1.

SANTOS vs NORTHWEST AIRLINES

G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional, a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international transportations of persons by aircraft
for hire." Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of
passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain
designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention
automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-vis Agreed Stopping Place: The contract
is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use
of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of
carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken
is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:
Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign
corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the
Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the
petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous
confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He
therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the constitution so as to deprive the
Philippine Courts jurisdiction over the case

HELD:
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he
has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention
was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession
was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November
9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and
every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the
citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force
and effect of law in this country.
Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?
By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall mean any transportation in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not
there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties . . .
Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers
is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated
terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply
and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States to the Philippines and
back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which
enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the
international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the
jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of
which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by
the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiffs destination was Manila?
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of
carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket
shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of
carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila.
Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and
not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate
destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that
every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the
carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

3 Pan American World Airways vs. Rapadas (G.R. No. 60673)

Facts: Private respondent Jose Rapadas held passenger ticket andbaggage claim check for petitioners flight No. 841 with
the route from Guam to Manila. While standing inline to board the flight at the Guam Airport, Rapadas was ordered by
petitioners hand carry control agent to check-in his samsonite attach case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that
other co-pasengers were permitted to hand carry baggage. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of
it to try of he can get through without having toregister his attach case. However, the same man in charge of had carry
control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again toregister his baggage. Upon arriving in Manila on the same day,
Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked in baggage except the attach case.

Issue: Whether or not a passenger is bound by the terms of a passenger under the Warsaw convention, shall apply in
case of loss, damage or destruction to a registered luggage of a passenger.

Held: After a review of the various arguments of the appointing parties, the court found sufficient basis under the
particular facts of the case for the availment of the liability limitations under the Warsaw Convention. There is no
dispute and the courts below admit that there was such a notice appearing on page 2 of the airline ticketstating that the
Warsaw Convention governs in case of death or injury of passengers or of loss, damage or destructionto a passengers
luggage. Art. 22(4) of the Warsaw Convention does not preclude an award of attorneys fees. That provision states that
the limits of liability prescribed in the instrument shall not prevent the court from awarding in accordance with its own
law, in addition, the whole or part of the court costs and other expenses of litigation incurred by the plaintiff.

4 Savellano v Northwest Airlines

Facts:
Savellano, ex-Mayor and former Chairman of COMELEC and wife were expected to arrive at NAIA after 12 hours of travel
coming from Seattle. The plane made an emergency landing because a fire started in one of the engines.

They passengers were brought to a hotel. At around midnight, they were awakened by a phone call from Northwest's
personnel saying that they would be take a Seattle-Tokyo-Manila route on the flight back to Manila the next day. Upon
arrival at the airport they were again advised that they would take an alternative and longer route (Seattle - Los Angeles -
Seoul- Manila) back to Manila.

Meanwhile, the other passengers took the first route. Upon arrival of Savellano at Manila, they were teased for taking the
longer and tiresome route. They also discovered that their luggage had been ransacked and the contents stolen.

Savellano demanded damages on the ground that they suffered inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation for taking
the longer route.

Issue:
1.Whether or not the bump-off was a breach of the air carriage contract
2. Whether or not Savellano is entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Held:
1. Yes. In the condition of the airline ticket, there is nothing authorizing Northwest to decide unilaterally what other
stopping places Savellano should take and when they should fly. Substituting aircraft without notice is entirely different
from changing stopping places or connecting cities without notice. Also, Northwest failed to show a case of necessity for
changing the stopping place.

2. On moral damages: Northwest is not guilty of bad faith. It appears that the passengers of the distressed flight were
randomly divided into 2 groups. One group taking the first route and the other taking the longer route of flight. The
selection of who was to take the flight was handled via computer reservation system. Savellano failed to present
convincing evidence to back the allegation that Northwest was guilty of bad faith.

On exemplary damages, it is not proper. The unexpected and sudden requirement of having to arrange connecting flights
in just a few hours, in addition to the Northwest employees' normal workload was difficult to satisfy perfectly. Northwest
is not liable for its imperfection of neglecting to consult with passengers beforehand.

Nominal damages are awarded in this case. The court considered that Savellano suffered the inconvenience of having to
wake up early to catch the flight and that they were business class passengers who paid more for better service. It also
considered Savellano's social and official status. The court awarded P150,000 as nominal damages in order to vindicate
and recognize their right to be notified and consulted.

Notes:
*The rulings of Lopez, Zulueta and Ortigas are not applicable in this case there is no showing that the breach was done
with the same entrepreneurial motive as in Lopez or with ill-will as in Zulueta and Ortigas.

*Good faith is presumed while bad faith is a matter of fact that needs to be proved by the party alleging it.