CASE DIGESTS

No. of Cases: 12

1. Caltex vs. Palomar

Caltex vs Palomar
G.R. No. L-19650
September 29, 1966

Facts: In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. announced its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. The
mechanics of the contest were as follows:
1. Participants must estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex
station will dispense during a specified period;
2. Contest is open to all car owners or licensed drivers;
3. Participants need not buy any Caltex products to be eligible. No fee is required.
4. Participants just need to fill out a form and drop their entries at the nearest Caltex station.
To publicize their contest, Caltex sought the assistance of the Philippine Postal Office. However,
then acting Postmaster Enrico Palomar denied the request of Caltex as Palomar deemed that the
contest is a violation of the Postal Law (Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code [RAC]).
Palomar cited Section 1954 of the RAC:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following
classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through
the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its
addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or
conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
According to Palomar, the contest is a lottery hence, communications pertaining thereto cannot
be mailed by Caltex via Philippine Post.
Feeling aggrieved, Caltex brought the issue before the regular courts thru a petition for
declaratory relief. Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, lottery consists of the following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance.
Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element, consideration, is
missing. Said element is missing because participants are not required to pay anything theres
no consideration on the part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he was
merely applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for the courts
to call for a construction on the statute in question. Palomar further argued that even if the said
contest, assuming arguendo, is not considered a lottery, the same is considered as a gift
enterprise which is still prohibited by the Postal Law to be mailed.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Caltexs petition for declaratory relief is proper
2. Whether or not the Caltex contest is a lottery/gift enterprise

Ruling:
1. Yes. The petition is proper. Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into
the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law. As defined in Blacks Law
Dictionary: Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.
2. No.
The contest is not a lottery. The contention of Caltex is well taken, i.e., the first element is lacking
(no consideration).
The contest is also not a gift enterprise. The Supreme Court went on to discuss that under
prevailing jurisprudence and legal doctrines as well as definitions provided by legal luminaries,
there is no explicit definition as to what a gift enterprise is. However, under the Postal Law, the
term gift enterprise was used in association with the term lottery. As such, the principle
of noscitur a sociis, a principle in statutory construction, is applicable. Under this principle, it is
only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that
which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, applyingnoscitur a
sociis, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term gift
enterprise be so construed. Therefore, since the contest does not include a consideration, it is
neither a lottery nor a gift enterprise. Caltex should be allowed to avail of the Philippine postal
service.

2. Imbong vs Ochoa
Imbong vs Ochoa
G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014

Facts: Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by the Congress on Decemmber 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
Issue: Whether or not the RH Law violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution prescribing
the one subject-one title rule
Ruling:
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the
various provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and responsible
parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

3. Tolentino vs Sec. of Finance

Arturo Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455
October 30, 1996

Facts: Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known
as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of
the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings
in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee, thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Bill was deliberated upon in the Conference Committee and become
enrolled bill which eventually became the EVAT law. Tolentino averred that what Senate could
have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630
in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text of the HB.
Issues: 1) Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26 (2) of the Constitution
2) Whether or not the Senate Bill violated the requirement of the Constitution that a bill
should undergo three readings on separate days
Ruling:
1) No, the argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis.
The Supreme Court held that it is not the law which should originate from the House of
Representatives, but the revenue bill which was required to originate from the said
House. The initiative must come from the Lower House because they are elected in the
district level which means that they are expected to be more sensitive to the needs of
their respective localities.
Also, a bill originating from the Lower House may undergo extensive changes while in the
Senate. Senate can introduce a separate and distinct bill other than the one the Lower
House proposed. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, so long as the action by the
Senate is withheld pending the receipt of the House bill. In the case at bar, such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. It is also important to note that there
were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having
 the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
2) No, the Senate Bill did not violate the requirement of the Constitution regarding the
three-readings-on-separate-days requirement. The Supreme Court held that Senate Bill
No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution
because the President had certified the necessity of the enactment of the said Senate Bill
to meet a public emergency, thus, having the second and third readings done on the same
day. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days, which is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.
Thus, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality ad the temporary
restraining order previously issued is listed.

4. Arroyo vs De Venecia
Arroyo vs. De Venecia
G.R. No. 127255
August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved
to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared
by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House
Ruling: The petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. Rules of each House of Congress
are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have
no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.

5. Mabanag vs Lopez Vito

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito
G.R. No. L-1123
March 5, 1947

Facts: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended
by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat
in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators
and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in order
to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered
as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of
the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise if
they were only allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative
votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths
vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the
said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take
cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or
resolution.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar
2) Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress

Ruling:

1) As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House
and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
 Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory.
Moreover, the SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law
and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had
been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be
found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between
the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
Acts and of the due enactment thereof. The SC is bound by the contents of a duly
authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents
of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

6. Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs Gimenez

Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs Gimenez
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963

Facts: Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic
resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue
are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank
circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco
however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were
submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez
maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax
exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining
urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609
which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one
hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the
following:
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.

Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde,
not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor
of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde
Issue: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and
formaldehyde.
Ruling: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly
a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said
law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill
would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

7. Morales vs Subido
Morales vs Subido
G.R. No. L-29658
November 29, 1968

Facts: Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelors degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934
as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief,
Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of
Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment
for failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the
said position. Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked
Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in
the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.

Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police
department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the
said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department
of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress
but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision
was the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.
Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a
memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and
can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
Issue: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the
journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
Ruling: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form
by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act
upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must
be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can
decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on
the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

8. Araullo vs Aquino III

Facts: When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government
project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was
taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a
few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the
validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President
to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

Ruling:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program
by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section
29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury
otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer
of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution
to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed.
But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive
were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are
still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer
to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when
there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or
finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP,
there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the
DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because
under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer
to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped
stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse
all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer
be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially
so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not
be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

9. Tanada vs Tuvera

Taada vs. Tuvera

136 SCRA 27
April 24, 1985

Facts:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

Ruling:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is
to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of
public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.

10. Ople vs Torres

Ople vs Torres
G.R. No. 127685
July 23, 1998

Facts: In 1996, President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 308, entitled Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System. This AO provides Filipino citizens and
foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities. Thus, this will require a computerized
system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and
reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations. With this, a
concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing
agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system.
Thereafter, Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order. He contends that the
order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds: (1) that it is a usurpation of the power
to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right to privacy.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference

System by the President is unconstitutional as it usurps the legislative power of the
Congress
2) Whether or not the implementation of A.O. 308 insidiously lays the groundwork for a
system which will violate the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution

Ruling:

1) The Supreme Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that an
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the
law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy. The Supreme Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements
the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. It cannot be simplistically argued
that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies. As said administrative
order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as
well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules
and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject
that should be covered by law. Again, the Supreme Court holds that A.O 308 unduly
expands the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary
power of Congress to make laws.

2) The Supreme Court holds that A.O. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy which is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of the Constitution. The said Court
prescinds from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provides our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant
the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness,
the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of
assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by
enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
 incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities
and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, the petition is
granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

11. Bagatsing vs Ramirez

Bagatsing vs Ramirez
G.R. No. L-41631
December 17, 1976

Facts:
In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of
public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation
thereof. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance,
alleging among others the noncompliance to the publication requirement under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the present
petition.

Issue:
What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance, the Revised City Charter, which
requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local
Tax Code, which only demands publication after approval?
Ruling:
The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code is a general
law because it applies universally to all local governments. The fact that one is special and the
other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular
case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject
in general, which the general statute treats in particular. The Revised Charter of the City
prescribes a rule for the publication of ordinance in general, while the Local Tax Code
establishes a rule for the publication of ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other
charges in particular.

12. Belgica vs Ochoa

Belgica vs Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013

Facts: The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress.
It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard
projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft
projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
Issues:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional

Ruling:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note
in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant
the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising
it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions
does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items
in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning
their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project
by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government
(note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and
this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if
thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of
a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well
as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-
related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to
further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may
direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be
allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution.
The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can
be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.