Due to the foregoing, Fernando, represented by his daughter and attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn Caballero, filed with
CASES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
GSIS VS HEIRS OF CABALLERO
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the Decision[1] and the Resolution,[2] dated December 17, 2002 and April 29, 2003, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential lot designated as Lot
No. 3355, Ts-268, covered by TCT No. T-16035 of the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, containing an area of
800 square meters and situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a
residential/commercial building consisting of two (2) stories.
On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a loan from petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) in the amount of P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note. Fernando and his
wife likewise executed a real estate mortgage on the same date, mortgaging the afore-stated property as
security.
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, on January 20, 1973, the mortgage
covering the subject property was foreclosed, and on March 26, 1973, the same was sold at a public auction
where the petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P36,283.00. For failure of Fernando to redeem the
said property within the designated period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership on
September 5, 1975. Consequently, TCT No. T-16035 was cancelled and TCT No. T-45874 was issued in the
name of petitioner.
On November 26, 1975, petitioner wrote a letter to Fernando, informing him of the consolidation of title in its
favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's continued occupancy of the subject
property. In reply, Fernando requested that he be allowed to repurchase the same through partial payments.
Negotiation as to the repurchase by Fernando of the subject property went on for several years, but no
agreement was reached between the parties.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for public bidding. On the scheduled date of
bidding, Fernando's daughter, Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00, while
Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC) submitted a bid in the amount of P450,000.00. Since
CMTC was the highest bidder, it was awarded the subject property. On May 16, 1989, the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award of the subject property to CMTC for a total
consideration of P450,000.00. Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between petitioner and CMTC
on July 27, 1989, transferring the subject property to CMTC.Consequently, TCT No. T-45874 in the name of
GSIS was cancelled, and TCT No. T-76183 was issued in the name of CMTC.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint[3] against CMTC, the GSIS and its
responsible officers, and the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato. Fernando prayed, among others, that
judgment be rendered: declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and
void; declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner and CMTC null and void ab initio; declaring TCT
No. 76183 of the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise, null and void ab initio; declaring the bid
made by Fernando in the amount ofP350,000.00 for the repurchase of his property as the winning bid; and
ordering petitioner to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of Fernando. He
also prayed for payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the bidding. CMTC
misrepresented itself to be wholly owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its
representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from its board of directors in an appropriate board
resolution to participate in the bidding. The corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate or invest its
funds for purposes other than its primary purpose. Fernando further alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid
despite knowledge that said corporation has no authority to do so. The GSIS also disregarded Fernando's prior
right to buy back his family home and lot in violation of the laws. The Register of Deeds of Cotabato acted with
abuse of power and authority when it issued the TCT in favor of CMTC without requiring the CMTC to submit
its supporting papers as required by the law.
Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. [4] The GSIS alleged
that Fernando lost his right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the property; however, he did
not avail of such option compelling the GSIS to dispose of the property by public bidding as mandated by
law. There is also no prior right to buy back that can be exercised by Fernando. Further, it averred that the
articles of incorporation and other papers of CMTC were all in order. In its counterclaim, petitioner alleged that
Fernando owed petitioner the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals, including additional interests from
January 1973 to February 1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita Ang Hao from January 1973 to February
1988.
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision[5] dated September 27, 1994, ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted petitioner's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of P249,800.00. The foregoing amount was collected by
Fernando from the CMTC and represents payment which was not turned over to petitioner, which was entitled
to receive the rent from the date of the consolidation of its ownership over the subject property.
Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated March 27, 1995.
Aggrieved by the Decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.[6] The CA, in its Decision dated December 17,
2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment ordering
Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 29, 2003. Hence, the instant
petition.
Civil Procedure

An Ex Parte Motion for Substitution of Party,[7] dated July 18, 2003, was filed by the surviving heirs of
Fernando, who died on February 12, 2002. They prayed that they be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
as respondents in this case.
Petitioner enumerated the following grounds in support of its petition:
I Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT GSIS' COUNTERCLAIM, AMONG OTHERS, OF P249,800.00
REPRESENTING RENTALS COLLECTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT FROM
CARMELITA MERCANTILE TRADING CORPORATION IS IN THE NATURE OF A
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM WHICH REQUIRED THE PAYMENT BY GSIS OF
DOCKET FEES BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CAN ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER
SAID COUNTERCLAIM.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT GSIS' DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ITS CLAIM
OF P249,800.00 LACKS PROPER IDENTIFICATION.[8]
The petition of the GSIS seeks the review of the CA's Decision insofar as it deleted the trial court's award
of P249,800.00 in its favor representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC.
In their Memorandum, respondents claim that CMTC cannot purchase real estate or invest its funds in any
purpose other than its primary purpose for which it was organized in the absence of a corporate board
resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. T-76183, issued in favor of the CMTC, should be
nullified; the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel have regularly performed their official duty
when they conducted the public bidding; Fernando, as former owner of the subject property and former member
of the GSIS, has the preemptive right to repurchase the foreclosed property.
These additional averments cannot be taken cognizance by the Court, because they were substantially
respondents arguments in their petition for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and docketed as G.R. No.
156609. Records show that said petition was denied by the Court in a Resolution [9] dated April 23, 2003, for
petitioners (respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.[10] Said resolution became final and executory on June 9, 2003. [11] Respondents attempt to re-
litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with finality by the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be
allowed.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by
Fernando from the CMTC is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando
against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the
other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees
results into the dismissal of its claim.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are
the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b)
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants counterclaim?
and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. [12]
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA's view that petitioner's counterclaim
for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The
evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is
different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor
of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim,i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive
the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property
by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is
bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.[13] This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the
collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar
as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void.
Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal
before this Court.[14]
Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try
and decide the same, considering petitioner's exemption from all kinds of fees.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment
of Legal Fees,[15] the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act
No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to
exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court
now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
Civil Procedure

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this
prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a
legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of
legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the
Court's independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority
of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under
Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF
expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee the independence of the
Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees therefore do not only
constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an essential
element of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government
units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is
constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence.
Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion,[16] where the Court held that:
xxxx
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag,[17] the Court, in interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, held that the
same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to which the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the
complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of
certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the
court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of
the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to
claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it
will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount
thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner's claim for payment of rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC did not arise after the filing of
the complaint; hence, the rule laid down in Sun Insurance finds no application in the present case.
Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioner's counterclaim, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over it and, thus, there is no need to discuss the second issue raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution, dated December 17, 2002 and
April 29, 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 196200 September 11, 2013
ERNESTO DY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. GINA M. BIBAT- PALAMOS, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Makati City, and ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure questions the December
13, 2010 and March 7, 2011Orders1 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64 (RTC), in Civil Case No.
92-2311, granting the motion for execution of petitioner, but denying his prayer for the return of his cargo
vessel in the condition when the possession thereof was seized from him.
The Facts
The present controversy finds its roots in the Courts decision in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation
v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy2 involving the same parties. The facts, as culled from
the Courts decision in the said case and the records, are not disputed by the parties.
Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the proprietors of Limchia
Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. In 1990, Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as co-
maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its acquisition
Civil Procedure
of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As additional security for the loan, Limchia Enterprises executed the Deed of become executory, the court cannot amend the same, except: x x x None of the three circumstances where a
Chattel Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.3 final and executory judgment may be amended is present in this case. And third, the present deplorable state of
M/V Pilar certainly did not happen overnight, thus, defendants should have brought it to the attention of this
Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make the Court, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court after it became apparent. Their inaction until after the
scheduled payments as required in their promissory note. After receiving several demand letters from judgment has become final, executory and immutable rendered whatever right they may have to remedy the
respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their loan. Meanwhile, Lourdes issued several checks to situation to be nugatory. [Underlining supplied]
cover the remainder of their loan but the same were dishonored by the bank, prompting respondent to institute a
criminal complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. Lourdes appealed to respondent with a new Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the RTC in its March 7, 2011 Order. 12
proposal to update their outstanding loan obligations.4
Hence, this petition.
On August 18, 1992, respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred
Ship Mortgage under Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with the RTC. The Issues
Following the filing of an affidavit of merit and the posting of bond by respondent, the RTC ordered the seizure
of M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to respondent. On September 28, 1994, respondent transferred all
Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:
of its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard Corporation (Colorado). 5
1. Whether or not the rule on hierarchy of courts is applicable to the instant petition?
On July 31, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted on
their loan because respondent agreed to a restructured schedule of payment. There being no default, the
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature. The RTC ordered that the vessel be returned 2. Whether or not the honorable trial court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
to Spouses Dy.6 This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), with the modification that Spouses Dy be jurisdiction, in finding that petitioner is not entitled to the return of M/VPilar-1 in the condition that it
ordered to reimburse the respondent for repair and dry docking expenses while the vessel was in the latters had when it was wrongfully seized by Orix Metro, or in the alternative, to a vessel of similar tonnage,
possession.7 On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision, dated September 11, 2009, upholding the findings length, beam, and other particulars as M/VPilar-1;
of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses Dy to reimburse respondent.8
3. Whether or not petitioner is estopped from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition it had
Consequently, on August 17, 2010, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC. In the at the time it was seized?
intervening period, Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion, dated July 29, 2010, informing the RTC that M/V
Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had sustained severe damage and deterioration and had sunk in its shipyard 4. Whether or not it was petitioners duty to look out for the vessels condition? 13
because of its exposure to the elements. For this reason, it sought permission from the court to cut the sunken
vessel into pieces, sell its parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow. 9 In his Comment/Objection, petitioner To be succinct, only two central issues need to be resolved: (1) whether petitioner was justified in resorting
insisted that he had the right to require that the vessel be returned to him in the same condition that it had been directly to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to the
at the time it was wrongfully seized by respondent or, should it no longer be possible, that another vessel of the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition when it was seized by respondent.
same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V Pilar-I be delivered.10 Colorado, however, responded that
the vessel had suffered severe damage and deterioration that refloating or restoring it to its former condition The Courts Ruling
would be futile, impossible and very costly; and should petitioner persist in his demand that the ship be
refloated, it should be done at the expense of the party adjudged by the court to pay the same. 11
The Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
The RTC issued its questioned December 13, 2010 Order granting the motion for execution but denying
Hierarchy of Courts; Direct Resort
petitioners prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state in which it was taken by respondent. In so
To The Supreme Court Justified
resolving, the RTC ratiocinated:

Petitioner argues that his situation calls for the direct invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the interest of
First, the judgment of the Supreme Court does not require the delivery of M/V Pilar in the state the defendants
justice. Moreover, as pointed out by the RTC, what is involved is a judgment of the Court which the lower
wanted it to be. Secondly, said judgment has now become final and it is axiomatic that after judgment has
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
courts cannot modify. Hence, petitioner deemed it proper to bring this case immediately to the attention of this
Court. Lastly, petitioner claims that the present case involves a novel issue of law that is, whether in an action
to recover, a defendant in wrongful possession of the subject matter in litigation may be allowed to return the
same in a deteriorated condition without any liability.14
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the petition should have been filed with the CA, following the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It pointed out that petitioner failed to state any special or important reason or
any exceptional and compelling circumstance which would warrant a direct recourse to this Court. 15
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme Court
is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional
functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
preventing the overcrowding of its docket. 16 Nonetheless, the invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons
clearly stated in the petition, such as,(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public
policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.17
This case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands that this
Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to the controversy and resolve the matter which has been
dragging on for more than twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final
judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its original jurisdiction and seek
final clarification.
Wrong Mode of Appeal;
Exception
Petitioner asserts that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to rule in his favor despite the
fact that he had been deprived by respondent of his property rights over M/V Pilar-I for the past eighteen(18)
years. Moreover, the change in the situation of the parties calls for a relaxation of the rules which would make
the execution of the earlier decision of this Court inequitable or unjust. According to petitioner, for the RTC to
allow respondent to return the ship to him in its severely damaged and deteriorated condition without any
liability would be to reward bad faith.18
Conversely, respondent submits that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the latter
merely observed due process and followed the principle that an execution order may not vary or go beyond the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.19 Respondent adds that the proper remedy should have been an
ordinary appeal, where a factual review of the records can be made to determine the condition of the ship at the
time it was taken from petitioner, and not a special civil action for certiorari. 20
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
There are considerable differences between an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari which have been
exhaustively discussed by this Court in countless cases. The remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on
the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal. 21 In
contrast, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action designed to correct errors of jurisdiction,
defined to be those "in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of in excess of
jurisdiction."22 A court or tribunal can only be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion if its
exercise of judgment was so whimsical and capricious as to be equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
must be extremely patent and gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." 23
Therefore, a misappreciation of evidence on the part of the lower court, as asserted by petitioner, may only be
reviewed by appeal and not by certiorari because the issue raised by the petitioner does not involve any
jurisdictional ground.24 It is a general rule of procedural law that when a party adopts an inappropriate mode of
appeal, his petition may be dismissed outright to prevent the erring party from benefiting from his neglect and
mistakes.25 There are exceptions to this otherwise ironclad rule, however. One is when the strict application of
procedural technicalities would hinder the expeditious disposition of this case on the merits, 26 such as in this
case.
Petitioner Not Barred from Demanding
Return of the Vessel in its Former Condition
Petitioner insists that it is respondent who should bear the responsibility for the deterioration of the vessel
because the latter, despite having in its possession the vessel M/V Pilar-I during the pendency of the foreclosure
proceedings, failed to inform the court and petitioner himself about the actual condition of the ship. For estoppel
to take effect, there must be knowledge of the real facts by the party sought to be estopped and reliance by the
party claiming estoppel on the representation made by the former. In this case, petitioner cannot be estopped
from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition that it had been at the time it was seized by respondent
because he had not known of the deteriorated condition of the ship.27
On the contrary, respondent argues that petitioner is barred from asking for a modification of the judgment since
he never prayed for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same condition that it had been at the time it was
seized.28Petitioner could have prayed for such relief in his prior pleadings and presented evidence thereon
before the judgment became final and executory. During the course of the trial, and even at the appellate phase
of the case, petitioner failed to ask the courts to look into the naturally foreseeable depreciation of M/V Pilar-I
and to determine who should pay for the wear and tear of the vessel. Consequently, petitioner can no longer
pursue such relief for the first time at this very late stage. 29 Moreover, respondent posits that it can only be held
liable for the restoration and replacement of the vessel if it can be proven that M/V Pilar-I deteriorated through
the fault of respondent. Nowhere in the prior decision of this Court, however, does it appear that respondent was
found to have been negligent in its care of the vessel. In fact, respondent points out that, for a certain period, it
even paid for the repair and maintenance of the vessel and engaged the services of security guards to watch over
Civil Procedure
the vessel. It reasons that the vessels deterioration was necessarily due to its exposure to sea water and the
natural elements for the almost twenty years that it was docked in the Colorado shipyard. 30
On this matter, the Court finds for petitioner.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of immutability of judgments. When a judgment becomes final and
executory, it is made immutable and unalterable, meaning it can no longer be modified in any respect either by
the court which rendered it or even by this Court. Its purpose is to avoid delay in the orderly administration of
justice and to put an end to judicial controversies. Even at the risk of occasional errors, public policy and sound
practice dictate that judgments must become final at some point.31
As with every rule, however, this admits of certain exceptions. When a supervening event renders the execution
of a judgment impossible or unjust, the interested party can petition the court to modify the judgment to
harmonize it with justice and the facts.32 A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new circumstance
which develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This includes matters which the parties were
unaware of prior to or during trial because they were not yet in existence at that time. 33
In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event.1wphi1 Petitioner, who did not
have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its Manifestation, dated
July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court in Orix Metro Leasing and Finance
Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010.
During the course of the proceedings in the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not have known of the
worsened condition of the vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado.
It could be argued that petitioner and his lawyer should have had the foresight to ask for the return of the vessel
in its former condition at the time respondent took possession of the same during the proceedings in the earlier
case. Nonetheless, the modification of the Courts decision is warranted by the superseding circumstances, that
is, the severe damage to the vessel subject of the case and the belated delivery of this information to the courts
by the party in possession of the same.
Having declared that a modification of our earlier judgment is permissible in light of the exceptional incident
present in this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is entitled to the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same
condition in which respondent took possession of it. Considering, however, that this is no longer possible, then
respondent should pay petitioner the value of the ship at such time.
This disposition is not without precedent. In the case of Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. D.M. Consortium,
Inc.,34 D.M. Consortium, Inc. (DMCI) acquired 228 buses under a lease purchase agreement with Metro Manila
Transit Corporation (MMTC). MMTC later alleged that DMCI was in default of its amortization, as a result of
which, MMTC took possession of all the buses. This Court upheld the right of DMCI, after having been
unjustly denied of its right of possession to several buses, to have them returned by MMTC. Considering,
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
however, that the buses could no longer be returned in their original state, the Court sustained the resolution of
the CA ordering MMTC to pay DMCI the value of the buses at the time of repossession.
The aforecited case finds application to the present situation of petitioner. After having been deprived of his
vessel for almost two decades, through no fault of his own, it would be the height of injustice to permit there
turn of M/V Pilar-I to petitioner in pieces, especially after a judgment by this very same Court ordering
respondent to restore possession of the vessel to petitioner. To do so would leave petitioner with nothing but a
hollow and illusory victory for although the Court ruled in his favor and declared that respondent wrongfully
took possession of his vessel, he could no longer enjoy the beneficial use of his extremely deteriorated vessel
that it is no longer seaworthy and has no other commercial value but for the sale of its parts as scrap.
Moreover, the incongruity only becomes more palpable when consideration is taken of the fact that petitioner's
obligation to respondent, for which the now practically worthless vessel serves as security, is still
outstanding.35The Court cannot countenance such an absurd outcome. It could not have been the intention of
this Court to perpetrate an injustice in the guise of a favorable decision. As the court of last resort, this Court is
the final bastion of justice where litigants can hope to correct any error made in the lower courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the value of
M/V Pilar- I at the time it was wrongfully seized by it. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 64, Makati City, for the proper determination of the value of the vessel at said time.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173038 September 14, 2011
ELENA JANE DUARTE, Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing
evidence.1
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the October 26, 2005
Decision3 and May 22, 2006 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 84461.
Factual Antecedents
Civil Procedure
This petition arose from a suit5 for collection of sum of money filed by respondent Miguel Samuel A.E.
Duran6against petitioner Elena Jane Duarte with
Branch 5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu.
According to respondent, on February 14, 2002, he offered to sell a laptop computer for the sum of P15,000.00
to petitioner thru the help of a common friend, Josephine Dy (Dy). 7 Since petitioner was undecided, respondent
left the laptop with petitioner for two days.8 On February 16, 2002, petitioner told respondent that she was
willing to buy the laptop on installment.9 Respondent agreed; thus, petitioner gave P5,000.00 as initial payment
and promised to pay P3,000.00 on February 18, 2002 and P7,000.00 on March 15, 2002.10 On February 18,
2002, petitioner gave her second installment of P3,000.00 to Dy, who signed the handwritten receipt11 allegedly
made by petitioner as proof of payment.12 But when Dy returned to get the remaining balance on March 15,
2002, petitioner offered to pay only P2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth P10,000.00.13 Due to the
refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining balance, respondent thru counsel sent petitioner a demand letter dated
July 29, 2002.14
Petitioner, however, denied writing the receipt dated February 18, 2002, 15 and receiving the demand letter dated
July 29, 2002.16 Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of sale. 17 Petitioner said that Dy offered to sell
respondents laptop but because petitioner was not interested in buying it, Dy asked if petitioner could instead
lend respondent the amount of P5,000.00.18 Petitioner agreed and in turn, Dy left the laptop with
petitioner.19 On February 18, 2002, Dy came to get the laptop but petitioner refused to give it back because the
loan was not yet paid.20 Dy then asked petitioner to lend an additional amount of P3,000.00 to respondent who
allegedly was in dire need of money.21 Petitioner gave the money under agreement that the amounts she lent to
respondent would be considered as partial payments for the laptop in case she decides to buy it. 22 Sometime in
the first week of March 2002, petitioner informed respondent that she has finally decided not to buy the
laptop.23 Respondent, however, refused to pay and insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead.24
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
On June 2, 2003, the MTCC rendered a Decision25 in favor of respondent. It found the receipt dated February
18, 2002 and the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Dy, sufficient to prove that there was a contract of
sale between the parties.26 Thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the
latter to pay plaintiff the following measure of damages:
(a) Actual damages in the amount of Seven Thousand (P7,000.00) Pesos with interest thereon at 12%
per annum from July 29, 2002 until fully paid;
(b) Attorneys fees in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos; and
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
(c) Litigation expenses in the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.27
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On appeal,28 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 12, reversed the MTCC Decision. Pertinent
portions of the Decision,29 including the dispositive portion, read:
xxxx
As shown in the records of the case, this Court finds the alleged receipt issued by the witness Josephine Dy [in]
her own handwriting a mere product of machination, trickery and self-serving. It shows no proof of conformity
or acknowledgment on the part of the defendant that indeed she agreed on the stipulations. Thus, it cannot be
given any credence and ultimately, did not bind her.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The defendant Elena Jane Duarte is
hereby directed to return the computer laptop to plaintiff Miguel Samuel A.E. Duran and plaintiff is directed to
return the money borrowed from defendant.
SO ORDERED.30
Respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order 31 dated May 13, 2004.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 1, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Review32 with the CA. Finding the petition meritorious, the CA
reversed the RTC Decision and reinstated the Decision of the MTCC. The CA said that the RTC erred in not
giving weight and credence to the demand letter dated July 29, 2002 and the receipt dated February 18,
2002.33The CA pointed out that petitioner failed to overturn the presumption that the demand letter dated July
29, 2002 sent by respondents counsel by registered mail was received by her. 34 Neither was she able to deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the receipt dated February 18, 2002. 35 Thus, the fallo of the
Decision36reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu City is REVERSED and the judgment of Municipal Trial Court in
Cities Branch 5, Cebu City is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Civil Procedure
SO ORDERED.37
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration38 which the CA denied in a Resolution39 dated May 22, 2006.
Issues
Hence, the present recourse by petitioner raising five issues, to wit:
I. Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave error in not resolving the issue as to whether or not the
petition for review that respondent filed in the said court was filed out of time.
II. Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave error when it reinstated the judgment of the [MTCC],
Branch 5, Cebu City which awarded excessive attorneys fees and litigation expenses without factual
and legal justification since the awards were merely stated in the dispositive portion of the decision and
the factual and legal bases thereof were not discussed in the text thereof.
III. Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave error in holding that the denial by the petitioner of a
receipt of the demand letter, sent through registered mail has not overturned the principal presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty.
IV. Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave error in holding that a "receipt" which does not contain
the signature of the petitioner is an actionable document.
V. Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave error in holding that the evidence available confirm the
existence of a contract of sale.40
Summed up, the issues boil down to: (1) the timeliness of the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA; (2)
the existence of a contract of sale; and (3) respondents entitlement to attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner contends that the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA on June 1, 2004 was beyond the
reglementary period.41 Records show that respondent received a copy of the RTC Decision on March 25, 2004,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 12, 2004 since April 9 and 10 were holidays and April 11, 2004
was a Sunday, and received a copy of the RTC Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on May 27,
2004.42 Thus, he only had one day left from May 27, 2004 within which to file a Petition for Review with the
CA.43
Petitioner likewise denies the existence of a contract of sale, insisting that the laptop was not sold to her but was
given as a security for respondents debt. To prove that there was no contract of sale, petitioner calls attention to
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
respondents failure to present a written contract of sale. 44 She claims that under the Statute of Frauds, a
contract of sale to be enforceable must be in writing. 45 She also imputes error on the part of the CA in giving
weight and credence to the receipt dated February 18, 2002 and the demand letter dated July 29, 2002. 46 She
claims that the receipt dated February 18, 2002, which she denies having written, is not an actionable document;
thus, there was no need for her to deny under oath its genuineness and due execution.47 Furthermore, she claims
that her denial of the receipt of the demand letter dated July 29, 2002 shifted the burden upon respondent to
prove that the letter was indeed received by her.48 As to the attorneys fees and litigation expenses, petitioner
contends that these were not discussed in the MTCC Decision but were only stated in the dispositive portion
and that the amount of P5,000.00 is excessive considering that it is 70% of the principal amount claimed by
respondent.49
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that his Petition for Review was timely filed with the CA because he has
15 days from receipt of the RTC Order dated May 13, 2004 within which to file a Petition for Review with the
CA under Section 150 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.51 Respondent defends the ruling of the CA by arguing
that the receipt dated February 18, 2002 is an actionable document, and thus, petitioners failure to deny under
oath its genuineness and due execution constitutes an admission thereof. 52 In addition, petitioners denial of the
receipt of the demand letter dated July 29, 2002 cannot overcome the presumption that the said letter was
received in the regular course of mail.53 Respondent likewise points out that the Statute of Frauds does not
apply in the instant case.54 Finally, respondent claims that the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses
are not excessive and that the factual and legal bases of the award were stated in the body of MTCC Decision. 55
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
The Petition for Review was timely filed with the CA
To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we ruled in Neypes
v. Court of Appeals56 that litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41,
42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court.57 This ruling, as we have said in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-
Valencia,58retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14,
2005, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. 59
Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the time Neypes was promulgated, respondent is entitled to a
fresh period of 15 days, counted from May 27, 2004, the date respondent received the RTC Order dated May
13, 2004 denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision dated March 19, 2004 or until June 11,
2004, within which to file his Petition for Review with the CA. Thus, we find that when he filed the Petition for
Review with the CA on June 1, 2004, his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.
Civil Procedure
There was a contract of sale between the parties
As to whether there was a contract of sale between the parties, we hold that there was, and the absence of a
written contract of sale does not mean otherwise. A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree
upon the object of the sale, the price, and the terms of payment. 60 Once perfected, the parties are bound by it
whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required. 61 Contrary to the view of petitioner, the
Statute of Frauds does not apply in the present case as this provision applies only to executory, and not to
completed, executed or partially executed contracts.62 In this case, the contract of sale had been partially
executed because the possession of the laptop was already transferred to petitioner and the partial payments had
been made by her. Thus, the absence of a written contract is not fatal to respondents case. Respondent only
needed to show by a preponderance of evidence that there was an oral contract of sale, which he did by
submitting in evidence his own affidavit, the affidavit of his witness Dy, the receipt dated February 18, 2002
and the demand letter dated July 29, 2002.
As regards the receipt dated February 18, 2002, we agree with petitioner that it is not an actionable document.
Hence, there was no need for her to deny its genuineness and due execution under oath. Nonetheless, we find no
error on the part of the CA in giving full weight and credence to it since it corroborates the testimonies of
respondent and his witness Dy that there was an oral contract of sale between the parties.
With regard to petitioners denial of the receipt of the demand letter dated July 29, 2002, we believe that this did
not overturn the presumption of regularity that the letter was delivered and received by the addressee in the
regular course of the mail considering that respondent was able to present the postmasters certification 63 stating
that the letter was indeed sent to the address of petitioner. Bare denial of receipt of a mail cannot prevail over
the certification of the postmaster, whose official duty is to send notices of registered mail. 64
As we see it then, the evidence submitted by respondent weigh more than petitioners bare denials. Other than
her denials, no other evidence was submitted by petitioner to prove that the laptop was not sold but was only
given as security for respondents loan. What adds doubt to her story is the fact that from the first week of
March 2002, the time she allegedly decided not to buy the laptop, up to the time the instant case was filed
against her, she did not exert any effort to recover from respondent the payment of the alleged loan. Her
inaction leads us to conclude that the alleged loan was a mere afterthought.
All told, no error can be attributed to the CA in finding that there was a contract of sale between the parties
The award for attorneys fees and litigation expenses was proper
Neither do we find any error in the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Article 220865 of the Civil Code enumerates the legal grounds which justify or warrant the grant of attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation, among which is when the defendants act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.66 The reason for the award of attorneys fees and litigation
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
expenses, however, must be set forth in the decision of the court and not in the dispositive portion only. 67 In this
case, the factual and legal bases for the award were set forth in the body of the MTCC Decision dated June 2,
2003, to wit:
x x x As the defendant refused to satisfy plaintiffs just and valid claim, the latter was compelled to litigate and
engage the services of counsel to protect his interest and in the process, incurred litigation expenses. 68 1avvphi1
The award of attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 is also reasonable and not excessive considering that
this case, a simple collection of a measly sum of P7,000.00, has dragged for almost a decade and even had to
reach this Court only because petitioner refused to pay. The fact that it is 70% of the principal amount claimed
is of no moment as the amount of attorneys fees is discretionary upon the court as long as it is reasonable. 69
Finally, although not raised as an issue, we find it necessary to modify the legal interest rate imposed on the
principal amount claimed. Since the claim involves an obligation arising from a contract of sale and not a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest rate should be six percent (6%) per annum of the amount claimed from
July 29, 2002.70 The interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, however, shall apply from the finality of
judgment until the total amount awarded is fully paid.71
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 26, 2005 Decision and May 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84461 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
as to the legal interest imposed on the principal amount claimed. The legal interest shall be at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from July 29, 2002 and at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time
the judgment of this Court becomes final and executory until the obligation is fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.
Cabili vs Judge Balindong
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve the administrative complaint against respondent Acting Presiding Judge Rasad G.
Balindong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8, forGross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial
Service.[1]
The Factual Antecedents
The antecedent facts, gathered from the records, are summarized below.
Civil Procedure
 Civil Case No. 06-2954[2] is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC against the
Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused the death of Jesus
Ledesma and physical injuries to several others.
On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for damages
amounting to P2,726,189.90. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and the CA
decision subsequently lapsed to finality. On January 19, 2009, Entry of Judgment was made. [3]
On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a writ of execution. [4] The MSU, however, failed to
comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on
the MSUs depository bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General opposed the motion for execution, albeit belatedly, in behalf
of MSU.[6] The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in itsMarch 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to
the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition
and mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. [7] The petition of MSU was raffled to the
RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8,
2009.[8] After this hearing, the respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from
garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[9]
On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required MSU to file a memorandum in support of its application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [10] On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[11] The respondent Judge thereafter granted the motion and dismissed
the case.[12]
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge withGross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse
of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial
Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO
to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.[13]
The respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan City
RTC.[14] He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard and eventually dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.[15]
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent
Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the elementary rule of non-interference with the
proceedings of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.[16] It recommended a fine of P40,000.00, noting that this is
the respondent Judges second offense.[17]
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
The Court resolved to re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter and to require the
parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings/records on file.[18]
Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili complied through his manifestation of April 19, 2010, [19] stating that he learned from
reliable sources that the respondent Judge is basically a good Judge, and an admonition will probably
suffice as reminder to respondent not to repeat the same mistake in the future.[20] The respondent Judge filed his
manifestation onSeptember 28, 2010.[21]
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the OCAs recommendation well-taken.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice:[22] no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments
or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction.[23] The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires
jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of
all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.[24]
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered
as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. [25] A court which
issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes.[26] To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of
the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.[27]
Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.
In Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano,[28] the judge committed grave abuse of discretion for issuing a TRO
that interfered with or frustrated the implementation of an order of another court of co-equal jurisdiction.
In Yau v. The Manila Banking Corporation,[29] the Court held that undue interference by one in the
proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law.
In Coronado v. Rojas,[30] the judge was found liable for gross ignorance of the law when he proceeded
to enjoin the final and executory decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on the
pretext that the temporary injunction and the writ of injunction he issued were not directed against the HLURBs
writ of execution, but only against the manner of its execution. The Court noted that the judge cannot feign
ignorance that the effect of the injunctive writ was to freeze the enforcement of the writ of execution, thus
frustrating the lawful order of the HLURB, a co-equal body.[31]
Civil Procedure
 In Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Estrera,[32] the Court penalized two judges for issuing a TRO against the
execution of a demolition order issued by another co-equal court. The Court stressed that when the respondents-
judges acted on the application for the issuance of a TRO, they were aware that they were acting on matters
pertaining to a co-equal court, namely, Branch 9 of the Cebu City RTC, which was already exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Case No. 435-T. Nonetheless, respondent-judgesstill opted to
interfere with the order of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard
of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established axiom in adjective law. [33]
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a
writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy,
however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of
the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1,
paragraph 2,[34] speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition forcertiorari, under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.[35]
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing a
TRO to temporarily restrain[36] Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court,
Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the amount of P2,726,189.90 from
MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was aware that he was acting on
matters pertaining to the execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and coordinate court since he even
quoted MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.[37]
The respondent Judge should have refrained from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the Iligan
City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question on the enforcement of the writ of execution. Section 16,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (terceria), cited in the course of the Courts deliberations, finds no application to
this case since this provision applies to claims made by a third person, other than the judgment obligor or his
agent;[38] a third-party claimant of a property under execution may file a claim with another court [39] which, in
the exercise of its own jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining order. In this case, the petition for
injunction before the respondent Judge was filed by MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje
committed any irregularity or exceeded his authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper recourse for
MSU was to file a motion with, or an application for relief from, the same court which issued the decision, not
from any other court,[40] or to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition for certiorari.[41] In this case, MSU filed
the proper motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court), but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse
through another co-equal court presided over by the respondent Judge.
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution is issued against an
erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ addresses the writ
itself, not merely the executing sheriff. The duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs is ministerial and not
discretionary.[42] As already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ
before the issuing court in whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher
judicial body. Significantly, MSU did file its opposition before the issuing court Iligan City RTC which denied
this opposition.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
That the respondent Judge subsequently rectified his error by eventually dismissing the petition before
him for lack of jurisdiction is not a defense that the respondent Judge can use.[43] His lack of familiarity with the
rules in interfering with the acts of a co-equal court undermines public confidence in the judiciary through his
demonstrated incompetence. In this case, he impressed upon the Iligan public that the kind of interference he
exhibited can be done, even if only temporarily, i.e., that an official act of the Iligan City RTC can be thwarted
by going to the Marawi City RTC although they are co-equal courts. That the complaining lawyer, Atty. Tomas
Ong Cabili, subsequently reversed course and manifested that the respondent Judge is basically a good
Judge,[44] and should only be reprimanded, cannot affect the respondent Judges liability. This liability and the
commensurate penalty do not depend on the complainants personal opinion but on the facts he alleged and
proved, and on the applicable law and jurisprudence.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply apply it.
Anything less would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. [45]
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices
and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but
not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service. Considering the attendant circumstances of this
case, the Court after prolonged deliberations holds that a fine of P30,000.00 is the appropriate penalty. This
imposition is an act of leniency as we can, if we so hold, rule for the maximum fine of P40,000.00 or for
suspension since this is the respondent Judges second offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in
the amount of P30,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Tijam Vs Sibonghanoy
DIZON, J.:
On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the
sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole
obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed
for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants properties, but the same
was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month. chanroblespublishingcompany
Civil Procedure
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some
admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This
counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs. chanroblespublishingcompany
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same
had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the
defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Suretys bond (Rec. on Appeal pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written
opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon
the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the
Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative
relief : to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question (Id. p. 54) The
Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to
satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond. On the date set
for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Suretys counsel, granted the latter a period of five days
within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ was issued. chanroblespublishingcompany
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion,
the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for
reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it
filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors:
chanroblespublishingcompany
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as
submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements
provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the herein bonding
companyappellant.
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the
herein bonding company- appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing
or setting aside the writ of execution.
Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly
nor indirectly.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case
affirming the orders appealed from.
On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for
extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in
its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO
DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July
19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed
P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try
and decide the case. Upon these premises the Suretys motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its
decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees
to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court
resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as
follows: chanroblespublishingcompany
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit for collection of money in the sum
of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically on June 17, 1948, the
Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296).
chanroblespublishingcompany
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellants motion is an important one which merits serious
consideration. As stated, the complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now
for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction
until after receipt of this Courts adverse decision. chanroblespublishingcompany
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be worthy of consideration in
connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros, et al., G. R. No. L-
10096, March 23, 1956; Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G. R. No. L14591,
September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. No. L-15092,
September 29, 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the undesirable practice of
appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction when adverse. chanroblespublishingcompany
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue (Sec. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we
have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify; this case to the Supreme Court.
Civil Procedure
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of this case
be forwarded to the Supreme Court. chanroblespublishingcompany
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against
the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which
had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case which shall forthwith be
set forth We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. As already
stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen
years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses,
the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of
the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin. (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired
certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with Sections
12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court. (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil.
170). chanroblespublishingcompany
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counterbond the Surety not only filed a written
opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief that it be relieved
of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition lack of
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them. chanroblespublishingcompany
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but
instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
chanroblespublishingcompany
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
chanroblespublishingcompany
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. chanroblespublishingcompany
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (Dean
vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subjectmatter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public
policy. chanroblespublishingcompany
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
Rathbun-Jones etc. 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L.
Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. chanroblespublishingcompany
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals
of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse as well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G. R. L14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano
et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G. R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings
in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Civil Procedure
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded that We
can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on
December 11, 1962 as follows: chanroblespublishingcompany
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of a sum of
money, a writ of attachment was issued against defendants properties. The attachment, however, was
subsequently discharged under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond subscribed by
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under
Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce
the obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the suretys opposition, denied on the ground that there
was no showing that a demand had been made by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the
amount due under the judgment. (Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction of the judgment, and upon the
latters failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of
writ of execution against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31, 1957, the
surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the suretys counsel asked that he be given
time within which to answer the motion, and so an order was issued in open court, as follows:
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr. counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is
given until Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution dated
October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED
Given in open court, this 2nd day of Nov. 1957, at Cebu City, Philippines.
(SGD.) JOSE M. MENDOZA Judge (Record on Appeal, pp. 64-65, Emphasis supplied)
Since the suretys counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the period given him, the court, on
December 7, 1957, issued an order granting plaintiffs motion for execution against the surety; and on
December 12, 1957, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the same
was issued without the requirements of Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with,
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
more specifically, that the same was issued without the required summary hearing. This motion was denied by
order of February 10, 1958. chanroblespublishingcompany
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-stated order of denial; which
motion was likewise denied by order of March 26, 1958. chanroblespublishingcompany
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958 denying the suretys motion to
quash the writ of execution and motion for reconsideration, respectively the surety has interposed the appeal
on hand.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because
the same was issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads:
chanroblespublishingcompany
SECTION 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. if the execution be returned
unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of this role to
secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the
plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be recovered from such surety or
sureties after notice and summary hearing in the same action.(Emphasis supplied).
Summary hearing is not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted. (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved with dispatch, with the
least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings. (Ibid, p. 790). What
is essential is that the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is
urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties.
(Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the
discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for
consideration. chanroblespublishingcompany
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs motion for execution and of the date when the
same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the suretys counsel, was present in court when the motion
was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file
an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
It is argued that the suretys counsel did not file an answer to the motion for the simple reason that all its
defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing.
(Appellants brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will
show that when the motion was called, what the suretys
Civil Procedure
counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order
given in open court upon request of the suretys counsel that after the fourday period within which to file an
answer, the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was
issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
It is also argued that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate action,
there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond.
(Appellants Brief, p, 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of
Rule 59, to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action, and stands in
place of the property so released. Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the
execution is returned unsatisfied (Section. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically
attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ
of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond. chanroblespublishingcompany
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant
Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This is the paramount issue
raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18. 4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as
charged.6 In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial courts
jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated
in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
from asserting the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision,
the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded. 8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues for our
resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case,
which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in
relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was
immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the
active participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but
by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus while it is running
at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road,
constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as falling within
Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the
speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever
presented by the prosecution during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for homicide through
reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not
prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not
contain an allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that the victim
unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not
enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.10 In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section
32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 11 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691. 12 The said
provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
Civil Procedure
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, 13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is
conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the
position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and
without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As
undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches, which continuously
confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no
court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal, and subject to objection at
any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and
large array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court
may dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the
lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the
lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same
"must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-
863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the
principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of
the parties, has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been granted an instruction based on its
defective character directing the jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the
former indictment was valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the former
prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's
motion quashed the information on the erroneous assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot
successfully plead former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction,
he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had
jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of jurisdiction by
the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the
question of this Courts jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This
case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never
impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us to believe
that they must have always been of the belief that notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this
Court has jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the
properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute
resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956,
a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without
questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily
waived so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a
contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the
Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the
decision be unfavorable: x x x20
Civil Procedure
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of
jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation
of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we
speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean
vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated
obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L.
Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals
of May 20, 1963 (supra)to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverseas well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et
al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings
in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. 22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in resolving issues
that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus,
in Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the
exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-
waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to
be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in
a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea
may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was the one who
invoked the courts jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the
ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to mention, the
Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v.
Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25 the Court ruled:
Civil Procedure
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not
supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial
court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from
challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to
both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco
North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491), participation in
all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed
its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower courts
jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts
decision that petitioner raised the question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-
60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both
sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However,
private respondents never questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout
the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the
reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial courts
jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus
foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province
of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a
party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC,
298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]). (italics
ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 27 where the issue
of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as
an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:
Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering
that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer
be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite successfully in a number of
cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was
espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure
affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from being raised
for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has
actively participated.
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the
rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which
the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present;
that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional
circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-
waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel.
Civil Procedure
Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the
averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took part in the trial
proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active
participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the
peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so
only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoyis
an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.32
33
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go, the Court again emphasized that laches should be clearly present for
the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked
to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited
case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been
raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by
the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings,
in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty.
Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a
Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
action. Her compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as an active participation in
the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to
disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. 34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply
the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule
should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a
court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person
seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse
party does not suffer any harm.35
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At
that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable,
will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights,
has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so
changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence,
change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness
of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. 37 The same,
however, does not obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied
rarelyonly from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great
care and the equity must be strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most
effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction
over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking
judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will
even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have stated in Heirs of Julian
Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 42
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over
the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all
such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over
the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of
Civil Procedure
the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action. x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant
or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the
status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the
controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are
null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks. 43
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No.
2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs Bantigue Point Development
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope of the delegated jurisdiction of
municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas[2] in LRC Case No. N-98-20, LRA Record No. 68329,
granting respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporations (Corporation) application for original
registration of a parcel of land. Since only questions of law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before filing this Petition for Review.
The Facts
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed
value of 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed value of 14,920 for the entire property, more
particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 square
meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. [3]
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997. [4] On 7
August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997. [5]
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records
were still with the RTC.[6]
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than 100,000.[7]
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default[8] and commenced with the reception of
evidence.[9] Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,[10] a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,[11] and a Certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable zone. [12] Thereafter, it
awarded the land to respondent Corporation.[13]
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. [15] The CA further found that
respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latters registrable title over the subject property after
having proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself
and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II. [16]
Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following
arguments in support of its appeal:
I.
THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION
OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
II.
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE. [17]
The Courts Ruling
Civil Procedure
We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for further proceedings in order
to determine if the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. II
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

I
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case. In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the
period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.

At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application, because
court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. [18] Jurisdiction over the Registration Decree.[28]
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. [20]Consequently, questions
We disagree.
of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. [21]
The Property Registration Decree provides:
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he
has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days
in the event that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him[22] is based on the doctrine of
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing
estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the
Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court and
order. x x x.
filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the
appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day
case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack
after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22
of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception
October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. [30] While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day
to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the
period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna
latter case.
Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements for original registration, because there were 125 days between the Order setting the date of the
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order
petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the application.Thus,
RTC.[25] At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply we held:
because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither
filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the
x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of
jurisdictional question in its Brief.[26] Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to
Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such
the instant appeal.
official in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the
exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it complied with all the requirements of the law.[32]
either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[27] In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its
right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure
 Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its
application for registration on account of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November
1997,[33] within the 90-day period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect was
still not cured, as the second Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the application, again
contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration Decree. [34]
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the
filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the
courts its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order
within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the
five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [35] It cannot be contingent
upon the action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that the
law deliberately meant the provision to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.[36] However, the
records of this case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for
initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for registration, [37] except that it had to issue a second
Order because the initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of the property based on the Deed of Sale
annexed to respondents application for original registration was160,000, [39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction
over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,[40] the MTCs delegated
jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not
exceed 100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases is indeed set forth in the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may
be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value
of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if
there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their
decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two instances: first, where
there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not
exceed 100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed respondent Corporations
application for registration on 8 January 1998.[41]
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value of the lot in this case does not
exceed 100,000.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling
price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to
be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of
the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property.[42]
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first method, because the records are
bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be
done through the second method, because this method finds application only where there are multiple claimants
who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point
Development Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations
submitted by respondent Corporation together with its application for registration. From the records, we find
that the assessed value of the property is 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total assessed value of 14,920 for the
entire property.[43]Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question does
not exceed 100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.
III
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Civil Procedure
 Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, we find that the
lower court erred in granting respondent Corporations application for original registration in the absence of
sufficient proof that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. [44] The applicant
for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership by establishing through
incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act
of the government.[45] We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient
to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered.[46] The applicant must also
show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.[47]
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO[48] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.[49]
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its
application.[50] Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.
We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to prove that the
property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. If respondent
Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient
proof that the land in question is alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the government, the
application should be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that
the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
SO ORDERED.
Vda. De Herrera vs Bernardo
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73674.
The antecedents are as follows:
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for
interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land situated
at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square meters. The complaint was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-221.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Crisanto
Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo. The parcel of land was later on covered by Tax
Declaration No. CD-006-0828 under the name of the respondents.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the subject property consisting of about 700 square
meters was bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's father, from a certain Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of
Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo inherited the 700-square-meter lot.
The COSLAP, in a Resolution[3] dated December 6, 1999, ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the
subject property. Consequently, a motion for reconsideration and/or reopening of the proceedings was filed by
Alfredo. The COSLAP, in an Order[4] dated August 21, 2002, denied the motion and reiterated its Order dated
December 6, 1999. Aggrieved, petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA.[5] The CA, Twelfth Division, in its Decision dated April 28, 2005, dismissed
the petition and affirmed the resolution of the COSLAP. The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive
jurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute
of the parties herein, petitioner is already estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed
to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the proceedings
before the said body. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated October 17, 2005.
Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, with the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT COSLAP HAD JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE
QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF A TORRENS TITLE IN THE
NAME OF THE PETITIONER'S HUSBAND IN 2002 RENDERED THE
INSTANT CONTROVERSY ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[6]
Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle and decide the question of ownership
over the subject land. Further, the present case cannot be classified as explosive in nature as the parties never
Civil Procedure
resorted to violence in resolving the controversy. Petitioner submits that it is the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of the subject property.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the present case. Further,
respondents argued that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of
laches due to Alfredo's active participation in the actual proceedings before the COSLAP. Respondents said that
Alfredo's filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reopening of the proceedings before the COSLAP is
indicative of his conformity with the questioned resolution of the COSLAP.
The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership
between the parties.
The petition is meritorious.
The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism
for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural
minorities to avoid social unrest.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its
adjudicatory functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxxx
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which
are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large
number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate
action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement
holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation
grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain; and
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude.[7]
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. [8] Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has
two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into
account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer
the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land
involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action
thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction
on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. [9]
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint. The
present case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No.
561. The dispute between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large number of
parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as
involving a critical situation that requires immediate action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over
the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all
such reliefs.[10]
Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject property,
which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, [11] the jurisdiction of
which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value of
the subject property.[12]
The case of Banaga v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, [13] applied by the CA and invoked by
the respondents, is inapplicable to the present case. Banagainvolved parties with conflicting free patent
applications over a parcel of public land and pending with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of
Land's inaction within a considerable period of time on the claims and protests of the parties and to conduct an
investigation, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction and resolved the conflicting claims of the parties. The Court
held that since the dispute involved a parcel of public land on a free patent issue, the COSLAP had jurisdiction
over that case. In the present case, there is no showing that the parties have conflicting free patent applications
over the subject parcel of land that would justify the exercise of the COSLAP's jurisdiction.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision
rendered, are null and void.[14] A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot
be the source of any right or create any obligation.[15] All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
Civil Procedure
from it have no legal effect.[16] Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no
judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the proceedings. [17]
Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason
of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. [18] The fact that
a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging
its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties.[19]
In Regalado v. Go,[20] the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[21] doctrine to
apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception
rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction
only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have
been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.[22]
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar that would justify the application
of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she
appealed the case to the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no laches will
even attach because the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction. [23]
Anent the issuance of OCT No. M-10991 in favor of petitioners husband Alfredo Herrerra in 2002, respondents
alleged that there was fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith in the issuance thereof. Thus, respondents are now
questioning the legality of OCT No. M-10991, an issue which this Court cannot pass upon in this present
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
petition. It is a rule that the validity of a Torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally. [24] Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled, except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during the proceedings before this Court as said title was
issued in the name of petitioner's husband only during the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The issue on
the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose[25] and the present appeal before us, is simply not the direct proceeding contemplated
by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
April 28, 2005 and October 17, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73674 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision and Order of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, dated December 6,
1999 and August 21, 2002, respectively, in COSLAP Case No. 99-221, are declared NULL and VOID for
having been issued without jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, Petitioner,
vs.
BRITISH AIRWAYS, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi. Jurisdiction is a power introduced for
the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice.1
Factual Antecedents
On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint 2 for damages against respondent British
Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she took
respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested
Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried
luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically
remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!"
Civil Procedure
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant,
Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to
lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated,
stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured
Kerrigan that she knew the planes safety regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly
thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that "We dont
like your attitude."
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents ground manager and demanded an apology.
However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were "only doing their job."
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral
damages, P2 million as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorneys
fees,P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the suit.
On May 16, 2005, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent through
Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.3
On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that
only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages
pursuant to the Warsaw Convention,5 Article 28(1) of which provides:
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the
carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has
been made, or before the court of the place of destination.
Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondents principal place of business is in London; c)
petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome);6 and d) Rome, Italy is petitioners
place of destination, then it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the proper courts of London,
United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not
its resident agent in the Philippines.
On June 3, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring herein petitioner to file her Comment/Opposition on
the Motion to Dismiss within 10 days from notice thereof, and for respondent to file a Reply thereon. 7 Instead
of filing a Comment/Opposition, petitioner filed on June 27, 2005, an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Formal
Amendment to the Complaint and Issuance of Alias Summons. 8 Petitioner alleged that upon verification with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, she found out that the resident agent of respondent in the Philippines
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
is Alonzo Q. Ancheta. Subsequently, on September 9, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Pending
Incident and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.9
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 14, 2005, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, issued an Order 10 granting respondents Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that:
The Court sympathizes with the alleged ill-treatment suffered by the plaintiff. However, our Courts have to
apply the principles of international law, and are bound by treaty stipulations entered into by the Philippines
which form part of the law of the land. One of this is the Warsaw Convention. Being a signatory thereto, the
Philippines adheres to its stipulations and is bound by its provisions including the place where actions involving
damages to plaintiff is to be instituted, as provided for under Article 28(1) thereof. The Court finds no
justifiable reason to deviate from the indicated limitations as it will only run counter to the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention. Said adherence is in consonance with the comity of nations and deviation from it can only
be effected through proper denunciation as enunciated in the Santos case (ibid). Since the Philippines is not the
place of domicile of the defendant nor is it the principal place of business, our courts are thus divested of
jurisdiction over cases for damages. Neither was plaintiffs ticket issued in this country nor was her destination
Manila but Rome in Italy. It bears stressing however, that referral to the court of proper jurisdiction does not
constitute constructive denial of plaintiffs right to have access to our courts since the Warsaw Convention itself
provided for jurisdiction over cases arising from international transportation. Said treaty stipulations must be
complied with in good faith following the time honored principle of pacta sunt servanda.
The resolution of the propriety of service of summons is rendered moot by the Courts want of jurisdiction over
the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied in an Order 11 dated January 4, 2006.
Petitioner now comes directly before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari on pure questions of law, raising
the following issues:
Issues
I. WHETHER X X X PHILIPPINE COURTs HAVE JURISDICTION OVER A TORTIOUS CONDUCT
COMMITTED AGAINST A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND RESIDENT BY AIRLINE PERSONNEL OF A
FOREIGN CARRIER TRAVELLING BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF ANY FOREIGN
COUNTRY; AND THUS IS OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION.
Civil Procedure
II. WHETHER x x x RESPONDENT AIR CARRIER OF PASSENGERS, IN FILING ITS MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE AND
OVER ITS PERSON MAY BE DEEMED AS HAVING IN FACT AND IN LAW SUBMITTED ITSELF TO
THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT, ESPECIALLY SO, WHEN THE VERY LAWYER
ARGUING FOR IT IS HIMSELF THE RESIDENT AGENT OF THE CARRIER.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from the tortious conduct
committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human
Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage, petitioner asserts that she has
the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.
Respondents Arguments
In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioners claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention. As such, the same can only be filed before the courts of London, United Kingdom or
Rome, Italy.
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.
It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines,12 we held that:
The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13,
1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The
Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was
deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the
Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto, "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof
may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such,
has the force and effect of law in this country.13
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was
between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.
Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by
aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport
undertaking.
2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within
the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A
carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international
for the purposes of this Convention. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international carriage". The High
Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which
subsequently adhered to it.14
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination
was Rome, Italy.15 Both the United Kingdom16 and Italy17 signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such,
the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the
Warsaw Convention.
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
Civil Procedure
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom
with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the
petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and
baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome,
Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the
courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome,
Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check.
Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of
Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines18 applies in this case.
Petitioner contends that Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines 19 cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the
present controversy since the facts thereof are not similar with the instant case.
We are not persuaded.
In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines,20 Augusto Santos III, a resident of the Philippines, purchased a ticket
from Northwest Orient Airlines in San Francisco, for transport between San Francisco and Manila via Tokyo
and back to San Francisco. He was wait-listed in the Tokyo to Manila segment of his ticket, despite his prior
reservation. Contending that Northwest Orient Airlines acted in bad faith and discriminated against him when it
canceled his confirmed reservation and gave his seat to someone who had no better right to it, Augusto Santos
III sued the carrier for damages before the RTC. Northwest Orient Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on
ground of lack of jurisdiction citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court granted the motion
which ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the case was brought before us, we denied the
petition holding that under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, Augusto Santos III must prosecute his
claim in the United States, that place being the (1) domicile of the Northwest Orient Airlines; (2) principal
office of the carrier; (3) place where contract had been made (San Francisco); and (4) place of destination (San
Francisco).21
We further held that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is jurisdictional in character. Thus:
A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue
provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages "must" be
brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent with one
of the objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of international
transportation by air." Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules of jurisdiction
other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article 32 must refer only
to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive enumeration in
Article 28(1) as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties regardless of the time
when the damage occurred.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
xxxx
In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept.
Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable
domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be
taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted. 22
Contrary to the contention of petitioner, Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines23 is analogous to the instant
case because (1) the domicile of respondent is London, United Kingdom; 24 (2) the principal office of respondent
airline is likewise in London, United Kingdom;25 (3) the ticket was purchased in Rome, Italy;26 and (4) the place
of destination is Rome, Italy.27 In addition, petitioner based her complaint on Article 2176 28 of the Civil Code
onquasi-delict and Articles 1929 and 2130 of the Civil Code on Human Relations. In Santos III v. Northwest
Orient Airlines,31 Augusto Santos III similarly posited that Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention did not
apply if the action is based on tort. Hence, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the factual setting of
Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines32 and the instant case are parallel on the material points.
Tortious conduct as ground for the petitioners complaint is within the purview of the Warsaw Convention.
Petitioner contends that in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 33 the cause of action was based on a breach
of contract while her cause of action arose from the tortious conduct of the airline personnel and violation of the
Civil Code provisions on Human Relations.34 In addition, she claims that our pronouncement in Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines35 that "the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude
the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention," is more of an obiter dictum rather than the ratio
decidendi.36 She maintains that the fact that said acts occurred aboard a plane is merely incidental, if not
irrelevant.37
We disagree with the position taken by the petitioner. Black defines obiter dictum as "an opinion entirely
unnecessary for the decision of the case" and thus "are not binding as precedent." 38 In Santos III v. Northwest
Orient Airlines,39 Augusto Santos III categorically put in issue the applicability of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention if the action is based on tort.
In the said case, we held that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the
case from the realm of the Warsaw Convention. In fact, our ruling that a cause of action based on tort did not
bring the case outside the sphere of the Warsaw Convention was our ratio decidendi in disposing of the specific
issue presented by Augusto Santos III. Clearly, the contention of the herein petitioner that the said ruling is an
obiter dictum is without basis.
Relevant to this particular issue is the case of Carey v. United Airlines, 40 where the passenger filed an action
against the airline arising from an incident involving the former and the airlines flight attendant during an
international flight resulting to a heated exchange which included insults and profanity. The United States Court
Civil Procedure
of Appeals (9th Circuit) held that the "passenger's action against the airline carrier arising from alleged
confrontational incident between passenger and flight attendant on international flight was governed exclusively
by the Warsaw Convention, even though the incident allegedly involved intentional misconduct by the flight
attendant."41
In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,42 the passenger brought nine causes of action against the airline in the state court,
arising from a confrontation with the flight attendant during an international flight to Mexico. The United States
Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) held that the "Warsaw Convention governs actions arising from international air
travel and provides the exclusive remedy for conduct which falls within its provisions." It further held that the
said Convention "created no exception for an injury suffered as a result of intentional conduct" 43 which in that
case involved a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the course of
the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is not deemed to
have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when the
latter stated in its Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that "Defendant [is at a loss] x x x
how the plaintiff arrived at her erroneous impression that it is/was Euro-Philippines Airlines Services, Inc. that
has been making a special appearance since x x x British Airways x x x has been clearly specifying in all the
pleadings that it has filed with this Honorable Court that it is the one making a special appearance." 44
In refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals45 where we held that even if a party "challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as by
reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he also invokes other grounds for the dismissal of the
action under Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the jurisdiction over
his person."46
This issue has been squarely passed upon in the recent case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 47 where we reiterated
our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals 48 and elucidated thus:
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not
Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together
with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on
voluntary appearance the first sentence of the above-quoted rule means is that the voluntary appearance of
the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily
appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b)
motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to
consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in
Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special
appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three
children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children
for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I
and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration,
even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting
forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not
abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the
forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure,
petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of
summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates
the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the courtchallenging its jurisdiction over
the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel
or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.1avvphi1
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the
defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction.
Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction
over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases,
insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)
Civil Procedure
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other
pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial
court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary appearance
before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondents objection to jurisdiction over its
person.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 14, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 132, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Office of Ombudsman vs. Vda. De Buenaventura
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 27, 2001, and the CA Resolution[2] dated December
11, 2001, be reversed and set aside.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On November 17, 1996, respondents filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint for Falsification of
Public Documents and Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) [3] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended
(the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) against Zenaida H. Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina
Darang. Respondents alleged therein that Palacio, then officer-in-charge of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Office in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, designated Celerina Darang, Senior Agrarian Reform Program
Technologist stationed at Sto. Tomas, San Jose City, to investigate the claims of respondents against the
formers husband Edilberto Darang; that Celerina Darang accepted such designation, conducted an investigation
and rendered a report favorable to her husband, Edilberto Darang; that Celerina Darang supported such report
with public documents which she falsified; and that Palacios then issued a recommendation, based on Celerina
Darangs report, to award the landholding in dispute to Edilberto Darang. [4]
Acting on respondents complaint against the aforementioned DAR officers and Edilberto Darang, petitioner
issued a Resolution[5] dated June 9, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charge against
respondents for falsification of public documents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
It is further recommended that the charge against respondents for Violation of Section 3, par.
(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, be provisionally dismissed. This is, however, without
prejudice to its re-opening should the outcome of DARAB Case No. 0040 pending before the
DAR Adjudication Board, Diliman, Quezon City, so warrant.
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
SO RESOLVED.[6]
Respondents filed several motions seeking reconsideration of the above Resolution, all of which were
denied.
Herein respondents then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court,
but per Resolution dated July 14, 1999, the petition was referred to the CA. OnFebruary 27, 2001, the CA
promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which is reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari, in regard to the
public respondents Resolution dated June 09, 1998 and Orders dated August 06 and 26, 1998
in OMB-196-2268, is hereby DENIED as to the dismissal of the complaint against private
respondents for falsification of public documents, but GRANTED as to the provisional
dismissal of the complaint for violation of Section 3, Par. (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended,
which is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, and consequently, the appropriate criminal charges under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act are hereby ordered filed against the individual respondents.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied in its Resolution dated
December 11, 2001.
Hence, this petition, where it is alleged that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF
PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE OMBUDSMAN IN CRIMINAL CASE OMB-1-96-2268.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
OMBUDSMANS PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF OMB-1-96-2268 WAS INFIRM, AS THE
SAID COURT CANNOT COMPEL THE OMBUDSMAN TO USURP THE
PREROGATIVES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DARAB.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE
OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN OMB-1-96-2268 AS SUCH AUTHORITY IS GIVEN
EXCLUSIVELY TO THE OMBUDSMAN.[8]
The petition deserves ample consideration.
Civil Procedure
The crux of the matter is whether the CA has jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases. This issue has been directly addressed in Kuizon v. Desierto[9] and reiterated in the more
recent Golangco v. Fung,[10] wherein the Court declared, thus:
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore,
review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or
non-administrative cases.
In Kuizon v. Desierto, this Court clarified:
The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears
stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we
categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into
account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for
judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.
x x x It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter is void. Since the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of
the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the same is void.[11]
The question that arises next is what remedy should an aggrieved party avail of to assail the
Ombudsmans finding of the existence or lack of probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases. In Estrada v. Desierto,[12] the Court emphasized that parties seeking to question the resolutions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, may file an original action
for certiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is believed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse
of discretion.
Respondents originally filed a petition for certiorari before this Court but the same was referred to the
CA. It, thus, behooves this Court to now look into whether the Ombudsman indeed acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the charge of Falsification of Public Documents and provisionally dismissing the charge
of Violation of Section 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against Zenaida H. Palacio and spouses
Edilberto and Celerina Darang.
A close examination of the records will reveal that the Ombudsman acted properly in dismissing the
charge for falsification of public documents because herein respondents utterly failed to identify the supposedly
falsified documents and submit certified true copies thereof. In fact, respondents admitted in their petition
for certiorari,originally filed with this Court but referred to the CA, that they had not yet submitted documents
in support of the charge for falsification of documents as they intended to present the same in a formal
preliminary investigation, which they expected to be conducted by the Ombudsman.[13] However, it has long
been acknowledged that in administrative proceedings, even those before the Ombudsman, a formal hearing is
Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban
not required and cases may be submitted for resolution based only on affidavits, supporting documents and
pleadings. Such procedure has been held to be sufficient compliance with the requirements of procedural due
process as all that is needed is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.[14] In this case, records show that respondents had been afforded such
opportunities.
As to the provisional dismissal of the charge for Violation of Section 3 par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, the Court likewise finds no reason to overturn the ruling of the Ombudsman. The hornbook doctrine
emphasized in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto [15] must be borne in mind, to wit:
x x x the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of
his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate
otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the
courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of
the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper
the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if
they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they
decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. [16]
Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not
absolute. However, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in
order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans findings by this Court.[17]
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,[18] the Court defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:
x x x grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.
Here, the Ombudsman based its provisional dismissal on the ground that the case between the same
parties before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), DARAB Case No. 0040, had not yet reached finality, as
there was a pending Motion for Relief from Judgment that was yet to be resolved. The Ombudsman reasoned
out that since what Section 3, par. (e), R.A. No. 3019 penalized was the giving of unwarranted advantage or
preference to a private party, it was only prudent to await the final resolution in DARAB Case No. 0040, which
would show if the favorable recommendation given by Celerina Darang benefiting her husband Edilberto was,
indeed, unjustified, unwarranted or unfounded.
The Ombudsmans reasoning was not unfounded. Note that the elements of the offense in Section 3(e)
are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said
public officers have committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation
to their public positions; (3) that they have caused undue injury to a party, whether the Government or a private
Civil Procedure
party; (4) that such injury was caused by giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such
party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.[19] From the foregoing, it can be seen that the complainants must show that the benefits, advantage
or preference given to a party is unwarranted. Since the main issue in DARAB Case No. 0040 is whether the
disputed parcel of land should be awarded to Edilberto Darang, then it is true that a final resolution of the
aforementioned DARAB case would establish whether the benefit or advantage given to him was indeed
unwarranted.
Verily, the action of the Ombudsman in provisionally dismissing the complaint for violation of Section
3(e), without prejudice to its re-opening upon final resolution of DARAB Case No. 0040, is not whimsical or
arbitrary. Such action finds support in the Courts rulings that a trial court, or in this case a quasi-judicial
tribunal, has the inherent power to control the disposition of cases by holding in abeyance the proceedings
before it in the exercise of its sound discretion to await the outcome of another case pending in another court or
body, especially where the parties and the issues are the same. This is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, and ensuring economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action (in this
case, the criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) before the Ombudsman) cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the first action (DARAB Case No. 0040) are settled, the second action
should be stayed.[20]
The reason behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may also be applied here by analogy. The
objective of said doctrine is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency, which has special knowledge, experience and tools to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, has determined some question or a particular aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court. [21] This is not to say that the Ombudsman cannot acquire
jurisdiction or take cognizance of a criminal complaint until after the administrative agency has decided on a
particular issue that is also involved in the complaint before it.Rather, using the same reasoning behind the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is only prudent and practical for the Ombudsman to refrain from proceeding
with the criminal action until after the DARAB, which is the administrative agency with special knowledge and
experience over agrarian matters, has arrived at a final resolution on the issue of whether Edilberto Darang is
indeed entitled under the law to be awarded the land in dispute. This would establish whether the benefits or
advantages given to him by the public officials charged under the complaint, are truly unwarranted.

Thus, aside from the fact that the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman
in criminal cases, it was also incorrect to hold that the Ombudsmanacted with grave abuse of discretion. The
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 27, 2001, reversing the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, dated June 9, 1998, and its
Resolution dated December 11, 2001, are declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.

Andrea Ivanne D. Panganiban Civil Procedure