Behaviorist Learning Theory

Behaviorism is an approach to psychology based on the proposition that behavior can be researched
scientifically without recourse to inner mental states. It is a form of materialism, denying any independent
significance for mind. Its significance for psychological treatment has been profound, making it one of the
pillars of pharmacological therapy.

One of the assumptions of behaviorist thought is that

free will is illusory, and that all behavior is determined
by the environment either through association or
reinforcement.

The behaviorist school of thought ran concurrent with

the psychoanalysis movement in psychology in the
20th century. Its main influences were Ivan Pavlov,
who investigated classical conditioning, John B.
Watson (1878-1958) who rejected introspective
methods and sought to restrict psychology to
experimental laboratory methods. B.F. Skinner,
sought to give ethical grounding to behaviorism,
relating it to pragmatism.
B.F. Skinner Ivan Pavlov

Within that broad approach, there are different emphases. Some behaviorists argue simply that the
observation of behavior is the best or most convenient way of investigating psychological and mental
processes. Others believe that it is in fact the only way of investigating such processes, while still others
argue that behavior itself is the only appropriate subject of psychology, and that common psychological
terms (belief, goals, etc.) have no referents and/or only refer to behavior. Those taking this point of view
sometimes refer to their field of study as behavior analysis or behavioral science rather than psychology.

Classical: The behaviorism of Watson; the objective study of behavior; no mental life, no internal states;
thought is covert speech.
Methodological: The objective study of third-person behavior; the data of psychology must be inter-
subjectively verifiable; no theoretical prescriptions. Has been absorbed into general experimental and
cognitive psychology. Two popular subtypes are Neo-: Hullian and post-Hullian, theoretical, group data,
not dynamic, physiological, and Purposive: Tolmans behavioristic anticipation of cognitive psychology.
Radical: Skinnerian behaviorism; includes behavioral approach to mental life; not mechanistic; internal
states not permitted.
Teleological: Post-Skinnerian, purposive, close to microeconomics. Theoretical: Post-Skinnerian, accepts
internal states (the skin makes a difference); dynamic, but eclectic in choice of theoretical structures,
emphasizes parsimony.

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J. B. Watson
Early in the 20th century, John B. Watson argued in his book Psychology from the
Standpoint of a Behaviorist for the value of a psychology which concerned itself with
behavior in and of itself, not as a method of studying consciousness. This was a
substantial break from the structuralist psychology of the time, which used the method of
introspection and considered the study of behavior valueless. Watson, in contrast, studied
the adjustment of organisms to their environments, more specifically the particular stimuli
leading organisms to make their responses. Most of Watson's work was comparative, i.e.,
he studied the behavior of animals. Watson's approach was much influenced by the work of Russian
physiologist Ivan Pavlov, who had stumbled upon the phenomenon of classical conditioning (learned
reflexes) in his study of the digestive system of the dog, and subsequently investigated the phenomena in
detail. Watson's approach emphasized physiology and the role of stimuli in producing conditioned
responses - assimilating most or all function to reflex. For this reason, Watson may be described as an S-
R (stimulus-response) psychologist.

Methodological behaviorism
Watson's behaviorist manifesto persuaded most academic researchers in experimental psychology of the
importance of studying behavior. In the field of comparative psychology in particular, it was consistent
with the warning note that had been struck by Lloyd Morgan's canon, against some of the more
anthropomorphic work such as that of George Romanes, in which mental states had been freely
attributed to animals. It was eagerly seized on by researchers such as Edward L. Thorndike (who had
been studying cats' abilities to escape from puzzle boxes). However, most psychologists took up a
position that is now called methodological behaviorism: they acknowledged that behavior was either the
only or the easiest method of observation in psychology, but held that it could be used to draw
conclusions about mental states. Among well-known twentieth-century behaviorists taking this kind of
position were Clark L. Hull, who described his position as neo-behaviorism, and Edward C. Tolman, who
developed much of what would later become the cognitivist program. Tolman argued that rats constructed
cognitive maps of the mazes they learned even in the absence of reward, and that the connection
between stimulus and response (S->R) was mediated by a third term - the organism (S->O->R). His
approach has been called, among other things, purposive behaviorism.

Methodological behaviorism remains the position of most experimental psychologists today, including the
vast majority of those who work in cognitive psychology so long as behavior is defined as including
speech, at least non-introspective speech. With the rise of interest in animal cognition since the 1980s,
and the more unorthodox views of Donald Griffin among others, mentalistic language including discussion
of consciousness is increasingly used even in discussion of animal psychology, in both comparative
psychology and ethology; however this is in no way inconsistent with the position of methodological
behaviorism.

Politics
Behaviorism relates to a school of politics that developed in the 50s and 60s in the USA. This school
represented a revolt against institutional practices in the study of politics and called for political analysis to
be modeled upon the natural sciences. That is to say that only information that could be quantified and
tested empirically could be regarded as 'true' and that other normative concepts such as 'liberty' and
'justice' should be rejected as they are not falsifiable. This is a version of what has been called scientific
empiricism, the view that all beliefs can, at least in principle, be proved scientifically. Skinner has been
roundly criticized for his political/social pronouncements, which many perceive as based on serious
philosophical errors. His recommendations thus reflect not science, but his own covert preferences.

Behaviourism has been criticised within politics as it threatens to reduce the discipline of political analysis
to little more than the study of voting and the behaviour of legislatures. A virtual obsession with the
observation of data, although providing interesting findings in these fields deprives the field of politics of
other important viewpoints.

Other criticisms have been leveled at the behaviorist claims to be Value Free. This is impossible (it is
argued) because every theory is tainted with an ideological premise that led to its formation in the first
place and subsequently the observable facts are studied for a reason. An example of this 'value bias'
would be that through this discipline the term 'democracy' has become the competition between elites for
election 'a la' the western conception rather than an essentially contested term concerning literally rule by
the people (the demos). In this manner behaviourism is inherently biased and reduces the scope of
political analysis. Nevertheless it has still managed to introduce a new scientific rigour into political
analysis and bequeathed a wealth of new information.

B.F. Skinner and radical behaviorism

B.F. Skinner, who carried out experimental work mainly in comparative psychology from the 1930s to the
1950s, but remained behaviorism's best known theorist and exponent virtually until his death in 1990,
developed a distinct kind of behaviorist philosophy, which came to be called radical behaviorism. He also
claimed to have found a new version of psychological science, which he called behavior analysis or the
experimental analysis of behavior.

Definition

Skinner was influential in defining radical behaviorism, a philosophy codifying the basis of his school of
research (named the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, or EAB.) While EAB differs from other
approaches to behavioral research on numerous methodological and theoretical points, radical
behaviorism departs from methodological behaviorism most notably in accepting treatment of feelings,
states of mind and introspection as existent and scientifically treatable. This is done by identifying them
as something non-dualistic, and here Skinner takes a divide-and-conquer approach, with some instances
being identified with bodily conditions or behavior, and others getting a more extended 'analysis' in terms
of behavior. However, radical behaviorism stops short of identifying feelings as causes of behavior.
Among other points of difference were a rejection of the reflex as a model of all behavior and a defense of
a science of behavior complementary to but independent of physiology.

Experimental and conceptual innovations

This essentially philosophical position gained strength from the success of Skinner's early experimental
work with rats and pigeons, summarised in his books The Behavior of Organisms (1938) and Schedules
of Reinforcement (1957, with C. B. Ferster). Of particular importance was his concept of the operant
response, of which the canonical example was the rat's lever-press. In contrast with the idea of a
physiological or reflex response, an operant is a class of structurally distinct but functionally equivalent
responses. For example, while a rat might press a lever with its left paw or its right paw or its tail, all of
these responses operate on the world in the same way and have a common consequence. Operants are
often thought of as species of responses, where the individuals differ but the class coheres in its function-
-shared consequences with operants and reproductive success with species. This is a clear distinction
between Skinner's theory and S-R theory.

Skinner's empirical work expanded on earlier research on trial-and-error learning by researchers such as
Thorndike and Guthrie with both conceptual reformulations Thorndike's notion of a stimulus-response
'association' or 'connection' was abandoned and methodological ones the use of the 'free operant', so
called because the animal was now permitted to respond at its own rate rather than in a series of trials
determined by the experimenter procedures. With this method, Skinner carried out substantial
experimental work on the effects of different schedules and rates of reinforcement on the rates of operant
responses made by rats and pigeons. He achieved remarkable success in training animals to perform
unexpected responses, and to emit large numbers of responses, and to demonstrate many empirical
regularities at the purely behavioural level. This lent some credibility to his conceptual analysis.

Relation to language
As Skinner turned from experimental work to concentrate on the philosophical underpinnings of a science
of behavior, his attention naturally turned to human language. His book Verbal Behavior (1957) laid out a
vocabulary and theory for functional analysis of verbal behavior. This was famously attacked by the
linguist Noam Chomsky, who presented arguments for the bankruptcy of Skinner's approach in the
domain of language and in general. Skinner did not rebut the review, later saying that it was clear to him
that Chomsky had not read his book (though subsequent rebuttals have been provided by Kenneth
MacCorquodale and David Palmer, among others). Skinner's supporters claim Chomsky's consideration
of the approach was superficial in several respects, but the appropriate subject for a study of language
was a major point of disagreement. Chomsky (like many linguists) emphasized the structural properties of
behavior, while Skinner emphasized its controlling variables.

What was important for a behaviorist analysis of human behavior was not language acquisition so much
as the interaction between language and overt behavior. In an essay republished in his 1969 book
Contingencies of Reinforcement, Skinner took the view that humans could construct linguistic stimuli that
would then acquire control over their behavior in the same way that external stimuli could. The possibility
of such instructional control over behavior meant that contingencies of reinforcement would not always
produce the same effects on human behavior as they reliably do in other animals. The focus of a radical
behaviorist analysis of human behavior therefore shifted to an attempt to understand the interaction
between instructional control and contingency control, and also to understand the behavioral processes
that determine what instructions are constructed and what control they acquire over behavior. Important
figures in this effort have been A. Charles Catania, C. Fergus Lowe, and Steven C. Hayes.

Molar versus molecular behaviorism

Skinner's view of behavior is most often characterized as a "molecular" view of behavior, that is each
behavior can be decomposed in atomistic parts or molecules. This view is inaccurate when one considers
his complete description of behavior as delineated in the 1981 article, "Selection by Consequences" and
many other works. Skinner claims that a complete account of behavior involves an understanding of
selection history at three levels: biology (the natural selection or phylogeny of the animal); behavior (the
reinforcement history or ontogeny of the behavioral repertoire of the animal); and for some species,
culture (the cultural practices of the social group to which the animal belongs). This whole organism, with
all those histories, then interacts with its environment. He often described even his own behavior as a
product of his phylogenetic history, his reinforcement history (which includes the learning of cultural
practices)interacting with the environment at the moment. Molar behaviorists (e.g. Howard Rachlin) argue
that behavior can not be understood by focusing on events in the moment. That is, they argue that a
behavior can be understood best in terms of the ultimate cause of history and that molecular behaviorist
are committing a fallacy by inventing a ficticious proximal cause for behavior. Molar behaviorists argue
that standard molecular constructs such as "associative strength" are such fictitious proximal causes that
simply take the place of molar variables such as rate of reinforcement. Thus, a molar behaviorist would
define a behavior such as loving someone as a exhibiting a pattern of loving behavior over time, there is
no known proximal cause of loving behavior (i.e. love) only a history of behaviors (of which the current
behavior might be an example of) that can be summarized as love.

Recent experimental work (see The Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior and Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes-- 2004 and later) shows quite clearly that behavior
is affected both by molar variables (i.e., average rates of reinforcement) and molecular ones (e.g., time,
preceding responses). What is needed is an understanding of the real-time dynamics of operant behavior,
which will involve processes at both short and long time scales.

Behaviorism in philosophy
Behaviorism is both a psychological movement and a philosophy. The basic premise of radical
behaviorism is that the study of behavior should be a natural science, such as chemistry or physics,
without any reference to hypothetical inner states of organisms. Other varieties, such as theoretical
behaviorism, permit internal states, but do not require them to be mental or have any relation to
subjective experience. Behaviorism takes a functional view of behavior.
 There are points of view within analytic philosophy that have called themselves, or have been called by
others, behaviorist. In logical behaviorism (as held, e.g., by Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel),
psychological statements meant their verification conditions, which consisted of performed overt behavior.
W. V. Quine made use of a variety of behaviorism, influenced by some of Skinner's ideas, in his own work
on language. Gilbert Ryle defended a distinct strain of philosophical behaviorism, sketched in his book
The Concept of Mind. Ryle's central claim was that instances of dualism frequently represented 'category
mistakes,' and hence that they were really misunderstandings of the use of ordinary language.

It is sometimes argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein defended a behaviorist position, and there are important
areas of overlap between his philosophy, logical behaviorism, and radical behaviorism (e.g., the beetle in
a box argument). However, Wittgenstein was not a behaviorist, and his style of writing is sufficiently
elliptical to admit of a range of interpretations. Mathematician Alan Turing is also sometimes considered a
behaviorist, but he himself did not make this identification.

Recognized Behaviorists

Leading developers of behaviorism (in rough chronological order):

C. Lloyd Morgan
Ivan Pavlov
Edward Thorndike
John B. Watson
Edward C. Tolman
Clark L. Hull

Why be a Behaviorist
Why would anyone be a behaviorist? There are three main reasons (see also Zuriff 1985).
The first reason is epistemic or evidential. Warrant or evidence for saying, at least in the third
person case, that an animal or person is in a certain mental state, for example, possesses a
certain belief, is grounded in behavior, understood as observable behavior. Moreover, the
conceptual space between the claim that behavior warrants the attribution of belief and the
claim that believing consists in behavior itself is a short and in some ways appealing step. If
we look, for example, at how people are taught to use mental concepts and termsterms like
believe, desire, and so onconditions of use appear inseparably connected with
behavioral tendencies in certain circumstances. If mental state attribution bears a special
connection with behavior, it is tempting to say that mentality just consists in behavioral
tendencies.
The second reason can be expressed as follows: One major difference between mentalistic
(mental states in-the-head) and associationist or conditioning accounts of behavior is that
mentalistic accounts tend to have a strong nativist bent. This is true even though there may
be nothing inherently nativist about mentalistic accounts (see Cowie 1998).
Mentalistic accounts tend to assume, and sometimes even explicitly to embrace (see Fodor
1981), the hypothesis that the mind possesses at birth or innately a set of procedures or
internally represented processing rules which are deployed when learning or acquiring new
responses. Behaviorism, by contrast, is anti-nativist. Behaviorism, therefore, appeals to
theorists who deny that there are innate rules by which organisms learn. To Skinner and
Watson organisms learn without being innately or pre-experientially provided with implicit
procedures by which to learn. Learning does not consist, at least initially, in rule-governed
behavior. Learning is what organisms do in response to stimuli. For a behaviorist an
organism learns, as it were, from its successes and mistakes. Rules, says Skinner (1984a),
are derived from contingencies, which specify discriminative stimuli, responses, and
consequences (p. 583). (See also Dennett 1978).
Much contemporary work in cognitive science on the set of models known as connectionist
or parallel distributed processing (PDP) models seems to share behaviorism's anti-nativism
about learning. PDP takes an approach to learning which is response oriented rather than
rule-governed and this is because, like behaviorism, it has roots in associationism (see
Bechtel 1985; compare Graham 1991 with Maloney 1991). Whether PDP models ultimately
are or must be anti-nativist depends upon what counts as native or innate rules (Bechtel and
Abrahamsen 1991, pp. 103105).
The third reason for behaviorism's appeal, popular at least historically, is related to its
disdain for reference to inner mental or information processing as explanatory causes of
behavior. The disdain is most vigorously exemplified in the work of Skinner. Skinner's
skepticism about explanatory references to mental innerness may be described as follows.
Suppose we try to explain the public behavior of a person by describing how they
represent,conceptualize or think about their situation. Suppose they conceive or think of their
situation in a certain way, not as bare, as filled with items without attributes, but as things, as
trees, as people, as walruses, walls, and wallets. Suppose, we also say, a person never merely
interacts with their environment; but rather interacts with their environment as they perceive,
see, or represent it. So, for example, thinking of something as a wallet, a person reaches for
it. Perceiving something as a walrus, they back away from it. Classifying something as a
wall, they don't bump into it. So understood, behavior is endogenously produced movement,
viz. behavior that has its causal origin within the person who thinks of their situation a
certain way.
Skinner would object to such claims. He would object not because he believes that the eye is
innocent or that inner or endogenous activity does not occur. He would object because he
believes that behavior must be explained in terms that do not themselves presuppose the very
thing that is explained. This is the behavior itself. The outside (public) behavior of a person
is not accounted for by referring to the inside (inner processing, cognitive activity) behavior
of the person (say, his or her classifying or analyzing their environment) if, therein, the
behavior of the person ultmately is unexplained. The objection, wrote Skinner, to inner
states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis
(Skinner 1953, p. 35). Not relevant means, for Skinner, explanatorily circular or regressive.
Skinner charges that since mental activity is a form of behavior (albeit inner), the only non-
regressive, non-circular way to explain behavior is to appeal to something non-behavioral.
This non-behavioral something is environmental stimuli and an organism's interactions with,
and reinforcement from, the environment.
So, the third reason for behaviorism's appeal is that it tries to avoid circular, regressive
explanations of behavior. It aims to refrain from accounting for one type of behavior (overt)
in terms of another type of behavior (covert), all the while, in some sense, leaving behavior
unexplained.
It should be noted that Skinner's views about explanation and the purported circularity of
explanation by reference to inner processing are both extreme and scientifically contestable,
and that many who have self-identified as behaviorists including Guthrie, Tolman, and Hull,
or continue to work within the tradition, broadly understood, including Killeen (1987) and
Rescorla (1990), take exception to much that Skinner has said about explanatory references
to innerness. It should also be noted that Skinner's derisive attitude towards explanatory
references to mental innerness stems, in part, not just from fears of explanatory regression
but from his conviction that if the language of psychology is permitted to refer to internal
processing, this goes some way towards permitting talk of immaterial mental substances,
agents endowed with contra-causal free will, and little persons (homunculi) within bodies.
Each of these Skinner takes to be incompatible with a scientific worldview (see Skinner
1971; see also Day 1976). Finally, it must be noted that Skinner's aversion to explanatory
references to innerness is not an aversion to inner mental states or processes per se. He
readily admits that they exist. Skinner countenances talk of inner events provided that they
are treated in the same manner as public or overt responses. An adequate science of behavior,
he claims, must describe events taking place within the skin of the organism as part of
behavior itself (see Skinner 1976). So far as I am concerned, he wrote in 1984 in a special
issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences devoted to his work, whatever happens when we
inspect a public stimulus is in every respect similar to what happens when we introspect a
private one (Skinner 1984b, p. 575; compare Graham 1984, pp. 5589).
Skinner does not have much to say about just how inner or covert behavior (like thinking,
classifying, and analyzing) can be described in the same manner as public or overt behavior.
But his idea seems roughly to be this. Just as we may describe overt behavior or motor
movement in terms of concepts like stimulus, response, conditioning, reinforcement, and so
on, so we may deploy the very same terms in describing inner or covert behavior. One
thought may reinforce another thought. An act of analysis may serve as a stimulus for an
effort at classification. And so on. Purely 'mentalistic' activities may be at least roughly
parsed in terms of behavioral concepts a topic to be revisited later in the entry (in the 7th
Section).