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Problem 1 - Warwick Advanced Micro - Bhaskar Dutta

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1. Show that in any normal form game, a player can have at most one

strictly dominant strategy.

2. Find the set of Nash equilibria (in pure and mixed strategies) of the

following game.

b 1 b2 b3

a1 5,6 7,2 0,8

a2 3,4 5,6 1,2

a3 2,7 0,2 0,0

each player has 4 pure strategies. Show that the unique Nash equilibrium in

pure and mixed strategies is (a2 , b2 ) played with certainty.

b1 b2 b3 b4

a1 0,7 2,5 7,0 0,1

a2 5,2 3,3 5,2 0,1

a3 7,0 2,5 0,7 0,1

a4 0,0 0,-2 0,0 10,-1

demand curve is q = 100 p. Firms simultaneously choose prices. Neither

firm can produce more than K units of output. If both firms choose the same

price, then they share the market equally subject to the capacity constraint

of K. If the prices are unequal, say pi < pj , then the low-price firm i, sells

qi (pi , pj ) = min(100 pi , K). If qi (pi , pj ) < K, then firm j sells nothing. If

qi (pi , pj ) = K, then firm j sells min(100 qi (pi , pj ) pj , K). The cost of

production for each firm is 10 per unit.

(i) Derive the payoff function of either firm.

(ii) Suppose K = 40. Show that there is no pure strategy Nash equilib-

rium in this game.

(iii) Suppose K = 30. Show that there is a pure strategy Nash equilib-

rium.

5. A set of 100 individuals play the following game. Each individual

simultaneously announces an integer between 1 and 100. The winner is the

individual whose announcement is closest to one-thirds the average number.

A prize of 100 is shared equally amongst the winners.

1

(i) Show that no pure strategy strictly dominates any other.

the unique choice of 1 for each of the players.

to announce (simultaneously) party positions in the policy space given by the

interval [0, 1]. Voters ideal points are uniformly distributed over the interval

[0, 1]. Each voter votes for the party whose announced position is closest to

his ideal point. In case the two parties announced point is equidistant from

a voters ideal point, then the voter votes for each party with probability

half. Each party wants to maximize its vote share.

(i) Show that there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which

each party locates at 21 .

(ii) Suppose now that there are three parties. Show that there is no pure

strategy Nash equilibrium.

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