G.R. No. 192717 March 12, 2014
4 situated at Patag, Cagayan de
MINDA S. GAERLAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated March 11 ,
2010 and the Resolution2 dated May 20, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN. The CA had
reversed and set aside the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) ofMisamis Oriental, Branch 20, in LRC No. 92-05
and dismissed the application for registration of title filed by
petitioner Minda S. Gaerlan.
The records bear out the following factual antecedents:
On April 10, 1992, petitioner filed an Application4 for original
registration of title over a parcel of land known as Lot 18793,
Cad-237 of Cagayan Cadastre, with an area of 1,061 square
meters, more or less, and particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land situated at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City.
Bounded on the North, by Lot 835, Cag. Cad; on the East, by
Lot No. 4342-A of Subd. Plan; on the South, by Lot 4342-K of
Subd. Plan; and on the West, by lot 4342-C of Subd. Plan with
an area of ONE THOUSAND SIXTY ONE (1,061) SQUARE
METERS more or less (Lot 4342-B - Sketch Plan).5
In her application, petitioner alleged that she acquired the
above-mentioned property from Mamerta Tan in November
1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered
Land.6 She had the property declared for taxation purposes
under her name and was issued Tax Declaration Nos.
998937 and 05 83 51.8 Attached to the application are the
following documents:
(a) Original Tracing Cloth Plan together with the three
(3) Blue print copies;9
(b) Technical Description of the parcel of land;10
(c) Surveyor's Report of Survey or Surveyor' s
Certificate;11
(d) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land;12 and
(e) Tax Declaration No. 99893.13
After finding petitioner's application sufficient in form and
substance, the trial court set the case for initial hearing.
On August 25, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
Opposition14 to petitioner's application for registration on the
ground that (1) neither petitioner nor her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) the muniments of title and tax
declarations attached to the petition do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the subject land; (3) the claim of ownership based on Spanish
title is no longer available for purposes of registration; and (4)
the subject land is a portion of the public domain, hence, not
registrable.
During the hearing, petitioner testified that (1) she is the
applicant for registration of a parcel of land located at
Buenavista Village, Carmen, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City,
known as Lot 18793, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre, containing
an area of 1,061 square meters; (2) that she acquired said land
through sale on November 28, 1989 from Mamerta Tan; (3)
that after the sale, she declared the property for taxation
purposes under her name; (4) that she was issued Tax
Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351 ; (5) that she has been
religiously paying taxes thereon since 1989 up to 1991; and (
6) that she took possession of the land and caused its
survey.15
Petitioner also presented Mamerta Tan who testified that she is
the vendor of the land subject of the present application and
that she sold the land to petitioner in 1989. Mamerta averred
that she became the owner of the said property in 1975 after
she bought the land from Teresita Tan. She declared the
property under her name for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 36942.16
Another witness, Mr. Honesto Velez, the City Assessor of
Cagayan de Oro City, testified that he issued certifications or
certified copies of records on file in his office and he identified
the certified photocopy of the Land History Card 17pertaining to
Cadastral Lot 4342, Case No.
Oro City under the name of cadastral claimant Potenciano
Abragan. The history card started with Tax Declaration No.
1645 in the name of Potenciano Abragan. Later, another tax
declaration, Tax Declaration No. 37129 in the name of
Presentacion Eviofa, was issued. This tax declaration was
subsequently replaced by Tax Declaration No. 37130. He
stated that based on the records in their office, it appeared that
petitioner is the owner of Lot 4342. Another claimant is
Presentacion Eviota and the remaining portion was in the
name of Potenciano Abragan. Presentacion Eviota was also
issued a tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 124750 covering
an area of 897 square meters, but not involving the same
parcel of land. Eviota's land was only a portion of Lot 4342.
The original area of the land claimed by Abragan is 12,293
square meters.18
City Assessor Velez further testified that their records showed
that petitioner possessed a 1,061-square meter portion of Lot
4342 covered by Tax Declaration No. 058351. All the transfers
made over portions of this parcel of land were all recorded in
the land history card on file with their office, thus paving the
way for the issuance of corresponding tax declaration to its
new owners.19
Petitioner also presented and offered the following exhibits 20 to
support her application for registration of title, to wit:
1) Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land,
2) Tax Declaration Nos. 99893 and 058351 ,
3) Tax Receipts,
4) Certified True Copy of Land History Card,
5) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano
Abragan,
6) Tax Declaration in the name of Presentacion T.
Eviota,
7) Tax Declaration in the name of Potenciano
Abragan.
On November 20, 2001, the trial court rendered
Judgment21 granting petitioner's application for registration of
title. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
There being no evidence presented by the oppositor,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding applicant Minda S.
Gaerlan as owner in fee simple of the land subject of this
application and hereby decreeing that Lot 18793, Cad-237,
Cagayan Cadastre, containing an area of One Thousand Sixty
One (1 ,061) square meters, more or less, be registered in her
name [in] accordance with the technical description attached to
the application.
SO ORDERED.22
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed from the
aforementioned decision asserting that the trial court erred in
ruling that the subject parcel of land is available for private
appropriation. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
00319-MIN.
On March 11, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision23 reversing
and setting aside the ruling of the trial court and dismissing the
application for registration of title filed by petitioner.
The CA found that petitioner failed to present any proof to
establish that the subject land is alienable and disposable. The
CA stressed that the applicant for land registration must prove
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable and that the land subject of the application falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (CENRO). In addition, the CA held that the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. Moreover, the CA observed
that there is no evidence on record to establish that petitioner,
by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land and that she possessed the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Thus, the appellate
court ruled that petitioner is not entitled to registration under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.24
Hence, petitioner is now before us claiming that the CA erred in
denying her application for registration of title.
Page 1 of 17
Petitioner asserts that her predecessor-in-interest, Potenciano
Abragan, possessed the subject property as early as 1929.
She claims Potenciano was the one who asked for the original
survey of Lot 4342, Cad-23 7 with an original land area of
12,293 square meters, situated in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City.
She averred that the property subject of the present application
consisting of an area of 1,061 square meters and known as Lot
18793, Cad-237, is a portion of Lot 4342, Cad-237. In support
of her claim, petitioner seeks to submit as additional evidence
Bureau of Lands (BL) Form No. 700-2A25 of the Land
Management Services which conducted a survey on Lot 4342,
Cad-237 on November 28, 1929 with Potenciano Abragan as
the Cadastral Survey Claimant.
Petitioner also maintains that the subject land is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain and this land
classification has long been approved by the DENR Secretary.
She points out that during the entire period of possession of
Potenciano Abragan, the subject land had already been
classified as alienable and disposable land. To support her
claim, petitioner submits as additional evidence the
Certification26 issued by the CENRO stating that a parcel of
land designated as Lot 4342, Cad-237 located in Patag,
Cagayan de Oro City containing a total area of 12,293 square
meters more or less falls within an area classified as Alienable
and Disposable under Project 8, Block I and Land
Classification (LC) Map No. 5 85 certified and approved on
December 31, 1925. She prays that she be allowed with leave
of, court to submit the aforementioned document in support of
her application for registration.
Furthermore, petitioner claims that she and her witnesses had
testified on the issue of actual, open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land,
including the act of declaring the subject lot for tax purposes in
their names and religiously paying the taxes of the land to the
government. Thus, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not
declaring that she is entitled to registration of the subject land.
Respondent, through the OSG, filed a Comment27 asserting
that only questions of law may be raised in a petition filed
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Respondent posits that in the present case,
petitioner, for the first time and only in the present appeal,
seeks the admission to evidence of the following: (1) the
Certification dated July 16, 2010 issued by the CENRO in
Cagayan de Oro City to prove that Lot 4342, Cad-23 7 located
in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and
disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I and LC Map No.
585 which was certified and approved on December 31, 1925
and (2) BL Form No. 700-2A which shows that Potenciano
Abragan was the original claimant of the entire land
denominated as Lot 4342 since 1929, to prove her supposed
acquisitive prescription of the contested lot.
Respondent argues that petitioner's attempt to introduce
additional evidence is impermissible as its introduction would
involve a review and assessment of the evidence on record.
Respondent adds that the determination of the probative value
of evidence is a question of fact which is beyond the province
of a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner should have
offered the aforementioned documents before the land
registration court and while the case was pending appeal
before the CA as it is an appellate court with authority to
receive evidence.
Moreover, respondent points out that BL Form No. 700-2A
submitted by petitioner named Potenciano Abragan as the
original claimant of the entire area known as Lot 4342 but the
same document does not show that petitioner is likewise a
claimant of a part of Lot 4342 or that she derived title to the lot
in question from Potenciano Abragan. Petitioner's possession
only started in 1989 when she acquired the lot from Mamerta
Tan who in turn acquired the lot from Teresita Tan. But there is
no clear evidence showing how, when and from whom Teresita
Tan acquired the subject lot.
Respondent cites the rule that the applicant for registration
must be able to establish by evidence that he and his
predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over
the lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier. It is respondent's contention that even if said
BL Form No. 700-2A were considered in this appeal, it would
not help petitioner's cause because the document is bereft of
any information showing that petitioner has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Hence, respondent maintains that the CA properly reversed
and set aside the trial court's ruling granting petitioner's
application for land registration since petitioner failed to offer in
evidence the necessary certification that the parcel of land
applied for registration is alienable and disposable in character
during the proceedings below. Petitioner also did not present
any certification from the DENR or a certified copy of any land
classification map in order to establish irrefutably the fact that
the subject parcel of land is, in fact, alienable and disposable.
Respondent claims that in the absence of such classification
the land remains an unclassified land until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Also, respondent avers that petitioner failed to present specific
acts that would show the nature of her possession and that of
her predecessors-in-interest. The trial court's decision merely
relied on the testimony of petitioner and her witnesses
regarding the transfer of possession of the subject property
from one possessor to another without, however, adverting to
the particulars of their respective possession thereof. To prove
adverse possession, it is not enough to simply declare one's
possession and that of the petitioner's predecessors-in-interest
to have been adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and
in the concept of owner for the required number of years. The
applicant should present specific acts that would show such
nature of possession. Thus, according to respondent, petitioner
has failed to positively establish a registrable title to the subject
parcel of land.
Essentially, the main issue to be resolved is whether the CA
erred in dismissing petitioner's application for registration of
title.
Prefatorily, we address the issue raised by respondent that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari. Indeed, the principle is well established that this
Court is not a trier of facts . Therefore, in an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, only questions of law may be raised.28
The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of
fact" is settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and the question does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when
the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to the
facts, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom
is correct or not, is a question of law.29 In Republic v.
Vega,30 the Court held that when petitioner asks for a review of
the decision made by a lower court based on the evidence
presented, without delving into their probative value but simply
on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then
a question of law is raised.
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the
facts, and the question presented before us calls for a review
of the CA's conclusion that the documents and evidence
presented by petitioner are insufficient to support her
application for registration of title. Hence, the petition is
properly filed.
Now, on the merits. Petitioner asserts that the land subject of
her application has been declared alienable and disposable in
1925 and that her possession through her predecessors-in-
interest started in 1929. However, after a careful examination
of the evidence adduced by petitioner, we find no error on the
part of the CA in dismissing petitioner's application for
registration of title for the failure of petitioner to prove
satisfactorily the requirements for registration provided under
the law.
P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,31 as amended by
Section 4 of P.D. No. 107332 specifies those who are qualified
to apply for registration of land. Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529
and Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
provide thus:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. -The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an
Page 2 of 17
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for
registration of title must establish and prove: (1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that
his possession has been under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.33Each element must
necessarily be proven by no less than clear, positive and
convincing evidence; otherwise the application for registration
should be denied.34
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State. The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration, who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable and
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject
of the application is alienable and disposable.35
To prove that the land subject of the application for registration
is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may secure a
certification from the government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable, but the certification must show that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must
also present a copy of the original classification of the land into
alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary
or as proclaimed by the President.36
To comply with the first requisite, petitioner submitted a
CENRO Certification stating that Lot 4342, Cad-237 located in
Patag, Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and
disposable area under Project No. 8, Block I. Petitioner also
submitted LC Map No. 543 which was certified and approved
on December 31, 1925. We, however, find that the attached
certification is inadequate to prove that the subject lot is
alienable and disposable. We held in Republic v. TA .N
Properties, Inc.37 that a CENRO certification is insufficient to
prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered. The applicant must also show
sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land
classification and released the land in question as alienable
and disposable. We ruled in Republic v. TA .N Properties, Inc.
that:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject
of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land
is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. 38
Thus, as it now stands, aside from the CENRO certification, an
application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records in order to
establish that the land is indeed alienable and disposable. 39
In Republic v. Medida,40 the Court explained why a CENRO or
PENRO certification cannot be considered prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the
official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the
DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication of the DENR Secretary s issuance declaring the
land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.-Documents consisting
of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against
a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution
and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132.
The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer," x x x. The
certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a
government office. The certifications are not even records of
public documents. x x x41
Moreover, the CENRO certification attached by petitioner to
her petition deserves scant consideration since it was not
presented during the proceedings before the trial court or while
the case was pending before the appellate court. Petitioner
only presented the said certification for the first time before this
Court. The genuineness and due execution of the said
document had not been duly proven in the manner required by
law.42 Also, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is
newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through
inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence
is to correct evidence previously offered.43 In the present case,
petitioner did not offer any explanation why the CENRO
certification was not presented and submitted during the
proceedings before the trial court to justify its belated
submission to this Court.
As to the second and third requisites, we agree with the
appellate court that petitioner failed to establish that she and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land on or before June 12, 1945. Based on the records,
the earliest evidence of possession that petitioner and her
predecessor-in-interest Mamerta Tan had over the subject
Page 3 of 17
property was only in 1975 when Mamerta Tan purchased the
subject lot from Teresita Tan. While Mamerta Tan testified that
she purchased the property from Teresita, the records are
bereft of any evidence to show Teresita's mode of acquisition
of ownership over the subject lot or from whom she acquired
the property and when her possession of the subject lot had
commenced.1wphi1
In addition, Honesto Velez, City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro
City, merely testified on the tax declarations issued to certain
persons including petitioner and Mamerta Tan as enumerated
in the Land History Card of Cadastral Lot 4342 but his
testimony did not prove their possession and occupation over
the subject property. What is required is open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by the applicant and her
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.44 Here, it is not shown by clear
and satisfactory evidence that petitioner by herself or through
her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the
land in an open, exclusive, continuous and notorious manner
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Notably, petitioner attempted to convince this Court that
Potenciano Abragan is her predecessor-in-interest and was in
possession of the subject property even before 1929. However,
there was absolutely no evidence proffered by petitioner that
she derived her title to the property from Potenciano Abragan.
Moreover, BL Form No. 700-2A attached by petitioner to her
present petition and sought to be submitted as additional
evidence, does not in any way prove that Potenciano Abragan
was in possession and occupation of the property before 1929.
At best, it merely shows that it was Potenciano who requested
for an original survey of the lot. More importantly, just like the
CENRO certification, BL Form No. 700-2A could not be given
any evidentiary weight and value since it was not presented
before the trial court and its genuineness and due execution
has not been duly proven. It must be emphasized that any
evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration
of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it
is excluded and rejected.45
In fine, since petitioner failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable
land of the public domain; and (2) she and her predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, her
application for registration of title of the subject property under
P.D. No. 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 11, 2010 and Resolution dated May 20, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00319-MIN are
AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167120 April 23, 2014
RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO, Petitioner,
vs.
EMILIANA M. ROJAS, and the legitimate heirs of JOSE A.
ROJAS, namely: JOSE FERDINAND M. ROJAS II,
ROLANDO M. ROJAS, JOSE M. ROJAS, JR., CARMELITA
ROJAS-JOSE, VICTOR M. ROJAS, and LOURDES M.
ROJAS, all represented by JOSE FERDINAND M. ROJAS
II, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) assails the December
22, 2003 Decision1 and February 7, 2005 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62449, which
nullified the decision and orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, and its predecessor,
Court of First Instance (CF!) of Rizal, Branch 10, in Land
Registration Case (LRC) Case No. 95-0004 (formerly LRC
Case No. N-9293), captioned In Re: Application for
Registration of Land Title, Rosalina V Francisco, et al.,
Applicants, to wit:
1. Decision dated September 15, 1977, declaring Rosalina V.
Francisco, Carmen V. Francisco, Carmela V. Francisco and
herein petitioner Rodolfo V. Francisco as the true and absolute
owners of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan Psu-04-001463;3
2. Order dated February 22, 1978, directing the Land
Registration Commission to issue a decree of registration over
the parcels of land covered by the Decision dated September
15, 1977;4
3. Order dated March 23, 1998, directing the Register of Deeds
of Morong, Rizal to issue new certificates of title covering the
same parcels of land, which are now technically identified as
Lots 6-B, 6-C, 6-D and 6-E, in relation to Lot 6-A of Plan Psu
04-083681;5 and
4. Order dated May 8, 2000, requiring the Register of Deeds of
Morong, Rizal to show cause why she should not be cited in
contempt of court for not issuing new certificates of title
covering the same parcels of land.6
The factual antecedents, as the CA thoroughly narrated,
appear as follows:
[Respondent] Emiliana M. Rojas is the widow of the late Jose
Rojas, while the other [respondents] are the children of the
spouses. For purposes of this disposition, [respondents] shall
hereafter be collectively referred to as the Rojases.
On the other hand, x x x Rosalina V. Francisco, [petitioner]
Rodolfo V. Francisco, and Carmela V. Francisco, hereafter
collectively referred to as the Franciscos, are the applicants for
registration in Land Registration Case No. 95-0004 from
whence the challenged decision and orders sprung. 7
Subject of the controversy is a portion of the 3,181.74 hectares
of a vast track of land, known as the Hacienda de Angono, in
Angono, Rizal. The entire hacienda used to be owned by one
Don Buenaventura Guido y Santa Ana upon whose death left a
portion thereof, consisting of the said 3,181.74 hectares, to his
two (2) sons Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido.
Sometime in September 1911, Decreto No. 6145, covering the
same 3,181.74-hectare portion of Hacienda de Angono was
issued in favor of the brothers Francisco and Hermogenes. On
the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 633
over the same 3,181.74 hectares was issued in the names of
the two (2) brothers.
Several years later, or on May 12, 1933, OCT No. 633 was
cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
23377 was issued. Nine (9) years later, or sometime in 1942,
the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes adjudicated among
themselves the same 3,181.74 hectares and transferred the
one-half (1/2) portion thereof to Jose A. Rojas, predecessor-in-
interest of the [respondents] Rojases. Allegedly, the
adjudication was formalized by the heirs of Francisco and
Hermogenes only on December 17, 1973, when they
purportedly executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate
With Quitclaim.
Confusingly, some few months thereafter, or on August 20,
1974, the heirs of Don Buenaventura Guido y Santa Ana,
represented by their lawyer, requested the then Land
Registration Commission (now, Land Registration Authority) to
issue the corresponding original certificate of title based on
Decreto No. 6145, evidently because OCT No. 633 which was
earlier issued on the basis of the same Decreto was previously
cancelled. The request, however, was denied by the said office
on January 8, 1976.
Meanwhile, on March 29, 1976, Alfredo Guido, Sr.,
representing the other heirs, filed with the Registry of Deeds of
Morong a petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377, alleging
that the original of the same title could not be located in the
files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal when he and his co-heirs
sought the registration of their aforementioned [Extra]-Judicial
Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim. The petition was
supported by the owners duplicate copy of the title sought to
be reconstituted.
On the same date that Guido, Sr. filed the petition for
reconstitution, the same was granted and a reconstituted
certificate of title TCT (23377) RT-M-0002 was issued.
After the reconstitution, the heirs presented before the Registry
of Deed of Morong the same Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate With Quitclaim.
Subsequently, the entire parcel of land covered by Decreto No.
6145 was subdivided into twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one
(21) different certificates of title were issued in lieu of the
reconstituted TCT No. 23377.
Thereafter, the heirs who executed the aforesaid document of
extra-judicial settlement, including the now spouses Jose Rojas
and Emiliana Rojas, sold the property to Pacil Management
Page 4 of 17
Corporation (Pacil, for short), and new titles were issued in
favor of Pacil on June 26, 1976. Three (3) months later, or on
August 26, 1976, Pacil reconveyed all the 21 lots to the former
owners. On August 25, 1978, fourteen (14) of the 21 lots were
exchanged for shares of stock of Interport Resources
Corporation. On April 25, 1980, all the named heirs in the same
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim renounced
their rights over the remaining portion of the 3,181.74 hectares
in favor of their co-heir Alfredo Guido, Sr., in exchange for
monetary considerations.
It appears, however, that on August 13, 1976, barely five (5)
months from the time Alfredo Guido, Sr. filed his petition for
reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 on March 29, 1976, which
petition was approved on the same date, an Application for
Registration of Title over four (4) parcels of land (lots 1, 2, 3
and 4), as shown in plan Psu-04-001463, which lots are
presently alleged by the [respondents] Rojases to be
"overlapping a portion of the area covered by TCT No. 23377,"
x x x was filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal, Branch 10, by Rosalina, Rodolfo, Carmela and Carmen,
all surnamed Francisco (the Franciscos), about which petition
the Rojases now claim to be unaware of. Raffled to Branch 10
of the court, the petition was docketed in the same court as
Land Registration Case No. N-9293 x x x.
Acting thereon, the said court issued on June 22, 1977 an
Order of General Default premised on the fact that despite
notice which was duly published, posted and served in
accordance with law, "no person has appeared as respondent
in the case or filed an answer within the time for that purpose
allowed, with the exception of the Director of Lands, the
Provincial Government of Rizal and the Municipal Government
of Binangonan, Rizal thru their counsel, who are given ten (10)
days from today within which to file their formal opposition." x x
x aforementioned Decision to the extent that the recognition of
Eventually, in the herein assailed Decision dated September
15, [1977], CFI Branch 10, acting as a land registration court,
declared the applicant Franciscos "the true and absolute
owners of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-04-00460," thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the following the
true and absolute owners of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-04-
[001463] in the ratio [as] set opposite their respective names:
Rosalina Villamor Francisco, widow, of legal age and residing
at Angono, Rizal ---------------------------------- 5/8
Carmen V. Francisco, single, of legal age and residing at
Angono, Rizal ------------------------------------------ 1/8
Rodolfo V. Francisco, married to Teofila Gil, of legal age and
residing at Angono, Rizal ----------------------- 1/8
Carmela V. Francisco, single, of legal age and residing at
Angono, Rizal ----------------------------------------- 1/8
The title to be issued shall contain the inscriptions:
Lots 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-04-001463 are hereby reserved for
the future widening of Manila East Road.
Once this decision becomes final, let an order for the issuance
of decree issue.
SO ORDERED" x x x
The aforequoted decision having become final and executory,
the Franciscos filed with the same court (CFI, Branch 10), a
petition for the issuance of a decree of registration. And, in the
herein assailed Order dated February 22, 1978, the court
directed the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue the
desired decree x x x.
To complicate matters, it appears that on August 22, 1979, in
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 155, stationed
in Pasig, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Solicitor General, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Decreto No. 6145 and the owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
23377 against the heirs of Francisco Guido and Hermogenes
Guido, the spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, the Pacil
Development Corporation and Interport Resources
Corporation, it being alleged in the same complaint that both
the Decreto No. 6145 and the owners copy of TCT No. 23377
were false, spurious and fabricated and were never issued by
virtue of judicial proceedings for registration of land either
under Act No, 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, or under any other law. The complaint for
annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. 34242.
After trial, the CFI of Rizal, Branch 155, rendered a decision
dismissing the Republics complaint and declaring Decreto No.
6145 and TCT No. 23377 "genuine and authentic." We quote
the pertinent portions of the decision:
"Considering that Decree 6145 and TCT No. 23377 are
genuine and authentic, the decree cannot now be reopened or
revived.
A decree of registration binds the land and quiets title thereto,
is conclusive upon all persons and cannot be reopened or
revived after the lapse of one year after entry of the decree
(Ylarde vs. Lichauco, 42 SCRA 641)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby
dismissed. Likewise, the counterclaims of the defendants are
dismissed."
From the same decision, the Republic went on appeal to [the
Court of Appeals] in CA-G.R. CV No. 12933. And, in a decision
promulgated on July 12, 1988, [the CA] dismissed the
Republics appeal and affirmed the appealed decision of the
Rizal CFI, Branch 155.
In time, the Republic moved for a reconsideration with an
alternative prayer declaring Decreto No. 6145 and its derivative
titles authentic except with respect to such portions of the
disputed property which were either: (1) possessed and owned
by bona fide occupants who already acquired indefeasible titles
thereto; or (2) possessed and owned by bona fide occupants
and their families with lengths of possession which amounted
to ownership.
In a resolution promulgated on September 14, 1988, [the CA]
denied the motion, saying:
"After careful consideration of the motion for reconsideration
and defendants-appellees opposition thereto, We find no
cogent reason to justify the reversal of Our decision dated July
12, 1988, hence the motion is DENIED.
Likewise DENIED, is the alternative prayer to modify the
the authenticity of Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 shall
not affect and prejudice the parcels of land already possessed
and owned by bona fide occupants who have already acquired
indefeasible title thereto, for to grant said alternative prayer
would be to run roughshod over Our decision adverted to."
Undaunted, the Republic, again thru the Solicitor General, went
to [this Court] on a petition for review in G.R. No. 84966,
entitled ["Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals"]. In
a decision promulgated on November 21, 1991, [the Court]
affirmed the decision of the [CA], subject to certain conditions
therein stated, thus:
"ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 12933 is AFFIRMED subject to the herein declared
superior rights of bona fide occupants with registered titles
within the area covered by the questioned decree and bona
fide occupants therein with lengths of possession which had
ripened to ownership, the latter to be determined in an
appropriate proceeding.1wphi1
SO ORDERED" (204 SCRA 160, 181)
Two (2) years after [this Court] handed down its
aforementioned decision, a Supplementary Report, dated
December 13, 1993, was submitted in LRC Case No. N-9293
by Director Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority,
recommending to the court that "the applicants (i.e., the
Franciscos) be ordered to submit a subdivision plan of Lot 6 of
the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-240150 covered by TCT No.
2095, together with the corresponding technical descriptions
duly approved by the Regional Technical Director by
segregating therefrom the parcels of land described as Lots 1,
2, 3 and 4 in plan Psu-04-001463 decided in favor of the
applicants and the issuance of new [transfer certificates of
title]by the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, in accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court" x x x.
On March [13,] 1995, the Franciscos, as applicants a quo
moved for a transfer of venue to the newly created RTC of
Binangonan, Rizal. The case was then raffled to Branch 69 of
said court, whereat the same application for registration was
docketed as Land Registration Case No. 95-0004.
In the herein other assailed Order dated March 23, 1998, the
Binangonan RTC directed the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
issue transfer certificates of title in favor of the applicant
Franciscos, to wit:
"WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal is
hereby directed to issue a new transfer certificate of title
covering the subject parcels of land which are now technically
Page 5 of 17
identified as Lot 6-B, Lot 6-C, Lot 6-D, and Lot 6-E in relation to
Lot 6-A of plan Psu-04-083681 in accordance with the
recommendation of the Land Registration Authority in its
Supplementary Report dated December 13, 1993 and [the]
decision of the Supreme Court in Republic vs. CA, 204 SCRA
160; [179] in the names of applicants who are hereby
declared to be the owners and bona fide occupants of the land
in question, with possession for more than 30 years since the
time that started way back during the American regime, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, which has
ripened into ownership, in the following proportion or interest,
to wit:
1) Carmen V. Francisco, married to Thomas Whalen, of legal
age, and residing at Angono, Rizal 1/3
2) Rodolfo V. Francisco, married to Teofila Gil, of legal age,
and residing at Angono, Rizal 1/3
3) Carmela V. Francisco, single, of legal age, and residing at
Angono, Rizal 1/3
Let the technical descriptions of Lots 6-B, 6-C, 6-D and 6-E, of
Plan 04-083681, as submitted to this court, be used in the
issuance of [certificates] of [title] in favor of the applicants, in
lieu of the technical descriptions of Lots 1, 2, 3 & 4 of Plan Psu-
04-001463.
SO ORDERED." x x x
Said Order not having been complied with, the Binangonan
RTC issued the herein last assailed Order dated May 8, 2000,
requiring Atty. Dian Lao of the Morong Registry to show cause
within ten (10) days from receipt why she should not be held in
contempt of court for failing to implement the earlier Order of
March 23, 1998 x x x.
Such was the state of things when, on January 3, 2001, the
herein [respondents] the Rojases filed the x x x petition for
certiorari and prohibition [before the CA] for the purpose
already stated at the threshold hereof, claiming that they came
to know of the existence of Land Registration Case No. 95-
0004 only "sometime in June 2000" when a real estate agent
by the name of Florentina Rivera discovered the same and
brought it to their knowledge x x x.8
Meantime, on July 29, 2000, the subject parcels of land were
eventually registered in the names of petitioner and his sisters,
Carmen and Carmela with the issuance of TCT Nos. M-
102009, M-102010, M-102011, and M-102012, covering lots 6-
E, 6-C, 6-D, and 6-B, respectively.9
On December 22, 2003, the CA ruled in favor of respondents.
The fallo of the Decision declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari is hereby issued ANNULLING
and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated September 15, 1977,
and the subsequent Orders dated February 22, 1978, March
23, 1978 and May 8, 2000 of the respondent court and its
predecessor, the then CFI of Rizal, Branch 10, in Land
Registration Case No. 95-0004. Consequently, Transfer
[Certificate] of Title [Nos.] M-102012, M-102010, and M-
102009 issued pursuant thereto by the Register of Deeds at
Morong, Rizal are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.10
As to the appropriateness of the petition, the CA rejected
petitioners supposition that the issue to be resolved is only a
pure question of law, that is, the determination or interpretation
of what an "appropriate proceeding" is as referred to in the
dispositive portion of Republic v. Court of Appeals 11 (Guido). It
held that since the petition raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the land registration court, the remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules properly applies. Anent
the timeliness of the petition, the CA overlooked the procedural
lapse of filing the petition beyond the 60-day reglementary
period in the interest of substantial justice given the compelling
merit of the petition.
On the merits of respondents petition, the CA ruled that the
challenged decision and orders were indeed issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction. It opined:
Unquestionably, the title covering the lots applied for was made
subject to the "superior rights" not only of those already with
registered titles within the area, but also of those bona fide
occupants whose lengths of possession have ripened into
ownership to be determined in a proper proceeding.
Notwithstanding, We cannot subscribe to [the Franciscos]
theory that the ruling in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
[Antonina] Guido, et al., supra, allowed what otherwise is a
void proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.
Indeed, the existence of a valid title covering the land sought to
be registered is the determinative factor in this case as far as
the matter of jurisdiction to entertain the application for
registration is concerned.
In Orchard Realty and Development Corp. vs. Republic, 364
SCRA 100, 107, where the previous registration of the subject
parcel of land being applied for was subsequently declared null
and void by a competent court, the Supreme Court made clear:
"A land covered by a title which is outstanding cannot be
subject of an application for registration unless the existing title
which has become indefeasible is first nullified by a proper
court proceeding, x x x."
Thus, unless and until an existing torrens title is declared a
nullity, or, for that matter, declared authentic but subject to any
"superior rights," as herein, it remains subsisting as it is, and
an application for registration of the land covered thereunder,
or any portion thereof, cannot, as yet, be entertained.
Here, at the time the application for original registration was
filed on August 13, 1976 and even when the decision of the
then CFI of Rizal granting the application was rendered on
September 15, 1977, there was no doubt as to the authenticity
of TCT No. 23377 covering the lots in question, considering
that the action for annulment of said TCT was filed by the
Solicitor General only on August 22, 1979. Hence, by the
simple fact that the lots in question were already covered by an
existing title at the time [the Franciscos] filed their application
for registration, the then CFI of Rizal is bereft of jurisdiction to
take cognizance thereof, much less grant the same.
Accordingly, herein [land registration court] was without
authority to order the issuance of new titles covering the same
lots.
Moreover, [if We were] to follow [the Franciscos] reasoning,
We would, in effect, be sanctioning a collateral attack on an
existing title, which simply runs smack against the well-settled
rule that "a title may be challenged only in a proceeding for that
purpose, not in an application for registration of a land already
registered in the name of another person" (Carvajal v. CA, 280
SCRA 351, 360).
For want of jurisdiction then, We inevitably rule and so hold
that the decision dated September 15, 1977, in LRC No. 95-
0004 adjudging [the Franciscos] the true and absolute owners
of the subject parcels of land therein sought to be registered,
and the orders issued in consequence thereof, are null and
void ab initio.
And being null and void, such decision and orders can never
become final and executory. Hence, an action to declare them
void is imprescriptible. In the graphic words of Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110, 122:
"x x x. (A) void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded
to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or
declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to
be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a
valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy
for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or
create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily,
no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings
founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as
invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded as a nullity,
and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no
judgment x x x."12
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid
Decision, but the CA resolved to deny the same on February 7,
2005; hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS IN LRC NO. 95-0004 [RTC];
LRC NO. N-9293 [CFI] IS THE "APPROPRIATE
PROCEEDING" CONTEMPLATED IN THIS HONORABLE
COURTS PRONOUNCEMENT IN "GUIDO CASE"? IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE BEING MAINTAINED BY THE
RESPONDENTS IS THE "APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING"?
Page 6 of 17
WE RESPECTFULLY STATE IT SIMPLY, WHAT IS THE
"APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING" THAT WAS
CONTEMPLATED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE
"GUIDO CASE"?
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE "CA FINAL AND EXECUTORY
DECISION" IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 77764 HAD ESTABLISHED A
PRECEDENT, I.E., "LAND REGISTRATION" IS THE PROPER
PROCEEDING, IN SO FAR AS ALL COURTS LOWER THAN
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND THE GUIDO
ESTATE IS CONCERNED? IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MAY STILL VALIDLY
RENDER DECISION IN CONTRAST THERETO?
III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS IMPLEADED AS
PARTY TO THE ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF DECRETO 6145 AND THE OWNERS DUPLICATE COPY
OF TCT NO. 23377 FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 34242, BR. 155,
CFI, RIZAL, WHICH WAS APPEALED TO THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 12933, AND
ELEVATED TO THIS COURT VIA PETITION FOR REVIEW IN
G.R. NO. 84966, ENTITLED REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL., NOW
KNOWN AS GUIDO CASE?
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN ENTERTAINING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION (CA-G.R. SP NO. 62449)
DESPITE ADMITTING THAT SAID PETITION WAS FILED
EXCEEDINGLY BEYOND THE MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY PERIOD?
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION?13
On February 1, 2006, during the pendency of the case,
respondents, through counsel, filed a Motion for Approval of
Transaction and Agreement Involving Property under Litigation.
They alleged that: the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. M-
102010 and M-102012 were acquired by Citimar Realty &
Development Corporation (Citimar) by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on September 7, 2001; that TCT Nos.
M-102010 and M-102012 were cancelled and replaced by TCT
Nos. M-107343 and M-107344, respectively, in the name of
Citimar; that pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement dated
January 31, 2006, respondents, for valuable consideration,
ceded their rights over the lots covered by said TCTs in favor
of Citimar; that on account of the agreement, Citimar, which is
the successor-in-interest of petitioner with respect to the
already cancelled TCT Nos. M-102010 and M-102012, has
been subrogated to the rights of respondents relative to the
parcels of land covered thereby; and that, in effect, there is no
longer any controversy that needs to be resolved by the Court
with regard to the rightful ownership of the lots mentioned
because Citimar acquired the rights pertaining to the party-
litigants.14 Respondents prayed that the MOA executed
between them and Citimar be approved and that the present
case be limited to the matter of determining the validity of TCT
No. M-102009 and its derivatives.
Despite no objection interposed by petitioner, the Court
resolved to deny respondents motion in its Resolution dated
November 26, 2007 due to lack of legal basis.15
The petition is denied.
First, We shall tackle matters of procedure.
Petitioner contends that the CA should have dismissed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondents on
January 3, 2001 for being filed beyond the 60-day
reglementary period in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules from the time they allegedly discovered the existence of
LRC Case No. 95-0004 in June 2000. He asserts that failure to
perfect an appeal within the prescribed period is not a mere
technicality but mandatory and jurisdictional in nature and that,
for want of allegations of compelling reason for the court to
exercise its equity jurisdiction, procedural rules on timeliness of
filing should have been strictly adhered to. Due to the CAs
error in entertaining the petition, he avers that it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the same, effectively rendering invalid its
questioned Decision and Resolution. Further, while petitioner
agrees with the CAs opinion that Torrens title cannot be
attacked collaterally, he argues that respondents petition for
certiorari before the CA does not and cannot be considered as
a direct attack to the Franciscos title; hence, the CAs Decision
nullifying TCT Nos. M-102009, M-102010, and M-102012 is
likewise void.
Indeed, respondents committed a lapse in procedure, but not
due to a petition that was filed out of time before the CA.
Respondents erred because they should have filed a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules instead
of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof. Such petition
does not require a person to be a party to the judgment sought
to be annulled.16 Nevertheless, considering that the petition
before the CA essentially alleged lack of jurisdiction and denial
of due process two grounds upon which a petition for
annulment of judgment may be based (aside from extrinsic
fraud)17 We deem it wise to ignore the procedural infirmity
and resolve the substantial merits of the case, especially so
since the action filed is not yet barred by laches or estoppel. 18
As to the alleged indefeasibility of the Franciscos title,
petitioners contention is incorrect. Unlike ordinary civil actions,
the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year from
the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as a final
decree has not yet been entered by the LRA and the period of
one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.19 In this case, the subject
parcels of land were eventually registered in the names of
petitioner and his sisters on July 29, 2000 with the issuance of
TCT Nos. M-102009, M-102010, M-102011, and M-102012.
Less than a year later, on January 3, 2001, respondents
already filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
CA.
Therefore, the principle that a Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked does not apply.
Next, petitioner calls Our attention to an alleged "closely
related case," Civil Case No. 01-052 then pending before
Branch 68 of the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal, entitled "Heirs of
Alfredo I. Guido, represented by Roberto A. Guido v. Carmen
V. Francisco, et al." for "Annulment of the Decision and Order
dated August 7, 2000 in LRC Case No. 95-0004 with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction." It was dismissed by
the trial court on September 13, 2002 and, subsequently, by
the CA on June 11, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 77764. The CA
Decision became final and executory on July 3, 2004.
Petitioner opines that with the CA dismissal of the Guidos
appeal, it has been settled that the land registration case is an
"appropriate proceeding." He posits that CA-G.R. CV No.
77764 has established a precedent and that the challenged
orders of the land registration court constitute the law between
the parties because the Guidos and the Rojases are similarly
situated in the sense that they are both registered co-owners of
the Guido Estate and both of them assailed the same decisions
and orders albeit via different modes of appeal. The effect of
this, petitioner holds, is that the CA Decision assailed in this
petition was not validly promulgated, since applying the
doctrine of stare decisis, the CA did not follow the authority
established in CA-G.R. CV No. 77764.
We do not agree. The principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code, which states that "[j]udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines." The doctrine embodies the
legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been
established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction
will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is
founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in
the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties. 20 In
a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the
higher courts bind the lower courts; the courts of co-ordinate
authority do not bind each other; and the one highest court
does not bind itself, it being invested with the innate authority
to rule according to its best lights.21 The principle of stare
decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions.22 Thus,
a ruling of a particular division of the CA, while may be taken
cognizance of in some cases, cannot bind or prejudice a ruling
of another division thereof, the former being a co-ordinate
Page 7 of 17
authority and, relative to Us, is still considered as a lower court
albeit empowered with an appellate jurisdiction.
The procedural issues having been disposed of, We now turn
to the substantive issues raised by petitioner. Given that the
resolution of the present case inevitably takes into
consideration Our pronouncements in Guido, a background
thereof is in order.
On August 22, 1979, the Republic of the Philippines filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6145, the
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377 and all titles derived
from said decree; and the declaration of the parcel of land
covered by the decree as belonging to the State, except so
much thereof as had been validly disposed of to third persons.
The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 34242
before the CFI of Rizal, alleged that Decreto No. 6145 issued
on September 10, 1911 and the alleged owner's copy of TCT
No. 23377 issued on May 12, 1933, both in the name of
Francisco and Hermogenes Guido, and which supposed
owner's duplicate was made the basis of the administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. (23377) RT-M-0002 on March 29,
1976 are false, spurious and fabricated, and were never issued
by virtue of judicial proceedings for registration of land, either
under Act No. 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, or any other law.
Named as defendants in the case were: (1) Antonina,
Margarita, Feliza, Crisanta and Candida, all surnamed Guido,
who claimed to be the heirs of Francisco Guido and whose
spouses were joined as defendants; (2) Esperanza, Alfredo
(who died during the pendency of this case and who was
substituted by his heirs), Eufronia, Gliceria, Priscilla, Profetiza,
Buenaventura, Buensuceso and Carlos, all surnamed Guido,
who claimed to be the heirs of Hermogenes Guido and whose
respective spouses were joined as defendants; (3) spouses
Jose and Emiliana Rojas; (4) Pacil Development Corporation;
and (5) Interport Resources Corporation.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and declared Decreto
No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 genuine and authentic. The CA
affirmed the Decision. In its motion for reconsideration, the
Republic prayed for an alternative judgment recognizing the
authenticity and validity of Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No.
23377 only with respect to such portions of the property which
were either: (1) not possessed and owned by bona fide
occupants with indefeasible registered titles thereto or (2)
possessed and owned by bona fide occupants and their
families with lengths of possession that has ripened to title of
ownership. The motion was denied. When elevated to Us, the
same prayer for alternative judgment was presented. This time,
all the private respondents accepted the alternative prayer.
In Our November 21, 1991 Decision, We upheld the findings of
the courts below that Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377
are authentic. However, the effects of laches and waiver were
applied, thus:
Anent the alternative prayer of the petitioner, We find no legal
basis for the declaration of the questioned documents as valid
only with respect to such portions of the property not
possessed and owned by [bona fide] occupants with
indefeasible registered titles of ownership or with lengths of
possession which had ripened to ownership. Having been
found valid and genuine, Decreto No. 6145 therefore,
possessed all the attributes of a decree of registration. Section
31 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), second
paragraph provides:
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title
thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be
provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the National Government and all branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or
notice, the same being included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern".
Likewise, TCT No. 23377, having been found true and
authentic also possessed all the attributes of a torrens
certificate of title. By express provision of Section 47 of P.D
1529, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. To declare that the decree and its derivative titles
is valid but only with respect to the extent of the area described
in the decree not possessed by occupants with indefeasible
registered titles or to possessors with such lengths of
possession which had ripened to ownership is to undermine
the people's faith in the torrens titles being conclusive as to all
matters contained therein. The certificate serves as evidence
of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose names appear therein. After the expiration of the one
year period from the issuance of the decree of registration
upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of
Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes and Nadres v.
Borbon and Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791, Sy Juco v.
Francisco, O.G. p. 2186, April 15, 1957, Brizuela v. de Vargas,
53 O.G. 2822, May 15, 1957), unless subsequent to the
issuance of the decree a third party may be able to show that
he acquired title thereto by any of the means recognized by
law.
It should be noted however, that prior to the reconstruction of
TCT No. 23377 on March 29, 1976, [there was] no record in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal show of the
existence of any registered title covering the land area subject
of this case. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that prior
to said date, certain portions of the area were in the
possession of occupants who successfully obtained certificates
of titles over the area occupied by them. There were also
occupants who had not obtained certificates of titles over the
area possessed by them but the lengths of their possession
were long enough to amount to ownership, had the land been
in fact unregistered. This fact is admitted by the parties.
Although prescription is unavailing against private respondents
because they are holders of a valid certificate of title, the
equitable presumption of laches may be applied against them
for failure to assert their ownership for such an unreasonable
length of time (only in 1976) against subsequent occupants.
The records showed that it was only in 1974 when they tried to
obtain an original certificate of title. When rebuffed by the LRC,
they applied for a reconstitution of a TCT only in 1976.
In the recent case of Lola v. CA, G.R. No. L-46573, Nov. 13,
1986, 145 SCRA 439, citing the cases of Pabalete v. Echarri,
Jr., G.R. No. L-24357, 37 SCRA 518, 521, 522 quoting Mejia
de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, it was held that
"although the defense of prescription is unavailing to the
petitioners (Pablo and Maxima Lola) because, admittedly, the
title to Lot No. 5517 is still registered in the name of the
respondent (Dolores Zabala), still the petitioners have acquired
title to it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to the
respondent's failure to assert her claim and ownership for thirty
two (32) years."
Moreover, conscious of the resulting "largescale dispossession
and social displacement of several hundreds of bona fide
occupants and their families" which the Solicitor General
pointed out, the private respondent agreed unanimously to
accept the alternative prayer of the petitioner in their joint
memorandum (pp. 624-636, Rollo). This agreement by private
respondents takes the form of a waiver. Though a valid and
clear right over the property exists in their favors, they
seemingly have voluntarily abandoned the same favor of: 1)
those who possessed and actually occupied specific portions
and obtained torrens certificates of titles, and 2) those who
possessed certain specific portions for such lengths of time as
to amount to full ownership. The waiver, not being contrary to
law, morals, good customs and good policy, is valid and
binding on the private respondents.
However, with respect to the second set of possessors, whose
alleged bona fide occupancy of specific portions of the property
is not evidenced by Torrens Titles, it is imperative that their
claims/occupancy be duly proven in an appropriate proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 12933 is AFFIRMED subject to the herein declared
superior rights of bona fide occupants with registered titles
within the area covered by the questioned decree and bona
fide occupants therein with length of possession which had
ripened to ownership, the latter to be determined in an
appropriate proceeding.
SO ORDERED.23
Going back to this case, petitioner contends that the
Franciscos correctly chose the land registration proceeding as
the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Guido because, as
evidently shown in the CFI Decision, their titles, rights or
interests to Lots 1-4 of Psu-04-001463 (now Lots 6B-6E of
Page 8 of 17
Psd-04-083681) have been successfully confirmed. While
recognizing that such proceeding is normally untenable
because the case involved the filing of an application for
registration of land that is already covered by a Torrens
certificate of title, petitioner submits that Guido impliedly
allowed the same. He avers that their application was filed on
August 13, 1976, or fifteen (15) years before this Court
rendered its decision in Guido on November 21, 1991, and that
they were made aware of the administrative reconstitution of
TCT No. 23377 only in 1978 when the LRA Report was
submitted to the CFI and a copy of which was furnished them.
By then, however, the CFI Decision granting the application for
registration already became final and executory.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that in view of the waiver made by
the Guidos and the Rojases in Guido, as well as the declared
superior rights of the Franciscos, the latters title over the four
parcels of land is deemed vested to them as far back as the
time the reconstituted TCT No. 23377 was issued. Their title
thereto was merely confirmed in the questioned land
registration proceedings. Petitioner notes the Motion for
Approval of Transaction and Agreement Involving Property
under Litigation filed by respondents, which allegedly
recognized the validity of TCT Nos. M-102010 and M-102012
and reinforces the view that land registration is an "appropriate
proceeding."
Petitioner attacks the CA in ruling that "[indeed,] the existence
of a valid title covering the land sought to be registered is the
determinative factor in this case as far as the matter of
jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration is
concerned." He argues that if the CA would be followed, any
subsequent proceeding for land registration involving the Guido
Estate would be declared void, because OCT No. 633 was
registered as early as June 22, 1912.
Lastly, in disputing respondents contention that the
"appropriate proceeding" should be an action for
reconveyance, petitioner states that such action may be proper
but is still not an exclusive remedy. He maintains that actual
fraud in securing a title must be proved so as to succeed in an
action for reconveyance, but the Court already held in Guido
that TCT No. 23377 is authentic and genuine; hence, it is
assumed that there is no infirmity or defect therein. Also, an
action for reconveyance cannot be availed of like an
application for registration of land as it would be dismissed
forthwith on the ground of prescription.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable.
The Franciscos have based their claim to ownership of the
subject lots on the alleged fact of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Their application
represented to the land registration court that the parcels of
land subjects of the case were unregistered and not yet
brought within the coverage of the Torrens system of
registration. These are obvious as they filed an application
pursuant to Chapter III (I) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529
(Property Registration Decree) by following the ordinary
registration proceedings for the confirmation of their title.
Specifically, under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, three requisites
must be satisfied: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land since June
12, 1945 or earlier; (2) pertains to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and (3) under a bona fide claim of
ownership.
As the very nature of the action limits the subject matter to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, an
ordinary registration proceeding cannot be availed of by the
Franciscos in order to establish claims over lands which had
already been brought within the coverage of the Torrens
system. Chapter III (I) of PD 1529 does not provide that original
registration proceedings can be automatically and unilaterally
converted into a proceeding for the issuance of new TCT
involving parcels of land already registered under the Torrens
system. Certainly, it is improper to make a legal short-cut by
implementing the judgment of the land registration court
against the parcels of land in the names of the Rojases and
Guidos under the guise that it is contemplated in Guido.
A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in
an earlier land registration case. Issuance of another decree
covering the same land is, therefore, null and void.24
The rationale behind the Torrens System is that the public
should be able to rely on a registered title. The Torrens System
was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership
is established and recognized. In Fil-Estate Management, Inc.
v. Trono, we explained:
It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of the
Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner
may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals
of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa" to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.25
It is clear that the March 23, 1998 Order of the RTC
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, which purports to merely
enforce the September 15, 1977 Decision of the CFI, disturbs
the stability of TCT No. M-2095, a collateral attack that is
impermissible under Section 48 of PD 1529 and well-
entrenched jurisprudence. After the promulgation of the Guido
on November 21, 1991, it can no longer be said that an original
registration proceeding is proper, since Guido held that
Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 (the mother title from
which TCT No. M-2095 was derived) are genuine and
authentic. What the land registration court should have done
was to dismiss the application for registration upon learning
that the same property was already covered by a valid TCT.
We reiterate that, unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication
of land in a land registration or cadastral proceeding does not
become final and incontrovertible until after the expiration of
one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration
and that until such time the title is not finally adjudicated and
the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
it.26 Until then the court rendering the decree may, after
hearing, set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the
land to another person.27
Likewise, on the assumption that what is being applied for
formed part of a bigger parcel of land belonging to the Guidos
and Rojases, then, as registered owners thereof, they (Guidos
and Rojases) should have been mentioned in the Application
for Registration as adjoining owners conformably with Section
15 of PD 1529, which requires in the application for registration
the inclusion of the full names and addresses of the adjoining
owners. Contrary to the mandatory requirement of the law,
there is nothing in the application for registration alleging that
the Rojases and Guidos are adjoining owners. As adjoining
owners, respondents are indispensable parties entitled to
actual and personal notice of the application for registration. A
valid judgment cannot be rendered where there is want of
indispensable parties like respondents who hold subsisting
Torrens title to the property in question.
Notably, a Manifestation and/or Compliance28 was filed by the
Franciscos on November 19, 1998 before the RTC
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69. They alleged that despite
service of notice of the Manifestation with Motion dated July
10, 1998 to the registered owners appearing on TCT No. M-
2095, said owners, including Jose Rojas whose envelope was
stamped "RETURN TO SENDER," did not file any comment or
opposition. The Franciscos stated that TCT M-2095 does not
bear the complete address of the registered owners, so they
gathered their respective addresses from the available and
accessible public records. This reasoning does not suffice. In
Divina v. Court of Appeals,29 We stressed:
Section 15 of P.D. 1529 is explicit in requiring that in the
application for registration of land titles, the application "shall
also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the
land and those of the adjoining owners if known, and if not
known, it shall state the extent of the search made to find
them." As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA
22 [1980] we emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of
knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining
owners is not sufficient but "what search has been made to find
them is necessary." x x x30
The "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Guido is a case
where the Franciscos must present specific acts of ownership
to substantiate their claim that they are bona fide occupants of
Lots 1-4 of Psu-04-001463 (now Lots 6B-6E of Psd-04-
083681) while, at the same time, respondents are accorded
Page 9 of 17
due process of law by availing of the opportunity to oppose and
refute the representations made by the Franciscos. Whatever
the "appropriate proceeding" may be, the decisive factor is that
the same should be a proceeding in personam wherein
personal service of summons and copy of the
complaint/petition is necessary.
Truly, one of the appropriate legal remedies that should have
been availed of by the Franciscos is an action for
reconveyance. Contrary to petitioners declaration, proof of
actual fraud is not required as it may be filed even when no
fraud intervened such as when there is mistake in including the
land for registration. In the action for reconveyance, the decree
of registration is highly respected as incontrovertible; what is
sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or
erroneously registered in anothers name to its rightful owner or
to the one with a better right.31
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four
years from the discovery of the fraud and if it is based on an
implied or a constructive trust it prescribes ten (10) years from
the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property.32
However, an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is in possession of the property. 33 In effect,
the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property
title, which does not prescribe.34 This Court held in Yared v.
Tiongco:35
The Court agrees with the CAs disquisition that an action for
reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. In a long
line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the issuance of the
Torrens title over the property.
However, there is an exception to this rule. In the case of Heirs
of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, the Court
reiterating the ruling in Millena v. Court of Appeals, held that
there is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked
in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed. In Heirs of Pomposa
Saludares, this Court explained that the Court in a series of
cases, has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance
despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the
issuance of title to the land and declared that said action, when
based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not
passed to an innocent buyer for value. But in all those cases,
the common factual backdrop was that the registered owners
were never in possession of the disputed property. The
exception was based on the theory that registration
proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for
enriching a person at the expense of another.
In Alfredo v. Borras, the Court ruled that prescription does not
run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed
land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before
initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of
a third party and its effect on his title. The Court held that
where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in
possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance
becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is
not subject to prescription.
The Court reiterated such rule in the case of Vda. de Cabrera
v. Court of Appeals, wherein we ruled that the imprescriptibility
of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive
trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the
trust is not in possession of the property. In effect, the action
for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which
does not prescribe.
Similarly, in the case of David v. Malay the Court held that
there was no doubt about the fact that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in
ten (10) years. This rule assumes, however, that there is an
actual need to initiate that action, for when the right of the true
and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as
when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the statute of
limitation would yet be irrelevant. An action for reconveyance, if
nonetheless brought, would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, or its equivalent, an action that is
imprescriptible. In that case, the Court reiterated the ruling in
Faja v. Court of Appeals which we quote:
x x x There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived
at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of
herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in
possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years
and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she
had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled
in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation
the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance
and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from
the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim
adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period
of prescription commences to run against such possessor. 36
In this case, the Franciscos claim to be in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject lots. It appears that they never lost possession of said
properties, and as such, they are in a position to file the
complaint with the trial court to protect their alleged rights and
clear whatever doubts has been cast thereon.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED. The December 22, 2003 Decision and February 7,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62449, which nullified the Decision and Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, and its
predecessor, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 10, in
Land Registration Case Case No. 95-0004 (formerly LRC Case
No. N-9293), and consequently, declared as null and void TCT
Nos. M-102009, M-102010, and M-102012, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212388 December 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPOUSES DONATO SANCHEZ and JUANA
MENESES, represented by RODOLFO S.
AGUINALDO,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision1 dated November 8, 2013 and Resolution dated April
29, 2014 of the Court or Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94 720,
entitled Heirs of the Spouses Donato Sanchez and Juana
Meneses, represented by Rodolfo S. Aguinaldo v. Republic of
the Philippines.
Respondents filed an amended petition for reconstitution of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 45361 that covered Lot
No. 854 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 26.2 In said petition, respondents made
the following allegations:
1. That OCT No. 45361 was issued in the name of their
predecessor-ininterest, the spouses Sanchez, pursuant to
Decree No. 41812 issued in relation to a Decision dated March
12, 1930 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Pangasinan;
2. Said lot was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
the spouses Sanchez and that when the latter died intestate,
they executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. Said Deed,
however, could not be registered because the owners copy of
OCT No. 45361 was missing; and
3. The Offices of the Register of Deeds (RD) of Lingayen and
Dagupan, Pangasinan issued a certification that the copies of
Decree No. 41812 and OCT No. 45361 could not be found
among its records.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the CFI
issued an Order dated June 24, 2001 giving due course thereto
and ordered the requisite publication thereof, among others.
Meanwhile, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) requested the trial court, which the latter granted through
Page 10 of 17
its October 11, 2002 Order, torequire respondents to submit
the following documents:
1. Certification from the RD that OCT No. 45361 was either lost
or destroyed;
2. Copies of the technical description of the lot covered by OCT
No. 45361, certified by the authorized officer of the Land
Management Bureau/LRA; and
3. Sepia film plan of the subject lot prepared by the duly
licensed geodetic engineer.
Due to difficulties encountered in securing said documents,
respondents moved for the archiving of the case, which motion
was granted by the trial court. It was later revived when
respondents finally secured the said documents.
The petition was published anew and trial later ensued, with
the following documents submitted by respondents in
evidence, to wit:
1. Decision dated March 12, 1930 (written in Spanish) in
Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No. 920
adjudicating Lot No. 854 in favor of the spouses Donato
Sanchez and Juana Meneses which was certified by the LRA
as a true copy of the original; and
2. Certified true copy of the Registrars Index Card containing
the notation that OCT No. 45361 covering Lot No. 854 was
listed under the name of Donato Sanchez.
On January 11, 2008, the LRA submitted its Report pertaining
to the legality of the reconstitution sought in favor of
respondents, the relevant portions of which, as quoted by the
CA in the assailed Decision, are as follows:
(2) From Book No. 35 of the Record Book of Cadastral Lots on
file at the Cadastral Decree Section, this Authority, it appears
that Decree No. 418121 was issued to Lot No. 854, Dagupan
Cadastre on January 12, 1931, in Cadastral Case No. 40,
GLRO Cad. Record No. 920. Copy of the said decree,
however, is no longer available in this Authority.
(3) The plan and technical description of lot 854, cad 217,
Case 3, Dagupan Cadastre, were verified correctby this
Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have
been approved under (LRA) PR-07-01555-R pursuant to the
provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.
On June 30, 2008, however, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
rendered its Decision3 dismissing the petition for lack of
sufficient evidence, ruling that RA No. 26 only applies in cases
where the issuance of the OCT sought to be reconstituted has
been established, only that it was lost or destroyed. While
acknowledging the existence of Decree No. 418121 which was
issued for the lot subject of the case, the RTC nevertheless
held that there is no established proof that OCT No. 45361 was
issued by virtue of said Decree.
Aggrieved, respondents moved for reconsideration of the
above Decision, insisting that there was sufficient evidence to
prove the issuance of OCT No. 45361. Instead of filing a
comment thereto, the RD of Dagupan City manifested that
OCT No. 45361 had been superseded by TCT No. 10202
issued to a certain Rufino Marias with notation that the land it
covered was "originally registered on the 29th day of January,
[1931] x x x as OCT No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121
issued in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 920." Furthermore,
TCT No. 10202 was cancelled by TCT No. 44365 and later by
TCT No. 80792 in the name of Dagupan Doctors Villaflor
Memorial Hospital, both bearing a note which reads, "The
name of the registered owner of OCT No. 45361 is not
available as per certification of the [RD of Lingayen], dated
August 18, 1982, entries nos. 107415 and 107416,
respectively."
Disagreeing with the trial courts findings and holding that Lot
854 was judicially awarded to respondents predecessor-in-
interest in Cadastral Case No. 40, GLRO Cad. Record No.
920,the CA reversed the RTC ruling on appeal and directed the
reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 in favor of herein
respondents.
The CA held that even though respondents were unable to
present the documents necessary for reconstitution of title as
enumerated under Section 2 of RA No. 26, particularly (a) to
(e) thereof, the documentary pieces of evidence presented by
respondents fall under paragraph (f) of said provision and are
sufficient to warrant the reconstitution of OCT No. 45361. In
this regard, the CA emphasized that the certificates of title
which the RD manifested to have superseded OCT No. 45361
all bear the notation to the effect that Lot No. 854 was originally
registered on January 29, 1931 as OCT No. 45361 pursuant to
Decree No. 418121 issued in G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No.
920, the name of the registered owner of which is not available.
This, to the CA, substantially complies with the requirement
enunciated in Republic v. Tuastumban4 that the documents
must come from official sources which recognize the ownership
of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court in the assailed Resolution, petitioner lodged the
instant petition questioning the sufficiency of the documents
presented by respondents to warrant the reconstitution of the
alleged lost OCT No. 45361.
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Court agrees with the trial court that no clear and
convincing proof has been adduced that OCT No. 45361 was
issued by virtue of Decree No. 418121. The Decision dated
March 21, 1930 and the Registrars Index Card containing the
notation on OCT No. 45361 do not cite nor mention that
Decree No. 418121 was issued to support the issuance of OCT
No. 45361. At this point, it is well to emphasize that a petition
for reconstitution of lost or destroyed OCT requires, as a
condition precedent, that an OCT has indeed been issued, for
obvious reasons.
Assuming arguendo that respondents were able to sufficiently
prove the existence of OCT No. 45361 considering the totality
of the evidence presented, the Court finds that reconstitution
thereof is still not warranted, applying Section 15 of RA No. 26.
Said provision reads:
Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents
presented, as supported by parole evidence or otherwise, are
sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title, and that the petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that
the said certificate oftitle was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same as those contained in the
lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution
shall be issued. x x x
As explicitly stated in the above-quoted provision, before a
certificate of title which has been lost or destroyed may be
reconstituted, it must first be proved by the claimants that said
certificate of title was still in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed, among others. Here, the mere existence of TCT No.
10202, later cancelled by TCT No. 44365, which, in turn, was
superseded by TCT No. 80792, which bear the notations:
originally registered on the 29th day of January, [1931] x x x as
OCT No. 45361 pursuant to Decree No. 418121 issued in
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 920.
The name of the registered owner of OCT No. 45361 is not
available as per certification of the [RD of Lingayen], dated
August 18, 1982, entries nos. 107415 and 107416, respectively
clearly shows that the OCT which respondents seek to be
reconstituted is no longer in force, rendering the procedure, if
granted, a mere superfluity.
Additionally, if indeed OCT No. 45361 was lost or destroyed, it
is necessary that the RD issue a certification that such was in
force at the time of its alleged loss or destruction. Definitely,
the RD cannot issue such certification because of the dearth of
records in support of the alleged OCT No. 45361 in its file. The
presentation of alleged derivative titlesTCT No. 10202, TCT
No. 44365 and TCT No. 80792will not suffice to replace this
certification because the titles do not authenticate the issuance
of OCT No. 45361 having been issued by the RD without any
basis from its official records. As a matter of fact, it isa wonder
how the derivative titles were issued when the existence of
OCT No. 45361 could not be established based on the RDs
records. The RD failed to explain how it was able to make an
annotation of the original registration of the lot under OCT No.
45361 when respondents are now asking for its reconstitution.
It is also highly suspicious why respondents are asking the
reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 when, supposedly, it has
Page 11 of 17
already been cancelled and new titles have already been
issued based on transfers purportedly made by respondents.
Lastly, of what use is the reconstituted OCT No. 45361 when
the lot has already been transferred to other persons. It will
practically be of no value or worth to respondents.
If the respondents still insist on the reconstitution of OCT No.
45361, the proper procedure is to file a petition for the
cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No. 418121 following
the opinion of then LRA Administrator Benedicto B. Ulep. In
said Opinion, Administrator Ulep explained the reason for the
necessity of the petition for cancellation of the old decree and
its re-issuance, thus:
1. Under the premises, the correctproceeding is a petition for
cancellation of the old decree, re-issuance of decree and for
issuance of OCT pursuant to that re-issued decree.
In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 123361, March 3, 1997, our Supreme Court
had affirmed the efficacy of filing a petition for cancellation of
the old decree; the reissuance of such decree and the
issuance of OCT corresponding to that reissued decree.
"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to
file and to admit amended petition, but this was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter to his Court (docketed as Teofilo
Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but
we resolved to remand the case to the lower court, ordering the
latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for
re-issuance of decreeunder the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297
(1961) and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA
315 [1968], and the lower court findings that the decrees had in
fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard
as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to have a basis for
the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in
their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court
to accept the amended petition subject to the private
respondents being given the opportunity to answer and to
present their defenses. The evidence already on record shall
be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties."
Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a
question may be asked: Why should a decree be canceled and
re-issued when the same is valid and intact? Within the context
of this discussion, there is no dispute that a decree has been
validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy of such
decree is intact. What is not known is whether or not an OCT is
issued pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, why is
there a need to have it cancelled and re-issued?
Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of
Section 39 of PD 1529 which states that: "The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration." This provision is significant because it
contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree.
If the old decree will not be canceled and no new decree
issued, the corresponding OCT issued today will bear the
signature of the present Administrator while the decree upon
which it was based shall bear the signature of the past
Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear intention of
the law which states that the OCT shall be true copy of the
decree of registration. Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of
the old decree and the issuance of a new one is necessary.
2. Republic Act No. 26 for reconstitution of lost OCT will not lie.
It is so basic under Republic Act No. 26 that the same shall
only apply in cases where the issuance of OCT has been
established, only that it was lost or destroyed under
circumstances provided for under said law. Again, within the
context of this discussion, RA No. 26 will not apply because in
this case, there is no established proof that an OCT had been
issued. In other words, the applicability of RA No. 26 hinges on
the existence of priorly issued OCT.
Will reconstitution of Decree lie then? Again, the answer is no.
There is no showing that the decree is lost. In fact, it can be
established that a decree, pursuant either to a cadastral
proceeding or an ordinary land registration case, has been
issued. Under existing land registration laws and jurisprudence,
there is no such thing as reconstitution of a decree. RA No. 26
cannot likewise be the basis because the latter refers to an
OCT and not a decree of registration.
3. For as long as a decree has not yet been transcribed
(entered in registration book of the RD), the court which
adjudicated and ordered for the issuance of such decree
continues to be clothed with jurisdiction.
This matter has been settled in several cases, to name a few:
"There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which
the court may order or issue a decree.1wphi1 The reason is
what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment
error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse
party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial
duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been filed
can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is
ordered to be registered."
"We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in
support of the above assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration
case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse
of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment may be enforced within 5 years by
motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action
(Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil
actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a
land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil
action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as
against the adverse party. And his failure to act to enforce the
same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes
the decision unenforceable against the losing party." (Sta. Ana
vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315) Furthermore, in Gomez v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-77770, December 15, 1988, 168 SCRA 503,
the Supreme Court declared that:
". . . Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility(,) until after the
expiration of one (1) year after (sic) the entry of the final decree
of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that
as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land
Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one
(1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it." (Also cited in
Labarada v. CA and Ramos v. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418, 423-
424)
4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in
representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree shall
still be under the name of the original adjudicate.
It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death
of the decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of
the decedent. The heirs shall have the legal interest in the
property, thus, they cannot be prohibited from filing the
necessary petition.
As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means
that the new decree shall be issued which shall, in all respects,
be the same as that of the original decree. Nothing in the said
decree shall be amended nor modified; hence, it must be under
the name of the original adjudicatee.
In sum, from the foregoing, it may be safely concluded that for
as long as the decree issued in an ordinary or cadastral
registration case has not yet been entered, meaning, it has not
yet been transcribed in the Registration Book of the concerned
Registrar of Deeds, such decree has not yet attained finality
and therefore may still be subject to cancellation in the same
land registration case. Upon cancellation of such decree, the
decree owner (adjudicatee or his heirs) may then pray for the
issuance of a new decree number and, consequently, pray for
the issuance of an original certificate of title based on the newly
issued decree of registration.
As such, We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the R TC
that reconstitution of OCT No. 45361 is not warranted under
the circumstances, albeit on a different ground.
Page 12 of 17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 8, 2103 and its Resolution dated
April 29, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 94720 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 40 in Dagupan City in Cad. Case No. 2001-
0043-D is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180027 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL C. SANTOS, VANNESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE
C. SANTOS and DELFIN SANTOS, all represented by
DELFIN C. SANTOS, Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 dated 9 October 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86300. In the said decision, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the 14 February 2005
ruling3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 15, of Naic,
Cavite in LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292. The dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals decision accordingly reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed decision dated February 14, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 15) in Naic, Cavite, in LRC Case No. NC-
2002-1292 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.4
The aforementioned ruling of the RTC granted the
respondents Application for Original Registration of a parcel of
land under Presidential Decree No. 1529.
The antecedents are as follows:
Prelude
In October 1997, the respondents purchased three (3) parcels
of unregistered land situated in Barangay Carasuchi, Indang,
Cavite.5 The 3 parcels of land were previously owned by one
Generosa Asuncion (Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita)
and by the spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona, respectively. 6
Sometime after the said purchase, the respondents caused the
survey and consolidation of the parcels of land. Hence, per the
consolidation/subdivision plan Ccs-04-003949-D, the 3 parcels
were consolidated into a single lot"Lot 3"with a determined
total area of nine thousand five hundred seventy-seven (9,577)
square meters.7
The Application for Land Registration
On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC an
Application8 for Original Registration of Lot 3. Their application
was docketed as LRC Case No. NC-2002-1292.
On the same day, the RTC issued an Order9 setting the
application for initial hearing and directing the satisfaction of
jurisdictional requirements pursuant to Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. The same Order, however, also
required the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to submit a report on the status of Lot 3.10
On 13 March 2002, the DENR Calabarzon Office submitted its
Report11 to the RTC. The Report relates that the area covered
by Lot 3 "falls within the Alienable and Disposable Land,
Project No. 13 of Indang, Cavite per LC12 3013 certified on
March 15, 1982." Later, the respondents submitted a
Certification13 from the DENR-Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) attesting that, indeed, Lot
3 was classified as an "Alienable or Disposable Land" as of 15
March 1982.
After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the
government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
the lone opposition14 to the respondents application on 13 May
2003.
The Claim, Evidence and Opposition
The respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest i.e.,
the previous owners of the parcels of land making up Lot 3,
have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and
adverse" possession of the said parcels "since time
immemorial."15 It is by virtue of such lengthy possession,
tacked with their own, that respondents now hinge their claim
of title over Lot 3.
During trial on the merits, the respondents presented, among
others, the testimonies of Generosa16 and the representatives
of their two (2) other predecessors-in-interest.17 The said
witnesses testified that they have been in possession of their
respective parcels of land for over thirty (30) years prior to the
purchase thereof by the respondents in 1997.18 The witnesses
also confirmed that neither they nor the interest they represent,
have any objection to the registration of Lot 3 in favor of the
respondents.19
In addition, Generosa affirmed in open court a Joint
Affidavit20 she executed with Teresita.21 In it, Generosa
revealed that the portions of Lot 3 previously pertaining to her
and Teresita were once owned by her father, Mr. Valentin
Sernal (Valentin) and that the latter had "continuously, openly
and peacefully occupied and tilled as absolute owner" such
lands even "before the outbreak of World War 2."22
To substantiate the above testimonies, the respondents also
presented various Tax Declarations23 covering certain areas of
Lot 3the earliest of which dates back to 1948 and covers the
portions of the subject lot previously belonging to Generosa
and Teresita.24
On the other hand, the government insists that Lot 3 still forms
part of the public domain and, hence, not subject to private
acquisition and registration. The government, however,
presented no further evidence to controvert the claim of the
respondents.25
The Decision of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
On 14 February 2005, the RTC rendered a ruling granting the
respondents Application for Original Registration of Lot 3. The
RTC thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court confirming
its previous Order of general default, decrees and adjudges Lot
3 (Lot 1755) Ccs-04-003949-D of Indang, Cadastre, with a total
area of NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN
(9,577) square meters and its technical description as above-
described and situated in Brgy. [Carasuchi], Indang, Cavite,
pursuant to the provisions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. No.
1529, it is hereby decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and
registered in the name of herein applicants MICHAEL C.
SANTOS, VANESSA C. SANTOS, MICHELLE C. SANTOS,
and DELFIN C. SANTOS, all residing at No. 60 Rockville
Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City.
Once this decision has become final, let the corresponding
decree of registration be issued by the Administrator, Land
Registration Authority.26
The government promptly appealed the ruling of the RTC to
the Court of Appeals.27 As already mentioned earlier, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision on appeal.
Hence, this petition.28
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the RTC ruling granting original registration of
Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.
The government would have Us answer in the affirmative. It
argues that the respondents have failed to offer evidence
sufficient to establish its title over Lot 3 and, therefore, were
unable to rebut the Regalian presumption in favor of the
State.29
The government urges this Court to consider the DENR
Calabarzon Office Report as well as the DENR-CENRO
Certification, both of which clearly state that Lot 3 only became
"Alienable or Disposable Land" on 15 March 1982.30 The
government posits that since Lot 3 was only classified as
alienable and disposable on 15 March 1982, the period of
prescription against the State should also commence to run
only from such date.31 Thus, the respondents 12 March 2002
applicationfiled nearly twenty (20) years after the said
classificationis still premature, as it does not meet the
statutory period required in order for extraordinary prescription
to set in.32
OUR RULING
We grant the petition.
Jura Regalia and the Property Registration Decree
We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia
or the Regalian Doctrine.33 Jura Regalia simply means that the
State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the
Page 13 of 17
general source of all private titles.34Thus, pursuant to this
principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired
from native title,35 must be traced from some grant, whether
express or implied, from the State.36 Absent a clear showing
that land had been let into private ownership through the
States imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the
State.37
Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as
land belonging to the State. It is basic that those who seek the
entry of such land into the Torrens system of registration must
first establish that it has acquired valid title thereto as against
the State, in accordance with law.
In this connection, original registration of title to land is allowed
by Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. The said section
provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Basing from the allegations of the respondents in their
application for land registration and subsequent pleadings, it
appears that they seek the registration of Lot 3 under either the
first or the second paragraph of the quoted section.
However, after perusing the records of this case, as well as the
laws and jurisprudence relevant thereto, We find that neither
justifies registration in favor of the respondents.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 refers to the
original registration of "imperfect" titles to public land acquired
under Section 11(4) in relation to Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as
amended.38 Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 specify identical
requirements for the judicial confirmation of "imperfect" titles, to
wit:39
1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain;.
2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership, and;
3. That such possession and occupation must be since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
In this case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third
requisite, i.e., that the respondents failed to establish that they
or their predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession and
occupation of Lot 3 "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." An
examination of the evidence on record reveals so:
First. The testimonies of respondents predecessors-in-interest
and/or their representatives were patently deficient on this
point.
None of them testified about possession and occupation of the
subject parcels of land dating back to 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Rather, the said witnesses merely related that they have been
in possession of their lands "for over thirty years" prior to the
purchase thereof by respondents in 1997.40
Neither can the affirmation of Generosa of the Joint Affidavit be
considered as sufficient to prove compliance with the third
requisite. The said Joint Affidavit merely contains a general
claim that Valentin had "continuously, openly and peacefully
occupied and tilled as absolute owner" the parcels of Generosa
and Teresita even "before the outbreak of World War 2"
which lacks specificity and is unsupported by any other
evidence. In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development
Corporation,41 this Court dismissed a similar unsubstantiated
claim of possession as a "mere conclusion of law" that is
"unavailing and cannot suffice:"
Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as to what specific acts
of dominion or ownership were performed by the respondents
predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely
made a general claim that they came into possession before
World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not factual
proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot
suffice.42 Evidence of this nature should have been received
with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.
Second. The supporting tax declarations presented by the
respondents also fall short of proving possession since 12
June 1945 or earlier. The earliest declaration submitted by the
respondents i.e., Tax Declaration No. 9412,43 was issued only
in 1948 and merely covers the portion of Lot 3 previously
pertaining to Generosa and Teresita. Much worse, Tax
Declaration No. 9412 shows no declared improvements on
such portion of Lot 3 as of 1948posing an apparent
contradiction to the claims of Generosa and Teresita in their
Joint Affidavit.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the respondents does not
qualify as the "well-nigh incontrovertible" kind that is required to
prove title thru possession and occupation of public land since
12 June 1945 or earlier.44 Clearly, respondents are not entitled
to registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
The respondents, however, make an alternative plea for
registration, this time, under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Notwithstanding their inability to comply with
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
respondents claim that they were at least able to establish
possession and occupation of Lot 3 for a sufficient number of
years so as to acquire title over the same via prescription. 45
As earlier intimated, the government counters the respondents
alternative plea by arguing that the statutory period required in
order for extraordinary prescription to set in was not met in this
case.46 The government cites the DENR Calabarzon Office
Report as well as the DENR-CENRO Certification, both of
which state that Lot 3 only became "Alienable or Disposable
Land" on 15 March 1982.47 It posits that the period of
prescription against the State should also commence to run
only from such date.48 Hence, the government concludes, the
respondents 12 March 2002 application is still premature.49
We find the contention of the government inaccurate but
nevertheless deny registration of Lot 3 under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 sanctions the
original registration of lands acquired by prescription "under the
provisions of existing law." In the seminal case of Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic,50 this Court clarified that the
"existing law" mentioned in the subject provision refers to no
other than Republic Act No. 386, or the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Malabanan acknowledged that only lands of the public domain
that are "patrimonial in character" are "susceptible to
acquisitive prescription" and, hence, eligible for registration
under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1529.51Applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code,52 Malabanan further elucidated that in order for public
land to be considered as patrimonial "there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial."53 Until then, the period of acquisitive prescription
against the State will not commence to run.54
The requirement of an "express declaration" contemplated by
Malabanan is separate and distinct from the mere classification
of public land as alienable and disposable.55 On this point,
Malabanan was reiterated by the recent case of Republic v.
Rizalvo, Jr.56
In this case, the respondents were not able to present any
"express declaration" from the State, attesting to the
patrimonial character of Lot 3. To put it bluntly, the respondents
were not able to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun
Page 14 of 17
to run against the State, much less that they have acquired title
to Lot 3 by virtue thereof. As jurisprudence tells us, a mere
certification or report classifying the subject land as alienable
and disposable is not sufficient.57 We are, therefore, left with
the unfortunate but necessary verdict that the respondent are
not entitled to the registration under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.
There being no compliance with either the first or second
paragraph of Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
Regalian presumption stands and must be enforced in this
case. We accordingly overturn the decisions of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals for not being supported by the evidence
at hand.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 9
October 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86300 affirming the 14 February 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Naic, Cavite in LRC Case
No. NC-2002-1292 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondents application for registration is, accordingly,
DENIED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142403 March 26, 2003
ALEJANDRO GABRIEL and ALFREDO
GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES PABLO MABANTA and ESCOLASTICA
COLOBONG, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Isabela Branch) and ZENAIDA TAN-REYES, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Born of the need to protect our land registration system from
being converted into an instrument of fraud, this Court has
consistently adhered to the principle that "a mere registration of
title in case of double sale is not enough, good faith must
concur with the registration."
In this petition for review on certiorari, Alejandro Gabriel and
Alfredo Gabriel assailed the Decision1 dated March 30, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33941 modifying the
Decision2 dated April 12, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Santiago, Isabela in Civil Case No. 0399 for
specific performance, reconveyance and damages with
application for preliminary injunction.
The facts are as follows:
Spouses Pablo and Escolastica Mabanta were the registered
owners of two lots located in Patul and Capaltitan, Santiago,
Isabela, with an area of 512 and 15,000 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 72705 and
72707, respectively. On October 25, 1975, they mortgaged
both lots with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
as collateral for a loan of P14,000.00.3
Five years thereafter or on September 1, 1980, spouses
Mabanta sold the lots to Susana Soriano by way of a "Deed of
Sale of Parcels of Land With Assumption of
Mortgage."4 Included in the Deed is an agreement that they
could repurchase the lots within a period of two (2) years.
Spouses Mabanta failed to repurchase the lots. But sometime
in 1984, they were able to convince Alejandro Gabriel to
purchase the lots from Susana Soriano. As consideration,
Alejandro delivered to Susana a 500-square meter residential
lot with an actual value of P40,000.00 and paid spouses
Mabanta the sum of P5,000.00. On May 15, 1984, spouses
Mabanta executed a "Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage"5 in favor of Alejandro. For her part, Susana
executed a document entitled "Cancellation of
Contract"6 whereby she transferred to Alejandro all her rights
over the two lots.
Alejandro and his son Alfredo cultivated the lots. They also
caused the restructuring of spouses Mabantas loan with the
DBP.7 However, when they were ready to pay the entire loan,
they found that spouses Benito and Pura Tan had paid it and
that the mortgage was already cancelled.8
On August 18, 1985, Benito Tan and Alejandro Tridanio, a
barangay official, approached Alejandro to refund to him the
P5,000.00 he paid to spouses Mabanta. Alejandro refused
because Tan was unwilling to return the formers 500-square
meter lot delivered to Susana as purchase price for the lots.
Thereafter, spouses Tan tried to eject Alejandro from the lot
covered by TCT No. 72707.
On September 17, 1985, Alejandro and Alfredo filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago, Isabela a complaint
(involving the lot covered by TCT No. 72707) for specific
performance, reconveyance and damages with an application
for a preliminary injunction against spouses Mabanta, spouses
Tan, the DBP and barangay officials Dominador Maylem and
Alejandro Tridanio. In due time, these defendants filed their
respective answers.
During the proceedings, it turned out that it was spouses Tans
daughter, Zenaida Tan-Reyes who bought one of the lots
(covered by TCT No. 72707) from spouses Mabanta on August
21, 1985. Not having been impleaded as a party-defendant,
she filed an answer-in-intervention alleging that she is the
registered owner of the lot covered by TCT No. 72707; that she
purchased it from spouses Mabanta "in good faith and for
value"; that she paid their loan with the DBP in the amounts of
P17,580.88 and P16,845.17 per Official Receipts Nos.
1749539 and 1749540, respectively; that the mortgage with the
DBP was cancelled and spouses Mabanta executed a "Deed
of Absolute Sale"9 in her favor; and that TCT No. T-72707 was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-160391 was issued in
her name.
On April 12, 1991, the trial court rendered its Decision
sustaining the right of Alejandro and Alfredo Gabriel over the
lot covered by TCT No. 72707 (now TCT No. T-160391), thus:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING Exhibit "A", the deed of sale with assumption
of mortgage executed by the spouses Pablo Mabanta and
Escolastica Colobong (in favor of Alejandro and Alfredo
Gabriel) valid and subsisting.
2. ORDERING the plaintiff Alejandro Gabriel to pay to the
spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong the sums of
P5,000.00 plus P34,426.05 (representing the loan with the
DBP which plaintiff assumed) within 30 days from receipt
hereof.
3. DECLARING the deed of sale executed by the spouses
Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong in favor of Zenaida
Tan Reyes as null and void.
4. ORDERING the intervenor Zenaida Tan-Reyes to reconvey
the land covered by T.C.T. No. T-160391 in favor of Alejandro
Gabriel.
"SO ORDERED."
In declaring null and void the "Deed of Absolute Sale" (or
second sale) of the lot covered by TCT No. 72707 between
spouses Mabanta and Zenaida Tan-Reyes, the trial court
ratiocinated as follows:
"But Zenaida (Tan) Reyes professes that she is a buyer in
good faith and for value. In her testimony she said that the
spouses Mabanta offered to sell the land to her on August 19,
1985. She was informed that the land was mortgaged in the
DBP. She readily agreed to buy the land on that same day.
She did not inquire further into the status of the land. She did
not go and see the land first. What she did was to immediately
go to the DBP the following day and paid the mortgage
obligation in the amount of P16,845.17 and P17,580.88
(Exhibits "1" and "2"). The following day August 21, a deed of
sale in her favor was prepared and on October 17, 1985 she
secured a certificate of title (Exhibit "5"). Under the above
circumstances, it cannot be said that she is a purchaser in
good faith. She should have first made a thorough investigation
of the status of the land. Had she inquired, she should have
been informed that the land was previously sold to at least two
persons Susana Soriano and Alejandro Gabriel. She should
also have first visited the land she was buying. Had she done
so she should have discovered that the land was being
cultivated by the Gabriels who would have informed her that
they already bought the land from the Mabantas. The reason
why she did not do this is because she already was appraised
of the status of the land by her father Benito Tan. For reasons
known only to her, she decided to buy the land just the same.
xxx xxx xxx
"Zenaida Tan therefore is not a purchaser in good faith and
she cannot seek refuge behind her certificate of title. True,
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that should immovable
property be sold to different vendees, the ownership shall
Page 15 of 17
belong to the person who in good faith first recorded it in the
registry of property. Unfortunately, the registration made by
Zenaida (Tan) Reyes of her deed of sale was not in good faith.
For this reason in accordance with the same Article 1544, the
land shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
possession. There is no question that it is the Gabriels who are
in possession of the land."
Unsatisfied, spouses Mabanta and Zenaida Tan-Reyes
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
On March 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
modifying the trial courts Decision, declaring as valid the
second sale of the lot covered by TCT No. 72707 between
spouses Mabanta and Zenaida Tan-Reyes on the ground that
a person dealing with registered land may simply rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title and, in the absence of
anything to engender suspicion, he is under no obligation to
look beyond it. The dispositive portion of the Appellate Courts
Decision reads:
"Wherefore the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with the
following modification:
1. DECLARING Exhibit "A", the deed of sale with assumption
of mortgage executed by the defendants-appellants spouses
Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong over lots covered by
TCT Nos. T-72705 and T-72707 valid and subsisting;
2. Ordering spouses Pablo Mabanta and Escolastica Colobong
to surrender TCT No. 72705 to plaintiff-appellee Alejandro
Gabriel;
3. Declaring the deed of sale executed over lot with TCT No.
72707 (now T-160391) by spouses Pablo Mabanta and
Escolastica Colobong in favor of intervenor-appellant Zenaida
Tan Reyes as valid;
4. Ordering plaintiffs-appellees and any all persons claiming
rights under them to vacate Lot 3651-A now covered by TCT
No. T-160391 and to deliver to intervenor-appellant Zenaida
Tan-Reyes the possession thereof;
5. Dismissing the case against defendants-appellants Benito
Tan and Purita Masa;
6. No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED."
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
Alejandro and Alfredo Gabriel raise this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THE SECOND SALE OF THE DISPUTED LOT
EXECUTED BY SPOUSES MABANTA IN FAVOR OF
ZENAIDA TAN-REYES VALID UNDER ARTICLE 1544 OF
THE CIVIL CODE.
Petitioners contend that respondent Reyes is not a purchaser
in good faith since she bought the disputed lot with the
knowledge that petitioner Alejandro is claiming it in a previous
sale.
In her comment on the petition, respondent Reyes maintains
that the Court of Appeals factual finding that she is a
purchaser in good faith and for value is final and conclusive.
Meeting the issue head on, she claims that there is no
evidence that prior to August 21, 1985, when she purchased
the lot from respondent spouses Mabanta, she had knowledge
of any previous lien or encumbrance on the property.
For its part, respondent DBP avers that it acted in utmost good
faith in releasing the mortgaged lots to respondent spouses
Mabanta who had the loan restructured and paid the same.
Also, it did not transact business with spouses Tan.
With respect to respondent spouses Mabanta, this Courts
Resolution dated June 14, 2000 requiring them to file comment
on the present petition was returned unserved. Thus, in its
Resolution dated January 22, 2001, this Court resolved to
consider the Resolution of June 14, 2000 "deemed served"
upon them.10
The petition is impressed with merit.
The issue for our resolution is whether or not respondent
Zenaida Tan-Reyes acted in good faith when she purchased
the subject lot and had the sale registered.
Settled is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. In
the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently,
it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over
again.11 This rule, however, is not an iron-clad rule.12 In Floro
vs. Llenado,13 we enumerated the various exceptions and one
which finds application to the present case is when the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.
We start first with the applicable law.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong
to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in
the Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in possession; and, in
the absence thereof; to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith."
Otherwise stated, where it is an immovable property that is the
subject of a double sale, ownership shall be transferred (1) to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in
good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to
the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.14 The requirement of the law then is two-fold: acquisition
in good faith and registration in good faith.15 The rationale
behind this is well-expounded in Uraca vs. Court of
Appeals,16 where this Court held:
"Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer
ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544
requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith.
Jurisprudence teaches us that "(t)he governing principle
is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot
defeat the first buyers right except where the second buyer
registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first, as
provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer
does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law,
among them, to register first her purchase as against the
second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the
second buyer of the first sale defeats his right even if he is first
to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his
prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by
Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able
to displace the first buyer, that before the second buyer can
obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in
good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of
the first buyers right) from the time of acquisition until the title
is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by
delivery of possession." (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, certain pieces of evidence, put together,
would prove that respondent Reyes is not a buyer in good faith.
The records show that on August 18, 1985, spouses Mabanta
offered to her for sale the disputed lot. They told her it was
mortgaged with respondent DBP and that she had to pay the
loan if she wanted to buy it.17 She readily agreed to such a
condition. The following day, her father Benito Tan,
accompanied by barangay official Tridanio, went to petitioner
Alejandros house offering to return to him the P5,000.00 he
had paid to spouses Mabanta. Tan did not suggest to return
the 500-square meter lot petitioner delivered to Susana
Soriano.18 For this reason, petitioner refused Tans offer and
even prohibited him from going to respondent DBP. We quote
the following testimony of petitioner who, despite his blindness
as shown by the records, testified to assert his right, thus:
"ATTY. CHANGALE:
Q What can you say to that statement?
A That is their mistake, sir.
Q Why do you say that is their mistake?
A Because her husband and Tridanio went at
home offering to return the money but I did not accept, sir.
Q Who is this Benito Tan you are referring to?
A The husband of Pura Masa, sir.
Q What is the relationship with the intervenor Zenaida
Tan?
A The daughter, sir.
Page 16 of 17
Q When did Benito Tan together with Councilman
Tridanio came? In fine, we hold that respondent Zenaida Tan-Reyes did not act
A Before they went to the Development Bank of the in good faith when she bought the lot and had the sale
Philippines they came at home and I prohibit them, sir. registered.
Q How did you prohibit them? WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
A No, I said please I am just waiting for the Bank to REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the trial court is
inspect then I will pay my obligation. hereby reinstated.
xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.
Q You stated earlier that you will just pay the payments.
What are those payments you are referring to?
A The payment I have given to Colobong and to the Bank,
sir. They do not want to return the payment I have given to
Susana Soriano and that is the beginning of our quarrel."19

We are thus convinced that respondent Reyes had knowledge

that petitioner previously bought the disputed lot from
respondent spouses Mabanta. Why should her father approach
petitioner and offer to return to him the money he paid spouses
Mabanta? Obviously, aware of the previous sale to petitioner,
respondent Reyes informed her father about it. At this juncture,
it is reasonable to conclude that what prompted him to go to
petitioners house was his desire to facilitate his daughters
acquisition of the lot, i.e., to prevent petitioner Alejandro from
contesting it. He did not foresee then that petitioner would
insist he has a prior right over the lot.

Now respondent Reyes claims that she is a purchaser in good

faith. This is preposterous. Good faith is something internal.
Actually, it is a question of intention. In ascertaining ones
intention, this Court must rely on the evidence of
ones conduct and outward acts. From her actuations as
specified above, respondent Reyes cannot be considered to be
in good faith when she bought the lot.

Moreover, it bears noting that on September 16, 1985, both

petitioners filed with the trial court their complaint involving the
lot in question against respondents. After a month, or
on October 17, 1985, respondent Reyes had the "Deed of
Absolute Sale" registered with the Registry of Property.
Evidently, she wanted to be the first one to effect its
registration to the prejudice of petitioners who, although in
possession, have not registered the same. This is another
indicum of bad faith.

We have consistently held that "in cases of double sale of

immovables, what finds relevance and materiality is not
whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but
whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in
good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title
of the property sold."20 In Salvoro vs. Tanega,21 we had the
occasion to rule that:

"If a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has

acquired knowledge that there was a previous sale of the same
property to a third party or that another person claims said
property in a previous sale, the registration will constitute a
registration in bad faith and will not confer upon him any right."
Mere registration of title is not enough, good faith must concur
with the registration. To be entitled to priority, the second
purchaser must not only establish prior recording of his deed,
but must have acted in good faith, without knowledge of the
existence of another alienation by the vendor to the other. 22 In
the old case of Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong Machinery, Co. and
Williamson, this Court ruled:
"One who purchases a real estate with knowledge of a defect
of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of
an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one
who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon
such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted
in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the
title of the vendor. His mere refusal to believe that such a
defect exists, or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility
of the existence of a defect in his vendors title will not make
him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops
that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had
such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had
he acted with that measure of precaution which may
reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation. x x
x "23

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