G.R. No.
136965 March 28, 2001
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal1 from the decision of the Court of
Appeals2 setting aside the order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 217, Quezon City which denied
respondent Segundina Rosario's (hereafter,
"Segundina") motion to dismiss3 and cancelled the
notice of lis pendens annotated on Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 121042.
The Facts
There being no controversy as to the facts and the
petition raising pure questions of law, we adopt the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, as follows:4
On September 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed with
the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, an application
for registration of title covering a parcel of land
situated in Quezon City, with an area of 100,000
square meters and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055,
as amended.5
On August 31, 1972, petitioner University of the
Philippines (hereafter, "U. P.") filed with the trial court
a "motion for intervention" in the case, claiming that
the land covered by the application (by Datu Ditingke
Ramos) is within its property described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9462.
On March 15, 1973, U.P. filed with the trial court an
opposition and motion to dismiss Datu Ditingke Ramos'
application for registration.
On June 6, 1973, the trial court issued an order which
reads as follows:
"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by the
University of the Philippines and considering
the certification, sketch plan (Exhibits "O" and
"P") the testimony of the Acting Chief,
Geodetic Engineer as well as the written
manifestation of the Land Registration
Commission to the effect that the land subject
matter of this application and covered by plan
SWO-15055 does not encroach on the property
of the University of the Philippines and that it
is not inside any decreed - property, the
motion to dismiss the application is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."6
On June 8, 1973, the trial court First Instance decided
the application as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the application
is hereby granted, declaring the applicant
Rosario Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos (surviving
spouse of the original applicant who was
substituted as party applicant in the order of
April 24, 1973) the absolute owner of the
property applied for and covered by Plan (LRC)
SWO-15055, as amended, confirming her title
thereto. Upon in the order of April 24, 1973)
the absolute owner of the property applied for
and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO 15055, as
amended, confirming her title thereto. Upon
this decision becoming final, let the required
decree of registration be issued and after
payment of corresponding fees, let the
certificate of title be issued in favor of Rosario
Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos, widow, Filipino
and a resident of Quezon City.
"SO ORDERED."7
On March 19, 1974, the trial court8 issued an order
stating:
"The decision rendered by this Court in the
above-entitled case under the date of June 8,
1973 having become final, the Commissioner
of the Land Registration Commission is hereby
directed to comply with Section 21 of Act
2347."9
On May 8, 1974, the Commissioner of Land
Registration issued Decree No. N-150604 in favor of
Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, pursuant to which
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued OCT No.
17 in her name.
On November 21, 1976, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City cancelled OCT No. 17 and issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 223619 also in the name of
Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos due to errors in the
technical description.10
On February 23, 1988, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de
Ramos executed a "deed of absolute sale" in favor of
Segundina Rosario (hereafter Segundina) covering the
parcel of land embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 223619.
On June 11, 1988, fire razed the Quezon City Hall
Building which housed the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
223619 was one of the titles destroyed by the fire.
Subsequently, Segundina Rosario requested the
Register of Deeds to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 223619 resulting in the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 (223619).
On March 11, 1993, U.P. filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21, Quezon City11 a petition for the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N-
126671) 367316 naming Segundina, Bugnay
Construction and Development Corporation and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, among others, as
respondents.
On November 10, 1994, Segundina caused the
registration with the Register of Deeds of the "deed of
absolute sale." Consequently, the Register of Deeds
issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 in
Segundina's name, resulting in the cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-78195(223619).
On November 19, 1996, after the parties had
presented their respective evidence, U.P. filed an
amended petition alleging that it is "the true, absolute
Page 1 of 24
and registered owner of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462" of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and that the "unlawful acts of
ownership being exercised by (Segundina) and
(Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation)
as well as the existence of their spurious certificates of
title, create a cloud of doubt on the title of (U.P.)."
In its third cause of action, U.P. prayed that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 121042 or the reconstituted
titles or derivatives thereof be declared null and
void ab initio for being spurious and fraudulently
issued.
On May 15, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court
an "omnibus motion" for the dismissal of U. P.'s third
cause of action in the amended petition as well as the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on
TCT No. 121042
On November 10, 1997, the trial court denied
Segundina's omnibus motion.
On December 30, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial
court a motion for reconsideration questioning the
denial of her motion to dismiss and praying for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.12
On April 16, 1998, the trial court13 denied Segundina's
motion for reconsideration and motion to cancel the
notice of lis pendens.14
On November 10, 1997, the trial court15 again denied
Segundina's omnibus motion to dismiss and cancel
notice of lis pendens.16
On May 26, 1998, Segundina filed with the Court of
Appeals17 a petition for certiorari18 assailing the orders
of the trial court denying her motion to dismiss.
On September 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision in favor of Segundina. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that the third cause of
action is barred by res judicata and that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Segundina's "motion to dismiss."19 We quote its
dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari
is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Orders
dated November 10, 1997, and April 16, 1998,
are declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE
insofar as they deny petitioner's Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss and Cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens. The Third Cause of Action in
respondent University of the Philippines'
Amended Petition is ordered DISMISSED and
the Notice of Lis Pendens annotated on TCT
No. 121042, CANCELLED. The writ of
preliminary injunction, insofar as it relates to
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 121042,
is LIFTED.
"SO ORDERED."20
On October 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals, a motion for reconsideration of the afore-
quoted decision.21
On December 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.22
Hence, this appeal.23
Petitioner's Submissions
First, U.P. contends that the Court of Appeals
erroneously allowed Segundina's "motion to dismiss"
as Segundina has yet to prove in a "full-blown hearing"
whether her reconstituted title traces its roots to OCT
No. 17. According to U.P., the issuance of Segundina's
title was "highly anomalous."24
Second, U.P. assails the issuance of OCT No. 17 in LRC
Case No. Q-239 as void ab initio. According to U.P.,
the Court of First instance never acquired jurisdiction
over LRC Case Q-239 as the requisite "signature
approval of the Director of Lands... over the survey
plan... was nowhere to be found."25
Third, U.P. asserts that the Court of Appeals ruled on
"unestablished factual issues... by admitting all the
photocopies annexed to respondent (Segundina)
Rosario's petition as evidence despite the fact that
they all still remained subject to authentication and
examination by the parties before the trial court."26
Fourth, U. P. attacks the verification of Segundina's
petition in the Court of Appeals as defective.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
We outline the history of the title that Segundina holds
(Title No. 121042): First, the land was originally
covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055, as amended,
which the Court of First Instance declared as not
encroaching on the property of U.P. and as absolutely
owned by Rosario Alcovendras Vda. de Ramos. Thus,
OCT No. 17 was issued in her name. Second, OCT No.
17 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
223619 was issued. Third, Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de
Ramos executed an "absolute deed of sale" over the
land in favor of Segundina. Fourth, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 223619 was burned in the fire that razed
the Quezon City Hall. Fifth, Title No. 223619 was
reconstituted and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
78195 was issued in its place. Sixth, Segundina
registered the "deed of absolute sale." Thus, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-78195 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 was issued in
Segundina's name.
In LRC Q-329 the trial court declared U.P. as having no
interest in the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 121042. However, UP's contention that OCT
No. 17 is void for lack of the requisite "signature
approval of the Director of Lands... over the survey
plan"27 is worth looking into.
P. D. No. 152928 requires the Director of Lands to sign
and approve the survey plan for the land applied for,
otherwise, the title is void.
"SECTION 17. What and where to file The
application for land registration shall be filed
with the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the land is situated. The
applicant shall file together with the application
all original muniments of titles or copies
thereof and a survey plan approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
Page 2 of 24
 "The clerk of court shall not accept any
application unless it is shown that the applicant
has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy
of the application and all the annexes
(emphasis ours)."
No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of
Lands.29 The submission of the plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan and
its technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are of no value.30
Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the
survey plan was nowhere to be found is an important
jurisdictional fact that must be ventilated before the
trial court. In Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,31 this Court stated that "void ab initio land titles
issued cannot ripen into private ownership." Thus, as
OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to
OCT No. 17, her claim would have no basis as a spring
cannot rise higher than its source.32
Further, the judgment in LRC Q-329 was subject to the
qualification that "If the parcel of land is found to be
inside decreed properties, this plan is automatically
cancelled."33
Whether the land covered by OCT No. 17 is inside
decreed property is an issue of fact that can be best
determined by the trial court after an examination of
the evidence. Welfind meritorious the trial court's
rationale for denying Segundina's motion to dismiss.
We quote:
"To establish their respective rights over the
disputed property, both plaintiff and
respondents submitted documentary exhibits,
the genuineness and authenticity of which can
only be proved in a full blown trial.
"There is no pretense that the foregoing
conflicting claims entail determination of facts.
It, thus, become imperative that both parties
be given their day in Court to avoid the danger
of committing a grave injustice if they were
denied an opportunity to introduce evidence in
their behalf.
"It is within this context that the Court
considers it appropriate under the present
stage of the action to DENY the instant
motion."34
Pending final ruling on the merits of the case,
Segundina's motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The
Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on September 18, 1998, in CA-G. R. SP
No. 47783.
In lieu thereof, the Court orders the case REMANDED
to the trial court for trial on the merits.
G.R. No. 175578 August 11, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as
Attorney-in-fact of MA. AURORA GUINTO-
COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO,
ALFREDO GUINTO, JR., PACITA R. GUINTO,
ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R. GUINTO and
ALBERTO R. GUINTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March 30,
2006 Decision1 and the November 20, 2006
Resolution,2 both of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set
aside the July 10, 2003 judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias City, Branch 199 in LRC Case No.
02-0036, one for original registration of title, whereas
the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The facts follow.
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-
Aldana4 (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora Guinto-Comiso, Ma.
Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R.
Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and
Alberto R. Guinto, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 199 an Application for
Registration of Title5 over two pieces of land in
Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las Pias City. These lands,
identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion
Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-
D,6 measure 1,509 square meters and 4,640 square
meters, respectively.7 Respondents professed
themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having
acquired them by succession from their predecessors
Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto
(Lucia)Zenaidas parentswho, in turn, had acquired
the property under a 1969 document denominated as
"Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa
Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan." Under this
document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a
consideration the respective shares on the property of
Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto and
Marcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had
derived the same from Romulado Guinto.8Respondents
also alleged that until the time of the application, they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous
possession of these lots in the concept of owner and
that they had consistently declared the property in
their name for purposes of real estate taxation.9
In support of their application, respondents submitted
to the court the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-
D,10 as well as copies of the technical descriptions of
each lot,11 a certification from the geodetic
engineer12 and the pertinent tax
declarations,13 together with the receipts of payment
therefor.14 Expressly, they averred that the propertys
original tracing cloth plan had previously been
submitted to the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 255
(Las Pias RTC) in connection with the proceedings in
LRC Case No. LP-128a previous registration case
involving the subject property which, however, had
been dismissed without prejudice.15
The trial court found the application to be sufficient in
form and substance; hence, it gave due course thereto
and ordered compliance with the publication and
notification requirements of the law.16
Page 3 of 24
Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City, advanced that
the lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands
of the public domain; that neither respondents nor
their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior
possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and
the tax declaration submitted to the court did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition or of prior possession in the concept of
owner.17
At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-
respondents to be her siblings, nephews and nieces.
She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners named
in the application and the supporting documents
attached to the application as well. She testified that
the subject lots had been surveyed at the instance of
her family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that
said survey was documented in Plan Ccs-007601-
000040-D and in the geodetic engineers technical
description of the lots. She implied that they did obtain
the original tracing cloth plan of the property, but it
was forwarded to the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) by the Las Pias RTC in connection with the
proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128. Notwithstanding
this admission, and without objection from the
oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D
and the technical description of the property were
provisionally marked in evidence.18
Furthermore, Zenaida61 years old at the time of her
testimonydeclared that she has known that the
subject lots were owned by her family since she was 5
years old and from her earliest recollection, she
narrated that her grandparents had lived in the subject
lots until the death of her grandmother in 1961. She
implied that aside from her predecessors there were
other persons, caretakers supposedly, who had tilled
the land and who had lived until sometime between
1980 and 1990. She remembered her grandmother
having constructed a house on the property, but the
same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in
1970, her family built an adobe fence around the
perimeter of the lots and later, in the 1990s, they
reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after an
inundation caused by the flood.19 She claimed that she
and her father, Sergio, had been religious in the
payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax
declarations and tax receipts which she submitted to
the court and which, following identification, were
forthwith marked in evidence.20
Zenaidas claim of prior, open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the land was corroborated by
Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot
owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly declared
that the subject lots were owned by Zenaidas parents,
Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera, since she reached the
age of understanding, and that she had not come to
know of any instance where a third party had placed a
claim on the property. When asked whether there was
anyone residing in the property and whether there
were improvements made thereon, she said there was
no one residing therein and that there was nothing
standing thereon except for a nipa hut. 21
At the close of Josefinas testimony, respondents
formally offered their exhibits without the oppositor
placing any objection thereto.22 After weighing the
evidence, the trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its
Decision denying the application for registration. It
found that respondents were unable to establish with
certainty the identity of the lots applied for
registration, because of failure to submit to the court
the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted
that the fact of adverse, continuous, open, public and
peaceful possession in the concept of owner has not
been proved by the evidence as Zenaidas and
Josefinas respective testimonies did not establish the
nature of the possession of respondents
predecessors.23 The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply
with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
the Application for Original Registration of Title is
hereby DENIED.
ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, on March 30, 2006, issued the assailed
Decision reversing the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied.26 Hence, it filed the instant petition which
attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the
trial courts July 10, 2003 decision.
Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of
P.D. No. 1529, the submission in court of the original
tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be
registered is a mandatory requirement in registration
proceedings in order to establish the exact identity of
the property. While respondents admitted that the
original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this
case was in the custody of the LRA as a consequence
of their first attempt to have the property registered,
petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the
Philippines,27 believes that respondents, on that score
alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to
adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan,
because they could have easily retrieved it from the
LRA and presented it in court.28
Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of
the subdivision plan submitted by respondents cannot
approximate substantial compliance with the
requirement of Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Again,
relying on the aforementioned Del Rosario case,
petitioner observes that the blueprint in this case,
allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear
the certification of the Lands Management
Bureau.29 Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents claim
of prior possession. It notes that there is no clear and
convincing evidence that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, adverse, public and exclusive possession
of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.30
Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that
petitioners arguments are mere reiterative theses on
the issues that have already been addressed by the
Court of Appeals in the assailed Decision and
Resolution, and that there are no new matters raised
which have not yet been previously passed upon.
Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.31
Page 4 of 24
We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The
Property Registration Decree of 1978, materially
provides:
Section 17. What and where to file.The application
for land registration shall be filed with the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the land is
situated. The applicant shall file, together with the
application, all original muniments of titles or copies
thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application
unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the
Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all
annexes.
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an
application for original registration that the applicant
submit to the court, aside from the original or
duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a
duly approved survey plan of the land sought to be
registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it
provides a reference on the exact identity of the
property. This begs the question in the instant case:
Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for
compliance with the requirement? In not so many
cases,32 it was held that the non-submission, for any
reason, of the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the
registration application, since the same is mandatory
in original registration of title. For instance, in the Del
Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court ruled
that the submission of the original copy of the duly
approved tracing cloth plan is a mandatory condition
for land registration as it supplies the means by which
to determine the exact metes and bounds of the
property. The applicant in that case was unable to
submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he
was claiming because apparently, as in the present
case, it was previously transmitted by the clerk of
court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the
applicants obligation to retrieve the plan himself and
present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth
plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases
for application of original registration of land is a
mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is to
establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it
does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to
forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining
land.1avvphi1 The failure to comply with this
requirement is fatal to petitioners application for
registration.
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted
the original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of
court, but the latter submitted the same to the LRA.
This claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to
retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to
present it in evidence in the trial court. x x x33
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to
provide a convenient and necessary means to afford
certainty as to the exact identity of the property
applied for registration and to ensure that the same
does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining
lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration
application must be denied for failure to present the
original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is
accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly
executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly
executed technical description of the propertywhich
may likewise substantially and with as much certainty
prove the limits and extent of the property sought to
be registered.
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,34 and
in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. Republic of the
Philippines35 and Republic of the Philippines v.
Hubilla,36 that while the best evidence to identify a
piece of land for registration purposes is the original
tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now
the Lands Management Services of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), blueprint
copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient
identification. Pertinently, the Court in Hubilla, citing
Recto, pronounced:
While the petitioner correctly asserts that the
submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth
plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a
mandatory requirement, this Court has recognized
instances of substantial compliance with this rule. In
previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint copies of
the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands
and other evidence could also provide sufficient
identification to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes. x x x37
In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D, together with
the technical description of the property, operates as
substantial compliance with the legal requirement of
ascertaining the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for
registration. The blueprint, which is shown to have
been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando
Roxas (Roxas), attached to the application and
subsequently identified, marked, and offered in
evidence, shows that it proceeded officially from the
Lands Management Services and, in fact, bears the
approval of Surveys Division Chief Ernesto Erive. It
also shows on its face that the survey of the property
was endorsed by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office of the DENR.38 This,
compounded by the accompanying technical
description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly executed and
verified also by Roxas,39 should substantially supply as
it did the means by which the identity of Lot Nos. 4
and 5 may be ascertained.
Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that respondents were able to
approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D. No.
1529. Also telling is the observation made by the Court
of Appeals that there was no objection raised by the
oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the
blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the
fact that they were well-informed of the present
proceedings, to wit:
In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not
deny that only the blueprint copy of the plan of the
subject lands (Exh. "J") and not the original tracing
cloth plan thereof was submitted to the court a quo
since they had previously submitted the original
tracing cloth plan to the Land Registration Authority.
However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-appellants
to present the original tracing cloth plan, neither the
Page 5 of 24
Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-appellee
question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the
blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. "J") was offered in
evidence, the oppositor-apellee did not raise any
objection thereto. Such silence on the part of the Land
Registration [Authority] and the oppositor-appellee can
be deemed as an implied admission that the original
tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh.
"J") are one and the same, free from all defects and
clearly identify the lands sought to be registered. In
this regard x x x, the blueprint copy of the plan (Exh.
"J"), together with its technical descriptions (Exhs. "K"
and "L"), is deemed tantamount to substantial
compliance with the requirements of law.40
We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner
theorizes that not only were respondents unable to
identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims
that they have no credible evidence tending to
establish that for at least 30 years they and their
predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed
the property openly, continuously, exclusively and
notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.41 We do not agree.
In an original registration of title under Section
14(1)42 P.D. No. 1529, the applicant for registration
must be able to establish by evidence that he and his
predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of
dominion over the lot under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.43 He must
prove that for at least 30 years, he and his
predecessor have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land.
Republic v. Alconaba44 well explains possession and
occupation of this character, thus:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the
words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of
a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.45
Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find
that indeed respondents have been in possession and
occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide claim
of ownership for the duration required by law. This
conclusion is primarily factual.
From the records, it is clear that respondents
possession through their predecessor-in-interest dates
back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject
property had already been declared for taxation by
Zenaidas father, Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia
Miranda (Toribia).46 Yet, it also can be safely inferred
that Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for
taxation even earlier because the 1937 tax declaration
shows that it offsets a previous tax number.47 The
property was again declared in 1979,48 198549 and
199450 by Sergio, Toribia and by Romualdo.
Certainly, respondents could have produced more
proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, as
certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor,
the relevant portions of the tax records on file with it
had been burned when the assessors office was razed
by fire in 1997.51 Of equal relevance is the fact that
with these tax assessments, there came next tax
payments. Respondents receipts for tax expenditures
on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are
likewise fleshed out in the records and in these
documents, Sergio, Toribia and Romualdo are the
named owners of the property with Zenaida being
identified as the one who delivered the payment in the
1994 receipts.52
The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments
clearly show that Zenaidas testimony in this respect is
no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive
acts exercised by respondents predecessors, as
demonstrated by these pieces of evidence, yields no
other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had
already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the
property. Not only do they show that they had
excluded all others in their claim but also, that such
claim is in all good faith.
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule
that while tax declarations and realty tax payment are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are a good indication of possession in the concept
of owner. These documents constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for
a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. The voluntary declaration of a
piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property. It also announces his adverse claim
against the state and all other parties who may be in
conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies
an unfeigned intention to contribute to government
revenuesan act that strengthens ones bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.53
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in
possession of the land in the concept of owneropen,
continuous, peaceful and without interference and
opposition from the government or from any private
individualitself makes their right thereto
unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of
protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30,
2006 Decision and the November 20, 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, are
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DOMINGO ESPINOSA, Respondent.
Page 6 of 24
 DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the
Decision1 dated November 11, 2004 and
Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa
(Espinosa) tiled with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu an application3 for land registration
covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square
meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application, which
was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged
that: (a) the property, which is more particularly
known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New), is
alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the
property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on
July 4, 1970 and the latters other heirs had waived
their rights thereto; and (c) he and his predecessor-in-
interest had been in possession of the property in the
concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey
Plan 07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As
proof that the property is alienable and disposable, he
marked as evidence the annotation on the advance
survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibaez, Chief of the
Map Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER
L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28
certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within
Alienable & Disposable Area".5 Espinosa also presented
two (2) tax declarations for the years 1965 and 1974
in Isabels name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and
06137 to prove that she had been in possession of
the property since 1965. To support his claim that he
had been religiously paying the taxes due on the
property, Espinosa presented a Certification6 dated
December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of the
Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax
declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax
Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and 010717 .8
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming
that: (a) Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
otherwise known as the "Public Land Act" (PLA) had
not been complied with as Espinosas predecessor-in-
interest possessed the property only after June 12,
1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove that
his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest
are in the character and for the length of time required
by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a
Judgment9 granting Espinosas petition for registration,
the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering for the
registration and the confirmation of title of Espinosa
over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at
Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines,
containing an area of 5,525 square meters and that
upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding
decree of registration be issued in favor of the herein
applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that
the property is alienable and disposable and that he
complied with the requirements of Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented
in the above-entitled case, the Court is convinced, and
so holds, that Espinosa was able to establish his
ownership and possession over the subject lot which is
within the area considered by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and
that of predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
actual, public, continuous, adverse and under claim of
title thereto within the time prescribed by law (Sec.
14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with
the Land Registration Act.11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas
failure to prove that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest were for the period required by
law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabels
possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June
12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the
PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into
possession of the property only in 1970 following the
sale that transpired between him and his mother and
the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the
year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa and
his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in
possession for more than thirty (30) years is
inconsequential absent proof that such possession
began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to
present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan or
a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing
Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines13 and Director
of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner argued that the
submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in
establishing the identity of the land subject of the
application.15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the
advance survey plan is not the evidence admissible to
prove that the subject land is alienable and
disposable.16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed
petitioners appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision
dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession
for at least thirty (30) years, despite the fact that it
commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert
the property to private. Thus:
The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the
following grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has
successfully established valid title over the subject land
and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been
in continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed
possession of said land in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years before the filing of the application.
Established jurisprudence has consistently pronounced
that "open, continuous and exclusive possession for at
least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure
converts the same into private property (Director of
Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA
604). This means that occupation and cultivation for
Page 7 of 24
more than 30 years by applicant and his predecessor-
in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land
(National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 218
SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since
June 12, 1945 is the latest amendment of Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict
implementation of the law would in certain cases result
in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As wisely stated
by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is
thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in
open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof for
thirty (30) years or more."17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on
other documentary evidence, not necessarily the
original tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location
of the property can be established by other competent
evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is
without merit. While the best evidence to identify a
piece of land for registration purposes may be the
original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration
Commission, the court may sufficiently order the
issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the
blue print copies and other evidence (Republic of the
Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
L-70594, October 10, 1986). The said case provides
further:
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the
applicant sufficient to justify the registration and
confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary
to avail of the original tracing cloth plan from the Land
Registration Commission for purposes of comparison,
should not militate against the rights of the applicant.
Such is especially true in this case where no clear,
strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has
been shown by the oppositor to overcome the
correctness of said plans which were found both by the
lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive
proofs of the description and identities of the parcels of
land contained therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs.
Republic, supra the Supreme Court pronounced that
the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth
plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases
for application of original registration of land is a
mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply
with such requirement is fatal to ones application for
registration. However, such pronouncement need not
be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly
in all cases without due regard to the rationale behind
the submission of the tracing cloth plan.
x x x:
xxxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be
established by other competent evidence like a duly
approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of
Lot 8499 and technical description of Lot 8499,
containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area
and location of the lot, the presentation of the original
tracing cloth plan may be excused.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven
that the property is alienable and disposable:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and
disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey Plan
As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by the Land
Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is
certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the
alienable and disposable area of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was
denied by the CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13,
2006.
Petitioners Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside
the CAs assailed decision and attributes the following
errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by competent
evidence that the subject property is alienable and
disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey
plan identifies the property in preparation for a judicial
proceeding but does not convert the property into
alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of
P.D. No. 1529, the submission of the original tracing
cloth plan is mandatory to determine the exact metes
and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint copy
of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the
identity and location of the property only if it bears the
approval of the Director of Lands.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether
Espinosa has acquired an imperfect title over the
subject property that is worthy of confirmation and
registration is hinged on the determination of the
following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced
survey plan substantially complies with Section
17 of P.D. No. 1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy
of the plan made by the geodetic engineer who
conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that
Espinosas application is anchored on Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA
and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence
supposedly showing his compliance with the
requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting
documents, it is patent that his claim of an imperfect
title over the property in question is based on Section
14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not
allege that his possession and that of his predecessor-
in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as
Page 8 of 24
prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions. On the
contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged that he acquired
title thru his possession and that of his predecessor-in-
interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30)
years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that
should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower
courts disposition of this case stemmed from their
failure to apprise themselves of the changes that
Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent over the years.
Section 48(b) of the PLA originally states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
except as against the Government, since July twenty-
sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title was since July
26, 1894 or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942
amended Section 48(b) of the PLA by providing a thirty
(30)-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title. Thus:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued,
changing the requirement for possession and
occupation for a period of thirty (30) years to
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section
48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted.
Notably, the requirement for possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted
under Section 14(1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such
that applications under Section 48(b) of the PLA filed
after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege
and prove possession and occupation that dated back
to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested rights
may have been acquired under Section 48(b) prior to
its amendment by P.D. No. 1073. That is, should
petitions for registration filed by those who had already
been in possession of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain for thirty (30) years at the time P.D.
No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their
possession commenced after June 12, 1945? In
Abejaron v. Nabasa,21 this Court resolved this legal
predicament as follows:
However, as petitioner Abejarons 30-year period of
possession and occupation required by the Public Land
Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation and
possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine
holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b)
takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejarons
satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would
have already gained title over the disputed land in
1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the
law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant.
More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have
been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January
25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since
January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial confirmation
of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b)
of the Public Land Act.22 (Citations omitted)
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48(b) and
claim an imperfect title over an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a
thirty (30)-year possession and occupation, it must be
demonstrated that such possession and occupation
commenced on January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-
year period was completed prior to the effectivity of
P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48(b) that would suggest
that it provides for two (2) modes of acquisition. It is
not the case that there is an option between
Page 9 of 24
possession and occupation for thirty (30) years and
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. It is neither contemplated under Section 48(b)
that if possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is
still possible to acquire an imperfect title if such
possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30)
years at the time of the filing of the application.
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa
complied with the requirements of Section 48(b) of the
PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 based
on supposed evidence that he and his predecessor-in-
interest had been in possession of the property for at
least thirty (30) years prior to the time he filed his
application. However, there is nothing on record
showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073, he or Isabel had already
acquired title by means of possession and occupation
of the property for thirty (30) years. On the contrary,
the earliest tax declaration in Isabels name was for
the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977,
only twelve (12) years had lapsed from the time she
first came supposedly into possession.
The CAs reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court23 is misplaced considering that the
application therein was filed on October 20, 1975 or
before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can
be said with respect to National Power Corporation v.
Court of Appeals.24 The petition for registration therein
was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that time, the
prevailing rule was that provided under Section 48(b)
as amended by R.A. No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 the applicants
therein entered into possession of the property on June
17, 1978 and filed their application on February 5,
1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the
individuals from whom the applicant purchased the
property, or their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of
Section 48(b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while
the prevailing rule was possession and occupation for
thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance of P.D. No.
1073, the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period was
already completed.
Thus, assuming that it is Section 48(b) of the PLA in
relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should
apply in this case, as the lower courts held, it was
incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other
things, that Isabels possession of the property dated
back at least to June 12, 1945. That in view of the
established fact that Isabels alleged possession and
occupation started much later, the lower courts should
have dismissed Espinosas application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not
applying the present text of Section 48(b) of the PLA.
That there were instances wherein applications were
granted on the basis of possession and occupation for
thirty (30) years was for the sole reason discussed
above. Regrettably, such reason does not obtain in this
case.
Being clear that it is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529
that should apply, it follows that the subject property
being supposedly alienable and disposable will not
suffice. As Section 14(2) categorically provides, only
private properties may be acquired thru prescription
and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only
those properties, which are not for public use, public
service or intended for the development of national
wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic,26 this Court held that there
must be an official declaration to that effect before the
property may be rendered susceptible to prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
"property of public dominion, when no longer intended
for public use or for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State." It is this
provision that controls how public dominion property
may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible
to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2)
makes clear that those property "which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth" are public dominion property. For as
long as the property belongs to the State, although
already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended
for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth." (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by
the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion,
pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared
by the State to be no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa
possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate
period of thirty (30) years, this does not operate to
divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit
allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial.
As the property is not held by the State in its private
capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates
observance of the provisions of Section 48(b) of the
PLA in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 or
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For
prescription to run against the State, there must be
proof that there was an official declaration that the
subject property is no longer earmarked for public
service or the development of national wealth.
Moreover, such official declaration should have been
issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30) years, as the
case may be, prior to the filing of the application for
registration. The period of possession and occupation
prior to the conversion of the property to private or
patrimonial shall not be considered in determining
completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed, while a
piece of land is still reserved for public service or the
development of national wealth, even if the same is
alienable and disposable, possession and occupation no
matter how lengthy will not ripen to ownership or give
rise to any title that would defeat that of the States if
such did not commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the
notation on the survey plan does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the
presumption that the property belongs to the
inalienable public domain.
Page 10 of 24
All lands of the public domain belong to the State,
which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.28
In Republic v. Sarmiento,29 this Court reiterated the
earlier ruling in Menguito v. Republic30 that the
notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that
the property surveyed is alienable and disposable is
not the positive government act that would remove the
property from the inalienable domain. Neither it is the
evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the
presumption that the property is inalienable:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue
print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation
of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No.
27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968
by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance
on such a notation to prove that the lot is alienable is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that it remains
part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read:
"This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-
13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant
(petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof
in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor
geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of
the land in question.
Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the
said surveyors assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable."31 (Citations omitted and
underscoring supplied)
Therefore, even if Espinosas application may not be
dismissed due to his failure to present the original
tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous
grounds for its denial. The blueprint copy of the
advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of
the identity and location of the subject property if: (a)
it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer;
(b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management
Services (LMS) of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied
by a technical description of the property which is
certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who
conducted the survey and the LMS of the DENR. As
ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana,32 the identity of the
land, its boundaries and location can be established by
other competent evidence apart from the original
tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the
survey plan and technical description:
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan is merely to
provide a convenient and necessary means to afford
certainty as to the exact identity of the property
applied for registration and to ensure that the same
does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining
lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration
application must be denied for failure to present the
original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is
accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly
executed blueprint of the survey plan and a duly
executed technical description of the propertywhich
may likewise substantially and with as much certainty
prove the limits and extent of the property sought to
be registered.33
However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan
may be offered as evidence of the identity, location
and the boundaries of the property applied for, the
notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of
Juan Fabio,34 this Court enumerated the documents
that are deemed relevant and sufficient to prove that
the property is already outside the inalienable public
domain as follows:
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it
is not enough for the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to certify
that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as
proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR
Secretarys declaration or the Presidents proclamation
must be certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of such official record.1wphi1 These facts must be
Page 11 of 24
established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.35 (Citation omitted)
Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa
cannot avail the benefits of either Section 14(1) of P.O.
No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA or
Section 14(2) of P.O. No. 1529. Applying Section 14(1)
of P.O. No. 1529 and Section 48(b) of the PLA, albeit
improper, Espinosa failed to prove that: (a) Isabel's
possession of the property dated back to June 12,
1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and
disposable. On the other hand, applying Section 14(2)
of P.O. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to prove that the
property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was
able to prove that his possession and occupation and
that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law,
the resolution of this issue has been rendered
unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Decision
dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72456 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
Domingo Espinosa's application for registration of title
over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at
Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible
deposit made through the effects of the current of the
water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to
the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of
the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed
belongs to the State as property of public dominion,
not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more
than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III
(Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The
property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters,
more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Paraaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by
Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos,
Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Paraaque
River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in
the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio
Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his
application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr.
as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership
of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.2
The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the
application for land registration, stating that it needed
the property for its flood control program; that the
property was within the legal easement of 20 meters
from the river bank; and that assuming that the
property was not covered by the legal easement, title
to the property could not be registered in favor of the
applicants for the reason that the property was an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from
accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for
land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants,
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the
TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being
applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San
Dionisio, City of Paraaque with an area of one
thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less
and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being
a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque
Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of
Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical
description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory,
let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the
Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors
to the RTC,5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN
ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY
APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE
ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY
WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL
FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE
RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
APPELLEES FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE.
Page 12 of 24
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES
HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR
CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE
OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A
PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8
I 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT
WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER
ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS
CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD
AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF
THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN
OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL
TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY,
PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the
Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not
respondents could claim the property by virtue of
acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil
Code to respondents benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the currents of the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as
follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the
applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the
land subject of this application which was previously a
part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard
after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4
which adjoins the same property is owned by
applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained
by him through inheritance from his mother,
Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably with Art.
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the
bank of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters."9
The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as
in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio
Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was
previously part of the Paraaque River which became
an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4
which adjoins the same property is owned by the
applicant which was obtained by the latter from his
mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by
both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was
erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents
evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the
drying up of the Paraaque River.
The Republics submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration
carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of
their application by a preponderance of evidence, by
which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight,
or more convincing than that offered in opposition to
it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property
as their own and apply for its registration under the
Torrens system only if they established that, indeed,
the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited
along the banks of rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be
considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the
concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant
the grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden
of proof. They did not show that the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of
Page 13 of 24
the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B.
Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was
the dried-up river bed of the Paraaque River, leading
both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot
4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the
Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it
dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot
4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4
was issued in their mothers name in 1920, and that
Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land
formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque River, the
unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and
sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4
by the current of the Paraaque River, resulting in the
formation of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For
one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the
current of the river are not the only cause of the
formation of land along a river bank. There are several
other causes, including the drying up of the river bed.
The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform
conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words,
respondents did not establish at all that the increment
of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible
deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it
seems to be highly improbable that the large volume
of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an
area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a
gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of
the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years the
span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4
was registered in the name of their deceased parent
(at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence)
and the early 1950s (which respondents witness
Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew
them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible
explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot
4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Paraaque River.
Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s own
testimony to the effect that the property was
previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried
up and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s
own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed
the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot
4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the
Paraaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated
subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by
Dried River Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1"
corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which
was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot
1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio
Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-
up river bed as an accretion that became respondents
property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That
land was definitely not an accretion. The process of
drying up of a river to form dry land involved the
recession of the water level from the river banks, and
the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which
was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on
the river banks through the effects of the current. In
accretion, the water level did not recede and was more
or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot
4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical
language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined
the provision only to accretion, we should apply the
provision as its clear and categorical language tells us
to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of
the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application.16 The
first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply
the law.17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not
be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the
Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It
follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
continue to belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is
an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person.19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents application for land
registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had
taken possession of the property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based
on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining
owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It
rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the
applicants became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years
because their predecessors-in-interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along
the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants
paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision
plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly
approved by the Land Management Services and the
fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys
Division Land Registration Authority, made a Report
that the subject property is not a portion of the
Paraaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap
with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the
application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the
applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing
reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land
Registration Authority and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds
and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the
requirements of law which are essential to a
government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the
issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also,
oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not
entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
Page 14 of 24
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation
of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a)
that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and
(b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts
that respondents "took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely
for more than thirty (30) years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally
will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings
being binding and conclusive on the Court,23 the Court
has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule,
including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent;
and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the
inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court
should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous,
open, public and adverse possession of the land for
more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the
applicant became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly,
publicly and adversely for more than thirty years
because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining
owners of the subject parcel of land along the river
banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its
realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-
00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the
Land Management Services and the fact that Engr.
Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject
property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and
that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus,
the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of
supposed possession to be "more than thirty years"
from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are
the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land."
Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts
respondents had performed showing their possession
of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely" in that length of time. The decision
mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and
had caused the survey of the property to be made.
That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing
findings, because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes
did not conclusively prove the payors ownership of the
land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and
payments being mere indicia of a claim of
ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of
the property involved was not itself an of continuous,
open, public and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land
receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to
make an express act of possession, and that no acts of
possession are necessary in that instance because it is
the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to
the riparian owner from the time that the deposit
created by the current of the water becomes
manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply
because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion.
Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the river
bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not
translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen
to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of
continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot
4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly
established. The admission of respondents themselves
that they declared the property for taxation purposes
only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from
199928 signified that their alleged possession would at
most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that
respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty
years in the character they claimed, they did not
thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other
means without any competent proof that the land was
already declared as alienable and disposable by the
Government. Absent that declaration, the land still
belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as
being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the
properties considered as part of public dominion,
namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
and others of similar character; and (b) those which
belong to the State, without being for public use, and
Page 15 of 24
are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. As earlier
mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that
rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to
acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the
Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v.
Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land
found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural
bed of a creek. There the Court held:
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject
land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan
Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse
possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest,
Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966,
when she purchased the adjoining property from the
latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of
the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of
the Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in
the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
It is only after the Government has declared the land
to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm
extending from a river and participating in the ebb and
flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and
502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek,
including its natural bed, is property of the public
domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent
any declaration by the government, that a portion of
the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its
inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried
up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject
land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her
predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds
which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course," and
the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to
acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of
the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river
beds are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however,
that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the
DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land
became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation
canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus,
in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room
for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a
natural change in the course of the waters. The rules
on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals
or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering
our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not
apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios
cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian
owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public
domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by
private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations
where there has been a change in the course of a
river, not where the river simply dries up. In the
instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a
situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry
river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold
emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No
public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It
is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a
title from the State.31Occupation of public land in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the
Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the
land occupied by the new course, and which gives to
the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire
only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging
to the owners of the land affected by the natural
change of course of the waters only after paying their
value), all river beds remain property of public
dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription unless previously declared by the
Government to be alienable and disposable.
Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be
already declared to be alienable and disposable,
respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the
property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was
already classified as alienable and disposable by the
Government. They cite as proof of the classification as
alienable and disposable the following notation found
on the survey plan, to wit:33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD
BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO.
007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued
by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Page 16 of 24
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that
Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the
propertys nature as alienable and disposable public
land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the
Government, such as a presidential proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a
legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the
alienability and disposability of public land, we said in
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive
order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records
are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters
of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in
Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the
issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was
sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and
disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read:
"This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-
13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."
For the original registration of title, the applicant
(petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof
in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be shown by the applicant. Absent such
evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-
geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of
the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyors assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with
the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial
Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community
Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a
piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the
following manner, viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do
not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager,
identified the certifications submitted by
respondent.1wphi1 The government officials who
issued the certifications were not presented before the
trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court
should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even
if the certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value
in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Page 17 of 24
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-
DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B
falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the
facts stated therein. Such government certifications
may fall under the class of documents contemplated in
the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do
not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on
the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the
effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Devt" did
not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as
alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents
could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot
4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for
registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan
S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of
1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, Metro Manila;
and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to
the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the
Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the
issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction
of municipal trial courts in land registration cases.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas2 in
LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329,
granting respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporations (Corporation) application for original
registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of
law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision
before filing this Petition for Review.
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point
Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for
original registration of title over a parcel of land with
an assessed value of 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
total assessed value of 14,920 for the entire property,
more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D,
San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less
10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte,
San Juan, Batangas. 3
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the
case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.4 On 7
August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the
initial hearing on 4 November 1997.5
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the
application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
records were still with the RTC.6
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted
motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
Juan, because the assessed value of the property was
allegedly less than 100,000.7
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General
Default8 and commenced with the reception of
evidence.9 Among the documents presented by
respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,10 a Deed of Absolute Sale in its
favor,11 and a Certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is
within the alienable and disposable zone.12 Thereafter,
it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.13
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,14 the CA
ruled that since the former had actively participated in
the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to
raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is
thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the lower court on appeal.15 The CA further found that
respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the
latters registrable title over the subject property after
having proven open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even
before the outbreak of World War II.16
Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic
filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the
following arguments in support of its appeal:
I.
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
OF LAND TITLE.17
The Courts Ruling
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the
case to the court a quo for further proceedings in order
to determine if the property in question forms part of
Page 18 of 24
 I In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts,
petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a)
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of the period for setting the date and hour of the initial
jurisdiction in this case. hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the
court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond
question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of the 90-day period provided under the Property
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at Registration Decree.28
any stage of the proceedings.18 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or We disagree.
the law.19 It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by The Property Registration Decree provides:
the acquiescence of the court.20 Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The
raised for the first time on appeal.21
court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-
estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if five days nor later than ninety days from the date of
he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which the order. x x x.
he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts
jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
In this case, the application for original registration
subsequently rendered is adverse to him"22 is based on
was filed on 17 July 1997.29 On 18 July 1997, or a day
the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of
after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately
that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on
Sibonghanoy.23 In Tijam, the party-litigant actively
22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the
participated in the proceedings before the lower court
Order.30 While the date set by the RTC was beyond the
and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter,
90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did
and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic
from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question
v. Manna Properties, Inc.,31petitioner Republic therein
the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique
contended that there was failure to comply with the
facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
jurisdictional requirements for original registration,
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the
because there were 125 days between the Order
question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa
setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial
v. People,24 we cautioned that Tijam must be construed
hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between
as an exception to the general rule and applied only in
the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial
the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is
hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was
similar to that in the latter case.
not fatal to the application. Thus, we held:

The facts are starkly different in this case, making the

x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the
exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner
Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the
registration when the records were still with the
business of such official in the performance of his
RTC.25 At that point, petitioner could not have
duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC,
exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
simply because the case was not yet with that court.
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on
When the records were transferred to the MTC,
matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an
petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested
applicant for an act or omission over which the
affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner
applicant has neither responsibility nor control,
immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its
especially if the applicant has complied with all the
Brief.26Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by
requirements of the law.32
laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.

Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize

Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it."27 In this case,
petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to
conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its
right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
II
respondent Corporation by dismissing its application
for registration on account of events beyond its
control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7
August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November
1997,33within the 90-day period provided by law,
petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect
was still not cured, as the second Order was issued
more than five days from the filing of the application,
again contrary to the prescribed period under the
Property Registration Decree.34

Petitioner is incorrect.
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction
over the case.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date
and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the
filing of the application for registration, as provided in
Page 19 of 24
the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the
courts its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day
period was merely directory, and failure to issue the
Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with
the five-day period is mandatory would make
jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon
the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law.35 It
cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the
court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the
statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume
that the law deliberately meant the provision "to
become meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter."36 However, the records of this case do not show
such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC
immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after
the filing of the application for registration,37 except
that it had to issue a second Order because the initial
hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period
provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended38 that since the selling
price of the property based on the Deed of Sale
annexed to respondents application for original
registration was 160,000,39 the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,40 the MTCs
delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land
registration cases is limited to lands, the value of
which should not exceed 100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral
and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land
Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear
and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or contested lots where the value of which
does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one, or
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decision in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral
and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or
opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value
of which does not exceed 100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance,
because petitioner opposed respondent Corporations
application for registration on 8 January 1998.41
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second
instance, because the value of the lot in this case does
not exceed 100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the
land should not be determined with reference to its
selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in
three ways: first, by the affidavit of the
claimant; second, by agreement of the respective
claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from
the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property.42
In this case, the value of the property cannot be
determined using the first method, because the
records are bereft of any affidavit executed by
respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise,
valuation cannot be done through the second method,
because this method finds application only where there
are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint
submission as to the value of the property. Here, only
respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation
claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be
ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax
Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation
together with its application for registration. From the
records, we find that the assessed value of the
property is 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total
assessed value of 14,920 for the entire
property.43 Based on these Tax Declarations, it is
evident that the total value of the land in question
does not exceed 100,000. Clearly, the MTC may
exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof
that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise
of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower
court erred in granting respondent Corporations
application for original registration in the absence of
sufficient proof that the property in question was
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.44 The applicant for
land registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership by establishing
through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought
to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a
positive act of the government.45 We held in Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is
insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the land sought to be registered.46 The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the
DENR Secretary has approved the land classification
and released the land in question as alienable and
disposable.47
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO48 Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.49
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO
certification in support of its application.50 Clearly, this
Page 20 of 24
falls short of the requirements for original
registration.1wphi1
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for
reception of further evidence to prove that the
property in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. If respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a
certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for
original registration should be granted. If it fails to
present sufficient proof that the land in question is
alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the
government, the application should be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan,
Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the
property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
G.R. No. 147359 March 28, 2008
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
OF TITLE FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING
CORPORATION, represented by KAM BIAK Y.
CHAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp.
(FATCO), through Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr., appeals by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
October 23, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52366, and the March 7, 2001
Resolution2 denying its reconsideration.
On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application for
confirmation of title to parcels of land, described as
Lots No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030,3 with an
aggregate area of 8,463 square meters, situated in
Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The application
was docketed as LRA REC. No. N-63835.
FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of
the subject parcels of land which it openly, exclusively
and notoriously possessed and occupied for more than
thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership,
tacking its possession with that of its predecessors-in-
interest. It allegedly acquired these lots in the
following manner:
a) Lot No. 1505 covered by Tax Declaration
No. 20304 was acquired by a Deed of
Exchange executed by and between the Brgy.
Council of Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union,
represented by its Brgy. Capt. Honesto Alcid
and Brgy. Sec. Teofilo Descargar, and the
applicant, at San Fernando, La Union, on
October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 415,
Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the
notarial register of Notary Public Roman R.
Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of La Union on
November 16, 1988;
b) Lot No. 1234 covered by Tax Declaration
No. 20305 was acquired by a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by and between
Ceferino Bucago, Ildefonso Bucago, Victoria
Bucago, Felomina B. Higoy, Elizabeth B.
Espejo, Ernesto B. Dacanay, Maria Bucago,
Reinerio P. Dacanay and the applicant at San
Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988
appearing as Doc. No. 411, Page No. 84, Book
No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial register of
Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and
registered with the Registry of Deeds for the
province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
c) Lot No. 47030 covered by Tax Declaration
No. 21971 was acquired by a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed by and between Ernesto Adman,
Amparo Carino Adman, and the applicant at
San Fernando, La Union, on August 27, 1990
appearing as Doc. No. 235, Page No. 47, Book
No. II, Series of 1990, in the notarial register
of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and
registered with the Register of Deeds for the
Province of La Union on September 25, 1990.4
FATCO, thus, prayed for the registration or
confirmation of its title over these parcels of land.
On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) entered its appearance, as counsel for
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando,
La Union to appear in the case.5
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order
setting the application for initial hearing on February
28, 1995.1awphi1The Order was published in the
January 23, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette,6 and the
February 18-24, 1995 issue of the Guardian.7 The
notice of hearing was, likewise, posted in a
conspicuous place in each parcel of land included in the
application, and on the bulletin board of the municipal
building of Bacnotan, La Union.8 The Provincial
Prosecutor of La Union was furnished with a copy of
notice of hearing on November 18, 1994.9
At the scheduled initial hearing on February 28, 1995,
Atty. Marita Balloguing entered her appearance as
collaborating counsel for FATCO, and requested the
resetting of the marking of exhibits.10 The RTC granted
the request and issued an Order resetting the hearing
to April 19, 1995, viz.:
As prayed for by Atty. Balloguing, who entered her
appearance in collaboration with Atty. Ungria as
counsel for the applicant, this case is reset to April 19,
1995 at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose of establishing
jurisdictional facts.
SO ORDERED.11
The Republic, through the Provincial Prosecutor, was
duly informed of the resetting.12
On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its
appearance as counsel for the Republic and once more
deputized the Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La
Union to appear in the case.13 On the same date, the
Page 21 of 24
Republic filed its Opposition to FATCOs application for
registration on the following grounds: (1) neither
FATCO nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title and
tax declarations of the applicant (and its predecessors-
in-interest) do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied
for, and do not appear to be genuine; (3) applicant
(and its predecessors-in-interest) can no longer claim
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant, since they failed to file the appropriate
application for registration within the period of six
months from February 16, 1976, as required by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; (4) the parcels of
land applied for forms part of the public domain and
are not subject to private appropriation; and (5) the
application was belatedly filed as it was filed beyond
December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec. 2,
P.D. No. 1073.14
During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria
D. Catbagan appeared for the Republic. FATCO,
through counsel, offered in evidence the following
documents to establish jurisdictional facts:
Exhibit "A" - Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-
000129 of Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030
Exhibit "B" - Technical Description
Exhibit "B-1" - Certification in lieu of Lost
Surveyors Certificate
Exhibit "C" - Notice of Initial Hearing from LRA
Exhibit "D" - Affidavit of Publication by
publisher of The Guardian
Exhibit "D-1" - Clipping of Publication
Exhibit "E" - Whole issue of The Guardian for
February 18 to 24, 1995;
Exhibit "E-1" - Section A of publication of said
issue;
Exhibit "F" - Certificate of Publication from the
Official Gazette/ National Printing Office;
Exhibit "G" - Certificate of Notification sent to
Adjoining Owners (Reserved);
Exhibit "H" - Certificate of Publication from LRA
Exhibit "I" - Sheriffs Certificate of Posting
Exhibit "J" - Certificate of Assessment15
The RTC then issued an Order16 setting the case for
the reception of evidence on May 25, 1995 at 8:30 in
the morning.
In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other documents
and testimonial evidence to prove its title to the
parcels of land applied for. The Republic, on the other
hand, did not submit evidence to controvert FATCOs
assertion.
In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a
finding that FATCO had sufficiently established its
ownership of the lands in question, ordered the
registration thereof in its name, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court
hereby approves the application and orders that the
parcels of land identified as Lots 1505, 1234 and
47030, Bacnotan Cadastre Pls-1050-D, containing an
area of EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-
THREE (8,463) square meters, more or less, located at
Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, covered by
Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 (Exh. "A"), and
more particularly described in the technical description,
Exh. "B" shall be registered in the name of the
applicant Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation,
with address at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, under
the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.
The encumbrance/mortgage of the property to the Far
East Bank and Trust Company, San Fernando, La
Union Branch in the amount of Seventeen Million
(17,000,000.00) Pesos, shall accordingly be
annotated at the back of the title to be issued in the
name of the applicant.
Once this decision shall become final, let a decree of
registration be issued.17
From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the
CA. It faulted the RTC for giving due course to FATCOs
application arguing that it did not acquire jurisdiction
over the same in view of the non-publication of the
notice of actual initial hearing. It also claimed that
FATCO failed to prove open, continuous and notorious
possession of the subject properties for more than
thirty (30) years, as required by law.
On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC
Decision. The CA agreed with the Republic that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over FATCOs
application because the publication of initial hearing
was fatally defective. The notice that was published in
the Official Gazette and in the Guardian was the
hearing set on February 28, 1995, but no hearing was
conducted on the said date. The actual initial hearing
was held on April 19, 1995, a date different from what
was stated in the notice, thereby defeating the very
purpose of the publication requirement.
The CA disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated February 5,
1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.18
FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied it on March 7, 2001.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by FATCO theorizing
that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONERS
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.19
Page 22 of 24
In its Comment on the petition, the Republic, through
the OSG, argues that:
I jurisdiction over FATCOs application.
No actual hearing was held by the trial court
on February 28, 1995 which was THE published
date of initial hearing;
II
The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction to
hear petitioners application for registration
due to petitioners failure to publish the notice
of actual hearing set on April 19, 1995 and to
post said notice in conspicuous places and to
serve the same to adjoining owners.
III
NO TRACING CLOTH PLAN WAS OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE IN THE COURT A QUO.
IV
petitioner failed to prove its open, continuous,
adverse and notorious possession of the
subject properties in the concept of an owner
for more than thirty (30) years.20
We will deal first with the jurisdictional issue.
Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property
21
Registration Decree, explicitly provides that before the
court can act on the application for land registration,
the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing
thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting.
FATCO insists that it complied with all the jurisdictional
requirements, specifically the publication of the notice
of initial hearing. It, therefore, faulted the CA for
reversing the RTC and, accordingly, dismissing its
application for registration.
The Republic, on the other hand, asserts that the RTC
never acquired jurisdiction over FATCOs application
because the publication of initial hearing was fatally
defective. It points out that the initial hearing set on
February 28, 1995 was reset to April 19, 1995. The
actual initial hearing, therefore, took place on a date
different from what was stated in the published notice
of initial hearing. Hence, re-publication of the new
notice of hearing was necessary, but FATCO failed to
publish the notice of hearing set on April 19, 1995,
thus, preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction
over the application.
The Republic is correct that in land registration case,
publication of the notice of initial hearing is a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance
therewith affects the jurisdiction of the court. The
purpose of publication of the notice is to require all
persons concerned, who may have any rights or
interests in the property applied for, to appear in court
at a certain date and time to show cause why the
application should not be granted.22
It is not disputed that there was publication, mailing,
and posting of the notice of the initial hearing set on
February 28, 1995. FATCO, thus, complied with the
legal requirement of serving the entire world with
sufficient notice of the registration proceedings.
Accordingly, as of that date, the RTC acquired
Even if, at the February 28, 1995 hearing, FATCOs
counsel requested a resetting, and the RTC granted
said request, the Republic and all interested parties
were already fully apprised of the pendency of the
application. When the hearing was reset to April 19,
1995, interested parties, the Republic included, may
be deemed to have been given notice thereof.23 There
was, thus, no need for the re-publication of notice of
hearing, for clearly, the avowed purpose of Section 23
had already been accomplished. We, therefore, find
that the application for registration was rightfully given
due course by the RTC. The CA, thus, committed
reversible error in holding otherwise.
Be that as it may, we cannot grant FATCOs plea for
the reinstatement of the RTC Decision granting its
application for registration or confirmation of its
imperfect title.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree
explicitly states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to the land, whether personally
or through their authorized representatives.
(a) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land,
he must show that: first, he, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, and second, the land subject
of the application is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.24
To prove its length of possession, FATCO offered the
testimonies of Antonio Casugay, its division manager,
Emilio Paz, owner of the adjacent lot, and of Ernesto
Adman and Cifirino Bucago, its predecessors-in-
interest. It also presented deeds of conveyance and
several tax declarations covering the lands in question.
Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its
witnesses do not serve to prove the validity of its
cause. Antonio Casugay and Emilio Paz merely stated
that FATCO acquired the subject lots and had taken
possession of the same in 1988 or 1989.25 FATCOs
predecessor-in-interest, Ernesto Adman, on the other
hand, testified that he acquired ownership and
possession of Lot No. 4703, also described as Lot No.
1504-A, from Victor Dacanay only in 1983 or
1984.26 Similarly, Cifirino Bucagos testimony27 did not
establish the period of possession required by law over
Lot No. 1234. His testimony consists merely of general
statements with no specifics as to when he began
occupying the land. He did not introduce sufficient
evidence to substantiate his allegation that he
possessed Lot No. 1234 for the length of time
prescribed by law.
Page 23 of 24
Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCOs
assertion. The earliest tax declarations presented for
Lot No. 1505 and Lot No. 47030 were issued only in
1948,28 while the earliest tax declaration for Lot No.
1234 was issued in 1970.29 We have ruled that while a
tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession.30

Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration

case must prove the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied
for. General statements which are mere conclusions of
law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing
and cannot suffice.31

In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof

that its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous and adverse possession of the subject lots
since June 12, 1945. At best, FATCO can only prove
possession of Lots No. 1505 and No. 47030 since
1948, and of Lot No. 1234 since 1970. But as the law
now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty
(30) years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown
too that possession and occupation had started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the

prescribed period and occupation not only as required
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
but also by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public
Land Act, which states:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, even if FATCOs case is considered as one for

confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act
(CA No. 141), as amended, it would still meet the
same fate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for

registration of title filed by Fieldman Agricultural
Trading Corporation is DISMISSED.

Page 24 of 24