RUJJERIC Z.PALAGANAS vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165483. 12 September 2006, First Division (Chico-Nazario, J.)Topic: Frustrated
Felony vs. Attempted Felony

FACTSCRIMINAL CASE No. U-9608

(Art. 248, in relation to Art. 6 and Art. 50 of the RPC)Accused shot SERVILLANO
FERRER JR., however, due to timely medical assistance rendered to the victim, the latter
survived the injuries caused by the gunshot.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9609
(Art. 248, in relation to Art. 6 and Art. 50 of the RPC)Accused shot MICHAEL (BOYING)
FERRER, however, due to timely medical assistance rendered to the victim, he latter
survived the injuries caused by the gunshot.
CRIMINAL CASE No. U-9610
(Art. 248, in relation to Art. 6 and Art. 50 of the RPC) Accused shot MELTON (TONY)
FERRER in the head causing his instantaneous death. While the Ferrer brothers were
singing My Way, a fight ensued between the Ferrer brothers and the Palaganases at a
videoke bar which resulted in to the latter shooting the former; causing the Ferrer brothers
to suffer injuries.

TRIAL COURT
The trial court finds the Rujjeric Palaganas guilty of the crime of Homicide and two (2)
counts of Frustrated Homicide (instead of Murder and Frustrated Murder) Ferdinand, on
the other hand, was not found guilty, for failure to prove conspiracy. There was NO
CONSPIRACY between Rujjeric Palaganas and Ferdinand in killing Meliton Ferrer, and
wounding the others. Rujjeric was not part of the rumble inside the videoke bar; and the
act of Ferdinand in pointing the Ferrers and saying that they are the ones, shoot does
not in itself connotes a common design or unity of purpose to kill. The shooting was
instantaneous and without any prior plan or agreement with Ferdinand to execute the
same. There is NO TREACHERY that will qualify the crime to murder. Ferrer brothers
were given the chance to defend themselves during the shooting incident by stoning
Rujjerick and Ferdinand. There is also no evident PREMEDITATION, as there was no
sufficient period of time that lapsed from the time Ferdinand called Rujjerick up to the
shooting. However, the use by the petitioner of a gun was NOT a reasonable means to
prevent the attack of the Ferrer brothers who were only equipped with stones.
On APPEAL, the court affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court.

ISSUE
WON the petitioner is liable for Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by
Michael Ferrer, instead of Attempted Homicide

RULING
Yes. The jurisprudence provides that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or
mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed
is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present.
However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal,
then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide. Lastly, if there
was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim
were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury.
Comparison of frustrated and attempted felony shows that, in the former, the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence;
whereas in the latter, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. In frustrated felony, the
reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of
the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment
of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.
Here, the gunshot wound sustained by Michael was not fatal or mortal since the treatment
period for his wound was short and he was discharged from the hospital on the same day
he was admitted therein. Hence petitioner is liable only for the crime of attempted
homicide as regards Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROQUE DAGOOCI DAYADAY

G.R. No. 213224. 16 January 2017. (Caguioa, J.)Topic: Treachery, as a qualifying
circumstance of Murder

FACTS
Accused, armed with a handgun and knife, assault, shot and stab several times the victim,
Basilio Gallenero; inflicting upon the latter several mortal wounds which caused his
instantaneous death. Postmortem report showed that the victim suffered four (4) gunshot
wounds and one (1) stab wound and died due to cardiopulmonary arrest, which, probably
secondary to multiple injuries. The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of
murder. Aggrieved by the said decision, Roque appealed, however, the Appellate Court
affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court. The latter Court argued that despite failure
of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation,
treachery was very patent. Records showed that the victim was shot several times in the
back while he was walking, which means that he was defenseless at the time of the attack;
and the fact that the stab wound was located on the victim's abdomen would not preclude
treachery because the victim was already vulnerable due to the gunshot wounds.

ISSUE
WON Roque is liable for murder.

RULING
Yes.T he law provides, under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, that murder s
committed when: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was
with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and
(4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide. All elements of the crime of
murder have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Through the testimony ofAlex,
the eyewitness to the crime, it was established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque
who had killed him. As to the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court sustains
the Appellate Court's finding that treachery attended the killing of Basilio. Here, the
evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind,
was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any
threat to his life as he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a firearm showed
deliberate intent to kill Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered
him defenseless and incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was evident in the case
at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BUENAVENTURA BULING

G.R. No. L-13315. 27 April 1960. En Banc (Labrador, J.)Topic: Physical Injuries; Double
Jeopardy vis--vis New Supervening Fact/s

FACTS
Accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for inflicting
wounds on Isidro Balaba; which wounds, allegedly required medical attendance for a
period of 10 to 15 days, and will incapacitate Isidro from the performance of his customary
labor for the same period. Accused pleaded guilty; and has fully served his sentence.
However, Isidros injury did not heal within the period estimated , and so the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information against accused for serious physical injuries; stating therein
that the wounds of Isidro requires medical attendance, and incapacitated him for a period
of 1 months. To 2 months. Accused was found guilty thereof.

ISSUE
WON the prosecution and conviction of Accused for less serious physical injuries is a bar
to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.

RULING
Yes.
The jurisprudence provides that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes
for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy, if indicted for the new offense. Here,
no new facts supervened . No X-ray examination of the wounded hand was made by
the physician during the first examination; hence, the latter could not have seen the
fracture at the distal end of the right arm, which, could only be apparent or visible by X-
ray photography. Clearly, the wound causing the delay in healing was already in
existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very
superficial examination made by the first physician. Hence, the Court finds that no new
supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the offense from less
serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO YORAC

G.R. No. L-29270. 23 November 1971. En Banc (Fernando, J.)Topic: Slight Physical
Injuries to Frustrated Murder Double Jeopardy vis--vis New Supervening Fact/s
FACTS
Accused was charged with slight physical injuries by victim Lam Hock who, according
to the medical certificate, was confined for head injury. Accused plea guilty. While serving
his sentence, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused for the crime
of frustrated murder arising from the same act; anchored upon another medical
certificate issued by the same physician. The said medical certificate revealed that the
head injury was a result of contusion with lacerated wound and cerebral concussion; and
the healing period would be from 18 to 20 days. Pursuant thereto, a Motion to Quash was
filed by Accused on ground that he would be placed in double jeopardy. The trial court,
relying on the ruling in the case of People vs. Buling, grant the said motion, and held that
nothing in the later medical certificate indicated that a new supervening fact had
developed since the time of the filing of the original action against the accused. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE
WON Accused may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act
committed, as in the first case, against the same person.

RULING
No. The jurisprudence provides that if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes
on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and
giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. There is then the indispensable requirement of
the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the defendant is responsible"
changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing
previously constituting a new and distinct offense. Here, the case of People vs. Buling
was squarely applicable as "nothing in the later medical certificate[indicated] that a new
or supervening fact had developed or arisen since the time of the filing of the original
action" against the accused. Hence, the accused cannot be properly charged of frustrated
murder, and the Appellate Court is correct in sustain the motion to quash and dismiss the
aforesaid information against Yorac.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ASST. PROVINCIAL FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR.

vs HON.MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, nad MARGARITO FAMA, JR.
G.R. No. L-41863. 22 April 1977. Second Division (Barredo, J.)Topic: Slight Physical
Injuries to Serious Physical Injuries; Double Jeopardy vis--vis New Supervening
Fact/sRule of Identity

FACTS
Accused was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries. It was alleged that the
accused assault/attack Miguel Viajar by hurling the latter with a stone on his right cheek;
thereby inflicting physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of 5 to
9 days, as shown by the medical certificate of the physician. On arraignment, accused
entered a plea of not guilty.
On the following day, victim and Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging the
accused with serious physical injuries arising from the same incident; anchored on the
fact that permanent scar and deformation on the right side of the victims face had become
apparent few days after the filing of the case for slight physical injuries. Pursuant
thereto, Accused filed an urgent motion to defer the proceedings, claiming that he would
be in double jeopardy. PROCEDURAL/DUE PROCESS: The Fiscal sought the dismissal
of the case for slight physical injuries, but the trial court did not act on the said motion,
instead, it was set for hearing. In view of the several postponements asked by the Fiscal,
in order to await the resolution of the issue of double jeopardy, the trial court dismissed
the aforesaid case. Ratiocinating that, To grant another postponement as sought by the
Fiscal against the vehement, strong and vigorous objection of the accused is to the mind
of the Court, no longer an exercise of sound discretion consistent with justice and fairness
but a clear and palpable abuse of discretion amounting to a serious denial to, and a grave
violation of, the right of the accused to a speedy trial to which he is rightfully entitled to
under Section 16 of Article IV, (Bill of Rights) of the Philippine Constitution

ISSUE
WON the additional allegation of deformity in the subsequent information constitutes a
supervening element which should take this case out of the Rule of Identity/ Ruling in the
case of People vs. Silva, as cited by the respondent court.

RULING
Yes.
The jurisprudence provides that if after the first. prosecution a new fact supervenes on
which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and
giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Here, no finding was made in the first
examination, as shown in the first medical certificate, that the injuries had caused
deformity and the loss of use of the right hand. It can be presumed that such fact was not
apparent or could have not been discernible at the time of the first examination. The
course of the healing of an injury may not be determined beforehand, it can only be known
after the period of healing has ended. Hence, the Court, considered that the additional
allegation of deformity of the right side of the face of the victim constitutes a supervening
fact occurring since the filing of the original information.

GODOFREDO ENRILE and DR. FREDERICK ENRILE vs. HON. DANILO

MANALASTAS, HON. ERANIOG. CEDILLO, SR. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 166414. 22 October 2014. First Division (Bersamin, J.)Topic: Presentation of
Medical Certificate to prove the number of days of medication required is essential only
during trial, and not during the filing of the complaint and/or preliminary investigation.

FACTS
A mauling incident ensued between neighbors, which includes the Moranos, who claims
to be the victims therein. Rommel and Perla Morano charged the Enriles with less
serious physical injuries, and JosefineMorano charged the latter with frustrated
homicide. MTC found probable cause against petitioners for less physical injuries; and
set their arraignment. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that complainants
had not presented proof of having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer;
however, MTC denied their Motion to Quash.

ISSUE
WON the presentation of medical certificates, showing the number of days rendered
for medication, is essential during the filing of complaint, considering that the complaints
were filed two (2) months after the alleged incident.
RULING
No. The jurisprudence provides that the presentation of the medical certificates to prove
the duration of the victims need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take
place only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. Further stated,
preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, in that it is the occasion for the submission
of the parties respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their
separate allegations; its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. Here, what is required only is that the evidence be sufficient to establish a
probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. Hence, the presentation of the medical
certificates during the filing of the complaint and preliminary investigation is not essential.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAND MAPALOG.R. No. 172608. 6 February

2007. Third Division (Chico-Nazario, J.)Topic: Maltreatment
FACTS
Appellant together with 3 John Does were charged with the crime of Murder. It was
alleged that the latter clubbed Manuel Piamonte with lead pipes and stabbed him several
with their bladed weapons; thereby inflicting fatal injuries to the victim which caused his
direct and immediate death. The RTC finds the 3 accused guilty of the crime charged.
The court ruled that the conspiracy was established by the prosecution. In addition, the
witness positively identified Appellant as the one who struck the victim on the head with
a lead pipe, which alone is sufficient manifestation of a concerted, common and united
design with the other accused to commit an unlawful and felonious act; and the fact that
the medical certificate shows that the COD was the stab wounds, was deemed
immaterial, in view of the presence of the conspiracy. On the contrary, the Appellate
Court, modified the assailed decision of the trial court, and convicted the Appellant of
frustrated murder only. It was not convinced that the evidence on record established
conspiracy among the Appellant and his co-accused .The COD of the victim was the stab
wounds; however, the prosecutions evidence only established that the Appellant clubbed
the victim with a lead pipe; hence, it cannot be inferred from the account of the witness
that the appellant ad his co-accused came to an agreement to commit a felony, or that
they decided to commit the, by concerted acts. Also, the killing was a result of a fight that
erupted suddenly, which fact discourages the conclusion that the killing was planned. It
could not now be said that conspiracy was proven attendant beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, in the absence of conspiracy, the Appellant could only be liable for the
consequences of his own criminal act.

ISSUE
WON Appellant shall be held liable for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
.
RULING
No, instead he shall be charged with the crime of maltreatment. The jurisprudence
provides that intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or
number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of
wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words
uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim. Here, no
motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown either prior or subsequent to
the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears reiterating that
no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed to the appellants act of hitting the
victim with a lead pipe. Hence, When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without
causing any injury, and without causing dishonor, the offense is Maltreatment under
Article 266,98 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. It was beyond reasonable doubt that by
hitting Piamonte, appellant ill-treated the latter, without causing any injury. No proof of
injury was offered. Maltreatment is necessarily included in Murder, which is the offense
charged in the Information.

JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172834. 6 February 2008. Second Division (Tinga, J.)Topic: Intent to kill as an
essential element of the crime of Homicide or Murder

FACTS
Accused mauled with fist and stones, and stabbed with a knife Rogelio Murao, hitting and
inflicting to the latter injuries on his face and head; but because of timely medical
assistance, death of the victim was prevented. Accused Jun and Gil, alias Banjo, were
found guilty as charged by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, arguing
that Jun had performed already performed all the acts of execution necessary to bring
about the death of Rogelio, which would have transpired had it not been for the timely
medical assistance.

ISSUE
WON Accused Jun is liable for the crime of physical injuries only, instead of frustrated
homicide.

RULING
Yes. The jurisprudence provides that when intent to kill is lacking but wounds were
inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries. Intent to kill is the
principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission; such intent
must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the aggressor. Here, such intent is lacking. Although it can be fairly
assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were sustained during the fistfight, it is not
conclusive that the same were inflicted purposely to kill him. If Jun in fact had been
carrying a bolo with intent of killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun,
it is no small wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal, more
mild than grave; and that Rogelio was able to go home shortly after the tricycle incident
without being pursued by his aggressor also shows that Jun and Banjo were not intent on
beating him to death or even leaving him for dead. Hence, it is wrong to infer that the
intent to kill was present in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt. The Accused shall be convicted of the crime of less physical
injuries, considering that in the opinion of the attending physician, the wounds sustained
by the victim would take two(2) weeks to heal.

ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167766. 7 April 2010. Third Division (Peralta, J.)Topic: Less serious physical
injuries under Art. 265 of the Revised Penal Code; Attempted Murder

FACTS
Accused shot the Rudy Baclig, hitting the latter just below his armpit, thereafter, accused
rode his car and sped away. The victim, on the other hand, was brought to the
Municipal Hall and identified the accused as the person who shot him; he was then
immediately brought to the hospital and was discharged therefrom on the following day.
The victim sustained gunshot wound on the arm which required only 10 days of medical
assistance. The Provincial Prosecutor filed an information against herein petitioner for the
crime of frustrated murder. The trial court finds petitioner guilty but only for attempted
murder. The fact that there was sufficient lighting at the place of incident, the positive
identification of the victim and that the latter knew petitioner ever since he attained the
age of reason, were considered by the trial court in arriving in the said decision. On
appeal, CA affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court, however, modified the crime
charged from attempted murder to less serious physical injuries. CA opined that the
intent to kill Rudy was not established. Petitioners act of shooting the victim once was
not followed by any other assault or any act which would ensure the latters death; or that
he could have chased or run him over, since petitioner was driving a car. Further stated,
Petitioners desistance displayed his nonchalance to cause the death of Rudy.

ISSUE
WON Petitioner is liable for less serious physical injuries only, instead of attempted
murder.

RULING
Yes. The law provides "Any person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not
described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for
labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period,
shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor." Further, the principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is
the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent
must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the aggressor. The inference that intent to kill existed should not be
drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable
doubt. When such intent is lac king but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is
not attempted murder but physical injuries only. Here, intent to kill the victim could not be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did
not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have
shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Also, it should be noted,
that, as per Medico-Legal Certificate, the wound sustained by the victim would only
require ten (10) days of medical assistance. Hence, petitioner shall be held liable for the
crime of less serious physical injuries.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINNES vs. HON. EMETERIO OCAYA, and ESTERLINA

MARAPAO, LETICIAMARAPAO and DIOSDADO MARAPAO.
G.R. No. L-47448. 17 May 1978. First Division (Teehankee, J.)Topic: Acquisition of
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter/Crime Charged

FACTS
Private respondents wrestled, threw and hit Mrs. Llolita Ares with a fist-size stone at the
face, thereby inflicting upon the victim lacerated wound, with contusion and swelling at
the inflicted, which caused deformity of her face. The victim, who was then on the
12th day from child delivery, suffered relapse, which incapacitated her from performing
her customary labor for a period of more than 30 days. he records shows that neither
arraignment nor trial on the merits ensued, and no warrant of arrest was issued; instead
herein respondent judge, motu proprio ordered that the case be dismissed, as the crime
of slight or less serious physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of his court. Further
stated, in the filing of a physical injury case is the certificate issued by the physician
regarding the duration of treatment and not whatth e victim declares because the same
is self-serving. The motion for reconsideration proved futile after evaluating the case
without the parties or their witnesses being heard nor having received their evidence.

ISSUE
WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case/subject matter.

RULING
Yes. The rule provides that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would
indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial court's jurisdiction was committed, does not
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction, which had vested in it under the allegations of the
information as filed, since the jurisdiction attaches to the person and subject matter of the
litigation; the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to
oust jurisdiction already attached. Here, Respondent judge disregards the established
rule that the information for serious physical injuries properly vested his court with
jurisdiction to try and hear the case, and that if from the evidence submitted a lesser
offense was established, that he equally had jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such
lesser offense. Besides, the doctor who issued the medical certificate had yet to be
presented at the trial and conceivably could corroborate the victim's testimony that her
injuries had taken longer to heal than had at first been estimated by him as well as clarify
the location of the victim's facial scar. Hence, the case below should therefore be
transferred to another court presided by another judge.

GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 169533. 20 March 2013. First Division (Bersamin, J.)Topic: Slight Physical
Injuries RA No. 7610, Child Abuse vis--vis element of intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.

FACTS
Petitioner hit and slapped the 12-year old victim Jayson Dela Cruz at his back and left
cheek, respectively, while uttering derogatory remarks against the victims family. The
incident happened during the evening procession in Legazpi City. Petitioner went to the
house of the victims father and challenged him into a fight, but latter refused. The victim
underwent medical treatment; and the medical certificates issued pursuant thereto states
that the child suffered contusions in the left scapular area and contusions in the left
zygomatic area. Petitioner was charged with child abuse, a violation under Sec. 10 (a) of
RA No. 7610; and was found guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, CA affirmed the
conviction.

ISSUE
WON the acts of Petitioner constituted child abuse within the purview of RA 7610.

RULING
No. The law (RA No. 7610) provides that child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child, which includes psychological and physical abuse, cruelty,
emotional maltreatment, or any act by deeds r words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being (Sec.3). In relation
thereto, the same law in Sec. 10 (a) provides that any person who shall commit acts of
child abuse or cruelty, not covered by the RPC, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor
in its minimum period. Here, the records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioners laying of hands on the victim had been intended to debase the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the latter as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass him. The laying of hands on the victim have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern
for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the
hands of the victim and his brother, Roldan. Hence, with the loss of his self-control, he
lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. Instead, he
shall be held liable for slight physical injuries; considering that the victims physical injury
required 5 to 7 days of medical attention.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICTORINO REYES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the crime of rape.

The Case

Victorino Reyes appeals his .conviction for the rape of his 13-year-old neighbor AAA,1 for which the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, in Rosales, Pangasinan had imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua under its decision of April 23, 2001,2 and which conviction the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed on appeal by its assailed decision promulgated on April 20, 2006.3

Antecedents

As the RTC and the CA both found, Reyes raped AAA at around 9:00 p.m. on December 26, 1996 in
Barangay San Aurelio, Balungao, Pangasinan. Earlier, at around 7:00 p.m., AAA and her 9-year-old
sister, BBB, had watched television at his house just across the street from their house. Only Reyes
1w phi 1

and his two sons, aged seven and five, were the other persons in the house, for his wife had gone to
another barangay to sell refreshments. By 9:00 p.m., AAA and BBB rose to go home, but as they
were leaving, Reyes suddenly pulled AAA into the store attached to the sala of his house. He told
her in the dialect: Umaykan ta agiyyot ta. (Come here and let us have sex).4 Alarmed by what his
words denoted, AAA struggled to free herself from him. BBB went to her succor by pulling her away
from him, but his superior strength prevailed. BBB could only cry as he dragged AAA into the store.
BBB was left outside the store crying.

Inside the store, Reyes kissed AAA and mashed her breasts. He threatened her: If you will shout, I
will kill you.5 He pulled down her long pants and panties below her knees, took out his penis,
grabbed her by the waist, and used his body to anchor her back to a nearby table. She fought back
by boxing and pushing him away, but her efforts were futile. He twice tried to pry open her legs, but
she strained hard to close them. On the second attempt, however, her effort was not enough to
prevent him from pulling her legs apart, and he then thrust his penis into her vagina and made push
and pull movements.6 Although his penis achieved only a slight penetration of her vagina,7 he
succeeded in satisfying his lust, as confirmed later on when CCC, the mother of the victim, found
semen on AAAs panties.8

After he had satisfied his lust, Reyes threatened to kill both AAA and BBB should they tell anyone
else about what had happened. Then they hurriedly left for home.9 Upon their arrival in their house,
CCC called out to her daughters to go to bed. Only BBB immediately complied because AAA tarried
outside, only to have her mother again call her inside. AAA entered the house this time, but went to
where the aparador was and took out fresh panties. CCC saw her doing so and became suspicious.
She also saw fear in the face of her daughter. When she inspected the soiled underwear of AAA,
CCC discovered that her panties were wet with semen.10 Upon being interrogated, AAA admitted
that Reyes had raped her.11
At around 6:00 a.m. of the next day, December 27, 1996, CCC reported the rape of her daughter by
Reyes to the Barangay Chairman of San Aurelio, who accompanied AAA and her father to the
Balungao Police Station to bring the criminal complaint for rape. At the request of the Balungao
Police, Dr. Ingrid Irena B. Gancinia, the Municipal Health Officer of Rosales, Pangasinan, conducted
a medical examination on AAA at around 3:30 p.m. of that day.

The findings reflected in Dr. Gancinias medico-legal report showed the following:

IE: Contusion, labia majora, Right and Left;

No hymenal lacerations noted with one examining finger difficult to penetrate the vaginal canal.12

Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed the information dated
February 3, 1997 charging Reyes with rape committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of December, 1996, in the evening, in Brgy. San Aurelio 1st,
Municipality of Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, a minor of about thirteen (13) years old, against her will
and to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to Article 335, Revised Penal Code.13

Upon his arraignment on February 23, 1998,14 Reyes pleaded not guilty to the information.

Although admitting that AAA and BBB had watched television in his house at the time of the rape,
Reyes insisted that he had been sleeping on the sofa in front of the television set in the sala of his
house from 7:30 p.m. of December 26, 1996 until 2:30 a.m. of the next day. He denied the
accusation, and called attention to the medical findings showing that AAAs hymen was intact;
hence, she was still a virgin.

On April 23, 2001, after the trial on the merits, the RTC convicted Reyes as charged. It regarded
AAAs narration of the circumstances of her rape as clear, convincing and consistent on all material
points. It concluded that the contusion (pamamaga) on AAAs labia majora found by Dra. Gancinia
proved that penile penetration had been achieved; that AAAs fragile personality manifested during
the trial explained why she had cried and refused to answer in the face of the often browbeating
questions during her cross-examination; that Reyes had also made intimidating glares towards her
while she testified; and that she had remained consistent in her claim of rape and insistent that she
was telling the truth.

The RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Victorino Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape as charged and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify the private complainant AAA in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand
(75,000.00) Pesos. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.15

On intermediate review, Reyes argued16 that AAA and her mother had concocted the charge as their
way of escaping their debts at his store.17 He denied having carnal knowledge of AAA, and stated
that he had merely kissed her, citing the lack of medical findings of any hymenal lacerations in the
medico-legal report.18 He posited that even assuming that there had been carnal knowledge, the act
could only be consensual considering that AAAs hand had landed on his shoulders during the
supposed sexual encounter.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed Reyes conviction.19

Hence, this appeal, wherein Reyes reiterates his submissions.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

To start with, both the CA and the RTC unanimously found that the testimonies of AAA and BBB
were credible and reliable. It consequently behooved Reyes to come forward with a good reason or
cause to have us depart from the age-old rule of according conclusiveness to the findings of the
RTC that the CA affirmed. The Court is not a trier of facts, and has to depend on the findings of fact
of the trial court by virtue of its direct access to the witnesses as they testified in court. Only when
the appellant convincingly demonstrates that such findings of fact were either erroneous, or biased,
or unfounded, or incomplete, or unreliable, or conflicted with the findings of fact of the CA would the
Court assume the rare role of a trier of facts. But that convincing demonstration was not done here
by Reyes.

Secondly, the decisive question is whether the evidence adduced by the State competently proved
that the crime reached the consummated stage. Reyes insists that the fact that AAAs hymen had
remained intact, per the medico-legal report, revealed that no rape had been committed.

His insistence is not persuasive.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,20 the
law applicable at the time of the rape of AAA, defined and punished rape thusly:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.21

As the text of the law itself shows, the breaking of the hymen of the victim is not among the means of
consummating rape. All that the law required is that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman
under the circumstances described in the law. By definition, carnal knowledge was "the act of a man
having sexual bodily connections with a woman."22 This understanding of rape explains why the
slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the crime.

During her examination of AAA, Dra. Gancinia found pamamaga (swelling) on the victims labia
majora. Dra. Gancinia opined that such swelling was possibly caused by the insertion of a hard
object, like a hard penis, or by friction with hard objects even without removing the panties or pants
of AAA.23 Although such medical finding, left alone, was susceptible of different probable
interpretations, AAAs testimonial narration about how Reyes had sexually assaulted her, including
how his penis had only slightly penetrated her vagina, confirmed that he had carnal knowledge of
her.

More specifically, the presence of the swelling in AAAs labia majora was an indication of the
penetration by the erect penis of the labia majora of the accused. As such, there was sufficient
factual foundation for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape,24 for, as the Court explains
in People v. Teodoro:25

In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape,
does not require full penile penetration of the female. The Court has clarified in People v.
Campuhan26 that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the
consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act
to come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is
consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either
labia of the pudendum. As the Court has explained in People v. Bali-balita,27 the touching that
constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or the mons pubis, but
rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the
conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated beneath
the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain
some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is required, however, that
this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established. (Emphasis
supplied)

Finally, although the RTC and the CA correctly imposed reclusion perpetua because the crime was
simple rape, we need to revise the civil liability fixed and allowed by the RTC in order to have it
accord with pertinent jurisprudence to the effect that civil indemnity of 50,000.00 and moral
damages of 50,000.00 should be awarded to the victim of simple rape without need of proof other
than the fact of rape.28 This is because the victim unquestionably suffered actual loss and moral
injuries from her experience. In addition, the attendance of AAAs minority as an aggravating
circumstance, which, although not a proper basis to raise the penal sanction on account of the
failure to allege it in the information, should still justify the grant of exemplary damages in order to
set a public example and to establish a deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth.29 According to People v. Catubig,30 exemplary damages are justified regardless of whether or
not the generic or qualifying aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information, considering
that the grant of such damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code is intended for the sole
benefit of the victim and does not affect the criminal liability, the exclusive concern of the State. The
grant in this regard should be in the sum of 30,000.00.31

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on April 20, 2006 by the Court of Appeals,
with the MODIFICATION that Victorino Reyes shall pay to AAA 50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
50,000.00 as moral damages, and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per
annum from the finality of this decision.

Costs of suit to be paid by the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 170723, March 03, 2008]
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MICHELINA S.AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR.
MARISSA B. PASCUAL, Respondents.

FACTS:

On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation
of Revised Penal Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act
No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and
several John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions
of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted,
prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr.
Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of Laureano
Aguirre. Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or
procured any false statement mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano
Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother went through a vasectomy
procedure but that does not amount to mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the
complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common law sister
of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends
that Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in
vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and medicine. The Assistant
City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to mutilation, the
vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ. Gloria Aguirre then
appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition
stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if there
is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation

RULING:
No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Art. 262.
Mutilation.The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction. Any other intentional mutilation shall
be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods. A straightforward
scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements [55]of mutilation under the
first paragraph of Art.262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration ,
that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused
purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ
for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to
the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., t]he vasectomy operation did
not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part
of his physical self.