PLATO AGAINST PERICLES

Arendt on the (Anti-)Politics of Thinking in

Greek Philosophy
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
HANNAH ARENDT (19061975)
born to secular Jewish parents in Hanover,
grows up in Knigsberg
studies with HEIDEGGER in Marburg
192425, attends his lectures courses on
Aristotles Rhetoric and Platos Sophist, brief
love affair
studies with HUSSERL in Freiburg 1925
26, with JASPERS in Heidelberg 192629
dissertation Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin
(1929)
 following arrest by the Gestapo, forced to flee Germany in
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

1933
works for Jewish refugee organizations in Paris 193339,
befriends WALTER BENJAMIN
after occupation of France, escapes to US in 1941 with her
mother and her second husband HEINRICH BLCHER
in New York, joins the intellectual circle around the Partisan
Review, writes for the Jewish newspaper Aufbau, works for the
Zionist organization Youth Aliyah
teaches through 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s at Berkeley,
Princeton, Northwestern, University of Chicago, Yale, New
School
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951/1958)

The Human Condition (1958)
Between Past and Future (1961)
On Revolution (1963)
Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963)
Men in Dark Times (1968)
The Life of the Mind, vols 12 (1978)
Lectures on Kants Political Philosophy (1982)
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

Arendts oeuvre as a whole is preoccupied with understanding

the historical preconditions of the totalitarian catastrophes of
the 20th century
The Origins of Totalitarianism: the process of modernization
results in a mass society consisting of uprooted, alienated,
and atomized individuals susceptible to mobilization by
totalitarian ideologies
 The Human Condition: a genealogy of modernity and of the
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

modern understanding of human activities underlying

totalitarianism as well as contemporary Western society in
general
based on a tripartite division of the human vita activa, basic
forms of human activity
1. action (praxis): activities undertaken for the sake of their own
inherent value, not for some extrinsic end
2. work or making (poisis): instrumental activity aiming at the
production of a stable work or product
3. labor: mere toil for the sake of survival and the necessities of life,
does not produce lasting works but is aimed at immediate
consumption (ancient slave labor, Marxist alienated labor)
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

ARENDTs historical narrative starts from an alleged classical,

prephilosophical era of Greek antiquity that values action, great
deeds and words freely undertaken for their own sake, above all other
activities
only such agency can grant the agents godlike immortality in the
form of immortal fame
the cultural paradigm behind this ideal are the great deeds of the
Greeks in the Trojan War, celebrated in the Homeric epics
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

great deeds are still dependent on the works of poets (e.g., HOMER)
and other monuments in order to achieve lasting memory
freedom for great deeds presupposes the labor of women and
slaves, dealing with the necessities of life in the private space of the
household (oikos)
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ARENDT: the classical Greek political idea, the ideal of the polis,
was to create a public sphere of equity and freedom within
which any free (male) citizen can engage in the sharing of
words and deeds
by acting in public, the agent manifests herself in his
singularity, in her capacity for engaging in completely new
and unforeseen actions
in the political space of public discourse, visibility, and
organized remembrance, action is no longer dependent on
the works of poets or other produced monuments
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

The polis, as it grew out of and remained rooted in the Greek pre-polis
experience and estimate of what makes it worthwhile for men to live together
(syzn), namely, the sharing of words and deeds, had a twofold function. First,
it was intended to enable men to do permanently, albeit under certain
restrictions, what otherwise had been possible only as an extraordinary and
infrequent enterprise for which they had to leave their household. The polis was
supposed to multiply the occasions to win immortal fame, that is, to multiply
the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word
who he was in his unique distinctness. . . . The second function of the polis . . .
was to offer a remedy for the futility of action and speech. . . . [L]ife together in
the form of the polis seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities,
action and speech . . . would become imperishable.
HANNAH ARENDT, The Human Condition
2nd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 19698.
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
the emblematic figure of this
classical political ideal was PERICLES
(495429 BCE), the most influential
statesman of the Golden Age of
Athens
the key text, for ARENDT, is
PERICLES Funeral Oration at the
end of the first year of the
Peloponnesian Wars (430 BCE),
rendered by THUCYDIDES in the
History of the Peloponnesian War
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

Future ages will admire us, as the present age admires us now.
Far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist . . . we have
forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and
everywhere we have established permanent reminders of our
deeds, both harmful and excellent. . . . For conspicuous
[epiphann] men have the whole earth for their tomb; and in
lands far from their own, where the column with its epitaph
records it, there dwells in everyone an unwritten record the
record of judgment [gnms], rather than that of the produced
work [ergou].
PERICLES FUNERAL ORATION, in THUCYDIDES
Historiae, vol 1, ed. Henry S. Jones and John E. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), 2.41.45,
43.34. Translated by Richard Crawley as The Peloponnesian War (London: J. M. Dent, 1910).
Translation modified.
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

action, for ARENDT, is an inherently nonteleological activity

action is undertaken for the sake of its arch or initium, the
entirely new beginning or initiative that it introduces into the
world that is also its guiding principle
by initiating a new train of action, a human being realizes the
inherent potential of every individual for unprecedented
novelty
cf. AUGUSTINE: initium ut esset creatus est homo
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

the only criterion of the importance of an action is the

aesthetic greatness of its performance, not its results,
which are potentially infinite and ultimately unpredictable
action as the self-disclosure of the agent is thus dependent
on a free intersubjective communal space in which its value
can be judged by others
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

however, in ARENDTs narrative, the status of action as a

pathway to human immortality was challenged early on by
the emerging philosophical tradition
Greek philosophers perceive the frailty, futility, and
unpredictability of public action as weaknesses
above all, the intersubjectivity and dependency on the
judgment of others involved by fame and influence as
political goals are mistrusted by philosophers, who
introduce the novel ideal of self-sufficiency (autarkeia) as a
criterion of human fulfillment (eudaimonia)
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO already in the Presocratics, the
solitary life of thinking as an
immediate contact with absolute
truth is contrasted with life in the
polis
PARMENIDES (fr. B 1) speaks of a divine road that takes the
thinker beyond the trodden path of humans/mortals
HERACLITUS (according to DIOGENES LAERTIUS), having
withdrawn to the temple of Artemis to play dice with
children, is said to have exclaimed to his fellow Ephesians:
Is it not more worthwhile to do this than to engage with
you in the affairs of the polis [politeuesthai]?
 JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

the decisive break between the polis

and philosophy is, for ARENDT,
PLATOS reaction to the death of
SOCRATES

the public trial and judgment of SOCRATES demonstrates the

necessity of elevating the philosopher above the political realm
the historical SOCRATES arguably sought to employ thought for the
benefit public life and discourse
PLATO, by contrast, ends up positing conceptual thought (dianoia)
and the philosophical insight (noein) into the absolute, universal,
and ideal truth as the supreme human capacity and as the ultimate
telos of the polis
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
in ARISTOTLEs Nicomachean Ethics, the supreme human fulfillment
is taken to consist in an action (praxis) that constitutes the actuality
(energeia) of the highest virtue of the discursive human soul
however, unlike ARENDT, ARISTOTLE conceives action
teleologically, according to the basic model of production (poisis),
as an activity that is already its own end, i.e., self-sufficient and self-
referential
the life of political participation (bios politikos, vita activa) is thus
necessarily subordinate to the life of contemplation (bios thertikos,
vita contemplativa)
contemplative dwelling by the eternal truths grants the highest
possible immortality
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

The wise man [sophos] is capable of contemplating [therein] even when

he is by himself [kath hauton], and his capacity to do this is
proportional to his wisdom. Perhaps he will be more successful if he
has associates [synergoi], but all the same, he is the most self-sufficient
of all men [autarkestatos]. . . . Such a way of life [bios] is, arguably,
superior to the essentially human [kat anthrpon] way of life, for one
will not live in this way to the extent that one is human, but to the
extent that there is something divine [theion] present in oneself. . . .
.One need not heed those who insist that, being a human being, one
should consider human affairs [anthrpina], or that, being mortal, one
should consider mortal things; one should rather be in an immortal
manner [athanatizein] to the extent that this is possible.
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7.1177a32b1, b2628, 3133.
Ed. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894).
 by instrumentalizing politics as a means to a higher end
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

(contemplation), PLATO and ARISTOTLE subordinate action to

making or producing
political philosophy is inherently metapolitical or
antipolitical
PLATOs Republic presents the first utopian model of politics as
the production of an ideal community
(cf. KARL POPPER, The Open Society and Its Enemies)
the notion of politics as production replaces the idea of a free
and equal political space of action with the economic model
of the political process as rule, administration, and government
that later dominates Western political thought
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

How persistent and successful the transformation of action

into a mode of making has been is easily attested by the
whole terminology of political theory and political thought,
which indeed makes it almost impossible to discuss these
matters without using the category of means and ends and
thinking in terms of instrumentality. . . . We are perhaps the
first generation which has become fully aware of the
murderous consequences inherent in a line of thought that
forces one to admit that all means, provided that they are
efficient, are permissible and justified to pursue something
defined as an end.
ARENDT, The Human Condition, 229.
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
since the Platonic beginning of political philosophy, politics,
political life, and the political sphere have predominantly been
seen as means to whatever is seen as the supreme end of
human life, not as ends in themselves
in medieval political theory, the end of secular rule is to
secure the salvation of souls for the eternal contemplation
of God
with the rise of modernity, the ancient and medieval
contemplative ideal is replaced by the early modern ideal of
the creative and productive human being (homo faber),
maker of immortal works
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
the late modern ideal human is the laboring animal
(animal laborans) who merely seeks survival and happiness as
an alienated wage-laborer and consumer: subject to
biopolitical governance
complete loss of action as an ideal: only marginal activities
are carried out for the sake of their own greatness
as the atomized laborer considered solely with her own
happiness and alienated from any common world and
public action, the late modern human being becomes the
mass man susceptible to totalitarian ideological
mobilization
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

the question of the role of thinking and its relationship to the vita activa is
omitted from The Human Condition
becomes relevant once more with Arendts case study, Eichmann in
Jerusalem, on ADOLF EICHMANN (19061962) as the paradigmatic
totalitarian human being
in ARENDTs analysis, the banality of EICHMANNs totalitarian evil is a
result of his inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of
somebody else . . . he was surrounded by the most reliable of all
safeguards against the words and the presence of others, and hence
against reality as such
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

this analysis leads ARENDT, in the final years of her life, to

attempt in her lectures a new approach to totalitarianism from
the perspective of the life of the mind
the posthumously published The Life of the Mind was supposed
to include three volumes, corresponding to KANTs three
critiques:
1. Thinking (cf. Critique of Pure Reason)
2. Willing (cf. Critique of Practical Reason)
3. Judging (cf. Critique of Judgment)
Judging was left unwritten due to ARENDTs sudden death
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
thinking is understood by ARENDT as discursive reflection,
dianoia, defined by PLATO as the souls soundless inner
discourse with itself (entos ts psychs dialogos aneu phns; Sophist
263e4)
thinking constitutes a rupture in ones engaged existence in
the common world with others: requires withdrawal into
solitary reflection
the leading question of ARENDTs study of thinking is
whether the activity of thinking as such . . . could . . . be
among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-
doing or even actually condition them against it
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

attempt to overcome the traditional philosophical

opposition between the vita activa and vita contemplative:
relevance of thinking for action
however, in order to be relevant for worldly action, thinking
requires a certain starting point
ARENDT distinguishes three different starting points for
thinking (what makes us think)
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

1. wonder, admiration (thaumazein): the starting point of

philosophy according to PLATO and ARISTOTLE
withdrawal from everyday activities in wonderment of the
sheer positive fact of being and its manifestations
thinking seeks to come to terms with being as such
thinking results in theoretical understanding, in the
contemplative beholding of phenomenal reality in terms of
its hidden, ideal and conceptual structure and principles
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

This condition [pathos], wondering [thaumazein], is most characteristic

of a philosopher; there is no other point of departure [arch] for
philosophy.
PLATO, Theaetetus 155d24.

It was through wondering [thaumazein] that human beings initially

began to philosophize and still do so. . . . The one who is perplexed
and wonders considers himself ignorant . . . and thus, if indeed they
philosophized in order to escape ignorance, they evidently pursued
science [epistasthai] for the sake of knowledge, not for any utility
[chrses].
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics 1.982b1213, 1718, 1921.
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
2. fear, terror: the Roman, Stoic
starting point of rational reflection
(EPICTETUS, SENECA)

thinking withdraws from the world in order to defend itself

against the worlds hostility
thinking makes the mind invulnerable and immune to
external impressions
thinking liberates the will, the minds capacity for directing
autonomous action, for issuing commands to itself, from
external inclinations and compulsions
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
3. self-examination, concern with
oneself: the Socratic starting point
of thinking emphasized by the
historical SOCRATES

thinking splits the unity of the self into a two-in-one, i.e.,

leads to the emergence of conscience in the sense of
reflective self-examination
thinking aims at avoiding contradiction or conflict with
oneself in order to be able to live with oneself
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

As for me, I believe . . . I would rather have . . . the majority of

people disagree with me [m homologein] and contradict me [enantia
legein] than, being one [hena onta], to be in discord with myself [eme
emaut asymfnon einai] and contradict myself.
PLATO, Gorgias 482b7c3.
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO
when applied to the world, this function of thinking
transforms into the faculty of judging, first discovered by
KANT in the Critique of Judgment
it is this function of thought, the moral self-reflection that
can lead to autonomous and spontaneous value-judgments,
that EICHMANN lacked
judging is nonideological, since it is never based on an
explicit rule or logic
judging rather appeals to an implicit, communally shared
common sense and requires an enlarged mentality,
looking at things from the point of view of other
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

totalitarianism seeks to destroy the possibility of thinking

completely by destroying the space between people in
which a world is shared
this transforms the solitude, the being-by-oneself
required by thinking into loneliness, total isolation from the
shared world, in which the mind remains capable only of
(ideo)logical reasoning
JYVSKYLN YLIOPISTO

When everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else

does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because
their refusal to join in is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of
action. In such emergencies, it turns out that the purging component of
thinking . . . is political by implication. For this destruction has a
liberating effect on another faculty, the faculty of judgment, which one
may call with some reason the most political of mans mental
abilities. . . . If thinking . . . actualizes the difference within our identity
as given in consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its by-
product, then judging, the by-product of the liberating effect of
thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of
appearances, where I am never alone and too busy to be able to think.
HANNAH ARENDT, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1: Thinking
(San Diego, CA: Harcourt, 1981), 19293.