NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION, INC.

G.R. No. 183543. 20 June 2016. First Division (Sereno, C.J.)

TOPIC: A possessor in bad faith has a specific obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything
that the former received, and that the latter could have received had its possession not been interrupted (Art.
549 in relation to Arts. 546 and 443 of the Civil Code)

FACTS: Petitioner NHA is the owner of a 120-hectare piece of government property reserved for the
establishment of the National Government Center. By virtue of Proclamation No. 1670, issued in 1977,
President Marcos reserved a 7-hectare area thereof and granted respondent Manila Seedling Bank
usufructuary rights over it. However, respondent Bank occupied a total of 16 hectares, thereby exceeding the
7-hectare area it was allowed to occupy. It leased the excess to private tenants. In 1987, President Aquino,
issued a memorandum revoking the reserved status of the remaining 50 hectares of the 120-hectare property.
In 1993, the Executive Committee was created to oversee the comprehensive development of the said 50-
hectares (North Triangle Property). Pursuant thereto, the Executive Committee proposed the transfer of
respondent Bank to areas more suitable to its operation.

Contention of the petitioner: Respondent shall vacate the 7-hectare area, and pay rent with the respect
to the excess thereof.

Ruling of the RTC: Turnover of the excess to petitioner is valid, however, payment of the rent for the
same was disallowed. Respondent leased the said excess to various establishments upon authority given
by the Minister of Natural Resources; the same is for the purpose of enabling the Bank to earn income to
finance its operations, considering that it no longer received any donation from the national government.
Further, respondent had protected the excess by developing it and keeping squatter syndicates from
taking possession. For that reason, the expenses it incurred for the development of the excess were more
than sufficient to compensate petitioner in terms of rent.

Ruling of the CA: As respondent possessed the excess by tolerance of petitioner, a demand to vacate
was necessary to establish the reckoning point for the filing of an unlawful detainer action, as well as for
the recovery of rent and damages.30 In that case, the CA found that the Executive Committee's proposal
for the transfer of respondent was not a demand in contemplation of the law.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner NHA is entitled to recover, among others, the rent over the excess of the 7-hectares area
it was allowed to occupy under Proclamation No. 1670.

RULING: YES. The controversy would not have arisen had respondent respected the limit of the beneficial use
given to it. As such, respondent must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. Since respondent had no
right to act beyond the confines of the seven-hectare area granted to it, and since it was fully aware of this fact,
its encroachment of nine additional hectares of petitioner's property rendered it a possessor in bad faith as to
the excess. While respondent may have been allowed by the Minister of Natural Resources to lease the excess
to various establishments, such authority did not come from petitioner, who is the owner. The Court have ruled
that a person whose occupation of realty is by sheer tolerance of the owner is not a possessor in good faith.

However, the Court is not inclined to adopt the allegation of petitioner as to the amount of rental it could have
received from the lease of the excess based on a professional appraisal; instead, the case shall be remanded to
the RTC for the conduct of trial for the purpose of determining the amounts the parties are entitled to as laid
out in this Decision. That notwithstanding, respondent shall be entitled to a refund of the necessary expenses
it incurred. Necessary expenses are those made for the preservation of the land occupied, or those without
which the land would deteriorate or be lost. These may also include expenditures that augment the income of
the land or those that are incurred for its cultivation, production, and upkeep.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JULIET PANCHO
G.R. No. 206910. 14 October 2015. First Division (Perez, J)

TOPIC: Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.

FACTS: Member of the Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau of Cebu City conducted a
search in the house of accused-appellant Juliet Pancho, pursuant to a search warrant. The search
yielded three (3) big plastic packets of shabu, which were recovered under a jewelry box placed on
top of a cabinet divider.

Contention of accused-appellant Juliet: On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea

of not guilty. She was sewing a blanket in her bedroom on the 2nd floor when the police officers
barged into her room and ordered her to go down. When she went down, two other police
officers came and one of them went up to the bedroom. After a few seconds, the said police
officer went back down and called the barangay tanods. She was handcuffed and brought to
the police stations, and later on learned that she was being charged with illegal possession of
shabu.

Ruling of the RTC and CA: Accused-appellant is guilty of illegal possession of shabu and
sentenced her to life imprisonment.

ISSUE: WON the element of possession is present.

RULING: YES. In order for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, there must be proof
that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.

The three packets of shabu were found not on accused-appellant's person but on top of a cabinet
divider inside her room. Accused-appellant was deemed to have been in constructive possession of
the packets of shabu because they were under her control and management.

Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Further,
accused-appellant is not authorized by law to possess the shabu. Mere possession of a regulated drug
per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted to the
accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. Accused-appellant's bare denials
will not suffice to overcome the presumption of knowledge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR.
G.R. No. 197472. 7 September 2015. Second Division (Del Castillo, J.)

TOPIC: To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be
established. Regalian Doctrine; Art. 530, NCC

FACTS: Respondent was engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities; he established an orphanage and
school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta Ana, Cagayan. In 1967and 1994, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 201, and President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447, respectively, declaring the entire
Palaui Island reserved for military purposes and marine protected area.

Rev. Cortez alleged that he has been in possession of about 50 hectares of land since 1962, which he, with the
help of the Aetas and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to
support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works. However, some members of the Philippine Navy
disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island, and thru the use
of force and intimidation, commanded him to vacate the area. He was then constrained to file a Petition for
Injuction with Prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injuction against the Commanding
Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Sta Ana, Cagayan. Application for the said writ was granted by the
RTC, however, the same pertained to 5-hectares only, not to the entire 50-hectares claimed to have been
occupied by the respondent.

Contention of the OSG: The Petition should have been dismissed outright on ground that Rev. Cortez
failed to prove his clear and positive right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui Island. This is considering
that by his own admission, he started to occupy the said area only in 1962. Hence, when the property
was declared as a military reserve in 1967, he had been in possession of the 5-hectare area only for five
years or short of the 30-year possession requirement for a bona fide claim of ownership under the law.

Contention of the Respondent: The arguments of the OSG pertaining to ownership are all immaterial
as his Petition for injunction does NOT involve the right to possess based on ownership but on the right
of possession which is a right independent from ownership. Further, he is entitled to the injunctive writ
based on the right of possession (jus possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of
the subject area since 1962. He avers that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be peremptorily
dispossessed therefrom, or if already dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession.

ISSUE: WON Respondent Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injuction.

RULING: NO. It must be emphasized that only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated
may be the object of possession. Property of the public dominion cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be
possessed. As such, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public domain and
therefore can be the proper object of possession.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Hence, all lands not
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them
to private persons. In this case, there is no proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been
declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered
as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of
possession under Art. 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez claimed right of possession has no
leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter
how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the
first place.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARTIN NG
G.R. No. 182449. 6 March 2013. First Division (Sereno, C.J.)

TOPIC: While tax declarations and realty tax payments on property are NOT conclusive evidence of ownership,
they are nevertheless good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in the right frame of mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in ones actual or at least constructive possession (Republic v.
Sta. Ana-Burgos).

FACTS: Respondent filed an application for the original registration of title over five (5) lots, where he claimed
ownership over the same. His claim was based on his purchase thereof from the vendors, who had possessed
the realties for more than thirty (30) years. Among the documentary evidence submitted are numerous vintage
Tax Declarations dating as far back as 1948, which were never assailed by petitioners. In support of his claims,
he further presented the testimony of Josefa Fat, who lived near the subject lots. Pursuant thereto, MTC
confirmed respondents title to the subject lots and ordering the registration of the title in his name.
Contention of the OSG: Petitioner failed to substantiate his alleged possession and occupation. The
Tax Declarations attached to the application merely provided an indicia of possession, and not a
conclusive proof of ownership.

Ruling of the MTC and CA: Considering that the possession of the subject parcels of land by the
applicant-appellee tacked to that of his predecessors-in-interest, covered a period of forty-nine (49)
years to the time of the filing of the application for registration in 1997, the court held that applicant-
appellee has acquired an imperfect title thereto which may be subject to confirmation and brought
under the operation of the Torrens system.

ISSUE: WON the respondent submitted sufficient evidence to prove that the possession of his predecessor-in-
interest was of the nature required by the Public Land Act and PROPERTY Registration Decree.

RULING: YES. As found by the courts a quo, it is clear from the records that respondent presented several pieces
of documentary evidence to prove that he openly possessed the properties. He submitted notarized Deeds of
Sale, Agreements of Partition and Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate and Sale to show the acquisition of the
lands from his predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, he presented Tax Declarations and realty payments
showing that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been paying real estate taxes since 1948 until the
inception of this case in 1997; hence, for more than 30 years.

The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes is an announcement of ones claim
against the State and all other interested parties. In fact, these documents already constitute prima facie
evidence of possession. Moreover, if the holders of the land present a Deed of Conveyance in their favor from
its former owner to support their claim of ownership, the declaration of ownership and tax receipts relative to
the property may be used to prove their good faith in occupying and possessing it. Additionally, when
considered with actual possession of the property, tax receipts constitute evidence of great value in support of
the claim of title of ownership by prescription.

*** In a judicial confirmation of title under original registration proceedings, applicants may obtain the registration of title to land upon a
showing that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of (2) agricultural lands of the public domain, (3) under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, (4) for at least 30 years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.

***The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on applicants who must show clear, positive and convincing evidence that their
alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.
MARK CRISTOBAL SOLEDAD VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 184274. 23 February 2011. Second Division (Nachura, J.)

TOPIC: Art. 523, NCC; Animus possidendi (intent to possess) is a state of mind, the presence or determination
of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case; it may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.

FACTS: Private complainant Henry Yu received a call from Rochelle Bagapporo, a credit card agent, offering
him a Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the said offer private complainant invited
the latter to his office Bagaporo immediately indorsed private complainant to her boss, herein petitioner Mark
Soledad, and required private complainant to submit various documents, such as his Globe handyphone
original platinum gold card, identification cards and statements of accounts. When private complainant
followed up his loan status, he failed to get in touch with petitioner.

Thereafter, private complainant checked with credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card
database information was altered and he had a credit card application with Metrobank Card Corporation.
Pursuant thereto, he filed a complaint with the NBI, and the latter conducted an entrapment operation, wherein
the NBI operatives posed as delivery boy of Metrobank credit card. Pursuant thereto, petitioner was
apprehended, and was charged with violation of Sec. 9 (e), of Republic Act No. 8484 (Access Device Regulations
Act of 1998), for possessing a counterfeit access device or access device fraudulently applied for.

Contention of the petitioner: He pleaded not guilty. He was not in physical and legal possession of
the credit card presented and marked in evidence by the prosecution. He was arrested immediately
after signing the acknowledgement receipt, thus, he did not yet know the contents of the envelope
delivered and had no control over the subject credit card.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was legally in possession of the credit card subject of the case.

RULING: YES. RA 8484 does not define the word possession; thus, the Court use the term as defined in Art. 523
of the Civil Code. As such, possession involves two elements: (1) the corpus or the material holding of the thing;
and (2) animus possidendi or the intent to possess it. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or
determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case; it may be inferred from the prior
or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.

Prior to the commission of the crime, petitioner fraudulently obtained from private complainant various
documents showing the latters identity. He, thereafter, obtained cellular phones using private complainants
identity. Undaunted, he fraudulently applied for a credit card under the name and personal circumstances of
private complainant. Upon the delivery of the credit card applied for, the messenger (an NBI agent) required
two valid identification cards. Petitioner thus showed two identification cards with his picture on them, but
bearing the name and forged signature of private complainant. As evidence of the receipt of the envelope
delivered, petitioner signed the acknowledgment receipt shown by the messenger, indicating therein that the
content of the envelope was the Metrobank credit card.

Petitioner materially held the envelope containing the credit card with the intent to possess. Contrary to
petitioners contention that the credit card never came into his possession because it was only delivered to him,
the above narration shows that he, in fact, did an active part in acquiring possession by presenting the
identification cards purportedly showing his identity as Henry Yu. Certainly, he had the intention to possess
the same. Had he not actively participated, the envelope would not have been given to him. Moreover, his
signature on the acknowledgment receipt indicates that there was delivery and that possession was transferred
to him as the recipient. Undoubtedly, petitioner knew that the envelope contained the Metrobank credit card,
as clearly indicated in the acknowledgment receipt, coupled with the fact that he applied for it using the identity
of private complainant.