Art.

4
PLDT vs. NLRC G.R. No. 111933, July 23, 1997

Recruitment and Placement

Tomas vs. Salac, et al., G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012
People vs. Panis, 142 SCRA 664
People vs. Laogo, 639 SCRA 28, G.R. No. 176264, Jan. 10, 2011
ROSA C. RODOLFO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 146964, August 10, 2006

DELIA D. ROMERO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROMULO PADLAN ANDARTURO SIAPNO,

G.R. NO. 171644, NOVEMBER 23, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ANTONIO NOGRA, G.R. NO. 170834, AUGUST 29, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT,

G.R. No. 187730,
June 29, 2010

People vs. HadjaJarmaLalli y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, Oct. 12, 2011
People vs. Segun, G.R. No. 119076, March 25, 2002, 379 SCRA 673
People vs. Loma Goce y Olalia et al., G.R. No. 113161, Aug. 29, 1995
People vs. Corpuz, G.r. No. 148198, Oct. 1, 2003,
People vs. BuluChowdury, G.R. No. 129577-80, Feb. 15, 2000
 G.R. No. 146964 August 10, 2006
ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment alleged to have been
committed as follows:

That in or about and during the period from August to September 1984, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused representing herself to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee,
recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO
CORPUZ, 1NECITAS R. FERRE, GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first securing the
required license or authority from the Ministry of Labor and Employment. 2

After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati RTC rendered its Judgment on the case, 3 the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused ROSA C. RODOLFO as GUILTY
of the offense of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences her [to] a penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT
YEARS and to pay the costs. 4 (Underscoring supplied)

In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note of the fact that while the information reflected the commission of
illegal recruitment in large scale, only the complaint of the two of the five complainants was proven.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly synthesized the evidence presented by the parties as follows:

[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that sometime in August and September 1984, accused-
appellant approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and invited them to apply for
overseas employment in Dubai. The accused-appellant being their neighbor, private complainants agreed and went to
the formers office. This office which bore the business name "Bayside Manpower Export Specialist" was in a building
situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that office, private complainants gave certain amounts to
appellant for processing and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee (Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00
(Exhibit B). Likewise, Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit D). Appellant then told private complainants that they
were scheduled to leave for Dubai on September 8, 1984. However, private complainants and all the other applicants
were not able to depart on the said date as their employer allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was
rescheduled to September 23, but the result was the same. Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, private
complainants demanded of appellant to return their money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was
not able to return private complainants money. Tired of excuses, private complainants filed the present case for illegal
recruitment against the accused-appellant.

To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, the prosecution
presented Jose Valeriano, a Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA), who testified that accused-appellant was neither licensed nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment to recruit workers for overseas employment.

For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching private complainants to recruit them for employment in Dubai. On
the contrary, it was the private complainants who asked her help in securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and
friend, she brought the private complainants to the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist agency because she knew
Florante Hinahon, 5 the owner of the said agency. While accused-appellant admitted that she received money from the
private complainants, she was quick to point out that she received the same only in trust for delivery to the agency. She
denied being part of the agency either as an owner or employee thereof. To corroborate appellants testimony, Milagros
Cuadra, who was also an applicant and a companion of private complainants, testified that appellant did not recruit
them. On the contrary, they were the ones who asked help from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C.
Tabing, the accountant and cashier of the agency, testified that appellant is not connected with the agency and that he
saw appellant received money from the applicants but she turned them over to the agency through either Florantino
Hinahon or Luzviminda Marcos. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed due to the
trial courts failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The appellate court thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision
EXCEPT the penalty x x x which is hereby changed to five (5) years as minimum to seven (7) years as maximum with
perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers. 7(Underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, 8 the present petition was filed, faulting the appellate court

I x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESSES, [AND]

II x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 9 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to credit the testimonies of her witnesses, her
companion Milagros Cuadra, and Eriberto C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of the agency.

Further, petitioner assails the trial courts and the appellate courts failure to consider that the provisional receipts she
issued indicated that the amounts she collected from the private complainants were turned over to the agency through
Minda Marcos and Florante Hinahon. At any rate, she draws attention to People v. Seoron 10 wherein this Court held
that the issuance or signing of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment. 11

The petition fails.

Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal provisions applicable when the offense charged was
committed, 12provided:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x

Article 39. Penalties. x x x x

(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof
or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the offender
undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. 13 If another element is present that the accused commits
the act against three or more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a large scale. 14

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement" as "[a]ny act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)

That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment
Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records of the POEA do not show that
petitioner is authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. 15 A Certification to that effect was in fact issued
by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of POEA. 16

Petitioners disclaimer of having engaged in recruitment activities from the very start does not persuade in light of the
evidence for the prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court held:

Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first complying with the guidelines
issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. She contends that she did not possess any license for recruitment,
because she never engaged in such activity.

We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight must be given to the
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly shows that
illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-
licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or authority
to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the
POEA or the labor secretary. A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private employment agency, while
authority is given to those engaged in recruitment and placement activities.

xxxx

That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was
certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S.
Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch both of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Yet, as
complainants convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan. 17 (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)
The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in recruitment, 18 is "the act
of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau." 19 Petitioners admission that she brought private
complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays
her guilt.

That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the private complainants were
turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free her from liability. For the act of recruitment
may be "for profit or not." It is sufficient that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment" to warrant
conviction for illegal recruitment. 20 As the appellate court stated:

x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives and keeps the placement
money for himself or herself. For as long as a person who has no license to engage in recruitment of workers for
overseas employment offers for a fee an employment to two or more persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal
recruitment. 21

Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the payment of fees from the private complainants when, in light of her claim
that she merely brought them to the agency, she could have advised them to directly pay the same to the agency, she
proferred no explanation.

On petitioners reliance on Seoron, 22 true, this Court held that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make a
case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is "rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority" that makes a case for illegal recruitment. 23

A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law which also applies to
offenses punished by special laws.

Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for All Persons
Convicted of Certain Crimes by the Courts of the Philippine Islands; To Create A Board of Indeterminate Sentence and
to Provide Funds Therefor; and for Other Purposes) provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;
and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225) (Underscoring supplied)

While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court is within the prescribed penalty for the offense, its
addition of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers" is not
part thereof. Such additional penalty must thus be stricken off.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accessory penalty imposed by it consisting of "perpetual
disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers" is DELETED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 171644 November 23, 2011
DELIA D. ROMERO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROMULO PADLAN and ARTURO SIAPNO, Respondents.

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated March 25, 2006 of petitioner Delia D. Romero assailing
the Decision2 dated July 18, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming the
Decision4 dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, Dagupan City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment as defined in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2018.

The records contain the following antecedent facts:

Private respondent Romulo Padlan (Romulo) was a former classmate of petitioner in college. Sometime in September
2000 Romulo went to petitioner's stall (wedding gown rentals) at W. A. Jones St., Calasiao, Pangasinan to inquire
about securing a job in Israel. Convinced by petitioner's words of encouragement and inspired by the potential salary of
US$700.00 to US$1,200.00 a month, Romulo asked petitioner the amount of money required in order for him to be
able to go to Israel. Petitioner informed him that as soon as he could give her US$3,600.00, his papers would be
immediately processed. To raise the amount, Romulo secured a loan from a bank and borrowed some more from his
friends. When he was able to raise the amount, Romulo went back to petitioner and handed her the money. Petitioner
contacted Jonney Erez Mokra who instructed Romulo to attend a briefing at his (Jonney's) house in Dau, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Romulo was able to leave for Israel on October 26, 2000 and was able to secure a job with a monthly salary
of US$650.00. Unfortunately, after two and a half months, he was caught by Israel's immigration police and detained
for 25 days. He was subsequently deported because he did not possess a working visa. On his return, Romulo
demanded from petitioner the return of his money, but the latter refused and failed to do so.

On the other hand, private respondent Arturo Siapno is petitioner's nephew. Sometime in August 2000, he went to
petitioner's stall. He was convinced by the petitioner that if he could give her US$3,600.00 for the processing of his
papers, he could leave the country within 1 to 2 weeks for a job placement in Israel. Arturo contacted a relative in the
U.S. to ask the latter to cover the expenses for the former's overseas job placement. The relative sent the US$3,000.00
to Teresita D. Visperas, petitioner's sister in Israel. Petitioner processed Arturo's papers and contacted Jonney Erez
Mokra. Jonney instructed Arturo to attend a briefing in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Afterwards, Arturo left for Israel
sometime in September 2000. He was able to work and receive US$800.00 salary per month. After three months of
stay in Israel, he was caught by the immigration officials, incarcerated for ten days and was eventually deported. After
arriving in the country, Arturo immediately sought the petitioner. Petitioner promised him that she would send him
back to Israel, which did not happen.

Arturo, after learning that Romulo suffered the same fate, checked with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) Dagupan District Office whether petitioner, Teresita D. Visperas and Jonney Erez Mokra had any license or
authority to recruit employees for overseas employment. Finding that petitioner and the others were not authorized to
recruit for overseas employment, Arturo and Romulo filed a complaint against petitioner, Teresita and Jonney before
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Consequently, an Information dated June 18, 2001 was filed against petitioner and Jonney Erez Mokra for the crime of
Illegal Recruitment which reads as follows:

That sometime in the month of August and September 2000 in the Municipality of Calasiao, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being licensee or holder
of authority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously undertake and perform recruitment activity by recruiting ARTURO SIAPNO and ROMULO PADLAN to a
supposed job abroad particularly in Israel, for a fee, without first securing the necessary license and permit to do the
same.

CONTRARY to Art. 38 (a) of P.D. 442, as amended by P.D. 2018.

Upon arraignment on August 20, 2001, petitioner, with the assistance of her counsel pleaded not guilty, whereas
accused Jonney Erez Mokra was and is still at-large. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish the facts earlier mentioned, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Romulo Padlan and Arturo
Siapno. Petitioner, on the other hand, offered her own testimony, as well as Satchi Co Pontaces to prove that petitioner
did not recruit the private respondents. According to petitioner, private respondents went to her to inquire about the
working status of her sister in Israel. She told them that her sister was doing well. When private respondents asked her
how her sister was able to go to Israel, petitioner told them that she does not know and that she will have to ask her
sister about that matter. Petitioner then called her sister and told her that the private respondents wanted to ask for her
help in going to Israel. It was petitioner's sister and the private respondents who communicated with each other, and the
petitioner had no knowledge as to the content of the former's conversations and agreements.

The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Delia Romero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment as defined in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2018, and pursuant to law hereby sentences accused Delia Romero to suffer the penalty of Eight (8) Years
and a fine of 100,000.00 plus costs.

Accused Delia Romero is directed to return the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to complainant Romulo Padlan
and the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to Arturo Siapno.

The case as against Jonney Mokra aka Erez, is hereby ordered archived subject to reinstatement upon his arrest.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC, the fallo of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition after petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Petitioner enumerates
the following assignment of errors:

First Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the accused of the offense charged (Illegal
Recruitment) for said finding is contrary to law and evidence in record.

Second Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the accused in interpreting the gesture of good faith
of the petitioner as referral in the guise of illegal recruitment.

Third Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the accused based merely on a certification from the
DOLE-Dagupan District Office without said certification being properly identified and testified thereto.

Fourth Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of accused based on speculations and probabilities and
not on the evidence on record.

Fifth Assignment of Error

The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, as follows:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The [Department] of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer
may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines, "recruitment and placement" as: "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement."

The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license
or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he
undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.5

In disputing the absence of the first element, petitioner offers her opinion that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's
reliance on a mere certification from the DOLE Dagupan District Office that she does not have the necessary licence to
recruit workers for abroad. She claims that the prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring a
certification from the agency primarily involved, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). The
said argument, however, is flawed.

Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not
been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose
license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.6 Clearly, the creation of
the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over recruitment and placement of activities. The
governing rule is still Article 357 of the Labor Code. This is further discussed in this Court's ruling in Trans Action
Overseas Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,8 wherein it was ruled that:

In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, we held that:

The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above-quoted
provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these
sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and
placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and
implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of
Labor gave the POEA, on its own initiative or upon a filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation
by any aggrieved person, "xxx (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of
the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including -

1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or
bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and

2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.

The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or
authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof."

This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz, viz.:

A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid
license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority
has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary.9

Thus, the trial court did not err in considering the certification from the DOLE-Dagupan District Office stating that
petitioner has not been issued any license by the POEA nor is a holder of an authority to engage in recruitment and
placement activities. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment 10 dated October 9, 2006, also gives a
valid observation as to the admissibility of the certification as evidence for the prosecution, thus:

x x x Notably, there is nothing on record to show that petitioner objected to the admissibility of the certification for the
purpose for which it was offered. Thus, petitioner's argument that the certification was inadmissible because it was not
properly identified by the issuing officer should be rejected. It is well-settled that "[e]very objections to the
admissibility of evidence shall be made at the time such evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the ground for
objection shall have become apparent, otherwise the objection shall be considered waived." Accordingly, the
certification has been accepted as admissible by the trial court and properly considered as evidence for the party who
submitted it.11

Anent the second element, petitioner insists that the CA was wrong in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.
According to her, the accommodation extended by the petitioner to the private respondents is far from the referral as
contemplated in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.

It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses' credibility, are
entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings. 12 After all,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. 13

Nevertheless, the testimonies of the private respondents clearly establish the fact that petitioner's conduct falls within
the term recruitment as defined by law. As testified by Romulo Padlan, petitioner convinced him and Arturo Siapno to
give her US$3,600.00 for the processing of their papers, thus:

Q: In September 2000, did you see the accused?

A: There was, sir.
Q: Where did you see each other?
A: At her stall, sir.
xxxx
Q: What was your purpose in going to her stall?
A: My purpose is to inquire about my application to Israel, sir.
Q: What happened when you inquired from her about your application in going to Israel?
A: I inquired from her and she responded with me with sweet words, sir.
Q: What did you ask her when you first met her in her stall [in] September 2000?
A: I asked her about the possible placement and the condition about the job in Israel.
Q: And what was her response?
A: Her response was positive and very encouraging, sir.
Q: What was the very good and very encouraging response of the accused?
A: Regarding the salary amounting to $700.00 to $1,000.00 dollars a month, sir.
Q: When you were informed that the salary is quite good in Israel, what did you do, if any?
A: I planned to produce money so that I can apply for Israel, sir.
Q: And what transpired next after that?
A: She told me that, "If you can produce $3,600.00 dollars then I will begin to process your papers.
Q: After telling you that, what did you do, if any?
A: So I planned to have a loan [from] Rural Bank of Central Pangasinan and borrow some money [from] my other friends,
sir.
xxxx
Q: After producing that money, what did you do?
xxxx
A: I [went] to her stall [in] September 26 around 10:00 P.M. and handed the money to Mrs. Delia Romero, sir.
xxxx
Q: How much money did you give to the accused [in] September 2000?
A: [In] September 2000, I gave her $1,500.00 US dollars, sir.14
Arturo Siapno also testified as to how petitioner convinced him to apply for a job in Israel and offered her services for a fee,
thus:
Q: [I]n August 2000, where were you?
A: I was residing in Puelay-Carangalaan. Dagupan City.
Q: On the same month, did you have any transaction with the accused?
A: Yes sir[.] I met the accused at the appliance store which is located at Puelay and she offered me a job in Israel.
Q: [When] she offered you a job in Israel, what did you do?
A: I went to their stall which is located [in] Calasiao, and in the same place I also met several applicants.
Q: When did you go to the stall of the accused?
A: The following day, sir.
xxxx
Q: And what did you do at the stall of the accused in Calasiao, Pangasinan?
A: When I went to the stall of the accused, since I saw other applicants, I was convinced to apply and I called up my aunt
and asked for help.
Q: Since you were at the stall of the accused in Calasiao, what transpired next?
A: When I talked to her, she told me if I have a money of 3,600.00 I could easily depart within one (1) week or two (2)
weeks.15

From the above testimonies, it is apparent that petitioner was able to convince the private respondents to apply for
work in Israel after parting with their money in exchange for the services she would render. The said act of the
petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the meaning of recruitment and placement as defined in Article 13 (b) of the
Labor Code.

As to petitioner's contention that the testimony of Arturo Siapno that the latter paid a certain amount of money to the
former must not be given any credence due to the absence of any receipt or any other documentary evidence proving
such, the same is without any merit. In People v. Alvarez,16 this Court ruled that in illegal recruitment cases, the failure
to present receipts for money that was paid in connection with the recruitment process will not affect the strength of the
evidence presented by the prosecution as long as the payment can be proved through clear and convincing testimonies
of credible witnesses. It was discussed that:

In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for money paid for acts constituting
recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing
testimonies of credible witnesses.

xxxx

x x x The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment is not fatal, as long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that accused-appellant has engaged in illegal
recruitment. Such case is made, not by the issuance or the signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in
recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority.

In People v. Pabalan, the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the amounts delivered to the accused did
not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of
evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the
procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses. 17
With regard to the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, this Court finds it to be inappropriate. The
trial court imposed the penalty of eight (8) years imprisonment and a fine of 100,000.00 plus cost and ordered
petitioner to return the amount of US$3,600.00 or its equivalent to Romulo Padlan and the amount of US$3,600.00 or
its equivalent to Arturo Siapno. Under Article 39 (c) of the Labor Code, which prescribes the penalty for illegal
recruitment, any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under the law and found violating any
provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four (4) years but not more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than 20,000.00 nor
more than 100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. Clearly, the trial court, by
imposing a straight penalty, disregarded the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 18 In Argoncillo v. Court of
Appeals,19 this Court ruled that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised
Penal Code and the special laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the application and non-application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:

x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment
exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases:
a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114) conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139) or espionage
(Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an Indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, February 22, 1974)
Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on
parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O. G. 6701, November 19, 1982).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same. (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused cannot avail himself of the
benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law
and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No.
00452-CR, January 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may
be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record.
The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the Revised
Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal
range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.201wphi1

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the offense is punished by a law other than the
Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same. The imposable penalty is imprisonment of not less than four (4) years but not more than eight (8) years;
hence, the proper penalty imposed should be within the range of four (4) years to eight (8) years. Thus, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court can impose the minimum and maximum terms of the penalty of imprisonment
within the range of four (4) years to eight (8) years.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 25, 2006 of petitioner Delia D. Romero is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated July 18, 2005 and Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals, affirming the Decision dated February 24, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment as defined in paragraph (a) of Article 38 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 2018, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed should be
imprisonment of four (4) years, as minimum, to seven (7) years, as maximum, and a fine of 100,000.00 plus cost and
for petitioner to return the amount of $3,600.00 or its equivalent to Romulo Padlan and the amount of $3,600.00 or its
equivalent to Arturo Siapno.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 170834 August 29, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO NOGRA, accused-appellant.

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R.
No. 00244 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Naga City in Criminal Case No. 98-
7182, convicting Antonio Nogra (appellant) of large scale illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) in relation to Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042),2otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995."3

The inculpatory portion of the Information charging one Lorna G. Orciga and appellant with large scale illegal
recruitment reads as follows:

That sometime during the period of March 1997 to November, 1997 in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the General Manager and Operations
Manager of LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., with office at Concepcion
Grande, Naga City, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves to
have the capacity to contract, enlist, hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to the herein
complaining witnesses RENATO ALDEN, OLIVER SARMIENTO, FE ZABALLA, TEOFILA LUALHATI, PILIPINA
MENDOZA and KERWIN DONACAO, but failed to actually deploy them without valid reason, as well as to reimburse
their documentation, placement and processing expenses for purposes of deployment despite their repeated demands for
the return of the same, to their damage and prejudice in the amounts as may be proven in court.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Only appellant was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court since Lorna G. Orciga was then and still is at large.
Arraigned with the assistance of counsel, appellant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY" to the crime charged. Thereafter,
trial of the case ensued.

Of the six complainants, the prosecution was able to present five of them, namely: Renato Alden, Fe Zaballa, Teofila
Lualhati, Filipina Mendoza and Kerwin Donacao. Anaielyn Sarmiento, wife of complainant Oliver Sarmiento, also
testified for the prosecution.

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are aptly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:

Appellant held office at Loran International Overseas Recruitment Co., (Loran) in Concepcion Grande, Naga City
(p. 4, TSN, October 19, 1998). A nameplate on his table prominently displayed his name and position as operations
manager (p. 11, TSN, November 17, 1998; p. 4, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 21, TSN, November 19, 1998). The
license of Loran also indicated appellant as the operations manager (p. 5, TSN, February 10, 1999). The POEA files
also reflect his position as operations manager of Loran (Exhibit L to L-4, pp. 5-9, TSN, November 19, 1998).

Sometime in December 1996, Renato Alden went to Loran to apply for a job as hotel worker for Saipan. He was
interviewed by appellant, who required Alden to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the
placement fee. Alden paid the amount of P31,000.00. The additional amount of P4,000.00 was to be paid prior to
his departure to Saipan (pp. 5-6, TSN, November 17, 1998). Appellant promised Alden that he would leave within a
period of three to four months. After one year of waiting Alden was not able to leave. Alden filed a complaint with
the NBI when he was not able to recover the amount and could no longer talk with appellant (p. 6, TSN, November
17, 1998).

On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati applied for employment as hotel worker for Saipan with Loran (pp. 1-3, 10,
TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay
the processing fee in the amount of P35,000.00 so she could leave immediately. She paid the amount of P35,000.00
to Loran's secretary in the presence of appellant. She was promised that within 120 days or 4 months she would be
able to leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite repeated follow-ups, Lualhati was unable to work in
Saipan. She demanded the refund of the processing fee. When the amount was not returned to her, she filed a
complaint with the NBI (pp. 14-15, TSN, November 19, 1998).

Sometime in April 1998, Filipina Mendoza went to Loran to apply for employment as hotel worker (p. 4, TSN, July
12, 1999). She paid the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she was not able to work abroad, she went to
Loran and sought the return of P35,000.00 from appellant (p. 7, TSN, January 21, 1999).

Sometime in October 1997, Kerwin Donacao went to Loran to apply for employment as purchaser in Saipan (p. 4,
TSN, February 10, 1999). He was required to submit NBI clearance, police clearance, previous employment
certificate and his passport. He paid the placement fee of P35,000.00 (pp.4-5, TSN, February 10, 1999). After
paying the amount, he was told to wait for two to three months. When he was not able to leave for Saipan, he
demanded the return of the placement fee, which was not refunded (pp. 6-7, TSN, February 10, 1999).

During the first week of November 1997, Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver Sarmiento, applied for
overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento, they submitted his medical certificate and
 certification of previous employment. They were also made to pay the amount of P27,000.00 as processing fee.
Oliver Sarmiento was promised that within 1 month, he would be able to leave. Initially, Oliver Sarmiento was told
that allegedly his visa was yet to be obtained. When he was not able to leave and what he paid was not refunded, he
filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 4-6, TSN, April 23, 1999).

Sometime in May 1997, Fe Zaballa applied for overseas employment in Saipan with Loran (p. 4, TSN, May 21,
1999). She was required to submit her medical certificate, original copy of her birth certificate, NBI clearance and
police clearance. She was also required to pay the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she could not be
deployed, she sought to recover the amount she paid, which was not returned (pp. 7-8, TSN, May 2, 1999).5

On the other hand, appellant presented the following evidence:

The defense presented [appellant] Antonio Nogra and the agency's secretary and cashier, Maritess Mesina.

From their testimonies it was established that LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO.,
LTD., (LORAN, for brevity) was owned by accused Lorna Orciga and Japanese national Kataru Tanaka (TSN,
September 30, 2000, p. 7). Sometime in July 1994, [appellant] Antonio Nogra read from outside the agency's main
office at Libertad, Mandaluyong City that it was in need of a liaison officer. He applied for the position. The part-
owner and co-accused, Lorna Orciga, hired him instead as Operations Manager as the agency was then still in the
process of completing the list of personnel to be submitted to the POEA. (TSN, January 31, 2001, p. 5).

[Appellant] Nogra started working with LORAN in October 1994. In 1995, he was transferred to Naga City when
the agency opened a branch office thereat. Although he was designated as the Operations Manager, [appellant]
Nogra was a mere employee of the agency. He was receiving a monthly salary of P5,000.00 and
additional P2,000.00 monthly meal allowance. He was in-charge of the advertisement of the company. He also
drove for the company. He fetched from the airport the agency's visitors and guests and drove them to hotels and
other places. (TSN, May 3, 2000, pp. 2-9).

Although part-owner Lorna Orciga was stationed in Manila, she, however, actually remained in control of the
branch office in Naga City. She conducted the final interview of the applicants and transacted with the foreign
employers. She also controlled the financial matters and assessment fees of the agency in Naga City (TSN,
September 20, 2000, pp. 8-9). The placement and processing fees collected by the agency in Naga City were all
deposited in the bank account of Lorna Orciga and not a single centavo went to the benefit of [appellant] Nogra
(TSN, January 10, 2000, pp. 14-22).6

On March 26, 2003, the RTC rendered Judgment7 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ANTONIO NOGRA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale defined under Sections 6(m) and 7(b) of RA 8042, otherwise
known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and, accordingly, hereby imposes upon
him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SO ORDERED.8

On April 10, 2003, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The RTC ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to this Court.

Conformably to the ruling in People v. Mateo,10 the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review.11

On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision12 affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA held that being an
employee is not a valid defense since employees who have knowledge and active participation in the recruitment
activities may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment activities, based upon this Court's ruling in People v.
Chowdury13 and People v. Corpuz;14 that appellant had knowledge of and active participation in the recruitment
activities since all the prosecution witnesses pinpointed appellant as the one whom they initially approached regarding
their plans of working overseas and he was the one who told them about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers
that they had to submit; that the mere fact that appellant was not issued special authority to recruit does not exculpate
him from any liability but rather strongly suggests his guilt; that appellant's invocation of non-flight cannot be weighed
in his favor since there is no established rule that non-flight is, in every instance, an indication of innocence.

A Notice of Appeal15 having been timely filed by appellant, the CA forwarded the records of the case to this Court for
further review.

In his Brief, appellant assigns as errors the following:

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A
MERE EMPLOYEE OF THE RECRUITMENT AGENCY DESPITE HIS DESIGNATION AS ITS
OPERATIONS MANAGER.
 II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
OFFENSE-CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER THE LAW, HE WAS NOT CRIMINALY
LIABLE FOR HIS AGENCY'S TRANSACTIONS.16

Appellant argues that the agency was under the management and control of Orciga, and that he was a mere employee;
that he could not be held personally liable for illegal recruitment in the absence of any showing that he was validly
issued special authority to recruit workers, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA); that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence.

Appellee, through the OSG, counters that appellant is not a mere clerk or secretary of Loran, but its Operations
Manager who directly participated in the recruitment scheme by promising private complainants work abroad, but
failed to deploy them and refused to reimburse the applicants' placement fees when demanded.

The appeal fails. The CA did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

R.A. No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the

Labor Code17 and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e.,Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority:

xxxx

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without
the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as
offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case
of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, evidence for the prosecution showed that Loran

International Overseas Recruitment Co., Ltd. is a duly licensed recruitment agency with authority to establish a branch
office. However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a licensee or holder of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment,
should he commit or omit to do any of the acts enumerated in Section 6.

Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042. Section 6
(l) refers to the failure to actually deploy without valid reason, as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Section 6 (m) involves the failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection
with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases in which the deployment does not actually
take place without the workers fault.

A thorough scrutiny of the prosecution's evidence reveals that it failed to prove appellant's liability under Section 6 (l)
of R.A. No. 8042. The law requires not only that the failure to deploy be without valid reason "as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment." The law envisions that there be independent evidence from the DOLE to
establish the reason for non-deployment, such as the absence of a proper job order. No document from the DOLE was
presented in the present case to establish the reason for the accused's failure to actually deploy private complainants.
Thus, appellant cannot be held liable under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042.
As to Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that private complainants
made payments to Loran, and appellant failed to reimburse the amounts paid by private complainants when they were
not deployed. The prosecution presented the receipts issued by Loran to private complainants evidencing payment of
placement fees ranging from P27,000.00 to P35,000.00.

Appellant does not dispute that private complainants were not deployed for overseas work, and that the placement fees
they paid were not returned to them despite demand. However, he seeks to exculpate himself on the ground that he is a
mere employee of Loran.

The Court is unswayed by appellant's contention.

The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 explicitly states that those criminally liable are the
"principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or
direction of their business shall be liable." Contrary to appellant's claim, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses
and the documentary evidence for the prosecution clearly established that he was not a mere employee of Loran, but its
Operations Manager. The license of Loran, the files of the POEA and the nameplate prominently displayed on his
office desk reflected his position as Operations Manager. As such, he received private complainants' job applications;
and interviewed and informed them of the agencys requirements prior to their deployment, such as NBI clearance,
police clearance, medical certificate, previous employment certificate and the payment of placement fee. He was also
responsible for the radio advertisements and leaflets, which enticed complaining witnesses to apply for employment
with the agency. Clearly, as Operations Manager, he was in the forefront of the recruitment activities.

The defense of being a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large scale illegal recruitment.
In People v. Gasacao18 and People v. Sagayaga,19 the Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Cabais,20 People v.
Chowdury21 and People v. Corpuz22 that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may
be held liable as principal by direct participation, together with its employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in the recruitment process.

In the present case, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private complainants. He interviewed
and informed them of the documentary requirements and placement fee. He promised deployment within a three or
four month-period upon payment of the fee, but failed to deploy them and to reimburse, upon demand, the placement
fees paid.

The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence. Unlike the flight
of an accused, which is competent evidence against him tending to establish his guilt, non-flight is simply inaction,
which may be due to several factors. It may not be construed as an indication of innocence.23

Of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill motive against appellant
other than to bring him to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to
conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be
against human nature and experience.24 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an
oath deserve full faith and credence.25

It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are
entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings. 26 After all,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. 27 The absence of
any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect
the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination
according credibility to the prosecution evidence.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
In the present case, five complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts
tantamount to economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage.

Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 31, 2995 of the Court of Appeals affirming
the conviction of appellant Antonio Nogra for large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 (m) and 7 (b) of Republic
Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 187730 June 29, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, Accused-Appellant,
FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, Accused.

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02764 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and
Pilar Manta y Dungo (accused), which affirmed the Decision2 dated March 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 30 in Manila which convicted the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot ("accused-appellant") of
syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.

The Facts

Originally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo ("Pacardo") and Pilar Manta ("Manta"), together with
Mardeolyn Martir ("Mardeolyn") and nine (9) others, were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen
(18) counts of estafa committed against eighteen complainants, including Edgardo V. Dela Caza ("Dela Caza"), Sandy
Guantero ("Guantero") and Danilo Sare ("Sare"). The cases were respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-
2062936 to 02-206311. However, records reveal that only Criminal Case No. 02-206293, which was filed against
accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated illegal recruitment, and Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-
206300 and 02-206308, which were filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for estafa, proceeded to
trial due to the fact that the rest of the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 02-
206294 to 02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and 02-206309 to 02-206311 were likewise
provisionally dismissed upon motion of Pacardo, Manta and accused-appellant for failure of the respective
complainants in said cases to appear and testify during trial.

It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297,
02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300, the case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case filed by Sare. However, accused-
appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, both filed by
Dela Caza, for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively.

Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants conviction for syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal
Case No. 02-206293 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-206297.

In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant, together with the others, as follows:

The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL GALANZA, NELMAR MARTIR, MARCELINO
MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR, NELSON MARTIR, MA. CECILIA M. RAMOS, LULU MENDANES, FIDES
PACARDO y JUNGCO, RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, ELEONOR PANUNCIO and
YEO SIN UNG of a violation of Section 6(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995, committed by a syndicate and in large scale, as follows:

That in or about and during the period comprised between November 2000 and December, 2001, inclusive, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, RAYMUND
EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO, RENATO V. HUFALAR, ELENA JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V.
MENOR, ROGELIO S. MORON, FEDILA G. NAIPA, OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L. SABALDAN, DANILO
SARE, MARY BETH SARDON, JOHNNY SOLATORIO and JOEL TINIO in Korea as factory workers and charge
or accept directly or indirectly from said FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of P45,000.00; ENTICE BRENDO
P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA P30,000.00; EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA
P100,000.00; SANDY O. GUANTENO P35,000.00; RENATO V. HUFALAR P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO
P30,000.00; LUPO A. MANALO P75,000.00; ALMA V. MENOR P45,000.00; ROGELIO S. MORON
P70,000.00; FEDILA G. NAIPA P45,000.00; OSCAR RAMIREZ P45,000.00; MARISOL L. SABALDAN
P75,000.00; DANILO SARE P100,000.00; MARY BETH SARDON P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO
P35,000.00; and JOEL TINIO P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with their overseas employment, which
amounts are in excess of or greater than those specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA
Board Resolution No. 02, Series 1998, and without valid reasons and without the fault of the said complainants failed
to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said complainants in connection with their
documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.3 (Emphasis supplied)

In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:

That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating
together and helping with [sic] one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud, to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in
Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to
meet the requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA to give and
deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue and were made
[solely] for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the said amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in
their possession, with intent to defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P45,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine
currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.

On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.

During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando Albines Roa, the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) representative and private complainants Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the
other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta.

Version of the Prosecution

On May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta,
Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at the office of MPM International Recruitment
and Promotion Agency ("MPM Agency") located in Malate, Manila.

Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar Martir was one of the
incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir and Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board
members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier and accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agencys employee who was
in charge of the records of the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was tasked to deliver
documents to the Korean embassy.

Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela Caza that the agency
was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he also told Dela Caza about the placement
fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP
45,000) and the balance to be paid through salary deduction.

Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their application
papers for job placement in Korea as a factory worker and their possible salary. Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a
briefing about the business and what to expect from the company and the salary.

With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well as the presence of the two (2)
Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part
with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through
accused-appellant Gallo who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official
Receipt No. 401.

Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agencys office in Malate, Manila only to
discover that the office had moved to a new location at Batangas Street, Brgy. San Isidro, Makati. He proceeded to the
new address and found out that the agency was renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc.
("New Filipino"). At the new office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accused-appellant
Gallo. He was informed that the transfer was done for easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose of changing the
name of the agency.

Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and
Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision. On the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any
knowledge about the money.

After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants decided to take action.
The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to another place. However, with the help of the
Office of Ambassador Seeres and the Western Police District, they were able to locate the new address at 500
Prudential Building, Carriedo, Manila. The agency explained that it had to move in order to separate those who are
applying as entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo and
Manta, were then arrested.

The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA employee, was dispensed with after the
prosecution and defense stipulated and admitted to the existence of the following documents:
 1. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the POEA to the effect that "New
Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc., with office address at 1256 Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro,
Makati City, was a licensed landbased agency whose license expired on December 10, 2001 and was delisted
from the roster of licensed agencies on December 14, 2001." It further certified that "Fides J. Pacardo was the
agencys Recruitment Officer";

2. Certification issued by Felicitas Q. Bay of the POEA to the effect that MPM International Recruitment and
Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment;

3. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1999 regarding placement fee ceiling for
landbased workers.

4. Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998 on the placement fee ceiling for
Taiwan and Korean markets, and

5. Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.

Version of the Defense

For his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he
also applied with MPM Agency for deployment to Korea as a factory worker. According to him, he gave his
application directly with Mardeolyn because she was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only Ten Thousand
Pesos (PhP 10,000) as processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to perform
some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport of applicants, running errands and
performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela
Caza one or twice at the agencys office when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised
deployment abroad but it never materialized.

Ruling of the Trial Court

On March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa.
The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308;

II. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 02-
206293 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also ordered to
indemnify EDGARDO DELA CAZA of the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal
interest from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002 until fully paid.

III. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No. 02-206297 is likewise found guilty and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to
NINE (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.

IV. Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
02-206300 and 02-206308.

Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in all the criminal cases. Pending their arrest, the
cases are sent to the archives.

The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is hereby ordered unless detained for other lawful
cause or charge.

SO ORDERED.5

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
206293 and 02-206297, dated March 15, 2007, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No.
02-206297, for estafa, appellant is sentenced to four (4) years of prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor.

SO ORDERED.6
The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that the accused-appellant, together with others,
engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the
actions of a mere errand boy.

As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered economic sabotage having been committed by more
than three (3) persons, namely, accused-appellant Gallo, Mardeolyn, Eleonor Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More
importantly, a personal found guilty of illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa. 7 The same evidence proving
accused-appellants commission of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale also establishes his liability for estafa
under paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.

The Issues

Accused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of errors:

I The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment committed
by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.

II The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of estafa despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Evidence supports conviction of the crime of Syndicated Illegal Recruitment

Accused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment because he was neither an
officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of
the private complainant that he was indeed an employee because such was not duly supported by competent evidence.
According to him, even assuming that he was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans evidence
that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.

We disagree.

To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender undertakes either any
activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited
practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;8 and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.9 When illegal recruitment is
committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group, it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage.10

Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, "recruitment and placement" refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not".

After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense
sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment.

Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042
("R.A. 8042"), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, viz:

Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the
following act, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually
received by him as a loan or advance;

xxxx
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for
purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group.

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.

In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-
appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations
concerning the agencys purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process,
collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment.11 Such acts were accurately described in the testimony of prosecution witness, Dela Caza, to wit:

PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: How about this Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He was the one who received my money.
Q: Aside from receiving your money, was there any other representations or acts made by Rodolfo Gallo?
A: He introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and he even intimated to me that their agency has sent so
many workers abroad.
xxxx
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your application at the agency. Was there any instance that you were
able to talk to Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo Gallo and Pilar Manta?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: What was the conversation that transpired among you before you demanded the return of your money and documents?
A: When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money, Mr. Gallo told me "I know nothing about your money"
while Pilar Manta and Fides Pacardo told me, why should I withdraw my application and my money when I was about to be
[deployed] or I was about to leave.
xxxx
Q: And what transpired at that office after this Panuncio introduced you to those persons whom you just mentioned?
A: The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the placement fee in that agency is Php 150,000.00 and then I
should deposit the amount of Php 45,000.00. After I have deposited said amount, I would just wait for few days
xxxx
Q: They were the one (sic) who told you that you have to pay Php 45,000.00 for deposit only?
A: Yes, maam, I was told by them to deposit Php 45,000.00 and then I would pay the remaining balance of Php105,000.00,
payment of it would be through salary deduction.
Q: That is for what Mr. Witness again?
A: For placement fee.
Q: Now did you believe to (sic) them?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Why, why did you believe?
A: Because of the presence of the two Korean nationals and they keep on telling me that they have sent abroad several
workers and they even showed visas of the records that they have already deployed abroad.
Q: Aside from that, was there any other representations which have been made upon you or make you believe that they can
deploy you?
A: At first I was adamant but they told me "If you do not want to believe us, then we could do nothing." But once they
showed me the [visas] of the people whom they have deployed abroad, that was the time I believe them.
Q: So after believing on the representations, what did you do next Mr. Witness?
A: That was the time that I decided to give the money.
xxxx

PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Do you have proof that you gave the money?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Where is your proof that you gave the money?
A: I have it here.

PROS. MAGABLIN:
Witness is producing to this court a Receipt dated May 28, 2001 in the amount of Php45,000.00 which for purposes of record
Your Honor, may I request that the same be marked in the evidence as our Exhibit "F".
xxxx

PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom portion of this receipt. Do you know whose signature is this?
A: Yes, maam, signature of Rodolfo Gallo.
PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: Why do you say that that is his signature?
A: Rodolfo Gallos signature Your Honor because he was the one who received the money and he was the one who filled up
this O.R. and while he was doing it, he was flanked by Fides Pacardo, Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.
xxxx

Q: So it was Gallo who received your money?

A: Yes, maam.

PROS. MAGABLIN
Q: And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your money?
A: They told me maam just to call up and make a follow up with our agency.
xxxx

Q: Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused, what happened with the application, with the promise of
employment that he promised?
A: Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a new office in Makati, Brgy. San Isidro.
xxxx

Q: And were they able to deploy you as promised by them?

A: No, maam, they were not able to send us abroad.12

Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying accused-appellant as one of those
who induced him and the other applicants to part with their money. His testimony showed that accused-appellant made
false misrepresentations and promises in assuring them that after they paid the placement fee, jobs in Korea as factory
workers were waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally talked to accused-
appellant and gave him the money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof of his payment. Without a
doubt, accused-appellants actions constituted illegal recruitment.

Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he was indeed an employee of the
recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he
was the one who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of innocence.

This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the other persons in the
agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and the rest of the officers and
employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception. Verily, the active involvement of each in the
recruitment scam was directed at one single purpose to divest complainants with their money on the pretext of
guaranteed employment abroad. The prosecution evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about
the processing of their papers for a possible job opportunity in Korea, as well as their possible salary. Likewise, Yeo
Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company. Then, here
comes accused-appellant who introduced himself as Mardeolyns relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact
that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers visas who were
already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant signed and issued an official receipt acknowledging the
down payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with
the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is
evidently present.

In People v. Gamboa,13 this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment, viz:

Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct
before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in its
execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such, all the accused, including accused-appellant, are
equally guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct
part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.14

Estafa

The prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of estafa as defined under Article 315
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow

xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by
means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person.15 Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended
to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.

All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large,
deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to send them abroad for
employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of
such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the
money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without informing
complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these representations of the accused-appellant
proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.1avvphi1

Defense of Denial Cannot Prevail over Positive Identification

Indubitably, accused-appellants denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face of the positive identification made
by Dela Caza and his co-complainants as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged. As enunciated by this Court in
People v. Abolidor,16 "[p]ositive identification where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial."

The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to
falsely testify against him.

Therefore, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials of the
accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail.17

Moreover, this Court accords the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in the absence of any
compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are
not disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did not err in
convicting the accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently show reversible error in the assailed decision. The
Decision dated December 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.