NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (CASE DIGESTS)

2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Constitution

ART. 1

1) MAGALLONA, et al. v. EXEC SEC ERMITA, et al.

ART. 2, SEC. 15

2) HENARES, Jr. v. LTFRB and DOTC

ART. 2, SEC. 16

3) OPOSA v. FACTORAN
4) YSMAEL, Jr. v. SENR

ART. 2, SEC. 22
5) CARINO v. INSULAR GOVT'
6) CRUZ v. NCIP

ART. 2, SEC. 25
7) SJS v. ATIENZA

ART. 3
8) CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVT' CORP
9) VALMONTE v. BELMONTE
10) LEGASPI v. CSC

ART. 10, SEC. 4

11) TANO v. SOCRATES

FACTS: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance
banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution
prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section
2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely
no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of
Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the
State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal
fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of
decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.

ART. 10, SEC. 15

12) CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS

FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao
Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the creation of such region were later on known
as the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, Section
13 of RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued
E.O No. 429 providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend
that Art. XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to
the President by authorizing him to merge by administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate
provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power granted is not expressed in the
title of the law.aw They also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA
6734 to the President is only to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions
in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian
City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents
discretion.

HELD: No, in conferring on the President the power to merge by administrative determination
the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress
merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative
regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions
is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While
the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision
over local governments. (Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions
like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries which has been described as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)Thus, the
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by
the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services

13) DIMAPORO v. COMELEC

ART. 22, SEC. 1

14) MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS

FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public
auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

ISSUES: 1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.

HELD: [The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further
laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.
The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that -
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated
with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns
the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51%
of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from
the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a
public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It
is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as
elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive
and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the three
(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed
among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending
of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution
the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid
of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so
if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

ART. 22, SEC. 2

15) ARANDA v. REPUBLIC

16) MINERS ASSOCIATION of the PHILIPPINES INC. v. FACTORAN

FACTS: The petition seeks a ruling from this court on the validity of two Administrative Orders 57 and
82 issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions
of Executive Orders 279 and 211. This petition arose from the fact that the 1987 Constitution provided for a
different system of exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources. Unlike the1935
and 1973 Constitutions that allow the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license,
concession or lease, the 1987 Constitution provides for the full control and supervision by the state of the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources. Pres. Cory Aquino promulgated EO
211, which prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals in accordance to the 1987 Constitution. Inaddition, Pres. Aquino also
promulgated EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and
prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance
by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, andutilization of minerals. In line with
EO 279, the DENR Secretary issued AO 57Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under EO
279 and AO 82Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
through negotiation. Petitioner, Miners Association of the Philippines, mainly contend that the DENR Secretary
issued both AOs 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power because these are inconsistent with the provisions
of EO 279.

ISSUE: Whether AO Nos. 57 and 82, which are promulgated by the DENR, are valid and constitutional

HELD: AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the fact that EO279, in
effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources the authority to conclude jointventure, co-production, or
production sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources.
Furthermore, the constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the utilization of inalienable
lands of public domain is not merely done through license, concession or lease since the options are now also
open to the State through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture, or production
sharing agreements.

17) ALVARES c. PICOP RESOURCES

Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.

FACTS: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.
43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec
Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the
latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended,
into an IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial
court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos,
to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

ISSUE: Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by
which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
HELD: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The Presidential Warranty cannot, in
any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment
of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of
PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
natural resources in the area.

ART. 22, SEC. 3

18) CRUZ v. NCIP

FACTS: Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic Act
No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources.In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-
7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition
was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

19) REPUBLIC v. NAGUIAT

FACTS: Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired
them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession
thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since
12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have
been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE: Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?

HELD: No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered
as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

ART. 22, SEC. 4

20) PROVINCE of RIZAL v. EXEC SEC

FACTS: This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various
concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for lack of cause
of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President Ramos], through Proclamation
No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications.
The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site under the
territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the the dump site is to be
constructed in Watershed reservation.
Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and Municipality of
San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was
re-opened.
A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question that the
project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take it into consideration
since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump sites permanent closure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..

HELD: The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.
Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No.
635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which
was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national agencies
and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program
shall be implemented by government authorities ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained."
Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Pao, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local
government units, should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological
balance of the particular community implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order,
Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the Court of Appeals that
they had conducted the required consultations. However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore
when at the height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks
from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for
the rally and notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the municipality, grants
the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These
include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural resources products
and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other activities
which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological
imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the
municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting
integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in
populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services
and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and
facilities, providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of
communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest
development projects .and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the
maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance,
repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the
water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred
(100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in
connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of
water.[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project
that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
 Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

ART. 22, SEC. 5

ART. 22, SEC. 7

ART. 23, SEC. 6