ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.

EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of
a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The
board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought
to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared
private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the
board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office
of the vice mayor of Makati.
Issue:

WON, respondent is of Philippine citizenship.

Held:

Yes. the Court ruled that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.

CITIZENSHIP; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; DISTINGUISHED FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE. Dual

citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for
the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are
citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article
IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.

RATIONALE. In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No.
7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As
Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of
other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen
of another country is something completely beyond our control. By electing Philippine citizenship, such
candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and
thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY SUFFICED TO RENOUNCE AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC it was held: It is not
disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code
would disqualify him from running for any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative,
as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that
he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before
he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship. On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995: By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in
1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government. These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections
of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private respondent had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar vs.
COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar: Considering the fact that
admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino [T]he Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is no implied renunciation
of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must
be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either express or implied. To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that
he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before
as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
Facts: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo,
a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her
father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship.
Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship averring that she
was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and national
elections as shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has
effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to
entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on certiorari, pointing out that
while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election
of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the nearest
local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority.

Issues:

1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally and

jurisdictionally permissible?

2. Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship?

Held:

1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a
specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts
competence.

2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which
declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship
followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine
citizenship. For respondent to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship,
to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article
IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
(3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625
unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently,
the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing
of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding
provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in
the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had
not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence
submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed
12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the
petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not
within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the
nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the
age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay
and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the
exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship
by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer
upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we
held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied.

EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares
St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income of
around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write
English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December
12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition
should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted
in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9

During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in
1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So familys business. He would usually attend parties and
other social functions hosted by petitioners family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and
possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years;
they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo
Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and
mingled well with friends.

The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
decision to the CA on the following grounds:

Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three ways
by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to
R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative
naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.

First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives,
who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated
love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the intention
of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship
less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather than judicial in nature.
Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the naturalization law of the
Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended
or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of
acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is
that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within
the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been
previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the
declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in
the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable;
and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicants worthiness.

We do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary
proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of
naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading
the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of
naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate.59 If the
government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it appeal the decision of the
RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.

RENATO M. DAVID v. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015, THIRD DIVISION (Villarama, Jr., J.)

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at
the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63,
the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country
was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-
acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a
consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned.

In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot
where they constructed a residential house. However, they came to know that the portion where they built
their house is a public land and part of the salvage zone. In April 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject land wherein he indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private
respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and she also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
in October 2007.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information in court. David filed
a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same was denied. Meanwhile,
CENRO rejected Davids MLA, ruling that the latters subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
did not cure the defect in his MLA. Thereafter, an information for Falsification of Public Document was
filed before the Municipal Trial Court and a warrant of arrest was issued against the David. The latter then
filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause, which was denied. Davids petition for
certiorari before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) was likewise denied.

ISSUES:

1. May David be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquition of Philippin citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225?

2. Did the MTC properly deny Davids motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused?

RULING:

I
1. R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired

Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: xxx

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath (Emphasis supplied).

While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the
conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural- born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath ofallegiance is required
for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the
terminology used is different, re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural -born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before
and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine
Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and retain to describe
the legal
effect of taking the oath of allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title
of the lawusing both re-acquisition and retention.

Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not
necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because
R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in
contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizensafter R.A. 9225 came into
force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens
as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new laws effectivity.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC refers to
falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification of documents
under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the
acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the falsification was committed in
a public, official or commercial document.

David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the
time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which anatural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect insofaras his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article172,
paragraph 1.

2. The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying
petitioners motion for redetermination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.
However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for
bail. In Miranda

v. Tuliao, which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between
custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived when he files

any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable
cause, the MTC clearly erred instating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such
erroneous ground stated in the MTC's order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

Facts:
 Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied
for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4
On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.5

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition
to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnados US
citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and
departing the Philippines.

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered
the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. The First
Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18The Court ruled that Arnados act
of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before
the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number
of

lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC: ruled in
favor of arnado
 Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, There are three questions posed by the parties
before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
Issues:

1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.

3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.
SC:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner. Comport

2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American,

Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive
act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth,
who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by
the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified
to run for a
local electiv
.

3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained
the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring
of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This
doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring
issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the
elections.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving
a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
 This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a

decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x
x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had
been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4
June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to
hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue
of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been
passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to
the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots
cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of
eligibility to run for public office.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity
to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorates voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1wphi1

With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole
and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed
second to ineligible ones.

The electorates awareness of the candidates disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification
to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate
ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment.
The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. With Arnado being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification
prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already
and he was already proclaimed the winner.

Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply