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Martial Law as Valid Declaration Military Courts Constitutional Allowance

In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. Gumaua, an ex PC aided Cordova
as he even sheltered them in his sari-sari store. After surveillance, Gumauas house was raided and he was arrested. Since
martial law is being imposed at that time, Gumaua was held under the custody and trial of the military court [No. 2].
Gumaua then petitioned for prohibition and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary injunction against Major
General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff of the AFP and Military Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation
and jurisdiction over him as a civilian of respondent Military Commission No. 2. He filed for habeas corpus and averred
that (a) military tribunals cannot try civilians if civil courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of
their jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a civilian, he is entitled even during Martial Law to his
constitutional right to counsel during the preliminary investigation, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts only upon
his arrest or voluntary submission.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.
HELD: The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The 1973 Constitution has been validly
ratified by the sovereign people and is now in full force and effect. Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under
martial law is valid. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas
corpus. That the President of the Philippines, as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or administrator of martial law, . .
. can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and
preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of
reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the
impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly
developed countries . . . . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator during the period of martial law, can legally
create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but also civilian offenders, for
specified offenses including kidnapping.
And finally, there is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, co-accused of petitioners
in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the commission of the crime, in much the same way
that the evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently,
the trial of petitioners Gumaua and Halasan before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other
accused who are members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos. 8.


Other Options Available to the President Aside from Declaring Martial Law Amendment No. 6
In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned
to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other
purposes unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution
(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty
only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred
that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi
averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed
after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: What are the possible options available to the president other than declaring martial law.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. SC declared it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly the power that
Amendment No. 6 vests upon the President (Prime Minister) are to be exercised only on two specified occasions,
namely, (1) when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence thereof and (2) whenever
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or is unable to
act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action. The power is to issue
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the land. As the tenor of the
amendment readily imparts, such power may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is
a power that is in the nature of the other powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to
be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.
The SC also noted that Amendment No. 6 is a measure seen by the president to avoid declaring another martial law. There
are also other options that the president can recourse to; they are:
(a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan;
(b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks;
(c) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
(d) martial law [being the last]
President must first exercise emergency powers as may be provided by the legislature. When it fails, it cannot be adequate
when lawless violence becomes generalized and public safety is in jeopardy, hence the need to call out the armed forces.
And when such situation still aggravates to the point of requiring the preventive incarceration or detention of certain
leaders or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Should
matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution,
without Amendment No. 6, the only recourse would be to proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an extreme
measure that carries with it repressive and restrictive elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded
sectors of the country, it is but natural to think of it only as a very last resort. Again, this is to avoid the necessity of
resorting to the proclamation of martial law that Amendment No. 6 was conceived. Paraphrasing President Marcos
himself, martial law is the law of the gun, that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the government by the
military. Thus, the virtue of Amendment No. 6 is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have to accompany
the exercise of the power thereby conferred on the Executive. To be sure, the calling out of the armed forces and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of martial law, may be left out or need
not be resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such power. It is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to
say that Amendment No. 6 is in reality no less than disguised martial law.


Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were
arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina,
mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of
arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were
later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case &
the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the
WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was
a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to suppress
the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of
the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the
least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end
the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang
Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired
even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.


Habeas Corpus The Right to Bail

In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were
charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any warrant
of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the
right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already
under surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same
time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
remains suspended with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained
for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also
suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which
the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.
The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an individual has
right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable
the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit
acts that endanger the States very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also
be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive
imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without
any justifiable reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite
notable in this case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they
ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.


Habeas Corpus
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa.
Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and
Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On
August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC
Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose
behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes
moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in military
detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become
moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues
to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil
courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the period of
martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction,
even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts
are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.


Habeas Corpus
Col. Abadilla was the head of the group that seized GMA 7 in 1987. A subsequent mutiny was done in Fort Bonifacio. The
act was infamously known as the Black Saturday Revolt. The mutiny failed and Abadilla was later detained. Ramos, the
then Chief of Staff, issued an order dropping the name of Abadilla from roll of regular officers in the military. Later, Susan,
the wife of Abadilla, filed a petition for the issuance of the WoHC together with their minor children. They questioned the
validity of Abadillas detention. It was alleged that when Col Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May
9, 1987, he became a civilian and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void because he was no
longer subject to military law. His detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal offense, either before a
civil court or a court-martial
ISSUE: Whether or not the detention of Abadila is legal.
HELD: The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and should not lead to the conclusion
that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal
to clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and expected from a
ranking military officer would be his shield against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to
surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of regular officers of the military,
cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts for offenses he committed while still in the
military service. Military jurisdiction had fully attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated against
him before the termination of his service in the military. The record of the case discloses that Col Abadilla has been charged
by the military authorities for violation of Article of War (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a serious offense, and the
corresponding charge sheets have been prepared against him. The detention of Col Abadilla under the circumstances
obtaining in this case is not illegal. For this reason, the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit.


Political Law Separation of Powers SC Cannot Change Law

Statutory Construction The Court Can Only Interpret Laws
Criminal Law Complex Crimes Compound Crimes Rebellion Absorbs Common Crimes
Remedial Law Criminal Procedure Bail; When available
Constitutional Law Warrant of Arrest Judge Should Personally Determine Probable Cause
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against
then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him.
Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and
alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it
was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should
have been charged against him is simple rebellion which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only took
Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that
such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the
case from the prosecutions office that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of
arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it should be
ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which
sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed
with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986
Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal
Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change
the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there
is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only be charged
with rebellion which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the warrant
from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record
from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by personally
evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what
some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that
he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed.


Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion

Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together with the spouses
Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to
hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and
that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on
the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted
for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the
prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when
he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The
contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his
right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.

REP. EDCEL LAGMAN ET AL. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (JULY 4, 2017) [see separate doc]


DOCTRINE: Power of Supreme Court to inquire into the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by the President


November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under
shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao.
Following these incidents of which the facts of such we all know very well, President Arroyo issued the following
Presidential Decrees, herein presented sequentially:

1. Proclamation 1946 - declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to
prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao; issued November 4, 2009.

2. Presidential Proclamation 1959 (the PD mainly assailed in this case) - declaring martial law and suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front; issued December 4, 2009.

Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with Section
18, Article VII of the 1987. Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in person or in writing of her

In her report, PGMA said that her actions were based on her finding lawless men have taken up arms in Maguindanao
and risen against the government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the nature, quantity, and quality
of the rebels weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in strategic positions, the closure of the
Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14 other municipal halls, and
the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized PNP/Police markings.

On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
to review the validity of the Presidents action.

But, two days later or on December 12, 2009 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation

3. Presidential Proclamation 1963 - lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in Maguindanao; issued December 12, 2009.


WoN there is a need for the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, considering the same were lifted within a few days
of being issued and thus Congress was not able to affirm/maintain the same based on its own evaluation.


Article 7, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.


No. It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power
to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation
on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.

Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The Court then can hear the petitions challenging the Presidents action, and ascertain
if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension.

The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the
suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and
academic. The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging these are.

Additional Note:

Should the 30 days given by the Constitution prove to be inadequate, it is important to note that the 30-day period does
not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not
lost until the case has been terminated.

DISPOSITION: Petitions dismissed for being moot and academic.

Carpio Dissenting:

The President has the sole power to declare martial law or suspend the writ. This power of the President is subject to
review separately by Congress and the Supreme Court. Justice Mendoza stresses, Thus, Congress and this Court have
separate spheres of competence. They do not act jointly and sequentially but independently of each other. Father
Bernas points out, Since the powers of Congress and the Court are independent of each other, there is nothing to
prevent the Congress and the Court from simultaneously exercising their separate powers.

FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She
directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 transferring
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended
the former AO (the term transfer used in AO 273 was amended to delegate, referring to the supervision of the ARMM
by the DILG).

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan,
Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They
alleged that the Presidents proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMMs autonomy as these issuances
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMMs operations and to seize the regional governments powers. They
also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the
taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Petitioners asked that
Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.


1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under the Constitution and
The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions


1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM.
After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the
Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM ViceGovernor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009
pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner SahaliGenerale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary
therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she
did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out
of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests
in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

3. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, it would
generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed
forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse
of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed
forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is
a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards
that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts.
In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces
may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done
swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of
the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and
she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that
there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus,
to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the
armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened
the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places and the
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must
respect the Presidents actions.(Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011)


489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over
Power Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to
be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies
and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and
seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial
law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017
by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact
operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take
cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of
which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected
to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free
speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the
validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject
to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as
provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically
states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but
cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without
any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling
out power of the president by the president.
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon
instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly,
they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding
the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134
of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared
under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the
same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring
the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration
of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members
v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as
an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al.
v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears
that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion.


Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief
Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power
to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine
whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none
of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced
civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out
the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may
be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long
as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question
of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge
the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers
of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
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