Miriam Defensor Santiago vs

Sandiganbayan (2001)
356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative Department Suspension of a Member of
Congress Violations of RA 3019
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission
of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of
about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is
also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens.
The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other
criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a
presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago
petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was
approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago,
who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda)
to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without
violating the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules
of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be
suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts
imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office
under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of
the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs

Sandiganbayan
252 SCRA 641 Political Law The Legislative Department Suspension of a Member of
Congress RA 3019
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a
case against Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty.
Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three
allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued
against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from
the judge handling the case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the
arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained
that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the
Office of the Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public
Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the
Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by
the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with
the power of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the
qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of
Representatives.

AVELINO vs CUENCO (March 14,

1949)
83 Phil. 17 Political Law The Legislative Department Election of
Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the
next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of
the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his
allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece.
Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even
ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to
adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair
and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and
asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the
Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Taada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz
yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This
was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the
following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo
warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is
in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of
the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose
their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the
morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall,
prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their
unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only
by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was
in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided
by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such
session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes
entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including
Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty
three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members
constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House
and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had
been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that
they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino
contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are
24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this
does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically
construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators
when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light
of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the
majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances
of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it
appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos
election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,
has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of
the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues
to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done
enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in
conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco
has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the
National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was
amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the
majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual
members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not
incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the
jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member
concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for
considering the use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact
that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the National Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of
the present Constitution, so as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of
each House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949,
were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Sergio Osmea, Jr. vs Salipada

Pendatun
109 Phil. 863 Political Law The Legislative Department Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message to
Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration.
Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate
the charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be
baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmea
avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme
Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a
democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the
Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein.
Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.

United States vs Juan Pons

4 Phil. 729 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y
Lopezarrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine
were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other
hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not
delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium.
Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were
charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the
Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine
Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law
was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act
2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the
Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are,
as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Alejo Mabanag vs Jose Lopez Vito

8 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat
in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some
senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each
house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which
has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already
entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but
it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the
prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents
argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD:
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and
an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court
on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of theenrollment theory, for, as already
stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in
the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule
of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order
to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and
the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that
if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by
the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by
their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
vs Pedro Gimenez
7 SCRA 347 Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea
and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular,
Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid
in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central
Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro
Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea
and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax
exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde).
Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and
for the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not
the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde
ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions
relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill
do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would
be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde
instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Enrique Morales vs Abelardo Subido

26 SCRA 150 Political Law The Legislative Department Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years
but does not possess a bachelors degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934
as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido,
Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected
his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position. Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the
post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be appointed
chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any
high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police
department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the
said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but
when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was
the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record. Morales
went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum
which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form
by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act
upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must
be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on
the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Herminio Astorga vs Antonio

Villegas
56 SCRA 714 Political Law The Legislative Department Journal;When to be Consulted
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who
had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel
Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065
(filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was
considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the
lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee
on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations.
During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently
approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter
approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It
was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower
house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the
version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as
validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the
Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned
signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is
merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note
however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the
SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.