B.

Freedom of association, assembly and form unions

Bayan vs. Ermita, GR. no. 169838 (April 25, 2006)

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and
that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on
October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-
neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause,
opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against
the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the
strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February
14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of
the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the
issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5
and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a
disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional
rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable
and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances
come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is
for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the
rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance
with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one
suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to
exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or
municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive
response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL
and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the
requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

C. Freedom of religion; free exercise and non-establishment

Estrada vs. Escritor AM No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man
not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another
woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of
Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of
the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch
Tower Central Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a
high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it
should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant,
a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that
her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.
Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the compelling state interest test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show
that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court
Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

Genaro Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.106 Phil 2

Facts : Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when
they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8
issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The
petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children.
This was denied. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8. The lower
court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights

ISSUE : WON DO .8 is constitutional

HELD : The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and
the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our
system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. After all, the determination of whether a certain
ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or
sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and
misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain
ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In
enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their
failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted.
Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they chose not to obey
the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the
expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or
leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their
right to attend public schools The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it
is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national
unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance
and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the
Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that
the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order
No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion;
that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline,
including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for
failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed
from the public school they were attending

Pamil vs. Teleron, 86 SCRA 413

In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was
later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case against
Gonzaga questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in Section 2175 of the
1917 Revised Administrative Code:

in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that the
Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to run.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?

HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. If the the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is
to be maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for elective office.
However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority
vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For
this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set
aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.

It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who swore to serve the Churchs
interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets.
This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands
because there is no implied repeal.

Dissenting Opinion

J. Teehankee The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective
office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 every person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces shall ipso facto cease in their office or
position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer
disqualified from running for an elective office. The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining
categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, ecclesiastics and contractors for
public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim,
Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible
under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except
those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.

Manosca vs. CA, 252 SCRA 412

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila
(492 square meters.) When the parcel of land was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. Which was approved.

So on on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint
for expropriation3 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not
for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the said parcel of land is for the purpose of public use

Held: Petition is DENIED.

The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by
most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property
does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

Ebralinag v division superintendent of schools of Cebu 219 SCRA 256

FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious
devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God. They feel bound
by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol
representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect
and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control.

ISSUE: Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may
be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to
take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge

RULING: Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right
to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. The
sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of
a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty)
to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is
not justified. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses, this religious which
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and
suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only
is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the
Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, science,
Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the
virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties
of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of
the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be condusive to love
of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses
from the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. While the highest regard
must be afforded their right to the exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by
actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace,
or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest that the State has a right. The petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. The expulsion orders issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.

Garces vs. Estenzo 104 SCRA 510

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for
the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image
of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the
election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saints feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs
property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the
priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and
Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to
facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was
placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow
the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the
image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they
decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used.
Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514

Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the issuance
of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel
located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing
them from getting into and praying in said church.

The facts to be considered are the following:

At about 5:00 in the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen,
students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of
hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang grounds located in the same street.
Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow T-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised
clenched fists 1 and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by
respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the
Malacaang security area. When petitioners protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the
church proved unavailing, they decided to leave. However, because of the alleged warning given them
by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future
would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.

Petitioners alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude
church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said
church. They maintain, however, that petitioners intention was not really to perform an act of religious
worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and
offices of the President of the Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners attempt to disguise
their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the
yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government
slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation. Thus, J.P. Fenix, commenting on the
motive of petitioners mass action of October 2, 1984, wrote the following in his article entitled Mission
Impossible, published in the October 12-18, 1984 issue of the Mr. & Mrs. magazine:

They couldnt go through Mendiola Bridge, and so they dared to get even closer to the heart of the
matter. But as in Mendiola , the barbed wire barricades and the array of sheet metal shields got in the
way of the members of the August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) as they tried last October 2 to get to
the pearly gates of power via the St. Jude Chapel on Laurel St. St. Jude happens to be a neighbor of
President Marcos, his (sic) chapel being adjacent to Malacaang.
The foregoing cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond
debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise
thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the
Civil Code admonishes: Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties observe honesty and good faith.

Even assuming that petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still
respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as violative of the
freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the
Malacaang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the
streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not
been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks.
The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the
same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government
officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacaang. The need to secure the
safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their
lives and safety is constant, real and felt throughout the world. Vivid illustrations of this grave and
serious problem are the gruesome assassinations, kidnappings and other acts of violence and terrorism
that have been perpetrated against heads of state and other public officers of foreign nations.

Said restriction is moreover intended to secure the several executive offices within the Malacaang
grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices include communications facilities
that link the central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is
necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive branch of the government, which
petitioners mass action would certainly disrupt.

Freedom of religious worship is guaranteed under Section 8, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, thus:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.

Elucidating on the meaning and scope of freedom of religion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut 2said:

The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one
hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the
free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be.

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This
curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 3
thus:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by ones imagination and thought. So
is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said
religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former
must yield and give way to the latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even
prosecutes the one exercising it. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners likewise invoke their freedom of locomotion under Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution,
which provides:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.

Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and
reasonableness of which have already been discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law, the same
having been established in the interest of national security.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.