[Syllabus]

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who
won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay
was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the
[1]
petition signing onOctober 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by
law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners
opposition. OnDecember 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time
on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action
No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and
his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
[2]
barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of
the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the
COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter
[3]
filed a reply.
Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No.
7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,
petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election
is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the
SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only
once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding aregular local election.

[Emphasis added.]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
[4]
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent
of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of
office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his
term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to
include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code
on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his
term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May
1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously
insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision
of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in
[5]
the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute
or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or
[6]
nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
[7]
harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government
Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of
Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the
[8]
spirit that vivifieth x x x

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this
case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one
year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the
next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could
choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than
a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent
of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be
filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office
[9]
concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election
should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the majority and
separate concurring opinions.
Davide, Jr., Please see separate concurring opinion.
 [Synopsis/Syllabi]

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109404. January 22, 1996]

FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village,
petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
HOUSING AND LAND USE. REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND
PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of
amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the
enactment of P.D. 957, The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree? This is the
major question raised in the instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the respondent
Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed the order of the
respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his
co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed
by the Delta Village Homeowners Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a
resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist from making further
sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and
Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his
amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose
favor title to the said property was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he suspended
his payments because of petitioners failure to develop the village. Private respondent prayed for
the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to cancel
the contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondents complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957,
ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private respondents
purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other, it appearing that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
269546 has been issued to x x x spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo x x x, the management of
E & S Delta Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the complainant-appellant (herein
private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests computed at legal rates from date of
receipt hereof until fully paid.
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.
Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the x
x x Office of the President x x x may be taken to the Court of Appeals x x x. However, in order to
hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half years
ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying
P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified private
respondents non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land
purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law
cannot govern the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his
discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts
executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory
construction stressed:

The intent of a statute is the law x x x. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule
of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is
the law itself and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and
purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act x x x. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt
that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and
objects of the legislature.1 (italics supplied.)

It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and
the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957
was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens
who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers, and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble,
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement
and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver
titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent
sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;2 (italics supplied.)

From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the legislative
intent must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively
even upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective
application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise
its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated under or in
connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to have been entered into prior to
P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by
said law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative authority intended to permit such a loophole to
remain and continue to be a source of misery for subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain of its
provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect
and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957s
enactment:

Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities,
which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus,
printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the
license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the
Authority.

Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior
to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or
condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section
within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an
adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.

Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions
shall constitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this Decree.

Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or

condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or
developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the
failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the
approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (italics supplied)

On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the application of P.D.
957 to the contracts in question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts themselves,
which expressly provides:

(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the entire area covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands subject of this contract is a part in
accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part
further binds himself to comply with and abide by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision
and development of lots for residential purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by
laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the
General Registration Office and other government agencies. (italics supplied)

Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that
Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making
further payment to petitioner due to petitioners failure to develop the subdivision project according
to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. (Such incomplete
development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual and statutory
obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the findings of the HLURB
which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.)
Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the following matters:
although private respondent started to default on amortization payments beginning May 1975, so
that by the end of July 1975 he had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments,
nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation option available to him under the contract, did
not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion but delayed until May 1979 when he finally made
up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by that time the land purchase agreements had already
been overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated onJuly 12, 1976. (In any event, as
pointed out by respondent HLURB and seconded by the Solicitor General, the defaults in
amortization payments incurred by private respondent had been effectively condoned by the
petitioner, by reason of the latters tolerance of the defaults for a long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent Secretary exceeded his
jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondents payments on Lot 12 although (according to
petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the
supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-development justified such order
inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioners motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretarys) Decision
dated March 10, 1992 was filed only onthe 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had become
final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987,
which provides that (d)ecisions/ resolutions! orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt
of a copy thereof x x x , unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition
is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE
LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO
DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p

The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts,
applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the
latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more
than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)

The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The
information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality
of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a
grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as
successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919,
accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land;
said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use
thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from
grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-
occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto
Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824,
1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December
9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land
through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the
rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the
expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said
ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be
admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not
include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes
reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid
of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble
shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions
in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural
areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated
October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications,
Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential
Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City
and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros
and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private
property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private
lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and
nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property.
It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of
public health, safety and peace and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in
this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association
to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy,
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such
public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any
other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the
corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in
the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit
such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case.
Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to
illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to
when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28
C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982

MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the decision dated August 14,
1974 1in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-
appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2,
1971 which found the petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended)
and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads as follows:

That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application for
insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of Perla
Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance company, registered under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-
RSA 0001 in the amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) dated June 21,
1969, without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from
the office of the Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:

IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969,
appellant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent to
Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at
Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its author
representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana M.
Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of policy, and for
reasons not explained in record, present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private
prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaa de Seguros, ... without said
accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the
Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines."
 and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that aforementioned policy was
issued with active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense
sought to show that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as
clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone
to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her
husband's desk to renew ...

Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court's decision was
affirmed by the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on October 22, 1974. 5

In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the following errors 11 allegedly committed by
the appellate court:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF

COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F,

F-1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN

PETITIONER.

We find the petition meritorious.

The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words,
it is necessary to determine whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is
governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph.

The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows:

No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay
any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance,
unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of
authority to act as an agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent,
sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for
services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance
company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually
on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the
Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority, such
application being approved and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent,
and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he
may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to
revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event
after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates
may be issued upon the application of the company.

Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company,
or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such
 company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements,
liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject.

Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five
hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the
commission of any offense connected with the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner
shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall
thereafter be issued to such convicted person.

A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from
acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines
who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation.

The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section
189 of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus

... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active endeavors that resulted in issuance
of policy to Isidro, she was there and then acting as agent, and received the pay thereof her
defense that she was only acting as helper of her husband can no longer be sustained, neither her
point that she received no compensation for issuance of the policy because

any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any
insurance company or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a
policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this
section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and
penalties, to which an agent of such company is subject. paragraph 2, Sec. 189,
Insurance Law,

now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained the insurance,

for compensation

which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what
appellant apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under the 2nd but under the 1st
paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is provided that,

No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement of

applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the
Philippine Island, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority to act
from the insurance commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of
January, or within six months thereafter.

therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be
overruled. 12

From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to imply that the definition of an
insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in
the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the second paragraph of Section
189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first
paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an
insurance agent.

We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an
insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent"
mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph,
it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence

Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, ...

Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent
mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition
and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of
the aforesaid section.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and
second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must
be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be
so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it must be
borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses
or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More
importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and
specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. 17

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the
agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a
violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the
petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according to the latter, the receipt of
compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for
direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent,
an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges
no offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma
1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in such
capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the
case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It
is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. 20

After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused
did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Acting C.J.,) Makasiar, De Castro, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Plana, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 p. 21, Rollo.

2 p. 11, CA Rollo.

3 p. 10, CA Rollo.

4 pp. 21-22, Rollo.

5 p. 7, Rollo.

6 p. 36, Rollo.

7 p. 51, Rollo.

8 p. 58, Rollo.

9 p. 69, Rollo.

10 p. 71, Rollo.

11 p. 69, Rollo; p. 6, Brief for the Petitioner.

12 pp. 25 and 26, Rollo.

13 Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709; Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953; Lopez vs. El Hogar
Filipino, 47 Phil. 249; Chartered Bank vs. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931.

14 People vs. Polmon 86 Phil. 350.

15 82 C.J.S., Section 345, pp. 699-700.

16 Tamayo vs. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953.

17 Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh & Dizon, 75 Phil. 371.

18 Jasper vs. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R 197; 164 S.W. 851.

19 149 p. 1074, 11 Okla. Crim. 594.

20 People vs. Sy Gesiong, 60 Phil. 614.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without giving due course to this instant
petition, to require the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In the comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974,
the respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted that petitioner may not be considered as
having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the
petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.