1
G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V.
USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN
T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------------------x
G.R. No. 167930 April 19, 2006
BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A.
CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY
Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS Representatives RAFAEL
V. MARIANO and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO,
Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, DR.
CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M. REYES, JR. of BAYAN,
MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT,
FERDINAND GAITE of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM,
WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, of KMP, LANA LINABAN of
GABRIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,
DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN, SHARON R. DUREMDES of the
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES, and BRO.
EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR
RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO
NERI, in his capacity as Director-General of the NATIONAL
ECONOMIC and DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) and the
Administrator of the NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
(NSO), Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the
ground that it is unconstitutional.
EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April
2005, reads:
REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;
WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in
government have created unnecessary and costly redundancies and
higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for
individuals to be holding several identification cards;
WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the
processes and issuance of identification cards in government to
reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those
transacting business with government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private
businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability of government-
issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent
violations of laws involving false names and identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of
the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law, do hereby direct the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID)
system for government.1avvphil.net All government agencies,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, are
hereby directed to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to
ensure the attainment of the following objectives:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden
on both the government and the public brought about by
the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of
redundant database containing the same or related
information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting
business with the government and those availing of
government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider
use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive
order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-
issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and
effective government service.
Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-
owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to
be collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall be
limited to the following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating
agency and a common reference number shall form part of the
stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed
above, including the print of the right thumbmark, or any of the
fingerprints as collected and stored, shall appear on the face or back
of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, to Harmonize All Government
Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic
Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and
harmonize all government ID systems.
Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General,
National Economic and Development Authority. In addition to his
organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following
functions and responsibilities:
a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this
executive order a unified government ID system containing
only such data and features, as indicated in Section 3
above, to validly establish the identity of the card holder:
b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through
their respective leagues of governors or mayors, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other
branches or instrumentalities of the government, for the
purpose of ensuring government-wide adoption of and
support to this effort to streamline the ID systems in
government;
b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or
create subcommittees or technical working groups, to
provide such assistance as may be necessary or required
for the effective performance of its functions; and
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be
necessary in pursuance of the objectives of this executive
order.
Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic
and Development Authority, and the pertinent agencies shall adopt
such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that
the right to privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient
public service delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a minimum, include
the following:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used
only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person,
shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this
executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other
data in violation of a persons right to privacy shall be
allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the
identification system shall be instituted;
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d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept
and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or
written authorization of the Owner shall be required for
access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by
advanced security features and cryptographic technology;
and
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card
shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant
data, or under such conditions as the participating agency
issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the
Department of Budget and Management shall be provided to carry
out the objectives of this executive order.
Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or
portions thereof, which are inconsistent with this executive order,
are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our
Lord, Two Thousand and Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies
and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
uniform data collection and format for their existing identification
(ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that
EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.1
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on
the following grounds:
1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and
violates the decision of this Honorable Court in Ople v.
Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates
RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of
1997.
2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of
Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420.
Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public
funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the
right to privacy
(i) It allows access to personal confidential data
without the owners consent.

(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate
safeguards or penalties for any violation of its
provisions.
(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will
legitimize the necessity of EO 420.
4. Granting without conceding that the President may
issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued without
public hearing.
5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal
protection of laws and results in the discriminatory
treatment of and penalizes those without ID.2
Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that
EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President. Second,
petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to
privacy.
Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the
ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming that petitioners are bereft
of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised under the
circumstances of paramount public concern or of transcendental
significance to the people. The petitions also present a justiciable
controversy ripe for judicial determination because all government
entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to
implement EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently
unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are without merit.
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. All government agencies
and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards
to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive
order." EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID
cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These
government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to
EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the
GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayors Office,6 LTO,7 PRC,8 and similar
government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a
unified multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all government entities that
issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required
to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1
of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection
and format, namely:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden
on both the government and the public brought about by
the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of
redundant database containing the same or related
information;
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b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting
business with the government and those availing of
government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider
use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive
order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-
issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and
effective government service.
In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID
format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure
compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by
government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded
under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1)
Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date
of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents;
(10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two
thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles
or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for
personal identification by government entities, and even by the
private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers license
provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more
data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce
the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases
of the government entities. Government entities cannot collect or
record data, for identification purposes, other than the 14 specific
data.
Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record
data for their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the nature
of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing
ID systems, some government entities collect and record more data
than what EO 420 allows. At present, the data collected and
recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs they
issue are dissimilar.
In the case of the Supreme Court,9 the IDs that the Court issues to all
its employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data,
namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number;
(5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of
Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification
Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name and Address of Person
to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we
consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the sex of
the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.
In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420
requires only "the first five items listed" in Section 3, plus the
fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or
only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the Supreme Courts ID
contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for

government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained
in the Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive,
specifically the Tax Identification Number.
Making the data collection and recording of government entities
unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve
substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of
procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as
to hardware and software, ease of verification and thus increased
reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format for
all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit
the collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific items in
Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government
entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3
of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the authority of the heads
or governing boards of the government entities that are already
authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be
achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing
government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement
making their systems uniform. If the government entities can
individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual
agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will
result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum
compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not
involve the exercise of legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order
direct the government entities under the Executive department to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same
Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President
can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions
under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID
format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of
control is self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the
Executive branch of government and does not extend to the
Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus,
EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which
under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. 10 This
only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating
government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services.11 The adoption of a uniform ID data
collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in
4
issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the
President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative
power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power
the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive
department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal
any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420
reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility
and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of
government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an
executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data
for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation. Private
employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and
public schools also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even
private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their members. The
purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper
identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a
club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising
a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an
employee, student or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government
maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID
card system requires a special appropriation because there is no
existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card
system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the
independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on
all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third,
when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of
personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such
purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special
appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government
entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or
funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government
and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow
and focused collection and recording of personal data while
safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data
collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data
collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO
420.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does
not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to
government entities that under existing laws are already collecting
data and issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions.
Every government entity that presently issues an ID card will still
issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is that
the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO
420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common
reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure
integrity and reliability of identification.
 5

This Court should not interfere how government entities under the b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other
Executive department should undertake cost savings, achieve data in violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed
efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and or tolerated under this order;
systems, and provide user-friendly service to the public. The
collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the
functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the identification system shall be instituted;
Supreme Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court
and all first and second level courts. The Court is even trying to unify
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept
its ID system with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of
and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or
Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals.
written authorization of the Owner shall be required for
access and disclosure of data;
There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all
courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by
under the Executive department. If government entities under the
advanced security features and cryptographic technology;
Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data
collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings,
efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card
the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant
does not constitute usurpation of legislative power. data, or under such conditions as the participating agency
issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even
narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their
further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of
governmental functions. There have been no complaints from
the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are
citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their
bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by
these government entities in the collection and recording of
personal identification data. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID
systems by government entities. Some one hundred countries have
compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID
Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and
systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to
Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID systems,
privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have
like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the
less basis to complain against the unified ID system under EO 420.
Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social
The data collected and stored for the unified ID system under EO
or other public services.12 Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still
420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will
fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID
show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID
systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health
card system under EO 420 will even require less data collected,
services, and other specific purposes.
stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO
420.
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining
mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID
the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for
system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand
their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and
to suffer substantial losses arising from false names and identities.
record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In
The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence
addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight
of a reliable ID system.
of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme
Courts ID shows.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the
personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to
"strictly confidential" under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are
government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection,
not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7,
recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect
Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the "right of the people to
the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following
information on matters of public concern." Personal matters are
safeguards are instituted:
exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to information
on matters of public concern. The data treated as "strictly
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used confidential" under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of
only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the
shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide
executive order; with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420.
 6

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to
privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial
examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data
collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive
safeguards. Ople v. Torres18 is not authority to hold that EO 420
violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed
executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was
annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required
legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The
voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it
is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court."

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID

systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any
power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In
contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to
establish a "National Computerized Identification Reference
System,"19 a national ID system that did not exist prior to the
assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection
and card issuance system where none existed before.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system

but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities
like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable
and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of
executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of
control over government entities in the Executive department, as
well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420

is declared VALID.

MACEDA VS. MACARAIG, JR.
196 SCRA 771, 223 SCRA 217
Petition to reconsider decision of Court promulgated on May 31, 1991
Facts: This case is regarding a matter of indirect tax exemption of theprivate
respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) which is brought tothe
Supreme Court (SC) a second time by petitioner Senator ErnestoMaceda.On
November 3, 1936, Commonweath Act No. 120 (An Act CreatingThe
National Power Corporation, And Prescribing Its Powers And Activities,
Appropriating The Necessary Funds Therefor, And ReservingThe
Unappropriated Public Waters For Its Use) was enacted creating the NPC,
which is a public corporation, mainly to develop hydraulic power and the
production of power from other sources in the Philippines (Com. Act No. 120,
secs 1 & 2(g)).The main source of funds for the NPC was the flotation of
bonds in the capital markets and such bonds were exempt from payment of
all taxes in order for the corporation to facilitate payment of its
indebtedness. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act
Revising The Charter Of The National Power Corporation) was enacted, which
tasked NPC to carry out the policy of national electrification, and provided for
the details of NPCs tax exemption. On January 22, 1974, Presidential Decree
No. 380 was issued and specified that NPCs tax exemption includes all taxes
imposed directly and indirectly on all petroleum products used by NPC in
its operation. On May 27, 1976, Presidential Decree 938 amended R.A 6395
which integrated the tax exemption privilege of NPC in general terms
Section10 To enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and
obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation of the policy
enunciated in Section One of this Act, the Corporation, including its
subsidiaries, is hereby declared exempt from the payment of all forms of
taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing
fees, appeal bonds, supersede as bonds, in any court or administrative
proceedings.
After a series of withdrawal and restoration of NPCs tax exemption, the
Fiscal Incentives Review Board, possessing the power restore tax exemptions,
issued Resolution 10-85 (February 7, 1985)restoring NPCs exemption from
June 11, 1984 to June 30, 1985.Since 1976, oil firms never paid excise or
specific and ad valorem taxes for petroleum products sold and delivered to
NPC. Such taxes were paid on their sales of oil products to NPC only in 1984.
NPC claimed for are fund of P468.58 Million (1984-1986), and only a portion
was approved and released by Caltex. The claim for the refund of taxes paid
by PetroPhil, Shell and Caltex was denied. NPC moved for reconsideration,
stating that all the deliveries of petroleum products to NPC are tax exempt.
Petitioner contends that Presidential Decree No. 938 (1976) repealed the
indirect tax exemption of NPC as Sec 10 thereof does not expressly include
indirect taxes.
Issue: Whether the National Power Corporation still possessed indirect tax
exemption after the repeal made in PD 938
Held: Yes, NPC still possess the exemption to indirect taxes.NPC laws show
that it has been the law makers intention that the
NPC was to be completely tax exempt from all forms of taxes direct and
indirect.One common theme in all these laws is that the NPC must be able to
pay its indebtedness which, as of P.D. No. 938, was P12 Billion in total
domestic indebtedness, at any one time, and U$4 Billion in total foreign loans
at any one time. The NPC must be and has to be exempt from all forms of
taxes if this goal is to be achieved. In addition to this, the then President
Marcos mandated that 200 Million pesos be appropriated annually to NPC,
such amount should be taken from the general fund of the government. It
does not stand to reason that the then President would order 200 million
pesos to be taken partially or totally from the tax money to be used to pay
the government subscription in the NPC on one hand and order NPC to pay
7
its indirect tax. Furthermore, section 10 of PD 938 was intended to be in its
general form, President Marcos must have considered all the NPC statutes
from C.A 120 up to its latest amendments, PD 380, PD 395 and PD 758 and
came up with a very simple Section 13, RA 6395, as amended by PD
938.When construing a series of statutes, they shall be taken and construed
together, as in statutes in pari materia. And in addition, repeal by implication
is not favoured unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.
RIZAL ECHECHE VS COURT OF APPEALS
198 SCRA 577 Political Law Control Power Defined
FACTS: Atty. Echeche was employed as Legal Officer II of the Bureau of Mines. In 1975,
Letter of Instruction No. 309 was issued by the president to purge undesirable public
officers. Echeche was among the persons listed therein and he was subsequently
removed. He appealed for reinstatement for he claimed that he is good standing; that
there were no complaints against him in any court or tribunal.
After 3 years he was favorably reinstated by the Assistant Secretary of Legal Affairs of
the Ministry of Natural Resources; it was also ruled that he is entitled for back wages. He
later requested for back pays before the Department of Budget and Management. The
secretary of DBM referred the issue to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, Jr. denied the request for as per another LOI (LOI 647), Echeche is
only entitled for reemployment and not reinstatement. He appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Executive Secretary.
Echeche assailed the decision of the CA. He argues that the Court of Appeals ruled on an
order which has already become final and executory. He reasoned that the order of the
Ministry of Natural Resources, reinstating him and ordering the payment of his
backwages, has attained finality. The Secretary of Budget and Management failed to file
any motion for reconsideration from the approval of payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Natural
Resources may be validly reversed by the Executive Secretary.
HELD: Yes. The acts of Ministers (now Cabinet Secretaries) are reviewable by the
President in the exercise of his power of control.
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec.
17)
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify, or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. The President can, by virtue of his power
of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in
the executive departments, bureaus or offices under him. He can exercise this power
motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party.
However, the President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious
executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an
auxillary unit which assists the President. Under our constitutional set-up, the Executive
Secretary acts for and in behalf of the President: and by authority of the President, he
has undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order of the Secretary
of Natural Resources and other Cabinet Secretaries. Where the Executive Secretary acts
by authority of the President his decision is that of the President.
In the case at bar, Echeche was denied by the Executive Secretary for payment of back
salaries, allowances and bonuses. The decision of the Office of the Executive Secretary
must be given full faith and credit by the Supreme Court as an act of the Chief Executive.
It does not matter, though, that considering the extensive range of authority of the
Executive Secretary, the decisions of such office which are attributable to the Executive
Secretary have been performed by the Assistant or Deputy Executive Secretaries. So
even if it is a deputy who performed such action it is still valid.
Anent the issue that the decision of the Ministry of National Resources became final and
executory (hence already immutable), Echeche was never able to prove such claim (but
regardless, pursuant to the Presidents power of control, the president can still review
such decision by a subordinate).

RODOLFO GANZON VS COURT OF APPEALS
200 SCRA 271 Political Law Control Power Local Government
FACTS: Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints
were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office.
The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against
Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue
to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon
asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any
of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was
given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents
alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are
two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent.
In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably
inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.
8
ANTONIO CARPIO VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
206 SCRA 290 Political Law Control Power Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency
FACTS: In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was
passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the
Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that
it only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power to administrative control
over the PNP thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under
whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local
executives choose local police heads also undermine the power of the
president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the
PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers
of the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person on the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed
by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by
him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in
the executive department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed
under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that
would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry,
local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public
safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being
in large part subsidized by the national government.

MALAYAN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
213 SCRA 640 Political Law Control Power Executive Secretary as the
Alter Ego of the President
FACTS: In 1977, a reclamation project was sought to be undertaken by the
City of Mandaue. It signed a contract with Malayan Integrated Industries
Corporation to actualize the project. The Justice Secretary opined that only
the national government can undertake reclamation projects however the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) can delegate such function to Mandaue. The
Sanggunian of Mandaue then authorized its mayor to enter into a
Memorandum of Agreement with the PEA to validate the contract with
Malayan. The project however remained hanging until after the EDSA
Revolution. The contract was re-indorsed to then president Corazon Aquino
who referred the contract back to PEA.
After this, the mayor of Mandaue chose to open a new contract with another
company (F.F. Cruz & Co.) since he deemed that the Office of the President
has some reservations against the contract with Malayan. The mayor
submitted the new contract before the PEA which endorsed it to the Office of
the President which approved the same and rescinded the earlier contract
between Mandaue and Malayan. The recommendation was however signed
by the Executive Secretary and not the president herself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation was validly approved.
HELD: Yes. Although the letter to the PEA advising it of the approval of the
reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.
and the disapproval of the earlier agreement between the City of Mandaue
and MALAYAN, was signed by the Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President, and not by the Presidents own hand, the Executive Secretarys
action is presumed to be valid and to have been regularly performed in
behalf of the President and thus should be accorded due respect. As head of
the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary, is an alter ego of the President.
One of his myriad functions is to exercise primary authority to sign papers
`By authority of the President, attest executive orders and other presidential
issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated to other officials by him
or by the President; assist the President in the administration of special
projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct, his
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President, his acts,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.
The approval by the Office of the President of the reclamation contract in
favor of F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the rejection of the contract with MALAYAN,
is not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of
powers which accords co-equal status to the three great branches of the
government, absent any showing that the President, in doing so, acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. VS JOSE PAO
1 SCRA 895 Political Law Delegation of Control Power to the Executive
Secretary
FACTS: Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land (1,103-
hectare) used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which
was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights
to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land.
The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture
likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the
President.
9
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the
earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence
beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary
is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the
Executive Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his
constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate
certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president
may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to
perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident
is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is
that under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and
in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President,
shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the
President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting
the land to Pao cannot be reversed.
ARSENIO LACSON VS MARIANO ROQUE
92 Phil. 456 Political Law Supervision Over Local Governments
FACTS: The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some
allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain JudgeMontesa
"I have nothing but contempt for certain courts of justice. . . . I tell you one thing
(answering an interrogator), if I have the power to fire Judge Montesa (the trial judge) I
will fire him for being incompetent, for being an arrogant . . . an ignoramus.".
Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was
assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension of
Lacson to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary
Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from
his post.
HELD: No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the
President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. It is true that the
President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments,
but supervision does not contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension of public
officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitations.
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in
section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done
conformably to law; and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines he may at any time remove a person from any position of trust
or authority under the Government of the Philippines. Again, this power of
removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege
libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.

RUBEN VILLALUZ VS CALIXTO ZALDIVAR
15 SCRA 710 Political Law Control Power Removal Power Appointees
FACTS: Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor
Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that
Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government.
He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary
Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate
the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be
removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing
Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to
remove him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be
removed considering that he is an appointee of the president.
HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The
President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him
since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260; being a
presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be
investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of
the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in
the power to appoint .
There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the
President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can
be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who
belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that
the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.
JOSE VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
67 Phil. 451 Political Law Control Power Supervision Suspension of a
Local Government Official Power to suspend comes with the power to
remove
FACTS: Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After
investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of
Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The
Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary
has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the
local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of
supervision over local governments, that power, according to the
constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and
the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal
officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as
amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his
supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law,
in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the
latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and
punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is
the genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official
under investigation.
10
HELD: Yes.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a
mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the
power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec
2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean
that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the
Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the
oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the
petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as
amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed,
if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal
official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser
power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if,
possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official
(sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the
power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal
official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for
an impartial investigation.
JULIANO ALBA VS ALBA & JUDGE JOSE EVANGELISTA
100 Phil. 683 Political Law Control Power Removal of Appointed LGU officials
Republic Act No. 603 created the City of Roxas. Section 8 thereof provides that the vice
mayor shall be appointed by the president. Pursuant to the law, Vivencio Alajar was
appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent communication to Alajar telling
him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Juliano Alba. Alba was then declared as
the acting mayor. Alajar refused to leave his post and he filed a quo warranto case
before Judge Jose Evangelista who ruled in favor of him.
Alba appealed before the Supreme Court. Alba argued that section 2545 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Appointment of City Officials. The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the
mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at pleasure any of the said officers . . .
Alajar however insisted that the above provision is incompatible with the constitutional
inhibition that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law, because the two provisions are
mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alajar, an appointed vice mayor, can be removed by the
president upon displeasure.
HELD: Yes. The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during
good behavior, had any vested interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress
could not deprive him.
The act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing
the term or the period during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right
and the tenure or the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a
valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power,
Congress enacted RA 603 creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the
position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor
holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the logical inference is that Congress
can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon the
pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alajar was appointed by the pleasure of the
president and can also be removed when that pleasure ceases.
 11

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS MINISTER OF LABOR BLAS OPLE ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has appellate jurisdiction
108 SCRA 757 Political Law Delegation of Power Completeness Test to review and reverse decisions promulgated by the CSC when it comes to
appointments.

FACTS: In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free
Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance
Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction
over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed
the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation of
power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting
discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for
compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it also
effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the
Minister of Labor was yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no
ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.
HELD: Yes, the President can. Under Sec 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code and Sec. 37 of Act 4007, the President as department head can review,
modify or revoke decisions or actions of the chiefs of bureaus, offices,
divisions or service under his department as well as exercise the power
expressly vested by law in such chief or head of the bureau, office, division or
service. The appellate jurisdiction of the President on disputed appointments
is also expressly affirmed by Sec. 693 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides that
A disbursing officer, the head of any department, bureau, or office, or the
Auditor General, may apply for, and the Commissioner of CSC shall render, a
decision upon any question as to whether a position is in the unclassified or
in the unclassified civil service, or whether the appointment of any person to
a classified position has been made in accordance with law, which decision,
when rendered, shall be final unless reversed by the President of the
Philippines on appeal.

The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the
Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle
and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. But as to
whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet
to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual
determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it
set a sufficient standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being
limited to strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.
VICENTA OLIVEROS-TORRE VS FLORES BAYOT
58 SCRA 272 Political Law Appointments Appellate Jurisdiction of the
President Rule on Next-in-Rank
But even without such express statutory conferment of appellate jurisdiction
on the President, he can at any time by virtue of his power of control over
executive departments, bureaus and offices, expressly vested in him by the
1935 Constitution, review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of
his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus, or offices under him.
He can exercise this power motu propio without need of any appeal from any
party.
Torre argued that the power of control granted by the Constitution to the
President over executive departments, bureaus, offices and services, should
be limited to a review of administrative acts, not to decisions of the
Commissioner of Civil Service on contested appointments; this untenable for
the law makes no distinction as to what administrative acts and the acts of
the CSC where there is no distinction made by law, the Court must not
distinguish.

FACTS: Vicenta Oliveros-Torre and a certain Virginia Barros were both

fighting over the position as the Chief Drug Inspector (CDI) of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). Both are more than qualified.

Rosario Capistrano was the incumbent CDI. Barros was the next in rank as
she was the Supervising Drug Inspector and even at that point she is also
contesting the position with Capistrano. Capistrano went on leave and Torre
was appointed as the acting CDI.

When Capistranos leave expired the Secretary of Health extended Torres

appointment until Capistranos return. The said office was given due course
by the Office of the President. Barros then filed a protest before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) claiming that she has the right to the office
because she was next in rank. CSC initially declared Barros to be the rightful
person to the contested position. Torre then relinquished her office to Barros
but Torre appealed to the CSC and the CSC reversed its earlier decision.
Barros appealed to the CSC and was denied hence she went to the Executive
Secretary (Office of the President). Through Under Secretary Flores Bayot,
the Executive Secretary granted the appeal by Barros and the CSC decision
was reversed. Torre appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the Office
of the President cannot review and reverse the decision of the CSC regarding
appointments; she argued that under the Civil Service Act the decision of the
CSC Commissioner shall be final and executory.