From November 10, 1978 to April 5, 1979, she was hospitalized four times at the PNR hospital.
Her attending
ZAIDA G. RARO, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM (Bureau
ofMines and Geo-Sciences),
Facts:The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Minesand
Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17,1975. About four years later,she began suffering from severe and
recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to takesick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. The
petitioner was diagnosedat the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time,vision, and
reasoning power had been lost. A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with theGovernment Service
Insurance System (GSIS)was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarlydenied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation
Commission resulted in the Commission's affirmingthe GSIS decision. On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by
a novelscheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of"presumption of compensability"
and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social securityprinciples. The present system is also
administered by social insurance agencie - the GovernmentService Insurance System and Social Security System - under the
Employees' CompensationCommission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's
obligation to payworkmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected
death ordisability.
Issues:Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is
compensableunder the present compensation laws. 2. Whether the presumption of compensability is
absolutelyinapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease.
Held:The Court saw no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers
tobe compensated for brain cancer. What the law requires for others is proof.The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive
thing
The illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by theworking
conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has theobligation to pay is contrary to
the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence ofotherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .The
Court has recognized the validity of the presentlaw and has granted and rejected claims according to its
provisions. We find in it no infringement of theworker's constitutional rights.
JESUS DE JESUS, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(Philippine National Railways), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the
decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 626, of petitioner Jesus de Jesus, surviving spouse of the late Ester P. de Jesus.
On April 13, 1945, Ester P. de Jesus was employed by the Philippine National Railways (PNR) as a telephone
operator assigned at its San Fernando, Pampanga railway station. She was transferred in 1964 to the
switchboard 'of the PNR Hospital at Caloocan City. De Jesus worked every other day during the night shift, for
continuous periods of 16 hours starting from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. of the following day.
physician, Dr. Juan Pineda, Chief of Clinics, PNR hospital, diagnozed her ailments as chronic pyelonephritis,
diabetes mellitus, anemia and modular pulmonary metastases which is also known as lung cancer.
According to Dr. Pineda, the ailments of Mrs. de Jesus started sometime in August, 1978 when she
experienced progressive loss of weight and sudden loss of appetite accompanied by body weakness and easy
fatigability with no other accompanying signs and symptoms except frequent urination. Despite medications,
no improvement was noted and she soon complained of non-productive cough and mild lumbar pains. On
December 8, 1978, after more than 33 years of service and at the age of 55 years she applied for retirement
under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act 1616 and Republic Act 4968 which was
approved effective March 1, 1979. Retirement benefits were thereafter given under Retirement Gratuity No.
65520. Ester P. de Jesus died of her ailments on June 20, 1979. Petitioner Jesus de Jesus, the deceased's
husband, filed a claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, on August 17, 1979. The claim was
denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) on the ground that the deceased's ailments were
not occupational diseases under the Labor Code. According to the GSIS
Diabetes mellitus is a hereditary disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to
inadequate production of insulin by the pancreas. Contributing factors for its
occurrence are obesity, excessive consumption of sugar and fat disorders of endocrine
glands and most important, hereditary. Symptoms include excessive thirst and
urination, itching, hunger, weakness and loss of weight.
Anemia is a condition in which the normal amount of red blood cans is reduced. This
may be a complication of the above diseases.
Chronic pyelonephritis is a slowly progressive infection in the renal pelvis and
parenchyma frequently bilateral. It is associated with some obstructive lesions such as
kidney stones and structural abnormalities in the renal tract.
Moreover, there is also no showing that your position as telephone operator in the
Philippine National Railways, Manila, had increased the risks of contracting said
ailments.
This decision was affirmed on review by the Employees' Compensation Commission on January 15, 1981.
Hence, the instant petition.
Since the ailments of the deceased, as found by her attending physician, manifested themselves in 1978 or
beyond January 1, 1975, the law governing the petitioner's claim is the New Labor Code (Art. 208, P.D. 442,
as amended).
Under Article 167 (L) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be
the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
In this case, it is the petitioner's contention that the condition of the deceased's work increased the risk of her
contracting the diseases which caused her death.
After a careful examination of the case, we find the petitioner's claim without merit. The petitioner has failed to
prove by competent evidence that the risk of contracting said diseases was indeed increased by the working
conditions concomitant with the deceased's employment.
In affirming the GSIS' decision, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission cited the following
medical discussions to negate causal relation of the deceased's work to her ailments.
Nodular pulmonary metastases' is a phenomenon which results from infection with
tumor emboli carried by the peripheral veins. Sarcomas, hypernephromas, melanomas
and tumors of the breast, thyroid, and pancreas seem to find the lung an especially
 favorable site for the growth of metastases. On x-ray, nodular pulmonary metastases
may appear as a solitary 'cannonball' nodule, multiple nodules, or military
dissemination known as lymphangitis carcinomatosis. Dyspnea and pleuritic pain are
the cardinal symptoms of lung metastases. (Reference: Harrison, T.R. Principles of
Internal Medicine, McGraw Hill N.Y.: 5th Edition, 1966, pp. 945-946). On the other
hand, 'anemia' is a condition in which the amount of blood in the body is decrease
From a practical standpoint, the term means a reduction in the number of and the
amount of hemoglobin per unit of blood. The Medical Division of this Commission
discusses the etiologic classification of - as follows: '(1) loss of blood, (2) deficiency of
factors in is; (3) excessive construction of red corpuscles; (a) Congenital -or hereditary,
(b) Acquired; (1) infection (2) chronic diseases; (3) plumbism following irradiation, drug
sensitivity; (4) endocrine deficiencies; (5) myelophthisic anemia; (6) hypersplenism (7)
Idiopathic bone marrow failure; (c) miscellaneous hypersideremic anemias. Reference:
Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine;McGraw Hill N.Y. 5th edition, 1966, p.
153.'
The decedent's other aliments, namely: diabetes mellitus and chronic pyelonephritis
are likewise not traceable to her employment and employment conditions. 'Diabetes
mellitus', according to medical science is:
A hereditary or developmental disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to an absolute
or relative insufficiency of the action of insulin appearing at any age as hyperglycemia,
glycosuria, polyuria, polydipsia, polyphagia, pruritus weakness and weight loss.
Etiology and incidence: Insufficient insulin action from causes still unknown is
responsible for most cases of diabetes mellitus. Decreased effectiveness of insulin,
which may or may not be associated with the presence of antagonist to insulin, is
probably of greater etiologic importance than is an inadequate production of insulin by
the B-cells of the islets of Langerhans.
Although the exact cause of diabetes has not been found, some contributory factors
are recognized. Hereditary is important, since there is a familiar history of diabetes in
as many as 50% of cases. Obesity has been indicted. Disorders of endocrine glands
other than the pancreas may be associated with the development of diabetes mellitus.
Infection is a common precursor to the appearance or exacerbation of the disease,
probably making a latent diabetes manifest. Pancreatitis, pancreatic tumors and
hemochromatosis are responsible for occasional cases of diabetes. In certain persons
who may be more susceptible to the eventual development of diabetes (e.g. strong
positive family history) the use of certain drugs may be associated with the appearance
of overt diseases. Such drugs include adrenocortical steroids and thiazide diuretics.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S.D.; N.J. llth
ed., 1966,. pp- 325-326.
Chronic pyelonephritis refers to a slowly progressing infection in the renal pelvis and
parenchyma frequently bilateral The condition may have its origin in an acute
pyelonephritis in childhood, especially in females, or during pregnancy. In males, it is
usually associated with some obstructive lesion, such as renal calculi or prostatic
hypertrophy. The common etiologic agent is the colon bacillus, P. vulgaris, or a related
organism. Less frequently, one of the gram-positive cocci may be responsible.
Reference: C.E. Lyght: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S., N.J. 1lth
ed., p. 255.
On the other hand, the petitioner alleges that the deceased's continuous night shift duties coupled with the
offensive odor of some medicine and dirty linens that were dumped regularly near her office, afflicted her
weakening lungs and induced the development of lung cancer and anemia.
To bolster his claim, he submits a clinical history of the deceased and a letter certification both prepared by Dr.
Juan Pineda, who was the attending physician of the deceased,
We regret to note, however, that the allegations have not been substantiated by the petitioner. While this court
has always maintained that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (Neri v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672), the basic rule that a mere allegation is not evidence
(Topweld Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 44944, August 9, 1985; Lagasca v. de Vera,
79 Phil. 376) should not be disregarded.
As to the medical view of Dr. Pineda, his endorsement that the deceased's working condition "contributed
immeasurably to the insidious development of her lung lesion" and that her 11 unusual and prolonged working
hours finally sapped her strength leading to physical exhaustion" which, together with diabetes and anemia,
provided a "groundwork for pulmonary metastases" (Rollo, p. 16), implies aggravation of the disease rather
than its direct causation.
We are, therefore, powerless under the law to reject the respondents' view that the diseases which the
deceased suffered are not caused by employment. As the medical authorities reveal, those ailments are
common to all mankind whether employed or unemployed, and if employed, irregardless of the nature of the
employment.
Under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, which provided for the concepts of "presumption of
compensability" and "aggravation" it was possible to stretch the work related nature of an ailment beyond
seemingly rational limits.
In this case, however, there is no dispute that the governing law is the New Labor Code, which according to
settled jurisprudence (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe U. Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
GSIS, Metro Manila, G.R. No. L45662, August 20, 1985), discarded the aforesaid concepts to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's
rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the
salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No
employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker
simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the
basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid.
The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has
also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not
look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to
meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission
administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table
of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational
disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of
compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus
one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is
now absent.
The Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund was established after actuarial studies and on the
basis of the provisions of the new law. I commiserate with the claimant but compassion should be for all
beneficiaries and not specific claimants. If we endanger the stability and liquidity of the Fund through orders
compelling payment of benefits where the law never intended such benefits to be paid, we are not
compassionate. We endanger the scheme.
WHEREFORE, we hold that the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Iloilo Doc & Engineering Co. V. Workmens Compensation Commission
27 SCRA 103
FACTS:
Teodoro Pablo and Rodolfo Galopez, had just finished overtime work at 5:00 pm and was going home. At
around 5:02 pm, while Pablo and Galopez were walking along the IDECO road, about20 meters from the
IDECO main gate, Pablo was shot by Martin Cordero. The motive for the crime was and still unknown since
Martin Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablos death.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Pablos death occurred in the course of employment and arising out of the employment.
2. Whether the PROXIMITY RULE should apply in this case.
3. Whether the death of Pablo was an accident within the purview of the Workmens Compensation Act.
HELD:
1. YES. Workmens compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arises out of and in
the course of employment. Both the arising factor and the course factor must be present. If one factor is
weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the
question is whether the accident is work connected. The words arising out of refer to the origin or cause of
the accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words in the course refer to the time, place and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. The presumption that the injury arises out of and in the
course of employment prevails where the injury occurs on the employers premises. While the IDECO does
not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and
egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate. Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed
from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right therefore is either a legal one or a contractual one.
In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road.
2. YES. The general rule in workmens compensation law known as going and coming rule provides that in
the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in going to, or coming from his place of work is
excluded from the benefits of workmens compensation acts. The following are the exceptions: a. Where the
employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer b. Where the employee is about
to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of exclusive or customary means of ingress
and egress. Where the employee is charged while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his
home or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment. Where the
employer, as an incident of the employment provides the means of transportation to and from the place of
employment. The second exception is known as the proximity rule. The place where the employee was
injured being immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have
occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of or in the course thereof.
3. YES. An assault although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an accident within
the meaning of the Workmens Compensation Act since the word accident is intended to indicate that the act
causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ROSARIO VDA. DE ROSANO respondents.
H. San Luis and L. V. Simbulan for petitioner.
Juan B. Moreno for respondent Rosario Vda. de Rosano.
Villavieja, Villanueva and Ocampo for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Petition filed by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner (in R04 WC Case No. 3941), ordering it to pay claimants Rosario Vda. de Rosano, minors
Rebecca, Edgardo and Baltazar, all surnamed Rosano death compensation benefits, burial expenses and
attorney's fees for the death of Pastor Rosano; as well as of the resolution of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission en banc denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
As found by the Acting Referee of the Department of Labor, supported by the evidence on record, the facts of
the case are as follows:
At about 6 o'clock in the morning of 30 November 1964, stevedore Pastor Rosano went to Pier 9, Manila, to
await the arrival of a barge of herein petitioner corporation, scheduled to dock at 9 o'clock in the morning.
While thus waiting for the vessel Rosano had a heated verbal argument with one Benjamin Valdez, another
stevedore engaged by petitioner corporation, over the possession of a platform used in the loading and
unloading of cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Rosano was able to get it. As the barge did not arrive
as scheduled, Rosano went home for lunch. When he returned at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, he found
the platform again in the possession of Valdez. Rosano's demand for delivery to him of said platform
precipitated another argument which almost ended in fist fight. Valdez finally gave up the platform, but not
before he had uttered threats against the life of Rosano. Later, informed that the barge they were waiting for
definitely was not arriving, Rosano, with two companions, boarded a passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When
he got off from the jeep near his house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out a knife and stabbed him.
Rosano fell to the ground. He was immediately brought to the hospital where he expired at 2:30 in the
afternoon of that same day, 30 November 1964 (Exhibit C).
On 1 March 1965, the widow, Rosario Vda. de Rosano, for herself and on behalf of her 3 minor children filed
with the Department of Labor a formal claim for death compensation benefits against petitioner Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation for the death of her husband, Pastor Rosano. The company answered, denying the
allegations of the complaint and raising the defense of prescription, in that the claim was filed beyond the 3-
month period from the death of Rosano, as provided in the Workmen's Compensation law.
On 15 September 1965, after due hearing, the Acting Referee rendered judgment, ordering the company to
pay to the claimants death compensation benefits in the sum of P6,000.00; P200.00 as reimbursement for
burial expenses; P200.00, as attorney's fees; and P61.00 as fees payable to the office. The award was based
on the finding that Rosano was an employee of the company and that death arose out of his said employment.
The defense of prescription was rejected, it appearing that the company had failed to controvert the claimants'
right to compensation within the period prescribed in Section 45 of Act 3428. The company appealed to the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, which affirmed the decision of the Referee. And when its motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied by the Commission en banc, the company filed the present
petition for review, assigning as all errors committed by the Commission its finding on the existence of
employee-employer relationship between the petitioner and the deceased and the ruling that the right to
demand compensation benefits has not prescribed.
The contention that there existed no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the late Pastor
Rosano is premised on the allegation that the latter was a "gang boss" working with the petitioner on an "on
and off" basis; that Rosano worked for petitioner when so assigned by the union, of which he was a member,
that, if at all, the employer-employee relationship existed only whenever the deceased rendered actual service
for the petitioner. Since on 30 November 1964 Rosano was not able to work (because the barge did not
arrive), then, according to petitioner, he was not an employee when he (Rosano) met his death.
There is no merit to this contention. In the first place, while petitioner company failed to submit any evidence
that the work rendered by the deceased was purely casual, 1 it has been established that prior to the stabbing
incident the deceased, with other stevedores, was in the pier prepared to do hauling jobs for the petitioner's
business. And there is unrebutted testimony that the deceased had been doing stevedoring work for said
petitioner for 15 years.2Secondly, even assuming petitioner's allegations to be true, that the deceased was a
union member, and that it was the union that furnished laborers and stevedors when required by petitioner
company, presumably with the latter delivering the stevedoring charges directly to the union for distribution to
the individual laborers, these facts did not make the union an independent contractor whose intervention
relieved the said company of liability for the death of a laborer specially where no contractor's bond was
required for the union's performance of its undertaking. 3 The union here was no more than an agent of the
company and whose fiction is merely to save the latter from the necessity of dealing with individual laborers.
And in this kind of indirect employment, it has been repeatedly held, the employer is not relieved of liability
under the Workmen's Compensation law. 4
It is next claimed for the petitioner that even if he were an employee, Rosano's death is not compensable
because it came when he was outside of the company premises and not at work.
We do not agree with the appellant. From the proved sequence of events that took place on 30 November
1964 involving the deceased Pastor Rosano, it is evident that the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin
Valdez (who was thereafter accused and convicted) can be traced to their disagreement over the possession
of a platform that was to be used in their work for petitioner that although the altercation started in the morning
the same was resumed when they returned in the afternoon and carried on when Valdez left, lay in wait near
Rosario's house, and there met and stabbed the latter when he alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be said
that the employer is exempt from liability under the Workmen's Compensation law because the cause of death
arose outside of the company premises, 5 whereas the quarrel happened at the waterfront at Pier 9.
For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall take place within the place of
employment. If a workman is acting within the scope of his employment, his protection "in the course of" the
employment usually continues, regard of the place of injury. 6 Thus, in one case, 7 an employee went to the
House of the employer across the warehouse where he worked to get a drink of water, that there, while trying
to drive away a puppy that he saw eating fish in the employer's kitchen, he was bitten in the hand, as a result
of which he later died of hydrophobia. The death of the employee was held compensable, on the ground that
his trip to the kitchen was occasioned by the employer's fault in not providing adequate drinking water at the
warehouse. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that it is inherent in the stevedoring work for the
petitioner that the laborers, like the deceased, stay in the pier and wait for the docking of petitioner's vessels.
Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an employee while in the course of his
employment, as the result of an assault upon his person by another employee, or by a third person, no
question of the injured employee's own culpability being involved, is compensable where, from the evidence
presented, a rational mind is able to trace the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the employment,
or some condition, obligation or incident therein, and not by some other agency.8
The rule as stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court is that ... when the employee is assaulted
while he is defending his employer, or his employer's interests, or when the assault was incidental
to some duty of his employment, the injuries he suffers in consequence of the assault will, as a
rule, arise out of the employment. He will then be serving his employer's ends and not of his own.
(Jacquemin vs. Turner and Sermour Manufacturing Co., Conn., 103 A. 115; Goldshirch vs.
American Character Doll Co., 135 Misc. 817, 238 N. Y. 519.)
Similarly, in Appleford vs. Kimmel, 296 NW, 861, it appeared that a theater employee's job required him to
handle disturbances in the theater; that several patrons were ordered by him to leave the theater because of
disturbances they were causing; and that after the theater closed the employee started for home and was
subjected to injurious assault by those he had previously ordered to leave; the court held that the evidence
sustained the finding that the employee's injury arose out of, and in the course of, the employment.
In the leading case of Field vs. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 138, where a superintendent was
injured on the sidewalk by workmen with whom he had quarreled in the mill, the late Justice Cardozo (then of
the New York Supreme Court) declared the injury compensable, reasoning that the quarrel outside of the mill
was merely a continuation or extension of the quarrel begun within; that continuity of the case had been so
combined with continuity in time and space "that the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken to be one".
The rationale applies to the case at bar, where the facts, shown by the evidence found by the referee and
affirmed by the Commission, are that Rosano had been assaulted by the man with whom he had quarreled
barely a half hour after leaving the place of work where the quarrel occurred, in connection with the
possession of the platform to be used in unloading cargo, without any independent agency or cause for the
assault being shown. As pointed out by Larson (Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, section 29.21)
since the ultimate test applied by Judge Cardozo was whether "the quarrel from origin to ending
must be taken to be one" it should make no difference how widely separated the assault was from
the employment in time and space if it remained an inherent part of an employment incident.
Other cases applying the same principle are collated in Schneider, "Workmen's Compensation", Perm. Ed.,
Vol. 6, page 131, et seq.
As regards the defense of prescription raised by petitioner, it is true that the formal demand for compensation
for the death of Pastor Rosano on 30 November 1964 was made by the dependent widow and minor children
only on 1 March 1965, or beyond the 3-month period provided for 'in section 24 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. But we are not impressed by petitioner's disclaimer that it had no knowledge of the
stabbing incident prior to its notification by the Regional Office of the filing of the claim. It may be pointed out
that the law does not speak of "formal notice" by the employer of the accident; it specifies only "knowledge of
the accident". For petitioner to say that it had no actual knowledge of the stabbing incident on 30 November
1964 would run counter to the ordinary course of human behavior. An employer could scarcely have been
spared the news of the killing of one of its laborers by another laborer, especially where the cause therefor
started in the place where the laborers gather and work. When the widow went to the company premises to
demand compensation for the death of her husband a week after his burial, she was able to talk to an
unknown employee inside the compound, who told her that she could not get anything because the death of
her husband did not occur in the company premises. Far from showing lack of knowledge by the employer,
this fact constitutes sufficient indication that the death of Rosano was already a matter of common knowledge
in petitioner's office that even an allegedly unidentified employee could advance the exact defense that the
employer later set up in the case.lawphi1.nt
The fact remains that the petitioner failed to controvert in due time the right of the claimants to compensation,
as required by section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now well-settled that the requirements (for claimants) of
giving of notice of injury and filing of claim within the prescribed period is non-jurisdictional and does not
constitute a bar to compensation proceedings if the employer, who had knowledge of the accident, failed to
controvert the claimant's right to compensation pursuant to section 45 of the law. 9 For such failure of the
employer to controvert the claimant's constitutes a waiver (or a forfeiture by law) of its right to question the
validity and reasonableness of the claim and precludes the setting up of all non-jurisdictional defenses, such
as non-compensability of injuries, prescription, and the like. 10
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and its
resolution en banc, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.
CRISPINA VANO, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Bureau of Posts) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, respondents.
Severino B. Estonina for petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS.
PARAS, J.:
The only issue in this case is whether or not the death of petitioner's husband, Filomeno Vano is compensable
under the Employees' Compensation Law.
Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at
around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station
in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Badge in Loay,
Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's
railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared
dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
Vano's widow, Crispina Vano, filed a death benefit claim under PD 626, as amended, with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). On April 6, 1984, the GSIS denied the claim, citing the following reason:
It appears on record that your husband was on his way to his station when he died in a
vehicular accident he figured in a Sunday, July 31, 1983.
Obviously, the accident occurred outside of his time and place of work; neither was he
performing official duties at the time of its occurrence. Accordingly, the conditions for
compensability in accordance with the law have not been satisfied, to wit:
1. that the employee must have been injured at the place where
his work requires him to be;
2. that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and
3. if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for his employer. (p. 22, Rollo)
Crispina Vano's requests for reconsideration were denied by the GSIS, consequently, the case was elevated
to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) for appropriate review under ECC Case No. 2658.
In a Decision dated October 13, 1987, the ECC affirmed the decision denying the claim of Crispina Vano
because:
Under the Employees' Compensation law, injuries resulting from accidents while an
employee is going to and from the place of work is not compensable. Some
exceptions, however, are: when the injury is sustained at a place proximate to the
work-place, when the employee meets the accident while riding in a company vehicle
and when he is on special errand for his employer. (Section 1, Rule III of the Amended
Rules of Employees' Compensation)
We note that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions. In
fact, the subject employee's accident happened on a Sunday, a non-working day. In
the light of the foregoing, we cannot but affirm respondent's denial of the claim. (pp.
13-15, Rollo; p. 2, Decision, ECC Case No. 2658)
The petitioner then came to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari. She alleges that since her husband
was precisely commuting from his hometown to Tagbilaran City, where he would report for duty as letter
carrier the following day, when he met the accident, then his consequent death should be compensated.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) reiterates its views and contends that the
present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's
Compensation Act and is "categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the
workplace or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 69)
For its part, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission stood firm in asserting that the death of
Filomeno Vano is not the result of an employment accident as contemplated by law hence petitioner is clearly
not entitled to her claim for death benefits.
The case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260, 263, 264) supports
petitioner's contention of compensability. In the said case, this Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the
morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his
way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the
accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death.
The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point
reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going to and from his work, such
injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
The same ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Alano vs. Employees' Compensation
Commission (158 SCRA, 669, 672):
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work.
She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her
to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or
personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there
because her employment required her to be there.
We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned
cases, it was established that petitioner's husband the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when
he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance
System is ordered to pay petitioner the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00)) as death benefit and
the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
VICTORIA TALLER VIUDA DE NAVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO., defendant-appellee.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Debuque for appellant.
A. de Aboitiz Pinaga for appellee.
De Witt, Perkins & Brady as amicus curiae.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Victoria Taller Vda. de Nava, for the purpose
of recovering the sum of P1,00.92 from the Ynchausti Steamship Co., it being alleged that said amount is due
to the plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428 of the Philippine Legislature, by reason of
the death of her husband in the course of his duty, while serving as helmsman (timonel) on the interisland
steamer Vizcaya, under the circumstances stated in the complaint. Upon hearing the cause the trial court
absolved the defendant from the complaint, and the plaintiff appealed.
The case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts from which it appears that the Ynchausti
Steamship Co. is engaged in the business of operating vessels in the coastwise and interisland trade, and on
April 2, 1930, the steamer Vizcaya, one of its vessels, was being maneuvered in the mouth of the Iloilo River,
at Iloilo. At this time Valentin Nava held the position of helmsman (timonel) on said boat, receiving a monthly
compensation of P35. In connection with moving the boat Nava, in charge of other members of the crew, was
engaged in hauling in the ship's cable and in coiling the cable on the deck of the boat preparatory to passing it
down a hatchway and bestowing it in its proper place in the vessel. While thus engaged Nava found the space
which they required for coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed belonging to one of the third-class
passengers. Nava asked whose bed it was, and Dalmacio Villanueva, one of the passengers, answered that
he was the owner of the bed. Thereupon Nava said that he (Nava) would push it to another place because it
interfered with the work. Suiting the action to the word, he pushed the bed with his foot towards the other side
of the ship. This act aroused the anger of the owner of the bed, and hot words were exchanged, in the course
of which Villanueva, using one of the wooden bars of the bed, gave Nava a jab in the pit of the stomach.
Under the impact of this blow Nava leaned back, and at this moment Vicente Villanueva, a brother of
Dalmacio Villanueva, ran up to Nava and stabbed him with a fan knife just above the left nipple. The blade
penetrated Nava's heart and he died almost instantly. For the crime of homicide thus committed Vicente
Villanueva was later sentenced to imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion
temporal, with accessories, and was required to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of P1,000,
with costs. The deceased left a wife and seven children, and this action for compensation was instituted by the
widow, under Act No. 3428 of the Philippine Legislature, as amended.
The answer of the defendant raises several questions all of which were decided in favor of the plaintiff by the
trial court with the exception of the most vital one which will chiefly engage our attention in the course of this
opinion. But as the defendant relies in its brief upon the various points decided against it in the appealed
decision, it is advisable to notice these points as preliminary to the discussion of what we consider to be the
main question.
Among other things, it is insisted that the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident within the meaning of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428. Under section 2 of Act No. 3428, as it stood when this incident
occurred, compensation is demandable for "a personal injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of
the employment". By the word "accident" as here used it is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury
shall be casual, in the sense of being unforeseen, and one for which the injured party is not legally
responsible. Now, in the case before us, the death of Valentin Nava, was not, at least as regards the
perpetrator of the deed, any accident whatever. The death was caused by the criminal and intentional act of
Vicente Villanueva. But an act may be an accident as regards one person or from one point of view and not an
accident as regards another person and from another point of view. This homicide was not attributable to the
act of deceased himself and was not capable of being foreseen as a likely consequence of the discharge of
his duties. The trial court therefore correctly held that the death of Nava was due an accident within the
meaning of section 2 of Act No. 3428.
Again, it is insisted that Nava was not an "industrial employee", within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, inasmuch as he was employed as a helmsman (timonel) and his duties were not of an
industrial nature. This contention takes too narrow a view of the meaning of the phrase "industrial employee"
as used in the Act cited. As helmsman on the boat Nava was charged with the performance of duties
connected with piloting of the boat and controlling its movements when in motion. Duties of this character are
clearly of an industrial nature, since they are concerned with effecting the ends and purposes of industry. The
definition of "industrial employment", as given in subsection (d) of section 39, Act No. 3428, covers all
employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain,
subject only to the limitation of yearly gross income. Nava was therefore an industrial employee and entitled to
compensation under the Act, provided the other circumstances attendant upon the accident which caused his
death were of such nature as to bring him within the purview of the Act.
It is further insisted that Act No. 3428, as amended, does not cover the case of an employee upon a coastwise
vessel. In this connection attention is directed to the fact that, under section 38, Act No. 3428 extends to the
cases of "employees engaged in the interisland trade"; and it was only by Act No. 3812 (section 12) that the
provision was amended so as to include employees engaged in the "coastwise and interisland trade". From
this it is supposed that the case in question does not fall under section 38 of Act No. 3428. The question is in
our opinion without merit. In the first place, the word "interisland", as originally used in section 38, was
apparently used in a broad sense, to include all shipping in and among the islands, in vessels of Philippine
registration, and it is not limited to shipping from a port of one island to a port of another island. The
expression "the coastwise and" was therefore of clarifying a possible ambiguity and to bring the phraseology
of the Act more into harmony with the technical terms commonly used in the Customs laws and regulations.
Even supposing, therefore, that the Vizcaya was only engaged in the carrying of trade between different ports
of the same island a fact which does not appear the "accident" with which we are here concerned should
be considered within the purview of the law. It is not apparent that the meaning of the law was changed in any
essential feature by this amendment.
Still, again, it is insisted that the case does not come under Act No. 3428 for the reason that it does not appear
that the defendant had a gross income during the year immediately preceding the one during which the
accident occurred of not less than P40,000. But we note that in the agreed statement of facts it is stated that
during the last twelve months anterior to the month of April of 1930, the defendant had a gross income of more
than P40,000 as a result of its business. This was evidently intended to cover the requirement expressed in
subsection (d) of section 39 of Act No. 3428, and although the stipulation does not technically cover the gross
earning for the full calendar year anterior to the calendar year in which the accident occurred, we are of the
opinion that the trial judge committed no error in interpreting the stipulation in that sense.
Finally, it is supposed that the circumstance that the criminal court imposed the civil obligation on Vicente
Villanueva to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of one thousand pesos makes it improper to
allow additional compensation in this case. As the trial court properly held, the suggestion is without merit. In
the first place, it does not appear that the criminal indemnity has been paid and, in the second place, that
obligation is wholly distinct from the obligation imposed by the Workmen's Compensation Act and the latter is
in no sense subsidiary to the former.lawphil.net
This brings us to consider the most important question in the case, namely, whether the death of Valentin
Nava occurred in the course of his employment, or was the result of the nature of such employment. In this
connection we quote section 2 of Act No. 3428, which runs as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal injury from any
accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly caused
by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
This provision was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812 so as to read as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal injury from any
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly
caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall
pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.
This last provision, having been enacted since the death of Valentin Nava, is not directly applicable to the
case before us, but it may properly be quoted for purposes of comparison and interpretation. Fixing our
attention then more particularly upon section 2 of Act No. 3428, it is quite clear that the death of Valentin Nava
was not due to any illness directly caused by his employment or the result of the nature of such employment.
We are of the opinion, however, that it occurred in the course of his employment and "in pursuance of the
employment", as this expression is used in the provision cited. The attorneys for the appellee presents a
narrow view of Nava's employment and insists that, inasmuch as he was employed as helmsman, he was
acting within the scope of his duties only when his hand was on the helm of the vessel and he was engaged in
actually guiding its motions. We are of the opinion that his duties should be considered as having greater
latitude. It is true that the term indicative of his employment was that of helmsman, but we think that his duties
should be considered as comprehending acts done by him in helping to guide the ship. In maneuvering a
vessel, in entering and leaving ports, it is necessary for the ship's officers in charge of the motions of the
vessel to avail themselves of cables; and the taking in of a cable and the coiling of it upon the deck are acts
properly incident to controlling the motion of the vessel. It results that, when Nava found that one of the third-
class passengers had placed his bed on the deck in a position where it was in his way, he acted within the
scope of his duty when he pushed the bed back; and when the fatal assault was made upon him because of
that act, it must be considered that his death resulted from an act done in the line of his duty.
At this juncture it may be well to give a few words of explanation concerning the verbiage of section 2 of Act
No. 3428 and of the amendment effected in this section by Act No. 3812, and particularly in the substitution, in
the latter Act, of the expression "arising out of and in the course of the employment" for the expression "due
and to in the pursuance of the employment" used in Act No. 3428. Upon this point we note that Act No. 3428
was adopted by the Philippine Legislature in Spanish, and the original of the section is taken from the statutes
of the Territory of Hawaii (section 3604, Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). Our English
version here is the official translation into English of the Spanish version as adopted by the Philippine
Legislature. In the Hawaiian law the expression used in the part of the statute here under consideration is
"arising out of and in the course of such employment". These words, after passing through the Spanish
version, and upon being turned back into English, appeared as "due to and in the pursuance of the
employment". It follows that the expression found in the amendatory provision (section 1 of Act No. 3812) is
merely a reversion to the English wording of the Hawaiian statute, which corresponds, we may add, to the
wording commonly used in the American statutes. It is clear therefore that the amendment introduced by the
last named Act was merely intended to bring the English version of our statute into verbal conformity with the
Hawaiian and other American laws. No change whatever in the meaning of the provision was intended to be
effected by said amendment.
The attorneys for the appellee have called our attention to some American decisions, which, it is insisted,
support the conclusion of the trial court that the homicide which resulted in the death of Valentin Nava was not
an accident due to and in the pursuance of his employment, as this expression runs in section 2 of Act No.
3428. The cases most emphatically urged upon us in this connection by the appellee are State of
Minnesota ex rel. School Dist. No. 1, in Itasca County vs. District Court (140 Minn., 470; 15 A. L. R., 579), and
Schmoll vs. Weisbrod & Hess Brewing Co. (89 N. J. L., 150; 97 Atl., 732). In the first of these cases the facts
were as follows:
The school district employed a young woman to teach in the Round Lake school, some 35 miles from Deer
River in Itasca County and 25 miles from Black Duck in Beltrami County, these two places being the nearest
railway points. The country was densely wooded and sparsely settled. The school was a one-room school and
fifteen pupils attended. The nearest house was a half mile away, and the boarding house was a mile or a mile
and a quarter. On the morning of September 20, 1916, an unknown man asked for food at the boarding place
of the teacher. On the evening of that day, when her work at the school was finished, she started for her
boarding house, taking a short cut through the woods. She had some papers which she intended to correct at
home in the evening, and a book to study. As she was on her way, and when just off the school grounds, she
was criminally assaulted by this for the gratification of his passions, and as part of the transaction he shot her,
destroying the sight of her left eye. She filed a claim for compensation against the school district, under the
Compensation Act, which required an employer to pay compensation "in every case of personal injury or
death of his employee, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of the employment". The District
Court for Itasca County awarded the compensation prayed for, and the School District brought an action for
certiorari in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, claiming that the injury suffered by the employee did not arise
out of and in the course of the employment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and
held that the injury for which compensation had been awarded by the district court did not arise out of the
employment.
In the second case it appeared that the deceased was a route foreman in the employ of the respondent. His
duties were to look after the various beer delivery routes and see that they were properly conducted, and on
Saturdays he had a beer delivery where he delivered beer and collected the moneys therefor. On the 19th day
of December, 1914, on a Saturday night, at about 8 o'clock, the deceased made a delivery of beer at some
dwelling house in Atlantic City leaving his wagon in the street, a little distance away, and while returning to his
wagon he was assaulted and shot by some person unknown. The deceased mounted his wagon and returned
to brewery and accounted to his employer for the moneys intrusted to and collected by him and then went to a
hospital where he, ten days later, died from the effects of the gunshot wound.
In the first of these cases it is quite evident that there was no causal relation between the service which the
plaintiff as a teacher, had rendered and the assault which was committed upon her. In the second case the
motive of the assault was evidently robbery, and there was no direct connection between the work done by the
victim of the robbery and the assault. If it had appeared, in the first case, that the teacher had been attacked
while in the act of properly disciplining one of her pupils, and because of that fact, it would, we think, have
been held that the injury had been incurred in the course of her employment. The second case brings us
perhaps into more debatable ground, but the casual relation between the performance of duty and the assault
was not as manifest as in the case now before us. The following decisions, gleaned from American
jurisprudence, shed further light upon the situation before us:
In In re Wooley vs. Minneapolis Equipment Co. and Globe Indemnity Co. (157 Minn., 428; 196 N. W. 477),
where a salesman was shot and killed in a street brawl brought on by himself and for his own purposes, even
though he was engaged in his employee's business just before the fracas, and intended to resume it
afterwards, the court held that the injury did not arise out of the employment.
In Scholtzhauer vs. C. & L. Lunch Co. (233 N. Y., 12; 134 N. E., 701), it was held that the injury did not arise
out of the employment, where a waitress in a restaurant was shot by a negro dish-washer because she had
declined an invitation to out with him and had stated that she would not go out with a negro.
In the case now in hand it seems clear to us that the plaintiff is entitled to the compensation demanded and no
question has been made as to the amount thereof.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed, and the plaintiff will recover of the defendant the sum
of P1,000.92, with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint and with costs. So ordered.
BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., recurrente y apelante,
vs.
FERMINA VIUDA DE MADANGUIT Y OTROS, recurridos y apelados.
Sres. Alvear y Agrava en representacion de la recurrente.
D. Antonio Logarta y D. Cecilio I. Lim en representacion de los recurridos.
HORRILLENO, J.:
Este es un recurso de certiorari promotivao por la Bohol Land Transportaion Co. contra Fermina Viuda de
Mandaguit, la recurrida, en el que pide se revoque la decision del Tribunal de Apelaciones, promulgada el 28
de febrero de 1940, la cual, copiada literalmente, dice asi:.
Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon Madanguit
left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another municipality in the afternoon
of May 17, 1937. On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in doing
so he fell but collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite
direction),practically ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's
truck, which a few minutes later had to park in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares,
because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went
to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he
cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store, and, without
much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted and having pleaded guilty was
sentenced accordingly.
Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act No. 3428, as
amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for the total sum of
P1,507.58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed, questioning not the
amount of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but the right of the plaintiff to be
compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that the death did not arise out of Madanguit's
employment and in the course thereof; and, second that compensation is not due because the
death occurred on the account of Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to inflict injury
upon Dalmao.
We are of the opinion that under the facts stated at the beginning of this decision, the death of
Madanguit arose out, and in the course of his employment. It appears that because while driving
the defendant's truck he offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him.
But the defendant maintains that there is no competent proof regarding Dalmao's motive,
maintaining that the declaration in open court of the widow of Madanguit, who merely repeated
Dalmao's testimony in the criminal case against him for murder is hearsay and incompetent
evidence. But hearsay evidence regarding the motive or intention of a person is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule. (See Wigmore on Evidence, par. 1729, et seq.: and also notes to its
Supplement.) And view of the fact that the declarations of Dalmao were made under the sanction
 of an oath, and the defendant itself presented Exhibit 9 (testimony of some witness in the criminal
case against Dalmao), which corroborates the widow's testimony, we cannot say that there is not
enough evidence about the motive impelling Dalmao's murderous hand.
At any rate, the declaration of the widow at pages 22 to 25 of the transcript of the stenographic
notes were not objected to as hearsay, and for all purposes are in the record entitled to some
value. (Diaz vs. U.S., 223 U.S. 442.).
Nevertheless, let us suppose, that proof of Dalmao's resentment is insufficient. Then Madanguit's
injury does not appear to have arisen out of his employment; yet it being undeniable that he was
killed 'in the course of his employment' (see Jackson vs. Dairyman's Creamery, 162 S.E., 359;
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. vs. Sartonio, 12 Pac. [2nd] 221, his family is entitled to
compensation under the decision of the Supreme Court in Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., G.R.
39721, Oct 23, 1993 (Philippine Cases on Workmen's Compensation by Butalid, p.7)
Referring to the second point, the accident did not arise out of his employment, which was that of
operating the machine and fixing it when it was out of commission, inasmuch as said accident did
not occur while he was engaged in said work and as a consequence thereof.
"But that the accident occurred in the course of his employment there can be no doubt,
for the reason that, being an employee of the firm and while riding in the wagon
furnished by the company to bring then home within the concession after their work,
plaintiff was within the radius of action and under the control of the defendant
company." (Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., supra ).
In Bellosillo vs. City of Manila (G.R. No. 34522, November 9, 1931, Butalid, supra, p. 16), a
workman employed on a public street temporarily left his work and crossed the street, he was run
over by an automobile and killed. The Supreme Court gave him compensation under Act 3428,
holding that the injury was caused by an accident due to, and in pursuance of, his employment.
It should be noted in this connection that in constructing this specific provision of the Workmen's
compensation law, the tendency is towards liberality in favor whenever an employee suffers injury
in the course of his employment, a reasonable factual presumption, is that the hurt arose out of the
employment.
The defendant attempted to establish the fact that Madanguit owed Dalmao about P3.50; that on
May 17, just a few minutes before the killing, Dalmao stopped Madanguit and asked for payment,
that Madanguit paid no attention to Dalmao, whereupon the latter became enraged, followed
Madanguit and killed him. The theory is not plausible for it is unlikely that for a small indebtedness
Dalmao should take away the life of an individual. it is also incredible that he should stop a truck to
demand payment. But this alleged debt of Madanguit lends color to the plaintiff's version, because
his rudeness in crowding Dalmao out of the street was resented by the latter, who, as a creditor of
Madanguit, evidently expected better treatment.
The other defense that the killing was caused by Madanguit's intention to inflict injuries upon
Dalmao, or to his notorious negligence, is concededly premised on the assumption that the
decision in criminal case No. 4180, Exhibit E, is admissible (appellant's brief, p.34). As we agree
with the defendant that said Exhibit, for the purpose of showing the facts recited therein, is not
admissible, we do not have to go into this defense, specially because we are not convinced there
was notorious negligence or wilfull misconduct on the part of Madanguit.
The net result is that plaintiff are entitled to compensation. And as the defendant has assigned no
error as to the rate or amount of the award, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with costs
against the appellant.
La recurrente, como fundamento de su recurso, alega:.
1. The Second Division of said Court of Appeals completely disregarded the fact that the death of
Ramon O. Madanguit was not an accident at all and erroneously held that, because Ramon O.
Madanguit was murdered by Ciriaco Dalmao in the Lourdes Drug Store, the said death arose in
the coarse of his employment or as a result of said employment it been found by said Second
Division of Court of Appeals that the death of the deceased arose from the following facts:
. . . "On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in doing so he fell
but collided Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite direction), practically ditching him,
Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck which a few minutes after had
to park in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to
get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop. Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across the
street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck. In the meantime,
Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store and without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death.
Dalmao was prosecuted, and having pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly."
2. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals committed an error in holding the deceased was
not notoriously negligent when,
(a) The deceased violated and disregarded the rules and regulations of petitioner by starting late
from; petitioner's garage which fact accounted for deceased going to the Lourdes Drug Store to
wash his hands and comb his hair; and
(b) The deceased disregarded the right of Ciriaco Dalmao, his assailant, by almost colliding with,
and there was not enough space for his truck to go through without causing injury or damage to
the travelling public.
3. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals also committed an error of law in implied holding
that petitioner is an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happened to its employees
while in the course of their employment and holding that, because the deceased was murdered on
account of his carelessness and derelictions of duty, the said deceased Ramon O. Madanguit died
in the course of his employment. (See par. 2, p.2, decision, Appendix A.)
4. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals again committed an error of law by concluding that
petitioner is answerable for the death of decease when it itself finds that "It appears that because
while driving the defendant's truck he (the deceased) offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and
killed him" and . . .
5. Finally, the decision of the Second Division of Court of Appeals is against the applicable
decision of this Honorable Court in that it applied without exception and limitation, the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Law in holding that 'the tendency is towards liberality in favor of the
employee. And perhaps it is not error to say that whenever an employee suffers injuries in the
course of his employment, a reasonable factual presumption is that the hurt arose out of the
employment' when according to the case Vergara vs. Pampanga Bus Co., G.R. No. 44149,
January 9, 1936; Vol. V, lawyers' Journal, p. 372, this Honorable Court says:
"We have heretofore given repeated evidence of our desire to see a spirit of liberality characterize
the construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We have endeavored to interpret the Act to
promote its purpose. We have even gone so far as to interpret it fairly in favor of the employee. But
we cannot construct the Act to fit particular cases, and in this particular case neither the facts nor
the law are demonstrative of a meritorious claim on the part of the employee coming within the
purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act."
No se discuten por la recurrente, ni puede discurtilos en esta instancia, los hechos declarados probados por
el Tribunal de Apelacion en su decision objeto del presente recurso, a sabeer:
Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon Madanguit
left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another municipality in the afternoon
of May 17, 1938. On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant and in doing
so he fell but collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (the riding a bicycle in the opposite direction), practically
ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck, which few
minutes later had to work in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some
 pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the Lourdes
Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the
truck. in the meantime , Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store, and without much ado,
knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted, and having pleaded guilty, was sentence
accordingly.
Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act 3428, as amended, in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for the total sum of P1,507,58, to be paid in the
manner directed. The defendant appealed, questioning not the amount of compensation nor the manner of
payment thereof, but the right of the plaintiff to be compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that the
death did not arise out of Madanguit's employment and in the course thereof; and, occurred on account of
Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to inflict upon Dalmao.
La unica cuestion, por consiguiente, que se plantea ante Nos es la de si, en vista de tales hechos, procede o
no otorgar a la recurrida los beneficios de la Ley de Compensacion de Obreros No. 3428, segun ha sido
enmendada por la Ley No. 3812. Dicha ley, tal como ha sido enmendada, dispone en su articulo 2, lo
siguiente:
ART. 2. Motivos para una compensacion. Cuando un empleado sufre una lesion personal por
accidente proveniente de, y en el curso de su empleo, o contrajere una enfermedad causada
directamente por el empleo o como resultado de la naturaleza de dicho empleo, su patrono le
pagara una compensacion en las cantidades y a las personas que se especifican mas adelante.
En Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., R.G. No. 39721, este Tribunal, entre otras cosas, declaro que Pollisco
tenia derecho a la compensacion no obstante haber ocurrido el accidente despues de su trabajo y mientras
volvia ya a su casa. El caso de autos es, a nuestro juicio, mas fuerte y meritorio todavia que el citado de
Pollisco. Como se desprende de los hechos probados segun el Tribunal de Apelacion, Madanguit, el difunto,
era el chofer de uno de los buses de la recurrente, Bohol Land Transportation Co., y mientras guiaba el
coche, este choco contra la bicicleta que montaba Ciriaco Dalmao; que momentos despues, casi
inmediatamente, Madanguit paro su coche frente a la casa del abogado Celestino Gallares, por haber
recibido seas de algunos peatones que querian coger el camion y, aprovechando esta oportunidad, bajo de
el y se dirigio al Lourdes Drug Store con el objeto de lavarse las manos que se habian ensuciado al limpiar su
coche. Entretanto, Ciriaco Dalmao llego y entro en la botica y, sin mas ni mas, apualo a Madanguit que
murio en el acto.
En otro asunto, Bellosillo vs. City of Manila, R.G. No. 34522, decidido por este Tribunal, se declaro que un
obrero de la Ciudad de Manila, que trabajaba en las calles publicas, tenia derecho a la compensacion bajo la
ley, a pesar de haber dejado temporalmente su trabajo y cruzado la calle, momento en que fue atropellado
por un automovil que le dejo muerto en el acto. En Corpus Juris, pag. 673, tomo 71, hallamos lo siguente:
. . . where the employee is injured while seeking toilet facilities or going to ro from a toilet, the
injury arises out of the employment and in the course of it . . .
El Tribunal de Apelacines, por tanto, no incurrio en error alguno al decidir este asunto, confirmando en todas
sus partes el fallo del tribunal a quo a favor de Fermina Vda. de Madanguit, la recurrida.
En su consecuencia, procede, y asi lo declaramos, confirmar en todas sus partes la decision objeto del
recurso, con las costas en ambar instancias a cargo de la recurrente. Asi se ordena.
EMELITA ENAO, petitioner,
vs.
THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.
ALAMPAY, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.), dated
October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's
claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her when on August 1, 1975, while
on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and other training and school aids for her
office, she, together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents.
The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed decision rendered by
the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the petition in this case.
... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together
with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr.,
Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer of
her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per District
Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station when
their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her forearm
and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for Payment),
and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party,
she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing supplies and other
training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as a school teacher'
(Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively). When the appellant
and her group were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, they
were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be communist insurgents. As a
result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm and
abdomen which compelled her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial
Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel)
from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 10 to 12,
1975 for definitive treatment. She also developed interstitial pneumonia as a result.
(Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).
On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and Culture,
through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim was not
controverted.
On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the
Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the System in its letter-decision, dated
February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:
It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs,
you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be NPAS. Though this happened
on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off day, having
held classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District Memorandum No. 1,
s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes of the Employees'
Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and place of work, not to
mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your official functions when it
happened.
In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7)
Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On October 26, 1976, the ECC
affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:
... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was an
off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1, series of 1975 and dated June 2,
1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of those
dates fixed and set in lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not during office
hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City; more aptly put,
while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges her official
functions. The sworn statement of the Acting Administrative Officer and the appellant's
 witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's witnesses testified
in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City on the day in
question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids to enhance her
teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative Officer more
credible-that is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for there is nothing
which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other hand, the
preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's witnesses,
are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force and are in themselves self-
serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation of a future
litigation. It has been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au the fallacies
of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar, upon the
happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still sympathetic to
her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side with her. (Annex
"B", Rollo, pp. 9-10)
In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent ECC has decided
the claim in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court.
At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found in Section
1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.
The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station at the
Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and other training
aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at the Wilbon Primary
School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who appear
to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, have attested in their
respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that time on their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose
of securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as
school teachers." There is no mention at an in the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission that
this particular assertion has been at all contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to
the Commission by the GSIS.
We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation Commission in its decision that
the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations because We can discern
no circumstance that would indicate or support such a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed
from accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-Appellant's witnesses constitute prima facie
evidence of the matter sought to be established. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such
statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries
sustained by appellant and which caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital
from August 1 to 6, 1975 for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center
from September 1 to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.
The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-serving
declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable. Petitioner could not
have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her claim. Notice of the same claim for the injuries she
sustained is said to have been presented to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division
Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog City, promptly on August 5, 1975, or
four (4) days after the ambush incident and such claim was not controverted by said public school officials.
These submissions of Petitioner-Appellant have not at all been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has,
therefore, been shown why petitioner would have been to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose
sense and probity and righteousness must be presumed until otherwise disproved.
Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this singular
circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner and her co-
teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time to purchase needed supplies and other training and
school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of residence, in this instance,
becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it
hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside
the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to
purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises and
her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries
she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so.
The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela vs.
Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260, where, by a significant
majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular accident sustained by a school
principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he
was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally
injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going to and from her work, such
injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to grant the Petitioner's claim for
loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the total amount due herein Petitioner and thereafter to
pay the same.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the public
respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of death was not work-connected.
Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang,
Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years.
Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.
On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs.
Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor.
Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to
suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of
her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because there was
much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went into labor and
prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).
Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. She was
brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she
was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from
the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died three (3) days later.
The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by her husband and four (4)
children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).
On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, 1984, it was denied
by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum the cause of
death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was
contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have precipitated the
death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at
home" (p. 14 Rollo).
On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8,
1988 holding:
We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum
septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting from the entrance
into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution
of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication.
The cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected vaginal lacerations
resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at home. The
alleged accident in school could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this
case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working
conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
Hence, this petition for review.
After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the comments of the public
respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the grounds for
compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows:
Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where
his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official
functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for the employer.
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these
Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.
The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as
an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the
petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of
her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to
slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which
culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the
classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum
septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in
motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.
. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as
might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation, but rather,
[is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be
that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere preexisting
condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to
produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause.
(Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil.
181.)
Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:
. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening
upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur.
132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law
3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from
the primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.)
Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom
teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature
delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death, are compensable.
There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's post partum septicemia
"was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the
incident in school could not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid
infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).
The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of childbirth, and
premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom.
It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room instead of in
the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been attended by specially trained doctors and
nurses, she probably would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have
contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days in the hospital to
complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to blame for her inability
to afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice
of the meager salaries that the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of
poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained doctors and nurses
when they or members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her
baby at home instead of in a hospital.
The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty.
Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public school
teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic
condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is
an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of
the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this
imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees Compensation Commission
and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the
dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully
paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.