guilty of the crimes charged and convicting them accordingly.
On April 21, 1954 Rene Escares was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in each of the six above-mentioned cases but later he asked
permission to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute it for a plea of guilty. The trial court granted the petition and forthwith it
rendered a decision of the following tenor:
When these cases were called for trial, the accused asked permission to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute it
with that of guilty in all these cases. The Court granted said petition, and the accused forthwith freely and voluntarily pleaded
guilty in all these cases.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rene Escares guilty of the crimes charged in the information in all these cases, and, in
accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences said accused to twelve (12) years, six
(6) months, and one (1) day in all the cases, with all the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs.lawphil.net
Rene Escares appealed from the decision but having taken the case to the Court of Appeals, the latter certified it to us on the ground that
the only issue involved is one of law.
The only question raised in this appeal refers to the penalty imposed on the appellant. He contends that since he pleaded guilty to all the
crimes charged and there is no aggravating circumstance to offset it, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reduced to the
minimum.
It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each of the six cases where appellant pleaded guilty in accordance with paragraph 5,
Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, which should be
applied in its minimum period in view of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by any aggravating circumstance, or from
4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be
sentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and the maximum shall not be less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day
of prision correccional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days of prision mayor. But in applying the proper penalty, the trial court
imposed upon appellant the three-fold rule provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 70 of the Penal Code. This is an error for said article can
only be taken into account, not in the imposition of the penalty, but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed.
The penalty imposed upon appellant by the trial court should therefore be modified in the sense that he should suffer in each of the six
cases an indeterminate penalty of not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and not more than 4 years 2 months and 1 day
of prision correccional, plus the corresponding accessory penalties provided for by law. These penalties should be served in accordance
with the limitation prescribed in paragraph 4, Article 70, of the Revised Penal Code.
Modified in the sense above indicated, we affirm the decision of the trial court, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
UR:
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72
ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979 decision of the Sandiganbayan finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada in
Criminal Cases Nos. 002-009 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan. The eight
informations substantially allege the same set of circumstances constituting the offense charged, Criminal Case No. 002 reads as follows:
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from October 1977 to February 1978, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being employed in the Office
of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, as Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring and confederating together with two (2)
other John Does whose true Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, with evident bad faith, and for personal gain,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and facilitate the approval of one Isagani de
Leon's claim for the payment in the removal and reconstruction of his house and a part of his land expropriated by the
government having been affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while
the accused, Arturo A. Mejorada is in the discharge of his official and/or administrative functions and after said claim was
approved and the corresponding PNB Check No. SN 5625748 was issued and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00 given only
P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon), appropriating, applying and converting to themselves the amount of P6,200.00, thereby
causing damage and prejudice to Isagani de Leon and the government in the aforementioned amount of P6,200.00.
Contrary to law.
Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the aggrieved private party, the PNB Check number, the amount
involved and the number or John Does, the seven other informations are verbatim repetitions of the above.
The facts are found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as follows:
Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March 16,
1947, and then as right-of-way agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from February, 1974 up to
December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or
improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD
Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la Cruz, Cipriano
Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog, Binangonan, Rizal.
Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons and informed them that he could work out their
claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the process, Mejorada
required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and
"Agreement to Demolish, Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. The claimants complied without bothering to
find out what the documents were all about as they were only interested in the payment of damages.
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective properties of the claimants were made to appear
very much higher than the actual value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value of the
improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower than the value declared by the owners in their sworn
statements. The value as per assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of the claimants containing
an assessed value exactly the same as that stated in the Agreements to Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and
Aran where there is only a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out, however, that said Declarations of Property are not
really intended for the claimants as they were registered in the names of other persons, thus showing that they were all falsified.
A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the Office of the Highway District Engineer at the
provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila, to receive payments and personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and encashing
the checks by certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby
where they were divested of the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac Carlos to whom P5,000.00
was left, explaining to them that there were many who would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because
they were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.
The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints with the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, narrating in
their supporting sworn statements what they later testified to in court.
Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan:
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution;
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent jurisdiction duly constituted in accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606;
III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary to the three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code;
IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved;
V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the Sandiganbayan in arriving at a verdict of conviction of petitioner is correct is
a question of law which this Honorable Court is authorized to pass upon.
I. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against him before the Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it failed to allege
the essential ingredients or elements constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The section under which the accused-petitioner was charged provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion, constitute a violation of Section 3(e).
First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions. Petitioner
contends that inasmuch as he is not charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he is not the officer
contemplated by Section 3 (e).
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to
"any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction
of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must be a public officer. This, the informations did not fail to allege.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the payments were allegedly made on the basis of a
document solely made by the Highway District Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is that the
government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated the true claims of complainants which became the basis of
the report submitted by the Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and which eventually
became the basis of payment. His contention that he had no participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was
precisely to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the purpose of compensating them.
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being divested of a large proportion of their claims and
receiving payment in an amount even lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just compensation to
which they are entitled.
Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference was done through manifest,
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage to the complainants and the government must
have been caused by the public officer in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as when the
damage was caused to the complainants, he was no longer discharging his official administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for
the offense charged.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-
way-agent by making the claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements which contained falsified
declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the
values of the true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to the allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a
violation of the Anti-Graft Law because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of Section 3 (e) but the crime of
robbery. Contrary to the petitioner averment. We find no variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense
proved. The prosecution was able to establish through the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented how through evident bad
faith, petitioner caused damage to the claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the private parties of
the compensation they received was part of' the scheme which commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and
informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of
the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).
II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide this case. He argues that before the
Sandiganbayan could legally function as a judicial body, at least two (2) divisions, or majority of the justices shall have been duly
constituted and appointed.
We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 54288, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337). In that case,
the petitioner De Guzman questioned the authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case on the same ground that herein
petitioner assails its jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of the Sandiganbayan saying that:
Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and eight Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot
validly function without all of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that the "Sandiganbayan shall sit in three
divisions of three justices each" while Section 5 thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three justices of a division shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each Division functions independently of the other. As
long as a division has been duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as judgments of the
Sandiganbayan.
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for
the pronouncement of a judgment as required by Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.
III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8)
days of imprisonment. Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration of the aggregate penalties
should not exceed forty (40) years.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into
account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677
[1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything
mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most
severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed against the accused-
petitioner. As We pointed out in the case of People v. Peralta, (No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 783-784):
... Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as there are separate and distinct
offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime
is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal
sanctions.
In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon him as harsh, cruel and unusual (See Veniegas v.
People, G.R. No. 57601-06 July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 790, 792).
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in view of the foregoing discussion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166401

Appellee, [Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
 Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ALFREDO BON, CORONA,
Appellant. CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
October 30, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon
(appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a
consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a question much broader in both scope and import. While the Court had
previously declined to acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution,[1] we now find it
necessary to determine whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death penalty.

The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on
appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to
appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of
consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

First, the antecedent facts.

I.

Eight (8) Informations[2] were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA[3] and BBB,[4] the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was
accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case
Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.[5] All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in
several instances over a span of six (6) years.

Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them. During trial,
their respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were entered as
documentary evidence.

AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with her
grandmother.[6] She recounted that the incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched her
thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be
killed should she disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3)
years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.[7]

AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third time, again at the house of her
grandmother.[8] The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she was raped in
an outdoor clearing[9] after having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to
lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.[10]
 It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC,[11] the brutish acts appellant had done to her.[12] Her
mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary evidence her birth
certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.[13]

BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant
shared with her grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her
vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of
fear of appellants threat that he would kill her.[14] BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several
occasions, the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day.[15]

BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.[16] On that night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the
house of her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters
away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her
to remove her clothes and forced her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for
three (3) minutes moving up and down. Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added that although it
was dark, she knew it was appellant who had molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her
grandmothers house again.[17]

It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother. Prior to that, however, she had already
revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to the police station
and her statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only
reported the abuses done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was afraid of appellants threat of killing
her and her family.[18]

The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15
June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a game, was
packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was
planning to leave their house. Upon learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after that incident
that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB
and AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested. [19]

CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters because she was afraid that her husband
might kill appellant. It was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his
relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then.[20]

The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer
of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for
each child. These medical certificates were presented in court.[21]

The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no external sign of physical injury found on her body.
However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two fingers without
resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at three (3) oclock and eight (8) oclock which might have happened a long time before
her examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex organ for several times.[22]
AAAs medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external physical injuries apparent on her body.
AAAs labia majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could
happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when
asked on cross-examination, she stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of
AAA.[23]

Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the
house of his parents which was about thirty (30) arm stretches away from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15
January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape
occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the following day.[24]

He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further
asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason the
case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father,
who would call CCC lazy within earshot of other family members.[25]

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.[26] The RTC pronounced appellants defense of denial and alibi as
unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to
controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of
the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being the formers relative by consanguinity within the third degree.

As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case were automatically elevated to this Court for
review. However, in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo[27] the present case was transferred to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed
on appellant.[28] The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:

We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of
the trial court except in at least two (2) cases. The prosecutions case which was anchored mainly on the testimonies of
private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith and credit for being clear, precise and straightforward. Like the
trial court, We find no reason to disbelieve the private complainants. It was established with certitude that the accused
on several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the crimes and its authorship were proved by the
victims candid and unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the same fate in the hands of
their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress
over what their uncle had done to her and her sister.[29]

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was
alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate court, it could not find
evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAAs vagina to
make him liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral certainty that appellants penis ever touched the labia of
the pudendum, quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in
inserting his penis into her vagina and she answered in the negative.[30] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached
to the two (2) counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.

Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief[31] before this Court, assails the findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony
of BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to her rape on 15
January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she
stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their parents house (and not at her grandmothers), the
accused passed through a window, entered their room and raped her again.[32] Appellant also latches on the inconsistencies in BBBs
testimony as to the length of the duration of her rape on that day. In BBBs testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her
for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.

It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and
the Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v.
Perez[33] on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:

We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details. They bear
no materiality to the commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was convicted.[[34]] As pointed out by
the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion and merely
represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct examination and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses
are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. The rape victim
was testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which, more often than not, is
talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was less than letter-
perfect.[[35]] "Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can
affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers questions."[[36]][37]

Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused on some points of her two testimonies.
Particularly in the Memorandum for the People[38] filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:

[BBB]s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the
last rape on January 15, 2000, as regards the place of commissionhouse of her parents or house of accused; and the
length of time he stayed on her top 3 minutes or half-minute. But she remained consistent in her declaration that
on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina, and he was moving while on her top then she felt
something came out from him. He was able to rape her because he threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon.
Further, the first she took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and many
acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused about her age when she was first raped by her uncle.
After she testified on November 14, 2001, for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to recall
more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in her own house. These noted discrepancies as to the
exact place of commission accuseds house or victims house is not an essential element of the crime of rape and both
houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court. x x x [39]

In addition, we share the lower courts disbelief of appellants proffered defenses of denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the
weakest as they are negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.[40]

In the case at bar, appellants alibi that he was at his sisters house barely two (2) kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January
2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have easily left his sisters house in
the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sisters house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his
absence.
 Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.[41] The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when
the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator.[42] In this case, both BBB and AAA,
minors and relatives of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting from the
credibility of such identification.

It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the
accusations against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did not know anything about
the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the evidence against him.

Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is
outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and
narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as lazy. In addition, CCCs father-in-law had died
several years before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the
reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No member of a rape victims family would dare
encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such accusation is against a member of the family,
unless the crime was in fact committed.[43]
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject
herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity.[44] The weight of such testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof that the
accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of such countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost
value.

The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and
their relationship with appellant were aptly established

in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the ages of the victims when they were raped but
the prosecution also presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove that they were both
minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of
the victims father, and thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity.

Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is understandably justified, considering that appellant
repeatedly threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again that
delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge.[45] Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the
victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the
intimidation produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at
the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she would report the incident.[46]

At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.

It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not
perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.[47] In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant
touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in AAAs testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:

Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you were eleven years old?
A Yes, Mam. [sic]

Q What was that?

A He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A No, Mam. [sic]

Q Why?
A It was painful, Mam. [sic]

xxxx
 Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
A Many times, Mam.[48] [sic]

AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.

Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No. 6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time
that this sexual abuse was committed by your Uncle?
A June 11, Mam. [sic]

Q What year?
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]

xxxx

Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?

A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]

Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?

A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]

xxxx

Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your vagina?
A Painful, Mam. [sic]

Q And what did you do when you feel painful?

A I cried, Mam. [sic]

Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?

A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]

xxxx

Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A No, Mam.[49] [sic]

In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the CA declared:

It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape. Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual
act but accused cannot be convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-settled that
complete penetration of the penis into the vagina is not necessary to convict for consummated rape since the slightest
penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the term slightest penetration was
clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis indeed touching at the very least the
labias of the female organ. Mere epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the victims vagina (the
stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime as
attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration, more accurately,
the touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed consummated. We, therefore, take exception to
the finding of the trial court that when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the childs vagina, the act proved
painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from further executing the act. From the testimony of private
complainant, [AAA] in the afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt
that accused-appellants penis reached the labia of the pudendum of AAAs vagina. There is no basis then to apply the
rule that the introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ (thereby touching the labia of the
pudendum) already consummates the case of rape. x x x [50]

It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the
felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina
of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not
completed.[51]

The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty
of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for both
crimes should be amended.
 II.

We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by
the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Section 2 of the law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if
the

guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since the
passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v.
Tubongbanua[52] and People v. Cabalquinto.[53]

III.

The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but
interesting question facing the Court.

The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of attempted rape.
There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:

ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.[54]

What is the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which
incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x[55]

The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been
raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the
death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to the provisions of
Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or
attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:

1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that
immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code. [56]

xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. The provision
reads:

Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than
another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty:

The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:

SCALE NO. 1

1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
 8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine[57]

xxxx

Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the
maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three
divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.

At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense. The purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege
granted under the same law, for prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of
Indiscriminate Sentence.[58] Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are
persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or maximum periods.[59]

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the
range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had
not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise
to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the
penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced
to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so
followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

IV.

Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will affect not only appellant, but several
classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following qualification.

Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable under two different frames of reference. This was
especially made clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided for in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for reclusion
perpetua to death, and death itself as an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes
of qualified bribery if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present;[60] kidnapping or detention for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;[61] destructive

arson wherein death results;[62] and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances enumerated under the law.

On the other hand, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death was imposable on several crimes, including murder,[63] qualified
piracy,[64] and treason.[65] The imposition of the death penalty for crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death depended on the
appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Reference to those two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as opposed to reclusion perpetua to death.

There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which
were punishable by reclusion perpetua to death if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do
not relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would
have carried prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not reclusion perpetua to death.

The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from reclusion perpetua to death differs from that based on
the exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death
is prision mayor.[66] In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the attempted stage, the penalty x x x two (2) degrees
lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal.[67] In People v. Tolentino,[68] we ruled that the
accused, who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In
explaining that reclusion temporal was the proper penalty, the Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:

Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been
consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, since [RT[69]] was eight years old and TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RTs] mother. The last paragraph
thereof provides:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxxx

The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the penalty lower by two degrees
than death. However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.[70]

This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death are
indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale. Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death if consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to
death is prision mayor. In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for
several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty prescribed for the felony is single
and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated
scale prescribed in Article 71. Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.

It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally,
the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was reclusion perpetua to death, a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties. As a result, the Court had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to consider the effect of the charter on
penalties downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some commonly occurring
crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom, were penalized with the single indivisible penalty of death.

The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of
accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of felonies for which the imposable penalty
was reclusion perpetua to death.
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

V.

If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose sentences had been graduated
beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent.
However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories
and accomplices.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight
Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known
as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty
are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,[71] among others, were deemed to have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such
amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as
they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as
the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive
orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No.
9346.

Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular phrase insofar as they impose the
death penalty. We can entertain two schools of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it
can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not impose the
death penalty, since none of the convicts concerned would face execution through the application of the penalty for attempted rape.
Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not
amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
 On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the
application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe impose as to mean apply, then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by
Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual operation of the
death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the proper graduated penalty.

On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would
the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a conservative
construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with that
employed by the Court in People v. Muoz,[72] a decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion.

If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the imposition of the death penalty to actual executions, this could
have been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead insofar as they sentence an accused to death, there
would have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual executions would have been repealed or
amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress
did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions only.

But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the
prohibition of the law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.

VI.

There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its
effects only to matters relating to the physical imposition of the death penalty.

Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was
charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his
house to detain the victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X
and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion
perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the
conservative interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus,
under Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.

It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the graduated scale of penalties under
Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the
legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for
principals and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a
legislature truly oriented to enact such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of
course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals
and accomplices in any crime at all.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties for principals and accomplices
are equalized in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were
charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the
crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping.
Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion
temporal as an accomplice.

Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was
merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised
Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal
and the accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the
accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that Congress
has the power to will it so.

Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and attempted felonies which were
punishable by death if consummated. The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion
perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one
degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would
be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize that
those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death,[73] such as murder, which may be frustrated.
 Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of commission in their attempted stages
and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony. The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than
death, as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the death penalty. [74]If it were to be
insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the subject attempted
felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony would now be prision mayor.

It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies
that is only one degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code
and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees
fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is
not only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if
such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but from oversight.

VII.

The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep.
Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than
death. In particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks death at the top of the scale for graduated penalties.

Simply put, the negation of the word death as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading
the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our
penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty
of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be
consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to death. Moreover, the
prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be
eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that
prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.

The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated the reference to death in Article 71
would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified
rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.

There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this expansive interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346.
The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not
only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible systema uniform system of jurisprudence.[75] Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of interpretation.
x x x x This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure
the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-

legislative acts.[76] There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed
as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a
clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and
accomplices.

It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in
favor of the accused.[77] If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it
would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice.[78]The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual.[79] It is
this philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles in
our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346
ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of penalties
other than death, dependent as these are on death as a measure under the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if
this were indeed the intent of Congress, and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and
inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the case, we would have acknowledged, perhaps
tacitly, that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be deliberately
inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of such rash or
injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our
general penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.

VIII.

One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death in
our penal laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Muoz,[80] decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the
constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties],
there being no expression of such a requirement in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication.[81] In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987
Constitution which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.[82]

It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. 9346. More precisely, would Muoz as precedent
deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death?

It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which under the Revised Penal Code, carried the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying
circumstance, and thus penalized in the penaltys medium term. Jurisprudence previous to Muozheld that the proper penalty in such
instances should be the higher half of reclusion temporal maximum, with reclusion temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that
purpose. Muoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the Court
made the above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charters effects on the other
periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as 1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging
the reexamination of Muoz.[83]

It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question now befacing us, as the legal premises
behind Muoz are different from those in this case. Most pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty
for murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the proper penalty for attempted qualified
rape. Muoz may have pronounced that the Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into consideration
herein, the correct query now being whether Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346. Otherwise
framed, Muoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty
Congress has unequivocally banned the same.

Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which provided that [n]either shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Muoz and its progenies, have
interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that
eliminates all references and applications of the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the
time Muoz was decided, it would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the
death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, as Congress very well did just four (4) years after Muoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act
No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and the
Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Yet it was that
express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and there
is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of the Constitution.

The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding
modification of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding
modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and not the Constitution.

For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word death as
expressly provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to
Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the
penalties for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the concept of death
penalty bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the
amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty of death.

The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word imposition in the Constitution evinced the framers intent to retain the
operation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of imposition in Rep. Act No. 9346
as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the death penalty, as applied in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of imposition was
implemented as a means of retaining death under Article 71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court
can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a
higher degree of clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and
oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as nothing but blather in search of meaning. [84] In the matter of statutes that
deprive a person of physical liberty, the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.

Yet in truth, there is no material difference between imposition and application, for both terms embody the operation in law of the
death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates death as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the
operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a persons liberty is
to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such
statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale
of penalties under Article 71.

We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the
graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in
the same restraints appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the
imposition of the death penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion,
Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has
never been more secure than at any time in our political history as a nation.
 Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of the death penalty
and instead placed it under a suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the interregnum
between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being in a state of hibernation. [85] No longer. It reawakened then it died;
because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before
that day, the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of depriving
liberty.

Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do not acknowledge that Muoz lacked legal
justification when it was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences
imposed on convicts on the basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly stood as the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that
passed finality prior to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law
jurisprudence.

IX.

Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed
therein as heinous, within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal
effects other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.[86] The
categorization of certain crimes as heinous, constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has
also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a general
inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of heinous crimes.

It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify
those crimes previously catalogued as heinous. The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death
penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of
the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category
by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere
to heinous crimes.

X.

Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding
modification of penalties other than death through that statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.

As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate. Henceforth, death, as utilized in
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of
appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.

There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing penalty of death, as utilized in
Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other
penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion
thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in
degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale. Hence, as we earlier
noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor.

Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously
convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see
no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code states that [p]enal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[ [87]] x x x x although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Given that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346
downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons defined as habitual criminal[s].
Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to
persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act.[88]

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts
presently serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be understood that this
decision does not make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their continued
detention. There are remedies under law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the
Public Attorneys Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help
implement the release of such prisoners who are so entitled by reason of this ruling.

XI.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence,
and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts
consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua with no eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by
one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of attempted rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v.
Miranda.[89]

Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence[90] in awarding to BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences
appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of consummated
rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant
is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.

For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two
(2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159208 August 18, 2006

RENNIE DECLARADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR S. GUBATON, Presiding Judge, Branch 14, Roxas City, and FRANK BANSALES, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the portion of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14, in
Criminal Case No. C-1419-10-2002, suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a student at the Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Capiz. At around
9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Yvonne Declarador was stabbed to death. After conducting the autopsy on the cadaver, Rural Health Physician
Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Certificate indicating that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds on different parts of the body. 2
On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank Bansales with murder was filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor with the Family
Court. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about 9:45 oclock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas,
Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby
hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple fatal stab wounds in the different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of the
said Yvonne Declarador.
The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength considering that the attack was made by the accused using a long knife which the latter carried along with him from his
house to the school against his lady teacher who was unarmed and defenseless at that time and by inflicting upon the latter about fifteen
(15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her death. 3
In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the RTC rendered judgment on May 20, 2003 finding Bansales guilty of
murder. However, the court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth
at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court finds CICL Frank Bansales GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating circumstance of minority, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) month of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne
Declarador, a civil indemnity of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages, Forty-Three
Thousand Pesos (P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorneys fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned income of
One Million Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).
The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug National High School of
President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was established to have been committed inside the
classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school hours.
Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the Child in conflict with the law (CICL), Frank Bansales is
ordered committed to the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.
Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors, the DSWD Capiz Provincial Office, Roxas City,
the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth, Concordia, Guimaras, the accused and his counsel, Atty. Ramcez John Honrado.
SO ORDERED. 4
On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the Public Prosecutor, the Social Welfare Officer
of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth, considering that the accused would turn 18 on
June 3, 2003. 5
Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing that
portion of the decision of the trial courts decision suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation
center.
Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death, 6 reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Ondo, 7 petitioner avers that since
Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended
sentence.
In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to file the petition, considering that the offense charged is a public crime
brought in the name of the People of the Philippines; only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court
assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the service of his sentence. He further avers that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles
the accused to an automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court did
not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.
In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.
The OSG, for its part, posits that respondents sentence cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the sentence
actually imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided for by law.
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the petition; (2) whether petitioner violated the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with this Court; and (3) whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.
The petition is granted.
On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he has sufficient personality
to file the instant special civil action for certiorari. 8 This is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in
order to promote their object. 9 Moreover, the OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined the petitioner in his plea for the
nullification of the assailed portion of the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC should be filed in the Court
of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 10 A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 11 This is an established
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts docket. 12
However, in Fortich v. Corona, 13 the Court held that considering the nature and importance of the issues raised and in the interest of
speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it. 14 Moreover,
this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the interests of justice so require.
In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either evident premeditation or abuse of superior
strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the
crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found him guilty of murder.
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the
court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application
of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend
all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any
training institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age, or for
a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development or the government training institution or responsible person under whose care he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require the Department of Social
Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over the offender and his family.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or government training institution as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one
who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.
The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, except for those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law, the sentence of the
accused is automatically suspended:
Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. The sentence shall be suspended without need of application by the
juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of
sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall
proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile:
care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug and alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling and similar activities; Commitment
to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the DSWD or other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.
The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict with the law with
the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on the matter. The Family Court may set
a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons
whose presence may be deemed necessary.
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence, or
to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of
judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified
from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. "Punishable" is defined as "deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to
be punished; may be punished; liable to punishment." 15 The word "punishable" does not mean "must be punished," but "liable to be
punished" as specified. 16 In U.S. v. Villalon, 17 the Court defined punishable as "deserving of, or liable for, punishment." Thus, the term refers to
the possible, not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed.
The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by
the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. 18 Despite
the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence meted against him. By this act,
respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall be
enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other
disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38
of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No.
603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences
suspended.
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have
enacted the new act with reference thereto. 19 Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed
national policy. 20
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge suspending the sentence of respondent
Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENNIE DECLARADOR, G.R. No. 159208

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
HON. SALVADOR S. CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
GUBATON, Presiding Judge,
Branch 14, Roxas City, and
FRANK BANSALES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 18, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the portion of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 14, in
Criminal Case No. C-1419-10-2002, suspending the sentence of respondent Frank Bansales and ordering his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.

Frank Bansales was born on June 3, 1985. He was a student at the Cabug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas,
Capiz. At around 9:45 a.m. on July 25, 2002, Yvonne Declarador was stabbed to death. After conducting the autopsy on the cadaver,
Rural Health Physician Pilar Posadas prepared a Post-Mortem Certificate indicating that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds on different
parts of the body.[2]

On October 10, 2002, an Information charging Frank Bansales with murder was filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor with the Family
Court. The accusatory portion reads:

That on or about 9:45 oclock in the morning of July 25, 2002, inside a classroom in Cabug-Cabug National High
School in President Roxas, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused armed with
a knife and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said
knife [his] teacher, one YVONNE DECLARADOR, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple fatal stab wounds in
the different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of the said Yvonne Declarador.
 The crime was committed with the attendance of the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength considering that the attack was made by the accused using a long knife
which the latter carried along with him from his house to the school against his lady teacher who was unarmed and
defenseless at that time and by inflicting upon the latter about fifteen (15) fatal knife wounds resulting to her death. [3]

In view of the plea of the accused and the evidence presented, the RTC rendered judgment on May 20, 2003 finding Bansales
guilty of murder. However, the court suspended the sentence of the accused and ordered his commitment to the Regional Rehabilitation
for Youth at Concordia, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In view of the Plea of Guilty by the accused and the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court finds CICL Frank
Bansales GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder being charged. Being a minor, 17 years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense charged, he is entitled to a special mitigating circumstance of minority, and is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) month of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs of Yvonne Declarador, a civil indemnity of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages, Forty-Three Thousand Pesos
(P43,000.00) for funeral expenses, attorneys fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and unearned income of
One Million Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P1,370,000.70).

The parents (father and mother of juvenile Frank Bansales) and his teacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug
National High School of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointly subsidiarily liable in case of insolvency, as the crime was
established to have been committed inside the classroom of Cabug-Cabug National High School and during school
hours.

Pursuant to the provision of P.D. 603, as amended, the sentence is suspended and the Child in conflict with the law
(CICL), Frank Bansales is ordered committed to the Regional RehabilitationCenter for Youth at Concordia,
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.

Furnish copies of this decision the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Private Prosecutors, the DSWD Capiz Provincial
Office, Roxas City, the Regional Rehabilitation for Youth, Concordia, Guimaras, the accused and his counsel, Atty.
Ramcez John Honrado.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On June 2, 2003, the RTC set a preliminary conference for 10:00 a.m. of June 10, 2003 with the Public Prosecutor, the Social
Welfare Officer of the court, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Rehabilitation Center for Youth, considering that the accused would
turn 18 on June 3, 2003.[5]

Rennie Declarador, the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing that
portion of the decision of the trial courts decision suspending the sentence of the accused and committing him to the rehabilitation center.

Petitioner claimed that under Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as well as A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (otherwise known as the Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), the benefit of a suspended sentence does not apply to a juvenile who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death,[6] reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Ondo,[7] petitioner avers that since
Bansales was charged with murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he is disqualified from availing the benefits of a suspended
sentence.

In his Comment, Bansales avers that petitioner has no standing to file the petition, considering that the offense charged is a public crime
brought in the name of the People of the Philippines; only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is authorized to file a petition in court
assailing the order of the RTC which suspended the service of his sentence. He further avers that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC entitles
the accused to an automatic suspension of sentence and allows the court to commit the juvenile to the youth center; hence, the court did
not abuse its discretion in suspending the sentence of the accused.

In reply, petitioner maintains that he has sufficient personality to file the petition.

The OSG, for its part, posits that respondents sentence cannot be suspended since he was charged with a capital offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. It insists that the entitlement of a juvenile to a suspended sentence does not depend upon the sentence
actually imposed by the trial court but upon the imposable penalty for the crime charged as provided for by law.

The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether petitioner has standing to file the petition; (2) whether petitioner violated the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts in filing his petition with this Court; and (3) whether respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the suspension of the sentence of respondent Bansales and his commitment to the Regional
Rehabilitation Center for the Youth.

The petition is granted.

On the first issue, we rule for the petitioner. Being the surviving spouse of the deceased and the offended party, he has sufficient personality
to file the instant special civil action for certiorari.[8] This is in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in
order to promote their object.[9] Moreover, the OSG has filed its comment on the petition and has joined the petitioner in his plea for the
nullification of the assailed portion of the RTC decision.
On the second issue, the rule is that a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify an order of the RTC should be filed in the Court
of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[10] A direct invocation of the original jurisdiction of the Court to issue writs of certiorari may be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition. [11] This is an established
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Courts docket.[12]

However, in Fortich v. Corona,[13] the Court held that considering the nature and importance of the issues raised and in the interest of
speedy justice, and to avoid future litigations, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it.[14] Moreover,
this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the interests of justice so require.

In this case, we resolve to take cognizance of the case, involving as it does a juvenile and the application of the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.

The charge against respondent Bansales was murder with the qualifying circumstance of either evident premeditation or abuse of superior
strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the
crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court found him guilty of murder.

Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, provides:

Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the evidence in the proper
proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him, the court,
shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of
pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender and if it finds that the best
interest of the public, as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and
commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any
training institution operated by the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one
years of age, or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training institution or responsible person under
whose care he has been committed.

Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the court may require
the Department of Social Welfare and Development to prepare and submit to the court a social case study report over
the offender and his family.

The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by the representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or government training institution as the court may designate subject to such
conditions as it may prescribe.

The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence
under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is
convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.

The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC where, except for those under paragraph 3, Section 32 of the law, the sentence of the
accused is automatically suspended:

Sec. 32. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. The sentence shall be suspended without need of
application by the juvenile in conflict with the law. The court shall set the case for disposition conference within fifteen
(15) days from the promulgation of sentence which shall be attended by the social worker of the Family Court, the
juvenile, and his parents or guardian ad litem. It shall proceed to issue any or a combination of the following disposition
measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the juvenile: care, guidance, and supervision orders; Drug and
alcohol treatment; Participation in group counseling and similar activities; Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation
Center of the DSWD or other centers for juvenile in conflict with the law authorized by the Secretary of DSWD.

The Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the DSWD shall monitor the compliance by the juvenile in conflict
with the law with the disposition measure and shall submit regularly to the Family Court a status and progress report on
the matter. The Family Court may set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the presence, if practicable, of
the juvenile, his parents or guardian, and other persons whose presence may be deemed necessary.

The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
over.

Thus, it is clear that a person who is convicted of an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is disqualified
from availing the benefits of a suspended sentence. Punishable is defined as deserving of, or capable, or liable to punishment; liable to be
punished; may be punished; liable to punishment.[15] The word punishable does not mean must be punished, but liable to be punished as
specified.[16] In U.S. v. Villalon,[17] the Court defined punishable as deserving of, or liable for, punishment. Thus, the term refers to the possible,
not to the actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed.

The disqualification is based on the nature of the crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty
imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a
juvenile.[18] Despite the disqualification of Bansales, respondent Judge, nevertheless, ordered the suspension of the sentence meted against
him. By this act, respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
 We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence shall
be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other
disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38
of Rep. Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No.
603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their sentences
suspended.

Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature
on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have
enacted the new act with reference thereto.[19] Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an
expressed national policy.[20]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the respondent Judge suspending the sentence of
respondent Frank Bansales is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

SECOND DIVISION

MICHAEL PADUA, G.R. No. 168546

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
July 23, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated April 19, 2005 and Resolution[2] dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for certiorari and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004[3] and July 28, 2004[4] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of
violating Section 5,[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,[6] otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling
dangerous drugs.[7] The Information reads:
 The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a.
Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in
relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar
Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully
authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of
dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation
of the said law.
Contrary to law.[8]
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.[9]
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his
plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 70[10] of Rep. Act No. 9165. The
prosecutor interposed no objection.[11] Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order[12] stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty
was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision[13] dated February 6, 2004, the RTC
found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art.
39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation[15] dated February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender
who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 [16] (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as The Probation Law
of 1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order[17] dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence
Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to
submit his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC
recommending that Padua be placed on probation.[18]
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for
Probation on the ground that under Section 24[19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor Michael Padua y Tordel
prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole
and Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor Michael Padua y Tordel be
placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child
and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful
offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application
for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the Program for Treatment and
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of
either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with Probation or
Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor
Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of
probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. (underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his
petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises
the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH
DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE]
RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED
IN THE LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
 WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.[22]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to adopt its Comment [23] as its Memorandum. In
its Comment, the OSG countered that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165
INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.
II.
SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.[24]
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts order
denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344,[25] the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
violated? and (3) Does Section 32[26] of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law have
application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[27]
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[28]
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for
probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear
under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. Any person convicted for drug
trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the
penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is
that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.[29] If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of intention.[30] Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[31]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to
provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and
magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sections 11[32] and 15[33] of the Act. The law considers
the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers,
like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given
the chance to mend their ways.[34] The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from
the application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.[35]
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person
arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for
the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under
Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law has application in this case. Section 68[36] of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of
sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38[37] of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for
petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence.
Section 40[38] of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a
child[39] for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case
is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN, G.R. No. 184874

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
 Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. October 9, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[2] dated November 16, 2007 and
the Resolution[3] dated October 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29316 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Robert
Remiendo y Siblawan.

The case arose from the filing of two criminal informations, both dated March 10, 2008, against petitioner Robert Remiendo y Siblawan
(Remiendo), that read

Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999

That in or about the month of March 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000

That in or about the month of May 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl below 12 years of age.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Upon arraignment, Remiendo pled not guilty to both charges. After pretrial, a joint trial ensued before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet.Both the prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence, summarized by the CA
in its Decision, to wit:

The prosecution presented the following version of facts:

The complainant [AAA] was born on 16 February 1986. At the time of the commission of the offense, she was a
minor below 12 years of age. She knew accused-appellant Robert Remiendo as he was residing near the house where
her family used to stay. Sometime in March 1997, she was sexually assaulted by accused-appellant inside said house. On
that day, her parents and brother left for work after breakfast, and she was left alone in the house. Accused-appellant
came in, pushed her into the room, and threatened to kill her if she reported what happened. He undressed himself and
the complainant. The latter was standing and refused to remove her panty but she obliged when accused-appellant
insisted. Then he made her lie on the bed and placed his penis in her vagina. The complainant struggled, moved, and
pushed accused-appellant. She felt pain when accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried until
accused-appellant left, but she did not shout because accused-appellant warned her not to, or else he would kick
her. She put on her clothes after accused-appellant left. Her parents arrived in the afternoon but she did not tell them
what happened to her because her mother might whip her.

Sometime in May 1997, [AAA] was again sexually assaulted by accused-appellant, which took place in the
house of the latter. At that time, she was on her way to see her mother at her workplace after she had lunch. When she
passed by the house of accused-appellant, the latter pulled her into his house and brought her into his room. She cried
and shouted but accused-appellant told her to keep quiet. She struggled but was helpless because accused-appellant
was stronger. They were alone in the room. Accused-appellant removed his clothes and told her to remove her
panty. Afraid, she removed her panty and was made to lie on the bed. Accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina and she felt pain. She kept on moving but she could not push away accused-appellant. She moved her
shoulders and pushed accused-appellant with both hands but he was stronger. Afterwards, accused-appellant moved
away and threatened to kill her if she told anyone what happened. She responded that she would not tell
anyone. Later, she executed a sworn statement and identified accused-appellant as the person who raped her.
 Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-Cordillera
Administrative Region, physically examined the complainant on 2 January 1998. Said medico-legal officer testified that
[AAA] was thirteen (13) years old and a Grade III pupil at Badiwan Tuba, Benguet at the time of the examination. She
was four feet and eleven inches (411) tall, weighed 78 pounds, fairly nourished, and fairly developed. She was conscious,
coherent, and cooperative. She was ambulatory and had no extra-genital injuries. Upon examination of her genital
area, he found old lacerations of the hymen at 5:00 and 7:00 oclock positions, which meant that her hymen was altered
by a hard rigid instrument. The lacerations were done more than three (3) months prior to the examination. To determine
the approximate size of the object that the hymenal opening could accommodate, he inserted a test tube. The 2.5-
centimeter diameter of said tube was admitted with ease by the hymenal orifice. He noted that the vaginal walls were
lax and the ridges inside were smothered. The complainant told him that accused-appellant raped her. He presented a
written report of his findings.

On 12 July 1998, psychiatrist Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy conducted an examination of the mental condition of the
complainant. The latter was also scheduled for psychological examination to be conducted by Elma Buadken. The result
of the examination showed that [AAA] is suffering from psychosis and organicity. She has a below average intelligence
quotient of 88, but not on the level of mental retardation. She can perform simple tasks but needs guidance. As to her
studies, she can hardly comprehend what is being taught to her. Having psychosis means that her brain is afflicted with
a disease. Her medical history showed that she suffered head and body injuries brought about by being sideswiped by a
motor vehicle sometime in 1996. She was confined in the hospital for twelve (12) days. Said injuries substantially
contributed to her present condition. Organicity, on the other hand, means that the complainant suffers from a cloud of
memory, upward rolling of the eyeballs, stiffening of the extremities, loss of consciousness, and epileptic seizures. Her
psychosis occurs after seizure. She is not, however, insane. During a seizure, she does not know what is going on, but
afterwards she returns to her level of consciousness. With regular medication, her seizures will be greatly
minimized. During her interview, the complainant had a seizure and the psychiatrist had to wait until her consciousness
level returned. The complainant then revealed that accused-appellant and a certain Reynoso Cera raped her. The
psychiatrist opined that during the rape, she did not have a seizure because if she had, she would not have
remembered what had happened. The fact that she was able to narrate what happened and who raped her
suggested that she was on her conscious level at such time. A written report of the foregoing findings was submitted in
court.

The defense presented the following version of facts:

Lea F. Chiwayan, thirteen (13) years old, testified that she was a friend, playmate, and neighbor of the
complainant. She testified that she and [AAA] played together and talked about their crushes. The complainant told
Lea Chiwayan that she had a crush on accused-appellant. Sometime in April or May 1997, the complainant said that her
brother had molested her, and that he and his father had sexual intercourse with her in their house in Poyopoy,
Tuba. Sometime in August 1997, the complainant confided that Reynoso Cera raped her in his house. She told Lea
Chiwayan that she did not feel anything because she was used to having sexual intercourse with brother and
father. One Saturday afternoon, Lea Chiwayan and the complainant were playing when they saw accused-appellant
going to the basketball court near the church. They followed him and watched a basketball game. After the game, Lea
Chiwayan went home with the others while the complainant stayed behind. A few seconds after they left, the
complainant ran after them and told them that something happened between her and accused-appellant. She said
that accused-appellant pulled her towards the back of the church and had sexual intercourse with her. The
complainant later took back what she said because she was only joking. She then asked Lea Chiwayan not to tell the
accused-appellant. However, Lea Chiwayan told accused-appellant what the complainant told them. Accused-
appellant confronted the complainant. He flicked a finger on her head, kicked and spanked her. He said, what are you
saying, why did I do that, if I like and I do it, Ill not do it with you, you should be ashamed of yourself. He then borrowed
the vehicle of a certain Junie, started the engine, and stepped on the gas such that the fumes from the exhaust pipe
were directed at the complainant. Later, Lea Chiwayan learned that [AAA] filed a case against accused-appellant.

Dolores L. Daniel, Grade II teacher of [AAA] for the school year 1997-1998, testified that the latter was unruly
and a liar. The complainant would pick fights and steal money from her classmates. However, the witness admitted that
there was no written record in school that she reprimanded complainant for her behavior. She knew that the
complainant had an accident before.

Victor Daniel, a jitney operator, testified that accused-appellant was one of his drivers. He described accused-
appellant as a hardworking and industrious person. When he learned that Robert Remiendo was accused of rape, he
was outraged because he knew the daily activities of accused-appellant. The latter could not have done such act
under his strict supervision.

Accused-appellant testified that he knew the complainant, as she was a townmate of his mother. In
September 1996, he and his parents were then residing in Badiwan. When the complainant figured in an accident at
that time, he was the one who informed her parents. The first time he saw the complainant was during the time when he
was doing some repairs on his jitney. He saw the complainant and her playmates go inside the jitney. He told them to
alight from the vehicle. Sometime in June 1997, he again saw the complainant and her sister playing inside the jitney. He
told them to alight as they were disturbing him. On the day he was playing basketball at the church grounds in Badiwan,
Lea and Emma Chiwayan approached him and asked him if it was true that he raped [AAA]. He asked where the latter
was and went to see her. Out of anger, he borrowed the vehicle of Junie, started the engine, directed the exhaust pipe
at the complainant, and revved the engine so the smoke would go straight to her. He slapped her and said if I would like
someone, it would not be you because there are a lot of girls better than you. During the Christmas party in Badiwan, he
again saw the complainant roaming around the dance area. He told her to get out as she irritated the people
dancing. The complainant said nothing and left the dance floor. Thereafter, he saw the complainant laughing and
 smiling. He learned that he was charged with two (2) counts of rape when he received a subpoena issued by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor in January 1998.[6]

In its Joint Judgment[7] dated October 27, 2004, the RTC found Remiendo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
statutory rape. The RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape as charged in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999 and
in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum for each count of rape.

He shall further indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of civil
indemnity, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) by way of moral damages, and the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.

Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet
Province is directed to immediately transfer the said accused, Robert Remiendo, to the custody of the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation unless
otherwise ordered by this Court.

Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province for his information,
guidance and compliance.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Aggrieved, Remiendo interposed his appeal before the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC, modifying only the
civil liability imposed upon Remiendo.The fallo of the CA Decision reads

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Joint Judgment dated 27 October 2004
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the civil liability
of accused-appellant. He is ordered to pay the complainant, for each count of rape, the sum of (a) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Remiendo moved to reconsider the November 16, 2007 Decision, but the CA denied the motion in its October 3, 2008 Resolution;
hence, this petition alleging that

(a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO CONVICTING
PETITIONER OF STATUTORY RAPE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE TRUE AND REAL AGE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PETITIONER THE BENEFIT ACCORDED TO HIM BY REPUBLIC
ACT 9344 KNOWN AS THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 INCREASING THE AGE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY.[10]

Remiendo questions his conviction for statutory rape despite the purported absence of competent proof that AAA was below 12
years old at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes. According to him, the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA offered by the
prosecution during its formal offer of exhibits was not admitted by the RTC in its Order [11] dated September 14, 1999 because it was neither
identified by any witness, nor marked as exhibit during the trial though reserved for marking during the pretrial. He further posits that, on the
basis of the testimonies of the defense witnesses and the Elementary School Permanent Record,[12] AAA was more than 12 years old in
March and May 1997.

Considering that AAA was more than 12 years of age, Remiendo then questions her credibility as a witness, claiming that she was
smiling during her testimony; and that her failure to flee from the situation, even taking off her panties herself, belies her charges of statutory
rape against him.

We disagree.

As provided in Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. Its
two elements are: (1) that the accused has carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual
congress with a girl under 12 years old is always rape.[13]

As regards the appreciation of the age of a rape victim, the Court, in People v. Pruna,[14] laid down the following guidelines:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live
birth of such party.
 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable,
the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity
who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party
pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives
concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by
the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.[15]

In this case, the prosecution offered in evidence a certified true copy of AAAs Certificate of Live Birth[16] as part of the testimonies of AAA
and her mother that AAA was born on February 21, 1986. It was reserved for marking as part of the exhibits for the prosecution, as shown in
the Pretrial Order[17] dated November 16, 1998. During the trial, in order to abbreviate the proceedings, the parties agreed to stipulate on
the testimony of AAAs mother, specifically on the following facts:

1. That she is [BBB], the natural mother of [AAA], the victim in these two (2) Criminal Cases Nos. 98-CR-2999 and 98-CR-
3000;

2. That on January 5, 1998[,] she executed an affidavit-complaint for and on behalf of her daughter which she
subscribed before NBI agent Atty. Dave Alunan; and

3. That the subject matter of her sworn statement against Reynoso Cera and Robert Remiendo is the alleged statutory
rape against [AAA].[18]

And part of the affidavit-complaint of BBB is the statement that AAA was born on February 21, 1986.[19]

A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). As such, it is prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child,[20] and it does
not need authentication. It can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, despite the September 14, 1999
Order, the RTC correctly appreciated the same in its Joint Judgment.

Nevertheless, even assuming that the Certificate of Live Birth was not appreciated by the RTC, the prosecution was able to establish that
AAA was below 12 years old during the two occasions of rape per the guidelines laid down in Pruna. It is significant to note that both AAA
and BBB testified that AAA was born on February 21, 1986. This fact was neither denied nor objected to by the defense. The argument of
Remiendo that the prosecution admitted in the course of trial that AAAs birthday was February 21, 1984 cannot stand. As quoted by
Remiendo in his petition

Court:

Anyway, it is stated in that document that the birth date of [AAA] was February 21, 1983. Do you agree that
that is an entry there?

Pros. Suanding:

Yes, your honor. We agree, your honor.[21]

This statement cannot qualify as a judicial admission on the birth date of AAA. A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case and it dispenses with proof with respect to the matter or fact
admitted. It may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [22] In
this case, what was only admitted was that the entry of AAAs date of birth appearing in her school record is February 21, 1983. There was
no such admission that the said date was the correct birthday of AAA. And as between the school record and the testimonies of AAA and
her mother BBB, the latter must prevail.
 As to the credibility of AAA as a witness, jurisprudence instructs us that the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason
is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[23]

Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, inasmuch as no young woman, especially of
tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being the
subject of a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world,
would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.[24]

What is more, AAAs testimony of rape was corroborated by the NBI medico-legal examination showing healed lacerations on her
hymen. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. When the consistent and forthright
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of
carnal knowledge have been established. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify
falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of
full faith and credence.[25] In this case, Remiendo failed to convince us to rule otherwise.

Remiendo also posits that he should benefit from the mandate of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.

The pertinent provision of R.A. No. 9344 reads

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall be likewise exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she acted with discernment, in which case, such child
shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.[26]

Remiendo argues that the prosecution failed to establish that he acted with discernment in the commission of the crimes
charged. Thus, he claims that he should be exempt from criminal liability.

We differ. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is
burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that
the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors
cunning and shrewdness.[27]

Culled from the records of this case, it is manifest that Remiendo acted with discernment, being able to distinguish between right
and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts against AAA. During the rape that occurred in March 1997, Remiendo
waited for AAA to be left alone at her house before he came, and, while doing his dastardly act, threatened to kick her should she shout
for help. In May 1997, Remiendo again ravished AAA in the room of his house when the latter passed by and, thereafter, threatened to kill
her if she told anybody about what had just happened. Per his own testimony, he knew that committing rape was wrong because he
claimed to have been enraged when he was asked by AAAs playmates if he indeed raped AAA, to the point of slapping her and revving
up the engine of a jitney and directing the smoke from the exhaust pipe towards her.

Remiendo, being above 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the rape,[28] and having acted with discernment, but having
already reached 21 years of age at the time of the imposition of his sentence by the trial court, his claim for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 is
rendered moot and academic in view of Section 40[29] thereof which provides

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence,
the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or
to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.[30]

Remiendo was born on January 21, 1982. The Joint Judgment was promulgated on October 27, 2004. Thus, at the time of the
imposition of his sentence, Remiendo was already 22 years old and could no longer be considered a child for the purposes of the
application of R.A. No. 9344.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Decision dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 186523

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
URBAN SALCEDO ABDURAHMAN ISMAEL DIOLAGRA, Promulgated:
ABDULAJID NGAYA, HABER ASARI, ABSMAR ALUK, BASHIER
ABDUL, TOTING HANO, JR., JAID AWALAL, ANNIK/RENE June 22, 2011
ABBAS, MUBIN IBBAH, MAGARNI HAPILON IBLONG, LIDJALON
SAKANDAL, IMRAM HAKIMIN SULAIMAN, NADSMER ISNANI
SULAIMAN, NADSMER ISNANI MANDANGAN KAMAR JAAFAR,
SONNY ASALI and BASHIER ORDOEZ,
Accused-Appellants,

KHADAFFY JANJALANI, ALDAM TILAO alias ABU SABAYA, ET

AL., and MANY OTHER JOHN DOES, PETER DOES and RICHARD
DOES,
Accused.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on November 24, 2008, in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 125, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. The CA found accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-1187 and sentenced them
to reclusion perpetua.

A close examination of the records would reveal the CA's narration of the antecedent facts to be accurate, to wit:

Accused-appellants interpose the present appeal to the Decision of branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela City,
Basilan, convicting them for the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Ransom, as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. After arraignment and
due trial, accused-appellants were found guilty and, accordingly, sentenced in Criminal Case No. 3537-1129
to Reclusion Perpetua, and in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-1187 to the Death Penalty.

The Decision in Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of Joe Guillo, the Court finds the
following accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

1. Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid Guillermo

Salcedo/Abu Urban
2. Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a. Abu Sahrin
3. Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu Ajid
4. Haber Asari, a.k.a. Abu Habs
5. Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk
6. Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. Abu Jar
7. Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. Abu Jakaria (in abstentia)
8. Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. Abu Jaid (in abstencia)
9. Mubin Ibbah, a.ka. Abu Black (in abstentia)
10. Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Annik (in
abstentia)
11. Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. Abu Nadim
12. Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
13. Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. Abu Nadim
14. Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. Abu Harun
15. Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. Abu Jude
16. Sonny Asali, a.k.a. Abu Teng/Abu Umbra, and
 17. Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu Bashier

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, the lesser penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is
hereby imposed on them.

The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay Joel Guillo by way of moral damages the
sum of P200,000.00, pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 2217 of the Civil Code, with proportionate costs
against them.

On the other hand, the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 3608-1164 decreed as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 3608-1164, for the kidnapping of Reina Malonzo, the court finds the following
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

1. Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid Guillermo

Salcedo/Abu Urban
2. Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a Abu Sahrin
3. Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu Ajid
4. Haber Asari, a.k.a. Abu Habs
5. Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk
6. Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. Abu Jar
7. Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. Abu Jakaria (in abstentia)
8. Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. Abu Jaid (in abstentia)
9. Mubin Ibbah, a.k.a. Abu Black (in abstentia)
10. Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Annik (in
abstentia)
11. Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. Abu Nadim
12. Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
13. Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. Abu Nadim
14. Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. Abu Harun
15. Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. Abu Jude
16. Sonny Asali, a.k.a. Abu Teng/Abu Umbra, and
17. Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu Bashier

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, are hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty
of DEATH.

The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay Reina Malonzo by way of moral damages
the sum of P200,000.00, pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 2217 of the Civil Code, with proportionate
costs against them.

Likewise, the lower court, in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165 decreed as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for the kidnapping of Shiela Tabuag, the (court) finds the following
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

1. Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid Guillermo

Salcedo/Abu Urban
2. Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a. Abu Sahrin
3. Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu Ajid
4. Haber Asari, a.k.a. Abu Habs
5. Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk
6. Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. Abu Jar
7. Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. Abu Jakaria (in abstentia)
8. Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. Abu Jaid (in abstentia)
9. Mubin Ibbah, a.k.a. Abu Black (in abstentia)
10. Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Annik (in
abstentia)
11. Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. Abu Nadim
12. Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
13. Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. Abu Nadim
14. Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. Abu Harun
15. Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. Abu Jude
16. Sonny Asali, a.k.a. Abu Teng/Abu Umbra, and
17. Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu Bashier

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, are hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty
of DEATH.
 The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay Shiela Tabuag by way of moral damages
the sum of P200,000.00, pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 2217 of the Civil Code, with proportionate
costs against them.

And in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, it entered its judgment against the accused-appellants as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the kidnapping of Ediborah Yap, the court finds the following
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals:

Urban Salcedo, a.k.a. Wahid Guillermo Salcedo/Abu Urban

Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, a.k.a Abu Sahrin
Abdulajid Ngaya, a.k.a. Abu Ajid
Haber Asari, a.k.a. Abu Habs
Absmar Aluk, a.k.a. Abu Adzmar/Abu Aluk
Bashier Abdul, a.k.a. Abu Jar
Toting Hano, Jr., a.k.a. Abu Jakaria (in abstentia)
Jaid Awalal, a.k.a. Abu Jaid (in abstentia)
Mubin Ibbah, a.k.a. Abu Black (in abstentia)
Annik/Rene Abbas, a.k.a. Abu Annik (in abstentia)

Margani Hapilon Iblong, a.k.a. Abu Nadim

Lidjalong Sakandal/Sabandal
Imran Hakimin y Sulaiman, a.k.a. Abu Nadim
Nadzmer Isnani Mangangan, a.k.a. Abu Harun
Kamar Jaagar, a.k.a. Abu Jude
Sonny Asali, a.k.a. Abu Teng/Abu Umbra, and
Bashier Ordonez, a.k.a. Abu Bashier

as defined and penalized under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, and applying Art. 63 of the Code, are hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty
of DEATH.

The aforementioned accused shall jointly and severally pay to the heirs of Ediborah Yap by way of
civil indemnity the sum of P50,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00 and, considering the
attendant aggravating circumstances, the sum of P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

The salient facts in this case are the following:

On June 1, 2001, Shiela Tabuag, Reina Malonzo, and Ediborah Yap, were serving their duty shift as nurses at Jose Maria
Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan. Joel Guillo, the hospital accountant, on the other hand, had just finished his
duty and decided to rest in the doctors quarter.

At around 12:30 past midnight of June 2, 2001, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG for brevity) led by Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu
Sabaya, with 30 armed followers entered and took control over said hospital. Previously, however, another group of ASG
with 60 followers led by Abu Umran hiked towards Lamitan for the sole purpose of reinforcing the group of Khadaffy
Janjalani and Abu Sabaya. However, upon reaching the vicinity of the hospital, a firefight had already ensued between
the military forces and the group of Janjalani and Sabaya. Simultaneously, the band also became entangled in a firefight
with a civilian group led by one retired Col. Baet, who was killed during the encounter. Moments later, the band fled to
different directions, with its members losing track of one another.

Pandemonium ensued in the hospital on that early morning, as the people were thrown into a frenzy by the shouting,
window glass breaking, and herding of hostages from one room to another by the ASG. The group was also looking for
medicine and syringes for their wounded comrades as well as food and clothing. The firefight lasted until the afternoon of
June 2, 2001. Finally, at around 6:00 in the evening, the ASG and the hostages, including those from the Dos Palmas Resort,
were able to slip out of the hospital through the backdoor, despite the intense gunfire that was ongoing. Hence, the long
and arduous hiking towards the mountains began.

On June 3, 2001, at about noontime, the group of Janjalani and Sabaya met with the group of Abu Ben in Sinagkapan,
Tuburan. The next day, Himsiraji Sali with approximately 60 followers also joined the group. It was only on the third week on
July that year that the whole group of Abu Sayaff was completed, when it was joined by the group of Sattar Yacup, a.k.a.
Abu Umran.

Subsequently, new hostages from the Golden Harvest plantation in Tairan, Lantawan were abducted by the Hamsiraji Sali
and Isnilun Hapilon.

On June 12, 2001, Abu Sabaya informed the hostages that Sobero had been beheaded and was warned of the
consequences should said hostages fail to cooperate with the ASG. Hence, the ASG formed a striking force that then
proceeded to behead 10 innocent civilians.

On October 1, 2001, Reina Malonzo was separated from the other hostages and taken to Zamboanga City by Abu Arabi
with two other ASG members on board a passenger watercraft to stay at a house in Sta. Maria. Later on October 13, 2001,
 a firefight broke out between the ASG and the military, giving Joel Guillo and 3 other hostages the opportunity to escape
from their captors. On even date, Sheila Tabuag was released together with 2 other hostages from Dos Palmas, allegedly
after paying ransom. Reina Malonzo was soon after also released by order of Khaddafy Janjalani on November 1, 2001.

Finally, after a shootout between the ASG and the military on June 7, 2002, at Siraway, Zamboanga del Norte, Ediborah
Yap, died at the hands of her captors. Thereafter, a manhunt by the military was conducted, where the accused-
appellants were subsequently captured and held for trial.

Hence, criminal informations for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7659 were filed against 17 ASG members on August 14, 2001, October 29, 2001, March 6,
2002, and March 12, 2002. As defense for the accused-appellants, 11 of the 17 of them raise the defense of alibi. Among
them were Jaid Awalal, Imran Hakimin Sulaiman, Toting Hano, Jr., Abdurahman Ismael Diolagla, Mubin Ibbah, Absmar
Aluk, Bashier Abdul, Annik/Rene Abbas, Haber Asari, Margani Hapilon Iblong, and Nadzmer Mandangan. On the other
hand, Bashier Ordonez, Sonny Asali, Lidjalon Sakandal/Sabandal, and Abdulajid Ngaya claimed that they were merely
forced by the Abu Sayyaf to join the group. The defense of being deep penetration agents of the military was conversely
raised by 2 accused-appellants, Urban Salcedo and Kamar Jaafar.

After due trial, the court a quo, on August 13, 2004, rendered the appealed decisions which convicted all the accused-
appellants of the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention.[2]

In Criminal Case No. 3537-1129, for the kidnapping of Joel Guillo, accused-appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua; in Criminal
Case No. 3608-1164, for the kidnapping of Reina Malonzo, they were sentenced to Death; in Criminal Case No. 3611-1165, for the
kidnapping of Sheila Tabuag, they were sentenced to Death; and in Criminal Case No. 3674-1187, for the kidnapping of Ediborah Yap, they
were also sentenced to Death.

The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view of the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants. However, in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo,[3] and the amendments made to Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and
Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court transferred this case to the CA for intermediate review.

On November 24, 2008, the CA promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, We hold to AFFIRM the appealed judgments with the modification that
the penalty of death be reduced to Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3611-1165, and 3674-1187.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Thus, the case is now before this Court on automatic review. Both the prosecution and the accused-appellants opted not to file their
respective supplemental briefs with this Court.

In the Brief for Accused-Appellants filed with the CA, it was argued that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It was further averred that some of the accused-appellants were merely forced to join the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) for
fear for their lives and those of their relatives, while four (4) of them, namely, Wahid Salcedo, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Nadzmer
Mandangan and Kamar Jaafar, were supposedly minors at the time the alleged kidnapping took place; hence, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9344 (otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006), should apply to said accused-appellants. It was then prayed that
accused-appellants Nadzmer Isnani Madangan, Magarni Hapilon Iblong, Wahid Salcedo, Kamar Jaafar, Abdulajid Ngaya, Lidjalon
Sakandal and Sonny Asali be acquitted, while the sentence for the rest of the accused-appellants be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

On the other hand, appellee maintained that the State had been able to prove accused-appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
that the defense failed to adduce proof of minority of the four accused-appellants.

The Court finds no reason to reverse or modify the ruling and penalty imposed by the CA.
The defense itself admitted that the kidnapped victims who testified for the prosecution had been able to point out or positively identify in
open court all the accused-appellants[5]as members of the ASG who held them in captivity. Records reveal that the prosecution witnesses
were unwavering in their account of how accused-appellants worked together to abduct and guard their kidnapped victims, fight-off
military forces who were searching and trying to rescue said victims, and how ransom was demanded and paid. The prosecution likewise
presented two former members of the ASG who testified that they were part of the group that reinforced the kidnappers and helped
guard the hostages. They both identified accused-appellants as their former comrades.

In the face of all that evidence, the only defense accused-appellants could muster are denial and alibi, and for accused-appellants
Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar, their alleged minority. Accused-appellants' proffered defense are sorely wanting when pitted
against the prosecutions evidence. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive
identification of the accused-appellants. More so where, as in the present case, the accused-appellants failed to present convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the commission
thereof.[6] In People v. Molina,[7] the Court expounded, thus:
In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill motive on their part or on
that of their families was shown that could have made either of them institute the case against the appellant and falsely
implicate him in a serious crime he did not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x[8]
Furthermore, the detention of the hostages lasted for several months and they were transferred from one place to another, being always
on the move for several days. Thus, in this case, for accused-appellants' alibi to prosper, they are required to prove their whereabouts for all
those months. This they were not able to do, making the defense of alibi absolutely unavailing.

Some of the accused-appellants maintained that they were merely forced to join the ASG. However, the trial court did not find their stories
persuasive. The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court
which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of witnesses.[9]The Court again explained the rationale for this principle
in Molina,[10] to wit:

As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and
entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge
therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to
great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be
disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially
affect the outcome of the case.[11]

The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule.

Lastly, the Court sustains the trial court's and the appellate court's ruling regarding the minority of accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan,
Salcedo and Jaafar. Iblong claimed he was born on August 5, 1987; Mandangan stated his birth date as July 6, 1987; Salcedo said he was
born on January 10, 1985; and Jaafar claimed he was born on July 13, 1981. If Jaafar's birth date was indeed July 13, 1981, then he was
over 18 years of age when the crime was committed in June of 2001 and, thus, he cannot claim minority. It should be noted that the
defense absolutely failed to present any document showing accused-appellants' date of birth, neither did they present testimonies of other
persons such as parents or teachers to corroborate their claim of minority.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that:

Sec. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age
of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child,
it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

xxxx

If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall
file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the
said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert
all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.[12]

It should be emphasized that at the time the trial court was hearing the case and even at the time it handed down the judgment of
conviction against accused-appellants on August 13, 2004, R.A. No. 9344 had not yet been enacted into law. The procedures laid down by
the law to prove the minority of accused-appellants were not yet in place. Hence, the rule was still that the burden of proving the minority
of the accused rested solely on the defense. The trial court, in the absence of any document stating the age of the aforementioned four
accused-appellants, or any corroborating testimony, had to rely on its own observation of the physical appearance of accused-appellants
to estimate said accused-appellants' age. A reading of the afore-quoted Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 shows that this manner of determining
accused-appellants' age is also sanctioned by the law.The accused-appellants appeared to the trial court as no younger than twenty-four
years of age, or in their mid-twenties, meaning they could not have been under eighteen (18) years old when the crime was
committed.[13] As discussed above, such factual finding of the trial court on the age of the four accused-appellants, affirmed by the CA,
must be accorded great respect, even finality by this Court.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the four accused-appellants were indeed less than eighteen years old at the time the crime was
committed, at this point in time, the applicability of R.A. No. 9344 is seriously in doubt. Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 are as follows:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That the suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteenyears (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

xxxx

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -

xxxx
 If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend
the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.[14]
If accused-appellants' claim are true, that they were born in 1985 and 1987, then they have already reached 21 years of age, or over by
this time and thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 of R.A. No. 9344 is now moot and academic.[15]
However, just for the guidance of the bench and bar, it should be borne in mind that if indeed, an accused was under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the crime, then as held in People v. Sarcia,[16] such offenders, even if already over twenty-one (21)
years old at the time of conviction, may still avail of the benefits accorded by Section 51 of R.A. No. 9344 which provides, thus:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in cooperation with the DSWD.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the evidence before the Court show that accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo
and Jaafar, were not minors at the time of the commission of the crime, hence, they cannot benefit from R.A. No. 9344.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 24, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C No. 00239, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming
the Omnibus Judgment2 dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and
Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen
Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-
bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces
of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao
District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the
act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of
shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police
officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the
appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala,
searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces
of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from
the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they
marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-
request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline
substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The
request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory examination revealed that
the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in
two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA
9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point
zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero
point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged,
the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for
selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of
R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally
possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
and accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-
appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He also argues that the chain of
custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place. However, based on the testimony of
PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug
trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused
for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request for powder dusting for our marked
moneys to be used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there should be a pre-arranged signal of the
poseur-buyer to the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at
that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and
a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked
moneys to the suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately
proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already given by the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] substance, we immediately
approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone or did he had (sic) any companion
at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed
him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We
called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso bills as marked moneys.8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the
elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
 of the thing sold and the payment therefor.9 From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the
elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as
well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the
buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a
forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation,
thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the result was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the marked money mentioned in this
report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of
bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally
effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.11 It is often utilized by law enforcers
for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities.12 In People v. Roa,13 this Court had the
opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust
operation. While it is true that Section 8614 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's
participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by
Section 5, Rule 11315 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No.
9165 in support of the PDEA.16 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially
when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to
the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in People
v. Tranca,19 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police
officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because trial courts have the
advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.21
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is equally guilty of violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the
consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search,
the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him. However, based on his cross-
examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found another sachet of shabu also in your
pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no money was taken from you
because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder,
your hands tested positively for the presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted
and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of
denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drug.
According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo
and Simon were present in the buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.25 Its
non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.26 What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.27 In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were
members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory
examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had
been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] in substance, we immediately
approached the suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We
called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials. Now, when these barangay
officials were present, what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of P100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-
bust and the other one during the search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory.28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item which, in the present case, was
complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking29 of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the
accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked
because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.30
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of
sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed,
but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005,
when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child
and Youth Welfare Code31 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, 32 the laws that were
applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which
provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a
certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of
RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have
happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the
appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old,
and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already
entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement
of convicted children as follows:35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as mandated in Section 9836 of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has
adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court
in People v. Simon,37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as
applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific
penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal
Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it
would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of
the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could
not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the
scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty
therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and
legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the
rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of
the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles
64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20
of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four
preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists
of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which
follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists of three
discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be
arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each
likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.1avvphi1
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding
penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond
or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each
be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted
so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.38
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority39 can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying
the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.40 The ISLAW is
applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where
ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus
Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA
9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y
NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA
PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863,
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding
accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng
Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian
Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the criminal information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 oclock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named-accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did
then and there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a
condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in
the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the
provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went
to Chans residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box
of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion
identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan
informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish
allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chans residence that evening. Chans houseboy
ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chans son, Levy
Chan (Levy), and the house companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man by grabbing
his mothers feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levys head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chans feet.8 Levy thereafter
proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a certain house. Accused-
appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with
two women,11 later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). 12 Chan was brought inside a
house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad
threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes,
the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three
persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as
Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao),
entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as
Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money
she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the P75, 000.00 she kept in
her cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chans son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mothers release. It was agreed
upon that Levy was to deliver P400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City area to
conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for
Chans release.21 During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the
route which led to the victims residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of
the house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort and
stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from
Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the abductors acceded to a P400,000.00 ransom
money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team
immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van
with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team
successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was
also able to recover the P400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 oclock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and
the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and
Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you
withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it has received
the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished
the presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous
of entering a plea of guilty?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other appellants likewise manifested, through
their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and explained to each of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to
change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao,
Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the
affirmative.26Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences
of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the trial court directed the
prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol,
Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of
death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court
and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the accused-
appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs and manifestations will be discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to positively identify them
because of her failing eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chans testimony credible and straightforward. During
her testimony, she positively identified the accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she could not have positively identified
them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was further established through the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this
reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.31 In
People v. Taedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed
that the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is for this reason that
we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find her argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended when they conducted the rescue
operation at around 5:00 oclock in the morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted
adequate evidence working against her defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial
cannot prevail over the witnesses positive identification of the accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the absence of evidence other
than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A
review of the records36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned.
They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid
down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. 38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely
death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on
the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life
and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking
further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. 40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgement. The
inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent
reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following
guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
 (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility
that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent quarters or simply because of the judges intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of
the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy
or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge
failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the
records43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge and
his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Karim was not warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected
by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judges seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not
allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this court that
he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable penalty is lowered,
Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea is not
allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition attached. We cannot make that condition and
dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenians, were improvidently made, this Court will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment.
Despite the trial court judges shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-appellants culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if
such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it
did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the
commission of the offense charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance
where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the
strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution was able to
prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not
convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation
based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the fact that they had no
participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation, the testimony of
Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the
"Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were
two of those who were arrested during the rescue operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.52 Moreover,
Chan positively identified the accused-appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the
same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common
purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving
that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-
appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the ransom money was
recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established
beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenians Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Courts attention to the manifestation made by the prosecution regarding their
disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned.55 However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once
the information is filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction,
competence and discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied several times under oath during the trial.57 Perpenian
lied about substantial details such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why
she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the
fear of being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was
an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of the
unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that
the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room
where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that
Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may
be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.1wphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just came to the
resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw
Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident
to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held
before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in
the crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellants presence and company were not indispensable and essential to
the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in
People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the evidence presented by the prosecution,
linking accused-appellants participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-
appellants of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping
for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion
Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344, 65 a determination of
whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a
privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No.
9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an
accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code
shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what
the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be
adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the
penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the
range of Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating
circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and
one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenians possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344,
this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court, however, finds such
arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenians actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for
her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the documentary evidence offered by the counsel for the
defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to the
crime, his death72 having occurred before rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable for P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this case, the penalty for the crime committed is
death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but is not imposable
under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants.
The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according
to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant should
shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for the total amount of P300,000.00
divided among the principals who shall be liable for P288,000.00 (or P32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for P12,000.00. This
is broken down into P10,666.67 civil indemnity, P10,666.67 moral damages and P10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal;
and P4,000.00 civil indemnity, P4,000.00 moral damages and P4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered
to indemnify the victim in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount
of P288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim P12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on several and
subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having
fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Correctional Institute for Women by personal
service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the
decision, the action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of
his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should
still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes
root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus:
Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary.
Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final
judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore
transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo
cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
 SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por
las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al
efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as
Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of
the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well
explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no
party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that
legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant
has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term final
judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not
become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute a
separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil
aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced
by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain,
we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the
source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would
remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines
v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal
in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final
judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v.
Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused
of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his
estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all
criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled
therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed
out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action
of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only
when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase
and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise
trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability
due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the
Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the
death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the
offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-
accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends
on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused
Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's
death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability
was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal,
passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred
after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex
crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23
(should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is
separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107
Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance,
it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24,
1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no
criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the
Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability
is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can
proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article
30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the
quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction
of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on
appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive
by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings
had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the
outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of
criminal proceedings. 12One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due
to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute
a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal
proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to
take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating
the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was
held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil
liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in
the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as
basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money
claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec.
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be
sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability
instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in
the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as
being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the
offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as
an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against
the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation
to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution
of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These
are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear
that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a
civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to
survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the
criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same
act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil
action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which
the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property
(real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to
Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim
for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil
action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses
for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims,
we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of
the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right
by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.

#Footnotes

Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48,
in Criminal Case No. 10106, with the rape of his daughter, AAA, 1 alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident. The
Information2 specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 finding Amistoso guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The dispositive portion
of the RTC judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, having been convicted of Qualified Rape, he is hereby sentenced to the capital penalty
of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum of Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (PhP75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the costs.4cralaw virtualaw library
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision5 dated August 25, 2011, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012, affirmed Amistosos conviction for qualified
rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No. 93466 and the latest jurisprudence on awards of damages.
The appellate court decreed:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision dated March 23, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch
48, in Criminal Case No. 10106 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. In addition to
civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, he is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.7cralaw virtualaw library
Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. In its Decision8 dated January 9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification
the judgment of conviction against Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca is DENIED. The Decision dated August 25, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Amistoso is further ORDERED to pay interest on
all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision.9cralaw virtualaw library
However, in a letter10 dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents and Processing Division
of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Muntinlupa
City. Roque attached to his letter a photocopy of the Death Report11 signed by Marylou V. Arbatin, MD, Medical Officer III, NBP, stating
that Amistoso, 62 years old, died at about 5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2012 of Cardio Respiratory Arrest. Roques letter was received by the
Court on February 12, 2013.

Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), Officer-in-Charge, Maximum Security Compound, NBP, wrote
another letter12 dated February 12, 2013, likewise informing the Court of Amistosos death on December 11, 2012. PIS Lansangan
appended to his letter a mere photocopy of Amistosos Death Certificate.13 The Court received PIS Lansangans letter on February 18,
2013.

Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), which represented Amistoso and which was apparently also unaware of its
clients demise, still filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 of the Courts Decision dated January 9, 2013.
In a Resolution15 dated March 20, 2013, the Court required Roque to submit a certified true copy of Amistosos Death Certificate within 10
days from notice and deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PAO pending compliance with the Courts former
directive.

In a letter16 dated June 20, 2013, and received by the Court on June 25, 2013, PIS Lansangan finally provided the Court with a certified true
copy of Amistosos Death Certificate.17cralaw virtualaw library

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:cralawlibrary

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
In People v. Bayotas,18 the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:cralawlibrary
a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. (Citations omitted.)
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as
his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.19cralaw
virtualaw library

Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was
not immediately informed of his death.

Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:cralawlibrary

(1) NOTE PIS Lansangans letter dated June 20, 2013 providing the Court with a certified true copy of Amistosos Death
Certificate;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

(2) SET ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS Criminal Case No. 10106 before the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 48 by reason
of Amistosos death on December 11, 2012; and

(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts Decision dated January 9, 2013 filed by the PAO given the Courts
actions in the preceding paragraphs.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Mendoza, * and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
 THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185843

Appellee,
Present:

CORONA, J.,

Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
NACHURA,

DEL CASTILLO,* and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

RONIE DE GUZMAN,
March 3, 2010
Appellant.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:
 This resolves the motion for extinguishment of the criminal action and
reconsideration of our Resolution dated July 20, 2009 filed by appellant Ronie
de Guzman.

Appellant was indicted before the Regional Trial Court, Branch

163, Pasig City, for two counts of rape. He pled not guilty when arraigned. After
pretrial and trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged and imposed on
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The trial court further
ordered him to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 in each case or a total amount
of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed, in its Decision dated

March 27, 2008, appellants conviction, but modified it with an additional award
of P50,000.00 for each case, or an aggregate amount of P100,000.00, as moral
damages.

Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal.

In a Resolution dated July 20, 2009, we dismissed the appeal for failure of
appellant to sufficiently show reversible error in the challenged decision as
would warrant the exercise of the Courts appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
March 27, 2008 Decision of the CA was affirmed in toto.

In the instant motion, appellant alleges that he and private complainant

contracted marriage on August 19, 2009, solemnized by Reverend Lucas R.
Dangatan of Jeruel Christ-Centered Ministries, Inc. at the Amazing Grace
Christian Ministries, Inc., Bldg. XI-A, Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City. Attached to the motion is the pertinent Certificate
of Marriage[1] and a joint sworn statement (Magkasamang Sinumpaang
Salaysay)[2] executed by appellant and private complainant, attesting to the
existence of a valid and legal marriage between them. Appellant, thus, prays
that he be absolved of his conviction for the two counts of rape and be
released from imprisonment, pursuant to Article 266-C[3] of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

In its Comment/Manifestation,[4] appellee, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, interposed no objection to the motion, finding the marriage
to have been contracted in good faith, and the motion to be legally in order.

The motion should be granted.

In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:

xxxx

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided

in

Article 344 of this Code.

Article 344 of the same Code also provides

ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,

seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. x x x.
 In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape,
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish
the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. x x
x.

On several occasions, we applied these provisions to marriages

contracted between the offender and the offended party in the crime of
rape,[5] as well as in the crime of abuse of chastity,[6] to totally extinguish the
criminal liability of and the corresponding penalty that may have been
imposed upon those found guilty of the felony.Parenthetically, we would like to
mention here that prior to the case at bar, the last case bearing similar
circumstances was decided by this Court in 1974, or around 36 years ago.

Based on the documents, including copies of pictures[7] taken after the

ceremony and attached to the motion, we find the marriage between
appellant and private complainant to have been contracted validly, legally,
and in good faith, as an expression of their mutual love for each other and their
desire to establish a family of their own. Given public policy considerations of
respect for the sanctity of marriage and the highest regard for the solidarity of
the family, we must accord appellant the full benefits of Article 89, in relation to
Article 344 and Article 266-C of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the motion is GRANTED. Appellant Ronie de Guzman

is ABSOLVED of the two (2) counts of rape against private complainant Juvilyn
Velasco, on account of their subsequent marriage, and is
ordered RELEASED from imprisonment.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bureau of Corrections for

appropriate action. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along
Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because
of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result,
complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit
of Complaint[1] against petitioner with the Fiscals Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. The information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical
Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver
and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a
reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws,
rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to
avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota
Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby
causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its
owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol
suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that
nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision[3] convicting
petitioner of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
slight physical injuries, and sentencing her:
 [t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the
complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five
Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary
impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.[4]
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant
suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting
physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment
(Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p.
711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302,
October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorios book, p. 718).[5]
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and
medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case
as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were
granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex
Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellants Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals
denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief.[6]
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of
Appeals rendered a decision[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY
AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY
SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE
RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH
JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]

.........

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF

PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND
MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND
GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT
 IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING
IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A
SECONDARY SOURCE.
A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME CASE WHERE THE
COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT
WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE
PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS
GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH
PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED
BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY
SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS
ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the
title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was
not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for
such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have
pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless
imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to
property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, do not
rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months, citing Lontok v.
Gorgonio,[12] thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical
injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical
injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the
slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos
graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974,
57 SCRA 363, 365).

.........
 The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is
different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted
in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were
both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones
leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate
information.

She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their
maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment
and not six months as imposed by the lower courts.
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as
such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January
1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had
already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged
in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two
months, Lontoks criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts.
89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule
117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in not sustaining Lontoks motion to quash that part of the information
charging him with that light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional
Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and
slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure;
therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute
of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its
maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v.
Court of Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for
the trial court to complex reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to
property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence,
not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court
had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court
properly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher
penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value
of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.[15]
 The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the
prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three
days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and
appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she
considers the OSGs reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing
there validates the complexing of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and
damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed -- one for
slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v.
Teleron[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,[20] two informations should have been filed. She likewise
submits that Cuyos v. Garcia[21] would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper
to complex damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro[22] is likewise inapposite, for it deals with
attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive effect;
otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling
in Zaldivia[24] favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the
first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in
question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto
mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is
incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
 constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong
which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in
the period which they may deem proper to apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum
period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however,
committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of
the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under
Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first
paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article
365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.[25]
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00,
the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply
since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What
applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through
reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave
felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the
crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and
the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and
1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If
the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first
paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower
in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum
period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would
be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a
minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court,
since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein
provided the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules
prescribed in article 64.

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of
fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or
lack of skill.[26]
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by
public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies
as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or
both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is
considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty
lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier
discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto
mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code,
the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48
of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
 Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this Court
declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light
felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex
crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony
may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to
property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of
imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged
in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties
(People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical
injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical
injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the
slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos
graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974,
57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the
less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate
information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e.,charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to
quash before she pleaded to the information.[28] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.[29]

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time
of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.[30]
 At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Section
32(2)[31]thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs),
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive
original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
amount thereof.
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the
imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The
question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure,
such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to
which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was
from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We
then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto
mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts,
and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto
mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express
provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said
provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized
with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and
municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2
months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that
those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the
graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days,
should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the
imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the
duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

 Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave
felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five
years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is
necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days
after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any
reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the
complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the
merits.[33] Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held
that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running of the statute
of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in
cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6
months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary
examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said
cases may be commenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be taken to
mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive
law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[37] Hence,
in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and
the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved
therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Under Section 2 thereof, the period of
prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party.Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute
a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the
filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code,
Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of prescription of
the offenses charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose
decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-41692 April 30, 1976

EUGENIO CABRAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BULACAN,
and SILVINO SAN DIEGO, respondents.

Arturo Agustines for petitioner.

Celso B. Poblete for private respondent.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Certiorari and prohibition to nullify the Order of respondent Judge dated May 21, 1975, reviving the
Information in Criminal Case No. B-537-74 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Baliwag Branch, and to
prohibit said court from conducting further proceedings on the case.

On the complaint of private respondent Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information on
September 24, 1974 with respondent court, accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of Silvino San
Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charge, as the said document of sale of Lot No.
378-C was notarized on August 14, 1948, registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26,
1948 and as a consequence the original certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of
title issued, and since then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and continuously possessed said property and
exercised acts of ownership thereon, which facts are apparently admitted in the letter of San Diego's
lawyer to Cabral on September 17, 1953. After hearing said motion, Judge Juan F. Echiverri, in a Resolution
dated March 25, 1975, granted the motion to quash and dismissed the Information on the ground of
prescription. The order of dismissal was predicated upon said court's finding that the factual averments
contained in the notion to quash were supported by the evidence. Private prosecutor, who was not
present during the hearing of the motion to quash, filed a motion dated April 8, 1975, for the
reconsideration of said Resolution. This was opposed by petitioner on the ground that San Diego can no
longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action in April 1974 against the same accused
(Eugenio Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments contained in the criminal Information.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration, respondent. Judge Benigno M. Puno, now presiding, ordered on
May 12, 1975 the Fiscal to "make known his position to the Court." In compliance with said Order, the Fiscal
submitted his comment dated May 19, 1975, expressing the view that the crime, has not prescribed as
Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and "... that, in the
interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties in
their total meaning and import in determining once and for all the direction direction and thrust of these
evidence of both parties."

Two (2) days later on, or on May 21, 1975, respondent Judge set aside the Resolution of March 25, 1975,
and reinstated the Information. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a)
"the judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon promulgation and could not, therefore,
be recalled for correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San
Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as
the second motion for reconsideration, hence this petition, raising the issue of whether or not the trial court
had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution of March 25, 1975.

The issue being purely legal and considering that the matter has been amply discuss in the pleadings, 1 this
case was deemed submitted for decision without need of memoranda.

The Solicitor General was required to appear in this case, and he recommends giving due course to the
petition and the reversal of the challenged order. According to the Solicitor General, the Resolution of
March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime became a bar to
another charge of falsification, including the revival of the Information. This is more so, because said
Resolution had already become final and executory, inasmuch as the Fiscal neither sought its
reconsideration nor appealed therefrom within the. reglementary period of fifteen (15) days after his
receipt of a copy thereof on March 31, 1975. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21,
1975, or about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same had already long
been final.

We agree with the Solicitor General. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to
quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 2 Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal
liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of
the Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. 3 Here, San Diego
had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of
Deeds on August 26, 1948.

In Pangan v. Pasicolan, 4 where the trial court set aside its own order dismissing the criminal case nine (9)
months thereafter, this Court held that the order was null and void for want of jurisdiction, as the first order had
already become final and executory.

Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga setting
aside its order of September 10, 1956 dismissing the case against petitioners nine months
thereafter, or on June 11, 1957. The issue is whether or not the court had jurisdiction to enter
that order. While the court may find it necessary to hear the views of a private prosecutor
before acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal, it does not follow that it can set
aside its order dismissing the case even if the same has already become final. There is no
law which requires notice to a private prosecutor, because under the rules all criminal
actions are prosecuted "under the direction and control of the fiscal" (Section 4, Rule 106). It
 appearing that the order already final, the court acted without jurisdiction in in issuing the
the subsequent order.

And likewise, in People v. Sanchez, 5 it was held that "a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, ... Under the circumstances, the sentence having become final,
no court, not even this high Tribunal, can modify it even if erroneous ...". We hold that these rulings are
applicable to the case at bar.

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for
reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the
period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration
on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and
control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have
interrupted the period for appeal. 6

The right of the offended party to appeal is recognized under the old Code of Criminal
Procedure. Under Section 4 of Rule 110 which provides that the prosecution shall be "under
the direction and control of the fiscal" without the limitation imposed by section 107 of
General Order No. 58 subjecting the direction of the prosecution to the right "of the person
injured to appeal from any decision of the court denying him a legal right", said right to
appeal by an offended party from an order of dismissal is no longer recognized in the
offended party. ... (U)nder the new Rules of Court, the fiscal has the direction and control of
the prosecution, without being subject to the right of intervention on the part of the
offended party to appeal from an order dismis ing a criminal case upon petition of the fiscal
would be tantamount to giving said party as much right the direction and control of a
criminal proceeding as that of fiscal. 7

More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on
September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same
allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974
an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case
No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the same property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from the
record that at the time the order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the
same alleged forged document filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the offended
party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case,, and consequently cannot ask for
the reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal from said order. 8

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975 and September 3,
1975, of respondent Judge are hereby set aside. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, C.J., Barredo (Chairman), Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MIZPAH R. REYES, respondent.
Pacianito B. Cabaron for respondent.
Celso C. Dimayuga co-counsel for respondent.

CORTES, J.:
The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 [Art. 172, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]. Being punishable by a
correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in ten (10) years [Art. 90, par. 3 (RPC)]. The ten (10) year prescriptive period
commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . .
." [Art. 91, (RCP)]. In the instant case, the public document allegedly falsified was a notarized deed of sale registered on
May 26, 1961 with the Register of Deeds in the name of the accused, private respondent herein, Mizpah R. Reyes. The two
informations for falsification of a public document subject matter of the controversy were, however, filed only on October
18, 1984. The complainants claim that they discovered the falsified notarized deed of sale in June 1983. The Court is tasked
with determining whether the crime has prescribed which hinges on whether or not its discovery may be deemed to have
taken place from the time the document was registered with the Register of Deeds, consistent with the rule on constructive
notice.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City registered in their names under TCT
No. T-7471. Both are now deceased, the husband having died on September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977. They
were survived by the following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R.
Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City that the
abovementioned property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and
resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines" under TCT No. T-9885. They further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was
effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia
Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961. Upon examination of the
document, they found that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful
statement that she was single although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950. The document was referred
by the complainants to the National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.) for examination of the signatures of their parents and a
report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged.
Upon complaint by the sisters of the accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas, Branch XIII, Lipa City on October 18, 1984 two (2) informations both for falsification of public document,
the first in Criminal Case No. V-1163, for allegedly making it appear in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo, the
mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the second in
Criminal Case No. V-1164, for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale, more specifically, by
stating that accused was single.
Before arraignment, accused filed a motion to quash both informations on grounds that: (1) "The criminal action or liability
has been extinguished by prescription of the crime in the light of Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA 606;" and (2) "The trial court had
no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of accused because of non-compliance with the pre-conciliation
requirement of P.D. No. 1508." [Rollo, p. 33].
The trial court granted the motion and quashed the informations in the two (2) cases stating that:
xxx
...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. All Persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of registration.
The essence, therefore, of registration is to serve notice to the whole world of the legal status and the
dealing therewith.
If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration is in itself a notice and therefore, the
prescriptive period of registered document must start to run from the date the same was annotated in the
Register of Deeds.
In these two cases in question, prescriptive period of ten (10) years should have started from May 26, 1960
(sic).
Considering the lapse of more than twenty (20) years before the two informations were filed, the crimes for
which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are charged have already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, Criminal Cases Nos. V-1163 and V-1164 are quashed. [Rollo, pp. 33-34].
From the trial court's order quashing the two (2) informations, the People, petitioner herein, filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals (then designated as the Intermediate Appellate Court). In a decision ** promulgated on April 3, 1986, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. The Court of Appeals rejected the theory of petitioner that the prescriptive period
should commence on June 1983, when the complainants actually discovered the fraudulent deed of sale. The appellate
court sustained the trial court's ruling that the prescriptive period started on May 26, 1961, when the deed of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, filed by the People, through the Solicitor-General.
Among the authorities relied upon by the Court of Appeals in dismissing petitioner's appeal is the case of Cabral v.
Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 606, where the Supreme Court made a statement to the effect that in the
crime of falsification of a public document, the prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had
constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds. However,
petitioner contends that this particular statement is not doctrine but merely an obiter dictum.
The Cabral case stemmed from the filing on September 24, 1974 of an information accusing Eugenio Cabral of the crime of
falsification of public document for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of the complainant Silvino San
Andres in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Before arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground
of prescription of the crime, as the notarized deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
After hearing the motion, the judge issued a resolution granting the motion to quash and dismissing the information on the
ground of prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution. Acting on said motion, the
trial court ordered the fiscal to make known his position. The fiscal filed a comment stating that the crime has not prescribed
as the complainant San Diego claimed that he only discovered the crime in October 1970. Thereafter, the trial court set
aside its resolution granting the accused's motion to quash and reinstated the information. The accused brought the case
to the Supreme Court questioning the trial court's authority to set aside its resolution granting his motion to quash. The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused by holding that the aforementioned resolution has already become final and
executory for failure of the fiscal to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the private prosecutor was disregarded because of the latter's lack of legal standing. Another
reason given by the Court for its decision is the following:
. . .The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense [Secs. 2(f) and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court]. Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime is one of the grounds for "total
extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-
paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime
prescribes in ten (10) years [Article 90, Revised Penal Code]. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive
notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26,
1948.
xxx
[Cabral v. Puno, supra at p. 609].
Although the prescription of the crime was not squarely in issue in Cabral, it is apparent that the statement of the Court on
prescription and constructive notice was not totally irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Moreover, it is not without any
legal basis.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive
notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge
of what it contains [Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48971 and
49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., G.R. No. L-38303, May
30, 1988,161 SCRA 634; See also Sec. 52, Pres. Decree No. 1529 (1978)].
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that a purchaser of registered land is presumed to be charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record. The Court, in explaining the nature of the rule on constructive notice and the presumption arising
therefrom stated in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28 1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712-713, that:
xxx
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein ...
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the
record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and
object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof
of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he
was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless
confusion and useless litigation.
xxx
It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased was executed by some of his
heirs, the registration of the instrument of partition with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice that said heirs have
repudiated the fiduciary relationship between them and the other heirs vis-a-vis the property in question. The heirs who were
not included in the deed of partition are deemed to have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the
Register of Deeds [De la Cerna v. De la Cerna, G.R. No. L-28838, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 514]. Likewise, the rule on
constructive notice has been applied in the interpretation of a provision in the Civil Code on the prescription of actions for
annulment of contracts which is parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states:
Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin:
xxx
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same [Emphasis supplied].
In Armentia v. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December 29, 1966,18 SCRA 1253, where a notarial document recorded with the
Registry of Deeds was sought to be annulled, the Court, interpreting the phrase "from the time of the discovery" found in the
aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken
place from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice
to the whole world . . ." [See also Avecilla v. Yatco, 103 Phil. 666 (1958); Gerona v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-19060, May 29,
1964, 11 SCRA 153; Carantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33360, April 25, 1977, 76 SCRA 514; Cultura v. Tupacar, G.R. No.
L-48430, December 3, 1985,140 SCRA 311; Cimafranco v. IAC, G.R. No. L-68687, January 31, 1987, 147 SCRA 611; Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Pauli, et al., supra.] However, petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal
Code which states that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day the crime is discovered by the
offended party,the authorities, or their agents. . cannot be construed in the same manner because the rule on constructive
notice is limited in application to land registration cases. It is argued that haste should be avoided in applying civil law
presumptions to criminal suits.
Although caution should be observed in applying the rules of construction in civil cases in the interpretation of criminal
statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant. Hence, in Mercado v. Santos,
66 Phil. 215 (1938), the Court applied the presumption arising from the allowance of a will to bar a criminal action. In theft
particular case, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. The will was duly probated.
Sixteen (16) months thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for falsification or forgery of the will.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case claiming that the order probating the will is conclusive as to its authenticity and
due execution. The motion having been denied, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)
which ruled that "the judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the due execution and
genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the purpose of punishment of a crime."
But the Supreme Court reversed the CA decision by ruling that, in accordance with See. 625 of the then Code of Civil
Procedure which provides that "the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its
due execution," *** a criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted
to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
It is, however, insisted in this case that the rule on constructive notice applies only in civil cases. It is argued that the law on
prescription of crimes is founded on a principle different from that of the law on prescription in civil actions. The difference, it
is claimed, precludes the application of the rule on constructive notice in criminal actions.
The statute of limitations of civil actions was explained in Penales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73611, October
27, 1986, 115 SCRA 223, 228 in the following manner:
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose object is to suppress fraudulent and stale
claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when
the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or death or removal of witnesses . . .
On the other hand, the Court in People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 389, 405-406 (1923), discussed the nature of the statute of
limitations in criminal cases as follows:
xxx
. . . The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring
that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return
to his country; and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve
the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation
are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction
belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition
and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence,
has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these
views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the
State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory,
of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes enforcing such
promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by
the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best
evidence that can be obtained.
xxx
It is evident that there is merit in petitioner's claim that the law on prescription of civil suits is founded on different policy
considerations from that of the law on prescription of criminal actions. However, the Court does not subscribe to the
conclusion that the presumptions and rules of interpretation used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on
constructive notice, can not be applied in criminal actions.
The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits are based mainly on practical and equitable grounds. The lapse
of a considerably long period of time obscures the surrounding circumstances of a particular claim or right and erodes the
integrity of whatever evidence may be presented in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or right.
Moreover, where a particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left on a
precarious balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party. After a certain period of time fixed by
law, the right enjoyed by a party must be accorded respect by prohibiting adverse claims the factual basis of which can no
longer be verified with certainty. Hence, the law on prescription of civil suits is properly called a statute of repose.
The practical factor of securing for civil suits the best evidence that can be obtained is also a major consideration in
criminal trials. However, the law on prescription of crimes rests on a more fundamental principle. Being more than a statute
of repose, it is an act of grace whereby the state, after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power
to prosecute the criminal act. While the law on prescription of civil suits is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter
between two contending parties, the law on prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the
state in favor of the offender [People v. Moran, supra, at p. 405]. Hence, in the interpretation of the law on prescription of
crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted [People v. Moran, supra; People v. Parel, 44 Phil. 437
(1923); People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956)]. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91
of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime
shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a
public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for
which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming
the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br.
151, and JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. 1 Bigamy carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an
afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years. 2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . 3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. 4 At least, it is not expressly denied. Thus the only
issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is
deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the
document evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on
constructive notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior
marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the
motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the
assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that
since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, 7such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore
is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to
run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have
been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as declared by the appellate
court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity Church in Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of registration the marriage contract was open to
inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime
but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if the
factual and legal circumstances so warrant, 8 we agree with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot
apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court
succinctly explains
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be applied in the case at bar,
principally citing in support of his stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People
v. Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the
crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered
into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person, in
order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or interest therein is made
in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property is located. Verification in the office of the
Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving the said property can easily be made by any
interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or the authorities
of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where the
offender is not known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was applied,
involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well
entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving
the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to
 be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals
from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He
does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his
bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known
to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery
of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period for the
offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the
violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would
encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various local
civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even third marriage has been contracted without the
knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to all persons of
every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed
or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time
of such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there
is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his marriage contract with Ms.
Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his
argument because why did he indicate in the marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as
a married man? Or for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina so that
everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or
authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously, petitioner
had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third
party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple expedience of having the
second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period
against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right into the
hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other
similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of
which is a primary concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47684 June 10, 1941
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DIONISIO A. MANEJA,Defendant-Appellee.
First Assistant Solicitor-General Reyes and Solicitor Barcelona for appellant.
Del Rosario & Del Rosario, Pelaez & Pelaez and Hilario B. Abellana for appellee.
Godofredo Reyes and Enrique Medina as private prosecutors.
MORAN, J.:
The sole question raised in this appeal is whether the period of prescription for the offense of false testimony which, in the
instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should commence from the time the
appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as
the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in
December, 1938, as the prosecution contends.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We hold that the theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.)
With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised
Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case,
the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf.
U. S. vs. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People vs. Marcos, et al., G.R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a
punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their
agents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is given, it would be impossible to
determine the length of such period in any particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the
basic case. For instance, a witness testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found
guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which
case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty
prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period for prescription is only five
years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be prosecuted before final judgment in the basic case, it would be
impossible to determine the period of prescription - whether twenty years or five years - as either of these two periods is fixed
by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the main case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the same, whether the defendant in
criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure coincidence. The four cases
enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code - and the instant case falls on one of them - uniformly presuppose a
final judgment of conviction or acquittal in the basic case as a prerequisite to the action ability of the crime of false
testimony.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Order of dismissal is reversed, and let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Avancea, C.J., Diaz, Laurel and Horilleno, JJ., concur.

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

Hector B. Almeyda for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO
OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE. Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully
begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies
that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in
the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not
isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of
"offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is
to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES. As it is clearly
provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS ACTUALLY FILED IN COURT. Under Section 9 of the Rule
on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed
in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326. This interpretation is in consonance with Act No.
3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not
distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. The
Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT THE INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS. The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is
filed seasonably with the prosecutors office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules
but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayors permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the responded judge. 4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the
following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the following cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

B. Criminal Cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six months
imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x

SECTION 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall
be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.

She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in
the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged
commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against
her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:cralawnad

SECTION 1. How Instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of
criminal action shall be as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for
the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the
complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscals office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Officer of the
Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without
distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals: 5

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the
question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes
of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription
"shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of
the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule
on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated
therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was
added on October 1, 1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The
phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those
offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute
should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or
city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months,
or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision does not
prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation.
This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on
any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No.
3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the
Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to
Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant
case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with
the prosecutors office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.
However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.cralawnad

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No.
3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this
was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-
089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon
and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
THIRD DIVISION

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION G.R. NO. 140231

ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), represented by ORLANDO
L. SALVADOR,
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO,
Office of the Ombudsman-Manila,
CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE PNB
BOARD OF DIRECTORS,
REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS
CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR.,
LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS
BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and
NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR
INDUSTRIES, INC. (NOCOSII), Promulgated:
Respondents. July 9, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Presidential Commission on Good Government[1] (petitioner) filed the herein Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Resolution [2] dated May 21, 1999 of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No. 0-95-0890 which
dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 [3] against
concerned members of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and Northern Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc.
(NOCOSII) officers, namely: Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose Barquillo, Jr., Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John
Does (respondents); and the Order[4] dated July 23, 1999 which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties
involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the
Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a behest loan, to wit: a) it is undercollaterized;
b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like
presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e)
a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the
project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.

Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions
between NOCOSII and PNB.

After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the
loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSIIs insufficient capital and inadequate
collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By
Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85%
from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the
General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was
allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up
capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3
(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
 xxx

g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer
(GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence.

In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the
offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999.[5]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [6] but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which
was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.[7]

Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and in support of its petition alleges that:

A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner on the ground of Prescription considering that:
1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH IS
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION 15, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A TRUSTEE TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE

BENEFICIARY;

3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE OF CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE STATE
CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENT. HENCE,
PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;

4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE MUST BE PLEADED, OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED

WAIVED;

5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY
NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS THE
COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;

6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH ADOPTS THE DISCOVERY RULE SHALL
APPLY IN THIS CASE;

7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE OF BEHEST LOANS
ARE KEPT SECRET.[8]

B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
not finding that a probable cause exists for violation by the private respondents of section 3 (e) and (g) of
RA 3019 despite the presence of clear, overwhelming and unrebutted evidence.[9]

In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the issue of prescription, in view of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),[10]contends that its finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable
cause against respondents deserves great weight and respect, and must be accorded full weight and credit.

No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.

The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that: (a) the offense
leveled against respondents has prescribed; and (b) no probable cause exists against respondents.

The petition is partly meritorious.

Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject complaint on the ground of
prescription.

Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII are charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, a
special law. Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,[11] increased the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen
years.
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, [12] as amended, which
provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto,[13] where the Court held:

x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of
R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE
that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should
be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase if the same not be known in Section 2 of Act No.
3326 does not mean lack of knowledge but that the crime is not reasonably knowable is unacceptable, as
it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written in a clear and
unambiguous language and thus provides no room for interpretation but only application. [14]

The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto (2001),[15] thus:

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa Revolution
that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not
have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R.
No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period
commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No.
3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person.[16]

Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,[17] or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well
within the prescriptive period of 15 years.

On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists
against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file
the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[18] Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily
interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons
to indicate otherwise.[19] Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate [20] and the courts will not interfere
in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and
the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of
public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[21]

While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when
the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where
it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied,[22] none apply here.

After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. [23] The exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [24]

The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the criminal complaint, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, is worth-
quoting, thus:
Taking into consideration the provisions of Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61, the
subject transactions can not be classified as behest.

Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the loans acquired by NOCOSII are actually foreign loans
from Midland Bank Ltd. of London. There were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit
accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland Bank.

Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by NOCOSII are insufficient, it should be noted that
under PNB Board Resolution No. 689 dated July 30, 1975, one of the conditions imposed to NOCOSII was
the execution of contract assigning all NOCOSII's share of sugar and molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was also
required to increase its paid up capital at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or
a total of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the stockholders of NOCOSII were required to pledge or
assign all their present and future shares to PNB while the accommodation remains standing. The proposed
plant site which was offered as collateral was estimated to cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing collaterals
offered by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans of P333,465,260.00.

Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it presupposes that all the required clearances were
submitted by NOCOSII including the clearance from the Office of the President; and having complied with
all the documentary requirements, NOCOSII became entitled to the release of the loan.

Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was undercapitalized because its paid up capital was
only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to consider the other assets of NOCOSII which also form
part of its capital. x x x[25]

The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne out by the evidence
presented by petitioner: firstly, there were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit accommodations to
guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd. of London; secondly, NOCOSII effectively came under
government control since 1975 when PNB acquired a majority of the voting rights in NOCOSII and was given the power to
appoint a comptroller therein; thirdly, PNB's credit accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and 1981 in the aggregate
sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently secured by: (1) the Assignment of Subscription Rights and/or Pledge of Shares dated
September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of stock, representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed
capital stock, and assigned their subscription rights to future stocks in favor of PNB;[26] (2) the Deed of Assignment dated
September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share of sugar and molasses from the operation of its sugar central
located at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North Cotabato in favor of PNB;[27] (3) the Joint and Solidary Agreement dated
September 5, 1975 whereby the NOCOSII officers bound themselves jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the
payment of NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;[28] (4) the Real Estate Mortgage dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII
mortgaged various buildings, machineries and equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII Sugar Mill Plant, with an
estimated value of P307,593,000.00 in favor of PNB;[29] and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated October
2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural and heavy equipment in favor of the
PNB;[30] fourthly, PNB imposed other conditions, such as, (1) the submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's approval of its
foreign loans; (2) the submission by NOCOSII of the required clearances from the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA) and/or Presidential Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3) submission by NOCOSII of its milling contracts
covering a total area of not less than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by NOCOSII of the government permit that the planters
can cultivate the required hectarage; (5) further increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in capital to P25,000,000.00
at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6) deposit in NOCOSII's account with the PNB of all cash
proceeds of NOCOSII's foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to the bank's control; and, (7) designation by
the PNB of its own representatives in NOCOSII's Board of Directors and its own comptroller who shall have the authority to
control all disbursements and receipts of funds of NOCOSII.[31]
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory
powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsmans ruling, that decision
will not be overturned.[32]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order
dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R.
SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January
1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure
of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon
Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed
his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner
had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and
in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself
had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced
checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly
the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson
himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while
the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against
Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga
held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the
checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and
not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and
no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already
prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI
could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should
come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no
dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating
that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies
to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not
Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the
case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as
amended, are judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ.
The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an
amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating
that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution.
Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on
technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial
to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the
Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they
claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the
rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number
of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor
always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are
true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find
that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the
verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that there was failure to
attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the
petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a certified true copy of
which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a municipal ordinance, in
declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is
applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case
similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would
result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. 38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts
and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special
laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than
one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty
of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326,
a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in
court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the
peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December
1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices
of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our declaration in People v.
Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial
proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should,
and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court
ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the
more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that
the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be
sufficient to toll prescription.54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995,
well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the
dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all,
he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of
the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not
sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of
the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no
longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
________________