# 11 G.R. No.

207246, November 22, 2016

JOSE M. ROY III v. CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA, THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, AND PHILILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY

FACTS:

This is a case of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 2013 (SEC-MC No. 8)issued by the SEC for allegedly being in violation
of the Court's Decision ("Gamboa Decision") and Resolution ("Gamboa Resolution") in Gamboa v. Finance
Secretary Teves, G.R. No. 176579 which jurisprudentially established the proper interpretation of Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution.

On June 28, 2011, the Court issued the Gamboa Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the
Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term "capital"
in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to
impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

On May 20, 2013, the SEC, through Chairperson Herbosa, issued SEC-MC No. 8 entitled "Guidelines
on Compliance with the Filipino-Foreign Ownership Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution and/or
Existing Laws by Corporations Engaged in Nationalized and Partly Nationalized Activities." Section 2 of SEC-
MC No. 8 provides:

Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory
ownership requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required
percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors.

On June 10, 2013, Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the validity of SEC-MC
No. 8 for not conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision and Resolution and for having been
issued by the SEC with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner Roy also questions the ruling of the SEC that
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company ("PLDT") is compliant with the constitutional rule on
foreign ownership. He prays that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8 unconstitutional and direct the SEC to issue
new guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in
accordance with Gamboa.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the act or issuance

RULING:
 Petitioners have no legal standing to question the constitutionality of SEC-MC No. 8. The personal and
substantial interest that enables a party to have legal standing is one that is both material, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the government action, as distinguished from mere interest in the issue involved, or a
mere incidental interest, and real, which means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

As to injury, the party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

To establish his standing, petitioner Roy merely claimed that he has standing to question SEC-MC No.
8 "as a concerned citizen, an officer of the Court and as a taxpayer" as well as "the senior law partner of his
own law firm[, which] x x x is a subscriber of PLDT."

The Court has previously emphasized that the locus standi requisite is not met by the expedient
invocation of one's citizenship or membership in the bar who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders
of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued as these supposed interests are too general, which
are shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry. Per their allegations, the personal interest invoked by
petitioners as citizens and members of the bar in the validity or invalidity of SEC-MC No. 8 is at best equivocal,
and totally insufficient.

Petitioners' status as taxpayers is also of no moment. As often reiterated by the Court, a taxpayer's suit
is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct correlation of the act complained of and the
disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution, or has shown that the case involves
the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. SEC-MC No. 8 does not involve an additional
expenditure of public funds and the taxing or spending power of Congress.

The allegation that petitioner Roy's law firm is a "subscriber of PLDT" is ambiguous. It is unclear
whether his law firm is a "subscriber" of PLDT's shares of stock or of its various telecommunication services.
Petitioner Roy has not identified the specific direct and substantial injury he or his law firm stands to suffer as
"subscriber of PLDT" as a result of the issuance of SEC-MC No. 8 and its enforcement. Moreover, in the most
practical sense, a PLDT subscriber loses or gains nothing in the event that SEC-MC No. 8 is either sustained
or struck down by [the Court].

#12 REPUBLIC VS. RANESES

FACTS:

Raneses filed for an Original Registration of Land Title which was granted upon due hearing and
presentation of evidence and witnesses, among which were several tax declaration certificates and the
testimony of the respondents mother that the land has been in the possession of her husband since
the Japanese occupation and subsequently inherited by her son after an extrajudicial partition among
the heirs.
Laguna Lake Development Authority submitted its opposition on the grounds that the subject parcels of
land were inalienable as it was below the 12.5 meter elevation, hence forming part of the lake bed.
The OSG filed its notice of appeal.
Raneses then filed his comment and motion arguing that the RTC should give more credence to his
evidence as it was the result of an actual survey as opposed to the table survey of the petitioners.
Moreover, the respondent argued that the petitioner did not formally offer its evidence, and hence,
should not be admitted.
 The RTC decided in favor of herein respondent. So did the CA upon appeal.

ISSUES:

Was the evidence presented by the respondent enough to grant him Land Registration?

HELD:

No. It bears noting that in support of his claim that the subject properties are alienable and disposable,
respondent merely presented the Conversion- Subdivision Plan which was prepared by Engr.
Montallana with the annotation that the subject properties were inside alienable and disposable land
area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per LC Map No. 2623 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
196842 and the Inter-Office Memorandum from the LLDA.

In Republic v. Dela Paz43 citing Republic v. Sarmiento,44 this Court ruled that the notation of the
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that this survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by
the Bureau of Forestry, is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome
the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.

In contrast, this Court has held that the applicant must present a certificate of land classification status
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and
that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further,
the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by
the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.awred

Clearly, the pieces of evidence submitted by respondent before the RTC in this case hardly satisfy the
aforementioned documentary requirements. Given the lack of evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve whether the Inter-Office
Memorandum should be given more credence over the ECD Memorandum.