The African Union - Focusing On Conflict Management

The African Union A Study
Focusing on Conflict Management

Karin Bogland, Robert Egnell, Maria Lagerstrm
FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are
research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and
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FOI
Swedish Defence Research Agency Phone: +46 8 55 50 30 00 www.foi.se FOI-R--2475--SE User report Defence Analysis
Defence Analysis Fax: +46 8 55 50 31 00 ISSN 1650-1942 May 2008
SE 164 90 Stockholm
Karin Bogland, Robert Egnell, Maria Lagerstrm
The African Union A Study

Focusing on Conflict
Management
FOI-R--2475--SE
Titel Afrikanska Unionen - En studie med

inriktning p konflikthantering
Title The African Union A Study Focusing on

Conflict Management
Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--2475--SE
Rapporttyp Anvndarrapport
Report Type User report
Mnad/Month Maj/May
Utgivningsr/Year 2008
Antal sidor/Pages 52 p
ISSN ISSN 1650-1942
Kund/Customer Frsvarsdepartementet
Forskningsomrde 1. Analys av skerhet och srbarhet
Programme area 1. Security, safety and vulnerability analysis
Delomrde 11 Forskning fr regeringens behov

Subcategory 11 Policy Support to the Government.
Projektnr/Project no A 12014
Godknd av/Approved by Sara Gullbrandsson
FOI, Totalfrsvarets Forskningsinstitut FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency

Avdelningen fr Frsvarsanalys
164 90 Stockholm SE-164 90 Stockholm

FOI-R--2475--SE
Sammanfattning
Den Afrikanska Unionen r av stor vikt fr afrikansk konflikthanteringsfrmga.
Rapporten syftar drfr till att hja kunskapsnivn om Afrikanska Unionen (AU)
som organisation, med inriktning p konflikthantering. Ett ytterligare syfte r att
skapa ett fundament fr fortsatt forskning genom att identifiera ett antal relevanta
forsknings- och policyfrgor fr vidare studier under 2008. Studien innehller
drfr en versiktlig genomgng av AU:s historik, organisation och dess
koppling till andra strre regionala aktrer. Drefter grs en fokusering p AU:s
konflikthanteringsorgan, vilket bland annat innebr en nrmare titt p AU:s
freds- och skerhetsrd (Peace and Security Council PSC), Direktoratet fr
Fred och Skerhet (Peace and Security Directorate), samt p African Standby
Force (ASF). Slutligen problematiseras ett antal mnen som uppkommit under
studiens gng och som bedmts s relevanta att de br ing redan i detta
inledande skede av forskningen.
Nyckelord: Afrikanska Unionen, AU, organisationsanalys, konflikthantering,
Afrika, fredsfrmjande operationer, ASF, Regionala organisationer
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Summary
The African Union is an organization of great importance for African conflict
management. The purpose of this study is therefore to increase our understanding
of the AU and its organizational structure with emphasis on conflict
management. Another aim is to create a foundation for future research by
identifying a number of relevant research and policy questions that can be
pursued in 2008. This study therefore contains a basic analysis of AU history,
organization and relations to other regional actors and organizations. That section
is followed by a study of the organizations organs for conflict management. This
means a closer look at the Peace and Security Council, the Peace and Security
Directorate and the African Standby Force. Finally, the study critically discusses
a number of features of the AU in order to assess its development in the near
future.
Keywords: African Union, AU, conflict management, African Standby Force,
organization, regional economic communities, peace support operations
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Contents
Preface ........................................................................................................... 6
Abstract ........................................................................................................... 7
1 Introduction.......................................................................................... 9
1.1 Aim and Method .............................................................................. 10
1.2 Scope of the Study .......................................................................... 11
2 The Emergence of the African Union .............................................. 12

2.1 From the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union .......... 12
2.2 The Formation, Vision and Aims of the African Union .................... 14
2.3 The Structure and Organisation of the African Union ..................... 15
3 The African Unions Conflict Management Bodies........................ 20

3.1 The Peace and Security Council..................................................... 21
3.2 The Peace and Security Directorate ............................................... 23
3.3 The African Standby Force ............................................................. 26
3.4 Regional Actors ............................................................................... 29
4 Discussing the Development of the AU .......................................... 34

4.1 State Sovereignty or Interventions to Safeguard Human
Security? ......................................................................................... 34
4.2 A Decentralised Structure in Symbiosis? ........................................ 36
4.3 The Gap between Ambition and Capacity....................................... 38
4.4 Striking a Balance: African Ownership External Funding ............ 42
5. Conclusions ............................................................................................. 44
5.1 Future Research ...................................................................................... 45
6. Bibliography............................................................................................. 47
7. Acronyms ................................................................................................. 51
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Preface
The African Union (AU) is a young organisation, which has, nevertheless, come to
play a major role in, among other things, peace and security initiatives on the
continent of Africa. In the run-up to the sending of Swedish troops to the conflicts in
Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) within the framework of a
multinational effort under the leadership of the European Union (EU) and also future
Swedish initiatives, a growing need for knowledge about the AUs organisation and
its forms of cooperation has become increasingly more evident within the Swedish
authorities.
The Defence Analysis Division of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) has
been commissioned, within the framework of the International Efforts project, by the
Swedish Ministry of Defences Department for International and Security Affairs
(F/SI) to carry out an organisational study of the AU, with particular focus on its
conflict management bodies. The study is to be regarded as a pilot study for a larger
piece of work on the AU that will be carried out within the framework of the new
Focus on Africa project, which began at the FOIs Defence Analysis Division in
January 2008, and which is also financed by the F/SI.
The report was quality checked at a seminar on 1 February 2008. The reviewers were
Bengt-Gran Bergstrand, who dealt with factual questions, and Ann dlund, who
took a closer look at questions concerning methods and structure. We are most
grateful to them and the other participants at the seminar for valuable comments.
We would also like to thank Henri Boshoff of the Institute of Security Studies (ISS)
in Pretoria, South Africa, for his talk and his generous and accommodating approach
to sharing information about the AU, and the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the
United Nations (UN) for putting together an interesting and rewarding programme at
the UNs Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).
Many thanks to Karl Srenson and Peter Haldn, analysts at the FOIs Defence
Analysis Division, and Colonel Anders Edqvist, former Defence Attach in South
Africa and the current military expert at the Swedish Ministry of Defences
Department for Military Affairs (F/MIL), for reading through the draft report prior
to the review of the report. The authors of the report are, of course, personally
responsible for the end result.
Stockholm, January 2008,
Karin Bogland
Project Manager, International Operations
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Abstract
The report aims to increase the level of knowledge of the African Union (AU) as
an organisation, with the focus on conflict management. An additional aim is to
create a foundation for further research by identifying a number of relevant
research and policy issues for further study in 2008. The study therefore contains
a general review of the history and organisation of the AU and its link to other
large regional actors. We will then focus on the AUs conflict management
bodies, which, among other things, involves a closer look at the AUs Peace and
Security Council (PSC), Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) and African
Standby Force (ASF). Finally, we will problematize a number of subjects that
have emerged during the course of our study and which have been considered so
relevant that they should already be included in this introductory phase of the
research.
The AU is an organisation that has great ambitions with regard to promoting
peace and security, but which also suffers from a serious lack of resources in its
efforts to achieve these ambitions. Extremely limited finances and a small
number of staff at its headquarters mean that the organisation has great difficulty
meeting the great expectations placed on it. The AU is, therefore, best described
as a skeleton structure that must be given time to have the opportunity to develop
the capacity required to bridge the gap between ambition and actual ability. The
development of the ASF, based on five multinational, regional brigades, is an
absolutely key factor in this capacity building. At present, the ASF is something
of a paper tiger and the goal of having five operational brigades by 2010 cannot
be considered a realistic one. It is very important to follow developments within
the triangular area of tension between the AUs ambitions, its capacity and its
Member States willingness to finance and contribute troops. The future
development of the AU will be decided within this area of tension.
A further number of areas have been identified as of importance with regard to
the development of the AU. The condemnation of non-constitutional changes of
government and the introduction of interventions under serious circumstances
seriously weaken the principle of national sovereignty and are described as the
most important difference between the AU and its predecessor, the OAU. The
area of tension between the principles of sovereignty and intervention within the
AU is important, as the organisations willingness and capacity to intervene in
the event of genocide and serious human rights abuses will be what will
ultimately determine its legitimacy.
Another interesting aspect is the regional construction of the AUs security
apparatus, the ASF, around five existing regional economic organisations. The
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critics of the construction see the dangers of unnecessary bureaucracy and

organisational complexity on the continent and that will cause lengthy processes
when conflicts and crises are to be dealt with. The five RECs, which are the
mainstay of the ASF, are also faced with several individual challenges in their
work on achieving peace and security. This regional element means, however,
that the organisation is continuing to build on established peace and security
structures and focusing them on joint efforts towards continent-wide conflict
management. By incorporating existing regional systems, the AU is allowed to
take advantage of the RECs comparative benefits, namely their experience of
previous peace operations, regional legitimacy, understanding of local conflicts
and already established frameworks and mechanisms for conflict prevention and
management. The decentralised peace and security structure within the AU
should, therefore, be described as a natural and practical solution to the problem
of creating integration and cooperation over such a large and heterogeneous area
as Africa. In order to effectively develop capacity in Africa, local, regional and
continental levels are required. It should, however, be emphasised that capacity
that is equivalent to the levels tasks and undertakings must exist at all three
levels if the structure is to work well.
Despite the shortcomings, the AU has, however, carried out an impressive
number of diplomatic assignments, sent observers to conflicts and, in particular,
carried out a number of extensive peacekeeping operations in difficult areas, such
as Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, since its official inauguration in 2002. In the
area of tension between ambitions and capacity, the political will of the Member
States and support for the organisation are of great importance. The legitimacy
and credibility of the organisation in the eyes of the Member States, in relation to
costs, are therefore of key importance for continued support. At present, the
Member States are very willing to make decisions and support the AU. The AU
is still very ambitious and, within the triangular area of tension, it is, therefore,
the organisations capacity that is the weakest point. The conclusion is, therefore,
that the willingness and ambition that pervade the AUs work must be
accompanied by a major build-up of capacity in order to give the organisation
credibility on the African continent and also globally. All of this must, however,
be accompanied by general economic growth which increases the Member
States ability to provide material, staff and finance to the organisations security
structure.
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1 Introduction
Africa and its different regions are of increasing interest and relevance with
regard to security policy. Security problems relating to disintegrating states,
international conflicts, civil war, economic and political development,
radicalisation, streams of refugees and resource and climate issues have made the
continent of great immediate interest within international security policy.
Africas problems, in the form of famine and a lack of political and economic
development, are more relevant than ever, something that is also illustrated in the
UNs Millennium Development Goals and other efforts.1 Among the external
actors involved, both the EU and the UN are carrying out and planning peace-
support missions on the continent. China is investing major resources in trade
and aid. The US is matching this with similar activity and also a newly
established military Africa Command (AFRICOM). France and Great Britain
have traditionally been very active in different parts of the continent. All this
points to increased interest in the continent with regard to security policy.
Security developments in Africa mean that even Swedish interests in the
continent are increasing through the international organisations we are active in.
In addition to traditional development work on the continent, which, in the latest
government bill on development from the spring of 2007, was further aimed at
Africa in particular, Swedish troops have contributed to international peace
operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Liberia. At the time
of writing, a mission is planned in Chad and the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) is
waiting for the starting signal for a possible EU-led mission in the first six
months of 2008.
According to Government statements, Swedish policy on Africa consists of
increased commitment in Africa, the development of the EUs instruments for
conflict management and increased UN focus on the continent. A cornerstone of
this policy is support for conflict management, which is manifested through
support for African capacity building.2 In order to effectively support African
capacity building, knowledge is required of African organisations and processes
within the area of conflict management. This study should be regarded as a
contribution towards such an increase in understanding.
1
The UNs Millennium Development Goals were created at the Millennium Summit of September
2000 and constitute a declaration of global cooperation concerning a number of time-bound
objectives in order to reduce poverty by 2015.
2
Conflict Management, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/13945>.
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Since the AU was formally created in 2002, it has quickly become a very
important actor in the area of African security. Through its extensive peace-
support efforts from mediation to full-scale military operations, observing
elections and economic sanctions, the organisation is already firmly rooted in the
continent. An expression coined at the time of the creation of the AU is that it
should contribute African solutions to African problems, which also indicates a
willingness among African leaders to look after their own affairs. The AU has
also created an important link between regional economic organisations, such as
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the international level, with
the EU and the UN at the forefront. An understanding of the AUs organisation,
capacity, opportunities and limitations is, therefore, of the utmost importance in
order to be able to pursue effective policies with the aim of developing the
capacity of African organisations and processes.
1.1 Aim and Method

The aim of this report is to increase the level of knowledge about the AU as an
organisation, with the focus on conflict management. A further aim is to discuss
and problematize the development of the AU, as well as create the foundation for
future research by identifying a number of relevant research and policy questions
for further study in 2008.
The study is partly a descriptive in that it contains a general review of the history
and organisation of the AU and its link to other large regional actors. We then
focus on the AUs conflict management bodies, which, among other things,
involves a more detailed study of the AUs Peace and Security Council (PSC),
Peace and Security Directorate and African Standby Force (ASF). In the second
part of the study, we problematize a number of subjects that have emerged during
the course of our study and which we consider so relevant that they should form
part of the introductory phase of this research. Among other things, we discuss
the ASFs capacity development in relation to the high expectations placed on it
and the objectives.
The study primarily makes use of secondary sources in the form of scholarly
books and articles. In the organisational sections, primary sources are used in the
form of official documents, such as treaties and doctrines. Finally, the written
source material will be supplemented by interviews. Generally speaking,
scholarly literature about the AU is relatively limited and any deeper
understanding of the AUs organisation is not mirrored in this literature. The
hope is thereby to make a limited yet important contribution to the existing
literature.
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1.2 Scope of the Study

This study is a fundamental study that will lead to a larger, more comprehensive
study in 2008. We have, therefore, defined it so that it provides a general
description of the history of the AU, the different organisational elements and
how these relate to each other with the focus on conflict management. The new
Africa project, which is financed by the Ministry of Defence, was initiated in
January 2008 and will continue the research within this area and also further
develop the areas we recommend for further research in this study. Among other
things, the different components of the AU will be looked at more closely and
also at how work is progressing on the creation of the ASF and the different
organisational components that will surround this. The study will also take a
closer look at the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and their work
towards setting up their respective brigades (see also Chapter 3).
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2 The Emergence of the African Union

The African Union is the most ambitious continental project Africa has ever seen
within the areas of peace and security, economic development and African
integration. It is, however, far from being the first continental organisation within
these areas and is the result of a long tradition of Pan-Africanism,
decolonialisation and the African states struggle for independence.
Pan-Africanism is a movement with its roots in the Afro-American diaspora of
the previous century. The first Pan-African Congress was held in 1900 and
organised by Sylvester Williams, a lawyer from Trinidad.3 The theme of all
congresses has been African unity, liberation from Western imperialism, African
development and peace. The most important theme was to be the movement for
the decolonialisation of Africa and it was W. E. B. Du Bois, one of several
people called the father of Pan-Africanism, who kept the Pan-African flame
burning to ultimately make it the starting point for the African struggle for
liberation after the end of the Second World War.4 Two separate traditions exist
within Pan-Africanism. One is a branch that advocates a United States of
Africa, with the US as a prototype and the other is a branch that aims instead at
a continent-wide regional organisation with the EU as the prototype.5 Jomo
Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah, Kenya and Ghanas first presidents were strong
advocates of Pan-Africanism during the time of liberation, which also led to the
creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
2.1 From the Organisation of African Unity to

the African Union
The AUs predecessor, the OAU, had already been formed on 26 May 1963
through 32 heads of state signing its charter.6 Initially, the OAUs main aim was
to fight apartheid and colonialism. Other aims were to improve living standards
for Africas population, organise the promotion of economic development,
promote unity and solidarity between the African states, further international
cooperation in accordance with the UN Charter, as well as defend the
3
Julius O. Ihonvbere, Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in the 1990s, Keynote address at
The All-African Students Conference, Peter Clark Hall, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario,
Canada, 27 May 1994, <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/033.html>.
4
Kwesi Kwaa Prah, African Unity, Pan-Africanism and the Dilemmas of Regional Integration, in
Ibbo Mandaza and Dani Nabudere (eds.), Pan-Africanism and Integration in Africa (SAPES
Books, 2002), <http://www.casas.co.za/papers_AfricanUnity.htm>.
5
Ibid.
6
<http://www.oau-creation.com/>.
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sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states.7 The

organisations effectiveness in this work was, however, questioned as a result of
its principles of not intervening in individual countries internal affairs and the
fact that it could only act based on consensus. This made the OAU a weak actor.
It should, however, be clarified that, with decolonialisation and the creation of
the OAU, the colonial national borders were quite rightly regarded as areas of
potential conflict as they were far from reflecting natural social tribes and
linguistic boundaries in Africa. The principle of non-intervention was, therefore,
regarded as vitally important if Africa was not to degenerate into lots of border
conflicts keeping a lid on Pandoras box.
In the 1990s, the continent was hit by Somalias complete disintegration into
civil war, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, a number of conflicts in the Manu
River area, and what was called Africas first world war, which took place in the
Democratic Republic of Congo between 1998 and 2003 and included six African
states in addition to the many groups in the DRC. In addition, the last obvious
colonial power structure in Africa disappeared in 1994 when apartheid was
finally abolished in South Africa. The primary aim of the OAU and the glue
holding it together the fight against colonialism and apartheid thereby
disappeared.
At the same time and, to some extent, as a consequence of the humanitarian
catastrophes, a new wave of Pan-Africanism swept across the continent. This
emphasised the importance of increased cooperation within the area of security
and, unlike the OAU, also democracy, accountability, good governance and
political openness as important concepts for African security.8 South Africas
President Thabo Mbeki provided an example of this new Pan-Africanism when
he spoke of an African renaissance at the end of the 1990s.9 The international
communitys inability to intervene to prevent conflicts or to alleviate their
consequences also led to African leaders realising that, if the continent was to
break the destructive cycle of violence, poverty and a lack of development, it
would be necessary for Africa to take its fate into its own hands and not rely on
7
S. M. Makunda and F. W. Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security and
Governance (Routledge, 2007).
8
Christopher Landsberg, The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism, in Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail
Rashid (eds.), West Africas Security Challenges Building Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 117.
9
Thabo Mbeki cited in Benedikt F. Franke, Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continents
Emerging Security Architecture, African Studies Quarterly, 9:3, Spring 2007,
<http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v9/v9i3a2 .htm>.
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the international community African solutions to African problems. It was in

this context that the AU was created.10
2.2 The Formation, Vision and Aims of the

African Union
In September 1999, the member states were summoned to a meeting where a
majority of the OAUs members decided to reconstruct the OAU into the AU as
part of the so-called Sirte Declaration.11 At a meeting in Togo in July 2000, a
majority of heads of state and government signed the agreement on the union, the
so-called Constitutive Act of the African Union.12 This entered into force in May
2001 when two-thirds of the 53 member states ratified the agreement. After a
transitional period of a little more than 2 years, the OAU was completely
replaced by the AU in Durban, South Africa, on 9 July 2002. The AU has its
headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and its members consist of all of Africas
states with the exception of Morocco.13
The AU wishes to work towards far-reaching political and economic cooperation
between its member states and it hopes that this will lead to reduced poverty,
increased respect for human rights and the promotion of peace and democracy.
There are two new norms in Pan-African politics that constitute the most
important difference between the AU and its predecessor, the OAU, and which
demonstrated an unrivalled willingness, in an African context, to limit the right
of self-determination on the part of the states in favour of so-called human
security: the condemnation of non-constitutional changes of government and the
introduction of interventions in serious circumstances, such as genocide and
human rights abuse.14
The vision of the African Union is to build an integrated Africa, a prosperous
and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force
in the international arena.15 For this reason, according to its charter, the AU will
promote and defend common African interests in international contexts,
10
Landsberg, The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism, p. 117.
11
AU in a nutshell, <www.africa-union.org>.
12
Constitutive Act of the African Union, <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/ AboutAu/
Constitutive_Act_en. htm>.
13
Morocco left the OAU in 1984 when the organisation welcomed the Moroccan-occupied Western
Sahara as a member. The same applies to the AU, which means Morocco refuses to become a
member.
14
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4, Principles.
15
African Union, Strategic Plan of the African union Commission, Vol. 1: Vission and Mission of
the African Union, May 2004, p. 26.
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accelerate Africas development, promote unity, solidarity and peace between the
African countries, work for democracy and respect for human rights on the
African continent and work towards political and economic integration between
the continents different regions.16 In order to achieve this, a number of decision-
making, decision-supporting and executive bodies have been created within the
framework of the African Union. Several of these will be discussed in the
coming section, which has the aim of increasing understanding of the AU as an
organisation with the focus on conflict management.
2.3 The Structure and Organisation of the

African Union
At present, the AUs organisation consists of ten organs. As we will be focusing
on the conflict-management bodies in Chapter 3, one of these ten bodies, the
Peace and Security Council, will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter.
The section of the Commission that is most relevant for peace and security work,
the Peace and Security Directorate, will also be presented there.
This chapter, therefore, presents the other main organs of the AU that are
relevant for conflict management. These are the Assembly of Heads of State, the
Executive Council, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives Committee
and the Pan-African Parliament. The Specialised Technical Committees, the
Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the Court of Justice, and the Financial
Institutions are not presented in this report even if they do, of course, indirectly
play a role in the organisations conflict management work. Through the clear
connection between development and security, they also play important roles in
work on preventing conflict and in the reconstruction phases after conflicts.
At the present time, there is no official organisation chart of the AU and its
structure, which has appeared more and more logical during the course of our
work, as the organisation is relatively difficult to explain. The AU is still a young
organisation that is very much understaffed, and relations, tasks and procedures
of the organisations have not, therefore, had the chance to fully become
established, which may explain why it appears somewhat disorganised. It will,
therefore, be interesting to follow the development of the organisation in the
future. Below is nevertheless an attempt to describe the organisational structure
of the AU visually, followed by short descriptions of the central organs of the
AU.
16
Makunda and Okumu, The African Union.
15
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16
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The Assembly of Heads of State

The 53 member states heads of state and government meet at a summit at least
once a year in the AUs highest decision-making body, the Assembly of Heads of
State. It is on these occasions that the guidelines for the organisation are drawn
up and an annual action plan is approved. Decisions are made by consensus, or,
if this fails, with a two-thirds majority.17 The Assembly bases its decisions on
reports and recommendations from the AUs other bodies. The Assembly
previously had President John A. Kufor of Ghana as its Chairperson but at the
AU summit meeting in January 2008, Tanzanias President Jakaya Kikwete was
elected to be the new Chairperson.
Some of the Assemblys other tasks are to pass the AU budget, monitor that the
member states are following the charter, decide on matters regarding
membership and mediate in disputes between member countries. This also
involves issuing directives to the Executive Council (see below) to deal with
conflicts, wars and emergency situations as well as peacebuilding work. At each
Ordinary Session, a Chairperson of the Assembly, who will hold the post for a
year, is elected.18
The Executive Council

The member countries foreign ministers, or another government representative,
sit on the Executive Council, which meets twice a year. The Executive Councils
tasks are to prepare the Assemblys summit meetings, coordinate the Unions
activities and monitor that the summit meetings decisions and guidelines are
complied with. The Council is to coordinate and make decisions in cases where
the member states have a common interest, such as foreign trade, energy,
transport and communications, research and technology development as well as
education, culture and health. The Executive Council is accountable to the
Assembly.19
The Permanent Representatives Committee

The Permanent Representatives Committee consists of AU ambassadors from the
member states. These meet at least once a month to make drafts for the Executive
Councils agenda and provide recommendations on what decisions it should take.
17
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 7.
18
P. Daleke, Afrikanska Unionen [The African Union] (The Swedish Institute of International
Affairs, 2005).
19
Constitutive Act of the African Union.
17
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The Committee is accountable to the Council and can form sub-committees or

working groups where it deems this necessary.20
The Commission
The Commission is the AUs secretariat and consists of a chairperson (Jean
Peng, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Gabon, who, in February
2008, was elected to replace President Alpha Oumar Konar), a vice-chairperson
and eight commissioners. The chairperson holds their post for four years and,
when electing a chairperson, vice-chairperson and the commissioners, it is
attempted to provide for a geographical spread (from Eastern, Western, Central,
Northern and Southern Africa). The Commission is both a preparatory and an
executive body where the eight commissioners are each responsible for their own
individual area: peace and security, political affairs, infrastructure and energy,
social affairs, human resources, science and technology, trade and industry,
farming and agricultural economics and economic affairs.21
There are also seven specialised committees that are subordinate to the
Commission22 and which support the Commissions work with departmental
ministers and senior officials from the member countries. The Commission
reports on its activity to the Executive Council. The Peace and Security
Directorate, one of the eight Directorates of the Commission, each of which has
its own commissioner, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
The Pan-African Parliament

The Pan-African Parliament consists of 265 parliamentarians: five (at least one
of whom must be a woman) from each member country. The Parliament is led by
a president and four vice-presidents, one representative from Southern, Western,
Eastern, Northern and Central Africa respectively. The Parliament usually meets
twice a year, but may also be convened if at least two-thirds of its members
request this. The Parliament was created as a common platform and body for
people and organisations to be able to take part in discussions and decision-
making with regard to development and economic integration on the African
continent. The goal is an institution with full legislative power; a kind of planned
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
International Cooperation Directorate; Women and Gender & Development Directorate; Office of
the General Counsel, Strategic; Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation; Office of the Internal
Audit, Protocol Services; Communication & Public Information Division.
18
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democratisation of the AU but, at present, the Parliament only has an advisory

role.23
How Do These Organs Relate to Each Other?

The Assembly is the highest decision-making body. The Executive Council is an
administrative and executive body that works on behalf of the Assembly. In turn,
the Committee carries out work on behalf of the Executive Council.
The Commission is both a preparatory and executive body that implements the
decisions made by the Assembly. It therefore implements the decisions made by
the Assembly on behalf of the Executive Council. The Pan-African Parliament is
formally outside the AUs decision-making and executive work and has the task
of putting topical issues on the agenda. The Parliament works solely on behalf of
the member states.
23
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 17.
19
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3 The African Unions Conflict

Management Bodies
Over the last few decades, Africa has been affected by violent conflicts to a
greater extent than other continents. Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Cte dIvoire and Burundi are a
few of the countries that have recently been, or are currently, affected. As a result
of this, the UNs peacekeeping efforts have increased greatly over the last few
years. Despite the increase in the UNs engagement, several of these conflicts
have rapidly deteriorated by the time the UN has arrived delays that are usually
due to discussions on mandates and attempts to get troop-contributing countries
to actually contribute them. UN missions are being deployed in increasingly
more complex areas of conflict and the design of the mission is also more
extensive, with military, policing and civilian components (so-called Integrated
Missions). The UN has, therefore, been sorely tested as regards both quantitative
aspects (the number of peacekeeping personnel) and qualitative aspects (the
integrated missions). Partly as the result of the Pan-Africanism mentioned in
Chapter 2 and partly as the result of the UNs inability to deploy troops in
African conflict areas at an early stage, if at all, the ASF within the AU has now
been identified as a possible alternative.24
At the African summit meeting in Durban, South Africa, in 2002, the AU was
launched with a broad political mandate within the areas of conflict prevention
efforts and conflict management. The AU Charter, and thereby the African
member states, also concedes that the AU is entitled to intervene in the member
states internal affairs during serious crises, such as genocide, war crimes or
human rights abuses.25 This agreement does not exist in, for example, the UN
Charter. On the other hand, world leaders agreed in 2005 that states have the
primary responsibility for the protection of their own populations while the
international community has the responsibility for preventing and reacting when
civilian populations are subjected to genocide, war crimes or human rights
violations, regardless of where they occur. This agreement has come to be called
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).26 So far, the political rhetoric has been
24
Carole Njoki, The African Standby Force (ASF) The African Solution for African Problems,
Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 24 January 2007.
25
African Union Constitutive Act, Article 4 (h).
26
The UN Security Council confirmed R2P in a resolution presented on 28 August 2006 regarding
the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. The Security Council invoked R2P for the first time
in the country-specific resolution on 31 August 2006 concerning Darfur, Sudan, and R2P
continues to be cited in country-specific and thematic debates. While many of the Council
20
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stronger than the political will, as, for example, the complaisance in Darfur has
demonstrated.27 This, combined with the fact that the UN has difficulty getting
troop contributions from the West for peacekeeping missions in Africa other
than military observers and staff personnel, has meant that the AU has come to
be regarded by many people as the ultimate guarantee for the safety of the
African people. In order to understand the AUs role and capacity within African
peace and security, this chapter will take a closer look at the AUs crisis
management bodies.
In order to underpin the broad mandate within peacebuilding efforts and conflict
management, the African leaders have developed a number of elements through
the AU within the scope of an overall framework that has come to be called the
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The central institution within
the AUs peace and security work is the Peace and Security Council (PSC),
which acts as the main decision-making body for peace and security issues in
Africa. The PSC is assisted by policy-supporting functions (Panel of the Wise,
Military Staff Committee, Continental Early Warning System and the
Chairperson of the Commission) as well as by the Peace and Security Directorate
within the Commission, and finally by an operational/tactical element, the ASF,
which includes military troops, police and civilian personnel. We will attempt to
analyse the relationships between these units below and provide a general
description of their tasks and aims.
3.1 The Peace and Security Council

Through the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union from the summit meeting in Durban in 2002, the
PSC was given considerable influence and is to be responsible for implementing
the AUs common defence policy with a view to protecting life and property and
members are in favour of R2P, there are many people who are opposed to the application of the
concept within the Councils work. The result has been that the Security Council has not yet
resolved whether and how R2P will direct its future work
(<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/>).
27
See Seth Appiah-Mensah, AUs Critical Assignment in Darfur: Challenges and Constraints,
African Security Review, 14:2, (2005).
21
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creating the conditions for permanent development.28 This gives the council,
among other things, a mandate to decide to set up peace-enforcement and
peacekeeping functions in order to predict and prevent conflicts. When conflicts
nevertheless arise, the PSC is responsible for authorising the setting up and
dispatching of peacekeeping missions. The PSC is also to provide
recommendations to the Assembly regarding intervention in a member country in
the event of serious circumstances, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity.29 The PSC also has powers to impose sanctions on member
states where unconstitutional changes of government have occurred,30 as well as
to monitor the development towards democracy, good governance, law and
order, the protection of human rights.31 The PSC thereby has a mandate to make
decisions itself on a number of questions regarding peace and security. However,
in the event of more serious crises such as genocide or missive human right
violations, or when action is required in a non-consenting member state, it is the
Assembly that jointly makes the decisions. Finally, it is the PSC that is to
promote and coordinate the continents struggle against terrorism as well as
promote and implement peacebuilding activities and reconstruction efforts. In its
work, the PSC is to promote close cooperation with the RECs and the UN
Secretariat and its different bodies.
The AU Assembly elects the 15 member states that are to sit as representatives
on the PSC. Five countries, one per region (Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern
and Western Africa), are elected for a three-year period (currently consisting of
Algeria, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa) while the remaining ten are
elected for a period of two years (currently consisting of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mozambique,
Senegal, Sudan and Togo).32 The chairmanship goes in alphabetical order and is
held for a calendar month at a time. Unlike the UN Security Council, none of the
member states has a permanent seat or the ability to use a veto to block a
decision, which, in practice, creates greater flexibility for the organisation to
make decisions. Decisions are made by consensus, or, if this does not work, with
a two-thirds majority.33 Since its inauguration in May 2004, the PSC has met on
a weekly basis to discuss conflicts on the continent and potential solutions to
these.
28
Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
(PSC Protocol), Article 3 (a, e).
29
PSC Protocol, Article 4 (j).
30
Ibid., Article 7 (1g).
31
Ibid., Article 3 (f).
32
In accordance with PSC Protocol, Article 5 (1-2).
33
Ibid., Article 8 Procedure, Voting (13).
22
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The Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise, which was officially inaugurated in December 2007, will
have a supporting role vis--vis the PSC and the Commissions chairperson,
particularly within conflict prevention measures and will also function as an
advisory party to these with regard to preserving and promoting peace and
security in Africa.34
According to the Protocol, the Panel of the Wise is to consist of five highly
respected African figures who have contributed to peace, security and
development in Africa and they are appointed for a period of three years35 by the
Chairperson of the Commission, Jean Ping.36 In January 2007, the following five
people were elected to the Panel of the Wise: Salim Ahmed Salim, former
Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (Eastern Africa); Brigalia
Bam, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa
(Southern Africa); Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of Algeria (Northern
Africa); Elisabeth K. Pognon, Chairperson of the Constitutional Court of Benin
(Western Africa) and Miguel Trovoada, former president of So Tom and
Principe (Central Africa).
3.2 The Peace and Security Directorate

The PSC is supported by the AU Commission, through the Commissions
chairperson, Jean Ping, and the Commissioner for Peace and Security and the
latters Peace and Security Directorate (PSD). The Commissioner is the Algerian
ambassador, Sad Djinnit, and the Directorate is headed by Geoffrey Mugumya.
As previously mentioned there are a total of eight Directorates under the
Commission, one of which is the PSD. While the PSC is the decision-making
body in peace and security matters, the PSD is the body that executes and
follows up the PSCs decisions and which strategically/operationally leads peace
and security work and the various AU efforts. The PSC also continuously briefs
the PSC on the state of the various peacekeeping missions. The PSD ultimately
acts as a harmonising party between the RECs and the PSC and between the
RECs and international initiatives, particularly from the UN and the EU.37
34
Ibid., Article 11 (1, 3).
35
8th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 29-30 January 2007, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, p. 152.
36
PSC Protocol, Article 11.
37
Peace and Security Directorate, < http://www.africa-
union.org/Structure_of_the_Commission/depPEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20DIRECTORA
TE.htm>.
23
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The PSD consists of a Conflict Management Division (CMD), a Peace Support

Operations Division (PSOD) and a Secretariat that is to assist the Peace and
Security Council. The organisational structure of the Peace and Security
Directorate is visually described on page 11.
The Conflict Management Division

The CMD is headed by Mr El Ghassim Wane and will be the operational policy
arm of the PSC consists of an Early Warning Unit and a Conflict Management
and Post-Conflict Unit. These two units will develop policy alternatives and
coordinate the peacekeeping initiatives for African intra- and interstate
conflicts.38
The Peace Support Operations Division

The PSOD is headed by Mr Bereng Mtimkulu. The PSOD will also consist of
two units, an Operations and Support Unit and an African Standby Force and
Military Staff Committee Unit. The PSOD strategically/operationally leads AU
peacekeeping missions, deploys liaison officers and special ambassadors, and
supports regional peace initiatives. The PSOD also assists in reconstruction
efforts and deploys observers in conflict areas.39
The PSOD is to take a similar role within the AU as the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has within the UN, i.e. it is to become the AU
department responsible for planning, preparing and strategically/operationally
leading peacekeeping missions on the African continent. It is also the PSOD that
appoints a Special Representative and Force Commander for each AU mission.
The similarity between the PSOD and the DPKO should not be taken too far,
however, as the staff of the PSOD is just a fraction of that of the DPKO. The
DPKO has 630 staff (with a planned increase of 295 staff as a result of the recent
establishment of the Department of Field Support), while the PSOD has fewer
than eight staff (with budgetary support from the EU this could be 18 staff, but
the staffing has been postponed).
The intention is for the PSOD to be able to manage, plan, organise and lead the
ASF. The PSOD is to consist of a Planning Element (PLANELM) with 15 staff
and is also intended to have the capacity to carry out Lessons Learned and Best
38
Ibid.
39
Peace and Security Directorate, < http://www.africa-union.org/Structure_of_the_Commission/
depPEACE %20AND%20SECURITY%20DIRECTORATE.htm>.
24
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Practices and have liaison officers and advisory personnel assigned to the UNs
DPKO in New York and the UN regional office in Addis Ababa.40
At a briefing in the Development Co-ordination Review Forum on 2 December
2007 the matter of why the PSOD was not yet sufficiently staffed, given that
there is the necessary funding through the European Commission/UNs capacity
building programme, was raised. Mr Bereng Mtimkulu, the Head of the PSOD,
explained that the new PSOD structure will consist of 100 staff, but stressed that
the PSOD needs to grow gradually, with support from, above all, the UN. At this
meeting, it was also stated that there was still no organisational chart to show
how the PSOD will be structured.41
This massive understaffing, combined with the many duties the PSOD currently
has, results, of course, in a tremendous strain on the staff. Regardless of their
qualities and knowledge, in the end, this leads to the AUs present efforts being
greatly neglected as regards strategic and operational management.
The Military Staff Committee

Another support function for the PSC within the Commission is the Military
Staff Committee (MSC), which consists of experienced officers who will have an
advisory role towards the PSC with regard to military and security-related issues.
The MSC consists of representatives from the countries elected to the PSC for
that electoral period.42
The Continental Early Warning System
In order to detect and prevent conflicts, the intention is to establish a centrally
located continent-wide Early Warning System (CEWS), which will, in turn, be
linked to regional early warning systems in each of the five RECs that are
responsible for setting up their own individual brigades for the ASF. The central
CEWS will have a Situation Room for data collection and analysis. The CEWS
will also gather information from the member states and other governments,
40
Talk, The Establishment of the African Standby Force A Progress Report, by Henri Boshoff,
the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa, at the Swedish Ministry of Defence,
December 2007.
41
Development Co-ordination Review Forum (DCRF), Meeting on Peace and Security, Meeting of
29 November, British Embassy, Addis Ababa, 2 December 2007.
42
Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff
Committee (PART I), Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (I), Document adopted by the Third Meeting of African
Chiefs of Defense Staff, 15-16 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
25
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regional and international organisations, research centres, academic institutions

as well as from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).43
3.3 The African Standby Force

The ASF is accountable to the PSD and funded from a Special Peace Fund.44 It is
led by the Nigerian Major-General Ishaya Hassan. The ASF consists of five
multinational brigades, which are set up and based in the respective regions
(Eastern, Central, Northern, Western and Southern Africa).45 The ASF is to be
equipped and ready for rapid deployment in missions that range from observation
missions to peace-enforcement assignments (scenarios 16 below). It will be
possible to deploy the force if this is requested by a member state itself or in a
member state where there has been a serious human rights abuse or genocide.
The mandate for these missions is obtained from either the AU or the UN
Security Council.46
The establishment of the ASF is taking place in two stages. In phase 1, which ran
until 30 June 2005, the AU was to develop a capacity to cope with scenarios 1
and 2 (AU/Regional military advisors to political missions and AU/Regional
observation missions deployed together with UN missions). The five regional
organisations, the RECs, were, during the same period, to develop the capacity to
deal with scenario 4 (AU/Regional peacekeeping force in accordance with
Chapter VI of the UN Charter).
43
PSC Protocol, Article 12.
44
The Special Peace Fund lies outside the ordinary budget of the AU and is primarily financed by
external actors.
45
In Section 3.4, the regional organisations responsible for establishing these brigades are described.
46
Njoki, The African Standby Force (ASF).
26
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Scenario Description Deployment

requirement
(from resolution)
1 AU/Regional military advisors to political 30 days

missions
2 AU/Regional observers together with UN 30 days

missions
3 AU/Regional observation missions 30 days

(independently)
4 AU/Regional peacekeeping force in 30 days

accordance with Chapter VI and for
preventive missions and peacebuilding
5 AU peacekeeping force for complex 90 days, with the

multidimensional peacemaking missions, military component
including those involving so-called ready to deploy within
spoilers in low-intensity conflicts 30 days
6 AU intervention, e.g. in genocide 14 days with a robust
situations where the international military force
community does not act promptly.
The AUs objective during phase 1 was also to be able to have a pool of forces of
300500 military observers and 240 police officers stationed in the member
states with the ability to be deployed within 14 days. Furthermore, they would
like to establish stand-by police units which would consist of two company-size
units (about 225 police officers) who could be deployed in complex
peacekeeping missions within 90 days.47
During phase 2 (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010), the AU is to have developed a
capacity to carry out all five scenarios right up to complex peacekeeping
missions in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. During the same
period, the RECs are to have developed a capacity to establish a mission
headquarters for scenario 4 and continue to develop the brigades and support
elements for these.48 The targets established will make great demands on
47
Committee (PART I), Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (I), Document adopted by the Third Meeting of African
Chiefs of Defense Staff, 15-16 May 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
48
Ibid.
27
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leadership, communication, interoperability, logistics and equipment, but also on

training, education and, not least, joint training between the different RECs and
between the RECs and the AU and the AU and the UN.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and the RECs is to be
signed in accordance with the Protocol. The final draft of this, the Memorandum
of Understanding between the AU and the RECs, was approved at the AU
summit meeting of 29 January 2008.49 The ASF is to be able to complement the
UN peacekeeping missions and fill the gaps where the UN falls short on the
African continent. This involves, besides the possibility of intervening in the
event of serious human rights abuses, also the means to get to the scene at an
early stage of the conflict when the UN has not yet had time to mobilise
sufficient operational forces. The memorandum also point to the possibility of
intervening in low-intensity conflicts that the UN does not normally get involved
in, like the one in the Comoros, as well as an opportunity for the AU to play an
important political role in conflict situations through so-called hybrid missions
together with the UN.50
While the UN plays an important role as an organisational model and support
function, as well as contributing advisers and assistance with manuals, doctrines
and technical systems in order to facilitate interoperability with future hybrid
missions and handovers, the EU acts as the biggest funder of the AUs peace and
security work. The EUs support primarily consists of the Peace Facility for
Africa, whose budget is 250 million and which has the purpose of supporting
the AU-led peacekeeping missions (e.g. 92 million to the AUs mission in
Darfur, AMIS [The African Union Mission in Sudan]), the AUs organisational
development and the RECs organisational development within the framework of
their peace and security work.51 As a result of this and also within a number of
other areas, the EU is an important partner of the AU.
The Civilian Elements within the African Standby Force

At the meeting in Durban in 2002, it was also recommended that the AU should
establish and centrally manage a pool of forces for mission-related administration
49
African Union Press Release No. 17/2008, Signing of an MoU on the Relationship between the
African Union, CENSAD, ECOWAS and IGAD.
50
For example, the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OLMEE) and the United Nations
Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS). Talk, The Establishment of the African Standby Force
A Progress Report, by Henri Boshoff, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South
Africa, at the Swedish Ministry of Defence, December 2007.
51
EU Support for Peace and Security in Africa, Fact Sheet,
<http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/Africa %20final.pdf>.
28
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and civilian experts specialising in human rights, humanitarian issues,

government rule, in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), as
well as in reconstruction in order to be able to be included as a component in a
peacekeeping mission.52
At the briefing at the Development Co-ordination Review Forum of 2 December
2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Head of the Peace Support Operations
Division (see the section below), Mr Bereng Mtimkulu, emphasised that there
has to be greater focus on the non-military elements (both police and civilian) of
the ASF as they have fallen behind in their development. For example,
invitations have been sent to the regions where they have explicitly requested
representatives from the police and civilian components. It is, however, rarely the
case that these enquiries are responded to. At the beginning of 2008, a meeting is
planned for parties that may be interested in financially or technically supporting
the non-military elements of the ASF.53 As indicated above, there is very limited
civilian capacity within the ASF as the development of the brigades has used up
all its energy so far.
3.4 Regional Actors

At present, there are at least 42 different regional organisations and institutions in
Africa with varying aims and ambitions. To exemplify the multitude of
memberships and fields of interest existing, it can be mentioned that, of the 53
African states, 26 are members of two different regional organisations and 19 of
these states are members of three different organisations. Overlapping and
competing structures are thereby a problem that must be dealt with within the
AU in order to avoid the unnecessary duplication of efforts and resources and to
facilitate the financial and temporal obligations that membership of several
organisations involves.54 A number of the continents organisations primarily
work on economic development cooperation and go under the name of Regional
Economic Communities (RECs).
The AU is consciously working towards streamlining and structuring the work of
the regional organisations on the continent and now officially works together
with seven RECs.55 Five of these clearly specialise in conflict management and
52
Committee (PART I).
53
Development Co-ordination Review Forum (DCRF), Meeting on Peace and Security, Meeting of
29 November, British Embassy, Addis Ababa, 2 December 2007.
54
Franke, Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continents Emerging Security Architecture.
55
Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission, 2004.
29
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act as the AUs mainstays within conflict management work. Among other
things, they will within the framework for this each contribute a brigade to the
ASF, which is the reason there is a general presentation of them below. The other
two RECs that officially work together with the AU are the Common Market for
East & Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan
States (CEN-SAD). However, these focus primarily on economic development
work. The map below shows the memberships of the African states in the five
RECs contributing to the African Standby Force. It should be noted that the grey
areas are states without membership in any of the five organisations and that
Angola and the DR Congo have double memberships.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in

1975 and consists of fifteen West African member states: Benin, Burkina Faso,
the Cape Verde Islands, Cte dIvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The
organisations primary aim is to promote economic integration and security.
30
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Initially, its goal was to create a strong trade federation by means of an economic
and monetary union, but this was transformed into a looser federation. The
members of ECOWAS have signed a protocol on mutual assistance in the event
of an attack, which takes care of the establishment of an allied force.56 The
organisation has previous experience of carrying out peacekeeping missions in
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cte dIvoire and Guinea-Bissau. The ECOWAS brigade
for the ASF goes under the name of the ECOWAS Brigade (ECOBRIG).
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) consists of fifteen
member states: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles,
Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The organisation
works together within socio-economics and integration, politically as well as
within peace and security. The foundations were laid as early as the 1960s and
1970s when the countries leaders worked together at the political, diplomatic
and military level to fight colonialism. SADC was created in its present form in
1992. The political work and security cooperation are institutionalised in the
Organ of Politics, Defence and Security (ODPS). SADCs brigade for the ASF
goes under the name of the SADC Brigade (SADCBRIG).
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has six member
states: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and was founded
in its present form in 1995. The aim was, with UN assistance, to create an
international body that would work on regional security and conduct the political
dialogue. Since 2005, IGAD has been an active player and contributed resources
to the conflict in Somalia. Eritrea, which was previously a member of IGAD,
withdrew its membership in April 2007, partly as a result of the Ethiopian
peacekeeping forces in Somalia. The IGAD brigade contributes what is called the
Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) to the ASF.
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),57 formed in
1983, is the economically weakest of the five African regional organisations that
are responsible for the ASFs brigades. Its members, Angola (not a member until
1999), Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, Rwanda, So Tom and
Prncip and Chad, are among the very poorest countries in Africa and in the
world.58 The organisation is in great need of external financing and it is likely
56
K. Powell, The African Unions Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and
Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect, ISS Monograph Series, No. 119
(2005).
57
In French, Communaut conomique des tats de lAfrique Centrale (CEEAC).
58
<http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/index.php?rubrique=presentation&id=3>.
31
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that it will soon merge with the free trade organisation the Economic and
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC, from the French
Communaut conomique et Montaire de lAfrique Centrale),59 something the
EU has worked towards since 2003 with a view to strengthening the region. Its
work on the standby brigade, the Multinational Force of Central Africa
(FOMAC, from the French, Force multinationale de lAfrique centrale), is still
only at the planning stage although a number of units have been announced.
The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)60 was not founded until 1989 in Marrakesh,
Morocco. Its members are Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia.61
With the exception of Mauritania, these are among the economically strongest
states in Africa. Despite this, the organisations work has stumbled along,
primarily due to the political antagonism between Morocco and Algeria, but
neither Libya nor Tunisia has shown any great ambitions in the Unions work
either. It is interesting that Egypt is not part of the AMU and has, in this way,
positioned itself outside all the regional organisations in Africa. As the AMUs
member states are strong militarily and, as in the case of Morocco and Tunisia,
have much experience of UN missions, the union could relatively quickly set up
a brigade within the framework of the ASF. However, due to difficulties
cooperating politically, they have not come very far with the brigade they have
announced, the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG).
The African regional organisations suffer from an enormous lack of resources
and capacity, which has affected and will continue to affect work on achieving
useful, operational brigades within the framework of the ASF. The problems also
consist of a lack of capacity to centrally lead regional organisations, the states of
which are unevenly distributed in terms of political and economic development
and which have different political agendas.62
The AU has drawn attention to the risks of the uncontrolled spread of regional
organisations and regional initiatives. The AU has, therefore, as previously
mentioned, limited its cooperation to the seven most important RECs on the
continent. In addition, a summit meeting in Banjul in 2006 was devoted to the
question of the rationalisation of the RECs on the continent. The RECs the AU
works with are, on the other hand, striving to have very good relations and to
harmonise work in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and competition for
resources. Rationalisation, harmonisation and integration of the cooperation
59
The members of which are the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon,
the Republic of Congo and Chad.
60
In French, Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA).
61
<http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/uma.cfm>.
62
Powell, The African Unions Emerging Peace and Security Regime.
32
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between different regional organisations and the AU are, in addition, principles

that appear in the majority of the AUs supporting documents.63 The fact that the
AU has a delegate who attends to coordination with the RECs, that regular
institutionalised meetings take place between the AU and the RECs and that the
AU has set up a liaison office at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja can be
seen as clear signs of their aspirations for an effective partnership with the
regional organisations.64 The most important step in making the relationships
between the AU and the RECs more effective is, however, the decision to base
the AUs ASF on five multinational regional brigades set up within the
respective RECs. The consequences of the regional structure are one of the
subjects in the chapter below.
63
See the Constitutive Act; the Protocol on the Establishment of the PSC and the Draft
Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs. See also Franke, Competing
Regionalisms in Africa and the Continents Emerging Security Architecture.
64
Funmi Olonisakin, African Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: An Assessment of the Continents
Evolving Peace and Security Architecture (New York: United Nations Best Practices, 2004), p. 8.
33
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4 Discussing the Development of the

AU
The AU as an organisation is a large study area and this introductory study has
had the aim of providing a general description of the organisation, with particular
focus on conflict management. During the work, we have, however, identified a
number of key areas that should be highlighted at this early stage in the study and
discussed in a little more detail whether a fundamental understanding of the
organisations development will be able to be obtained. This chapter therefore
discusses the AUs development, focusing on a number of important areas.
Where is the AU heading?
4.1 State Sovereignty or Interventions to

Safeguard Human Security?
As previously mentioned, the introduction of two new norms in Pan-African
politics constitutes the biggest difference between the AU and its predecessor,
the OAU: the condemnation of non-constitutional changes of government and the
introduction of interventions in serious circumstances, which, in a later context,
has come to be called the responsibility to protect (R2P).65 It should, however,
be pointed out that, higher up on the list in Article 4, the principles of state
sovereignty and non-intervention appear, although this is not mentioned as
frequently in the references to the Constitutive Act. This section will take a closer
look at the area of tension between the principles of sovereignty and intervention
within the AU.
Three important factors operate within the area of tension: the organisations
ambition and culture, the organisations capacity to intervene and the Member
States will and ability to contribute political decisions, as well as finances and
personnel for implementation. The principles of sovereignty and intervention and
R2P respectively will thereby be applied from case to case depending on political
processes and interests. At the heart of the discussion is Article 4(h) of the AUs
Constitutive Act, which expresses the following principle:
65
Paul D. Williams, From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of
the African Unions Security Culture, African Affairs, 106/423, March 2007, pp. 253279, p. 278.
The R2P principle was developed in a report, The Responsibility to Protect from December
2001, by the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
34
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The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a

decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;66
What is important in relation to this principle is that it only requires a two-thirds

majority within the AUs highest decision-making body, the AU Assembly, to
carry out an intervention. In other words, without individual states right of veto,
the organisation can force through decisions on sanctions and interventions in
individual states by virtue of a statutory majority of the member states.
As previously mentioned, the AUs explicit and implicit organisational culture
and norms also play an important role for work within the organisation. The AU
was created in the context of a new wave of Pan-Africanism, which emphasised
democracy, accountability, good governance and political openness as important
concepts for African security.67 Unlike its predecessor, the OAU, this is also
clearly stated in the charter.68 This was also highlighted by the former
Chairperson of the AU Commission, President Alpha Oumar Konar, who
advocated the importance of going from an organisational culture based on non-
intervention to non-indifference, which briefly means that the fundamental
principles of the sovereignty and right of self-determination of states must not
entail that human suffering is accepted due to intrastate persecution or abuse of
power; on the contrary, this will lead to an intervention in such cases.69 These
principles are in stark contrast to the OAUs uncompromising support for the
sovereignty of states and the principle of non-intervention.70 It has also been
noted that the political norms on the continent are largely based on a change in
the concept of security from state security to human security, which is clearly
enshrined in the AU Charter.71 At the same time, it is cautioned that the concept
of human security is on the retreat within the AU. According to Thomas Kwasi
Tieku, there is the risk of a return to the OAUs system of norms based on the
sovereignty of the state and non-intervention. The risk is an anti-colonial view of
human security as a neo-colonialist attempt to impute Western values to African
states. Advocates of the principle of human security are not as powerful today as
they were at the time of the creation of the AU and the anti-Western rhetoric of
66
Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4, Principles.
67
Landsberg, The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism, p. 117.
68
See, for example, the African Union Constitutive Act, Article 4, Principles (m).
69
Tim Murithi, The Responsibility to Protect, as Enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of
the African Union, African Security Review, 16:3, 2007, p. 16.
70
Williams, From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference, p. 278.
71
Thomas Kwasi Tieku, African Union Promotion of Human Security in Africa, African Security
Review, 16:2, 2007, p. 27.
35
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their opponents is enticing. This is made clear when comparing the original draft
of the AUs joint defence and security policy, produced in the early years of the
AU, and the recently produced Non-Aggression and Defence Pact, in which
human security is not expressed as an important factor.72
The strong wording of the AUs Constitutive Act and the subsequent
establishment of the ASF and other structures for international missions offset,
however, the most negative descriptions of the development of norms and culture
within the AU. It is, therefore, too early to draw any conclusions regarding the
AUs future support for R2P and human security. A hard balancing act for
external actors working for democratisation and liberalisation is to support the
AU as conflict managers without this giving the appearance of implementing
Western values something that could ultimately weaken the African Union and
its even more fragile R2P culture.
4.2 A Decentralised Structure in Symbiosis?

An interesting and important aspect of the African Unions new peace and
security structure is its multilayered, decentralised method of security
cooperation. As described in Chapter 3, the Pan-African security structure within
the AU gravitates towards existing regional organisations, particularly in the
implementation of continent-wide security policy.73
Historically, however, the regional structure is on shaky ground as relations
within and between the different regions have, in some cases, involved conflicts
and competition for existing aid. Chapter 2 demonstrated the abundance of
different regional organisations and institutions on the continent, which need to
be integrated into the AU in different ways. Overlapping and competing
structures are thereby a problem that must be dealt with within the AU in order to
avoid the unnecessary duplication of efforts and resources and to facilitate the
financial and temporal obligations that membership of several organisations
involves. 74 As previously mentioned, this is a problem the AU is very conscious
of and which has already been dealt with in several different ways by, among
other things, limiting the number of organisations the AU works together with
and by allowing the RECs to be the mainstays within conflict management.
72
Ibid., pp. 3334.
73
Benedikt F. Franke, Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: U.S. Military Capacity Building and
Africas Emerging Security Architecture, Strategic Insights, 6:1, January 2007.
74
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The decentralised system has, however, been criticised for creating unnecessary
bureaucracy and organisational complexity on the continent and, consequently,
causing lengthy processes when conflicts and crises are to be dealt with. The five
RECs, which are the mainstays of the ASF, are also faced with several individual
challenges in their work on achieving peace and security. These shortcomings
may have consequences for the development of continental capacity in the areas
of peace and security and will require good monitoring within the capacity
development at both continental and regional levels.75
Several authors (Powell, Franke, Juma and Mengistu) believe, however, that the
regional system has significant advantages. By incorporating existing regional
systems, the AU is allowed to profit from the RECs comparative advantages, i.e.
their experience of previous peace operations and already established
frameworks and mechanisms for the prevention and management of conflicts.76
The proximity of the regional organisations to trouble spots may also lead to a
better understanding of the specific dynamics of the conflict which actors and
interests are of importance and how to best arrive at a solution. The proximity
principle may also, in theory at least, lead to the regional organisations managing
these crises more effectively than larger organisations, such as the UN.77 The
idea is that the regional organisations and leaders have greater political
legitimacy in the conflict area than international organisations. It would thereby
be easier for them to achieve peace and security in conflicts than for distant
powers.78 It should, however, be added that while proximity to conflicts may lead
to comparatively legitimate, quick and less costly missions by the RECs, they
could, however, also jeopardise the neutrality and impartiality of the actions.
Being close to a conflict may cause considerable tension between the parties
involved: in the worst case scenario, so much tension that the regional
organisation that is to remain impartial becomes part of the conflict.79 It is,
therefore, relevant to raise the matter of how the regional organisations should
act if a great power of a region is a party in a conflict and whether the regional
brigade will then be sufficiently impartial and strong to act neutrally, or if more
geographically distant brigades from the ASF should be used.80
75
76
77
78
M. Juma and A. Mengistu, The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peace Building
Capacity of African Institutions (International Peace Academy, 2002).
79
80
International Peace Academy, Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives on the Brahimi
Report on UN Operations (2001).
37
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The regional structure of the AUs peace and security architecture means that the
organisation is continuing to build on established structures for peace and
security and focusing them on joint efforts towards continent-wide conflict
management.81 The creation of the ASF in regional form therefore contributes
towards continent-wide security policy cooperation in a further two ways. Firstly,
the ASF constitutes a common goal for the member states, a political framework
for peace and security, which increases the opportunity for channelling the great
variety of resources, initiatives and programmes in a common direction.82
Secondly, the ASFs decentralised structure helps the regional organisations
retain both their interest and a sense of responsibility as they still personally play
a key role in both regional and continental security. A large part of the
responsibility for peace and security in Africa is thereby kept within the regional
organisations, while the AU contributes the strategic framework, the continental
legitimacy and the important conceptual and institutional link with the global
level (the UN, the EU, etc.). This mutual symbiosis between the AU and the
regional organisations increases the different actors sense of responsibility for
the capacity development at the same time as reducing the risk of competition
between different levels of African security organisations and initiatives
something that often restricted the OAUs initiatives regarding peace operations
and joint forces.83 The regional, decentralised peace and security structure within
the AU may, therefore, be described as a natural and practical solution to the
problem of creating integration and cooperation over such a large and
heterogeneous area as Africa. In order to effectively develop African conflict
management capacity, the local, regional and continental levels will be required.
It should, however, be emphasised that capacity that is equivalent to the levels
tasks and undertakings must exist at all three levels if the structure is to work
well.84
4.3 The Gap between Ambition and Capacity

The institutional framework, as well as doctrines and concepts for AU-led peace
support operations are in place and are of a relatively high quality. Unfortunately,
the actual implementing structure does not match up to the theoretical and
conceptual one. The AU needs time to develop its practical capacity and the
81
82
Cedric de Coning, Towards a Common Southern African Peacekeeping System, Electronic
Briefing Paper No. 16, Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2004, p. 4.
83
84
This was raised by Colonel Anders Edqvist, former Swedish defence attach in South Africa,
during an interview at the Ministry of Defence on 26 November 2007.
38
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missions carried out and going on therefore have had little chance of succeeding.
These hastily put-together and, in many aspects, inadequate efforts are the result
of a great willingness to find African solutions to African problems, eagerly
supported by external actors reluctance to become too heavily involved in
complex and, to say the least, dangerous missions on the continent. This has led
to the AU taking on assignments with international support, despite all involved
actors being well aware of the many shortcomings.85 The other side of the same
coin is that, given the ambition of African solutions to African problems, the AU
has been reluctant to accept support when it patently needs it.
African leaders have put the creation of the ASF at the heart of the AUs peace
and security agenda. By way of this tool the PSC will be given the capacity to
intervene militarily in conflict and crisis areas when this is required.86 It is, of
course, impossible to emphasise enough how important the ASFs capacity will
be for the credibility of the PSC on the continent. Work has, however, proceeded
very slowly and it cannot be regarded as likely that these will be fully operational
by 2010 as planned. In the meantime, the many shortcomings in the AUs
operations in Somalia and Sudan are showing a major gap between ambition,
capacity and quality.
When we speak of a lack of resources and capacity within the AU, it may be
necessary to make this clear by using a few figures in order to illustrate the
extent of the problem. In 2007, the AUs total budget was USD 73 million. In
addition, there is what international donors contribute within the AUs Peace
Fund and what is provided in connection with specific operations. USD 73
million is, however, a very small sum in the context. For example, the EUs
budget is 2,500 times bigger at EUR 129 billion. The member states within the
AU are among the poorest on the planet and their limited national budgets are in
many cases largely financed by international donors. According to the
Commission for Africa, half of all Africans live on less than one dollar per day
and the life expectancy age is 46 years.87 As an example, it can be noted that the
total GDP of Africa, despite a population of 928 million, is only slightly more
than double that of Swedens GDP with a population of 9 million.88
An important argument that is often presented in connection with the AU and the
ASFs capacity development is that the biggest problem is not producing soldiers
85
Ibid.
86
See Article 13 (1), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, July
2002.
87
Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa, March
2005, http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/introduction.html
88
Data collected and presented by BG Bergstrand, Swedish Defence Research Agency.
39
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but transporting them quickly over great distances and being able to support them
with sufficient logistics for a long time and under difficult circumstances.89
Deane-Peter Baker believes that the AUs lack of capacity was illustrated
through its inability to quickly and effectively intervene in Somalia in December
2006 after Ethiopia invaded Somalia and when it began its retreat from Somalia
after international pressure. Somalia witnessed the beginning of a revolt and the
AU decided to send 8,000 peacekeepers from the African Union Mission to
Somalia (AMISOM). However, the AU was only able to muster 4,000 soldiers
on paper, of which only 1,200 Ugandan soldiers were sent to Somalia in March
2007. In August 2007, only a couple of hundred Ugandans had arrived in
addition to the initial force and there were no other troop contributions in place
although 1,700 soldiers from Burundi were technically ready to be deployed but,
according to them, they still lacked transport and communications equipment
promised by the US and France.90 It should, however, be added that the rapidly
deteriorating security situation made other potential troop contributors hesitant
about the mission in Somalia and technical obstacles should, to some extent, be
seen as excuses to avoid having to go into a highly dangerous mission area a
reluctance the AUs member states share with both the EU and the UN.
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has further underlined the gap
between the AUs ambitions and its capacity to intervene in crises. The
conclusions from a seminar arranged by the International Peace Academy once
again point to it not being enough just having soldiers available.91 Among other
things, it indicates a lack of planning on the part of AMIS prior to the operation
commencing. In principle, there were no ready structures for strategic and
operational command and control, and the result was an ad hoc organisation
which did not have the capacity to command the mission effectively. This should
be linked to the analysis of the PSOD in the previous chapter, which highlighted
the serious understaffing and lack of resources for planning and leading missions.
The logistics were also completely lacking at the beginning of the mission and
did not function until a private American company was hired with funding from
the US State Department. The lack of resources meant that units and observers in
the field often lacked sufficient means of communication and transport. Another
conclusion was that the operation was completely dependent on funding, tactical
89
Deane-Peter Baker, The AU Standby Force and the Challenges of Somalia, African Security
Review, 16:2, 2007, p. 122.
90
BBC News, Burundi delays Somali deployment, 7 August 2007,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 6935033 .stm>.
91
Catherine Guicherd (Rapporteur), The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African Standby Force
(International Peace Academy, 2007).
40
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advice, and technical assistance from external actors. This caused unnecessary
delays, uncertainty, limitations and confusion.92
Like all international organisations, the member states willingness to contribute
motivation, funding and resources of different kinds is decisive for the AUs
ability to implement decisions. For this reason, the AUs development is largely
dependent on its ability to exude confidence both on the continent and
internationally. The development of the AUs capacity in the areas of peace and
security therefore largely depends on the organisations ability to make the latest
wave of Pan-Africanism tangible in a credible form and thereby act as a catalyst
for continental integration. This ability is largely dependent on the member
states perception of the AUs capacity, in relation to the membership cost,
which, in the end, either generates political will and drive, or an implementation
and credibility crisis where financial, personnel and material contributions
quickly disappear. The OAU suffered, to a great extent, from implementation
difficulties when the organisations high-flying ambitions were not supported by
a corresponding political will from its members. At the moment, however, the
majority of member states have a great political willingness to support the AUs
work. It is more the case that there is frustration at the Commissions inability to
execute decisions or make the most of the member states expertise in order to
support the organisations work and processes.93
For this reason, the AUs failed missions and the financial problems, combined
with its weak stance against, for example, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and
Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, are serious. Its strength and credibility are weakened,
as the high expectations set are not met. The president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-
Sirleaf, has repeatedly stated that setting expectations that are too high is a major
danger in war-torn regions.94 The same applies to the complicated organisational
climate in Africa, in which loyalties change just as quickly as perceptions of
capacity and returns. It will take a long time to build up the resources and
capacity required to implement the AUs comprehensive Constitutive Act. It is
deemed that 2010 will not be a realistic target for the operability of the ASFs
five brigades within the full scale of deployment scenarios indicated.95 The
organisation must, therefore, be given time, finances and peaceful surroundings
in order to develop this capacity before it is forced into missions that are too
92
Ibid., pp. 34.
93
Interview with Martin Kimani, Senior Researcher at the ISS, Stockholm, 21 January 2008.
94
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, speech to the Swedish Parliament on 27 November 2007.
95
This clearly emerged at an interview with Colonel Anders Edqvist, former Swedish defence
attach in South Africa, at the Ministry of Defence on 26 November 2007, and at the talk The
Establishment of the African Standby Force A Progress Report, by Henri Boshoff, Institute of
Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa, at the Ministry of Defence in December 2007.
41
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comprehensive and that risk upsetting its present status, and the affection for it
among many of Africas leaders and peoples. The AUs leadership also has a
responsibility not to set too high expectations until such time as there is sufficient
capacity and not to create too big a gap between the organisations ambitions and
its actual capacity. External actors who have lent support to the organisations
ambitions by pushing it into complex conflicts also have an important role to
play by focusing on the development of the AUs capacity without asking too
much of missions over the next few years.
4.4 Striking a Balance: African Ownership

External Funding
The lack of economic and material resources is one of the biggest problems that
all peace and security initiatives contend with on the African continent. At
present, funding from external donors is a necessity in order to be able to carry
out any activity whatsoever within the AU and in order to improve the
organisations capacity to forestall, prevent and manage conflicts. The African
Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and the AMIS were largely funded by external
actors, which also applies to the development of the ASF. All operations are also
influenced greatly by international expertise, advisors and companies. This is, to
some extent, problematical in relation to the popular motto, African solutions to
African problems. Bearing in mind the continents extreme poverty and the
limited funds in the public coffers, complete African funding and ownership are
utopian in the short and medium term. At the same time, in order to maintain the
AUs legitimacy and credibility on the continent, it is extremely important that
external funding is not accompanied by too much influence on decision-making
processes or leadership.96 Often, increased funding is not enough either, as skills
and personnel are in short supply within the organisation. On several occasions,
money has been sent back when the AU Commission has not had the staffing
capacity to accept and administer these financial contributions to operations.97
Bearing in mind the expressed importance of African solutions to African
problems and the hesitation over Western interference in decision-making
processes, mentorship and advice are instead, according to Anders Edqvist, a
model that can be combined with financial support. This model is, however,
significantly more difficult than completely taking over, as it is based on mutual
96
Kwesi Aning, Africa: Confronting Complex Threats, IPA Coping with Crisis, Working Paper
Series, February 2007, pp. 810.
97
Interview with Martin Kimani.
42
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trust in order to work.98 Once again, it will be difficult for Sweden and other
external actors to strike the right balance.
98
Interview with Anders Edqvist.
43
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5. Conclusions
The African Union was created out of a new wave of Pan-Africanism and has
become a very important organisation for peace and security in Africa in a short
time. Its Constitutive Act gives the organisation the ability to intervene when
there are serious crimes against humanity and non-constitutional changes of
government, such as military coups something that distinguishes the AU from
its toothless predecessor, the OAU. A number of important institutions, such as
the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early
Warning System, and the African Standby Force, have been created in a short
time and are accompanied by an impressive doctrine and concept development.
The AU is an organisation with great ambitions regarding the promotion of peace
and security, but which, at the same time, suffers from a serious lack of
resources. Extremely limited finances and a small staff at its headquarters mean
that the organisation has great difficulty meeting the high expectations set. The
AU is, therefore, best described as a skeleton structure that must be given time to
develop the capacity required in order to bridge the gap between ambition and
actual ability. The development of the ASF, based on five regional brigades, is
absolutely central to building up this capacity. Despite the fact that the ASF has
large sections of the brigades ready on paper, there are major gaps within
leadership, training, equipment, transport options and the general health
situation. Having five fully operational brigades ready by 2010 cannot be
regarded as a realistic goal.
Like all international organisations, the AU suffers from the great breadth of
national and regional interests. Just as within the framework of the UN and the
EUs international efforts, the political support of the member states is required
in each individual case and, in particular, contributions in the form of troops,
materiel and diplomacy. The AU will never be more effective than the sum of its
members will. A triangular area of tension has, thereby, arisen between the
AUs ambitions, the organisations resources and capacity and the member
states political interests and will. At present, there is sufficient political will
among the majority of member states while the lack of resources is limiting the
contributions required for effective implementation.
Despite the shortcomings, the AU has, however, carried out an impressive
number of diplomatic tasks, sent observers to conflicts and, in particular, carried
out a number of large-scale peacekeeping operations in difficult areas, such as
Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, since its official inauguration in 2002. The
conclusion is, therefore, that the willingness and ambition that pervade the AUs
44
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work must be accompanied by a major build-up in capacity in order to reinforce

the organisations credibility on the African continent and also globally.
5.1 Future Research

One of the aims of this study was to identify important areas for future research.
In conclusion, an account will therefore be given of the areas the authors of this
report consider of interest for future studies. A more in-depth understanding of
the AU as an organisation and how its different bodies function and relate to each
other is certainly necessary. As previously mentioned, no official organisation
charts of the AU have been produced, which is, in all likelihood, due to the fact
that the work of the organisation is still somewhat fluid and cannot be formalised
on a clear chart. Time will be required for the organisation to mature and for
practical structures to take root and future studies will be required on location in
Addis Ababa. The more in-depth studies should also include all the AUs bodies
and support functions so as to gain a complete picture of the organisation.
Further points for future study include following the development of the ASF.
This should include both the continental level with command structures, concept
and doctrine development and the regional level where the majority of the actual
development of the brigades takes place. These studies must not focus too much
on the number of troops and equipment and must also include training level and
military culture. The neglected civilian aspects of international efforts are, of
course, of great importance for the development of the ASFs capacity and
thereby an important area for future studies.
One obvious study that will be of great interest is the illustration and evaluation
of the peace-support missions that the AU has carried out and those that are
ongoing. These studies also provide an increased understanding of the AUs
capacity development, as any shortcomings soon become obvious when the
organisation is forced out into the field.
Besides an increased understanding of the AUs organisation and capacity, future
studies need to put the AU in a wider political perspective. At a global level, this
should include relations with the EU, the UN and the great powers. Future
research should also put the AU into a continental and regional context to an
even greater extent than this study. The relationship between the AU and the
regional organisations is a complex problem area that requires more extensive
illustration. For this, it is not just studies of relationships that are required, but
also increased knowledge and understanding of the regional organisations,
particularly the five RECs, which are responsible for the ASFs regional
brigades. Closely related to this is the importance of understanding the political
45
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process and diplomatic support for missions in Africa. What does the chain
between an individual country, the RECs, the AU and the UN look like in
connection with resolutions and missions? Further questions connected to this are
where are the boundary-defining factors and where should support thereby be
prioritised?
46
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Aning, Kwesi, Africa: Confronting Complex Threats, IPA Coping with Crisis,
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Franke, Benedikt F., Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: U.S. Military Capacity
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Guicherd, Catherine (Rapporteur), The AU in Sudan: Lessons for the African
Standby Force (International Peace Academy: 2007).
Ihonvbere, Julius O., Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in the 1990s,
Keynote address at The All-African Students Conference, Peter Clark Hall,
University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, 27 May 1994,
<http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/30/ 033.html>.
International Peace Academy, Refashioning the Dialogue: Regional Perspectives
on the Brahimi Report on UN Operations (2001).
Juma, Monica and Mengistu, Aida, The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa:
Assessing the Peace Building Capacity of African Institutions (International
Peace Academy: 2002).
Landsberg, Christopher, The Fifth Wave of Pan-Africanism, in Adekeye
Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (eds.), West Africas Security Challenges Building
Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).
Makinda, Samuel L. and Wafula Okumu, F., The African Union: Challenges of
Globalization, Security and Governance (Routledge: 2007).
Murithi, Timothy, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and
Development (Ashgate: 2005).
Njoki, Carole, The African Standby Force The African Solution for African
Problems, Institute for Security Studies (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 2007).
Peace and Security Council Protocol.
Peace and Security Directorate, <http://www.africa-union.org/
Structure_of_the_Commission/
depPEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20DIRECTORATE.htm>.
Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the
Military Staff Committee (PART I), Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (I), Document adopted by
48
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the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff, 15-16 May 2003, Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia.
Powell, Kristiana, The African Unions Emerging Peace and Security Regime:
Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect,
ISS Monograph Series, No. 119, 2005.
Prah, Kwesi Kwaa, African Unity, Pan-Africanism and the Dilemmas of
Regional Integration, in Ibbo Mandaza and Dani Nabudere (eds.), Pan-
Africanism and Integration in Africa (SAPES Books: 2002),
<http://www.casas.co.za/papers_AfricanUnity.htm>.
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African Union, www.africa-
union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf .
Refashioning the dialogue: Regional perspectives on the Brahimi Report on UN
Operations International Peace Academy 2001.
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Challenges, (Boulder, 2003).
Tieku, Thomas Kwasi, African Union Promotion of Human Security in Africa,
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Development of the African Unions Security Culture, African Affairs, 106/423,
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www.africa-union.org
www.oau-creation.com
www.news.bbc.co.uk
www.panapress.com/
www.regeringen.se
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org
Interviews and Talks

Talk, The Establishment of the African Standby Force A Progress Report, by
Henri Boshoff, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Pretoria, South Africa, at the
Ministry of Defence, December 2007.
49
FOI-R--2475--SE
Interview with Christian de Cockbourne, Desk Officer at the Current Military

Operations Service, DPKO, 5 December 2007.
Interview with Colonel Anders Edqvist, former Swedish defence attach in South
Africa, the Ministry of Defence, 26 November 2007.
Interview with Shayne Gilbert, Deputy Chief, Military Planning Service, DPKO,
5 December 2007.
Interview with Martin Mbugua Kimani, Institute of Security Studies (ISS),
Pretoria, South Africa, at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, 21 January
2008.
Interview with Filip Van Der Linden, Central and Southern Africa Team,
Military Planning Service, DPKO, 6 December 2007.
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Sweden to the United Nations in New York, 5 December 2007.
Interview with Nicholas Seymour, Chief, AU Support Team, Africa Division,
DPKO, 6 December 2007.
Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen, Speech to the Swedish Parliament, 27 November 2007.
50
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7. Acronyms
AFRICOM Africa Command
AMIB African Mission in Burundi
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
CAR Central African Republic
CEMAC Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
CEWS Continental Early Warning System
CMD Conflict Management Division
COMESA Common Market for East & Southern Africa
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EASBRIG Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOBRIG ECOWAS Brigade
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
FOI Swedish Research Defence Agency
FOMAC Multinational Force of Central Africa
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISS Institute of Security Studies
51
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MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MSC Military Staff Committee
NASBRIG North African Standby Brigade
NBG Nordic Battle Group
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OAU Organization of African Unity
ODPS Organ of Politics, Defence and Security
PSC Peace and Security Council
PSD Peace and Security Directorate
PSOD Peace Support Operations Division
PSOD PLANELM Peace Support Operations Division Planning Element
R2P Responsibility to Protect
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG SADC Brigade
UN United Nations
52

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The African Union A Study

Focusing on Conflict Management

The African Union A Study

Titel Afrikanska Unionen - En studie med

Title The African Union A Study Focusing on

Delomrde 11 Forskning fr regeringens behov

FOI, Totalfrsvarets Forskningsinstitut FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency

164 90 Stockholm SE-164 90 Stockholm

2 The Emergence of the African Union .............................................. 12

3 The African Unions Conflict Management Bodies........................ 20

4 Discussing the Development of the AU .......................................... 34

critics of the construction see the dangers of unnecessary bureaucracy and

1.1 Aim and Method

1.2 Scope of the Study

2 The Emergence of the African Union

2.1 From the Organisation of African Unity to

sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states.7 The

the international community African solutions to African problems. It was in

2.2 The Formation, Vision and Aims of the

2.3 The Structure and Organisation of the

The Assembly of Heads of State

The Executive Council

The Permanent Representatives Committee

The Committee is accountable to the Council and can form sub-committees or

The Pan-African Parliament

democratisation of the AU but, at present, the Parliament only has an advisory

How Do These Organs Relate to Each Other?

3 The African Unions Conflict

3.1 The Peace and Security Council

The Panel of the Wise

3.2 The Peace and Security Directorate

The PSD consists of a Conflict Management Division (CMD), a Peace Support

The Conflict Management Division

The Peace Support Operations Division

The Military Staff Committee

regional and international organisations, research centres, academic institutions

3.3 The African Standby Force

Scenario Description Deployment

1 AU/Regional military advisors to political 30 days

2 AU/Regional observers together with UN 30 days

3 AU/Regional observation missions 30 days

4 AU/Regional peacekeeping force in 30 days

5 AU peacekeeping force for complex 90 days, with the

leadership, communication, interoperability, logistics and equipment, but also on

The Civilian Elements within the African Standby Force

and civilian experts specialising in human rights, humanitarian issues,

3.4 Regional Actors

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in

between different regional organisations and the AU are, in addition, principles

4 Discussing the Development of the

4.1 State Sovereignty or Interventions to

The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a

What is important in relation to this principle is that it only requires a two-thirds

4.2 A Decentralised Structure in Symbiosis?

4.3 The Gap between Ambition and Capacity

4.4 Striking a Balance: African Ownership

work must be accompanied by a major build-up in capacity in order to reinforce

5.1 Future Research

Interviews and Talks

Interview with Christian de Cockbourne, Desk Officer at the Current Military

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

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