Supreme Court of the Philippines

336 Phil. 154

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 123361, March 03, 1997
TEOFILO CACHO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION AND THE CITY OF
ILIGAN, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of land
situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the
limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were jointly
tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho vs.
Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the
following pronouncements:
Re: Case No. 6908
The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased by the
applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel Salzos. The
title of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in his favor, executed
and signed by a Moro woman named Alanga, who acted for her
husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears that the husband of
Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and before admitting this parcel to
registration, it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon be presented,
renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No.
6908. It is further ordered that the applicant present the corresponding
deed from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the
larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than 90 acres.
This was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto Bunglay.

Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance from his

uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the balance by his
own possession and cultivation.
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by the
Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of
parcels now on trial before this court, the average size of the parcels is
not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro
with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one
in question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is
owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased
Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of
expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest of the
land solicited in said case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had
another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part
cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes marking the N.E.,
S.E., & N.W. corners of the land found to have been cultivated by
Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the
points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the costs of the
new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by the
Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
 Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said
deed and the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole heir of the
late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two original
certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the original GLRO
Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the Philippines,
National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic
and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the petition because it found the evidence
inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be restored. The
same order stated further that the proper remedy was for the reconstitution of
decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No.
10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The same trial court
specifically found that since the decrees had, in fact, been issued, the judgment of
this Court in Cacho vs. U.S., supra, although by itself expressly dependent upon
some conditions, must have indisputably become final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit
amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court
(docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495)
but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to
accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees under
the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961)
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and
the lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the
omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the
decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the
respondents being heard in their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept
the amended petition subject to the private respondents being given the
opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence
already on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to
controvert existing evidence shall be given the parties.
(p. 59, Rollo.)
Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one for re-
issuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition,
respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the
petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real
p j p
party in interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was not
the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees covering the
properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and that the issuance
of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered its
decision decreeing the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and
18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for the
issuance of the subject decrees.
This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959 were
issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and that
the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had
already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited
pronouncements and therefore these should now be considered final
and conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through its then
Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of Court
III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all
certified that according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary
Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record
No. 6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No.
6908. (Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC Commissioner
Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this Court, confirmed
that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the original petition for
reconstitution have been regularly and properly done based on existing
records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued and recorded
in LRC's Record Book of Decrees; that the plan and technical
description of the lots involved were found to be correct, approved by
the LRC and transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and
63 in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and
18969 in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A.
Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and
validated the report of the LRC to this Court on the present petition,
(Exh. "M"), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC had recorded
the fact and date of issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in
GLRO Rec. No. 6908 and 6909 and the approval of the plans and
corresponding technical descriptions of the lots involved in the
aforesaid record numbers and decrees (Exh. "T").
 ( )
It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors' counsel,
Arandilla produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary
Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries showing that
Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case No. 6908 and
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No. 6909. (Exhs.
"T", "P" and "19").
From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the
existence of the decrees have been established sufficiently and
indubitably by the evidence submitted by the petitioner, and therefore,
said amended petition has to be granted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring
Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969 as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration
Commission) to reissue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869 existing at
the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in the name of
Demetria Cacho upon payment by the petitioner of the required legal
fees.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their joint
brief assigned the following errors:
The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho's amended
petition for reconstitution of decrees of registration purportedly issued
in LRC Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Notwithstanding that
I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;
II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the
United States, 28 Phil. 616, that final decision in LRC Cases 6908
and 6909 had been reserved pending compliance by the applicant
therein of certain conditions albeit, as of Date, No competent
evidence exists showing compliance with the imposed conditions
and/or the rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the issuance
of decrees pursuant thereto;
III.The petition is barred by laches; and
 IV.The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person and/or a
party who does not have a lawful interest in the case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred:
1. In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho's" petition for
reconstitution of titles when the same is already barred by
laches.
2. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when
there is no proof that Teofilo Cacho actually exists and is a
real party in interest.
3. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in
the absence of sufficient proof to the effect that land
registration Decree Nos. 10364 & 18969 were indeed issued
to Demetria Cacho.
4. In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated
16 April 1979 dismissing the original petition for
reconstitution of title.
5. In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already
owned by appellant City of Iligan pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4 October 1965) which
ownership was affirmed by the Supreme Court on 26
February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al.,
158 SCRA 158].

(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)

The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and brushed
aside respondents' claim of jurisdictional infirmities. It also acknowledged the
issuance and existence of the registration decrees in favor of Demetria Cacho, to
wit:
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree
Nos. 10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and
GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively,
according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land
Registration Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration
Commission Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the Supreme Court),
submitted a Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance
with an order at the lower court, confirming that the plan and technical
description of the land involving both Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that
said lots are decreed properties, and that all the proceedings undertaken
by the LRC were regularly done based on existing records.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower
court and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969,
with prejudice, for the following reasons:
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of
the United States on December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28 Phil. 617,
regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and
granted in part the application for adjudication and registration of the
two parcels of land of Demetria Cacho, appellee's predecessor-in-
interest. Final decision on the cases was reserved pending compliance
with conditions set forth therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908, "x x x before admitting this parcel to registration,
it is ordered that a deed from Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all
his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil.
629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant
in Case No. 6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares .
. . (28 Phil. 619). The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa
Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by
the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel
object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest
of the land solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day
of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular
inspection for the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by
Datto Anandog . . . with previous notice to the applicant and her husband
and representative Seor Vidal. Having arrived late, Seor Vidal did not
assist in the ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless, set stakes
marking the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630); "And it is ordered
that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned . .
." (28 Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in
the Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner
of the Land Registration Commission and the plan submitted by
Demetria Cacho in Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is
37.87 hectares, and as to the date of approval, which is November 15,
1910. Since the Supreme Court decision in Cacho vs. US "ordered that
the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned"; that
applicant Demetria Cacho is owner only of the portion of land occupied
and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog; and that her application as
to all the rest of the land solicited in case No. 6909 is denied, it follows
that the new survey, if it was made, must have a smaller area and a later
date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in
GLRO No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the
 absence of the "new survey" on which to base the area and technical
description of the parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property
through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the
original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his
right to recover back the possession of such property and the title
thereto, by reason of laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to act
earlier;
b. that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that
appellee would not assert the right on which he bases his suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to
them in the event that relief is accorded to the appellee or that the suit
is not held barred; and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property
covered by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which,
unless the contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands, under the
principle that all "lands belong to the Crown which have not been
granted by (the King), or in his name, or by the kings who preceded
him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that
he is a real party interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in
interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to
be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the present
petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of substance in
a way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this Court:
First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a
reopening of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and
July 8, 1915, respectively, when it required proof of compliance with
conditions for their issuance. These conditions are conclusively
 presumed to have been complied with before the original decrees were
issued and can no longer be inquired into.
Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing
doctrines pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as
a bar to the reissuance of decrees.
Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this
Honorable Court when it applied laches despite the total absence of
proof to establish the requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the
"Regalian doctrine" to dispense with proof of the essential elements of
laches.
Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility
to uphold the stability and integrity of the Torrens system.
Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on
the identity and existence of petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed
by wild and gratuitous allusions to the contrary.
(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed their
respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of registration
is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and
its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the
filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an answer to
said application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication
required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration
proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then Land Registration
Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan (now a
distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy Clerk of Court III, the Head
Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, the lower court and the Court
of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that decrees of registration had in
fact been issued in the case at bench. It is likewise beyond dispute that such
decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. To allow
the final decrees to once again be subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914
 g j
case of Cacho vs. U.S. would be tantamount to setting aside the decrees which
cannot be reopened after the lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs.
Pascual, 107 Phil. 695 [1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the
very purpose of the Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners
to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of
the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees
presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere
ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the
NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that
the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior
fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the
corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913
(upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO
Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on
December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon
which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the
decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus,
violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the
judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the
whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides,
such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of
the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason therefor
may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions
and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration
case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately
enforce a judgment that is secured against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership of a parcel of land
is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and
confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had
been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or
 y y
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a
decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land
Registration Commission ...
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuver (25 SCRA 316
[1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered
inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was reiterated in Vda.
De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being a real
party in interest, records show that petitioner has sufficiently established his
existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the property in
question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355, Page 128, Series
of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in Chicago. The fact of
adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was published in the Times Journal.
Petitioner also appeared personally before Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the
Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and
executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to
represent him in this case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of
Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to
assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who
alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by
merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting
preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason shall
the same rule apply in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly sworn
before the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the Philippines in
Chicago, the act of the administering oath being of itself a performance of duty by
a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the Twelfth
Judicial Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No. CLR (GLRO)
Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
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