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RISOS -VIDAL V. COMELEC The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987
Facts: In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides
for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and other acts of executive clemency. It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President provisions that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights. In conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore,
disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results. In it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit
2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of the pardoning power of the President.
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila. The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. The disqualification
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him. While it
to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary
pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been
Issue: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local
disqualification to hold public office? or national position.

Held: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal conditional. Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles public elective office have been restored.
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
former President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardons text. statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved Position Allocation
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the position of
Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational Service,
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to then De Guzmans appointment to this position must be invalid. TIDCORP then appealed
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the to the CSC-CO, but nonetheless, the central office reiterated that TIDCORP misconstrued
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor the provisions of Section 7 of RA 8494 in its attempt to bypass the requirements of CSC
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. If former President Arroyo intended Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998. While RA 8494 gave TIDCORP staffing
for the pardon to be conditional on Respondents promise never to seek a public office prerogatives, it would still have to comply with civil service rules because Section 7 did
again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon not expressly exempt TIDCORP from civil service laws.
itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be The CA denied TIDCORPs petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution
interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada. No. 030144 and Resolution No. 031037. The CA noted that filing a petition for certiorari
was an improper recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review
TIDCP V. CSC under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Citing Central Bank of the Philippines v.
Facts: On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Civil Service Commission, the CA stood by the CSC-COs ruling that it has authority to
Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government owned and controlled approve and review De Guzmans appointment. The CSC has the power to ascertain
corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment whether the appointing authority complied with the requirements of the law;
was included in TIDCORPs Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which otherwise, it may revoke the appointment. As TIDCORP is a government owned
was submitted to the CSC Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office. corporation, it is covered by civil service laws and is therefore bound by the CSCs
jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to personnel, including appointments. Hence this
In a letter dated September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De petition to the Supreme Court.
Guzmans appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was
not included in the DBMs Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORPs Executive Vice Issues: Whether De Guzmans Appointment is valid
President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De Guzmans appointment to
Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-National Capital Region (NCR). According to Ruling: The petition is meritorious. The Supreme Court ruled that TIDCORP is indeed
Tambanillo, Republic Act No. (RA) 8494, which amended TIDCORPs charter, empowers exempted from the circular issued by the CSC. The phrase to endeavor means to to
its Board of Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and devote serious and sustained effort and to make an effort to do. It is synonymous
to approve its own compensation and position classification system and qualification with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek.41 The use of to endeavor in the
standards. context of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORPs exemption from laws
involving compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it should still
On the basis of Section 7 of RA 8494, Tambanillo argued that TIDCORP is authorized to strive to conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA
adopt an organizational structure different from that set and prescribed by the CSC. 6758. The phrase as closely as possible, which qualifies TIDCORPs duty to endeavor
Section 7 exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on compensation, position classification to conform, recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758, but it
and qualification standards, and is thus not bound by the DBMs Index of Occupational should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress
Service. Pursuant to this authority, TIDCORPs Board of Directors issued Resolution No. been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with RA 6758, it would
1185, s. 1998 approving the corporations re-organizational plan, under which De have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to
Guzman was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV. De Guzmans appointment endeavor to conform to the principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of
was valid because the plan providing for his position followed the letter of the law. this law. These inter-relationships render it clear, as a plain reading of Section
7 of RA 8494 itself would confirm, that TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws on
Tambanillo also noted that prior to De Guzmans appointment as Financial Management compensation, position classification and qualification standards, including compliance
Specialist IV, the position had earlier been occupied by Ma. Loreto H. Mayor whose with Section 1(c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998.
appointment was duly approved by Director Bugtong.Thus, Director Bugtongs
invalidation of De Guzmans appointment is inconsistent with her earlier approval of REVALDO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Mayors appointment to the same position. The CSC-NCR denied Tambanillos appeal Facts: Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium
because De Guzmans appointment failed to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which requires that the position title of an 17th day of June 1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of contended that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was confirmed that
P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under existing respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court granted
forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the damage and the Motion with a condition upon the service of summon on the respondent within 10
prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, days from the receipt of the Order. On August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on 1997 convicting tried to serve summons at respondent s address but no avail. In his handwritten
petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that
motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber annotation, he stated that respondent s brother, Michael Francisco, told him that
without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, the petition for respondent no longer lived at the said address, however, Iconar left a copy of the
certiorari. Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the summons to Michael Francisco. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in
police officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not have been admitted in Default for failure off respondent to file Answer despite the service of summons. Trial
evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed with a Court declared that the summons was validly served to respondent, declared that
search warrant when they went to his house to verify the report that petitioner had in respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Michael
his possession lumber without the corresponding license Francisco, through his lawyer filed a Manifestation and Motion, he denied that he
received the summons and he was authorized to receive on behalf of his brother. He
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in prayed his name to be stricken off the records as having received the copy of summons.
court In his Affidavit of Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o, and respondent had left the
house since 1993 and respondent would only write or call them without informing his
Held: When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying whereabouts. On the other hand, petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the Affidavit
around the vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain prepared by respondent dated December 23, 1992, where declared he was a resident of
view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the No. 36 Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer who notarized the affidavit was the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. same lawyer who represented his brother. Trial Court denied the Manifestation and
When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner Motion for lack of merit, it rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordered
failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his possession was respondent to pay the damages. Respondent received the copy of the Trial Court s
intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus probable Decision, he then filed a Notice of Appeal to Court of Appeals. The appellate court
cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity directed the parties to file respective briefs, a copy of which was sent by respondent at
for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary No. 36 Sampaguita St. BausaQ.C. Respondent prayed that the trial court erred in
documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically assuming jurisdiction over the person, despite the irregularity of the substituted service
admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact of summons by the court Process Server and in awarding of damages to petitioner.
that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use Court of Appeals rendered decision granting the Appeal of respondent and setting aside
the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products the decision of the trial court for the irregularity of the service of summons. Petitioner
without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law filed Petition for Review on Certiorari to Supreme Court.
may be harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner
for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed. Issue: Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent
through his brother.
Facts: Petitioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to Held: The Petition for Review on Certiorari was granted. Court of Appeals decision was
recover damages alleging that on November 20,1992, respondent with intent to kill him reversed and set aside, and the Trial Court decision was reinstated and affirmed.
and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. On Although, in general, the statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed
January 31, 1995, Process Server Manuel Panlasigue attempted to personally serve strictly, faithfully and fully and that any substituted service other than that authorized
summons at respondents addressat No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was by Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court ruled that strict application of the
unsuccessful. In his Servers Return, he stated that the occupant in that house refused to Rules is not warranted to this case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws as well
give his identity and that respondent is unknown at said residence. The Trial Court also as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years for resolution of this case. The
attempted to serve summons to the respondents office through registered mail, respondents actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to
however, respondent failed to pick up summons. The case was dismissed by the Trial give their identity, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents or eluding the
Court on account of petitioners lack of interest to prosecute that he did not take action officers of court. Respondent tried to avoid the service of summons, prompting the
since the filing of the Servers Return. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, court to declare that sheriff must be resourceful, but sheriffs cannot be faulted of the
respondent themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative. As such, it is insisted that such
justice. minute resolution did not become stare decisis.


Facts: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Facts: Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC Rule65 to nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands,
then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the for being unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population
country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of
volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a 371,576 inhabitants with average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers as certified by the
constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be Bureau of Local Government Finance. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Government Code, a province may be created if it has an average annual income of not
Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or
were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands
specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the
pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino. income of the province. Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was
enacted into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the people from both the mother
the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative. province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was
created into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued that exemption from
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to
constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of develop self-reliant political and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations
the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum purposes of the law.
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Issue: Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by
Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without Ruling: No. The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of basic law. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province,
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the Code. The IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the Government Code when it added the italicized portion The land area requirement shall
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law as
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial
implementation. subdivision. Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law
and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC
of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT
this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part: Ten (10) Members of the Court vs COMELEC.
reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when the
Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate
Facts: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong who remains qualified.
Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them. II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
disqualifying the said party-lists. participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above). Allowing major political parties to participate,
Held: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned who lack well-defined political constituencies. Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave
some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting
follows: the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that
it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters: develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers;
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list
organizations. system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
underrepresented sector. the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately machinery unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved for
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-
or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
elderly, women, and the youth. economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must as they are ideologically marginalized.
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY V. LINGAD
lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The US V. TORIBIO
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be
of such parties or organizations. slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for
work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was
eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk,
other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil
carabao is not a valid exercise of police power. exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began
drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually
Issue: Whether or not the said law is valid. terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme
Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review. In its decision, the Supreme
Held: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the Court first addressed the important procedural point of whether the case was moot
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and because the service contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is
legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations and paramount public interest in the
the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not case, not to mention the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the
be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the particular
interests of the community. service contract had been terminated.

SY TIONG SHIOU V. SY CHIM & SY Issue: Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court
narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards,
MATABUENA V. CERVANTES have legal standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the
Facts: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws.
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After
the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the Held: As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses natural and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in
during the marriage shall be void. Philippine jurisprudence moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the court access in environmental cases. Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, the need
donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
were simply cohabitating. which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential
Issue: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional
requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract
Held: Yes, it is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and reported to
spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the congress. Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and
ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional.
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated
relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected
exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact
Respondent were legitimated by marriage. assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA
was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V. NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not specifically
Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract authorized the activity in Taon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration
No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service should be permitted in that area.
contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Taon Strait during which it
performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was COMENDADOR V. DE VILLA
brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Taon Strait by two individuals Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with
acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer
and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised government property and funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded
Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial officer. It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to
investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner accept a mere paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of
applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if
granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any doubt about the
the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and property
officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision represented by such paper accounts or balances.
was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court
stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is clear duty imposed by law,
before the higher court. the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel
action. If the duty is ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. In the present
the right to bail. case, however, the mandamus is not for the purpose of the compelling action only. It is
presented for the purpose of requiring particular action on the part of the Auditor.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as There is a very wide distinction between the use of the writ of mandamus to compel
an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a action and its use to compel particular action on the part of a public official, board, or
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. officer upon whom particular duties are imposed by law.
Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national
security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers The following are the powers and duties of the Auditor General: First, that the Auditor
will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in for the Philippine Islands has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance to examine, audit,
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever source of
the petitioners was reversed. every governmental entity within the Philippine Islands. Second, that his decision or the
result of his accounting upon such revenues and receipts and accounts is final and
LAMB VS PHIPPS conclusive upon all parties unless an appeal is taken within a period of one year. Third,
Facts: Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands (See sec. 36, Act No. 1792) is not
Dec. 31, 1911 due to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for possessed with power to revoke or alter or modify the results of accountings made by
Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his the Auditor without reference to the Secretary of War. Fourth, that when an appeal is
clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds under taken to the Governor-General and the latter disapproves of the accounting made by
his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without the auditor, he must at once forward to the Secretary of War for final action the matter
incurring criminal liability. in controversy.

Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled The SC held that since the nature of the Auditors job requires him to exercise
his accounts, refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a discretion, he may not compelled by mandamus to issue the certificate to Lamb. Also,
civil suit against the government. However the records also show that Fernandez signed there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy afforded to Lamb in that the Auditors
the receipt acknowledging payment from the government. The petition for mandamus, decision may be appealed to the Governor-General. The SC relied on the case of Decatur
asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was demurred to by the auditor vs. Paulding where it was held the the US courts that an Auditor may not be compelled
because it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause of action. by mandamus. Also, the SC held that the decision of the executive branch is not
The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the reviewable by the courts.
SC decided the case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.
Issue: W/N Mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate Facts: The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of
of clearance of Lamb. Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
Held: NO. The certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
and there is no averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they Issues: (1) W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider. (2) W/N Section 14 of Rep.
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. (3) W/N
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal Held: To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down
Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to the rule that: Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
appointive officials, thus: SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks
the filing of his certificate of candidacy. to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for
the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive be an abstract or index of the Act. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to
officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon Fair Election Practices. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep.
filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete
are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
certificates of candidacy. Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
becomes effective. method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
law; hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The
in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on executive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers: Sec. 1. Public signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for
this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular officials assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of
opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v.
Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case Issue: W/N the SK election is a local election.
that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the Held: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,
paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The
deserving members of Congress is achieved. Substantial distinctions clearly exist evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective lochal official to recall once during his
between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election to
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,
appointing authority. meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it SALVACION V. CENTRAL BANK
shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does Facts: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of
not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule: ... rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him
the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however,
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded
does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended. Following Article 2 of the Civil Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No.
Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other
express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
a newspaper of general circulation. body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the
Supreme Court.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the Issue: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act
policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit
the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in Held: No. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
this case. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
MALONZO VS. ZAMORA hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the

PARAS V. COMELEC Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and
Facts: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;
and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution
law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
and inequality such as the case before us.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even sustained
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw and cost of suit. Hence, this petition.
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not Issues: (1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to
the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and improper service of summons. (2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering actions in personam. (3) Whether or not the affidavit of service of the copy of the
that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court and not respondents
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment messenger.
or other court processes.
Held: (1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant is
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts are unknown and
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, such times as the court may order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with
is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen summons despite diligent efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of granted leave of court to effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a
the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person.
prevail. (2) The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been
SANTOS V. PNOC changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies
Facts: PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by Hence, the petitioners contention that the complaint filed against him is not covered by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of the said rule because the action for recovery of sum of money is an action in personam
summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his is not applicable anymore.
last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondents (3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by
motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused registered mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is
the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by
affidavit of service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the registered mail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that the
summons by registered mail to petitioners last known address. affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial
court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to
summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. service by publication.
Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and
formal offer of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, SANTILLON V. MIRANDA
alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with FACTS: son vs mother- after deducting conjugal share, son claims from the remaining
Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. 1/2; while mother claims of the remaining .
Pedro Santillon died without a will, leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son,
Claro. 4 years after Pedros death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration
which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales.

Upon partition, Claro filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting
claims of the parties invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting
from the conjugal properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be
divided as follows: for her and for him. Perfecta (mother) claimed besides her
conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to another of the remaining
half. Court: Perfecta correct.

ISSUE: WON Art. 892 or Art. 996 applies.

RULING: YES. Art. 996 applies. Article 996 specifically applies to intestate succession
while Art. 892 which is found in the chapter of testamentary succession, applies to such
type of succession. Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-
half of the intestate estate. When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring
with only one legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the
deceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.