Romanian Journal of International Relations and European

Studies (ROJIRES)

Roads of Migration. Roads to Migration

Vol. 1, no. 2/2012

 Romanian Asociation of International Relations and European Studies

Scientific Committee

Enrique Banus (Barcelona)

Adrian Basarab (Timioara)
Iordan Gheorghe Brbulescu (Bucharest)
Mircea Brie (Oradea)
Mariana Cojoc (Constana)
George Contogeorgis (Athens)
Gabriela Drgan (Bucharest)
Ioan Horga (Oradea)
Adrian Ivan (Cluj-Napoca)
Ariane Landuyt (Siena)
Francisco Aldecoa Luzzaraga (Madrid)
Andrei Marga (Cluj-Napoca)
Adrian Miroiu (Bucharest)
Gabriela Pascariu (Iai)
Nicolae Pun (Cluj-Napoca)
George Poede (Iai)
Vasile Puca (Cluj-Napoca)
Denis Rolland (Strasbourg)
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra)
Sophie Vanhoonacker (Maastricht)

Editorial Committee

George Anglioiu (Bucharest)

Mihail Caradaic (Bucharest)
Simion Costea (Tg. Mure)
Radu Cucuta (Bucharest)
Natalia Cuglean (Cluj-Napoca)
Oana-Andreea Ion (Bucharest)
Claudia Iov (Cluj-Napoca)
Claudiu Marian (Cluj-Napoca)
Florin Pastoiu (Craiova)
Andra Popa (Bucharest)
Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu (Oradea)
Alina Stoica (Oradea)
Ionu Virgil erban (Craiova)
Luminia oproni (Oradea)
Nicolae Todera (Bucharest)
Ioana Vrbiescu (Bucharest)

Editorial Assistance: Elena ZIERLER

ISSN-L 2284 9882

ISSN 2285 3529
 Contents

Lehte ROOTS
Sharing Refugees after Lisbon Solution for the Small States? .............. 5

Adrian CHIROIU
Strategies in the Romanian labor emigration towards Spain:

colonists and transnational households .................................................................... 20

Silvia MONEAGA
Building a more attractive Europe: the Blue Card experience .... 28

Andrei CHIU
EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: What are the Main
Challenges? The Egyptian Case ............................................................................... 47

Raluca RDESCU
Situating Old and New Minorities within the European
Integration Policy: Opportunities and Challenges ................................................... 57

Maria-Antoaneta NEAG
Romanian Migration through Europeans Eyes .................... 71

Book Review ............................................................................................................. 97

Luca Ferreiro PRADO
Muslims and Contexts in the Study of Muslim Minorities.
Visible and Invisible Muslims, by Nadia Jeldtoft and Jorgen Nielsen (eds.) ............ 98

Promoting our Academic Community at International Level ..................................101

ARRISE members at the European Evaluation Society Biennial....................................... 102

President of ARRISE, Professor Iordan Gheorghe Brbulescu member in the

International Steering Committee of the European Union - Latin America and the
Caribbean Academic Summit .................................................................................. 104

Call for Papers .........................................................................................................105

 Sharing Refugees after Lisbon Solution for the Small States?

Lehte ROOTS

Abstract: The article is elaborating on the different burden sharing ideas created at the
European Union level by looking at the pre and post Lisbon time. It describes the role of Frontex
and states in sharing the burden of asylum applicants by controlling borders and taking
responsibility. It gives a review of some theoretical aspects of burden sharing in the context of
immigration and asylum. Article is analysing the different legal and policy sources for promotion
of burden sharing between the EU states. Illegal immigration and big numbers of asylum seekers
seem to be a problem for small states - small in territory and population Case studies of the
situation in Malta and Estonia are discussed as these are one of the examples of two small states at
the external border of the European Union. Finally it comes to the conclusion that from the part of
small states there seems to be more interest to promote the sharing of immigration burden,
especially of those guarding the external border in south and east.

Keywords: immigration and asylum policy, external borders, Lisbon Treaty.

Sharing migrants after Lisbon solution for small states?

EU since its foundation should be based on the mutual understanding and
streaming towards the same goal. Already in the Single European Act one of the
objectives was to ensure a smoother functioning of the Communities". European
integration started from the security and economic integration but has reached now a level
of integration not imaginable before. In 2012 we face a different Europe where states have
agreed upon other policy areas including immigration and asylum to be tackled at the
European level. In this situation, are the common objectives still the same, and is the
integration still desirable or the ideas in the field of immigration shared?
The EU Treaty amendments introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have brought some
more focus on solidarity and burden sharing. Article 67 section 2 1 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that the Union shall ensure the absence
of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum,
immigration and external border control. This should be based on solidarity between
Member States and should be fair towards third country nationals. The Treaty of the EU
does not have a special solidarity clause. Article 80 of the TFEU renews calls for
solidarity by sharing responsibility, including the financial implications on Member
States, when measures are taken in the field of border checks, asylum and immigration.
The word burden sharing is nevertheless missing from the treaty provisions.

Tallinn Law School, Tallinn University of Technology, lehte.roots@ttu.ee.

1
Previous Article 61 TEC and previous Article 29 TEU.
5
 The principle and the idea of burden sharing are not new at the European level.1
Ambitions for an EU burden sharing - form of immigration management - were already
made explicit in the text of the Amsterdam Treaty in article 63, which states that the
Council shall adopt measures promoting a balance of effort between Member States in
receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons.
Other documents also call for solidarity and fairness in this area.2
The physical transfer of protection seekers from one host territory to another is the
most evident method of addressing disparities in the refugee burden on states. It is,
however, important to mention that in the early 1990s, several EU member states faced a
mass influx of asylum seekers because of the collapse of the Communist regime in the
eastern bloc, but it did not create the need for more burden sharing in the area of border
management or at least the EU states were not then ready to make any decision.
Refugees from Bosnia or Russia usually moved to European states with well
established reception system and practice, such as Germany or Scandinavian countries.
The capacity of these countries of asylum to receive refugees was relatively higher than,
for example, in Malta or in Estonia. There were, nevertheless, other solutions agreed upon,
such as the Dublin Convention, 3 which established the criteria for deciding which
Member State was responsible for an asylum claim. The concept of a safe third country
was also agreed upon.4
Is the question really about the capacity of Malta, being relatively new member
(joined EU in 2004) state on the EU southern border? The so-called old member states
seemed to manage the influx in the 1990s. The migratory pressure facing Mediterranean
Member States after the 2004 EU enlargement is more delicate. The countries like Malta,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania on the EUs new border tend to be smaller and have less
financial resources, human resources and settlement capacity.
The situation on the southern border, however, has not created the sufficient
critical mass on a European level for funds from the External Borders Fund to be
distributed. 5 The purpose of the External Borders Fund is to allocate some money to
finance national actions as well as transnational actions and actions that are of interest to
1
Look for more in Schuck, P. (1997) vol 22. "Refugee Burden - Sharing: A Modest Proposal". Yale
Journal of International Law, and D. Torun and E. Thielemann (2006) vol 29(2). "The Myth of
Free-Riding: Refugee Protection and Implicit Burden-Sharing". West European Politics, pg. 351.
2
Communication from the Commission on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration
of third-country nationals, COM (2006) 402 final, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament establishing a framework programme on solidarity and
management of migration flows for the period 2007-2013 COM (2005) 123 final, Commission
Decision 2008/22/EC of 19 December 2007 laying down rules for the implementation of
Decision No 573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the
European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme "Solidarity
and Management of Migration Flows" as regards Member States' management and control
systems, the rules for administrative and financial management and the eligibility of expenditure
on projects co-financed by the Fund, OJ L 17 of 10 January 2008.
3
OJ 1997, C254/1.
4
Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on a harmonised approach to questions concerning host
third countries, London Resolution.
5
Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as
part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows, OJ 2007,
L144/22. See also Monar, J. (2008). Justice and Home Affairs. JCMS Annual Review of the
European Union, pg. 113.
6
the Community as a whole so called Community actions". National actions are
implemented by Member States within the framework of multiannual programming
consistent with the Community's strategic guidelines for the intervention of the Fund by
shared management. The budget allocated for Community actions is implemented by the
Commission. The Fund can support national actions relating to surveillance infrastructures
at external borders and at border crossing points; surveillance equipment; means of
transport; investments in state-of-the-art technology; personnel training and exchanges;
data-exchange equipment and systems; studies and pilot projects relating to the
implementation of good practices.1 As it is evident from the list, it does not cover the
reception of irregular migrants or reallocating them or managing the asylum applications.
In 2002, the Commission introduced the idea of burden sharing in the
Communication on integrated Border Management. 2 It raises concerns about how
financial and operational burden-sharing can be organised, and whether the
geographical situation of certain Member States warrants burden-sharing for the sound
operation of fixed and mobile infrastructures for checks and surveillance from which all
the Member States would benefit 3 . The Common policy should also include burden-
sharing between Member States in the run-up to a European Corps of Border Guards:
The Commission is of the view that that in due course there could be established a
financial burden-sharing mechanism between the Member States making use of the
existing national financing together with Union budgetary support. This financial burden-
sharing should in the long term be supplemented by operational burden-sharing through
the establishment of European Corps of Border Guards, once the constitutional difficulties
of the Member States have been overcome. The Commission will proceed with an initial
evaluation of the financial implications, as soon as precise activities have been identified,
in function of the options which could be retained.
The Commission has been aware of the need for burden sharing while designing
plans for the common border control. The Commission states in its Communication:
The common policy of integrated management of the external borders should also
establish for itself as the objective as genuine sharing of the financial burden as well as
sharing the requirements in equipment and human resources. Currently this burden is not
shared in a balanced way between the Member States. Some of them, owing to their
geographical situation, have to perform checks and surveillance in the common interest on
highly exposed and very long external maritime or land borders, while some other
Member State no longer have any external borders except the airports. It is in their interest
also to take part in the joint protection effort at all the external borders, since the security
of the area without internal borders depends on this. The sharing of this burden should not
have as an objective the integral financing of all checks and surveillance at the external
borders through the community budget. National budgets should remain the principle
resources affected to these expenses. Nevertheless, Community budget support could be
used to establish a mechanism for financial redistribution between Member States as well
as to finance in the longer term the acquisition of common equipment, in particular in the
hypothesis of the creation of a European Corps of Border Guards.4

1
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asyl
um_immigration/l14509_en.htm.
2
COM (2002) 233 final, Commission Communication Towards Integrated Management of the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, pg. 24, The Hague Programme,
Annex to the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004, point 1.7.1.
3
Ibid COM (2002) 233 final.
4
Ibid COM (2002) 233 final.
7
 So far this has remained a policy statement, with no clear rules on sharing the
burden existing. The main burden of financing the border control on the EUs external
borders is on the Member State using its own budget.
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 caused some concern because of the widening
of the EU borders towards the east and also in the south, which are targeted by irregular
migrants. The Commission was concerned by enlargement because the borders of seven of
the new Member States represented 40% of the new EU land border.1 The 2003 (10 new
member states) and 2005 (Romania and Bulgaria) Acts of Accession provided, under the
Schengen Facility 2 , pre-accession financial instruments for the implementation of the
Schengen acquis at the new external borders. It cannot be seen to have acted as a burden
sharing tool, however. Instead, its instruments were used to improve the management and
control of new external borders so that they met acceptable standards.
In 2005 the General Programme "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows"
was agreed upon. The framework programme is designed to improve management of
migratory flows at the level of the European Union and to strengthen solidarity between
Member States. It has four dimensions. The first concerns the integrated management of
external borders, with the setting up of an External Borders Fund. The second concerns
asylum policy, with the prolongation of the European Refugee Fund. The third concerns
the social, civic and cultural integration of Non-EU Member Country nationals, with the
setting up of a European Integration Fund. The fourth concerns the fight against illegal
immigration and the return of Non-EU Member Country nationals residing illegally in the
EU, with the setting up of a European Return Fund.3
The Lisbon Treaty introduces, with Art. 67(2) of the TFEU, the principle of solidarity
between Member States as the basis for a common policy on asylum, external border control
and immigration. Therefore, further developments in this field can be expected.
The Council Decision of 2 December 2004 establishing the European Refugee
Fund for the period of 2005 to 2010 4 states that asylum policy should be based on
solidarity between Member States and requires the existence of mechanisms intended to
promote a balance in the efforts made by the Member States.
The commitment of Member States was perhaps most clearly stated at the
Brussels European Council meeting in November 2004. EU leaders stated that the
development of EU common policy in the field of asylum, migration and borders should
be based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility including its financial implications
and closer practical co-operation between Member States (European Council 2004, pg.
18). The Stockholm Programme avoids using the word burden sharing but instead
mentions sharing of responsibilities and focuses on solidarity between Member States
(Stockholm Program 2009, pg. 71). The other type of concern seems to be restrictive
policy measures adopted in neighbouring states that might shift the responsibility and are
in part responsible for increasing their own asylum burden.
1
COM (2004) 487 final, Commission Communication on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, pg 9.
2
Article 35, Act of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, OJ 2003, L236/33 and Article 32, Act of
Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ 2005, L157/203.
3
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament establishing a
framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007-
2013, COM/2005/0123 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
52005DC0123:EN:HTML.
4
2004/904/EC.
8
 Theoretical approach to burden sharing
Scholars have discussed burden sharing before debate at the EU level became a
serious concern. Noll categorises burden sharing in three ways: 1) physical burden
sharing which means sharing people, 2) harmonising the asylum system which means
sharing policies,1 and 3) financial burdensharing (sharing money) (Noll 2000).
The debate on burden sharing is, however, only taking place in the field of asylum
and not in the field of informal migration and migrants. It leads us to the conclusion that
controlling the EUs borders only concern the Member States and not the EU in general.
Thielemann (Thielemann 2008) discusses the different international burden
sharing regimes and identifies two of them one-dimensional sharing and multi-
dimensional sharing.
One-dimensional burden sharing aims to equalize the efforts of states on one
particular contribution dimension, usually by seeking to equalise the number of asylum
seekers and refugees that states have to deal with through policy harmonization. Noll
claims that common rules will reduce the need for corrective action. Redistribution quotas
are also a classic example of binding rule mechanisms as they try to equalize observed
imbalances or inequities in burdens through some agreed distribution key (such as the
fairness principle, capacity, benefit of costs).
The European Union has created instruments to tackle financial and operational
burden sharing but still lacks burden sharing in fairness and capacity. It might be difficult,
however, to measure the fairness of burden sharing as it is explained below because
burden sharing can also happen in other dimensions. This includes development
cooperation and financial help for developing countries that some EU member states are
more involved with.
The second type of one-dimensional burden sharing mechanisms is based on non-
binding pledging mechanisms. This, according to Thielemann, means that if states
cannot agree on a binding distribution key, they can make appeals to states with fewer
responsibilities to alleviate the high burdens they are faced with.
Multi-dimensional burden sharing regimes, according to Thielemann, are those that
do not seek to equalise burdens or responsibilities on one particular contribution dimension
alone, but instead operate across several contribution dimensions (Thielemann 2008).
Thielemann claims that multi-dimensional burden sharing is based on the explicit
compensation logic. Countries disproportionate efforts in one contribution dimension are
recognised and that country gets compensated in other dimensions, like having other benefits
or cost reductions. It is also based on the Kyoto emission trading scheme, in which case the
international agency will assign a refugee protection quota to each country and on this basis
the state can trade their quotas by paying others to fulfil their obligations. The payment does
not necessarily need to be in the form of money but can be made up in other types of benefits.
A second type of multi-dimensional burden sharing mechanism, as described by
Thielemann, is based on an implicit trading logic which recognises that states contribute to
international collective goods, such as the protection of refugees, in different ways. These
include proactive measures such as investing in development or sending peace-keeping
troops to conflict areas. In other cases these can be reactive measures that then deal with
the consequences of refugee problems once they have occurred, in particular by admitting
protection seekers to a host countries territory (Thielemann 2008).

1
Although the Common Asylum Policy document has been agreed upon, it still seems that there is
a lack of acceptance of this common asylum policy as was previously discussed in the thesis.
9
 Burden sharing in asylum cases
The focus in the first step of the Common Asylum System was to establish a
common asylum procedure and uniform status for persons in need of international
protection that would be valid throughout the EU. As the Green Paper on the Future of the
Common EU Asylum System says:
The goal pursued in the first stage was to harmonize the Member States' legal
frameworks on the basis of common minimum standards. The goals in the second stage
should be to achieve both a higher common standard of protection and greater equality in
protection across the EU and to ensure a higher degree of solidarity between EU Member
States.
It also mentions solidarity and burden-sharing and the external dimension of
asylum as issues to be addressed in the second phase. In 2005 the UNHCR High
Commissioner Lubbers stated that:
there is a need for responsibility and burden-sharing within the EU I fear that high
protection standards will be difficult to maintain in a system which switches responsibility
to states located on the external border of the EU, many of which have the limited asylum
capacity1
Later in the Green Paper on the Future Common Asylum System (COM 2007), the
Commission echoes this concern and emphasises that there is a pressing need for increased
solidarity in the area of asylum, so as to ensure that responsibility for processing asylum
applications and granting protection in the EU is shared equitably. The Green Paper was
produced after the enlargement of the EU in 2004, when Malta and Estonia joined the EU
and the problems at the EUs southern external border became more evident.
The concern is derived from the fact that asylum seekers, together with irregular
migrants, arrive spontaneously and not on the basis of offers for resettlement. These
immigrants are unexpected and unwanted and do not really fit into the idea behind burden
sharing. States have to deal with them when they arrive at their borders. Currently, there is
no functioning system of distribution of those at the borders of the EU as those borders
still represent the border of Member States where national border guards or immigration
officials decide who to admit. Current policy does not take into account the reception
capacity of the state and the relative burden that the state might have in receiving irregular
immigrants. Malta and Cyprus are examples of states that had to deal with the highest per
capita burden of irregular migrants.2 Burden sharing is legislated at the European level by
the directive on mass influxes3. In other cases there are no specific binding rules to share
the burden on Member States dealing with immigration. There are a wide range of non-
binding mechanisms based on the principle of double voluntarism which means that the
agreement of both the recipient state and the individuals concerned is required before
protection seekers can be moved from one country to another. This type of burden sharing
applies only in cases of mass influx. The case of Malta is not considered at the moment to
be a case of mass influx, as boats still randomly arrive there.4 The Council simply seemed

1
UNHCR, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, Talking Points for the Informal Justice and Home Affairs Council
(Luxemburg 29 January 2005).
2
Look for more in Thielemann, E., R. Williams, et al. (2010). "What system of burden-sharing
between Member States for the reception of asylum seekers?" from http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?language=en&file=29912.
3
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20th July 2001.
4
The JHA Council Conclusions of 12-13 June 2007 (Council Document 10267/07), stated: With
regard to the specific difficult situation of Malta, suggestions on a system of sharing of
10
not to have any motivation to make a decision that would solve the issue of burden
sharing. There seems to be an unwillingness to react to the problem at the EU level. Only
some member states, such as Germany, France or Lithuania have shown solidarity with
Malta by agreeing to resettle some of their refugees.
The Commission acknowledged in 2007 that the Dublin system may de facto
result in additional burdens on Member States that have limited reception and absorption
capacities, and that find themselves under particular migratory pressure because of their
geographical location.1
The Quadro Group, established by a Maltese initiative in November 2008, brings
together the ministers of the interior of Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Italy.2
In June 2009, the EU introduced a pilot burden sharing project3 that was tailored
to tackle irregular migration to Malta. Member States gave the EU Commission a mandate
to launch a pilot intra-community voluntary relocation programme for Malta. The idea is
to provide the opportunity for refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection
currently in Malta to move and resettle to other EU member states.4 Unfortunately, very
few states took part in this voluntary burden sharing project and usually less than 20
persons from Malta were resettled in 2009 in other EU member states. It is interesting to
mention that the Estonian prime minister has expressly noted that Estonia is not going to
take part in the EU resettlement initiative because the state cannot afford it and because
Estonian society is simply not ready for this. 5 This was the Estonian response to the
decision of the Lithuanian government (another small Baltic State) to receive refugees6
from Malta. Lithuania first received refugees in 2006 when Lithuanian migration officials
went to Malta to conduct asylum interviews. The outcome was that Lithuania accepted
two refugee families, one from Eritrea and the other one from Ethiopia. At a Council
meeting on 29/30 November 2009, the Council noted the pilot project for reallocation, on
a voluntary basis, of beneficiaries of international protection present in Malta and urged
more Member States to participate in the project (Council Conclusions 2009, pg. 11).

responsibilities will be discussed in COREPER next week with a view to a proper follow-up on
this issue. The JHA Council Conclusions of 18 September 2007 (Council Document 12604/07)
returned to the issue by concluding with an invitation to: the Commission to continue its
examination of the scope for further measures to address the particular pressures which Member
States may be faced with and the suggestions made by Malta to the Justice and Home Affairs
Council on 12-13 June 2007 (). Very little has however been achieved since and in its
Conclusions of 4-5 June 2009, the JHA Council once more agreed to further examine ways to
prevent human tragedies and strengthening the fight against illegal immigration (Council
Document 10551/09).
1
COM(2007) 301 final, Green Paper on Future of Common Asylum System, pg 10.
2
Quadro Group report stresses solidarity and burden sharing. Times of Malta. (2009, 6 March). See also
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/16/0970_Final_paper_Versione _firmata.pdf
3
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20090604/local/eu-to-introduce-pilot-burden-sharing-
project-for-malta, 29.10.2009 JHA Council Meeting, 4th June 2009.
4
COM (2008) 360 final, Policy Plan on Asylum. An Integrated Approach to Protect Across the EU, The
same solution is proposed by the European Council in its Conclusions of 18-19 June 2009, point 37.
5
http://uudised.err.ee/index.php?06181286, "Eesti ei kavatse hakata mberasustamise projektis
osalema, sest meie eelarve seis ei vimalda seda ning meie hiskond ei ole selleks tna valmis,"
rkis siseasjade nunik Eesti esinduses Euroopa Liidus Uku Srekanno.
6
http://uudised.err.ee/index.php?06181321.
11
 Member State and Schengen Border Code
According to art. 12 of the Schengen Border Code, Member States are still
responsible for the surveillance of their parts of the EUs border. It is the task of Member
State to arrange sufficient financial, human and technical means to guard the border in
order to prevent irregular border crossing. Guarding the border of the EU places extra duty
on certain Member States because of the financial and human expenditures required. As a
consequence, the External Borders Fund1 was established to assist Member States in need
of financial help to manage their borders. Cooperation between Member States can,
however, be regulated by Frontex the European Border Agency.
Operational burden sharing was identified as a potential objective in the 2002
Commission Communication highlighting the necessity for human and technical resources
and which also proposed the establishment of the European Corps of Border Guards. 2 In
addition, the Councils Action Plan on External Borders mentioned the possibility of
setting up a European Corps of Border Guards. Currently there is still no European Corps
of Border Guards but we have an Agency (Frontex) that deals with EU border issues.
Cooperation with the agency is important for both countries, although so far Estonia has
not had a particular need to use the help of Frontex. In the Maltese case, FRONTEX has
been active on the high seas, close to Maltas maritime border, and has played a more
prominent role in the relationship with Malta.

Role of Frontex in burden sharing

Frontex is a recently established EU Agency.3 Often, it is mistakenly assumed to
be an EU border guard agency, whose task it is to guard the EU borders. I do not enter
here into a deep discussion of the role of Frontex in managing migration to the EU but I
will briefly mention the role Frontex plays in the field of burden sharing. The Executive
Director of Frontex, Mr. Laitinen, has made it explicitly clear that Frontex doesnt have
any monopole on border protection and is not omnipotent. It is a coordinator of the
operational cooperation in which the Member States show their volition.4
The Commission proposed the creation of a European Border Agency already in
November 2003 (COM 2003). Twelve months later, the Council adopted Regulation (EC)
No 2007/2004 establishing Frontex on the basis of Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC
TREATY.5 The Agency has been operational since October 2005 with its headquarters in

1
Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as
part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows, OJ L 144/44, 6
June 2007.
2
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament towards
integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union,
COM(2002) 233.
3
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union, OJ L 349, 25 November 2004.
4
Laitinen, I. (2007). Executive Director Frontex, Frontex: Facts and Myths, Frontex Press
Release. Available http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/news_releases/art26.html
5
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, supra note 90, as amended by Regulation (EC) No
863/2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the
tasks and powers of guest officers, OJ 2007, L199/30 (hereinafter: RABIT Regulation).
12
Warsaw, Poland. 1 The Frontex Regulation, for the first time, provided operational
cooperation for the management of external borders with a basis in secondary Community
legislation.
Although the management of the external borders became a matter of Community
competency with the Treaty of Amsterdam, there was no real mechanism in the EU to
exercise this competency. The role though is not to regulate or guard the borders but
mainly to assist Member States.
The Frontex Regulation constitutes a development of the part of the Schengen
acquis that the UK and Ireland do not participate in and consequently they have been
excluded from participation in the Agency. 2 In relation to the Schengen acquis, it
constitutes a development of the rules on the crossing of the external borders as covered
by Article 1(a) of Council Decision 1999/437/EC. 3 The participation in the Schengen
acquis is foreseen in Article 21(3) of the Frontex Regulation.4
Frontex, however, aims to facilitate the communication and coordination of
member states operations. It can be seen as a next step to the intergovernmental
cooperation that was institutionalised by the EU in the form of agency that is Frontex.
Recital 4 of the Frontex founding regulation 5 emphasises that responsibility for the
control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member States. At the moment,
the role of Frontex in burden sharing is to coordinate the Member States activities; but
without having any special forces, such as the European Corps of Border Guards, it retains
a weak position if required to react fast to an emergency situation. Although the European
Corps of Border Guards would not have substituted the authority of member states
national border guards, it could have helped to support small member states.
Currently, the task of Frontex is to: coordinate operational cooperation between
Member States in the field of the management of the EUs external borders with Member
States. It assists Member States by: training their national border guards, including the
establishment of common training standards; carrying out risk analyses; following up on
the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders;
helping Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational
assistance at external borders; and providing Member States with the necessary support in
organizing joint return operations and deploying Rapid Border Intervention Teams

1
Council Decision 2005/385/EC designating the seat of the European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union,
OJ 2005, L114/13.
2
Case C-77/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-1145.
3
Council Decision 1999/437/EC on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement
concluded by the Council of the EU and Iceland and Norway concerning the association of those
two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ
1999, L176/31. This decision applies by analogy to Switzerland.
4
The article states that countries associated with the implementation, application and development
of the Schengen acquis shall participate in the Agency. They shall have one representative and
alternate in the Management Board. Under the relevant provisions of their association
agreements, arrangements will be developed which shall, inter alia, specify the nature and extent
of, and the detailed rules for, the participation by these countries in the work of the Agency,
including provisions on financial contributions and staff.
5
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union, OJ L 349, 25 November 2004.
13
(hereafter RABIT)1 to Member States in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 863/2007.2
The regulation establishes a mechanism for providing rapid operational assistance for a
limited period to a requesting Member State facing a situation of urgent and exceptional
pressure, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third
country nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member State illegally, in the form of
Rapid Border Intervention Teams. 3 No consideration for asylum seekers or potential
refugees is made. It shows how EU migration management at the borders focuses on
security and control without taking into account human rights, humanitarian and
international obligations to provide asylum.
The RABIT Regulation introduced precise rules into the Frontex Regulation, not
only for the procedure for the decision to deploy a RABIT (Article 8d), but also for the
operational plan (Article 8e), the reimbursement of costs (Article 8h) and the role of the
Frontex coordinating officer (Article 8g). These rules often differ from those adopted by
the Management Board applying to joint operations. The Executive Director immediately
informs the Management Board of a request by a Member State to deploy a RABIT.
Member States should communicate the number, names and profiles of border guards
from their national pool which they are able to make available within five days to act as
members of a RABIT. The Executive Director shall decide on the request within five
days, taking into account Frontexs risk analyses, as well as any other relevant
information. He may also send Frontex experts to the requesting Member State to assess
the situation. The decision must contain the reasons on which it is based and must be
notified to the Management Board and the requesting Member State. With the Lisbon
Treaty now, a requesting Member State should be able to challenge the denial of a request
before the Court of Justice under Article 263 of the TFEU. In line with previous Article
230 of the EC Treaty, the Court could have only reviewed the legality of measures
intended to produce legal effects vis--vis third parties.4
Operational activity at the EU level is limited to the coordination of operational
activities of national law enforcement agencies by EU bodies and institutions. Article 66
of the EC Treaty (now covered by art. 74 of the TFEU) clearly referred to cooperation in
the areas covered by Title IV of the EC Treaty as between the relevant departments of the
administrations of the Member States. Likewise, Article 30(1) (a) of the TEU provided
that police cooperation shall include operational cooperation between competent
authorities (now the police cooperation is covered by articles 87 and 88 of the TFEU). The
coordination at EU level does not replace bi- or multi-lateral initiatives between Member
States themselves. This is underlined in the Frontex Regulation in Article 2(2), as well as
in Article 16(3) of the Schengen Border Code (SBC). The Lisbon Treaty included a
provision to this effect in Article 73 of the TFEU. It says that it shall be an option for
Member States to organise cooperation and coordination between the competent
departments of their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security, as they
deem appropriate.

1
Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2006 emphasise the need for
rapid agreement in order to draft a regulation.
2
Article 2 (1).
3
Article 1, RABIT Regulation.
4
The Court has held that an action for annulment is available in the case of all measures adopted
by the institutions, whatever their nature or from, which are intended to have legal effects: Case
22-70, Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, para. 42.
14
 Cooperation and coordination, however, does not mean increased burden sharing.
In fact it could place a further burden on smaller member states because it might mean
more human and financial resources are required to participate in cooperation and
coordination activities.

State responsibility and burden sharing

There is another issue that has to be taken into account while assessing burden
sharing in the field of immigration, asylum and border control. Very often States refrain
from getting involved in extra state border surveillance activities and providing help to
other states in need because of the sanctity of national sovereignty. The same applies to
accepting help from other states. Border guards, who might not be aware of certain states
national legislation, norms and practices, may have to become involved in immigration
control actions led by another Member State. At the same time it is impossible for those
belonging to RABIT to receive training on all 27 Member States national legislation and
practices. Under the international principles of state liability, Member States could be held
responsible for fatalities that are a direct result of specific border control measures.1
A parallel responsibility of the EU, under the Principles of the Responsibility of
International Organisations, could be assumed where these measures are a direct result of
the EUs coordinating activities. 2 Member States could also be held responsible for
violations of human rights in the course of operational activity under the European
Convention on Human Rights and they should follow the obligations set up in the Refugee
Convention from 1951.
These facts show that there should be a high degree of trust among Member States
in order to allow the personnel of another Member State to act within the jurisdiction of
the state in question and be physically present during border surveillance activities. Any
mistake made by an incompetent border official from another Member State, however,
might lead to a serious situation and could lead to accusations of an abuse of power.
Despite these problems, the Commission has not abandoned its vision of a
European Corps of Border Guards. Nonetheless, Member States seem unwilling to cede
any power on this to the EU level. It soon has to be decided whether EU border protection
should be left to Member States to manage or whether there is space and political
willingness to allocate certain power to the supranational level and introduce the European
Corps of Border Guards, which will actively participate in guarding the external borders
of the EU. This can potentially help states and a clear burden sharing mechanism would
especially aid small EU member states that have to guard the EUs external borders. But it
also needs the expansion of the EUs liabilities and obligations. The Lisbon Treaty seems
to provide for the necessary legal basis for the establishment of the European Corps of
Border Guards. Member States should, however, realise that the conferral of executive
powers on the European Union has important consequences for their position as sovereign
states. In the case of controlling borders and the access of third country nationals it seems
that EU Member States are currently not ready to relinquish their sovereignty to the EU.

1
Look for more in Spijkerboer, T. (2007). "The Human Cost of Border Control." EJML 9(1). pg 137.
ILC (2001). ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, . ICL
Report of 53rd Session, A/56/10. Chap. IV.
2
ILC (2004). ILC Draft Articles on international responsibility of international organisations. ILC
Report of 56th Session, A/59/10. Chap. V.
15
 Conclusion
Factors such as state liability, international obligations and the unclear liability of
the EU in the management of EU borders do not enhance the prospect of increased burden
sharing. The new EU agency, Frontex, does not have troops of border guards that it can
send to required areas. Although the RABIT groups, while not true European Border
Guards, do provide some service, they have limited powers. Whilst the training of border
guards who belong to the RABIT group has to be up to date, they still require some
supervision from state border guards who are more familiar with the specifics of their
national borders, as well as the legislation and procedures of the state in question. The
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which is scheduled to be established by
2012,1 can create increased burden sharing as more trust will develop through the common
standards adopted.
Increased burden sharing and conferring powers on the EU in the immigration
field might lead to a further loss of state sovereignty as Border Corps will guard the EUs
external border rather than the traditional border of the Member States.
State borders have always been closely related to a states identity. The state
identifies itself by establishing and controlling its borders.2 Therefore the reluctance to
give the EU competency for controlling borders can be easily explained.
Unfortunately, burden sharing within the EU rarely occurs. It is difficult to
convince other Member States to take care of refugees and illegal immigrants coming to
Malta. It is easy to blame Malta for its inability to control its borders but one has to
remember that it is a small Member State with approximately 400,000 inhabitants. It is
hard to imagine Malta as a gatekeeper to the EU border with its limited financial and
personnel resources. The chain is as strong as its weakest part. Estonia, by contrast, is a
good example of a successful gatekeeper. The number of asylum seekers has been stable
since Estonia signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention, although it must be mentioned
that in 2009 the number of asylum seekers doubled. Previously, only 15-20 persons per
year applied for asylum but in 2009 approximately 40 applications were submitted. The
reason for such divergences between Malta and Estonia might be purely geographical,
since Estonia has to guard the land border with Russia, which is much easier to control
than the southern EU border, from where most modern-day refugees originate. The
accession to the EU and to Schengen has not resulted in a rise in potential refugees
arriving in Estonia nor has there been any mass influx on the Estonian-Russian border. In
the case of Malta, accession to the EU and Schengen does seem to be one of the main pull
factors contributing to rising numbers of clandestine immigrants arriving every year.
The question emerges whether Member States are ready for burden sharing:
whether they are willing to receive asylum seekers who are not at their borders but on the
borders of EU. It also raises the question of how much power Member States can confer on
the European Union without losing its national control over immigration. At the moment it
seems that all efforts made are not sufficient to create the relief for small member states and
the solution how to share the burden of forced immigration should be found.

1
Look for more in Stockholm Program draft from 16th October 2009.
2
Macmillan English Dictionary gives a definition of a country as an area of land that has its own
government and official borders (pg. 318).
16
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

2009, 6 March. Quadro Group report stresses solidarity and burden sharing. Times of
Malta.
29.10.2009 JHA Council Meeting, 4th June 2009.
Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ 2005, L157/203.
Act of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, OJ 2003, L236/33.
Case C-22/70, Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263.
Case C-77/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-1145.
Communication from the Commission on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal
immigration of third-country nationals, COM (2006) 402 final.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
establishing a framework programme on solidarity and management of migration
flows for the period 2007-2013 COM (2005) 123 final.
Commission Communication Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union, pg 24 The Hague Programme, Annex to
the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004, COM (2002) 233
final.
Commission Communication on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, COM (2004) 487
final.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
towards integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the
European Union, COM(2002) 233.
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
establishing a framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of
Migration Flows for the period 2007-2013, COM/2005/0123 final.
Commission Decision 2008/22/EC of 19 December 2007 laying down rules for the
implementation of Decision No 573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part
of the General programme "Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows" as
regards Member States' management and control systems, the rules for
administrative and financial management and the eligibility of expenditure on
projects co-financed by the Fund, OJ L 17 of 10 January 2008 (OJ 1997, C254/1).
Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2006 emphasise the
need for rapid agreement in order to draft a regulation.
Council Decision 1999/437/EC on certain arrangements for the application of the
Agreement concluded by the Council of the EU and Iceland and Norway
concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application
and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/31.
Council Decision of 26 April 2005 designating the seat of the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union(2005/358/EC).
Council Decision of 2 December 2004 establishing the European Refugee Fund for the
period 2005 to 2010 (2004/904/EC).
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on

17
 measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such
persons and bearing the consequences thereof.
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 349, 25 November 2004.
Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on a harmonised approach to questions
concerning host third countries, London Resolution.
Council Conclusions from 29-30 October 2009.
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 349, 25 November 2004.
Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, supra note 90, as amended by Regulation (EC)
No 863/2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border
Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as
regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers, OJ
2007, L199/30 (hereinafter: RABIT Regulation).
Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to
2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration
Flows, OJ 2007, L144/22.
Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to
2013 as part of the General programme Solidarity and Management of Migration
Flows, OJ L 144/44, 6 June 2007.
Green Paper on the future of the Common European Asylum System, COM (2007) 301
final.
Green Paper on Future of Common Asylum System, COM (2007) 301 final.
ILC (2001). ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts, . ICL Report of 53rd Session, A/56/10.
ILC (2004). ILC Draft Articles on international responsibility of international
organisations. ILC Report of 56th Session, A/59/10.
Laitinen, I. (2007). Executive Director Frontex, Frontex: Facts and Myths, Frontex Press
Release. Available http://www.frontex.europa.eu/newsroom/ news_releases/ art26.html
Monar, J. (2008). Justice and Home Affairs. JCMS Annual Review of the European Union .
Noll, G. (2000). Negotiating Asylum the EU Aquis, Extraterritorial Asylum and the
Common Market of Deflection. The Hague, Kluwer Law International.
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European
Union, OJ 2005, L114/13.
Policy Plan on Asylum. An Integrated Approach to Protect Across The EU, The same
solution is proposed by the European Council in its Conclusions of 18-19 June
2009,. COM (2008) 360 final.
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 4-5 February 2004, pg 18.
Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Co-operation, at the External Borders, COM(2003) 687
final.
Stockholm Program adopted on 2 December 2009.
Stockholm Program draft from 16th October 2009.
Schuck, P. (1997). "Refugee Burden - Sharing: A Modest Proposal." Yale Journal of
International Law 22.
Spijkerboer, T. (2007). "The Human Cost of Border Control." EJML 9(1).
18
Torun, D. and E. Thielemann (2006). "The Myth of Free-Riding: Refugee Protection and
Implicit Burden-Sharing." West European Politics 29(2): 351-369.
Thielemann, E. (2008). The Future of the Common European Asylum System. European
Policy Analysis.
Thielemann, E., R. Williams, et al. (2010). "What system of burden-sharing between
Member States for the reception of asylum seekers? from http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?language=en&file=29912.
UNHCR, Mr. Ruud Lubbers, Talking Points for the Informal Justice and Home Affairs
Council (Luxemburg 29 January 2005).
The JHA Council Conclusions of 12-13 June 2007 (Council Document 10267/07).
The JHA Council Conclusions of 18 September 2007 (Council Document 12604/07).
The JHA Council Conclusions of 4-5 June 2009 (Council Document 10551/09).

Internet sources:
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_pers
ons_asylum_immigration/l14509_en.htm.
http://uudised.err.ee/index.php?06181286.
http://uudised.err.ee/index.php?06181321.
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/16/0970_Final_paper_
Versione_firmata.pdf.
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20090604/local/eu-to-introduce-pilot-burden-
sharing-project-for-malta.

19
 Strategies in the Romanian labor emigration towards
Spain: colonists and transnational households

Adrian CHIROIU

Abstract: The massive Romanian labor emigration towards Western Europe began in
2002- when a Romanian citizen was no longer required to get a visa in order to enter the Schengen
Area- and continued after 2007 when Romania became a member of the European Union. The
Romanian emigration is economically driven and, at its earliest stages, followed the simple pattern
announced by the European labor market segmentation scholars: the Romanians came to Spain to
occupy the less attractive jobs, which although poorly paid, insured them greater incomes than the
ones achievable in their native country.
At that point, the Romanian emigrant remained in Spain for an average period of 5 years
during which he/she obtained a job, had a place of his/her in Spain and created a social network.
At the same time the Romanian emigrants maintained a tight relation with the family members back
in Romania through permanent communication and remittances. The result was the creation of
transnational households and the emigrants difficulty to fully identify with the adoption society.

Keywords: Labor emigrations, transnational households, return intentions and strategies.

Stages of the Romanian emigration

The years that followed the revolution of 1989 brought to the fore a phenomenon
that was to became defining for the Romanian democratic society. Labor emigration is
now, more than ever, a label that is rightfully associated with the Romanian social and
economic reality. As the freedom of movement was gradually granted to the Romanian
citizens, they gained the opportunity to choose their personal destiny; they were able to
decide whether they wanted to stay in Romania or undertake the possibility of finding
wealth abroad.
In the 1990s, the freedom of movement meant the right to own a passport and
leave the country at any time. This was a real loophole to civilization after 50 years of
insulation. Immediately after the revolution, Romanians left the country to reunite with the
relatives who had escaped from the communist camp or to bring to Romania the first
traces of Western civilization that were, as risible as that might seem nowadays, the
Turkish jeans and the Bulgarian cigarettes.
After the borders opening, Romanians began to be increasingly attracted by the
so-called mirage of the West. Recently released from a closed society, facing
shortcomings of all kinds, many of them saw in the emigration an opportunity of
economic achievement, an outlet after years and years of frustration. As a result, the small
traders appeared. Still, they were not strictly speaking emigrants, but rather people who
had a certain money capital and highly developed entrepreneurial spirit. Taking advantage
of the newly gained freedom, many of our compatriots decided to feed the Romanian

Faculty of Political Sciences-University of Bucharest, chiroiu.adrian@yahoo.com.

20
market, which had been deprived of the benefits of capitalism for too long, on western
products.
These are the first legal emigrants leaving Romania and heading towards the
Western countries. When the small trade of western merchandise slowly diminished its
productivity, these entrepreneurs changed tactics and became the first seasonal workers.
Little by little, the Romanian government intervened in the emigration policy and initiated
negotiations with Western states in order to sign readmission agreements (Rdulescu
2005, pg. 121) that will allow Romanian citizens to legally work abroad. These efforts
will form the basis of some future agreements on labor emigration issued from Romania.
One of these first agreements was the Convention signed in 1992 with Germany
(Rdulescu 2005, pg. 131). The document stipulated hat a limited number of people aged
between 18 and 40 were allowed to work in Germany for a limited period of time as chefs
or construction workers.
In parallel, but especially when the Romanian government abandoned the policy
of bilateral agreements, a pirate job market was created, offering jobs abroad. Thus, there
appeared all sorts of companies that were sending and placing Romanian seasonal
emigrants on the Western labor market, in exchange for fees. For most emigrants, the
destinations were the same, Turkey and Israel, where visas were easy to get and the
demand for cheap labor force was high.
This emigration, initiated after 1989 by the cross-border entrepreneurs and
continued by a more or less legal work in Turkey or Israel, kept on spreading during the
transition period. The experience and the know-how shared by these emigration pioneers
increased Romanians' appetite for large and rapid earnings, especially since
unemployment was becoming an increasingly pressing problem in the country.
The second cycle of the Romanian labor emigration (1992-2002) is largely the
preserve of seasonal work, oriented towards sectors that were not socially valued, but
which were likely to provide if not substantial profits, at least higher earningd than those
possible in Romania.
During this period, labor emigration reached 6.7 of the population. Gradually,
the cheaper and more effective labor force coming from Romania began to be appreciated
in Europe and skepticism in Western countries-which had adopted, after 1990,
protectionist measures to counteract emigration from Eastern Europe- decreased.
In 2002, the freedom of movement had a slightly different sense. It meant
removing visa requirements for accession to the Schengen Area. That was the time when
the actual mass emigration (Antohi 2005, pg. 10) started. Those who left are "people of all
kindsmodest and law-abiding who, although reduced to a state of hopeless poverty by
the mismanagement of the country, could leave the country easily and without
complications" (erbnescu 2005, pg. 4).
Although there are no exact figures showing the extent of the phenomenon, it is
estimated that by 2002 emigrants represented between 10 and 18% of the population (Sandu
2006, pg. 18). This was probably the moment when the Western mirage became more
palpable for Romanians of any category. The social and economic climate in Romania led
emigrants to seek better life conditions elsewhere. Corruption, political oligarchy and the
lack of opportunities (Antohi 2005, pg. 9) were only some of the factors motivating the
Romanians decision to leave the country. Yet, beyond that, the emigration had a strictly
mercantile explanation: Romanians left their country to earn more money abroad.
Five years later, Romania obtained the membership of the European Union and its
citizens would finally be equal to other Europeans. Western countries had learnt the lesson
21
of the Romanian emigration and, consequently, they chose to apply a double standard with
regard to its new members. While an entire legal framework concerning the freedom of
movement and equal treatment of the Romanian and Bulgarian workers in the European
Union was developed in order to facilitate the access on the European labor market, a
parallel solution was found to slow the invasion of workers issued from the East. This fear
of invasion gave birth to the transitional measures imposed on Romanians and Bulgarians,
in fact, an attempt of the West to earn some time to prepare itself to receive and integrate
Eastern emigrants on their labor markets. Despite the activation of these transitional
measures, the adhesion to the European Union would launch a new stage in the Romanian
labor emigration.
Contrary to what expected, January 1st, 2007 did not bring an explosion in the
emigration of Romanian labor force. Cold figures show that in 2007 the number of
emigrants leaving the country legally (through the National Office for Labor Emigration
and private recruitment agencies) reached only 67,771 persons (Ministry of Labor, Family
and Social Protection 2008, pg. 1). Taking into account that in 2006 only 52,600
Romanians had left the country, the increase of the emigration flow was of about 5%,
which definitely cannot be classified as an explosion.
Due to the emigration experience of the previous years, the Romanians had all the
necessary data to knowingly calculate the risks and the benefits of a migratory adventure.
Under these conditions, Romanians tended to analyze more carefully all factors before
deciding to pursue their fate abroad. At that time, signs of an economic growth were more
and more visible in Romania, which made it likely to fuel hopes for better living
conditions. In addition, even if after 2007 some European countries had open their labor
markets, the Romanian workers main destinations- Italy, Spain or Germany-.would allow
Romanians (and Bulgarians) access only to limited categories of jobs and only after
obtaining a work permit. Under such conditions, emigration should have focused rather on
the member states that hadnt imposed any restrictions, but on one hand, they were not as
economically attractive as the Western part of the continent and, on the other hand, the
cultural differences were a major obstacle.
January 1st 2007 meant an important change in the migratory strategy, bringing a
certain legalization of the phenomenon. Thus, there is an increase in the percentage of those
seeking the help of accredited institutions (40.8% of emigrants resort to them) in order to get
a job abroad. Personal networks remain an important factor, even if their role is not as
decisive as in the past, but is rather informative. Relatives and friends are pconsidered an
alternative source, able to provide them with the necessary information for a successful
emigration attempt. At the same time, personal networks remain an emotional comfort factor
since many of the emigrants (about 20%) (Noica and Stoiciu 2007, pg. 21) head to a
destination where they have a relative or where there are Romanian communities.

A heterogeneous movement
By granting them the right to travel freely and settle without any obligation on
their territory (for a limited period of 3 months), the EU states have assumed the risk or
the privilege, where appropriate, to know all facets of the Romanian people. As a result,
the entire sociological spectrum is represented in the Romanian labor emigration.
Regarding gender distribution, after 2002, a certain balance was reached- 45% of
emigrants were women and the remaining 55% males (Sandu 2006, pg. 18). By 2008,
studies reflected a significant increase in the proportion of women among emigrants,
reaching 65% of the total (Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection 2008, pg. 3).
22
The explanation may consist in the changes of the Romanian emigrants status after
joining the European Union. If during the first years of the Romanian emigration such a
challenge involved an entire range of risks, from the bold attempts to leave the country
illegally to difficulties in finding a shelter or a job in the adoptive countries, after the
adhesion to the EU, Romanians enjoyed, when legally employed, social protection in the
countries where they had decided to settle. The risks of failure were reduced and
emigration became as feasible for women as it was for men. In addition, there was an
increasing demand for more skilled workers on the European labor markets, which had
been previously offering rather difficult jobs practised in rough conditions, thus more
suitable for men. Consequently, women were able to access various job opportunities, not
only those that had become classical- maid or domestic personnel.
In terms of education and training, after 2007, the share of emigrants who have
only elementary education decreases drastically. If during 1990-2006 they represented
49% of the total, after 2007 they came to represent only 9.7%. Instead, there is a growth in
the share of emigrants with high school and university degrees (which represent 53% and
respectively 26% of all emigrants) (Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection 2008,
pg. 5). This evolution is related to the changing European labor market that increasingly
requires highly educated staff. Although the most popular crafts between Romanian
emigrants are waiters, welders, farmers and construction workers, after 2007, doctors,
researchers or IT specialists emigrate to the same extent.
Based on the social perception, the main group who emigrated for economic
reasons is composed of young people with low skills and weak training, coming from
rural areas. Indeed, compared to the early stages of the Romanian emigration, the
percentage of the emigrants aged between 26 and 40 increased during 2007-2009 from
38% to 57%, while the share of those aged between 41 and 60 has been decreasing
continuously (Constantin 2006, pg. 34). Since the conditions offered to emigrants
improved after the adhesion, the migratory adventure became more attractive for young
people. Emigration was initially seen as a temporary solution. All the risks and
shortcomings it supposed represented the price an emigrant had to pay to earn better
whereas the eventual integration in the destination country came as a bonus. Those who
left were having in mind the idea to return after a period of time.
It was only after 2007 that the possibility to integrate into the adoptive society was
taken into consideration as the new status that Romanians had as European citizens
favored their propensity for a permanent stay abroad.
All these aspects considered, we observe several distinct categories in this
heterogeneous mixture of Romanian emigration after the adhesion. First of all, we deal
with a group of highly skilled specialists. They are small entrepreneurs and workers,
legally employed and are part of various forms of social protection. They have relatively
high incomes; they brought their families with them and are well integrated into their
adoption societies.
A second category consists of people working illegally in agriculture or
constructions. They use to avoid contact with the authorities and are highly dependent on
their personal networks. For them, the opportunity to work abroad, more or less legally, is
just a way to increase their revenue. Finally, there is a third category, the opportunists
(Istvan 2008, pg. 10); they have no stable position on the labor market, with short-term or
occasional employment. In order to make a living they would appeal to a variety of
alternative sources, using all opportunities that arise, even resorting to criminal acts.

23
 Personal networks, communities and return strategies
After 2007, the emigration mechanism turns out to be very simple. From now on
each and every person who has a valid passport or an identity card is allowed to leave the
country and settle for a period of maximum three months in any EU country. Leaving the
country is no longer an obstacle, but the real drama starts at the same time with the arrival
in the destination country. The main actors are these illegal emigrants who do not have a
secure and stable job, who cannot find shelter. Since their stay is not legal and they do not
possess the necessary documents, they are not eligible for social security or health care.
Although the percentage of those who choose the path of legal emigration and
implicitly have the means to maintain a decent standard of living in the destination
countries, increases after the adhesion to the European Union, the role of personal
networks remains highly important. According to the surveys, after 2007, 77.4% (Noica
and Stoiciu 2007, pg. 22) of the emigrants turned to a relative or a friend when they left
the country.
Even if the confidence in specialized recruitment agencies seems to increase,
Romanians still use to resort to a family member when they decide to emigrate. In most of
the cases, when this point of contact has managed to get a job in the destination country,
he or she tries to bring the loved ones alongside. But the consequence of turning to
informal networks is often illegal employment on discriminatory terms without the
possibility of recourse to social protection.
On the other hand, even those who choose the legal way resort to support of
relatives and friends for information that will allow them to assess the opportunities is the
target country.
Networking is though a main characteristic of the Romanian labor emigrations.
Even if this kind of strategy remains a quite common practice, Romanians slowly begin to
realize that the legal actions, though sometimes cumbersome and costly, can bring them
more advantages than engaging in an illegal emigration experience.
Living together is another feature that characterizes Romanian emigration. Since
they frequent the same places and go to the same stores or churches, one can assume that
certain solidarity will appear between Romanians. But this is highly debatable. On one
hand, in some communities this solidarity is encouraged by the associations that aim to
protect the Romanians rights and organize cultural activities. Still, on the other hand, the
differences of status, which are dictated by the opportunities that arise for each individual,
may lead to negative consequences:
They all avoid each other ... if you come with your brother you will argueif he found
work and you havent had his luck (Ioana Alexandra Mihai, Aspecte comunitare, in
Sandu 2006, pg. 74).
And even where these communities exist and people share interests, they can
replace the affective universe of each individual emigrant only in a small proportion.
Although the idea of returning persists, putting it in practice depends on a rational
calculation, because the financial matters prevail over the emotional ones. Nevertheless,
emotional matters remain the main reason to consider a possible return to the native
country:
I have an emotional bond with Romania. In fact I have a similar connection with
SpainLet me explainSpain gave me more than Romania did, but in
Romaniatheres the house where I grew up, there are my family and the friends I made
since childhood. One cannot forget that (Sandu 2009).

24
 Cold figures indicate that 20% of those who left between 2002 and 2009 have
permanently settled abroad, 36% left Romania for seasonal work and returned and the rest
have not decided yet whether to return or not to their native country (Sandu 2008, pg. 9).
Surveys conducted within the Romanian community in Spain show that 70% of emigrants
intend to return home. But although most of them consider returning, only 32% are
confident that they will, and only 14% place this action in a time horizon of between one
to three years.
As is the case of the integration in the adoption countries, the return strategies
heavily depend on personal experiences of each emigrant.
For the legal emigrants, the return is the least likely. They are mostly well
integrated into the destination society. They usually have stable jobs that allow them to
lead a better life than in Romania. For them, financial aspects could prevail over affective
ones. Having a certain status in their adoption country, they can compensate these
emotional issues. Even if they were to lose their jobs, they may receive some social
protection, much stronger than they may have in Romania. Furthermore, after spending
several years in Spain, they tend to feel more attached to their adoption country. The
paradox is they do not feel completely at home either in Spain or Romania. They consider
Spain to be the home of their future, but cannot totally separate from their roots.
Those who work illegally abroad calculate the return opportunity in other terms.
The sectors in which they work (constructions, agriculture, and tourism) are quite unstable
and the jobs are quite volatile. In this case, deprived of jobs and without the possibility of
recourse to social protection, these emigrants may choose to return home.

Transnational households-financial and emotional aspects

The Romanian emigration scheme is simple - it basically involves a person who
decides to leave Romania in order to earn abroad money that they can use at home. This
scheme is virtually respected by all Romanian emigrants, although after 2007 more and
more tend to permanently stay in the adoption countries. But even if they decide not to
return home, they do not completely break ties and continue to maintain relationships with
the left-behind relatives and provide them with financial aid. Transnational households are
yet another constant in the Romanian labor emigration.
There are generally three mechanisms that allow transfer of assets from the
country of destination to Romania, each emigrant choosing one of them depending on the
opportunities that arise. These mechanisms consist of either saving a significant amount of
money and send it home, or in sending small amounts frequently, or finally, purchasing
products from abroad in order to use them later at home or to sell them on the Romanian
market (Vlad Grigora, Venituri i investiii din migraie, in Sandu 2006, pg. 42).
Whatever the chosen strategy, emigration seems to be, in financial terms, a more
or less profitable business. The remittances contribute to the family welfare and to ease
the burden by covering various expenses. Most of the gains thus obtained are used for the
daily expenses of the household (in 54% of the cases) and the purchase of household
appliances or other devices designed to facilitate domestic tasks (in 24% of the cases).
Most important projects are related to buying a car (10% of emigrants choose such a
destination for the money issued from emigration) or building a house (another 10% of
emigrants are considering such a strategy).
Besides the economic aspects of emigration, one should bend more carefully over
the emotional matters. The first one affected is the emigrant himself/herself because
he/she has to deal with all kinds of changes (environment, language, people) without
25
being able to count on the support of the family he/she leaves behind. Moreover,
emigration also affects the family that remains at home. When a family member migrates,
his/her roles related to emotion, sexuality and education of children are taken over by
another family member or remain unfulfilled (Alexandru Toth, Georgiana Toth, Relaiile
de familie, in Sandu 2006, pg. 65), a situation that produces, in many cases, imbalances
within the family.
Even if only 30% of the families in which there is a member who has migrated
declare that emigration affects family relationships, reality shows us more and more cases
of divorce or abandonment of children caused by the emigration of one or both parents.
In Romania, 8 children out of 100 have at least one parent abroad, of whom nearly
two-thirds have both parents working abroad. Although Romanian law stipulates that
parents who choose to work abroad must declare to the authorities how many children
they will leave at home and who will take care of them, only 7% of emigrants officially
announce their departure (Toth and Munteanu 2008, pg. 6).
According to estimations, more than half of the affected children live in rural areas.
Children left behind by both parents are usually cared for by the extended family, especially
grandparents: 39% of them remain in the care of grandparents, 9% are helped by their
siblings and 7% by friends (Toth and Munteanu 2008, pg.8). Most of these parents come
rarely to visit their children, but nearly 80% of them speak on the phone at least once a week
with the children left home and send them money or other goods monthly. Internet is much
less used for communication between parents and children: only in 10 to 15% of the cases,
children communicate through email or messenger programs with their parents.
Even if the parents emigration may increase the standard of living of the child
who is left home, the risks are also to be considered. Among the negative effects it is
interesting to note that the departure of one of the parents can, in some cases, cause
damage to the child's relationship with the parent left at home. Also, in many cases, the
absence of parents has a negative impact on children, who become less sociable (16% of
the cases) or have unsatisfactory scholar results. (14% of the cases) (G. Toth and A. Toth
2007, pg.12).
Labor emigration is more than a concept. It is a reality and its effects are constant
and visible in all aspects of the Romanian society. No matter the strategies adopted, no
matter the struggle or the personal itinerary of each emigrant, leaving ones country in
order to find wealth abroad is always a rough encounter. The emigrant is constantly
prisoner of two worlds, one he/she cannot forget or leave behind and one who captivates
him/her and which he/she wants to fit in.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Antohi, Sorin. (2005). Romnia n 2004-marea evadare e n toi, Revista 22, no.757,
Bucharest, pp. 8-10.
Bover, Olympia, Pilar Vellila. Emigration in Spain: historical background and current
trends in Klaus Zimmmemann (ed.) European emigrations: what do we know?,
Oxford Univesity Press, pp. 388-415.
Constantin, Daniela-Luminia (coord.). (2006). Perspective europene de abordare a
azilului i migraiei. Bucharest: European Institute of Romania.
Ferro, Anna. (2004). Romanians email from abroad - a picture of highly skilled labor
emigrations from Romania, UNESCO-CEPES Quarterly, vol. 23.
26
Istvan, Horvath. (2008). Migraii i reveniri in Dilema Veche, no. 254, Bucharest, pp. 9-
11.
Massey, Douglas, Joaquin Arango et al. (1998). Worlds in motion. Understanding
international emigration at the end of the millennium, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection. (2008). Raport privind migraia muncii
n anul 2007, Bucharest.
Noica, Ruxandra, Victoria Stoiciu. (2007). Anchet social asupra fenomenului migraiei
forei de munc. Bucharest: Romanian Academic Society.
Rdulescu, Mugurel. (2005). Europa n micare. Bucharest: Tritonic Publisher.
Sandu, Dumitru (ed.). (2009). Comuniti romneti n Spania. Bucharest: Soros
Foundation.
Sandu, Dumitru (coord.). (2006). Locuirea temporar n strintate. Migraia economic
a romnilor 1990-2006, Bucharest: Open Society Foundation.
Sandu, Dumitru. (2008). Migraii i reveniri, Dilema Veche, no. 254, Bucharest.
erban, Monica, Alexandru Toth. (2007). Piaa forei de munc din Romnia i imigraia,
Bucharest: Soros Foundation.
ebnescu, Ilie. (2005). 2004 i pariul Romniei in Revista 22, no. 774, Bucharest, pg.4.
Toth, Alexandru, Daniela Munteanu. (2008). Analiz la nivel naional asupra fenomenului
copiilor rmai acas prin plecarea prinilor la munc n strintate, UNICEF.
Toth, Georgiana, Alexandru Toth. (2007). Efectele migraiei-copiii rmai acas,
Bucharest: Soros Foundation.

27
 Building a more attractive Europe: the Blue Card experience

Silvia MONEAGA

Abstract: In search of a comprehensive approach to legal immigration, in 2009 the

European Union (EU) introduced the Blue Card a horizontal directive establishing a single
permit and a single procedure for immigrants from third countries willing to work in the EU. In
this respect, this paper will mainly analyse to what extent the implementation of the Blue Card
Directive makes EU attractive for highly qualified migrants. Considering the challenges the EU
faces in attracting highly skilled professionals to its member states, this essay will also estimate
whether the introduction of the Blue Card could possibly solve the demographic problems resulting
from the ageing population. Thereupon, the paper will assess the effects that the Blue Card
directive could have on national labour markets. Taking into account the distinctive European
demographics, labour markets or the particular domestic labour capacity, Germany and Spain will
be considered as case studies. Based on the results of this analysis, this study will then determine
whether the Blue Card is indeed a response to the EU prospective.

Keywords: highly skilled immigrants, Blue Card, EU, Spain, Germany

1. Introduction
Demographic projections show that by 2060 the European Unions (EU) active
population1 will decline whereas the numbers of retired people will increase. The share of
people aged 65 years or over in the total EU population is projected to increase from
17.1% to 30.0%. And the number of 65 year olds is projected to rise from 84.6 million in
2008 to 151.5 million in 2060. 2 This trend poses a real danger to the economic
productivity of the EU, especially because the ratio of working population for every EU
citizen aged 65 years or over is expected to drop to 2 to 1.3 The negative effects of this
phenomenon are addressed in different proposals and strategies at European and national
levels. One of the approaches considered at this stage is that immigrants could bridge the
gap between the decline in the active population and the recession in the work force.
Therefore, the possibility for the EU to tackle labour force shortages and to boost the
economy by attracting highly skilled workers from outside has been discussed since

silvia.mosneaga@gmail.com.
1
Population of working age (15-64 years old).
2
European Commission, Eurostat, Population projections, Eurostat, data from April 2011,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Population_projections (accessed
15 May 2012).
3
Rainer Muenz, Aging and Demographic Change in European Societies: Main Trends and
Alternative Policy Options, pp.1-3, SP Discussion Paper no. 0703, March 2007,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-
papers/Labor-Market-DP/0703.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
28
2005.1 The same tendencies on the labour market have been reported by a number of
researchers at the Institute for the Study of Labour from Germany.2
This paper will analyse the Blue Card, a horizontal directive establishing a single
permit and procedure for high-skilled immigrants from third countries applying for work
in the EU. The main objective is to examine to what extent the implementation of the Blue
Card Directive makes the EU more attractive for highly qualified migrants. It is the
contention of this paper that the diversity of national labour markets and distinct national
immigration policies in the EU limit the effectiveness of the EU Blue Card. The first two
sections of this essay will introduce the main features and functionalities of the Blue Card
Directive. The third section will present a theoretical framework underpinning the
immigration policy construction cycle at the national level. The fourth section will
examine the main challenges that this policy sector faces presently in Europe with a
particular focus on high-skilled immigrant approaches. The fifth section will look at the
policies of Spain and Germany for highly skilled immigrants and will discuss
developments and improvements at the respective national levels including the progress in
the Blue Card implementation. In order to assess the competitiveness of the Blue Card
system in a broader context, the European model will be compared to the United States
Green Card scheme. Finally, this essay will present a critical approach towards the Blue
Card system with regard to the existing highly skilled immigration (hereafter HSI)
policies in the EU. The Conclusion will summarise the main findings of this paper.

2. The Blue Card: main features and functionalities

Attracting highly skilled migrants is seen by the EU as a measure to improve its
international competitiveness. As Vice-President Franco Frattini, the Commissioner
responsible for Freedom, Security and Justice stated: We want Europe to become at least
as attractive as favourite migration destinations such as Australia, Canada and the USA.3
The figures presented by him show that 55% of the United States (US) immigrants are
highly qualified (engineers, technicians and ICT specialists), whereas in the EU only 5%
of immigrants are highly skilled and another 85% have limited qualifications.4 Translating
these figures into shares of the total employed population, the highly qualified workers in
the EU constitute 1.72%, in Australia 9.9%, Canada 7.3% and US 3.2%.5 Based on
these statistical data, one could argue that the EU has recently experienced difficulties in
attracting skilled foreign workers.
In an attempt to gain more competitiveness and attract highly skilled workers from
third countries, after a long process of negotiation and drafting, the EU Council adopted

1
An EU Blue Card for high-skilled immigrants?, EurActiv, http://www.euractiv.com/
en/socialeurope/eu-blue-card-high-skilled-immigrants/article-170986 (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Klaus F. Zimmermann and Martin Kahaneca, High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe,
Institute for the Study of Labour, December 2010, pg.1, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5399.pdf (accessed 15
May 2012).
3
European Commission, Press release IP/07/1575, Making Europe more attractive to highly skilled
migrants and increasing the protection of lawfully residing and working migrants, 23 October 2007,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1575 (accessed 15 May 2012).
4
An EU Blue Card for high-skilled immigrants?, EurActiv, http://www.euractiv.com/en/
socialeurope/eu-blue-card-high-skilled-immigrants/article-170986 (accessed 15 May 2012).
5
European Commission. Press release MEMO/07/423, Attractive conditions for the admission and
residence of highly qualified immigrants, 23 October 2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/423#fnB1 (accessed 15 May 2012).
29
the European Blue Card system in May 2009. The legal framework is set under the
Directive 2009/50/EC clarifying the conditions of entry and residence of third-country
nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment. 1 The Directive aims at
facilitating work conditions and authorizations for highly skilled professionals from non-
EU countries in order to improve the EUs ability to attract a highly qualified labour force.
Another goal of the Blue Card project is to reduce the existing differences between the
laws and practices of the 27 member states.2 The Blue Card system was developed in
compliance with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy and does not replace the existing
EU member states' immigration systems. In fact, it represents a horizontal approach to a
new common process of receiving highly qualified professionals from third countries.
Bearing in mind the need to tackle the challenges of demographics, labour markets and
economic realities, the signatory states had to implement by 19 June 2011 individual
systems for qualifying the applicants and issuing the Blue Cards consistent with the EU
Councils guidance and policies.
The Blue Card facilitates several aspects for migrant applicants. The main feature
of the Blue Card is that highly qualified migrants from outside the EU have the right to
work and reside in an EU country for a period between 1 and 4 years (decided individually
by each member state), after which these foreign nationals may apply for a new Blue Card
in the same or another member state. During the first period of admission, 18 months
consecutively, the highly skilled professional is confined to working in the country that
issued the Blue Card.3 Furthermore the Blue Card system foresees simple admission and
application procedures both for the migrant and the employer. Family reunification and
the right to work for spouses are fundamental elements granted through the above-
mentioned Directive.
With regard to the eligibility criteria, the Blue Card applicant needs to present
plenty of documents beforehand, such as a valid work contract or a binding job offer of at
least one year in one of the EU member states; a document attesting legal requirements of
the contract in case of regulated professions, or establishing the relevant higher
professional qualifications in case of unregulated professions; a valid travel document as
determined by national law, and proof of health insurance. Concerning the salary
threshold, the Directive respects the competences of the member states and sets a wage of
at least 1.5 times the average gross annual salary in the Member State concerned.4 For
certain professions member states may reduce the salary threshold to 1.2 times. In line
with these requirements, Blue Card holders and their family members should enjoy equal

1
European Union, The Council of the European Union, Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment,
EUR-Lex, 25 May 2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
32009L0050:EN:NOT (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Nonetheless, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland opted out.
3
European Commission, Entry and residence of highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card),
Summaries of EU legislation, last updated 18 August 2009, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l14573_e
n.htm (accessed 15 May 2012).
4
European Union, The Council of the European Union, Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment,
EUR-Lex, 25 May 2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009
L0050: EN:NOT (accessed 15 May 2012).
30
treatment in terms of working conditions, social security, pensions, recognition of
diplomas, access to services, etc.
Nonetheless, the same Directive stipulates that in order to respect the principle of
Community preference, member states have to maintain control on the qualification
profile and the number of foreign nationals entering their labour markets. On the one
hand, it is a mechanism for improving labour market efficiency, preventing skill
shortages and offsetting regional imbalances1; on the other hand, it gives preference to
workers from the new 2004 and 2007 member states over third-country nationals. In other
words, the Directive enables the EU countries to decide based on their own labour market
circumstances whom the priority is given to: national workers, EU citizens or third-
country nationals who are already residents or wish to become long-term residents.2
The EU estimates that while medical and technical professionals will be
particularly sought after for the Blue Card programme, a number of professions from other
fields will be in demand as well.

3. Immigration policy construction cycle

In order to verify the hypothesis put forward by this paper, namely that the
diversity of the EU national labour markets and their distinct immigration policies limit
the effectiveness of the common Blue Card approach, tThis paper builds on the theoretical
framework developed by Lucie Cerna in "The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration
Policies: Sectoral Coalitions and Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries".3 Applied
to the European context, one notices a curious dichotomy. On the one hand the EU
institutions try to identify and tackle common challenges among the member states.
However, on the other hand, the 27 member states have distinct preferences as to highly
skilled immigrants in the labour markets along with different factors that influence the
immigration policy outcomes. This model was developed based on data from specific
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 4 ;
however it is also applicable to the EU.5 In order to demonstrate that inside the EU there are
distinct approaches to developing immigration policies, it is sufficient to show that at least
some countries do so. Furthermore, due to the unanimity rule of voting in the Council of the
EU and the different degrees of influence exerted by different players in the policy-making

1
European Union, The Council of the European Union, Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment,
EUR-Lex, 25 May 2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
32009L0050:EN:NOT (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
European Union, The Council of the European Union, Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the
status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, EUR-Lex, 25 November 2003,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003L0109:EN:HTML
(accessed 15 May 2012).
3
Lucie Cerna, The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral Coalitions and
Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries (paper presented at the European Union Studies
Association Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007), http://aei.pitt.edu/7784/1/cerna-l-
11i.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
4
Namely: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
5
The analysed countries are among the main global highly skilled immigration players.
31
process, this section will look at how HSI policies are developed and what factors influence
their contents both at national and European levels.
This paper proceeds from Putnam's "two-level game" assumption in that
interactions occur in the EU at two levels: national and supranational (EU level). On the
national stage each government enacts separate immigration policies; at the Union level,
each government wants to influence and shape the common position. Therefore, when it
comes to deciding on a common immigration procedure at the supranational level, the
process of achieving unanimity is gruelling and burdensome. This explains, as this paper
will show, why the approval of the Blue Card has been a long and diffuse process.

3.1. The national process of HSI policy making

According to Cerna there is a continuing divergence among countries policies
that target HSI.1 Subsequently, although all EU countries have common goals and opt for
liberalised policies, not all of them are equally transparent due to their internal preferences
and priorities. To put it differently, the policy-making process at the national level
represents a controversy that implies convergent goals with divergent immigration policy
developments.
For these reasons, this paper concurs with Cernas affirmation: No consistent
HSI position of left and right parties exists cross-nationally because different coalitions
between groups of high-skilled labour, low-skilled labour and capital take place. 2
Therefore the varying HSI policy outcomes are the result of different types of coalitions
between these actors, but also of the distinct preferences they have. Cerna's schema is
fully applicable to the hypothesis of this paper maintaining that EU national labour
markets are diverse and distinct in their immigration policies (Figure 1).

Figure 1. HSI causal schema

Source: Lucie Cerna, The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral Coalitions and
Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries, pg. 4

1
Lucie Cerna, The EU Blue Card: A Bridge Too Far? (paper presented at ECPR Pan-European
Conference on EU Politics, Porto, Portugal, 23-26 June 2010), http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-
porto/virtualpaperroom/041.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Lucie Cerna, The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral Coalitions and
Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries, (paper presented at the European Union Studies
Association Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007), pg.2,
http://aei.pitt.edu/7784/1/cerna-l-11i.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
32
 In the above schema, under the section Preferences, Cerna presents four groups
that emerge at the individual level, which she later simplifies and reduces to three: native
high-skilled workers, native low-skilled workers, high-skilled industries and low-skilled
industries. The preferences of these participants are determined by the political-economic
organization and institutions governing their political participation. Therefore, she argues,
these Preferences (i.e. personal wants and desires of political actors) when interacting
with Institutions (i.e. formal and informal rules) lead to specific outcomes with regard to
HSI policies.
Similarly, native high-skilled workers oppose more open HSI policies due to
labour market competition. The native group of labour would lose in competition with the
immigrants by accepting lower wages and/or facing unemployment. On the other hand,
groups of low-skilled workers are more pro-HSI as they can benefit from greater
productivity and wages through increased demand for labour services.1 Regarding the
high-skilled and low-skilled industries, the author groups them under the same capital
sector (named Capital in the presented chart). These are the owners and employers who
are more or less in favour of the HSI liberalization, as in both groups they benefit from
lower wages, greater profit and sustainable production growth. Such a presentation of
actors and their preferences on a national labour market has a very wide application.
Therefore, this model can be applied to any EU national labour market.
As a next step, Cerna asserts that coalitions occur between these groups of
interests inside a domestic labour market. The author presents three pairs of coalitions
between the above-mentioned groups (native high-skilled (HS) labour, native low-skilled
(LS) labour and capital) with six winning possibilities that predict six possible HSI policy
responses (Table 1). Depending on the strength of the coalition towards the third actor,
two HSI outcomes are anticipated.

Table 1. Political coalitions and HSI outcomes

Coalition line-up Winner Predicted HSI
outcome
Pair A:
1) HS Labour + LS Labour vs. Capital HS Labour + LS Labour Restrictive
2) HS Labour + LS Labour vs. Capital Capital Open
Pair B:
1. HS Labour + Capital vs. LS Labour HS Labour + Capital Restrictive
2. HS Labour + Capital vs. LS Labour LS Labour Open
Pair C:
1) LS Labour + Capital vs. HS Labour LS Labour + Capital Open
2) LS Labour + Capital vs. HS Labour HS Labour Restrictive
Source: Lucie Cerna, The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral Coalitions and
Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries, pg. 8

The first pair represents the combination of high- and low-skilled labour forces
against the capital. If HS labour and LS labour make concessions or common agreements,
for example supporting each other for higher wages, then a restricted policy outcome can

1
Barry R. Chiswick quoted in Lucie Cerna, The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies:
Sectoral Coalitions and Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries, (paper presented at the
European Union Studies Association Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007), pg.7,
http://aei.pitt.edu/7784/1/cerna-l-11i.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
33
be predicted. On the contrary, a more open policy towards HSI is sought in case the
capital wins, due to favourable benefits both owners and employers have from HSI. In this
respect, a relevant example can be seen in the case of Sweden, which until 2006 was
mainly protecting its domestic high-skilled workers with no specific policy towards HSI.
However, with the coming to power of a pro-business government, the new 2008
Immigration Law liberalised immigration policy and made it more "employer-driven.1
The case of Sweden is also a relevant example of political influence on the coalition shift.
The second pair features a coalition between high-skilled labour and capital
opposing the low-skilled labour. If this coalition emerges to win, then HSI policies are
expected to be restrictive. This can occur if a compromise is reached between these
groups, for instance when native high-skilled workers agree to accept lower wages in
return for less open HSI. Instead, a more open HSI policy outcome is predicted if native
low-skilled labour comes out as a winner. The case of Denmark appears relevant for
describing the HS Labour and Capital success on the labour market, since both entities
participate in policy-making. In 2005, several highly-skilled unions expressed concern
about labour immigration and so demanded the government not to lower their wages and
to give preferential treatment to Danish unemployed specialists. Therefore, since 2005, the
Danish government agencies give advantage to the professionals already residing in the
country over foreign immigrants; however, they do not rule out the need of HSI
immigration labour in the future.2
The third pair exemplifies the coalition of low-skilled labour and capital that can
lead to more open policy outcomes. In this equation, both parts can benefit from HSI and
this can be often seen in practice. However, due to the competition on the labour market,
the native high-skilled workers also have the possibility to succeed. The United Kingdom
(UK) is an example of such successful coalition, being one of the few member states with
open programmes and policies for attracting high-skilled immigrants.3 After revision of its
immigration scheme in 2008, the UK introduced a target system for five groups. The first
two categories are endeavouring to attract high-skilled immigrants, entrepreneurs,
investors, and graduate students who have job offers in the UK.4 Such an immigration
policy output demonstrates the coalition strength of low-skilled labour and capital in a
specific country.
According to Cernas theory, national actors build coalitions in order to compete
for political influence. Therefore, the Preferences interact with another set of
determinants of the policy outcomes, called Institutions, which comprise labour market
organisation and the electoral system. In the interaction process labour market
organisations, represented by unions and employers associations, target specific
coalitions in order to gain authority in the policy-making process. For this reason, in some

1
Lucie Cerna, Changes in Swedish Labour Immigration Policy: A Slight Revolution?, SULCIS
Working Paper 2009:10, pg.3, http://www.luciecerna.com/uploads/5/1/2/5/5125288/
sulciswp2009_10.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Klaus F. Zimmermann and Martin Kahaneca, High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe,
Institute for the Study of Labour, December 2010, pg.7, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5399.pdf (accessed 15
May 2012).
3
Lucie Cerna, Changes in Swedish Labour Immigration Policy: A Slight Revolution?, SULCIS
Working Paper 2009:10, pg.7, http://www.luciecerna.com/uploads/5/1/2/5/5125288/sulciswp
2009_10.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
4
UK Border Agency, Working in the UK, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/visas-
immigration/working/ (accessed 15 May 2012).
34
countries, unions or professional associations rather than political parties are interested in
the representation of native, high-skilled workers (e.g. Scandinavia).1 However, in other
countries, preferences differ and hence are directly linked to the political interest and
representation (e.g. Sweden, Germany).2 To sum up, depending on the country, national
labour actors interact more or less in response to labour market organisations or political
parties and therefore achieve different policy outputs for high-skilled immigrants.
This paper argues that the proposed framework for analysis has a cross-national
application and therefore can explain the distinct immigration policies' approaches and
outcomes. Each country has its own domestic coalition on the labour market; labour
market organisation and political interests also change from one entity to another. All
these disparities at national levels can be transferred successfully to the European level.
The theoretical model can also be applied to the Blue Card Directive. However, because
of the earlier described differences at the national level, this essay argues that the
implementation process resulting in a joint European policy will have dissimilar shapes
and features, regulated internally on behalf of the sovereign state.
The EU reached promising agreements in terms of economic cooperation;
nevertheless, when it comes to immigration, one can notice that member states are
reluctant to cede their sovereignty over social or political matters. This paper argues that
besides their will to control such matters, this also happens because of the distinct internal
composition of actors, institutions strength (e.g. associations, unions) and political
parties influence. These findings concur with the hypothesis of this paper and support the
idea that EU national labour markets are diverse and distinct in their immigration policies
approaches and outcomes.

4. European immigration policy challenges

This section maps out the current challenges to the European immigration policy
sector. In order to quantify the analysis, this paper will use data from the Institute for the
Study of Labour (IZA) Expert Survey on High-Skilled Labour Immigration in the EU held
in 2009. This survey is relevant to this study because it comprises data on possible inflow
tendencies and perceptions of high- and low-skilled immigrants in Europe based on IZA
expert opinions (from a total of 545 fellows, 182 answered all the questions).3
Firstly, it appears important to address high and low immigration issues in
connection with the current economic situation. Overall in the media it is often reported and
assumed that due to the economic crisis the need for immigrants will decrease. Therefore, in
search of pros or cons, it is imperative to take into account experts data. Questioned about
their long-term expectations toward immigrants labour force in the EU, 85.5% of the
respondents consider that the crisis will not change the need for immigrant labour.
Moreover, 87.3% claim that European labour markets need at least as many immigrants as

1
Lucie Cerna, The EU Blue Card: A Bridge Too Far?, (paper presented at ECPR Pan-European
Conference on EU Politics, Porto, Portugal, 23-26 June 2010), pg.10, http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-
porto/virtualpaperroom/041.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Lucie Cerna, The EU Blue Card: A Bridge Too Far?, (paper presented at ECPR Pan-European
Conference on EU Politics, Porto, Portugal, 23-26 June 2010), pg.10, http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-
porto/virtualpaperroom/041.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
3
Klaus F. Zimmermann and Martin Kahaneca, High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe, Institute
for the Study of Labour, December 2010, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5399.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
35
they already have, whereas 56.6% suggest an even higher number.1 This is to say that the
EU should consider immigrants as an essential part of its future economic welfare.
Considering the previous assumption that high-skilled labour force influences
more positively economic productivity, it is necessary to consider at this stage what the
expectations from the immigrant labour force are. 78.6% of the experts surveyed by IZA
foresee a growth in low-skilled inflows. This assumption can be developed further. As
long as there is no economic stability and safety, no unique diploma recognition system or
language barriers that persist even at country level (e.g. bi-, multi- lingual European
countries), most immigrants, both low- and high-skilled, will be more inclined to turn their
profile from a high to a low-skilled one. This is to say that immigrants, generally, will take
on jobs that require a lesser qualification than the ones they had in their country of origin.
Therefore, one could anticipate the gaps and weaknesses the European immigration policy
has from the perspective of an immigrant.
Building on the theoretical approach discussed above, this paper has shown how
and why policy outputs may vary in different countries. Here the focus is on the overall
progress of immigration policies and the importance of having more open and immigrant-
oriented policies at national and European levels. Many scholars argue that European
countries rather hold back their immigration policies and therefore markets are affected by
labour shortages. Looking back at the data from the survey, only 39.6% of the respondents
believe that national EU immigration policies impede the access of third-country high-
skilled workers, whereas 65.2% consider the same to be true of the low-skilled
immigrants. Consequently, from these figures, it can be concluded that current
immigration policies help to reduce the aforementioned mismatch between the supply and
demand for high- and low-skilled labour in the EU.2
Another relevant finding is that the respondent experts agreed that both national
and European levels were essential when implementing immigration policies. However,
only a small percentage considered the national level to be addressed primarily for this
issue. This finding suggests that the EU level is the first stage where supranational
immigration policies start to harmonise with the national ones. Furthermore, the data from
the Eurobarometer 2008 show that 63% of the EU citizens consider that decision-making
on the migration and asylum policies should occur at supranational level.3

4.1. European HSI policy approaches

Until recently, the media and political discourse perceived immigration as a threat
to the European integrity. In particular, not much importance has been given to the
specific group of highly skilled immigrants, who are also considered among scholars as
economic immigrants. Nowadays, as a consequence of the economic crisis and the
demographic decline represented by an increasing ageing population, economic
immigration has become a priority and many countries have started to revise their
domestic immigration policies in order to resolve specific labour market shortages. EU
member states responded to this need by opening their internal labour markets, albeit not

1
Klaus F. Zimmermann and Martin Kahaneca, High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe, Institute
for the Study of Labour, December 2010, pg.3, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5399.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Ibid, 4.
3
European Commission, The role of the European Union in Justice, Freedom and Security policy
areas, Special Eurobarometer no. 290, June 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/ebs/ebs_290_en.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
36
to all of them (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria are still outside the free movement of workers
zone). The positive developments of the enlargement related to labour markets are clearly
stated in the European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial
Affairs Communication report: The enlargement has opened, for enterprises in the old
member states, new markets for exports and foreign investment. It has offered them
opportunities to increase their efficiency and competitiveness.1 Member states started to
revise immigration policies at the national level for third-country immigrants, while a
common Community EU preference principle was agreed upon at the European level.
When analysing the member states policies approaches towards third-country nationals,
several restrictions can be spotted.
Transitional arrangements limited the new EU 10 labour force to the old member
states (2004 enlargement countries) until May 2010 and are still restricting the other EU 2
countries (2007 enlargement countries) until 2014.2 In other words, competition to access
the EU 15 labour market is now higher, especially for the highly skilled immigrants. The
comparison with the US labour market reveals other unattractive restraining factors in the
EU: no single communication language, strongly to moderately differentiated cultural
patterns, diverse labour legislations. The listed differences are applicable both to EU
nationals and immigrants. One could also add other administrative procedures impeding
free circulation for labour migrants. For example, in the case of third-country migrants
further restrictions apply, such as transfer of social security benefits or health insurance.
Furthermore, the tax system and pension scheme in each country is different and complex,
both for EU and non-EU citizens. With regard to diploma recognition, foreign highly
skilled immigrants face particular difficulties because of the variable coding of
educational qualifications. Also, referring to the Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition
of professional qualifications, the related costs are high and the process is time-
consuming.3

5. HSI developments and improvements at national and international levels

This section adds an empirical layer to the research by examining two case studies
of Spain and Germany. This analysis focuses on HSI policy developments and
improvements at national levels. These countries have been selected on the grounds of
different migration patterns: one from Southern Europe and the other from the Nordic
corpus. Moreover, Spain presents a good case study due to the fact that it used to be an
emigrant country and later emerged into one of the most attractive countries for a big
number of low-skilled workers. Germany, instead, after World War II, has always been a
popular host country for immigrants. Its immigration policies were revised twice during
the last decade (in 2005 and 2009) and during the discussions on the approval of the Blue
Card, Germany insisted on restricting the HSI for the first 18 months to one country.

1
European Commission, Five years of an enlarged EU. Economic achievements and challenges,
European Economy no. 1/2009, pg.5,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication _summary14081_en.htm (accessed
15 May 2012).
2
British Broadcasting Corporation, EU free movement of labour map, BBC, 17 April 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513889.stm (accessed 15 May 2012).
3
European Union, The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, Directive
2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, EUR-Lex, 7 September 2005,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2005L0036:20090427:EN:PDF
(accessed 15 May 2012).
37
 Another difference is the specific tendency in Spain, whereby 55 per cent of the
highly-skilled foreign-born population is employed in jobs that require a lower level of
qualifications.1 On the other hand, Germany has a majority of 54 per cent of employed
third-country migrants, of which 23 per cent are highly qualified.2 Moreover, Germany
has the highest share of relatively old population in the EU, with a 20.7 per cent of the
population in 2010 aged 65 and over.3 In the same line of argument, when launching the
Blue Card proposal at the EU level, Spain was among the countries that welcomed the
initiative; on the other hand, Germany met the proposal with harsh opposition saying that
highly-skilled professionals can be obtained domestically and claiming that economic
migration should be considered as a national matter.4 Therefore these two contrasting EU
countries present good grounds for comparison of the success of their HSI policies. The
findings and reflection of this comparison will also be applied to the Blue Card Directive.

5.1. Spain HSI policy developments and improvements

Traditionally, Spain used to be an emigrant country and later became one of the
most attractive countries for a big number of low-skilled workers. Spaniards have often
left abroad driven by financial gain. At the beginning of the twentieth century, many
Spanish cities experienced heavy emigration waves to rich regions of the New World;
nonetheless, the population later returned with their earned wealth to Spain. After the
Fascist revolt and the destructive civil war, lots of Spaniards immigrated to the US during
the Franco dictatorship. However, with the economic boom in Europe, this tendency
slowed down.5
The regulation of immigration in Spain is a recent development, as the country
turned from being an emigration source during 1960s-1970s to an immigration country at
the beginning of 1990s,; soon after it became a member of the European Community and
started to enjoy substantial economic growth. The legal field of migration and asylum is
established by Article 13.1 of the Spanish Constitution, which specifies foreign nationals
public freedoms, fundamental rights and duties. Subsequently, the Organic Law 7/1985 of
1 July constituted the first law on foreigners; noteworthy, at that time, the law was already
conferring generous powers to the authorities to sanction irregular immigration. Currently,
at the basis of the legal framework lies the Organic Law 4/2000 of 11 January on the
rights and freedoms of foreign nationals in Spain and their social integration. 6 1

1
European Commission, Demography Report 2010, Eurostat, 2010, http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/documents/Tab/report.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Parusel, Bernd and Jan Schneider. Satisfying Labour Demand through Migration in Germany.
EMN NCP Germany, 2010, Working Paper 32, http://emn.intrasoft-intl.com/Downloads/
download.do;jsessionid=5EC627B5E38DC674C16EF5A71DE1A78E?fileID=1118 (accessed
May 24, 2012).
3
European Commission, Demography Report 2010, Eurostat, 2010, http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/documents/Tab/report.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
4
Gms, Yasin Kerem. EU Blue Card Scheme: The Right Step in the Right Direction?,
European Journal of Migration and Law, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010, no. 12, pp. 435
453, doi: 10.1163/157181610X535773.
5
Colahan, Clark, Spanish Americans, Countries and Their Cultures, 2011,
http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Pa-Sp/Spanish-Americans.html#b (accessed 17 May 2012).
6
Personal translation from Spanish: Ley Orgnica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y
libertades de los extranjeros en Espaa y su integracin social.
38
 One should mention that the pattern of economic migration in Spain is a complex
one. The number of immigrants in the Spanish society increased dramatically during the
last two decades, from 500 000 in 1995 to almost five million of foreigners with residence
permits in 2009.2 However, Spain also counts a very large number of irregular migrants.
In order to prevent foreigners from being unprotected or exploited, in 2000 and
respectively 2005 normalization measures have been undertaken for approximately one
million immigrant workers (EMN 2010, pg. 8).3
In 2005 Spain legalised 700.000 illegal immigrants. This decision was highly
debated at the European level.4 The general work permit procedure in Spain functions in
two ways. Either the immigrant has a Spanish employer with an offer of employment or
a home employer hosted by a Spanish company. To be eligible for the second option, the
worker should be remunerated by the home country. The work permit validity in the first
case is up to three years maximum, whereas in the second case it can be for a maximum of
nine months.5 With respect to high-skilled workers, there is no direct mentioning of the
category in Spanish immigration policies. Still, there are specific provisions applicable to
certain categories of workers (e.g. researchers, academics, etc.), as well as a list of in-
demand jobs.6 With regard to social security, the period of registration with the Spanish
authorities is one month. Spain is one of the EU countries that already incorporated the
Blue Card Directive provision into its national law, but has not started accepting
applications yet. As a result, the social security registration period has been extended to
three months. Also, no offer of employment is required anymore. With the introduction
of the Blue Card, a formal labour contract with the proposed salary is required and it must
be registered with a local employment office.7
To conclude, one should mention that prior to the existence of the Blue Card permit,
the Spanish legislation had no specific work or stay permits for the category of highly
qualified workers. From year 2000, with the adoption of the new Organic Law 4/2000,
Article 41 was the only legislative provision defining the categories of third-country highly
qualified workers (e.g. invited or hired by public administrations technicians, scientists,

1
Ministry of Labour and Immigration. Ley Orgnica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y
libertades de los extranjeros en Espaa y su integracin social. 2009, http://extranjeros.mtin.es/
es/NormativaJurisprudencia/Ley_Organica_4_2000.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Annual Policy Report on Migration and Asylum 2010. Spain. EMP NCP Spain and Instituto
Universitario de Estudios sobre Migraciones of the Universidad Pontificia Comillas of Madrid,
December 2010,
http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/RedEuropeaMigraciones/Informe_Anual_Politicas_Inmigracion_Asi
lo/EMN-EN-Annual-Policy-Report2010.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
3
Annual Policy Report on Migration and Asylum 2010. Spain. EMP NCP Spain and Instituto
Universitario de Estudios sobre Migraciones of the Universidad Pontificia Comillas of Madrid,
December 2010, http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/RedEuropeaMigraciones/Informe_Anual_Politicas_
Inmigracion_Asilo/EMN-EN-Annual-Policy-Report2010.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
4
Katya Adler, Spain stands by immigrant amnesty, BBC, 25 May 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/4579127.stm (accessed 15 May 2012).
5
Ministry of Labour and Immigration of Spain, http://www.mtin.es/en/index.htm (accessed 15 May
2012).
6
The EU Blue Card in Spain, Spain Expat, 27 February 2010, http://www.spainexpat.
com/spain/information/the_eu_blue_card/ (accessed 15 May 2012).
7
Berry Appleman & Leiden LLP, SPAIN Introduction to the EU Blue Card and Changes to the
National Immigration Law, LexUniversal, 30 March 2010, http://lexuniversal.com/
en/news/10787 (accessed 15 May 2012).
39
professors and foreign directors), which allowed holding a residence permit instead of a
work permit and not being subject to the national employment situation. Moreover, in 2007,
the Spanish Council of Ministers agreed on detailed instructions of authorising third-country
foreigners to enter, reside and work. The main differences between these two are that with
the latter agreement, the foreigners hold a preliminary residence and work permit for
remunerated employment while () the national employment situation is NOT considered
for the granting of the work permit. 1 Also, although both regulations share the same
categories of persons, in the latter case they are commonly hired by natural or legal persons
and not public bodies. In the second case, the applications are processed quicker and there is
possibility for family reunification.

5.2. German HSI policy developments and improvements

The immigration policies in Germany have been subject to constant revision since
the 1990s, as Germany () has never really regarded itself as a country of
immigration.2 Germany represents an appealing case study due to the various shifts that
took place in the formulation of its immigration policy. As Clarence argues ()
Germany has a considerable amount of influence over policy-making at the supranational
level that could impact the shape of EU policy.3 Moreover, Germany has a share of 54
percent employed third-country migrants, of whom 23 percent are highly qualified.4
In the decades after World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany in order to
reduce labour shortages, signed recruiting agreements with Italy, Turkey, Portugal and
Yugoslavia. Naturally Germany had the conviction that its guest workers would go back
to their origin countries at a certain moment. As a result, in order to regulate the access to
the federal territory, in 1965 the first Alien Act entered into force. In 1971 a green card
ordinance set off the regularization of legal migrant workers. Later, in 1990 a new Aliens
Act came into force, which brought more certainty to migrant foreigners residing in
Germany but also, notwithstanding, introduced the distinction between the temporary
residence permit and the residence permit, not temporary, although it generated a more
complex process. The new Immigration Act of 2005 and the accompanying Residence Act
has led to further simplification, whereby three distinctions were introduced: stay title,
settlement permit and residence permit. This chronological perspective represents a good
illustration of the German experience in the field of immigration, which has led to many
other developments and improvements nowadays.5
In 2005 and in 2009 Germany revised its Immigration Law and in both cases
anticipated and introduced separate provisions for the high-skilled citizens of the new EU
members and their families. Non-EU immigrants can receive a work permit only if there is

1
European Commission, Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty. European Communities, 2009, doi:
10.2775/13772
2
Clarence, Sherran. From Rhetoric to Practice: A critique of immigration policy in Germany
through the lens of Turkish-Muslim womens experiences of migration. Theoria Berghahn
Journals, December 2009, vol. 56, no. 121, pp. 57-91, doi:10.3167/th.2009.5512104.
3
Clarence, Sherran. From Rhetoric to Practice: A critique of immigration policy in Germany
through the lens of Turkish-Muslim womens experiences of migration. Theoria Berghahn
Journals, December 2009, vol. 56, no. 121, pp. 57-91, doi:10.3167/th.2009.5512104.
4
Ibid.
5
International Organization for Migration, Laws for Legal Immigration in the 27 EU Member
States. International Migration Law, 2009, no. 16, http://publications.iom.int/
bookstore/free/IML_16.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
40
a specific job position. However, priority to Germans, - EU citizens -, citizens from EEA
states will be given over high-skilled immigrants from non-EU countries.1 A temporary
residence permit can lead to a permanent one after a stay of five years. The German
legislation does not stipulate fixed salaries, but foresees language and culture integration
courses for any immigrant (both EU and non-EU). Due to the special provisions enacted
by the Immigration Law from 2009, third-country nationals and their family members
who hold university degrees and have jobs are allowed to work without the consent of the
Federal Employment Agency.2 Other positive developments are also listed in the law.3
By and large, the German immigration legislation liberalised and became more
open towards HSI. But, even if Germany revised its approach towards immigration,
statistics show that it did not seem to be the cause for an increase in the number of high-
skilled foreign immigrants only 151 in 2007 and still just 157 in 2008. 4 Analysing
further the German case and recalling the theoretical framework provided at the beginning
of the paper, the case study can be enriched with more details regarding the countrys
political stage and the high-skilled immigrants policies. Germany is a country where on
the national arena strong and prominent low-skilled native labours and the capital are
present (unions, employers organisations, etc).5 The failure of the Green Card programme
can be explained by the fear of the unions to get lower wages. Only as time passed,
following a lot of debates between the political parties and many compromises, was the
new Law on Immigration adopted in 2009, a law which is more open toward HSI workers.
With regard to the Blue Card Directive, during the discussions leading to its adoption,
Germany insisted on restricting the HSI for the first 18 months to a certain country. At the
beginning, Germany opposed and refused the implementation of the EU Commission project
aimed at highly skilled immigrants. 6 However, in August 2010, the German Chancellor
Angela Merkel rejected the proposals of the cabinet members to improve the current HSI
regulations in favour of the Blue Card.7 No further information is available regarding the
integration of the Blue Card into the existing immigration system of Germany.

1
German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Working in Germany, 2009,
http://www.german-info.com/images/business_images/a388__fachkraefte__arbeitnehmer__
your__future__in__germany.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Klaus F. Zimmermann and Martin Kahaneca, High-Skilled Immigration Policy in Europe,
Institute for the Study of Labour, December 2010, pg.7, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5399.pdf (accessed 15
May 2012).
3
In 2000, Germany also introduced an individual Green Card system to attract IT specialists.
However, because of poor success, it was stopped.
4
Steffen Angenendt and Roderick Parkes, The Blue Card Impasse: Three Options for EU Policy
on Highly Qualified Immigrants, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Comments, June 2010, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/
2010C14_adt_pks_ks.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
5
Lucie Cerna, The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral Coalitions and
Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries, (paper presented at the European Union Studies
Association Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007), pg.18,
http://aei.pitt.edu/7784/1/cerna-l-11i.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).
6
David Crossland, Germany Shows Red Card to EU's Blue Card Idea, Spiegel Online
International, 14 September 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/ 0,1518,505843
,00.html (accessed 15 May 2012).
7
Germany rejects call for immigration proposal in favour of EU blue card, Blue Card
Immigration.com, 22 August 2010, http://bluecardimmigration.com/news/2010-08-22/germany-
rejects-call-immigration-proposal-favor-eu-blue-card.htm (accessed 15 May 2012).
41
 5.3. Competitiveness of the European Blue Card in comparison with the
United States Green Card
The EU Blue Card policy is comparable to the US Green Card, the main European
competitor in attracting migrants. The table below shows the main convergent and
divergent features of both systems.

Table 2. European Blue Card in comparison with the United States Green Card
Blue Card (EU) Green Card (US)
Does not give permanent residency. Gives holder permanent residency.
Valid up to four years, renewable. Valid for 10 years, renewable.
Allows holder and family to live, work and travel in Allows holder and family to live, work
the EU. and travel in the US.
Applicant must present: Five channels to seek a card:
a recognised diploma, and; employment, or;
proof of at least three years of professional family links, or;
experience, and; a lottery, or;
a one-year EU job contract with an annual investment, or;
salary of 1.5 times the average gross annual resident since/ before 1972.
salary.
Nevertheless, the Blue Card will be attached to the
individual, not the job.
Permanent residency automatic after five years. Holders can become US citizens after
five years.
Source: An EU 'Blue Card'; for high-skilled immigrants?, EurActiv, 2009

Analysing the table, one can see that the only common feature the two schemes
share is the possibility to renew the card. As for the rest, it might appear that the Blue
Card is more attractive for the holders families to live, work and travel in the EU.
However, this is not necessarily the case, as the US Green Card offers many more
channels to seek a card, as well as a longer validity period and a permanent residence with
the possibility to become a US citizen. For the most part, when comparing it to another
internationally competitive system, the value of the EU model has decreased. According
to Elspeth Guild, the EU Blue Card will not assure the security of residence and access to
the labour market that the US Green Card does.1 Neither will it formulate a right of
entry for a labour migrant.2 In addition, proceeding from the Directive provisions, the
migrant worker has access solely to one EU member state at a time. As a result, the
mobility of the worker is geographically limited and offers fewer job opportunities.
Therefore, the Blue Card programme is less flexible and competitive with similar
programmes, such as the US Green Card, aimed at attracting highly skilled workers.

6. Critical approach toward the future of the Blue Card and the existing HSI
policies
When connecting the Blue Card features and functionalities to a broader European
HSI immigration context, it can be observed that it offers some positive developments,
such as the right to permanent residence for highly skilled immigrants and their family
1
Elspeth Guild, EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First Look at the Commissions Blue Card
Initiative, CEPS Policy Brief no. 145, November 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334076
(accessed 15 May 2012).
2
Ibid.
42
members. The possibility for a third-country national to move from one labour market to
another after a minimum of 18 months can also be perceived as positive. Another positive
element is the equal treatment in terms of working conditions, social security, pensions,
recognition of diplomas, and access to services.
On the other hand, one needs to point out the impediments that could stop
immigrants from considering the Blue Card programme attractive. The case study of
Spain and Germany showed us different levels of readiness, awareness and openness
with regard to highly skilled immigrants. One could argue that some countries might
appear more attractive than others due to bigger salaries and more HSI job opportunities,
such as in the case of Germany. However, the differences these countries revealed may
also create limitations. Based on the same case study, facts such as language barrier or the
missing immigration integration programmes (refer to the case of Spain) can reflect
negatively on the success of the Blue Card. Besides, the Blue Card Directive itself does
not offer a concrete definition for HSI, which might result in some countries interpreting
this profile of migrants in a different manner. Coupled with these negative outcomes of
the programme, one could add the fact that each country, in light of the sovereignty
principle, will determine its own need of HSI inflows and set domestic labour preferences
over the HSI. Similarly, one could understand the first 18 months period of admission as
limiting. The lack of a common recognition framework for qualifications and skills
together with the social security, health insurance, taxes and other elements will still
remain different among member states and as such will create restraints with regard to
third-country nationals.1
To sum up, the Blue Card can be considered as a good tool in order to reduce
differences at the European level. However, it should be seen only as a system that offers
a common process that intends to attract highly skilled immigrants to the job vacancies
that EU member states need to fill. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned
constraints, the application of the system across the EU appears to be limited in scope and
effectiveness.

7. Conclusion
Data on the current labour situation in the EU seem to suggest a lack of highly
qualified professionals. To attract this segment of the labour force, the EU developed an
analogue to the American Green Card the Blue Card, a special work permit with a
temporary residence condition. One of its main objectives is to create a common process
regulating the entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly
qualified employment. Taking into consideration the distinctive European labour market
preferences and demands, the cross-national theoretical framework showed in detail the
immigration policy construction cycle, with a special emphasis on the national process of
policy making. The theoretical framework explains how and why distinct immigration
policies approaches have certain outcomes on national immigration policy. Examples of
coalitions that exist in some countries showed that the disparities at national levels,
transferred to the European level also lead to diversification of policy results.
Consequently, the case studies of Spain and Germany exemplified contrasting national
immigration legislations and Blue Card approaches that have dissimilar shapes and

1
European Commission, Migrant Worker section, last updated 11 March 2011,
http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/migrant-worker/index_en.htm (accessed 15 May
2012).
43
features. The comparison with its US competitor the Green Card coupled with earlier
depicted attributes, revealed further gaps and weaknesses of the Blue Card limiting the
attractiveness of the system as a whole.

Figure 2. Conclusion

Source: Personal elaboration

The chart above schematises the main conclusion of this paper: namely that as
long as an EU policy area is dominated by distinct and divergent national interests and
coalitions, its outputs will vary from country to country. Therefore, in the case of the Blue
Card, whenever the EU launches an immigration procedure, each member will implement
it in an individual way influenced by the existing actors on the national stage. The same
pattern can be seen in the decision-making process at the EU level, where each state will
try to push forward its distinctive approach and interest, as it happened with the lengthy
approval of the Blue Card. In the end, on account of strong sovereignty feelings, EU
member states agreed on a common process but with a minimal number of harmonising
and unifying provisions. The underlying hypothesis of this essay holds true: the diversity
of EU national labour markets and distinct national immigration policies limit the
effectiveness of the Blue Card. The individual member states need more convergence of
their national immigration policies in order to provide a truly attractive scheme for highly
qualified workers. In the short and medium term, this does not appear to be the case.

44
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

An EU Blue Card for high-skilled immigrants?. European Union Information Website

EurActiv, 22 April 2008, http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/eu-blue-card-
high-skilled-immigrants/article-170986 (accessed 15 May 2011).
Germany rejects call for immigration proposal in favour of EU blue card. Blue Card
Immigration.com, 22 August 2010, http://bluecardimmigration.com/news/2010-08-
22/germany-rejects-call-immigration-proposal-favor-eu-blue-card.htm (accessed 15
May 2011).
The EU Blue Card in Spain. Spain Expat, 27 February 2010, http://www.spainexpat.
com/spain/information/the_eu_blue_card/ (accessed 15 May 2011).
Adler, Katya. Spain stands by immigrant amnesty. BBC, 25 May 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4579127.stm (accessed 15 May 2011).
Angenendt, Steffen, and Parkes, Roderick. The Blue Card Impasse: Three Options for
EU Policy on Highly Qualified Immigrants. German Institute for International and
Security Affairs Comments, June 2010, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/comments/2010C14_adt_pks_ks.pdf (accessed 15 May 2011).
Berry Appleman & Leiden LLP. SPAIN Introduction to the EU Blue Card and
Changes to the National Immigration Law. LexUniversal, 30 March 2010,
http://lexuniversal.com/en/news/10787 (accessed 15 May 2011).
British Broadcasting Corporation. EU free movement of labour map. BBC, 17 April
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513889.stm (accessed 15 May 2011).
Cerna, Lucie. Changes in Swedish Labour Immigration Policy: A Slight Revolution?, The
Stockholm University Linnaeus Center for Integration Studies Working Paper 2009:10,
2009. http://www.luciecerna.com/uploads/5/1/2/5/5125288/sulciswp2009_10.pdf
(accessed 15 May 2011).
Cerna, Lucie. The EU Blue Card: A Bridge Too Far?. Paper presented at ECPR Pan-
European Conference on EU Politics, Porto, Portugal, 23-26 June 2010.
http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/virtualpaperroom/041.pdf (accessed 15 May 2011).
Cerna, Lucie. The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Sectoral Coalitions
and Outcomes in Advanced Industrial Countries. Paper presented at the European
Union Studies Association Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May 2007.
http://aei.pitt.edu/7784/1/cerna-l-11i.pdf (accessed 15 May 2011).
Crossland, David. Germany Shows Red Card to EU's Blue Card Idea. Spiegel Online
International, 14 September 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
0,1518,505843,00.html (accessed 15 May 2011).
European Commission. Attractive conditions for the admission and residence of highly
qualified immigrants. Press releases RAPID, MEMO/07/423, 23 October 2007,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/423#fnB1
(accessed 15 May 2011).
European Commission. Entry and residence of highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card).
Summaries of EU legislation, last updated 18 August 2009, http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylu
m_immigration/l14573_en.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).
European Commission. Five years of an enlarged EU. Economic achievements and
challenges. European Economy no. 1/2009, Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
publication_summary14081_en.htm (accessed 15 May 2011).
45
European Commission. Making Europe more attractive to highly skilled migrants and
increasing the protection of lawfully residing and working migrants. Press releases
RAPID, IP/07/1575, 23 October 2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/07/1575 (accessed 15 May 2011).
European Commission. Migrant Worker section, last updated 11 March 2011,
http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/migrant-worker/index_en.htm
(accessed 15 May 2011).
European Commission. Population projections. Eurostat, data from April 2011,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Population_projectio
ns (accessed 15 May 2011).
European Commission. The role of the European Union in Justice, Freedom and Security
policy areas. Special Eurobarometer no. 290, June 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_290_en.pdf (accessed 15 May 2011).
European Union. The Council of the European Union. Directive 2003/109/EC concerning
the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. EUR-Lex, 25
November 2003, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
32003L0109:EN:HTML (accessed 15 May 2011).
European Union. The Council of the European Union. Directive 2009/50/EC on the
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of
highly qualified employment. EUR-Lex, 25 May 2009, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0050:EN:NOT
(accessed 15 May 2011).
European Union. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.
Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications. EUR-Lex, 7
September 2005, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:
2005L0036:20090427:EN:PDF (accessed 15 May 2011).
German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Working in Germany. BMAS,
2009. http://www.german-info.com/images/business_images/a388__fachkraefte
__arbeitnehmer__your__future__in__germany.pdf (accessed 15 May 2011).
Guild, Elspeth. EU Policy on Labour Migration: A First Look at the Commissions Blue
Card Initiative. CEPS Policy Brief no. 145, November 2007,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334076 (accessed 15 May 2011).
Ministry of Labour and Immigration of Spain. http://www.mtin.es/en/index.htm (accessed
15 May 2011).
Muenz, Rainer. Aging and Demographic Change in European Societies: Main Trends
and Alternative Policy Options. SP Discussion Paper no. 0703, Social Protection
Advisory Service, The World Bank, March 2007, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Labor-
Market-DP/0703.pdf (accessed 15 May 2011).
UK Border Agency. Working in the UK. UK Border Agency Home Office,
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/visas-immigration/working/ (accessed 15 May
2011).
Zimmermann, Klaus F., and Martin Kahaneca. High-Skilled Immigration Policy in
Europe. Institute for the Study of Labour Discussion Paper No. 5399, December
2010, http://ftp.iza.org/dp5399.pdf (accessed 15 May 2011).

46
 EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: What are the
Main Challenges? The Egyptian Case
Andrei CHIU*

Abstract: The recent changes in Egypt opened a great opportunity for the EU to act as
norm promoter. The aim of this paper is to explain what major obstacles stand in the EUs way
towards better democracy promotion in Egypt. The core of the paper is divided in four parts, each
corresponding to a major challenge for the EU in its attempt to promote norms south of the
Mediterranean. First, I bring arguments in support of the idea that the democracy versus stability
dilemma is still a hindrance to the EUs norm promotion efforts. Second, I describe the main lines
of divergence within the EU as the cause for its inconsistent policies. Third, I emphasize that there
are systemic differences between the European and the Egyptian models of political rule. Finally, I
assess the economic and financial interactions between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbour.
Not only is the exclusion of certain agricultural products from the free trade agreements the EUs
southern neighbours main source of discontent, but also the Free Trade Area (FTA) envisaged by
the economic partnership has overall negative effects in Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMC).
As long as the European-promoted reforms do not consider Egyptians as equal partners, the EU
cannot be successful as norm promoter. Following the EUs lack of achievements in promoting
democracy and the recent regime changes in Northern Africa, I conclude that the EU needs a
different Mediterranean strategy and new priorities.

Keywords: Agricultural trade, Association Agreement (AA), Democracy promotion,

Democracy versus stability dilemma, Free Trade Area (FTA), Regime change, South
Mediterranean Countries (SMC)

The European Union has the potential to become an effective democracy promoter
outside its borders. The value of Europe rests in the universal character of the principles it
promotes in relation with non-members and its ability to shape conceptions of normal in
the international arena (Manners 2002, pp. 239-241). When it promotes values that
empower actors affected by its foreign policy, the EU behaves normatively (Bicchi 2006,
pg. 289). One of the priority regions for norm diffusion has always been the
Mediterranean the EU led a series of initiatives aimed at improving cooperation with its
North-African and Middle-Eastern neighbours (Bouris 2011, pg. 2).
In the Mediterranean area, Egypt has always been an important partner for the EU
and an important pillar for the security and stability of the region. Similarly, the EU has
traditionally played an important role for Egypt: the EU is Egypts main trading partner; it
is the biggest investor in the country and the second largest donor. The EU-Egypt
Association Agreement of 2004 established a Free Trade Area (FTA), while an agreement

I would like to thank Vlad Corbu (Dialogue Advisory Group) for his useful feedback on earlier
drafts of this paper.
*
University of Trento (Italy), School of International Studies, Masters in European and
International Studies, andreichitu@ymail.com.
47
on certain agricultural; processed agricultural and fisheries products came in force in 2010.
Moreover, negotiations on improving conditions for services trade and for companies
seeking to open businesses on both markets are ongoing (Pace 2012, pg. 49). However, the
EU-Egypt relations also constitute a case in point for the EUs foreign policy most common
fault: the EU seems to lack the ability to translate its economic influence into the necessary
political leverage for effective norm promotion (Kumrulu 2008, pg. 1-2).
This paper attempts to assess the conditions for European democracy promotion in
Egypt. In examining the relation between the best intentions rhetoric of the European
Union and the actual results of its foreign policies, several particular question need to be
analyzed: Do the EUs Mediterranean partners, including Egypt, really benefit from
having a special relationship with the EU? What are the conditions under which the EU
could become a norm promoter in relation to Egypt? What lessons need to be learned from
previous (unsuccessful) strategies?
Finally, the questions I want to answer are: what are the major obstacles the EU
has to overcome in order to promote its norms in Egypt and what are the main issues that
the EU needs to address before creating new policies for norm diffusion in Egypt? My
hypothesis is that in spite of the recent Egyptian regime change, four important obstacles
stand in the way of the EU asserting itself as an effective democracy promoter in Egypt:
the democracy versus stability dilemma, the divergences inside the EU, the flawed
association agreement and the lack of adaptation of the European policies to the systemic
antagonism between the European and the Egyptian political models.

The democracy versus stability dilemma. Still relevant?

The foreign policy of the European Union towards the North-African countries
has been marked by a choice between democracy and stability, both of which are central
goals of the EU (Cavatorta & Pace 2010, pg. 583). The strategy of the EU has two main
flaws: first, it gives too much power to national (central) authorities, at the expense of
grassroots organizations and second, it overemphasizes stability to the detriment of
democracy. A normative long-term democracy seemed at times to give room to the very
appealing option of a strategic short-term stabilization of the authoritarian systems on the
Southern shore of the Mediterranean. This led to criticism about double standards: EUs
Mediterranean policy demanded more democracy while, at the same time supporting
authoritarian rulers (Bauer, 2011a, pg. 1). In spite of strong European rhetoric in favour of
democratic reforms, observers noticed gaps between discourse and practice (Bicchi,
2009, pg. 62) and emphasised that there is little evidence that European policies can live
up to the strong language used at the policys outset in favour of democratic promotion
(Johansson-Nogus 2007, pg. 192).
The implementation process of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as
presented by Bauer (2011a, pp. 4-5), clearly illustrates how the conflict between the need
for stability and the desire for democracy ultimately affects democratization policies. The
core management agency for all Egyptian cooperation with the EU is the Egyptian
Foreign Ministry and its National Steering Bureau: EgyptEU Action Plan & Association
Agreement. The Ministries implement important tasks by themselves especially all
kinds of regulation and norm adoption. The Egyptian government also distributes the EU
funding to national agencies. Hence, all financial aid provided by the EU has to pass the
governmental level to reach the civil society. That is one essential reason why, in practice,
the stabilization effect of the ENP prevailed over the intended democratization effect.

48
 The implementation of European democracy support policies has been restricted
by the authoritarian regime. Although the Arab Spring of 2011 brought hope for a new
democratic order in Egypt, prospects remain unclear, as the newly elected president,
Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, still struggles with the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces for the de facto power. The transition and the future distribution of
power could lead to a democratically consolidated stability in Egypt, but also to a more
unstable domestic situation (Bauer 2011a, pg. 9) or even a return to authoritarian rule.
The democracy versus stability dilemma is still one of the main obstacles in the
way of European promotion of norms in Northern Africa. The Egyptian regime change
gives hope that this dilemma will become irrelevant, but the transition from the culture of
authoritarianism in politics and society has just started and a period of social learning as
well as re-education is needed. The EU will have to learn to re-evaluate its position
towards a Muslim government and discover a better way to overcome the difficult choice
between supporting democracy at the risk of instability, on the one hand and promoting
stability at the cost of democracy, on the other.

Divergences within the EU. Can we get past them?

The lack of consensus among member states adds up to the list of obstacles
standing in the way of a better European promotion of norms. Disagreements include
broad security strategies and divergences intensify when dealing with specific decisions,
such as the policy towards Egypt. The discrepancy in the positions of member states on
stringent issues is harmful for the capacity of the EU to establish itself as a strong and
unitary norm promoter south of the Mediterranean.
Getting past divergences between, most notably, France, Germany and the Great
Britain, as shown by Behr (2008, pp. 79-96) and Lonhurst & Miskimmon, (2007, pp. 88-
90) is a major challenge for the EU when it comes to a credible norm promotion abroad.
France and Germany have had different, if not conflicting approaches to the region. The
different French and German foreign policy traditions pose a limit to the field of action of
a potential normative power EU. On the one hand, the French Arab policy has aimed at
reducing the American influence in the area and has shown its preference for certain Arab
countries. On the other hand, the German foreign policy in the area was rather neutral.
While France decisively positioned itself against any Islamist movements, seen as a threat
to its secular partners, Germany had a distinct vision on the region and promoted a policy
based on dialogue with both sides.
September 11 and the following War on Terror - in which Egypt had a central
strategic role also found Germany and the Great Britain on incompatible positions. The EU
became polarized as the two member states had contrasting views on the use of force,
Europeanist versus Atlanticist solutions, institutional arrangements, decision-making
processes, budgetary allocation for troops and other security expenses. Such divergences had a
strong impact on European projects in Egypt, both indirectly, through the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EMP) and the ENP, as well as directly, damaging the EU-Egypt agreements.
In Touvals (2011, pg. 44) view, the response to the recent Arab upheaval showed
an EU as helpless and hapless as ever and was marked, first, by the triumph of national-
particularistic interests over supranational ones and second, by the return of the so-called
humanitarian doctrine as justification for French-led military intervention.
If the EU is to become a credible promoter of democracy and wishes to have a real
influence in Egypts transition, it needs to start acting as a unitary actor. In spite of the recent
convergence of European foreign policy approaches, divergences continue to occasionally
49
occur, especially after the beginning of the economic crisis. The EU must find solutions for
its internal divergences as the first step towards gaining credibility in Egypt.

The antagonism of the models of political rule. Are they really irreconcilable?
The legitimacy of the EU is crucial for the efficiency of its democracy promotion
policies. Norm promotion revolves around a distinction between internationals/foreigners
and nationals/locals. The lack of communication because of different political traditions can
contribute to creating even greater problems for the host countries populations (Newman et al.
2009, pp. 3-23). Hence, the EU should accurately perceive the specificity of the political and
cultural profile of the host state and overcome the obstacle of having to deal with a completely
different Egyptian political tradition. Otherwise, it is unlikely to generate sustainable
institutions of governance that are accepted by local stakeholders and avoid developing
cooperation on shaky foundations, insufficiently sensitive to local traditions.
Many of the conventional features of the democratic state are simply not present
in Egypt. As Bauer (2011b, pg. 2) shows, there is a difference at a systemic level between
the EU and North African and Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt. However, the
central issue is not this incompatibility per se, but rather the EUs incapability to adapt its
democratization policies to the Egyptian reality.
Hence, the Egyptian population is not ready to trust Europeans in their efforts to
promote norms and this illegitimacy leads to the EU programs and policies enhancing a
permanent antagonism between the European and the Egyptian models of political rule. On the
one hand, there is the European post-modern model originating from the integration process
and on the other hand, there is the completely different authoritarian rule of Arab provenience
based on the prevalence of hierarchical interaction in Egypt. This (apparent) irreconcilability
needs to be confronted: the EU has to better comprehend the other in order to acquire the
credibility required for effective democracy promotion outside its borders.

The status of NGOs

One relevant example of systemic difference between the EU and Egypt is the status
of the Egyptian NGOs. Whereas the EU in its policy formulation implicitly assumes the
existence of civil society actors and asks for NGOs to take greater responsibility in the
implementation of its policies (Bauer 2011b, pg. 2), this idea of civil society involvement is
practically unknown to the Egyptian society and, as Guirguis (2009) shows, faces legal
obstacles in the Egyptian legislation. Instead of providing a useful framework for a stronger
role of the civil sector, the Egyptian NGO law is actually a restricting instrument, as an
approval from governmental institutions is needed for both formal admission and funding.
There is a systemic antagonism between the EU as potential norm promoter and
Egypt as potential recipient; the contrast between the two models is best seen in the status
Egyptian NGOs have. In order to be able to promote legitimate norms in Egypt, the EU
needs to overcome the obstacle of recipients not being able to handle, not to speak of
comply with the requirements of European policies. The enthusiasm following the recent
regime change included hope for structural changes with regard to the role of NGOs have
in the implementation process of European policies, but the transition in only at the
beginning. The EU should take advantage of the current changes in the Egyptian society
and support civic associations and other grassroots organizations.
The economic agreement. Is it really mutually benefiting?
The general aim of the economic agreement is to create prosperity through
progressively establishing a FTA between the EU and all Mediterranean partners,
50
including Egypt, with the conclusion of an Association Agreement (AA), assisted by
financial support for economic transition and for the social consequences of this process.
Egypt is not only committed to implement vertical North-South liberalization with the EU
partners, but also with the other SMC (horizontal South-South integration) (Abbasi 2005).
The institution of a FTA is aimed at ensuring free movement of goods, services
and companies through national boundaries. The main tool for the implementation of the
FTA is the Association Agreement, which combines free trade with financial support for
promoting modernization. The main objective embodied in the AA is the elimination of all
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. The AA contains a reference to political dialogue and
respect for democracy and human rights. Although the clauses providing for suspension of
the AA due to violations of human rights were never invoked so far, the EUs credibility
is undermined, as the Egyptians see European double standards over human rights, in
particular with respect to Israel.
The AA lays down the goal of achieving free movement of goods. It is stated that
no custom duties or other charges will be imposed on imports of industrial products, but in
the case of agricultural and fishery products, there is only a general intent of progressive
liberalization, while protectionist measures are kept as priorities. The establishment of
services is provided in very general terms and there is no provision on the crucial issue of
freedom of establishment of people. Additionally, a major role is given to legal
convergence: it is expected that by facilitating the circulation of goods and capital and the
dismantling of non-tariff barriers, the partnership will harmonize relevant legislation and
foster regulatory convergence. (Donini 2008, pp. 4-6) However, the economic partnership
does not meet its objectives, but rather the opposite, having negative effects on the
Egyptian economy, hence, hindering European efforts to acquire a higher level of
legitimacy as norm promoter.

1. The agricultural trade issue

Agricultural trade has been the most sensitive issue in the Euro-Mediterranean
relations. The effect of EU subsidies and protectionism with regard to agricultural
products on SMC producers is crucial. While suffering from the hardship entailed by the
reforms required for establishing the FTA, Egypt does not gain much in return, as the
protectionist character of EUs agricultural policy has negative effects on its southern
partners (Abbasi 2005). Although the EU and Egypt signed an agreement on liberalization
of agricultural trade, many products are still under European protectionism. In addition to
industrial products, free trade is applied only to oil and gas. Very importantly, limits have
been imposed in the textile sector as well. The exclusion of certain agricultural imports
highlights the structural disadvantage that Egypt has. Unless more concessions on
agriculture are given, EUs attempts to bring the SMC closer seem to not be able to have a
more than mediocre positive impact.
Trans-Mediterranean agricultural trade is hampered from both sides. The SMC,
including Egypt as the biggest trade partner of the EU in North Africa and the Middle East,
have a comparative advantage with agricultural products, such as tomatoes, oranges, olives,
potatoes, dates, figs and fisheries, but these coincide with European (especially southern)
production, thus making the liberalization agenda very difficult to implement. Tomatoes,
olive oil, almonds, oranges, mandarins, lemons, grapes, melons, strawberries, potatoes,
flowers, rice and wine are considered sensitive products by the European Commission;
this results in higher tariffs and entry prices for the majority of fresh fruit and vegetables
(Donini 2008, pp. 8-10). These are both the main agricultural export commodity of the SMC
51
(a quarter of the total agricultural exports, of which half are destined for the EU) and the
most protected products by the EU. Agriculture is vital for Egypt; it represents 20% of the
GDP and accounts for the same proportion of employment.
The EU has a complex system of seasonal preferences as several EU members
compete with Egypt on the same agricultural products. Consequently, European farmers
lobby groups spend considerable resources in order to prevent agricultural trade
liberalization. Moreover, sanitary standards further restrict Egypts agricultural exports
(Bolle 2007, pp.16). EUs reluctance to include all agricultural products in the AA
hampered the establishment of a full north-south FTA. According to Montanari (2007, pp.
1015-1017), this emphasizes the internal asymmetry of the EU-North Africa partnership,
given that the EU enjoys stronger bargaining power and consequently shaped the AA. At
national level, fearing increased competition; agricultural producers in southern Europe
oppose liberalization in the AA, while industrial producers support liberalization of
agriculture, as compensation for the opening of industrial markets. Andersen (2011, pp.
16-17) further argues that in a second stage, domestic interests are bargained at EU level,
which leads to trade agreements on agriculture not being formally signed, in spite of
European Commissions exclusive competence on external trade. Consequently, in the
field of agriculture, AA include not more than the lowest common denominator.
The criticism of the Egyptians is especially focused on the inconsistency of the AA,
which does not provide for a balance between the liberalization of the industrial trade and
that of the agricultural trade. According to their claims (Attina 2004, pp. 149-150), it is a
violation of the principle of free trade, which provides that each party is entitled to benefit
from the sectors in which it has a relative advantage. The problems caused by EUs
protectionist attitudes with regard to agriculture were only partially mitigated through gas
and oil exports. Attina (2003, pg. 6) argues that the fact that the EU practically keeps
agriculture out of the partnership is the best proof that the Europeans want to play the
privileged position in this asymmetrical partnership. While declaring its commitment for
establishing a full FTA, the EU uses the arms of protectionism and denies Egypt the right to
compensate through agricultural exports the loss caused by the gradual elimination of tariffs
on the import of European industrial products. Ultimately, the European preference system
comes in opposition to the principle that trade in agricultural products will be progressively
liberalized through reciprocal preferential access among the parties.

2. Destabilizing effects of the FTA

The EU-Egypt AA and the FTA have overall negative effects for Egypt. First,
European protectionism goes against its rhetoric and damages its credibility as norm
promoter. Unless the EU starts promoting a partnership based on equal grounds, it cannot
emerge as a legitimate promoter of democracy in Egypt. Secondly, the FTA affects
negatively the Egyptian economy. Due to tariff dismantling, Egypt loses revenue; hence,
employment both public and private - decreases and competitive pressures lead to a
decrease in income as well. Ultimately, the general effect on the level of growth is
negative. As long as the EU does not meet the Egyptians central economic demands - free
trade on all agricultural goods and incentives for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) -
neither supports economic growth in Egypt, it will continue to lack effectiveness in
promoting norms. The credibility of the EU as norm promoter in relation to Egypt
depends on the former positively affecting the quality of life of the population of the latter.
Employment. The first things that the dismantling of tariffs will affect are wages
and employment. An increase in industrial imported products that substitute locally
52
manufactured goods leads to job destruction. At least in a first stage (which could be very
lengthy), the impact of the EU-Egypt FTA on employment in the less industrialized country
is negative. That includes the public sector also, as the Egyptian state, losing revenue and
already in crisis and going through a rough transition, will have to reduce its workforce.
Martin et al. (2004, pp. 428-429) argue that all potential benefits from preferential
access to European markets were already achieved during the 1970s and 1980s. Through
this new FTA, Europeans do not offer any other opportunities for Egypt in exchange for
opening their markets to European companies. For this reason, labour adjustment will
have to be absorbed either by the public sector or by the informal economy (where wages
are usually lower; often even lower than the legal minimum). It is safe to say that
following economic reform, unemployment rates will rise. Taking the examples of
Morocco and Tunisia, Martin et al show that the higher the unemployment rates a
country is already suffering, and the higher its trade protection against imported products,
the more it will suffer due to tariff dismantling.
Additionally, the labour displacement caused by the FTA takes place in a very
difficult labour environment, as Middle East and North African countries, Egypt included,
already experience some of the highest unemployment rates of any region of the world.
Given that the FTA is not truly reciprocal, not only trade does liberalization fail to
improve the social conditions, but it also damages Egypts economy, affecting wages,
employment levels and employment conditions. (Martin et al. 2004, pg. 430)
Income. One of the effects that competitive pressures have on Egyptian companies
is that local firms need to reduce costs, in order to be able to lower their prices. That leads,
among others, to replacement of permanent workers with temporary ones, who enjoy
fewer benefits. The process through which the FTA affects the income level of the SMC is
the following: the deterioration of the balance of payments will force devaluations, which
will generate inflationary pressures, probably followed by tight monetary policies imposed
by the authorities. This will have a negative effect on real income.
The FTA should equalize prices across countries, bringing a convergence in
wages levels and consequently an increase in average wages in the less developed
countries. However, that is not the case with Egypt. The Egyptian salaried workers are, in
many respects, a privileged group, given the context of high unemployment rates.
Suppressing protectionism may induce a fall in their wages: empirical studies in Tunisia
and Morocco (Martin et al. 2004, pg. 431) show that the impact of trade liberalization was
not absorbed through a decrease of employment rates, but rather by a fall in real wages. In
addition, the loss of employment and income is multiplied by a loss in tax revenue for the
state, as workers lose their jobs and head towards the informal economy.
Prices (of consumer goods). Following tariff dismantling, the FTA is supposed to
reduce prices of imported goods south of the Mediterranean. But there are three reasons to
believe that in the case of Egypt, the FTA will not have the expected effect (Martin et al.
2004, pp. 431-432). First, the poor will hardly benefit from price reductions, because the
middle and upper classes consume legally imported products, while the lower classes
consumption is based on smuggled goods, which are not subject to tariffs anyway.
Second, the deterioration of the current account balance leads to a devaluation of the
Egyptian currency against the euro. Third, there is the possibility that European companies
will choose to increase their export prices instead of expanding their sales.
Public expenditure. First, dismantling tariffs led to a loss in state revenues, as the
average volume of foreign trade taxes dropped. Second, there is a need for public
expenditure in order to provide subsidies to support the costs associated with the private
53
sector restructuring. Additionally, public expenditure might also be needed for the
improvement of both the quality of the labour force (training and education) and the
infrastructure to support the competitiveness of the private sector. Furthermore, given that
since the beginning of the global economic crisis in the international context there are strong
disincentives for running big public deficits, the Egyptian government will be tempted to
raise taxes. As the quickest way for the SMC governments would be to increase indirect
taxes on consumption, leading to a reduction of the disposable income, this will have a
negative impact on income distribution and will especially affect the poor (Martin et al.
2004, pg. 432). However, one must admit that the international economic context did not
prevent many European countries from continuing to run high public deficits.
The informal economy. At least in the short term, the unemployed will turn to the
informal economy as a survival strategy, in order to have a (however small) source of
income. The FTA requires the reduction of the scope of the informal economy, in order to
ensure a fair competition for all actors involved. However, the implementation of the AA
is likely to lead to the widening of the informal economy, which will receive a great
proportion of labour force. On the other hand, it is also true that the liberalization of trade
reduces the difference between national and foreign prices and that will be an incentive for
illegal trade flows to surface (Martin et al. 2004, pg. 434).
Growth. Ultimately, employment, income and state expenditure depend on the level
of growth of the economy. Martin et al. (2004, pp. 435-436) point out that the two main
reasons for the SMC to enter an economic and financial partnership with the EU were first, to
extend liberalization of trade to all agricultural goods and second, to open new opportunities
for FDI. But the impact was overestimated, due to lack of South-South integration, negative
perceptions on security in the area and non-inclusion of agricultural products in the FTA. As
the SMC base their economies mainly on three pillars - oil, migrant remittances and
agriculture (to which, in a few cases, tourism can be added) -, what is excluded from the AA is
exactly the drivers of economic growth south of the Mediterranean. Due to the non-reciprocal
character of the economic agreement between the EU and Egypt, the positive impact of the
liberalization of trade on growth will be weak, at best.

Conclusion
The EU has the potential to become an effective democracy promoter in relation to
Egypt. But in order to do so, the European promotion of norms in Egypt needs to overcome
a series of obstacles, among which four major ones stand out. The dilemma between
democracy and stability is still relevant, as the transition towards democracy in Egypt is only
at the beginning. Additionally, if it wants to play a major normative role, the EU needs to
have a single voice in relation with Egypt, and for that, the EU has to solve its internal
problems and overcome divergences on key issues. Furthermore, a fundamental challenge
stands in the way of legitimate European democracy promotion in Egypt: the systemic
difference between the two models of political rule is enhanced, due to the lack of
adaptation of European efforts to the empirical reality of Egypt. EU needs to adjust its norm
promotion strategy according to the local political tradition of the norm recipient.
Last but not least, the EU-Egypt economic partnership favours only the European
part; as long as the EU does not make concessions on agriculture and keeps ignoring the
negative effects of the FTA, it cannot assert itself as a credible, legitimate and efficient
norm promoter. The crucial challenge is to identify these obstacles and see them as
lessons to be learned.

54
 Giving the saliency it holds for Egypt, the most pressing issue is related to the
agricultural sector. The AA does not include liberalization of trade with agricultural goods
considered sensitive products by the Europeans. That is crucial for Egypt, as it has a
large agricultural sector and enjoys a comparative advantage. Despite the fact that Egypt
has decisively moved towards liberalization and considerably reduced tariffs, it was in
return not granted full access to the European agricultural market. The exclusion of the
agricultural sector contributed to widening the welfare gap between North and South
(Brussels Focus 2008, pg. 2). Hence, the non-reciprocal character of the economic
agreement largely leads to the relative failure of what was supposed (and enthusiastically
hoped for in Egypt) to be the most powerful measure of the process.
The implementation of the FTA has destabilizing effects on employment and
wages level, income, prices, public expenditure and ultimately, economic growth. State
revenue will be reduced by the amount that Egypt currently receives for imported
European goods, while, given the reduction of import prices brought about by tariff
dismantling, the current account balance of Egypt (which already runs a high deficit with
its trade balance with the EU) will be affected. In addition, the employment level will
drop, as local companies will be unable to successfully compete with European imported
products at tariff-free prices.
Joffe (2004, pp. 9-11) pointed out three main aspects that should dominate the
agenda for improvement that are as valid now as they were before the Arab Spring. First,
European efforts to become legitimate in promoting democracy need to receive an
increased visibility on both shores of the Mediterranean. Second, the perception of
European domination of the partnership has to be corrected, as Egyptians need to feel a
sense of ownership of the process. Third, the creation of the FTA has to include the SMC
as direct part to management, along with their European counterparts. Furthermore, FDI is
one of the keystones for the FTA to succeed: attracting a steady flow of foreign
(European) investments is a major challenge for the economic transition. It is also one
way for the EU to improve its image south of the Mediterranean.
Revitalizing EUs efforts south of the Mediterranean requires more than just
continuing past approaches. The Mediterranean policy of the EU, including the democracy
promotion agenda, needs both a revised strategic focus and a new set of priorities. EU
decision makers need to responsibly reflect on the role envisaged for the EU as a norm
promoter and address the highlighted challenges. They have to identify solutions which
are acceptable all across the spectrum of member states national interests and equally
beneficial to both the EU and the SMC. The recent regime change in Egypt provides a
great opportunity for the EU to launch a new and improved strategy of norm promotion.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbasi, N. (2005). Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, The Institute of Strategic Studies,

Islamabad, http://www.issi.org.pk/old-site/ss_Detail.php?dataId=335 [25.05.2012].
Andersen, J. (2011). The future prospect of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An
Assessment of the EUs most Recent Proposal for Adapting its Approach towards
the North African Region, Euromed.
Attina, F. (2003). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal
Views. European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 181-200.

55
Attina, F. (2004). The Barcelona Process, the Role of the European Union and the Lesson of
the Western Mediterranean. The Journal of African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 140-152.
Bauer, P. (2011a). Egypt after the Revolution of 2011 still a Matter of Democracy versus
Stability? Cairo University.
Bauer, P. (2011b). European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt: Implementation as an
obstacle run. Cairo University.
Behr, T. (2008). Enduring Differences? France, Germany and Europes Middle East
Dilemma. European Integration, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 7996.
Bicchi, F. (2009). Democracy assistance in the Mediterranean: An overview.
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 6178.
Bicchi, F. (2006). Our size fits all: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean.
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 286-303.
Bolle, M (coord.). (2007). The Political Economy of Governance in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. GoEuroMed.
Bouris, D. (2011). The limits of normative power Europe: Evaluating the third pillar of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 80-106.
Cavatorta, F; Pace, M. (2010). The post-normative turn in European Union - Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) relations: An introduction. European Foreign Affairs
Review, Vol. 15, pp. 581587.
Donini, V M. (2008). Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Collapse of a Model.
Guirguis, D. (2009). Egypts NGO Law imperils Civil Society Funding. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/
2009/02/03/egypt-s-ngo-bill-imperils-civil-society-funding/2hm [20.07.2012]
Joffe, G. (2004). The status of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Instituto de Estudos
Estrategicos e Internacionais, Lisbon.
Johansson-Nogus, E. (2007).The EU and its neighbourhood: An overview, in Weber,
K; Smith, M E; Baun, M (eds.). (2007). Governing Europe's Neighbourhood:
Partners or Periphery? Manchester University Press, pp. 2138.
Kumrulu, G. (2008). Can the EU become a normative power in the South? The Egyptian
case. Perceptions.
Longhurst, K; Miskimmon, A. Same Challenges, Diverging Responses. (2007). Germany,
the UK and European Security. German Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 7994.
Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms. Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-58.
Martin, I. (2003). The Euro-Mediterranean partnership and Inward FDI in Maghreb
Countries. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
Martin, I; Byrne, I; Schade Poulsen, M. (2004). Economic and Social Rights in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership: The Missing Link?. Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 9,
No. 3, pp. 307-318.
Montanari, M. (2007). The Barcelona Process and the Political Economy of the Euro-
Mediterranean Trade Integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45,
No. 5, pp. 1011-1040.
Newman, E; Paris, R; Richmond, O P. (2009). New perspectives on liberal
peacebuilding. United Nations University Press, Hong Kong.
Pace, M. (2012). Egypt, in Peters, J (ed.). (2012). The EU and the Arab Spring.
Promoting democracy and human rights in the Middle East, Lexington Books.
Touval, Y. A. (2011). Spring of Discontent: European Politics in the Face of the Arab
Upheaval. Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2.
56
 Situating Old and New Minorities within the European
Integration Policy: Opportunities and Challenges

Raluca RDESCU

Abstract: Minority groups, be they national, ethnic or religious, provide an invaluable

contribution to the diversity of societies, yet still too often their existence is not valued as such and
they remain a largely invisible and often vulnerable population.
In the post-1989 era, Europe and its minority presence have faced many challenges: the
'balkanisation' of societies, border changes, migration, more recently economic and political
instability, the economic crisis and the rise of extreme right movements. All these accompanied by
shrinking institutional state-care have made minorities even more vulnerable so steadily the
demand for the recognition of the national/ ethnic minority population increased. Twenty years
after the adoption of important legal documents for the protection of minority rights1, minority
groups are still in the process of being recognized and non-discriminated on the European
continent. This growing demand for minority recognition is often characterized by high levels of
politicization, both in respect to recognizing minorities and also to bringing them at a non-
discrimination/'equal' level with the majority of the society.
With the recent adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the issue of minority rights has received
renewed attention both from academia and from policy-makers. In light of this renewed interest, the
paper addresses the developments in the field of minority rights protection, 1990's onward going
through the improvements brought by the Council of Europe, the position of the High
Commissioner for National Minorities of the OSCE and up to the ratification of the Treaty of
Lisbon only to establish the overall progress made.

Keywords: European affairs, national minorities, citizenship, minority recognition,

migration

Introduction
The presence of different minorities and of international immigrants on the
European continent makes most European states multicultural societies. Inspired either by
the American melting-pot assimilation model or the Canadian multicultural
accommodation, some European countries are striving to find the best institutional
arrangements for the integration of their old and new minorities. The paper will present
how minority protection is dealt with at a supranational level, in the European Union,
within the European Integration Policy and other relevant EU initiatives. The point I am

PhD Student at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies,

radescuraluc@yahoo.com.
1
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (1995), the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages (1992), the Recommendations on Language, Education and on
Political Representation offered by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE)
(1999-2008) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992).
57
trying to make is that even if there is not a clear policy to deal with minorities, and every
member state has its own internal agenda for them, there are European policies which
trigger a better integration for EU minorities.

How to define minorities?

The article treats minorities, under two of their components. As stable national
minorities on the territory of different states, but also as a potential moving force, as
groups resulted from migration to the EU states.
Depending on their formation, minorities can be of two kinds: national ones, which
have durable ties to the territory and that is why they are also considered old minorities, and
new minorities resulted from immigration. For Will Kymlicka (Kymlicka 1995, pg. 72), the
Canadian multicultural philosopher, the difference between national and immigrant
minorities lies in the fact that while the latter chose to move to the host state, national
minorities have been residing on the territory before the formation of the new state and
resulted in the process of border transformation, request for exile or abandoned territories.
One of the milestones in recognizing minorities is the lack of a formally accepted
definition of minorities. However, as homogeneity in a state is the exemption and diversity
is the rule, most minorities are self-evident. I know a minority when I see one1, declared
Max Van Der Stoel, the first OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities. In the
international law system the most frequently used definition belongs to Francesco
Caportorti and defines a minority as a group, numerically inferior to the rest of the
population of a State, in a non-dominant position, traditions, religion or language, whose
members - being nationals of the State - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only
implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture.2
However, most countries reserve the right to use their own definition of minorities
or to choose not to define them at all, making it harder for a regional or universal
protection of minorities to be set in place. The internationally accepted definition of
Capotorti provides us with objective elements of categorization for minorities, such as:
self-identification, the number of members and the long-term ties with the territory
concerned3. The subjective element of categorization refers to the expressed will of the
group to preserve its own particular identity.
The new debate over minority rights has attracted increased attention also because
of the recent migration movements. Some theoreticians argue that it is valid to consider
immigrant groups as minorities, as there seems to be an emerging consensus that such new
minorities should be considered to be minorities for the purposes of minority protection.4
The discussion on minority rights refers only to that category of people who
already posses the citizenship of the country they live in. Broadly analyzing, Diner (1998)

1
Speech at the Dimension Seminar on Case Studies on National Minority Issues: Positive
Results, Warsaw, 24th May 1993. For text of speech, see: http://www.osce.org/
hcnm/speeches/1993/24may93.html, consulted February 21st 2012.
2
Capotorti Francesco, a Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1-7 (1977), consulted on
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/Library/books.nsf/b4f3ead53f86ae0841256c92005e897c/cb76eccce6b4
bb7bc12566400038aa33?OpenDocument on February 23rd 2012.
3
The long-term criteria in defining minorities excludes the minorities formed as a result of
immigration.
4
Kristen Henrard, pg. 13.
58
defines two rationales for obtaining citizenship: ius sanguinis and ius soli. The first one
refers to those people who were born on the territory of the country and have blood
relations to relatives living there, while the second can be obtained just by living in the
country. Of course, each European country has its own criteria for settling claims of
belonging to the state.
Citizenship, in its broader understanding, means one's belonging-ness or
membership to a political community1. Many have done an inquiry into the different ways
of constructing the idea of citizenship, using different criteria such as: its legitimacy, its
rights, duties and compliance. However, for the sake of this research, the whole debate
about the types of citizenship, what they stand for and how they shape the social/ political
context individuals live in is important only from the point of view that it renders visible
the institutional background of the reality under study (Heater 1999). More precisely,
depending on the type of citizenship model a country applies, there can be evident
predictions of what the individual trajectories are possible for acquiring or not social and
cultural rights.
Most of the research conducted on the issue of citizenship is based on the work of
T.H. Marshall. His theory is based on the three dimensions of citizenship: civil, political
and social. It is based on the development of citizenship rights he observed through the
centuries: the 18th century was marked by the acknowledgment of civil rights (rights to
property, formal legal protection, etc.) for individuals; the 19th century brought forward
political rights such as the right to vote or to be elected, while the 20th century was the
beginning of the social rights era (the right to healthcare and education, a decent wage, a
house, well-being). As T.H. Marshall puts it in one of his major works, Citizenship and
the Social Class (T.H. Marshall 1992) to talk about citizenship means to deal with the
state legitimacy and its social, civic and political responsibilities towards its constituency.
His understanding of the evolution of rights provided by citizenship is parallel, in my
opinion, to the development of the human rights movement. His view is that people earned
more rights progressively, starting with the civil rights, going to political rights in the
nineteenth century and more recently being granted social rights. His predictions expected
that with the rise of social rights the economic gap between the lower and upper class will
decrease leaving room for more middle class citizens, therefore to more equality. His ideas
have been questions by many philosophers and social policy practitioners, especially in
the American liberal context, as T.H. Marshall's ideas pledge for a welfare state based on
access to free education and medical care services which contravene the traditional US
liberal minimal state model.
Today, the concept of citizenship is a bit obsolete. Bellamy and Castiglione (2000)
dealt with the problem of the big democratic deficit in the European Union. Starting in
1993, the EU member states through their representatives at EU level pushed for the
implementation of a political agenda regarding the European citizenship. What is the
European citizenship and is it possible to speak of a supranational citizenship without
referring to the national one? The discussion on this topic is now more alive than ever
because the last EU enlargement phase in 2007 impacted the old EU member states
through the process of migration. Meaning that with their national passports from
Romania and Bulgaria, many EU citizens of these two nationalities migrated to EU
countries for better conditions of life. This fact puts the EU Cohesion Policy high up on
the EU Agenda for the next few years, as the situation in some EU countries is far worse

1
Stewart Angus, Two Conceptions of Citizenship, British Journal of Sociology 46, no. 1, pp. 63-78.
59
than expected and some EU citizens see migration as a possible solution for better life
conditions. As MEP David Campbell puts it, Immigration [] it is about space, not race.
We simply do not have room.1. The EU Cohesion Policy is seen by the EU driven forces
as a way aims to contribute to promoting economic prosperity and social cohesion
throughout the European Union. It relies mostly on the European Social Fund, an
economic instrument of the European Union created back in the 1957 to overcome
economic disparities between European regions. Up until 2013, the ECP will function on
the EU Structural Funds, and from 2014 to 2020 there is a proposition to change the
funding system but no agreement has been reached so far. For minority groups throughout
Europe this policy can mean a way to attract funds and invest in their own identity/
culture/ development.
The philosophy of minority rights for groups is interpreted by the EU policy
makers in two ways: either as positive action or as non-discrimination clauses. According
to Kristen Henrard (Henrard 2007, pg. 46), the difference between these two positions
resides in the reasoning behind minority rights action. The positive action measures are
legitimated by the formal vs. substantive equality discourse. While formal equality
doctrine treats everybody in the same way, substantive equality acknowledges the
differences and the setbacks some people face in society and helps them to overcome them
through positive discrimination/ differential treatment. One doctrine relies on
republic/democratic citizenship, while the second one pushes for liberal citizenship. This
second philosophical point of view of minority rights and non-discrimination rights is
closely linked to the liberal model of rule of law, which treats all citizens in the same way.
According to this position non-discrimination clauses are enough to ensure a fair and
adequate treatment of citizens in society.

Why special rights for minorities? The inclusion of positive action in policy-
making
Many argue2 that there is no need to offer special protection rights to minorities as
they ultimately have the same rights as the rest of the citizens, as individuals and not as a
collectivity. Making the distinction between the majority and the minority by awarding
minorities, even temporarily, special rights to help them overcome an inferior position in
society can have negative effects on: the meritocratic system in society, on the formal and
substantive equality between citizens, and last but not least it can mean more social
exclusion and marginalization of minority groups as they continue to be treated differently
compared to the majority.
My argument in favor of implementing positive action for minority groups relies
on a reinterpretation of the theories on development. The European Project started as an
economic one and in the last twenty years it has grown to become a political and social
one as well. The European construction is based on values and institutional democratic
arrangements which make its legitimacy grow and that is possible only by offering
citizens more tools to participate in EU governance. The changes taken place under the
Lisbon Treaty and the implementation of the European Charter of Human Rights make
these democratic processes more possible and more real.

1
David Campbell Bannerman MEP slamming EU Cohesion Policy, Retrieved 10th February 2010,
from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7noD-ODgG8M.
2
The most prominent liberal philosopher is Brian Barry. His book, Culture and Equality is a
reconsideration of the multicultural theories from the egalitarian perspective.
60
 Minority rights as non-discrimination rights
The idea according to which group rights for minorities are necessary to guarantee
a number of rights, such as the ones threatened by the possibility of acculturation and
disappearance: minimal protection of groups allows for special rights to identity, culture,
language, education and political participation. From the point of view of the some states,
enforcing these rights can represent a threat or an unwanted social cost. Firstly,
international migration or the recognition of minorities on the territory of national-states is
very often regarded as a threat to the secularization and sovereignty of the European
nation state. In his theory on multicultural citizenship, Kymlicka explains how minority
groups can go as far as demanding self-governance rights, meaning autonomy over
finances at local level and sometimes even self determination. So a contradiction can arise
from the existence of nation state and rising demands for limited independence. Secondly,
cultural and social rights like the ones to have education in the mother-tongue, the right to
preserve and promote the minority identity, are part of the positive rights1 a state must
invest money in, in order to be fulfilled.

The European Dimension

Policies to address the issue of minority integration models have to be understood
in a European context, in accordance to European history, values and aspirations.

Secularization
After the formation of the nations with the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, an
important step in the creation of the modern state was the separation of the religious
power from the state affairs. To this day, in most EU countries, religion and state have
been completely separated and religion appears to exist in a privatized way in the lives of
the individuals, but ceased to be a matter of state affairs (Berger 1974). This separation is
relevant due to the debates over the affair of the foulard and the presence of Muslim
minorities in EU states which interdict the use of the Muslim scarf in public institutions of
education. Most EU countries justify their position using the argument of state neutrality.

Liberal rule of law

The European project, since the raise of the European Coal and Steel Community in
1951, has been primarily an economic project. Its ideological construction was highly
influenced by the liberal principles of the right to property and the autonomy of the
individual. The classical liberal theories of John Locke defined the social contract as a way
in which society could guarantee the protection of the individuals natural rights to
autonomy, security and private property. The European construction follows this line of
thought, establishing the current conditions: the separation of powers in the state, separation
of church and state, equal rights and access to justice for all citizens. Neutrality is achieved
through the impartial rule of law. Liberty allows for the freedom of the citizens to act upon
as long as one's freedom does not intervene with somebody elses freedom and threatens it.

1
In the evolution of human rights theory, a distinction was made between different types of rights.
The criterion used to differentiate between positive and negative rights consists of the obligation
of the state to honor them. The negative rights, like the civil and political rights, do not need state
intervention in order for them to be protected and fulfilled, while the positive rights need to be
facilitated through state intervention in order to be delivered. Such examples are the rights to
education, health, a decent wage, etc.
61
 These two aspects called 'the European dimension' are relevant for the minority
issues because they impose the EU approach in terms of granting religious freedom and
other social 'welfare' policies for minorities. Secondly, as I will examine in the next part of
the article, the European model of citizenship has shifted from the assistance-model, like
the welfare state of the 60s' and even the 80's, to a more liberal model, privatizing social
assistance and allowing the individuals to care more about themselves than they used to.
This model puts more responsibility on minority group members to find solutions on their
own, as they can rely much less on state-care.
Regardless of how minorities are formed, through the process of immigration or
as the result of historical events, the old or new groups undergo processes of assimilation/
accommodation/ acculturation and integration. These processes represent a great challenge
for the minority groups at different levels: collectively, in terms of group rights, and
individually, as persons belonging to the group; the member states are also challenged
internally by the need to create policies of accommodation or integration. These
observations make room for the following questions to arise: is the nation-state still a
viable concept for the modern times we live in today? Which is the proper way to treat
diversity and according to which criteria? Did the concept of 'citizenship' change and does
it leave room for new-comers?
In respects to minority issues, the theme of integration is important because it
dictates the way the majority and the minority interact and also to place the minority
occupies in society. To Berry 1 , there are three models of such interaction. Segregation
represents the model in which a minority group is separated from the rest of the society in
one or more ways. In most cases, such a model allows the group to maintain and strengthen
its identity. It can take the form of separation or marginalization. Assimilation represents the
second possible model and implies that the minority group has to adopt certain elements of
the majority culture. The result of this policy model ends up in the dissipation of the
minority culture and its absorption into the majority culture. Integration is the last possible
model and it refers to a mix of the first two. Integration implies leaving aside some aspects
of the traditional culture while embracing the ones of the majority culture. Its advantages are
that it does not exclude any possibility of being and it accommodates diversity and pluralism
as they are, without interventions and corrective measures.
In respects to minority issues, this theme of integration versus accommodation is
important because it dictates the way the majority and the minority interact and also
whether the minority group will be provided with tools for a better representation and
position in society.
At the international level most European countries have implemented policies for
the integration and assimilation of their minorities; at domestic levels most of them
adopted legislative measure to protect their minorities against discrimination. All national
and regional policies of integration of EU member states have to be in accordance with the
broader context of the European integration policy. In this context, there is no clear cut
regarding who has the biggest responsibility in the integration process, whether it falls
primarily in the hands of the authorities (assistance model) or it lies primarily within the
individuals of the group to take the necessary steps (self-empowering, liberal model).

An overview of the Minority Rights Protection

Minorities are not a recent invention of the 20th century but rather a constant

1
Berry, pg. 10.
62
presence in history. In one of his articles (Castellino 2010 pg. 227), Joshua Castellino
explores the evolution of minority rights documents and argues that minorities were best
represented before the modern invention of international human rights system. According
to him, there are three stages in minority rights protection: post-Westphalia and pre-
League of Nations period, the regime during the existence of the League of Nations, and
thirdly under the UN mandate.
(1) The first recollections of minority rights protection, he points out, date back to
the 17th century in post-Westphalia Treaty era. Back, then two types of documents were
used, unilateral and multilateral treaties, for the minority protection of certain groups
residing on the territory of another state. The unilateral ones were signed between a host
state and an entity residing on its territory. It is the case of Maronites living in France. The
second case implies multiple ratification, as in the case of Christians in Ottoman
conquered Austria. The groups were identified in terms of language or religious affiliation
as different from the rest of the society, or from the ruins of a former great power. The
treaties were made up to offer these groups protection in terms of keeping their faith or
guarantee equal rights as the majority in cases of shifting sovereignty. Such documents
existed and their importance cannot be contested.
In Synergies in Minority Protection (Henrard and Dunbar 2012, pg. 1), the
authors see this phase of development in the field of minority rights as limited to non-
discrimination clauses, right to freedom of religion, and language rights in private life.
(2) The end of World War I and the difficulties to reach peace agreements led to
the creation of the League of Nations. The organization aimed to maintain long lasting
peace ties and enhance cooperation between states so that future armed conflict to be
prevented and so avoided. With it, a new era started for minority rights. As a result of the
war many borders changed, so territories and populations changed their belongingness to
state entities. That is why there was a higher need to protect them in the new
configuration. The papers of the treaty state clearly that members of minority groups have
the same treatment as the nationals. The discussion does not define clearly what minorities
are, nor is there any hint about the right to autonomy of self-determination, but still the
document was progressive for its time.
(3) The foundation of the United Nations was a response to the horrors of
genocide and war crimes of the Second World War. Although its creation came from the
need to avoid other possible genocide threats, the minority protection included under the
UN umbrella was very weak. It took decades and powerful efforts to place Minority
Protection in the UN Advocacy Agenda and the breakthrough came after the collapse of
the Iron Curtain and the outbreak of the Balkan conflicts.
(4) At regional level, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation (OSCE) and more recently the EU act as supervisors and promoters of
minority protection in state matters.

The European Dimension of Integration and the role of international

institutions in minority protection
As mentioned previously, minorities in Europe present renewal interest due to
many factors, but most importantly due to migration. Next, by making an overview of the
main European tools for the recognition and protection of minority groups, I try to prove
that formal efforts have been done to deal with the minority issue.
The formulation and implementation of minority rights in international law has
been the result of small but secure steps. The first mile stone was the creation of the
63
Council of Europe (CoE) and the 1950 ratification of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). The CoE is separate from the EU. There is a pre-condition of membership
in the EU for all member states to be members of the CoE and ratify the ECHR. The
Convention does not refer explicitly to minority rights, except for Article 14 on the right
to freedom against discrimination, which deals with non-discrimination of national
minorities. In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Strasbourg
based Court which judges cases of acclaimed violations of the Convention for all member
states, there have been a few complaints dealing with issues of discrimination against
national minorities. It was not until the fall of the Iron Curtain and the inter-ethnic wars in
the Balkans that the CoE initiated the elaboration of the Framework Convention on the
Protection of National Minorities, in 1993, and in 1995 opened it to ratification. Some
countries took a long time to ratify it and some still did not do it of fear that minority
claims can appear.
Meanwhile OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, did a
lot in standard setting for minority rights, through the following initiatives: the
Copenhagen Document 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990, the Geneva
Report on National Minorities 1990, the Moscow Document 1991, the Helsinki Document
1992 and the Budapest Document in 1994.
The institution of the High Commissioner on National Minorities created by the
OSCE in 1992 fostered many improvements in the field of human rights and minority
protection. It was intended to offer conflict prevention strategies, early warnings and early
action in uprisings of violence and threats. The Commissioner chooses the issues to be
investigated. He works independently from the OSCE interests and he does not need a
mandate from the Council to start his activity. If he decides to conduct country visits, he
needs an approval from the state in question to conduct his activity. Although his findings,
delivered under the name of 'recommendations', are not legally binding documents,
without any politically binding force, they make states the subject of international public
scrutiny and therefore they have powerful impact on the states in question.
Under the name of 'recommendations', the HCNM presented his extensive work in
international standard setting, standards to which states should aim for, a better minority
rights accommodation. These recommendations are:
The Hague Recommendations Regarding the Education Rights of National
Minorities 1996;
The Oslo Recommendations Regarding Linguistic Rights 1998;
The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National
Minorities in Public Life 1999;
The Bolzano Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations
2008.
The best known document in the field of policing multi-ethnic societies is the
Rotterdam Charter, which was adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in 2003,
and which offers an overview of the current debate over the issue of defining minorities.
Secondly, it touches upon the distinction between national minorities (referred to as
traditional or historical) and new minorities (migrant workers and immigrant
communities). The Rotterdam Charter urges people to analyze also new minorities, but the
HCNM decided to appoint other 'Personal Representatives' to fulfill the task of
investigating the outcomes of combating anti-Semitism or Muslim situation in the EU, as
he declared it is not in his competence to deal with new minorities. For this he was
strongly criticized by the entire community.
64
 Before the EU, CoE, and OSCE, the member states played the major
responsibility in the field of minority rights protection. In the recent years, the EU took on
a more active role and a new approach.
Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union makes references to minorities.
However, in 2004 when the Constitutional Treaty was just signed, it failed to be ratified by
the member states, so it was renegotiated under the Reform Treaty of Lisbon. The new
article II-81 of the Constitutional Treaty prohibits discrimination on different grounds,
except on grounds of belonging to a national minority or language. The article 21
explicitly prohibits discrimination of people belonging to a national minority. At EU level
there is no monitoring body for evaluating the situation of minorities in the member states.
Although Council of Europe has played a more active role in this field, the EU started to
take more steps towards achieving greater influence and gain more expertise. Therefore an
EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights has been created to act as a
human rights monitoring mechanism on issues regarding minority rights.

EUs main contributions to the integration of minorities are:

1. The rights of EU citizens and third country nationals: EU citizens can form
minorities in their states of residence. This is the case of Portuguese people in
Luxembourg. Their legal status as European citizens give them the same rights
as the nationals have. More specifically, one can ask for language rights, entry
and residence permits and rights to vote in elections or reside with their family
where they want.
2. The Race and Ethnic Discrimination Act 2000/43/EC or the Race Directive as
it more frequently called, acknowledges the right to not be discriminated
against on basis of ethnic origin but it does not say anything about nationality.
It proved useful in issues regarding education, housing, social protection.
3. In terms of using minority or regional languages in education and cultural
manifestations, the EU protects these rights indirectly in articles 149 and 151
of the Treaty and also through the creation of the European Agency for
Linguistic Diversity and the Framework Strategy for Multilingualism.
Programs such as Culture 2000 and Socrates also promoted the cultural
inclusion.
4. Through foreign affairs: between 1991 and 1993, the EU followed the CoE and
OSCE Frameworks for minority protection. Their requirements became
preconditions for EU accession through the Copenhagen document of 1993
and from then on the EU used the structures and expertise of CoE and OSCE
for the minority protection.
5. The Lisbon Treaty is an innovative and more powerful instrument for human
rights protection of EU citizens in general, and especially in particular for
minorities. Starting with the entry into force of the Treaty, the European Union
Charter of Fundamental Rights becomes legally binding directly and can be
used in all European Courts, settling standards and so on.
However, the European institutions, in front with the European Commission, are
quite reluctant to accept the responsibilities of the European Union in the field of human
rights, especially in the delicate field of minority protection. However, after the Lisbon
Treaty, the European citizens have a legally binding treaty which is the European Charter
of Fundamental Rights. The European Union is responsible for human rights violations
only in the field of EU law, meaning in the sector of EU directives and regulations. In
65
regards to other aspects, the principle of subsidiarity on which the EU is made up dictates
that it is up to the member states how to deal with their human rights system. However,
the situation is changing and there are two reasons for it. First of all, in the 1990's and
with the fall of the Iron Curtain there was a progress in the field of human rights almost
everywhere. In Europe, states started to pay more attention to the idea of human rights and
the new-born states wanted to create for themselves better governance also in the field of
rights and freedom. This progress lasted until 2001 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the
United States of America, which blocked the process and which allowed states to be more
intrusive in the lives of the citizens under the suspicions of terrorist attacks.
For minority issues, the EU Eastern Enlargement started in 2004 with eight
Central and Eastern European Countries plus two Mediterranean states, followed by the
2007 accession of Romania and Bulgaria, brought some positive effects. For example, in
the field of trans-border cooperation, improvements were done to take care of the
minorities living over the border of the country, for example Hungarians living in
Romania. These minorities were resulted due to border changing or as a consequence of
the dissolution of Communist territories so there was.
In practice it meant that when the European Constitution was drafted, some states,
like Hungary, lobbied for the inclusion of minority rights in the document. Even if the
Constitution did not go through, the references were kept and were included in the Lisbon of
Treaty. Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union declares at least that we all have to
respect national minorities. This article 2 does not represent a valid legal basis for any action
in the European Union. It does not mean that the Commission can adopt other documents in
this field. The European Parliament is not legally bound by the treaty so it can express its
opinion on any issue. That is why it can be a powerful actor in promoting pieces of
legislature for the protection of minorities. In 1979 the European Parliament started to have
direct elections so after 1980 there were more people representing minority regions and they
became actively involved in the minority debate. They used the opportunity to be part of the
Parliament to promote minority inclusion. After 2004 it became even more active in their
declarations to respect national minorities. One step forward meant the recreation of the
Inter-group for Traditional National Minorities, Constitutional Regions and Regional
Languages in the European Parliament. The group meets at least one a month to discuss
minority issues in general or in specific member states.
Another important element of the European integration policy is the European Race
Directive, which prohibits discrimination on basis of race and ethnicity. The member states
had to translate this directive in their domestic legislation. Even if the member states did not
do that, the directive still can be used in order to fight against some cases of discrimination
of national minorities. The Act related to Multilingualism can also be used because it offers
protection not only to official national languages but also to regional or minority languages.
So even if the minority languages are not protected as such by the European Union, this Act
can be used to protect against the discrimination of minority languages.
The European Charter comes to complement its predecessor, the European
Convention of Human Rights (CoE) with more rights and a newer understanding of
certain freedoms and liberties. The political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights
make the document be one of the most ambitious human rights declaration ever drafted1.
The Charter builds upon the European Convention on Human Rights, but whereas the

1
Groussot Xavier, Pech Laurent, Fundamental Rights Protection in the EU post Lisbon Treaty,
consulted on http://www.robert-schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-173 10th of January 2012.
66
European Convention is mainly limited to the more classic civil and political rights, the
Charter covers more progressive social rights, such as the right to good administration, the
rights of the disabled, the social rights of workers, the right to a clean environment, the
protection of personal data and bio-ethical rights. Compared to the European Convention
on Human Rights, which actually authorizes the use of capital punishment since it was
drafted 60 years ago, the new EU Charter, not only prohibits capital punishment but even
forbids the extradition or transfer of persons to other countries where this might take
place1. The Charter applies to the EU institutions and to the Member States. As article 6 of
the Lisbon Treaty clearly states, fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, will continue to constitute general principles of EU law. It is yet too soon to tell
what the impact of the Charter on the lives of the actual individuals that can benefit from
it is, but in my opinion the adoption of the Charter is a big step forward for the European
Union because it acknowledges the importance of social rights.
Some classic fundamental rights (ex. freedom of expression) are said to be already
fully justiciable, meaning that they can be acted upon in court, while others need to be
backed up through positive action from public authorities (such as the right to education,
right to engage in work, right to health care etc.), so many states still have to frame their
internal understanding of the rights in the Charter. For the topic under debate, minority
rights, these are the most important rights which should be granted in order for minorities
to access full and equal citizenship. Some argue that the EU Charter is a too progressive
document, which will never actually make a difference in real like as it relies too much on
state intervention for fulfilling certain rights, like in the case of the social and economical
rights. However, the articles about economic, social and cultural rights (ex. the right to
work, the right to housing, and the right to health care) in the Charter should be interpreted
more as guidelines and are to be followed as principles by state authorities. These
principles or landmarks, however, if put in practice, could mean a shift for the situation of
minorities in the EU.
Such a progressive document could not leave behind the area of the minority rights.
The breakthrough lays in the fact that the Lisbon Treaty represents the first piece of legal
document belonging to the European Union to have explicit mentions to minorities. The
Treaty states to respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities (Art. 1.a), that the
EU shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity (Art.2.3) 2 . In addition, the
European Charter prohibits any discrimination on any ground such as () language,
membership of a national minority (Art. 21.1). The Treaty of the European Union (TEU),
in its Art. 2 refers to persons belonging to minorities. The minorities recognized are
national or ethnic or religious or linguistic or any combination of these terms with the
word minorities. One also finds the distinction of old and new minorities where the old
minorities are national minorities or those minorities covered by the international treaties on
minorities and the new minorities are immigrants, asylum seekers and others. Article 21
deals with the issue of non-discrimination. It lists more than ten different grounds upon
which discrimination is prohibited. One is membership to a national minority. This is
another break through for those minorities living in countries which do not recognize

1
Prof. Schabass William on capital punishment, lecture at the Galway Center for Human Rights.
2
Hicks Davyth, The Lisbon Treaty:extending linguistic and national minority rights, consulted
on http://www.ieuskaraz.net/albisteak/1264147058 February 2012.
67
minorities (ex. France). These minorities can claim that their right not to be discriminated
against on basis of their language or religion or, being an ethnic or national minority.
In spite of all the progress made in the sphere of minority rights protection the
practice shows that the minority issues are highly sensitive and of great political
importance and at the level of the European Union it is always subjected to the scrutiny of
the majority. There are some progressive actors in this field, such as the Council of
Europe, some international NGOs and representatives of the European institutions, some
legal scholars but on the other hand there are some very skeptical actors, such as some
member states.
Overall, the Lisbon Treaty, together with the European Charter, represents
additional sources of protection for both the old and new minorities of the European
Union. The Treaty of Lisbon includes three major improvements for the minority rights
regime. Firstly, the persons of minorities are for the first time explicitly mentioned in EU
primary law. Secondly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights receives the status as an
internationally legally binding document. Thirdly, it offers explicit provisions against
discrimination of basis of recognition and belongingness to a minority group. The fact that
the Treaty implies the adhesion of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights is
also a step forward for strengthening the European Regional System of Human Rights
Protection. However, the European Court of Justice cannot be accessed by individuals. It
serves litigation against EU institutions and EU pieces of legislation. One institution/
member state can sue the EU institutions on basis of violations of Fundamental Rights.
That leaves the European Court of Human Rights the first institution to be addressed in
case of minority rights violation.

Conclusion
To sum up, the minority rights protection offers a missing perspective in dealing
with the old minorities and the new comers on the European Continent. Although it does
not promise to solve the problems of minority groups, it offers a set of rights, procedures
and rules through which social disparities can be dealt with. However, in practice states
are still strongly influenced by the ideas of national unity, sovereignty, formal equality of
chances. Minority Rights continue to be held in check by the traditional principles of
international politics state sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and
the like(Preece 1998, pg. 22). Moreover, as Joshua Castellino puts it, the issue of whether
minority rights are a matter of individual or collective remains unsolved until now, which
represents a big problem for the minority rights system.
To conclude, in the EU protection comes in many forms and it is channeled by
different institutions. It can be the responsibility of the state, through pieces of primary
law and secondary case law, European case-law or European through secondary law and
through founding policies, for example in education and culture.
Since the Lisbon Treaty the integration of national minorities became a European
desideratum. As proven by the developments in the field, the protection of national
minorities and immigrant groups 1 is possible through diverse international legally
bounding documents and national legislation. The rights of minorities to full and effective
equality are accepted by the state. National minorities face more vulnerability in areas

1 EU member states are less inclined to consider immigrant groups as minorities so the situation differs
from one case to another. For example, the French state does not recognize any minority on its
territory and in Germany the only minority formally recognized in the Constitution are the Frisians.
68
pertaining to education, culture, religion and political representation and therefore positive
action is needed to protect them. A change in perspective is needed in order to approach
the real problem of assimilation and social exclusion.
To summarize that, although minority protection has been a slow emerging policy
in the EU, the new development of treaties, the EU Cohesion Policy and other documents
of standard setting and policies in the field of minority rights protection create new tools
and opportunities for the old and new minorities of Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alfredsson, Gudmundur. (2012). Institutional Trends Minority Rights,

http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/hracademy/documents/Class2-Reading3
MinorityRightsNormsandInstitutions.pdf?rd=1 consulted in 15th of February.
Appadurai, Arjun. (2004). The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of
Recognition, in Rao, Vijayendra and Walton Michael. (2004). Culture and Public
Action, Stanford University Press, California, pp. 59-84.
Berger, Peter. (1974). Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change,
Random House.
Barry, Brian. (2001). Culture and Equality, Polity Press.
Berry, J.W.. (1980). Acculturation as varieties of adaptation, in A. Padilla (ed.) (1980),
Acculturation: Theory, models and some new findings, Westview, Boulder, pp. 9
25.
Capotorti, Francesco. (1977). A Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1-7, consulted on
http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/Library/books.nsf/b4f3ead53f86ae0841256c92005e897c/cb76
eccce6b4bb7bc12566400038aa33?OpenDocument on February 23rd 2012.
Diner, A. (1998). Nation, Migration and Memory: historical concepts of citizenship,
Constellations, 4.3, pp. 293-306;
Enzinger Han. (1994). Immigrant ethnic minorities in the Dutch labour market: analysis
and policies, Amsterdam.
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, consulted on http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf February 2012.
Groussot Xavier, Pech Laurent. (2012). Fundamental Rights Protection in the EU post
Lisbon Treaty, consulted on http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num= qe-173 10th of January 2012.
Heater, Derek. (1999). What is citizenship?. Cambridge: Polity Press.
I. Henrard, Kristen and Dunbar, Robert. (2009). Synergies in Minority Protection:
European and International Law Perspectives, Cambridge: University Press.
Hicks Davyth (2010). The Lisbon Treaty: extending linguistic and national minority
rights, consulted on http://www.ieuskaraz.net/albisteak/1264147058 February
2012;
Hjerm, Mikael. (1998). National identity: a comparison of Sweden, Germany and
Australia, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 451-469.
Hutnik, Nimmi. (1991). Ethnic minority identity: A Social Psychological perspective,
Oxford: Clarendon Press and New Delhi OUP.
Hutnik, Nimmi. (1986). Patterns of ethnic minority identification and modes of social
adaptation, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.9, no. 2, pp. 150167.
Jennifer Jackson Preece. (1998). National Minorities, Politics, vol. 18 (1), pp. 17-23.
69
Joshua Castellino. (2010). The Protection of Minorities and Indigenous People in
International Law: A Comparative Temporal Analysis. International Journal on
Minority and Group Rights, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 393-422.
Kymlicka Will. (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.
Oxford University Press.
Redfield, Linton R. and Herskovits M. (1936). Memorandum on the study of
acculturation, American Anthropologist, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 149152.
Stewart Angus. (1995). Two Conceptions of Citizenship, British Journal of Sociology,
vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 63-78.
UN Report of Doudou Diene, the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism,
Report 2008 accessed on http://www.choike.org/documentos/rapporteur2008.pdf
consulted on March 2nd 2012.

70
 Romanian Migration through Europeans Eyes

Maria-Antoaneta NEAG

Abstract: During communism, some Romanians chose the path of exile to escape
persecutions and to enjoy freedom. After the fall of communism, many others chose to migrate in
search of a better life. Today, Romania faces a more than two million people Diaspora and
European Unions reluctance to accommodate further Romanians alongside other Eastern or
Balkan nationalities.
The present paper aims to investigate the Romanian migration phenomenon from the
image perspective. During the country's EU accession period, foreign media (i.e. in the United
Kingdom, Italy) started virulent campaigns against what they sought to be Romanias future hoard
migration. The two aspects that were underlined relate to the size of the population thus a high
number of potential migrants and to the a priori link to crime.
Besides a short presentation of European media attacks against Romania in view of its EU
integration, by means of an oral history research undergone in the European Parliament, this
paper presents Europeans' views about Romanian migration and the so-called Roma issue, that
adds up to this equation. Furthermore, it investigates the way these topics shape Romanias present
image while also impacting on EU policies affecting this countrys future development (i.e. the
freedom of movement and the restrictions imposed to Romanians on the labour market and
Romanias accession to Schengen).
Last but not least, this paper draws attention to the desperate undertakings by Romanian
stakeholders to rehabilitate Romanias image by various projects and the promotion of positive
examples.

Keywords: migration, Romanian Diaspora, Roma, freedom of movement, oral history,

Schengen, brain drain

Migration, just a little bit of history repeating

One of the oldest collective phenomena, migration relates to temporary or
definitive population transfers dating back to 3000 BC. This form of migration was every
so often violent and related to the adopted land's natural resources and fertility. The
archaeological evidence left by pre-modern migration reveals that the tribes' movement
had an influence or even inflicted on the already resident cultures. Other causes of
migration were the persecutions or threats of destruction of their home commonwealth
(i.e. Jewish exodus). In todays vocabulary, these migrant communities could be called the
ancient asylum seekers.
The reasons that lay behind today's migration are generally linked to existing
differences between the economic and lifestyle standards in origin and hosts countries,
political instability, human rights, discrimination or minority related issues, and, more
recently, natural disasters or climate change. The difference between pre-modern and
contemporary migration rests upon its collective versus individual character. While pre-

PhD student, Bucharest University, History Department, maria.neag@gmail.com.

71
modern tribes were united both genetically and in the fight for a better place to live, the
contemporary migration is an individual, rationally based choice.
From pre-history to the era of empires until present times, people continued to
change their residence over time, occasionally in a more concentrated form. Throughout
history records mention efforts for increasing the population density (as in the case of US,
Canada, Australia and New Zeeland), forced migration (as in the case of American
Indians or African slaves) or exchanges of populations (as in Turkey-Greece case).
Emancipation and industrialisation have also created grounds for economic migration, the
massive rural-urban exodus being worthwhile to mention in this sense.
The beginning of the 20th century brought upon the reshape of the world map, with
past and ongoing wars, decolonisation, evacuations, and genocides at the origin of intensive
human migration. However, it is only in the 1960s and especially after the fall of communism
that migration became a real concern for the more developed Western societies.
In the light of globalisation and especially due to the financial and economic
crisis, these societies become more and more critical about the consequences and costs of
migration for the host countries. Issues such as alleged rise of hoodlumism, disruptions to
the national labour offer and demand balance, the need for integration policies, social
welfare, readmission agreements and international cooperation, found their way into the
migration puzzle. The rise of organised crime and terrorist networks has brought upon an
increased burden on the host states in view of protecting its citizens. These problems
reinforced stereotypes, preconceptions and created stigmas that started to be exploited
politically, as analysed in a later part of the present paper.
The international presence of corporations and multi-national companies with
flexible policies for exchanges of human recourses also play a role in the migration
process, this time with emphasis on highly skilled workers. In a world where best
technology rules, countries like US and Japan alongside some European ones, such as
Switzerland, Germany, France and the UK, strive to achieve exquisite results, often
relying on capable foreign human resources. As a consequence of globalisation, the high
skilled migration has become a main pattern in international migration.
Despite the concerns of some receiving Member States (MS), the labour offer and
demand balance revealed the need for foreign highly qualified workers but also for the
less skilled ones. From the late 1990s Romanian workers became aware of the existing
demand and seized the opportunity obtaining employment in sectors such as agriculture,
constructions, public works and home assistance in countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece
and Portugal. Other countries favoured receiving inflows of highly qualified workers,
namely providing an easier access for very qualified Romanians coming especially from
the medical or IT sectors. In this sense, the brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation
concepts deserve special attention that will be granted to them in a later part of this paper.

A short history of Romanian migration phenomenon

Past early history reveals several movements of migratory hoards settling in
Romania. The inflow of foreigners following conquests or settlements continued until
modern history. Romania became home for a variety of nationalities. Historical provinces
hosted Hungarians, Saxons, Slovaks, Czech, Ruthenians (Transylvania), Armenians,
Greeks (Moldova and Walachia), Turks and Tatars (Dobrogea) alongside Jews and Roma
present all across the countrys territory.
The era of revolutions, starting with the French Revolution culminating with the
1848 Revolutions remembered as the Spring of Nations, had a strong impact on
72
societies emancipation. Same applied to Romania. The elite started travelling to Europe
and began sending their offspring abroad for studies. This practice had a social status
enhance role. Due to its economic development, at the beginning of 20th century, Romania
registered a considerable population increase (the numbers almost doubled compared to
the numbers from late 19th century). With demography progressing, Romania became one
of the largest independent territories in Central and Eastern Europe. After the creation of
the Romanian state in 1859 and its territorial completion under the so called Greater
Romania in 1918, the elite intensified the customary practice of educating their children
abroad, this way starting an incipient circular migration. In the inter-war period, after
concluding their studies, Romanian intellectuals and artists began to live alongside
European elite in cities like Paris, Berlin, Vienna etc.
As of late 19th century and beginning of 20th century, Eastern Europe as a whole
started a great migration flow towards the Americas. The reasons behind these massive
movements were the changes in European countries' configuration due to border changes
and annexations following the great wars.
Europe's territory was in the process of being redesigned. After World War I,
there were countries that gained territories (e.g. France, Greece, Italy etc.), emerging
nation-states (e.g. the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, later Yugoslavia etc.),
empires that dissolved (Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire), leading to an ethnic
reconfiguration of Europe by population transfers.
In the interwar period, almost 1.5 million Greeks moved from Turkey while almost
700,000 Turks removed from Greece. Similar transfers took place between Bulgaria and
Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria (following the Treaty of Craiova from
1940, when Romanians and Aromanians were forced to relocate from Southern Dobruja to
Northern Dobruja, the same geographic provision applying in reverse to the Bulgarians) etc.
Transylvania, maybe the most sensitive and disputed page in Romanian-Hungarian
national history discourses can be a case study for the population exchanges. After World
War I, Transylvania and Eastern Banat were reassumed by Romania. Once the heart of the
Kingdom of Dacia, Transylvania's rule slid among different tribes, peoples and empires,
falling under Hungarian tribes' rule around 10th century. It was soon colonized mostly by
Saxons and Szkelys (a subgroup of the Hungarian people). After a tumultuous history of
tribes conquests, domination and independence, it became part of newly created Romania
in 1918 and was recognized as such by the Allies through the Trianon Treaty (1920) that
drastically changed the configuration of the Hungarian state. The old and new rulers agreed
on some population changes that provided for the departure of approximately a quarter of a
million ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania who headed primarily towards Hungary
but also the Americas. Same event took place in reverse, in 1940, when Transylvania
entered under Hungarian administration (Second Vienna Award) only to shift again in 1945,
being officially reassumed by Romania following the Treaty of Paris (1947). However,
despite winning back Transylvania, World War II closed the short history of Greater
Romania as the northern Romanian region of Bucovina became part of Ukraine while
Bessarabia was transformed into the Soviet Republic of Moldova.
In the aftermath of the second world conflagration and at the beginning of the
Cold War, Central and Eastern European citizens relocated around the globe in search of
freedom. The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zeeland and Western Europe were
perceived as a freedom oasis by the population faced with the communist threat.
In 1947, Romania became part of the Soviet-aligned communist Eastern Bloc.
Under communist rule, travelling was restricted and any attempt to leave the country
73
(regardless of the reason) was translated into harassments by the Securitate and,
eventually, deprivations of economic and social rights. Any requests to emigrate were
castigated and remained a black stain on the persons career dossier, certain jobs thus
becoming inaccessible.
Although the first communists were mostly of non-Romanian descent and the first
phase of communism claimed its international views, minorities did not enjoy an easy
faith, being discriminated, ignored or sold. The state began an ethnic controlled-migration:
in exchange for economic incentives (approximately 2.000 USD per person), Jews and
Germans were allowed to flee the country to reach Israel, the US and respectively
Germany. The state supervised another type of migration as well, namely labour migration
heading towards the Middle East, mostly to the Persian Gulf area.
The life of political opponents was not easy either: most of them were doomed to be
imprisoned, intellectuals being the most exposed in this sense. Episodes of their
extermination in Sighet or Aiud prisons were widespread. The political persecutions were
the reason behind the creation of a Romanian exiled elite. Famous names include Eugene
Ionesco (the creator of the Theatre of the Absurd), Mircea Eliade (philosopher, religious
historian), Emil Cioran and Ioan Petre Culianu (philosophers), Gheorghe Zamfir (pan pipes
artist). In addition, even though they were Romanian-born, none of the three Nobel Prize
winners - George Palade, Physiology and Medicine, 1974; Elie Wiesel, Peace, 1986; Herta
Mller, Literature, 2009 - lived and worked in Romania. France and the US seemed to offer
better development opportunities to this layer of the society. Cases such as the departure of
Ion Mihai Pacepa (the head of the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service) to the US and
Nadia Comaneci (famous gymnast who was kept under strict communist supervision) to
Canada represented image coups for the already unpopular communist regime.
The Romanian and other nationals from the communist bloc, who left their
countries mostly clandestine even endangering their life, enjoyed a special policy.
Western democracies were taking action based on the assumption that these asylum
seekers can't be sent back as their security might be in danger. As a result of this positive
policy, in the late 1980s, the requests for asylum registered a remarkable increase
(doubled or even tripled) compared to the previous decades and to the beginning of the
1980s, as shown by the figure below.

Figure 1. Asylum applications by Romanian citizens in OECD countries, 1980-1989

74
 Migration waves
As already noted, during communism, some Romanians chose the path of exile to
escape persecutions and enjoy freedom. After the fall of communism, many chose to
migrate in search of a better life. Until today, there were three waves of migration, as
underlined by the studies of Professor Dumitru Sandu (2006).
With a difficult transition period affecting several layers of the Romanian society,
the first wave of migration emerged, taking place from 1990 to 1996. With an inefficient
government unable to properly reform or privatize parts of the Romanian industry, in the
late 1990s around 40% of the existing jobs disappeared, leaving room to a dramatic
unemployment. Throughout this period, the Romanian state assisted passively to the export
of its unemployed people, realizing the potential benefits for the economy arising from this
phenomenon (i.e. remittances). The ethnic and religious minorities were among the first to
choose the departure from their country of origin to move to the states with which they had
historic ties. They accused discrimination and were granted political asylum. The Roma
minority also took advantage of this provision, moving towards the west.
This waves migrant profile was that of men, mostly coming from urban areas,
married, with the majority (78%) having vocational or secondary studies and a not
negligible minority holding university degree (17%), as shown by the table below. These
migrants headed towards Western Europe, Canada and the United States.

Table 1. Labour migrants per stages (%)

Stages
1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2006 Total %
Gender Women 12 15 44 34
Men 88 85 56 66
Urban Rural 41 48 49 48
Urban 59 52 51 52
Nationality Romanians 92 89 94 93
Hungarians 8 10 4 6
Others 1 2 1
Civil Status Married 88 76 60 66
Not married 7 19 31 26
Others 5 6 10 7
Education Primary 3 3 1 2
Grammar 2 8 16 13
Vocational and
78 79 77 77
secondary
University/college 17 9 7 9
Source: TLA survey, temporary departures to work, Dumitru Sandu

The second migration wave, from 1996 to 2001 was also formed of mostly
married urban men heading primarily to Germany, Hungary, Spain and Italy but also
Israel and Turkey. The closure of traditional industries (such as mining) had a powerful
effect on this migration wave. Migrants were mostly leaving Romania for temporary
illegal work and seldom with predefined contracts, as little legal options were available at
this time and when information about the opportunities in the future host countries was
still scarce. Furthermore, financial efforts were made in order to obtain Schengen visas as
this was a complicated and sometimes humiliating process (long queues in front of
embassies or other public institutions) at the time.
75
 The third and most dramatic wave took place from 2001 to 2006. The year 2002
marked the start of what was soon to be a mass migration phenomenon. Schengen area
opened its doors to Romanians and Bulgarians in view of the negotiations for EU
accession. Despite some provisions restricting travelling, such as the minimum liquidity
threshold, migration couldn't be discouraged. This waves migrants focused mainly on
Italy (migrants from Moldova and Oltenia) and Spain (migrants from Muntenia and
Transylvania). Some explain the choice for these countries due to their Latin roots,
cultural and language similarities. A very important aspect was the establishment of
Romanian communities in these two countries, creating grounds for the newcomers. Their
integration into the labour market was smoother as for this wave the sharing of
information and the high number of migrants already settled in Italy and Spain played an
essential role.
Researchers already agreed on the existence of a fourth wave covering early years of
EU accession and currently still under way (Alexe, 2008, pg. 45-49). Even though some 15
MS1 imposed restrictions on the entry to their labour markets, Romanians continued to be
attracted by the EU. They became the largest group of EU migrants, second only to the Poles.
Unfortunately for Romania, this last ongoing wave has a high rate of brain drain. The exact
dynamic of this wave is yet under study. There is evidence of a form of circular migration
explained by the consequences of the crisis translated in disturbances in many businesses
including construction works and services (sectors served by many Romanians abroad).

Brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation

In this part of the paper, the focus becomes the movement of highly skilled people
across the world and its consequences within the migration phenomenon, namely brain
drain, brain gain and brain circulation. Brain drain is a rather contemporary phenomenon,
specific mainly to less developed countries. Qualified and highly qualified workers -
considered to be the brains of a country - are lost as these professionals flee their home
countries towards the more developed West that receives in this way brain gain. For some
parts of the industry, this loss is not that dramatic. To give an example, if a country is not
involved in the space race, it will not acknowledge the loss of a future astronaut. However,
the Research and Development activities of that country may be disrupted on the long run
by the lack of people to ensure future innovation.
When thinking specifically about the medical human resources, the biggest
casualty in this process is the country of origin who will soon fail to provide its citizens
quality healthcare services due to the lack of adequate personnel. Romania already finds
herself in such complicated situation, ranking 25th out of the 27 MS on the number of
physicians available to treat its inhabitants, as shown in the table below.
Unfortunately, Romania is one of the largest exporters for medical staff. It is in
this sense comparable to African countries (Malawi, Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra
Leone and the United Republic of Tanzania) that are also heavily affected by the medical
brain drain. Their loss of medical human resources has severe consequences on the
already precarious health of the population affected by lack of resources and technology
(i.e. starvation, high infantile death rates, virus infections etc.) and additional social,
economic or political problems.

1
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
76
 Table 2. Top of EU medical infrastructure. Number of doctors per 100.000 inhabitants

Source: Econtext1

In Romania, the medical brain drain has among its causes: low public wages, poor
technology, low financing for research and development etc. The private healthcare sector
is still timid as citizens lack the necessary financial resources and the consumer behaviour
to benefit from it. For these reasons, faced with the effects of the aforementioned
shortcomings of the system and unwilling to be a part of the widespread corruption
surrounding this field of activity, doctors who can't afford to open private clinics or
couldn't find their way into the already existing ones prefer to leave the country to treat
patients in countries that will soon adopt them. Romanian medical personnel covers today
almost all Europe and is present namely in France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Sweden,
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria Portugal and Cyprus.
As already mentioned, Romania has been for a long time confronted with the crisis
of an unsustainable healthcare system. Besides modest infrastructure and funding, the
Romanian healthcare system already suffers from lack of personnel, both at assistance level
(nurses, anaesthetists) but mostly specialized one, as approximately 3.000 members of the
medical staff decide to flee the country on a yearly basis, accepting even the jobs for which
they are over-qualified. As presented in the table below, a worrying trend of medical
emigration can be noticed and is still under way, intensifying after EU accession. From the
around 40.000 doctors present in the years prior to EU accession, in 2012, according to the
Council of Romanian Physicians, there were only 20.648 doctors active in 396 hospitals2.
Only in 2011, 2841 applications for professional certificates were requested for seeking

1
Econtext analysis on medical brain drain in Romania, http://www.econtext.ro/dosar--
2/analiza/exodul-creierelor-incepe-sa-ne-doara-romania-la-coada-europei-dupa-numarul-de-
doctori-vezi-cati-medici-mai-sunt-in-romania-si-in-celelalte-tari-europene.html
2
CMR, press release, 29 March 2012 http://www.cmr.ro/comunicat-de-presa-19/
77
work abroad. The applicants specialised mainly in family/general medicine and general
surgery headed towards Germany (835), Great Britain (611) and France (560)1.

Table 3. Evolution of the Romanian physicians' migration 1991-2004

year MBD PhysEmig PhysTot Phys1000 Population
1991 0,03792 1659,6 42101,6 1,81590 23185000
1992 0,03983 1764,0 42522,0 1,86590 22789000
1993 0,04593 1938,2 40265,0 1,76950 22755000
1994 0,04869 2053,0 40115,7 1,76480 22731000
1995 0,05092 2152,0 40111,3 1,76850 22681000
1996 0,05266 2274,7 40920,5 1,81000 22608000
1997 0,05697 2440,2 40392,0 1,79090 22554000
1998 0,06128 2696,8 41311,0 1,83580 22503000
1999 0,06482 2971,7 42871,0 1,90894 22457990
2000 0,06855 3119,4 42388,1 1,88870 22443000
2001 0,07315 3296,1 41764,0 1,88704 22132000
2002 0,07829 3494,7 41143,2 1,88704 21803000
2003 0,08297 3712,7 41031,9 1,88704 21744000
2004 0,08708 3913,7 41031,9 1,88704 21744000
Source: Revised Panel Data Set on Physician Emigration (1991-2004) 2

Even though some EU countries (e.g. Germany, Austria, France) registered brain
gain, overall, EU is experiencing a brain drain in favour of USA and countries like China,
India, Brazil and Switzerland. Over the years, top scientists started to move away from their
home countries, stimulated by prolific research institutions and their strong focus on quality.
To face this challenge, EU is developing policy instruments (i.e. 2020 Strategy that
emphasize on the positive role of R&D for the economy) both at EU and national level in an
attempt to encourage brain circulation and ensure the return and stay of researchers.
The Attractiveness of the EU Top Scientists report by the European Parliament's
Policy Department - Economic and Scientific Policy (2012) points out the need to develop
appropriate public institutions and reward excellence in research. Due to globalisation,
already developed countries benefit from brain gain thus creating human resources
shortages where already scarce by re-shifting them towards already abundant areas. This
process can be reversed by providing incentives to reward proficiency and creating the
necessary background for high quality research in order to achieve the retention and
further development of valuable and skilled human resources.

1
CMR, press release, 26 March 2012, http://www.cmr.ro/migratia-medicilor-2012/
2
Bhargava, A., Docquier, F., Moulla, Y. (2010). Modelling the Effect of Physician Emigration on
Human Development Revised Panel Data Set on Physician Emigration (1991-2004), research
project on Brain drain, return migration and South-South migration: impact on labour markets
and human capital (financially supported by the Belgian National Funds for Scientific Research,
the Austrian, German, Korean, and Norwegian governments through the Multi-donor Trust Fund
on Labour Markets, Job Creation, and Economic Growth administered by the World Bank's
Social Protection and Labour unit).
78
 Migration policy in Romania
After the EU accession, two parallel tendencies could be observed: the emigration
of Romanian citizens and the immigration of foreigners to Romania that thus became a
destination for third countries nationals (mostly from Moldova, Turkey and China, but
also from Africa, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union). In this context, the
naturalisation of citizens from the Republic of Moldova is not a negligible aspect. The
number of Moldavian applications for Romanian citizenship increased, reaching 1.8
million requests at the end of 2007 (the year of Romania's EU accession). Economically
speaking, we might extrapolate by saying that these parallel trends keep the right balance
between labour demand and supply. Maybe this is the model that can successfully be
implemented and is compatible with the globalised world. However, only few Moldavian
citizens with Romanian passports remain in the country, most of them continuing their
path towards the EU's labour market.
The exact size of the Diaspora is yet unknown, speculation data mentioning
between 2 million up to 13 million Romanians living abroad. More numerous Romanian
communities in the Diaspora can be met in the Republic of Moldavia (2,867,000), Spain
and Portugal (1,450,000), Italy (950,000), Germany (750,000), France (875,000), U.S.A,
Canada and South America (1,350,000), Israel (400,000), Turkey (310,000), Greece,
Mount Athos and Cyprus (400,000), Bulgaria (62,000), Macedonia (45,000), Albania
(15,000), Hungary (28,000), Austria (35,000), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (16,000),
UK and Northern countries (130,000), Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China and Korea
(140,000), the Arabic countries, South Africa and Africa (150,000), Serbia and
Montenegro (590,000), Russia (470,000), other ex Soviet countries (595,000) etc (Crciun
2011, pg. 28). The data is not exhaustive as it depends on the definition of the Romanian
citizen and is affected by the incomplete data concerning the Romanians present abroad
still having an illegal status. During the July 2012 Referendum elections, the Romanian
authorities mentioned the presence of 3.5 million persons with legal residence abroad.
Given its financial potential for a transition economy, migration is translated by Romanian
politicians as an important source of remittances, as shown by the chart below, as well as
an electoral tool.

Figure 2. Migrants remittance inflows (USD million)

Migrant remittance Inflows (US$ million)

9.381
10000 8.542
8000 6.718
6000 4.733 4.952
3.952 3.811
4000
2000 143 124 132
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011e

Source: World Bank, Annual remittances data 1

1
Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, Annual remittances data, updated in April 2012,
available at: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/
0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html
79
 From an institutional point of view, in 1995, The Council for the Issues of
Romanians Abroad was established under the supervision of the Prime Minister. This was
the first structure of its kind designed to offer support to the Romanian communities
abroad in order to preserve their ethnical, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.
Furthermore, a General Inspectorate for Immigration was set up in 2007 to implement the
respective policies in the field of migration and asylum.
In 2004, Romania adopted its first migration strategy. Later on, stakeholders
including national experts of the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Office for Labour Force Migration within the Ministry of Labour,
Social Security and Family - after having consulted representatives from other
governmental institutions, international organisations (UNHCR and IOM) and NGOs -
have drafted the Strategy on Migration for the period 2007-2010. It focused on control of
immigration (better digitalised screening of foreigners), preventing and controlling illegal
immigration (by providing relevant information and enhanced international cooperation).
In May 2011, the 2011-2014 strategy was adopted to focus on promoting legal migration,
controlling illegal migration, addressing the issue of integration of migrants coming to
Romania, developing a national asylum system etc. Overall, todays government strategy
fails to address the migration of Romanians abroad as well as their possible return.

Image perspective
The presence of Romanians abroad has a powerful effect on the Europeans image
of Romanians. They are still the other in their host countries even though the status of
EU citizens, the multiculturalism metaphor or the free movement principle should grant
them more tolerance. Nowadays, perception is more important than statistics. Western
Europe still sees the Romanians as uncivilized second hand citizens. They associate by
default Roma to Romania, calling on authorities to get a better grip of the whole
Romanian migration phenomenon.
Media and the way people rely on it for information shapes or reshapes the image of
a country by bringing along new images alleged to be linked to nationality. Media has the
tendency to show its teeth especially when important events approach (enlargement
moment, world championship matches etc.). Due to the size of its population abroad,
sometimes still found in an irregular situation, Romania became soon enough Europes new
media scapegoat, being criticized for its inability to provide sufficient support for the
unemployed or Roma population, for the illegal status of the Romanians abroad operating at
the level of the gray economy, the high numbers of crimes committed by these nationals etc.
One example refers to the imminent accession moment when the British press
undertook a virulent campaign again the foreseen arrival of the Romanian hoards. After
the last two waves of enlargement (2004 and 2007), the British society was confronted by
an increase of crimes whose authors were citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. They
were found to have committed one in five crimes in London, according to an article in
Mail online1.

1
Doyle, J. and Wright, S. (18 February 2012). 'Immigrant crimewave' warning: Foreign nationals
were accused of a QUARTER of all crimes in London, Daily online, available at:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2102895/Immigrant-crimewave-warning-Foreign-
nationals-accused-QUARTER-crimes-London.html#ixzz269l5l68e
80
 Figure 3. Top Ten Worst Offenders

Source: Daily online, 18 February 20121

Because of the precedence and existing stereotypes, when a crime is committed,

the press makes sometimes use of speculations announcing in advance that its possible
that a Romanian or a Pole could be responsible of the respective crime. Furthermore, there
were cases when the state authorities reacted in haste accusing Romanians for crimes they
did not commit. To name an example, three Romanians, among which one Sorbonne
student were arrested in France for allegedly stealing an Iphone. As all three suspects had
Iphones themselves and spoke Romanian, therefore they were immediately arrested
despite having shown the police officers their personal pictures from the devices in an
attempt to prove their innocence2.
The case of Claudiu Crulic, a Romanian citizen unrightfully judged in Poland for
having committed a theft even though he had evidence of being in a different country at
the time of the crime is the most unfortunate example to prove this point. Crulic died after
a four-month-long hunger strike trying to prove his innocence. This case led to the
resignation of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the prosecution of three
Polish doctors officially accused of Crulic's death but did not affected the persisting
preconceptions against Romanians.
Due to media's predominance in presenting mostly negative or spectacular news,
the success stories of migrant Romanians are seldom reflected in the press. There are of
course positive examples of Romanians having contributed to the wellbeing of the
communities where they reside. To name some examples, Romanians had good academic
results, they proved their exquisite IT and medical skills, volunteered for public works
(helped at the construction of the British Olympic stadium) etc.
Western Europe always had and continues to have a negative perception of the
Eastern European countries, seen to have a discontinuous historical past, different than the
Western Catholic way. Many cultural theorists (Said, 1978; Anderson, 1983; Wolff, 1996;
Todorova, 1997) argued that the idea of Europe was created based on the antithesis with
the other, Easterner, savage, Oriental, Balkan and later on Communist. Romania belongs
to the Eastern European block whose citizens are still perceived to be uncivilised, second

1
Idem 7.
2
Rigaux, M. (14 September 2011). Policiers, un Roumain avec un iPhone ne l'a pas forcment
vole, Rue 89, available at: http://www.rue89.com/2011/09/14/policiers-un-roumain-avec-un-
iphone-ne-la-pas-forcement-vole-221973
81
hand citizens. The most critical countries towards migrants are the United Kingdom,
Germany, Austria, Hungary, Cyprus, followed by Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Bulgaria
and some Scandinavian countries, as shown in the graphic below.

Figure 4. Views of Immigrants (Population Mean Attitudinal Scores in Eu-27 Countries)

Light green means relatively favourable views of immigrants, red means unfavourable.
Source: Hlavac (2011)

The 2004 accession which generously received 10 additional countries led to

several waves of migration towards the West. To name an example, the United Kingdom
received many migrants, mostly Poles and Slovaks. As a consequence of the EU 10
massive inflow of citizens, the 2007 enlargement allowed Member States to impose
additional restrictions linked to the labour markets via some transitional arrangements
concluded in the years prior to accession.
As these new harsh conditions for future labour applicants were not enough, in the
summer of 2006, an ample media campaign started in the UK focusing on warning the
public of the invading army of cheap labourers1. This campaign was mostly supported
by the tabloids, namely The Sun, The Daily Express, The Daily Mail and sometimes even
by the quality press (The Guardian, The Independent, The Times). The way the tabloids
depicted the foreseen Romanian migration using the word invasion in all its forms leads
one to the idea of a barbarian menace, not entirely supported by the reality on the ground.
Romanian press via Libertatea's campaign Uite cine vorbeste (Look who's
talking)2 counter-reacted to this offensive providing more accurate data and underlined
UK's existing social issues in order to prove that they shouldn't be the ones pointing the
finger against Romania. The Romanians rightly predicted that even though many

1
Hickley, M. (21 July 2006) Britain's biggest wave of migrants in history, Daily Mail, online edition,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-396825/Britains-biggest-wave-migrants-history.html.
2
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1142350-campania-anti-britanica-declansata-libertatea-subiect- the-
guardian.htm.
82
Romanians will migrate after the EU accession, they wouldn't choose Great Britain as
main destination thus not disrupting the British labour market, as predicted by the media.
A similar negative media offensive applied to the Polish immigrants, especially in
the UK. However, in time, even though they are ranked the second immigrant group in the
EU, their image was rehabilitated as they proved to be professionals, hard workers and most
importantly, they displayed tendencies towards a form of circular migration, meaning they
eventually return to their mother land. There is hope for the image rehabilitation of
Romanian migrants in UK as well. In a 2011 document commissioned by the UK
government in order to identify the social and economic push and pull factors for migration
to the UK by Bulgarian and Romanian nationals1, data infirm the negative description of
Romanians revealing that these foreigners have the highest education rate, employment rare
(the lowest unemployment rate) amongst the other migrants present in the UK.
Negative attitudes towards Romanian migrants can be found in the Italian press as
well. Unlike the UK example, the Italian press started writing more about the Romanians
after Romanias accession to the EU. An examination of the articles of the popular Italian
newspaper La Repubblica proved that the negative image of Romanians in Italy
augmented after the EU accession. In 2007, 42% of the articles mentioning Romanians
made reference to crime, in 2008, 25% and in 2009, 33%.2
Late 2007, the Italian authorities begun taking security measures by expelling
Romanians who have committed violent crimes or considered a threat to public safety, and
several Romanians have been victims of xenophobic incidents (episodes slightly overlooked
by the press) following the death of an Italian naval officer's wife in November 2007.
The analysis of La Repubblica articles confirms that Romanians are not well
perceived by the Italian society because of their semi-legal economic activities, criminal
activities including human trafficking, prostitution and drug smuggling. However, in
terms of direct interaction between the two nations, Italians seem to consider the
Romanian similar to them even calling them brothers, linked by the Latin language and
past history3. Emphasis is being made also on the considerable number of Italians present
in Romania for economic purposes since early 1990s. For this reason, at state level,
solutions for enhanced cooperation were envisioned.
Italians' negative attitude persists besides the fact that Romanian presence
generates an unquestionable added value to Italy's economy and GDP. The same applies
for Spain. The data supports this supposition, as at the end of 2010 Romanian and
Bulgarian workers have brought an increase by 1.3% to the GDP of Italy and 1.7% to
Spain's GDP, as pointed out by the EP's Motion for a Resolution on freedom of movement
for workers within the European Union4 and other Commission and Council documents.

1
Kausar, R. (2011). Identifying social and economic push and pull factors for migration to the UK
by Bulgarian and Romanian nationals. Research commissioned by the Department for
Communities and Local Government. London: Eland House, available at:
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/corporate/pdf/19971601.pdf.
2
Uccellini, C.M. (2010). 'Outsiders' after Accession. The case of Romanian migrants in Italy,
1989-2009. Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Conference 'Insiders and outsiders'.
3
Romano Prodi' interview at TVR1 covered by La Reppublica, 10 November 2007, available at:
http://www.repubblica.it/2007/11/sezioni/cronaca/sicurezza-politica/prodi-tv-romena/prodi-tv-
romena.html?ref=search.
4
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B7-2011-0727+0+
DOC+XML+V0//EN.
83
 The Roma 'issue'
As the largest minority in Europe (around twelve million), the Roma have become
the front page of European policy-making agenda. In this context, the European Union
started to address the issue of Roma envisaging a strategy or a framework for the social
inclusion of the Roma, having as main points the equal access to labour market, better
education policies, protection of fundamental rights, and better use of EU funds and
empowerment of Roma women.
In this context, by means of an oral history research 1 (semi-guided interviews)
undergone in the European Parliament, Members and civil servants were inquired about
Romanian migration and the so-called Roma issue. The following part underlines the way
these topics shape Romanias present image while also impacting on EU policies affecting
this countrys future developments in the EU (i.e. the freedom of movement, the restrictions
imposed to Romanians on the labour market and Romanias accession to Schengen).
Roma was a term adopted by the International Romani Union in 1974 in order to
avoid the other negative terms that designates this population. The word Gypsy was
thought to have negative implications especially in Eastern Europe even though there are
still some Roma who prefer to call themselves by this term. The findings resulting from
the abovementioned research prove that there is still a confusion between Roma and
Romanians. About this term change, during one interview, a respondent mentioned:
Roma and Romania are often confused in Portugal. It has to do also with the name
change. The terms Tzigauner or Gypsy were more widespread and did not leave room for
confusions or associations with a certain country. (P.R., male, Portugal, 44 years old,
interviewed on 04.06.12 in Brussels).
An interesting observation is that in some cases, when asked to characterize
Romanians in one word, some said hard working or ambitious. Others were more
negative in their descriptions emphasising on their unreliability and Balkan roots. The
usual characterisation given to the Roma minority is that they are nomad and do not
belong to a specific political structure or that this is a European problem. Interestingly
enough, sometimes respondents intrigued by the one word challenge to describe
Romania, answer spontaneously with: Gypsies!, thus proving the aforementioned
association or confusion.
The subjects chosen for this investigation have the political correctness disease
as they are seldom blunt, fearing the possibility to offend or enter controversies, especially
when it comes to ethnicity related issues. This is why, the solution envisaged for the Roma
issue is to delegate it to Europe. This is a European issue as there are Roma everywhere.
Since we are dealing with a minority without a state, the solution should envisage a
European status for Roma people (P.R., male, Portugal, 44 years old, interviewed on
04.06.12 in Brussels). This point is in line with Lvia Jrka's report on the EU strategy
on Roma inclusion2, adopted by the European Parliament in March 2011 and with the EU
framework for national Roma strategies designed by the Commission3 in April 2011.
This is where the paradox arises. On the one hand, the situation of the Roma is a
European issue but on the other hand Europeans point the finger against Romania for its poor

1
The interviews were made in the contaxt of a PhD research paper in progress, "Representations of
Romania in the European institutional setting" by Maria-Antoaneta Neag, PhD candidate,
Bucharest University, History Department.
2
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0043&language=EN.
3
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/discrimination/docs/com_2011_173_en.pdf.
84
policy to tackle the situation of this minority. The press absorbed this idea and continues to
perpetuate Roma-Romania stereotypes, enhancing the confusion even to a greater extent.
Many subjects of this research took a stand against this confusion: The Roma issue
affects Romania's image. Everybody thinks that the origin of Roma is Romania or Hungary
(A.H., male, Belgium (US born), 32 years old, MA studies, interviewed on 15.02.2011 in
Strasbourg). Recalling that there are ongoing arrangements between the Romanian
government and minorities, a Dutch MEP answered bluntly: The Roma issue negatively
affects Romania's image. Roma is called Roma and this affects your image. (V.vd.C., male,
Netherlands, 59 years old, MA studies, interviewed on 16.02.2012 in Strasbourg).
The problems caused by Roma abroad, leading sometimes to mass expulsions,
alter Romania's image affecting its EU development. As Roma are considered to be
poorly treated in their home countries, Romania is among those states criticized for failing
to properly address the problems of the respective community (in terms of housing,
education, segregation, public health etc.). To name an example from a respondent: There
is still a lot of discrimination against Roma. There are efforts to integrate them but there is
also a resistance from Roma to integrate. There is segregation from both sides. The Roma
issue is automatically linked to Romania as the latest events in France proved (forced
evictions, August 2010). (S.N., female, Portugal, 41 years old, MA studies, interviewed
on 06.06.12 in Brussels). Roma also represents one of the reasons for which some
Member States block Romania's accession to Schengen. The Roma issue raises the wrong
perceptions of a Roma influx coming from Romania. This also relates to the lack of
information (as Roma can travel freely in the EU already) and to the rise of xenophobic
feelings across Europe. (C.C., male, Portugal, interviewed on 05.06.12 in Brussels).
To conclude, adding up to an already frugal and unflattering image Romania
developed in the years following 1989, the Roma exodus towards the European capitals'
streets started a new phase in Romanias perception abroad, possibly opening doors to
flexible arrangements from MS to help dealing with this European phenomenon, as will
be presented in a later part of this paper.

The image rehabilitation efforts

The life of Romanians living abroad is often troubled by a generalized negative
perception against them. As a consequence, state authorities from the country of
destination often hassle Romanians by applying an unequal treatment compared to their
nationals or other minorities (e.g. Indians in UK or Muslim in France). Especially after the
EU accession, migrants, professional or business associations, private companies,
alongside the Romanian state, understood the need to promote positive examples in order
to change the persisting negative image abroad. Television advertisements, studies, press
and other materials were designed to underline the Romanian assets.
Such examples feature the economy related campaigns, such as A fresh look at
Romania initiated by the Ministry of European Integration and conducted in March-April
2007 in The Economist and Financial Times, with the aim of promoting business opportunities
offered by Romania; a similar project, Romania, an attractive destination for foreign
investments, was inaugurated by the Romanian Agency for Foreign Investments (ARIS).
The 2008 Romanians in Europe was among the most coherent state run campaign
aimed at counter-balancing the image of Romanians in the Italian and Spanish press
flooded by cases of murder, theft, prostitution and fraud. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
together with the Agency for Governmental Strategies (ASG), ran the Hola, soy rumeno
(Hello, I am Romanian!) campaign (including video commercials, images, press
85
campaigns, online support) between September and December 2008. The same strategy
was designed for Italy with the campaign Romania. Piacere di conoscerti (Romania,
pleased to meet you!), which run in parallel with another programme, People and Places
in Romania, aimed at promoting the Romanian culture and customs through events
organised in the central squares in Rome, Milan and Turin.
The statistics provided by the Agency1 after the end of these projects concluded
that Italians positive attitude towards the Romanian immigrants is growing, registering a
24% improvement compared to the studies from 2008. 58% of the respondents considered
that Italy has to win over the presence of Romanians. 43% of the interviewed Italians
considered that the image of the Romanian immigrants will improve, while 34% consider
that Italians will become more tolerant towards immigrants. Similar answers could be
found in Spain. While 69% of the Spanish population considered in May 2008 that
immigrants' expulsions were justified, the number decreased by 10% following the Hola,
soy rumeno campaign.
The abovementioned data indicates some form of superficiality as the research
questions' formulation may have inflicted upon the results. For example, the research
revealed that 33% of respondents were of the view that mass-media in Italy will present
more positive news about Romanians in the future, a rather naive assumption with no
implications on the press' actual behaviour.
The government initiatives to improve Romania's image abroad were complemented
by the country branding process aiming to increase international public's interest for
Romania as an international tourism destination which included several spots broadcasted
on CNN, Eurosport etc. Furthermore, additional viral efforts were made to revigorate
Romanias image, such as the 2009 The World without Romania campaign by Ursus
Breweries; the pro-Romania campaign entitled Why I love Romania, present on the special
site opened on this occasion, released in November 2011 by a number of media institutions:
Pro TV, Gandul, ProSport, Sport.ro, Ziarul Financiar and Mediafax; Graffiti BBDO's five
ad prints with the message: Born in Romania. Like Me!, all emphasizing on perhaps yet
unknown Romanian personalities that contributed to the development of Western culture.
Overall, these efforts to revalorise Romania's image abroad were not redundant,
even though they were criticized for being too costly, poorly designed and ineffective.
However, both Italian and Spanish press generously covered the abovementioned
government campaigns possibly having the positive expected effects on the viewers'
perception and tolerance level towards the Romanian migrants present in their countries.

Migration and EU policy

This part of the paper aims at providing a panoramic view on the European policy
on migration and the possible inconsistencies between the goals of the EU founding
fathers and the reality on the ground. The freedom of movement has been a key topic
since the very beginning of the European project. Was this target actually achieved? EU
members are still divided in the question of migration and freedom of movement,
especially regarding workers, as the remaining Member States' restrictions on the labour
market for Romanian and Bulgarian workers still prove it today.

1
Press release ASG covered by Mediafax (7 January 2009), Agenia pentru Strategii
Guvernamentale susine c imaginea romnilor n Italia i Spania e mai bun, available at:
http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/agentia-pentru-strategii-guvernamentale-sustine-ca-imaginea-
romanilor-in-italia-si-spania-e-mai-buna-7754554.
86
 The Single European Act (1987) drew the lines of a genuine Single Market in
view of achieving deeper integration by eliminating the restrictive practices in the area of
private enterprise and public sector. It enhanced EP's role and facilitated passing
legislation by adding more areas where Qualified Majority Voting was possible. With the
adoption of Maastricht Treaty (1993), which created the pillar system with the aim to
deepen the European Political Union, the responsibility to implement the Single Market
shifted from MS to EU level, an important step towards today's community method. The
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) focused more on the Justice and Home Affairs related aspects
and attempting to establish a common policy, has introduced a new chapter named Visas,
asylum, immigration and other policy related to free movement of persons, the downturn
being that the labour market issues would still remain under the responsibility of MS.
The Hague Programme (November 2004) aimed at strengthening the area of
freedom, security and justice and finding a more balanced approach to tackle legal and
illegal immigration in a harmonised manner. In this sense, it laid grounds for a Common
European Asylum System and emphasized on the need of effective integration policies for
immigrants. With the Nice Treaty (2003), the voting procedure in the Council on decisions
relating to migration and asylum has changed from unanimity to qualified majority voting,
thus facilitating the decision making process.
The Lisbon Treaty (2009) complemented the EU prerogatives in this respect. Steps
forward have been made, specialised institutions were created (i.e Frontex, 2005;
European Asylum Support Office - EASO, 2009) and funds became available (i.e.
European Refugee Fund - ERF - 2008). However, even with a European Pact on
Immigration and Asylum currently being implemented and other relevant components
related to enhancing cooperation, available in the Stockholm Programme (2010), the EU is
still striving to design a comprehensive policy for migration and asylum, in line with its
commitments made at the Tempere European Council in 1999.
With an estimated number of 214 million1 international migrants worldwide, the
EU is receiving an average of 1.8 million immigrants annually, Germany and the United
Kingdom receiving the highest inflows with 10.8 million persons and respectively 6.4
million. International migrants make up 8.7% of continental population. Should it be
worrying that 3.1% of the world's population are migrants (more precisely, one out of
every 33 persons in the world today is a migrant) or that migrants would constitute the
fifth most populous country in the world? It is still unclear if this phenomenon represents
a paradigm shift related to globalisation and the free movement of people. Either way, the
EU receiving countries are overwhelmed by the magnitude of the migration phenomenon
and its implications, invoking the solidarity clause stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 80
TFEU), as it happened in the case of Italy, France or Malta in the light of the Arab Spring
and the subsequent wave of migrants.
After the fall of communism, EU sought to include its former Eastern-block
neighbours thus contributing to their reunification with the European roots and democratic
values. As already noted, 2004 was a generous year for the EU that embraced no less than
ten new Member States. Western Europe was somewhat unprepared for this Central and
Eastern reunification. There were obvious discrepancies of wealth and lifestyle between
the Western and Eastern citizens, so a lot of people became economic migrants. The Poles
were the scapegoats of that enlargement wave since many of them went to the West for

1
International Organisation for Migration, Global Estimates and Trends, available at:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en.
87
work. This experience traumatised the West who decided to be more cautious regarding
the next enlargement, thus adding new conditions to the EU accession process.
The Eurobarometer 64.21 from the autumn of 2005, testing the public opinion
regarding Romanias upcoming EU accession, revealed that Europeans fear the most the
migratory potential of this populous country. Germany, Austria, Italy and Luxemburg
showed restraints about Romania based on immigration and economy related worries.
Similar answers and trends can be identified in 20062, for instance France showed its
scepticism with 60% of its respondents opposing enlargement.
Returning to the asylum and migration policy, the downturn related to EU's
approach is that there are countries that have the possibility to opt-out from a common
policy (i.e. United Kingdom). Furthermore, some voices claim that MS should solely
retain the responsibility on deciding the number of migrants to receive and best integration
policies. Even though commitments were made to deliver a Common European Asylum
System and specific regulation addressing migration, by the end of 2012, MS are still
reluctant to reach agreement, as they are to receive further migrants. The most restrictive
countries in this sense are United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Cyprus, Hungary
followed by France, Italy, Austria, some Scandinavian countries etc., as shown in the
figure and data below.

Figure 5. Population Support for Variously Restrictive Immigration Regimes (image and chart)

Light green means most permissive, red means most restrictive policy preference.

1
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_ro_nat.pdf, p26.
2
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_ro_nat.pdf.
88
 Table 4.
PROPORTIONAL SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION REGIME
Prohibit Put strict Let people Let anyone Permissive
people limits on the come as come Immigration
COUNTRY from number of long as Regime
coming foreigners there are
jobs
available
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) + (4)
Romania 3.9 % 12.4 % 43.7 % 40.1 % 84.7 %
Slovenia 4.1 % 30.5 % 54.8 % 10.6 % 65.4 %
Spain 2.8 % 32.2 % 56.5 % 8.5 % 65.0 %
Luxembourg 2.4 % 38.0 % 53.5 % 6.1 % 59.6 %
Sweden 3.3 % 38.9 % 44.1 % 13.8 % 57.8 %
Portugal 6.2 % 36.2 % 51.5 % 6.1 % 57.6 %
Poland 3.6 % 40.0 % 40.6 % 15.8 % 56.5 %
Lithuania 9.2 % 35.3 % 46.3 % 9.2 % 55.4 %
Estonia 5.7 % 40.9 % 44.7 % 8.6 % 53.4 %
Italy 6.0 % 41.3 % 14.6 % 11.1 % 52.7 %
France 5.9 % 42.1 % 44.6 % 7.5 % 52.1 %
Austria 6.7 % 41.6 % 45.2 % 6.5 % 51.7 %
Slovakia 4.7 % 45.9 % 41.5 % 7.9 % 49.4 %
Bulgaria 8.1 % 44.5 % 30.1 % 17.3 % 47.4 %
Finland 2.8 % 51.5 % 37.5 % 8.2 % 45.7 %
Greece 70.0 % 45.3 % 36.9 % 7.8 % 44.7 %
Latvia 11.4 % 43.9 % 36.8 % 7.9 % 44.7 %
Germany 8.0 % 47.8 % 40.0 % 4.3 % 44.3 %
Denmark 1.0 % 55.5 % 38.5 % 4.9 % 43.4 %
Czech Rep. 9.4 % 48.6 % 33.7 % 8.4 % 42.0 %
Belgium 8.4 % 50.0 % 36.5 % 5.1 % 41.6 %
Ireland 8.2 % 50.7 % 36.6 % 4.4 % 41.1 %
Netherlands 4.4 % 54.6 % 37.1 % 3.9 % 41.1 %
Great Britain 10.6 % 54.2 % 32.3 % 2.9 % 35.1 %
Cyprus 15.1 % 51.1 % 31.3 % 2.5 % 33.8 %
Hungary 14.5 % 53.5 % 28.3 % 3.7 % 32.0 %
Malta 20.4 % 57.0 % 21.2 % 1.3 % 22.5 %
EU-27
7.3 % 43.8 % 40.0 % 8.5 % 48.5 %
Average
1
Source: Hlavac (2011)

Moreover, in the light of further Western Balkan enlargement, EU MS are trying

to properly assess all the possible related inflows, as they did when granting them a visa
liberalisation regime establishing in the same time a post-visa liberalisation monitoring
mechanism. Like in the case of Romania, the stereotypes of Western Balkan countries -
exporting criminal activities and trafficking - persist in host populations' mindsets,
perpetuated by the media while the politically correct Eurocrats express their concerns.

1
Hlavac, M. (2011), Political Ideology and Individual-Level Attitudes Towards Immigration in the
European Union: Evidence from the European Values Study, 2008/2009, Master's Thesis, Georgetown
University, Georgetown Public Policy Institute, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1814608.
89
 Migration and politics
Due to the disturbances on the European labour market leading to high
unemployment, the immigration topic is being used demagogically by the increasing
number of radical parties (namely in the Netherlands, Austria, France, Hungary).
Unfortunately, MS pay more attention to the entry of migrants to their countries and do
not sufficiently take into consideration the integration policies. The local population is
often reluctant to receive the new inhabitants who carry further their own culture and
lifestyle. The existing stereotypes clash with the traditionalism of some migrant
communities, resulting in violent actions mostly directed against state establishments. This
is not unusual for France who receives an average of 200.000 immigrants each year.
This unsought attitude of migrants becomes a political tool for nationalist parties
who emphasize on the need to take action against unwanted visitors of their lands. The
Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders is a clear example in this sense. The
hostility against immigrants and Islam increased Wilders' electoral results thus proving
that part of the Dutch population prefers a cleaner country. The last scandal, in February
2012, when PVV set up a new website encouraging people to post their complaints about
central and east Europeans ... for general nuisance, pollution and labour market
displacement, steered lively reactions from the CEE countries as well as the European
community. However, Netherlands remains confronted with the challenge to reasonably
cope socially, culturally and economically with the approximately 200,000 Poles and
100,000 migrants from other CEE countries (primarily from Romania and Bulgaria) in a
difficult period when it just lost its triple AAA rating and its place as fifth-largest
economy in the Eurozone due to poor economic performance.
Another interesting aspect to underline is that migrant communities abroad begun
to be a political tool for some parties in their countries of origin. As the number of
Romanian migrants has reached around 10% of the country's population, their vote can
make a difference when it comes to sensitive elections. Virtually all relevant political
parties started to have tailor-made campaigns for the Diaspora. For the 2008 parliamentary
elections, a new constituency was created, some Members of Parliament thus being
elected to serve the Romanian communities abroad. Four colleges were created for the
Chamber of Deputies to cover Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and the
Americas and two additional colleges were designed for the Senate.
The 2009 presidential elections were also an example of the power of the
Diaspora. With a less than 1% difference to his opponent, Traian Basescu received a
second mandate, granted with the help of the Diaspora whose votes made the difference.
The presence of the Diaspora on the Romanian permanent electoral lists was also a topic
used by parties and media as a political standpoint during the 2012 referendum campaign.
Apparently, studies reveal that after living in a foreign country, Romanian migrants often
endorse centre-right political views and tend to be more critical and demanding towards
the social, economic or political system. Calls to create a Ministry for the Diaspora were
made emphasizing on the high presence of Romanian abroad and the need to provide
appropriate support. As another electoral campaign awaits (December 2012), the Diaspora
will continue to be a useful tool for the Romanian political class.
As previously underlined, the migration phenomenon has consequences on the
political systems. In the country of destination, political parties adopt positions and
strategies to best contain and control the migration phenomenon while in the countries of
origin the nationals abroad become a vulnerable but valuable political mass.

90
 Conclusions
Today, Romania faces a two million people Diaspora and the European Unions
reluctance to accommodate further Romanians alongside other Eastern or Balkan
nationalities. The consequences of the ongoing migration phenomenon are still far for being
addressed in a comprehensive manner. Unfortunately, Romania is facing a powerful brain
drain phenomenon possibly inflicting on the future development of the country. Migration
often linked to criminality is also a black stain on the country's image and continues to bring
prejudice in terms of EU policy related aspects. Managing migration has become sort of
integration conditionality as EU was so 'traumatised' by the Romanian 'exodus'.
As already mentioned, not all the data cited by media and various authorities is
accurate. European Commission documents provide insightful information for the analysis
of the migration phenomenon. The report on phase one of the Transnational Arrangement
regarding Romania and Bulgaria states that migration of these nationals started well
before the actual accession and escalated rapidly to reach 1.8 million Romanian and
Bulgarian EU residents at the end of 2007, compared to 690.000 at the end of 2003. Spain
was the receiver of 50% of the Romanian migrants, followed by Italy who accommodated
25%1. The young age of these workers and their skill mix brought a positive contribution
to the EU labour market helping to meet the offer and demand, unlike EU public opinions
view who still considers them as a threat.
While the Commission communications and European Parliament's resolutions
stress the economic added value of the presence of Romanian and Bulgarian workers on
EU market, public opinion polls continue to indicate the citizens holdback to tolerate
Romanian work force. The preconception is that they steal the already scarce jobs
available in the host country. Reality contradicts this assumption as Romanians usually
apply for jobs that the nationals of the receiving country would not pursue, not disturbing
their labour market but mostly complementing it. As the era of globalisation advances,
these concerns become redundant since the paradigm has already shifted from national
emphasis to a more general demand and offer approach.
Romanian migration is not an exclusive economic migration, as usually assumed
by default. There are some people, mostly among the young, who expressed their
disappointment and lack of trust in the political and economical system by leaving
Romania in an attempt to restart their life in countries where opportunities arise also due
to merits supplemented by hard work. Another aspect mostly ignored by researchers and
politicians is the fact that during communism, travelling abroad was a taboo. In the light
of EU's fundamental principle of free movement of persons, many chose the migration
adventure to fill in this communist void. However, some migrants become nostalgic,
seeking to perpetuate Romanian traditions (i.e. gastronomy, religious celebrations etc.), as
well as deciding to return. In this sense, it's worth mentioning that migrants' comeback has
a definite positive impact on the society as a whole.

1
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - The impact of free
movement of workers in the context of EU enlargement - Report on the first phase (1 January
2007 31 December 2008) of the transitional arrangements set out in the 2005 accession treaty
and as requested according to the transitional arrangement set out in the 2003 accession treaty,
COM/2008/0765 final, pg.5, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0765:EN:NOT.
91
 The know-how gained abroad, the Western lifestyle and critical approach towards
the social, political and economical arena are a form of enlightenment for certain citizens
who wouldn't have had the chance to accumulate this type of experience and information
otherwise. Signs of circular migration can be seen especially regarding rural population
who usually returns to build more prosperous households and, sometimes new businesses
thus acquiring new social statuses within the community.

Figure 6. Puzzle of Yanko Tsvetkov's Mapping stereotypes

Source: http://alphadesigner.com/mapping-stereotypes/

Despite the goals of integration and the political correctness that surrounds the EU
discourse, the media continues its negative broadcasting perpetuating public opinion's
negative image of Romania. Despite it being called a European issue, the Roma topic
creates lively debates in the countries of destination. However, for the sake of their
European integration, some MS, like France for instance, provided extensive social
incentives. In the light of the latest Roma expatriations towards Romania (August 2012), the
French authorities decided to make their labour market more flexible allowing a swifter
92
access of Romanian and Bulgarian thus including the Roma population as well into this
social mechanism. Furthermore, the Government promised to open up the debate on the EU
labour market remaining restrictions for these nationals during upcoming European Council
meetings and to push for an update in MS strategies for Roma inclusion as to include
similar provisions as the abovementioned labour integration strategy.
In order to conclude the remarks on the image of Romanian abroad, the
presentation of non-academic project could be revealing, namely the series of satirical
drawings by Bulgarian artist Yanko Tsvetkov's, entitled Mapping stereotypes1. Tsvetkov
is a migrant himself, a globetrotter, living his life all over Europe. In 2009, he started to
produce ironical maps that identify the prevailing stereotypes, posting the graphic art on
his website. People started to react and provided useful critics as well as raw material for
new ideas. The project literary pictures Europe through the lenses of different peoples.
Not to our surprise, the Europe according to the British, describes Romanians as
immigrants. The French think of Romania as poor brothers. When it comes to the
countries where there is a strong Romanian presence, like Spain for instance, the
characteristics fit the ungenerous nature of the occupations Romanians have in that place:
diaper changes. The Italians are more negative, placing the thieves stigma on the
country's map. The Poles call the Romanian Gypsy while even Bulgaria considers
Romania the poorer neighbour.
What do all these drawings tell us besides the comic side? These representations
are some countries' mainstream stereotypes about other nations based on people views and
opinions. Flawless as it may be, this kind of project gives researchers a great opportunity
to take a look at what foreigners think of a specific country at a given time as it stores
major events and trends (i.e. the Arab Winter - obvious reference to the Arab Spring
outcomes; Angela Merkel's Reich, according to the Cristal Ball 2020 etc.).
Unfortunately, at image level, Romania doesn't score very high and many of the
attributes associated with Romania fit a more general trend. As always, the positive
achievements are considered exceptions and do not have an influence on the general view.
Additional efforts are needed to rehabilitate Romania's image abroad and both the state
and its migrant citizens have to work on changing stereotypes. Furthermore, besides the
image aspect, efforts are needed to design efficient ways to tackle the brain drain
phenomenon and focus on the creation of a Romanian brain network abroad, as well as on
the brain retention by rewarding excellence. Only by these means could Romania entirely
consummate its EU role.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ackers, L. (2005). Moving People and Knowledge: Scientific Mobility in the European
Union. International Migration, Volume 43, Issue 5, pp. 99131, Blackwell
Publishing Ltd.
Alexe, I. (coord.) (2008). The Fourth Wave - The Brain Drain Along the Route Between
Romania - The West, Bucharest: Soros Fundation.
Andersen, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, London: Verso.

1
http://alphadesigner.com/mapping-stereotypes/
93
Anghel, R.G., Horvath, I. (coord.) (2009). Sociologia migraiei. Teorii i studii de caz
romneti, Iai: Polirom.
Crciun, V. (2011). Romnia n lumeazi, in Dimensiuni ale crizei societii
contemporane, Bucureti: Ed. Pro-Universitaria.
Hammond, A. (ed.) (2004). The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other,
1945-2003. Hampshire: Ashgate.
Prelipceanu, R. (2008). The New Migration Patterns to the EU: What Challenges for the
Individuals and for the Nation State, in Romanian Journal of European Affairs,
Volume 8, No. 4, Bucharest: European Institute of Romania.
Said, E. (1979). Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books.
Sandu, D. (coord.) (2006). Living Abroad on a Temporary Basis - The Economic
Migration of Romanians: 1990 - 2006, Bucharest: FSD.
Todorova, M. (1997). Imagining the Balkans, New York, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Wolff, L. (1994) Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the
Enligtement, Calofornia: Stanford University Press.

Studies and other resources:

Ali, S., Garden, G., Culling, B, Hunter, R., Oswald, A., Owen, N., Ralsmark, H and
Snodgrass, N. (2007). Elite Scientists and the Global Brain Drain, paper by the
University of Warwick, U.K.
Bhargava, A., Docquier, F., Moulla, Y. (2010). Modelling the Effect of Physician
Emigration on Human Development Revised Panel Data Set on Physician
Emigration (1991-2004), research project on Brain drain, return migration and
South-South migration: impact on labour markets and human capital (financially
supported by the Belgian National Funds for Scientific Research, the Austrian,
German, Korean, and Norwegian governments through the Multi-donor Trust Fund
on Labour Markets, Job Creation, and Economic Growth administered by the World
Bank's Social Protection and Labour unit).
Docquier, F., Rapoport, H. (2011). Globalisation, Brain Drain and Development, IZA DP
No. 5590, Bonn: IZA.
Halme, K., Cartalos, O., Lhteenmki-Smith, K. & Viljamaa, K. (2012). The Attractiveness
of the EU Top Scientists, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department
Economic and Scientific Policy, Brussels: European Parliament available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studiesdownload.html?languageDocum
ent=EN&file=74891.
Hlavac, M. (2011). Political Ideology and Individual-Level Attitudes Towards
Immigration in the European Union: Evidence from the European Values Study,
2008/2009, Master's Thesis, Georgetown University, Georgetown Public Policy
Institute, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1814608.
Jaroka, L. (March 2011). EU strategy on Roma inclusion (European Parliament report)
available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5884532.
Kausar, R. (2011). Identifying social and economic push and pull factors for migration to
the UK by Bulgarian and Romanian nationals. Research commissioned by the
Department for Communities and Local Government. London: Eland House,
available at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/corporate/pdf/19971601.pdf.
Saggar, S., Drean, J. (2001), British Public Attitudes and Ethnic Minorities, Performance
and Innovation Unit, study commissioned by the UK Government.
94
Sandu, D. (2005). Patterns of temporary emigration: experiences and intentions at
individual and community levels. Paper presented at the Workshop on
Developments and Patterns of Migration Processes in Central and Eastern Europe,
25 to 27 August 2005 in Prague.
Suciu, O.V. (2010). Migration in Europe: Case Studies: Bulgaria & Romania, Centre for
Research into Post-Communist Economies, CRCE 2010 Colloquium.
Uccellini, C.M. (2010). 'Outsiders' after Accession. The case of Romanian migrants in
Italy, 1989-2009. Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Conference 'Insiders and
outsiders'.

Internet sources:
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - The
impact of free movement of workers in the context of EU enlargement - Report on the
first phase (1 January 2007 31 December 2008) of the transitional arrangements
set out in the 2005 accession treaty and as requested according to the transitional
arrangement set out in the 2003 accession treaty, COM/2008/0765 final: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0765:EN:NOT
Econtext analysis on medical brain drain in Romania, http://www.econtext.ro/dosar--
2/analiza/exodul-creierelor-incepe-sa-ne-doara-romania-la-coada-europei-dupa-
numarul-de-doctori-vezi-cati-medici-mai-sunt-in-romania-si-in-celelalte-tari-
europene.html
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st13440.en08.pdf
Institutul National de Statistica (INS) (National Institute for Statistics, Romania)
http://insse.ro/cms/rw/pages/index.en.do
International Organisation for Migration
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/europe-facts-and-figures
Ministerul Internelor si Reformei Administrative (MIRA), Autoritate pentru Straini (ApS)
(Romanian Ministry of Interior and Administration Reform, Authority for Aliens)
http://aps.mai.gov.ro/english/index_en.htm
Stockholm Programme
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF
Eurobarometer 64.2
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_ro_nat.pdf
Eurobarometer 65
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_ro_nat.pdf
Special Eurobarometer 255, Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf
Eurobarometer 66
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_ro_nat.pdf
Eurobarometer 76
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_ro_ro_nat.pdf
EU framework for national Roma strategies designed by the Commission (April 2011)
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/discrimination/docs/com_2011_173_en.pdf
Mapping stereotypes
http://alphadesigner.com/mapping-stereotypes/

95
BOOK REVIEW

97
 Muslims and Contexts in the Study of Muslim Minorities.
Visible and Invisible Muslims, by Nadia Jeldtoft and Jorgen
Nielsen (eds.), Routledge, London, New York, Hardcover, 242 pp.
Luca Ferreiro PRADO

Muslims and Contexts in the Study of Muslim Minorities. Visible and Invisible
Muslims offers new insights on how to carry out research when studying non-organized
Muslims. It is based on field work done in several European countries that include Italy
(Turin), France (Paris), Germany (Hamburg), Sweden and Denmark.
The book is divided into an introduction and two parts: methods (chapters two to
nine) and contexts (chapters 10 to 13). In the introduction, Jeldtoft and Nielsen state that
their main focus on non-organized Muslims goes beyond traditional research based on the
representatives of institutionalized forms of religion and offers new representations of
migrant reality. These views understand themselves as a part of reality and do not claim to
be representative of the whole.
In chapter two (Studying Muslims and constructing Islamic identity), Bectovic
problematizes Muslim use of Islam and the role researchers have in interpreting Muslim
identity. Bectovic points out the scarce attention that Muslims self perception has on
research. He also notes that by focusing research on Muslim religious practice and
neglecting other elements of identity, Muslim identity is oversimplified and reduced to a
sole feature. In chapter Three (Lived Islam: religious identity with non-organized
Muslim minorities), Jeldtoft presents a comparative study of Muslims in Germany and
Denmark, aiming to understand religiosity from a three-fold perspective: Religious
practice and non-practice, attitudes towards and use of authority and tradition, belonging
and being (Jeldtoft 2012, pg. 31). In Jensens chapter four on Context, focus and new
perspectives in the study of Muslim religiosity what has been found particularly appalling
is the authors attempt to overcome usual sampling problems derived from the traditional
snowball approach results in the singling out of a pistol approach methodology. This
method seeks to access as many field sites as possible in order to avoid the overreliance on
the same social networks. Ritualization among young adult Muslims in Malm and
Copenhagen (chapter 5) from Jonas Otterbeck is an openly transgressive innovation. For
the first time in academic scholarship cartoons are used as a way of showing (mostrar) the
evidence found in interviews. Although Otterbeck is certainly a pioneer, the actual fact of
making cartoons out of the interviews does not enable the reader to better improve the
understanding of the topic. Chapter 6: Excuse me, which radical organization are you a
member of? Reflections on methods to study highly religious but non-organized
individuals is also methodologically relatively unusual in the Anglo-Saxon world as Lene
Khle explores Muslims world-views using focus groups a technique traditionally
applied to marketing oriented research-.
However the use of this qualitative technique in social research has been explored
in other contexts. Spanish sociological research has been pioneer in the application of this

Luca Ferreiro Prado holds a Phd on International Relations and is senior lecturer at the European
University of Madrid. lucia.ferreiro@uem.es.
98
technique, since the late 70s when Ibaez (1979) gave discussion groups the necessary
theoretical support to overcome the shortcomings of focus groups. The reason for the
relative ignorance of its existence outside the Spanish-speaking community is due to the
fact that Spanish sociologists have not published in English-speaking Journals. Discussion
groups have also been put into practice in the field of International Relations in sensitive
cultural topics, including religiosity (Ferreiro 2011).
In our opinion, it is Hemmingstens chapter 7 on Salafi Jihadism: Relying on
fieldwork to study unorganized and clandestine phenomena the chapter which credits the
highest methodological merits. The author manages to gain the trust and, thus the access
to a highly stigmatized and fairly unexplored group, obtain the necessary information for
the investigation and, at the same time, protect identities in such a way that she is able to
avoid having authorities request her work on the basis of security reasons. In addition, the
content is very suggestive as it breaks down the prejudices on the reason that underlie the
use of jihadi violence in Denmark. Islam and poor integration are proved not to be
sufficient causes to explain a much more complex phenomenon to which ethnic Danes
also adhere to (Hemmingsten 2012, pg. 102).
Garbi Schmidt deals in chapter 8 with Understanding and Approaching Muslim
Visibilities: Lessons Learned from a Fieldwork-based Study of Muslims in Copenhaguen.
The most attractive element of this work is the ethical standpoint of the author who
considers giving back the results to the community a necessary part of the research
process. This act empowers the object of study who is enabled to express his/her view on
the representation of that reality which has been made of the group. In addition, Schmidt
considers that showing the results to the community enriches both the analysis and the
conclusions and facilitates future participation in research projects.
Chapter 9 also stands out for its acute methodology. In Faith intersections and
Muslim women in the European microcosm: notes towards the study of non-organized
Islam, Sara Silvestri focuses her research on Muslims womens life and feelings but
without imposing the researchers topics onto her interviewees. She finds this is best done
following a grounded theory approach. Grounded-theory is a way of researching that, to
our knowledge, has only been carried out in immigrant Muslim minorities by Soriano,
who applied the aforementioned approach to Moroccan women in Spain (Soriano, 2006)
PART TWO is devoted to the contexts in which Muslim migration lives. In stark
contrast to PART ONE, contexts are based on quantitative data. Therefore, results are not
limited to a heuristic value and are representative of the phenomena it covers. Connors
chapter 10 on Contexts of immigrant receptivity and immigrant religious outcomes: the
case of Muslims in Western Europe is based on different waves of the European Social
Survey (2002, 2004 and 2006) and it explains how less welcoming immigrant contexts are
associated to higher religious outcomes in comparison to the host countrys religiosity
(Connor 2012, pg. 141). Bevelander and Otterbecks study on Young peoples attitudes
towards Muslims in Sweeden (chapter 11) uses the multiple regression technique to
inquire on the attitudes towards Muslims held by held by Swedish teenagers (15 to 19 year
olds). Results show that factors that have traditionally been thought to have an impact,
such as socioeconomic status, are not proved relevant, whilst other elements (like the
socio-psychological factors of each individual, family environment and unemployment)
that have had an impact in past research have been reconfirmed by this study. Chapter 12
on Democracy and denomination: democratic values among Muslim minorities and the
majority population in Denmark by Peter Gundelcah tests Huntingtons ideas on a clash of
civilizations within Western societies due to Muslim immigrations apparent lack of
99
adhesion to democracy. Results show -quite the opposite reality-, ethnic Danes have less
democratic principles than the ethnic minorities living in their territory. Lastly,
Maliepaard, Lubber and Gijsberts chapter 12 on Generational differences in ethnic and
religious attachment and their interrelations. A study among Muslim minorities in the
Netherlands focuses on exploring the cultural elements of integration which have not had
the adequate attention by assimilation studies, focused on structural integration. Results
confirm previous findings on second generation majority tendency to a more nuanced
attachment to religion and ethnic origin in contrast to their parents.
In conclusion, Muslims and Contexts greater achievement lies in its capacity to
opening up new possibilities on the research of Muslim populations in European
countries. Social research aimed at studying migrant ethnic groups should always include
the broader reception context where installations take place, since inter-ethnic relations are
based on the continuous interaction of communities. Methods of study should always take
into account the circumstances in which a specific immigrant community lives. On the
other hand, the books main drawback is that several studies lack a reasonable sample
upon which to draw, making their empirical validity weak.
All in all, the text is well-written, concise and direct in its aims and it is
characterized by acute preciseness. It is recommended reading for specialized scholars
wishing to open up their research to new perspectives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ferrreiro Prado, L. (2011): Migraciones internacionales e influencia cultural: espaoles y

marroques en la Comunidad Autnoma de Madrid, Rey Juan Carlos University,
Madrid, un-published Phd. Dissertation.
Soriano, R. (2006): La inmigracin femenina marroqu. Un estudio desde la Grounded
Theory, Revista Internacional de Sociologa, no. 43, vol. LXIV: pp.169-191.

100
PROMOTING OUR ACADEMIC COMMUNITY AT
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

101
 ARRISE members at the European Evaluation Society Biennial
The Tenth Biennial Conference of the European Evaluation Society entitled
"Evaluation in the networked society: New concepts, New challenges, New opportunities"
was held in Helsinki, Finland on 3-5 October 2012. The event was attended by Professor
Iordan Gheorghe Brbulescu, Chairman of the Senate of National University of Political
Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) and President of the Romanian Association of
International Relations and European Studies (ARRISE); Professor Ioan Horga, Dean of the
Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication and Vice-
president of the Romanian Association of International Relations and European Studies
(ARRISE); Nicolae Todera and Oana Andreea Ion PhD lecturers within the Department of
International Relations and European Integration and members of ARRISE.
The conference was regarded as the main international event of the year in
evaluation because more than 600 representatives from over 70 countries participated at the
activities of the reunion. The event was attended by numerous personalities from the field,
such as Robert Stake, Elliot Stern Kim Forssa, Maria Bustelo, Nicoletta Stamos, Vedung
Evert, Jennifer Greene, Robert Kirkpatrick and others. Due to a wide international
participation, the event can be considered important not only for Europe, but for the entire
area of evaluation, especially since major international organizations and important financial
donors, all over the world, were represented there. The conference agenda contained 52
panels and symposiums, as well as 275 parallel sessions of scientific communications.
The papers presented there had a clear theoretical approach, but also elements
proving the authors interests towards a more practical experience in evaluation, so we can
say that the conference successfully managed to combine the two perspectives on
evaluation. The symposiums and working groups provided new perspectives and
interesting guidelines for investigation, analysis and innovation in this field. Several
speakers emphasized the role of internationalization and Europeanization of practices and
evaluation tools, policies and national strategies, cultural convergence etc. The main
topics addressed during the conference activities were: evaluation governance, networks
and information; evaluation research, methods and practices; evaluation ethics,
capabilities and professionalism; evaluation of regional, social and development programs
and policies; evaluation in government and in organizations.
During the conference, Professor Brbulescu and his colleagues - lecturers Oana
Andreea Ion and Nicholas Todera - presented the paper Purposes and criteria for
evaluating the way in which the responsiveness principle is implemented within public
organizations. Case-study: Romanian universities. The research started from the idea that
in the context of an organizational culture oriented towards responsiveness, organizations,
through applied practices and procedures of evaluation, are called not only to provide
instant answers for the current problems of the communities they interact with, but also to
design landmarks, impulses and visions in order to assist them in the development process
identifying alternative solutions, shaping development modes, anticipating possible
scenarios for their beneficiaries and communities they serve. All these aspects need to be
assessed in order to provide the necessary impetus for organizational development and for
a continuous improvement of services, products and programs offered.
In the first part of the paper the authors identified the need for theoretical and
practical assumptions concerning evaluation of the way in which organizations apply the
principle of responsiveness. In this regard, they used the responsive evaluation approach,
102
originally developed by Robert Stake, and then leaned on the particularities of evaluating
the application of the responsiveness principle to specific educational organizations. The
second part of the paper has been used to describe and analyze the developments in
applying the responsiveness principle to internal and external evaluation of higher
education institutions in Romania. At the end of this analysis the authors proposed a set of
criteria to evaluate the organizational responsiveness, criteria that could be used by
Romanian universities to improve quality assurance. The paper will be published in a
specialized academic journal in Romania.
Professor Ioan Horga presented the paper The evaluation of cross-border
programmes in Romania. The valorization of expertise from the academic environment.
The research aimed to present the evolutionary stage of the evaluation process of the
European Territorial Co-operation, and especially that of the cross-border programmes. In
this analysis professor Ioan Horga departs, on one hand from the European expertise in the
assessment of cross-border programs and especially those developed through the
INTERACT network, associating them with other local enterprises. On the other hand,
analysis takes into account the evaluation of two of the cross-border programs between
Romania and EU countries (Romania-Bulgaria Cross-border Co-operation Programme,
Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme). He also specified that in the
Universities of Craiova, Oradea and Timisoara exists the scientific expertise able to be
involved in the assessment process of the cross-border programs, in all its phases.
The event was an important one for SNSPA and ARRISE given that fact that in
2010 the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration started to offer a
master program focused on Evaluation of European Public Programs and Policies, and from
the autumn of 2011 a network of regional inter-university cooperation in teaching courses
and modules of evaluation for public programs and policies began to be developed. The
network was created based on the cooperation establish within the framework of ARRISE, a
structure that facilitated the dialogue and future partnerships. As a result, in October 2013
two higher education institutions from Romania, University of Oradea and Babes-Bolyai
University in Cluj-Napoca, will offered master programs in evaluation of public policies and
programs. We should mention that in May 2013, under the umbrella of this master program,
SNSPA will organize a School of Advanced Studies entitled New approaches to evaluating
public policies and programs. Strengthen evaluation capacity in Romania, coordinated by
Professor Iordan Gheorghe Brbulescu and achieved through funds from IDEI Program -
School of Advanced Studies, managed by UEFISCDI.
The participation of the four members of ARRISE at the Conference organized by
the European Evaluation Society was possible through the project "Inter-university
cooperation to develop quality courses and masters programs in the field of evaluation of
public policies and programs (EVAL-EPPP)" POSDRU/18 / 1.2/G/28682. One of the
objectives of the project refers to facilitating innovation in the area of evaluation public
programs and policies through transfer, adaptation and integration of best practices in
curriculum development process. One of the main activities of the project is to establish
and develop a regional network of inter-university cooperation in the area of evaluation of
public policies and programs and connecting it to the European evaluation community -
European Evaluation Society.
More information can be found on the conference website: http://www.ees2012.org/.

103
 President of ARRISE, Professor Iordan Gheorghe Brbulescu
member in the International Steering Committee of the European
Union - Latin America and the Caribbean Academic Summit

Professor Iordan Gheorghe Brbulescu, President of the Romanian Association of

International Relations and European Studies (ARRISE), representing the National
University of Political Studies and Public Administration, attended the second
Preparatory Seminar regarding the organization of the European Union - Latin America
and the Caribbean Academic Summit, held in Lima, Peru on 8-9 October 2012. During the
seminar, Professor Brbulescu moderated the panel European-Latin-American Higher
Education Area. Previously, Professor Iordan Brbulescu attended the first Preparatory
Seminar which was organised on July 7, 2012 in Paris, France.
The European Union - Latin America and the Caribbean Academic Summit will
take place in Santiago, Chile on 22-23 January 2013 and will bring together academic
institutions from both regions - universities, research centers and institutes, but also other
higher education organizations active in the bi-regional dialogue. The Academic Summit,
which will take place in parallel with the political one, attempts to analyze current and
future cooperation opportunities in the Euro-Latin American area of higher education and
science, research and innovation, but also to discuss new proposals for the development of
this cooperation.
National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, represented
Professor Iordan Brbulescu, is the only institution of higher education in Central and
Eastern Europe represented in the International Steering Committee of the event. Based on
the results of the discussions during the Preparatory Seminar organized in Lima, the
Committee will set the agenda and the topics of the Summit that will take place in
Santiago, in January 2013. We should remark that through such activities ARRISE is
promoted in international structures and networks of cooperation and development
assistance.
More information can be found on the website http://www.cumbreacademica-alcue.cl/

104
 Call for Papers
Romanian Journal of International Relations and European Studies
Place of publication: Romania
Type of publication: print and online
Publication date: May 2013
Published/Edited by: The Romanian Association of International Relations and European
Studies
Topics: The editors of the Romanian Journal of International Relations and European
Studies (RoJIRES) are encouraging contributions for the third issue of the journal. The
main topic of this issue is: New Governance in the EU. The Journal welcomes
manuscripts related to the emergence of new governance processes and practices within
the EU Policy Making. The editors emphasise on Cohesion Policy, EU Justice and Home
Affairs, Social Policy, Environmental Policy and other relevant case studies. Strong
theoretical and empirical contributions are highly recommended.
All potential authors are invited to submit an abstract (200-250 words) to office@rojir.ro
by February 11th, 2013. By February 20th, 2013 the authors will be informed about the
acceptance of their abstracts. When the abstract is accepted, a full draft paper should be
submitted by April 10th, 2013.
Abstracts may be in Word, WordPerfect, or RTF formats with the following information
and in this order: a) author(s), b) affiliation, c) email address, d) title of abstract, e) body
of abstract, f) up to 6 keywords.
E-mails should be entitled: New Governance in the EU Abstract Submission
Please use plain text (Times Roman 12) and abstain from using footnotes and any special
formatting, characters or emphasis (such as bold, italics or underline). Please note that the
printed edition is planned for the beginning of May 2013. We acknowledge receipt and
answer to all paper proposals submitted.
Authors can also submit articles on other innovative theoretical and empirical issues and
approaches.
Book Reviews
We are also looking for reviews of books published between 2010-2012 dealing with
developments in the fields of Political Science, International Relations Theory and
European Studies. Reviewers must have their own copy of the book. Book reviews should
have 1,000 - 1,500 words and should not only present the book, but also critically discuss
the main issues it raises. Deadline for book reviews submission is April 10th, 2013.
Deadlines:
Abstract submission: February 11th, 2013.
Applicants will be informed about selection: February 20th, 2013.
Paper submission: April 10th, 2013.
Contact: For any further information please feel free to contact the editors at
office@rojir.ro.
105