Davao Fruits Corporation vs Associated Labor Unions, G.R. No.

85073, August 24, 1993; 225 SCRA 562

Facts: Respondent ALU for and in behalf of all the rank-and-file workers and employees of petitioner sought to recover from
the latter the 13th month pay differential for 1982 of said employees, equivalent to their sick, vacation and maternity leaves,
premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays which petitioner, allegedly in disregard
of company practice since 1975, excluded from the computation of the 13th month pay for 1982.
Issue: WON in the computation of the 13th month pay under PD No. 851, payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves,
premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for regular holidays may be excluded in the computation
and payment thereof.
Held: Yes. Basic salary does not merely exclude the benefits expressly mentioned but all payments which may be in the form
of fringe benefits or allowances.
Sec. 4 of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851 provides that overtime pay, earnings and other
remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13 th month pay.
Whatever compensation an employee receives for an 8 hour work daily or the daily wage rate is the basic salary. Any
compensation or remuneration other than the daily wage rate is excluded. It follows therefore, that payments for sick, vacation
and maternity leaves, premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, as well as pay for regular holidays, are
likewise excluded in computing the basic salary for the purpose of determining the 13 th month pay.

DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES, petitioner, vs. RUBEN V. ABARQUEZ, at. al., respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent, THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU-TUCP), entered into a CBA providing for 2
sections on sick leave with pay benefits which apply to both the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers who
render a daily eight-hour service to the company as governed by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA, and the intermittent
field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor pool, as governed by Sec. 3
thereof.

Sec. 1, however, of said CBA had a proviso that only those regular workers of the company whose work are not intermittent,
are entitled to the commutation of sick leave privilege.A proviso not found in Sec. 3. This caused the new assistant manager to
discontinue the commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the intermittent workers or its
conversion to cash.

The Union objected and brought the matter for voluntary arbitration before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
with respondent Abarquez acting as voluntary arbitrator who later issued an award in favor of the Union. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:
WON intermittent(irregular) workers are entitled to commutation of their
unenjoyed sick leave with pay benefits.

HELD:
Yes.
The CBA has two (2) sections on sick leave with pay benefits which apply to two (2) distinct classes of workers in petitioners
company, namely: (1) the regular non-intermittent workers or those workers who render a daily eight-hour service to the
company and (2) intermittent field workers who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra labor
pool.

Sick leave benefits, like other economic benefits stipulated in the CBA such as maternity leave and vacation leave benefits,
among others, are by their nature, intended to be replacements for regular income which otherwise would not be earned
because an employee is not working during the period of said leaves. They are non-contributory in nature, in the sense that
the employees contribute nothing to the operation of the benefits. By their nature, upon agreement of the parties, they are
intended to alleviate the economic condition of the workers.
***Notes: Petitioner-company is of the mistaken notion that since the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the
unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits is found in Section 1, Article VIII, only the regular non-intermittent
workers and no other can avail of the said privilege because of the proviso found in the last sentence thereof.

States Marine Corp. vs. Cebu Seamens Assc.

Facts: On September 12, 1952, the respondent union filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), a petition (Case No.
740-V) against the States Marine Corporation, later amended on May 4, 1953, by including as party respondent, the petitioner
Royal Line, Inc. The Union alleged that that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required their
employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P.40 for every meal, while the masters and officers were not required to
pay their meals.

The petitioners shipping companies, answering, averred that in enacting Rep. Act No. 602 (Minimum Wage Law), the Congress
had in mind that the amount of P.40 per meal, furnished to employees should be deducted from the daily wages.
Issue: WON meals are deductable from wages.

Held: It is argued that the food or meals given to the deck officers, marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in
question, were mere facilities which should be deducted from wages, and not supplements which, according to said section
19, should not be deducted from such wages, because it is provided therein: Nothing in this Act shall deprive an employee of
the right to such fair wage or in reducing supplements furnished on the date of enactment. In the case of Atok-Big Wedge
Assn. v. Atok-Big Wedge Co., L-7349, July 19, 1955; 51 O.G. 3432, the two terms are defined as follows

Supplements, therefore, constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the
laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages. Facilities, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the
laborers and his familys existence and subsistence so that by express provision of law (Sec. 2[g]), they form part of the wage
and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and
pay for them just the same.
Facilities may be charged to or deducted from wages. Supplements, on the other hand, may not be so charged. Thus, when
meals are freely given to crew members of a vessel while they were on the high seas, not as part of their wages but as a
necessary matter in the maintenance of the health andefficiency of the crew personnel during the voyage, the deductions made
therefrom for the meals should be returned to them, and the operator of the coastwise vessels affected should continue giving
the same benefit.
Petition dismissed.

Mabeza vs NLRC

271 SCRA 670 Labor Law Labor Standards Abandonment of Work Loss of Confidence

Norma Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an inspection was made by the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at Hotel Supreme and the DOLE inspectors discovered several violations by the hotel
management. Immediately, the owner of the hotel, Peter Ng, directed his employees to execute an affidavit which would
purport that they have no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme. Mabeza signed the affidavit but she refused to certify
it with the prosecutors office. Later, when she reported to work, she was not allowed to take her shift. She then asked for a
leave but was not granted yet shes not being allowed to work. In May 1991, she then sued Peter Ng for illegal dismissal. Peter
Ng, in his defense, said that Mabeza abandoned her work. In July 1991, Peter Ng also filed a criminal complaint against Mabeza
as he alleged that she had stolen a blanket and some other stuff from the hotel. Peter Ng went on to amend his reply in the
labor case to make it appear that the reason why he dismissed Mabeza was because of his loss of confidence by reason of the
theft allegedly committed by Mabeza. The labor arbiter who handled the case, a certain Felipe Pati, ruled in favor of Peter Ng.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is abandonment in the case at bar. Whether or not loss of confidence as ground for dismissal
applies in the case at bar.
HELD: No. The side of Peter Ng is bereft of merit so is the decision of the Labor Arbiter which was unfortunately affirmed by
the NLRC.

Abandonment

Abandonment is not present. Mabeza returned several times to inquire about the status of her work or her employment status.
She even asked for a leave but was not granted. Her asking for leave is a clear indication that she has no intention to abandon
her work with the hotel. Even the employer knows that his purported reason of dismissing her due to abandonment will not
fly so he amended his reply to indicate that it is actually loss of confidence that led to Mabezas dismissal.

Loss of Confidence

It is true that loss of confidence is a valid ground to dismiss an employee. But this is ideally only applied to workers whose
positions require a certain level or degree of trust particularly those who are members of the managerial staff. Evidently, an
ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other hotel property from the property custodian each day and who
has to account for each and every towel or bedsheet utilized by the hotels guests at the end of her shift would not fall under
any of these two classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally apply.
Further, the suspicious filing by Peter Ng of a criminal case against Mabeza long after she initiated her labor complaint against
him hardly warrants serious consideration of loss of confidence as a ground of Mabezas dismissal.

Odango vs. NLRC Case Digest

Cesar Odango vs. NLRC and Antique Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Facts: Petitioners are monthly-paid employees of ANTECO whose workdays are from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday.
After a routine inspection, the Regional Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment found ANTECO liable for
underpayment of the monthly salaries of its employees. On September 1989, the DOLE directed ANTECO to pay its employees
wage differentials amounting to P1,427,412.75. ANTECO failed to pay. On various dates in 1995, thirty-three (33) monthly-
paid employees filed complaints with the NLRC praying for payment of wage differentials, damages and attorneys fees.

On November 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners granting them wage differentials amounting
to P1,017,507.73 and attorneys fees of 10%. ANTECO appealed the Decision to the NLRC where it reversed the Labor Arbiters
Decision. The NLRC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then elevated the case to CA where it dismissed
the petition for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals explained that petitioners
failed to allege the specific instances where the NLRC abused its discretion. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to money claims.

Ruling: The Court ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to money claims or wage differentials.

The petitioners claim is based on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Policy Instructions No. 9 issued by
the Secretary of Labor which was declared null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Codes provisions on holiday
pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion.

Even assuming that Section 2, Rule IV of Book III is valid, their claim will still fail. The basic rule in this jurisdiction is "no work,
no pay." The right to be paid for un-worked days is generally limited to the ten legal holidays in a year. Petitioners claim is
based on a mistaken notion that Section 2, Rule IV of Book III gave rise to a right to be paid for un-worked days beyond the ten
legal holidays. Petitioners line of reasoning is not only a violation of the "no work, no pay" principle, it also gives rise to an
invidious classification, a violation of the equal protection clause.
Tabas vs. California Manufacturing Co., Inc. [169 SCRA 497, GR 80680]

(Labor Standards Both employer and labor only contractor may be liable)
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition in the NLRC for reinstatement and payment of various benefits against California
Manufacturing Company. The respondent company then denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
the company and the petitioners.
Pursuant to a manpower supply agreement, it appears that the petitioners prior their involvement with California
Manufacturing Company were employees of Livi Manpower service, an independent contractor, which assigned them to work
as promotional merchandisers. The agreement provides that:

California has no control or supervisions whatsoever over [Livis] workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or
perform [Californias] obligation It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a
seasonal and contractual basis; that [c]ost of living allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged directly to
[California] at cost ; and that [p]ayroll for the preceding [sic] week [shall] be delivered by [Livi] at [Californias] premises.

Issue: WON principal employer is liable.

Held: Yes. The existence of an employer-employee relation cannot be made the subject of an agreement.
Based on Article 106, labor-only contractor is considered merely as an agent of the employer, and the liability must be
shouldered by either one or shared by both.

There is no doubt that in the case at bar, Livi performs manpower services, meaning to say, it contracts out labor in favor of
clients. We hold that it is one notwithstanding its vehement claims to the contrary, and notwithstanding the provision of the
contract that it is an independent contractor. The nature of ones business is not determined by self-serving appellations one
attaches thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law. The bare fact that Livi maintains a separate line
of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California with workers to pursue the latters own business.
In this connection, we do not agree that the petitioners had been made to perform activities which are not directly related to
the general business of manufacturing, Californias purported principal operation activity. Livi, as a placement agency, had
simply supplied California with the manpower necessary to carry out its (Californias) merchandising activities, using its
(Californias) premises and equipment.

REPUBLIC V. ASIAPRO COOPERATIVE (G.R. NO. 172101)

Facts:
Respondent Asiapro Cooperative is composed of owners-members with primary objectives of providing them savings and
credit facilities and livelihood services. In discharge of said objectives, Asiapro entered into several service contracts with
Stanfilco. Sometime later, the cooperative owners-members requested Stanfilcos help in registering them with SSS and
remitting their contributions. Petitioner SSS informed Asiapro that being actually a manpower contractor supplying
employees to Stanfilco, it must be the one to register itself with SSS as an employer and remit the contributions. Respondent
continuously ignoring the demand of SSS the latter filed before the SSC. Asiapro alleges that there exists no employer-
employee relationship between it and its owners-members. SSC ruled in favor of SSS. On appeal, CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not there is employer-employee relationship between Asiapro and its owners-members.
Ruling: YES.
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection
and engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power
to control the workers conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. All the aforesaid elements are
present in this case.
First. It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the exclusive discretion
in the selection and engagement of the owners-members as well as its team leaders who will be assigned at Stanfilco.
Second. It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service surplus are indeed wages, because these are
given to the owners-members as compensation in rendering services to respondent cooperatives client, Stanfilco.
Third. It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the power to
investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members and its team leaders who were rendering services at Stanfilco.
Fourth. In the case at bar, it is the respondent cooperative which has the sole control over the manner and means of
performing the services under the Service Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work. Also, the
respondent cooperative is solely and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other representatives at
Stanfilco. All these clearly prove that, indeed, there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative
and its owners-members.

COCA COLA VS HINGPIT

DBP VS DAMI RESPONDENTS LITCHI