Journal of Personality 00:00, Month 2016

Blissfully Blind or Painfully Aware? C 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

V
DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12284

Exploring the Beliefs People With

Interpersonal Problems Have About
Their Reputation

Erika N. Carlson,1 Aidan G. C. Wright,2 and Hira Imam1

1
University of Toronto Mississauga
2
University of Pittsburgh

Abstract
Objective: Problematic interpersonal behavior might stem from and be maintained by the beliefs people have about how
others see them (i.e., metaperceptions). The current study tested whether people with interpersonal problems formed more
or less accurate metaperceptions about their personality (meta-accuracy), whether they thought others saw them in more or
less positive ways (positivity), and whether they underestimated or overestimated how much others saw them as they saw
themselves (transparency).
Method: Participants (NTime1 5 189; NTime2 5 175; Mage 5 19.78; 36% male) completed a measure of interpersonal problems
and provided personality judgments and metaperceptions for a group of peers after a first impression and after 4 months of
acquaintanceship.
Results: Generalized distress was associated with less positive metaperceptions at both times and with higher meta-accuracy
after 4 months. Dominance problems were not associated with meta-accuracy, positivity, or transparency after a first impres-
sion, but dominance was linked to lower meta-accuracy and lower positivity after 4 months. Affiliation problems were associ-
ated with higher meta-accuracy after a first impression and with higher positivity and transparency at both times.
Conclusions: Metaperceptions were linked to interpersonal problems, and these expectations might partially explain some
maladaptive patterns of behavior.

Keywords: Interpersonal problems, personality, metaperception, self-concept, self-knowledge

The interpersonal domain is of fundamental importance (Bau-
meister & Leary, 1995), which helps explain why people who
suffer from interpersonal dysfunction experience problems in
living. Interpersonal problems are typically one of the major
concerns people report when seeking out psychological treat-
ment (Horowitz, 1979) and are linked to a wide range of psycho-
logical problems such as anxiety, depression, and personality
disorders, which are associated with severe, pervasive, and per-
sistent problems in living (Alden & Phillips, 1990; Hopwood,
Wright, Ansell, & Pincus, 2013).
Interpersonal problems are at the heart of many forms of psy-
chopathology, but the processes that contribute to these prob-
lems are poorly understood (Horowitz, 2004). One potential
mechanism driving difculties in social functioning might be a
poor understanding of the self in relation to others (Hopwood
et al., 2013). Specically, people with poor interpersonal func-
tioning might have inaccurate or maladaptive beliefs about how
other people perceive them. Metaperceptions, which are the
beliefs people have about how others perceive them, powerfully
inuence behavior and are the gauge people use to successfully
navigate their social worlds. As such, acting on inaccurate meta-
perceptions likely leads to conict and hurt feelings (Cameron
& Vorauer, 2008). For brevity, we use the term awareness to
refer to the degree to which metaperceptions are accurate, that
is, whether a metaperceiver (Meg) forms accurate beliefs about
how a judge (Jon) perceives her personality. Indeed, poor aware-
ness might partially explain why people with interpersonal prob-
lems behave in maladaptive ways, but the content of their
metaperceptions might also partially explain their maladaptive
patterns of behavior. The degree to which people expect to be
seen in desirable ways, or the extent to which they feel valued,
as well as the degree to which people think others see them as
Special thanks to Simine Vazire for her generous collaboration in data
collection. Data from the current study have been reported elsewhere, but
analyses are novel (Carlson, 2013; Carlson, 2016b, Study 2; Carlson,
Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011).
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Erika
N. Carlson, Department of Psychology, University of Toronto Mississauga,
3359 Mississauga Road, Mississauga, Ontario L5L 1C6, Canada. Email:
erikan.carlson@utoronto.ca.
2 Carlson, Wright, Imam
they see themselves, or the extent to which they feel understood,
are important components of relationship quality and well-being
(Campbell, Lackenbauer, & Muise, 2006; Carlson, 2016a,
2016b; Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998). Peo-
ple with interpersonal problems might feel less valued or under-
stood, and this negative subjective reality might exacerbate and
maintain their problems.
The main goals of the current research are to test whether
individuals with more interpersonal problems are more or less
aware of how other people perceive them. We also explore the
subjective reality of people with interpersonal problems by test-
ing whether these individuals expect to be seen in more or less
positive ways and whether they tend to think others see them as
they see themselves. Given that interpersonal problems cut
across traditional diagnostic categories (e.g., Cain et al., 2012;
Pincus & Wiggins, 1990; Przeworski et al., 2011), this research
aims to understand decits underlying many forms of psychopa-
thology. In addition to shedding light on the nature of interper-
sonal problems, results will also speak to the broader question of
whether self-knowledge is a feature of psychological adjustment
(Colvin & Block, 1994).
Interpersonal Problems
We adopt the interpersonal circumplex (IPC; Leary, 1957; Wig-
gins, 1982) as a structural framework for organizing individual
differences in interpersonal problems. The IPC organizes inter-
personal functioning (i.e., behavior, traits, motivation, cogni-
tion) as blends of the two primary orthogonal domains of
agency (dominance vs. submissiveness) and communion (afli-
ation vs. disafliation; see Figure 1). Problematic functioning
can be understood as excesses (i.e., behavior one does too much
or has a hard time inhibiting) and inhibitions (i.e., behavior one
nds difcult to do or has a hard time enacting) in dominance
and afliation (Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990). Impairments
in dominance reect impairments in identity and self-direction
(self-functioning), whereas impairments in afliation reect fail-
ures in empathy and intimacy (interpersonal functioning; Pincus
& Wright, 2011). Specically, the dominance dimension repre-
sents the individuals motivations, strivings, and behaviors to
maintain agency, which are manifested in domineering and self-
centered ways when problematic. The afliation dimension rep-
resents the individuals motivations, strivings, and behaviors to
maintain connectedness, which is manifested in intrusive and
dependent ways when problematic. Thus, individuals with dom-
ineering problems prioritize the self over the concerns of others
(e.g., narcissism; Gurtman, 1992), whereas individuals with
afliative problems prioritize concerns with others over the self
(e.g., dependency; Pincus & Gurtman, 1995).
Individual differences in problematic interpersonal func-
tioning can be decomposed into variance related to general-
ized distress, which represents overall interpersonal problem
severity, and variance specically related to dominance and
afliation, which represent characteristic styles of problems.
Domineering
(90)
Self-serving Vindictive Intrusive
(135) (45)
PROBLEMS
Coldhearted AFFILIATIVE PROBLEMS Overly-Nurturant
(180) (0)
DOMINANT
Avoidant Exploitable
(225) (315)
Nonassertive
(270)
Figure 1 The interpersonal problems circumplex. Dark lines with arrows
represent the two primary dimensions of the Inventory of Interpersonal
ProblemsCircumplex Scales (Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990). Dashed
lines frame the content captured by each octant scale. Octant titles give
primary themes of each scale, and angles in parentheses provide locations
of scales in circular space. Associations among scales are inverse to their
angular distance and are weighted and combined to form the two primary
dimensions and an index of generalized interpersonal distress.
People with more generalized distress report diffuse difcul-
ties in a wide variety of interpersonal problems and tend to
describe themselves as higher in neuroticism (Hopwood,
Koonce, & Morey, 2009; Wright et al., 2012). Thus, general-
ized distress is a unipolar scale of levels of a diffuse set of
problems and distress.
Dominance problems reect a bipolar scale of problems
ranging from submissive to dominant behaviors. People with
more submissive problems (i.e., low dominance) report difcul-
ties with opening up to others, asserting themselves, and being
taken advantage of, but people with more dominance problems
report difculties in taking another persons perspective as well
as being overly intrusive, manipulative, hostile, attention seek-
ing, controlling, and vindictive (Gurtman, 1992; Pincus & Wig-
gins, 1990; Wright et al., 2012).
Afliation problems are also bipolar, representing a range
from coldhearted to overly nurturant behaviors. People with dis-
afliative problems (i.e., people with less afliation) tend to
report social avoidance, detachment, difculty feeling close to
others, and difculty trusting others, but people with afliative
problems tend to report struggles with setting boundaries, being
overly generous, excessively trying to please or accommodate
others, and spending time alone (Wright et al., 2012).
The Roles of Awareness and Subjective
Reality in Interpersonal Problems
We predict that metaperceptions are linked to interpersonal
problems. The following sections outline specic, competing
hypotheses about whether people with interpersonal problems
form (in)accurate metaperceptions, whether they expect to be
Blissfully Blind or Painfully Aware
seen in more positive or negative ways, and whether they tend to
think others see them as they see themselves.
The Accuracy of Metaperceptions: Blissfully
Blind or Painfully Aware?
People with interpersonal dysfunction have a distorted sense of
social reality that often results in miscommunication, hurt feel-
ings, and unmet needs (Hopwood et al., 2013; Sullivan, 1953).
One explanation for this pattern is that people with interpersonal
problems fail to appreciate how their personality affects other
people. Thus, while the typical person is aware of how people
perceive him or her on core personality traits (Carlson & Bar-
ranti, 2015; Carlson & Kenny, 2012; Kenny & DePaulo, 1993),
people with more interpersonal problems might be less aware of
how others see them, a possibility we call the Blissfully Blind
Hypothesis. The core assumption of this hypothesis is that it is
adaptive to know what others think about the self and that per-
ceiving social reality in an accurate light is a sign of psychologi-
cal adjustment (Colvin & Block, 1994). Indeed, people with
more awareness tend to be liked more by acquaintances, friends,
and partners (Carlson, 2016b), suggesting that awareness has an
adaptive function. There is also some evidence that poor meta-
accuracy is maladaptive. People with lower self-esteem are less
aware of how they are seen by acquaintances (Campbell & Fehr,
1990) and that people with more personality disorder symptoms,
dened as a combination of self-reports, informant reports, and
semistructured interview scores, tend to be less aware of how
they are seen by a close other than are people with fewer symp-
toms (Carlson & Oltmanns, 2015). In sum, the Blissfully Blind
Hypothesis argues that awareness is adaptive and predicts that
people with interpersonal problems (Meg) fail to appreciate how
others (Jon) perceive them.
There are at least two ways in which people with interperson-
al problems might be blind to the impressions they make. First,
people with problems have an interpersonal style marked by
extreme inhibitions and excesses, and as such, they are unique
from the typical person and likely make distinctive impressions.
For these individuals to know how others see them, they must
have a keen understanding of how they differ from the typical
person, a form of awareness called distinctive meta-accuracy
(Carlson 2016a, 2016b). The Blissfully Blind Hypothesis pre-
dicts that people with problems have less distinctive meta-
accuracy and fail to appreciate how others see them as unique
from the typical person. There is some evidence that people who
are seen by their peers as being more interpersonally adjusted
(e.g., socially skilled) have higher distinctive meta-accuracy
than people who are seen as being less adjusted (Carlson,
2016a), suggesting that interpersonal problems might be linked
to lower distinctive meta-accuracy as well.
Second, people with more problems might fail to appreciate
the way others experience them differently from how they see
themselves. For the average person, self-perceptions are the
most valid source of information to use when forming
3
metaperceptions (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993). Yet, people with
more psychopathology symptoms tend to see themselves differ-
ently than others see them (Clifton, Turkheimer, & Oltmanns,
2005; Mosterman & Hendriks, 2011), suggesting that self-
perceptions probably hinder rather than foster their accuracy.
Interestingly, most people are able to make valid distinctions
between how they see themselves and how others perceive
them, an ability called meta-insight (Carlson, Vazire, & Furr,
2011; Gallrein, Carlson, Holstein, & Leising, 2013; Mosch &
Borkenau, 2016; Oltmanns, Gleason, Klonsky, & Turkheimer,
2005). Thus, people can effectively use sources of information
other than their self-perceptions to infer the impression they
make (e.g., feedback). However, the Blissfully Blind Hypothesis
predicts that people with interpersonal problems have weaker
meta-insight, or are less able to make valid distinctions between
self-views and others perceptions. Indeed, the same study
showing that interpersonal adjustment was linked to distinctive
meta-accuracy showed that adjusted individuals had higher
meta-insight as well (Carlson, 2016a). Thus, Megs problems
might persist because she fails to realize the ways in which Jon
experiences her differently from how she experiences herself.
For example, Meg might see herself as shy, nervous, and caring,
but she fails to realize Jon actually sees her as cold and with-
drawn. This misunderstanding could lead to her further with-
drawing when Jon does not reach out to her.
The Blissfully Blind Hypothesis predicts that people with
interpersonal problems fail to appreciate the ways in which they
make distinctive impressions (distinctive meta-accuracy) and the
ways in which they are seen differently from how they see them-
selves (meta-insight). However, rather than being blissfully blind,
people with problems might be acutely aware of how they are
seen, a possibility we call the Painfully Aware Hypothesis. There
is some evidence that awareness for the typical person is linked to
negative self-reported outcomes, suggesting that accurate meta-
perceptions might come at a cost for the metaperceiver. For exam-
ple, people with higher distinctive meta-accuracy for a new
acquaintance reported less liking for that acquaintance (Carlson,
2016b), suggesting that Megs insight into what makes her dis-
tinctive in Jons eyes can be aversive. Likewise, people who
reported higher self-esteem and fewer personality disorder symp-
toms had less meta-insight for peers (Mosch & Borkenau, 2016),
suggesting that if Meg has lower self-esteem or more personality
disorder symptoms, she likely has more meta-insight. Thus, the
Painfully Aware Hypothesis posits that awareness is higher
among people with interpersonal problems and suggests that their
awareness about what makes them distinctive to others and their
keen insight into how others experience them differently from
how they see themselves might exacerbate their problems.
The Valence of Metaperceptions: Expecting
the Best or the Worst?
Independent of accuracy, peoples subjective sense of social
reality can play a critical role in how they relate to other people.
4 Carlson, Wright, Imam
For example, people who expect to be seen in positive ways by
another person tend to like that person more (Carlson, 2016b),
suggesting that the valence of metaperceptions has interpersonal
consequences. Thus, we explore whether positive or negative
metaperceptions are linked to interpersonal problems.
On one hand, people with problems might think they are
seen in especially positive ways, a pattern we call the Positivity
Hypothesis. Individuals with problems might persist in mal-
adaptive behavior because they think others enjoy their person-
ality (i.e., their behavior is valued). For example, people with
afliation problems might persist in alienating others because
they assume others enjoy their intrusive behavior. That is, their
subjective sense of their reputation is positive and thus does not
alert them to the fact that others might not enjoy their behavior.
On the other hand, people with problems might assume that
others see them in especially negative ways, an expectation we
call the Negativity Hypothesis. This negative subjective reality
might lead people with problems to lash out or withdraw, behav-
iors that might eventually create the negative reality they per-
ceive. There is some evidence that people who report higher
psychological adjustment (e.g., higher self-esteem) tend to
expect to be seen in desirable ways (Campbell & Fehr, 1990;
Carlson, 2016a), whereas people who have more psychopathol-
ogy symptoms (e.g., social anxiety) expect to be seen in negative
ways (Christensen, Stein, & Means-Christensen, 2003). Thus,
people with problems might also expect less positivity from
others.
The Role of Self-Perception: Feeling
Transparent or Misunderstood?
Another way in which subjective reality might be linked to inter-
personal problems is the degree to which people think others see
them as they see themselves. On one hand, individuals with
interpersonal problems might be especially likely to assume
others perceive them as they see themselves more so than others
really do, a possibility we call the Transparency Hypothesis.
Most people assume others see them as they see themselves
more so than they really do (Kenny & DePaulo, 1993), but peo-
ple with interpersonal problems might be especially unable to
disentangle their self-views from their reputation. Indeed, one
reason they might withdraw or lash out is because others do not
respond to them in ways they expect. For example, if Meg false-
ly assumes her anxiety is transparent to Jon, she might resent
Jon for not responding to or soothing her anxiety.
On the other hand, people with interpersonal problems might
feel less understood than the typical person does and overesti-
mate their transparency less, a pattern we call the Misunderstood
Hypothesis. There is some evidence that people who report
greater psychological adjustment tend to overestimate their
transparency, suggesting that people who are less adjusted feel
more misunderstood (Carlson, 2016a). Feeling less understood
might explain some patterns of extreme behavior. For example,
Meg might assume that Jon fails to appreciate how anxious she
is, so she expresses her anxiety in excessive ways. Likewise,
Meg might feel as though others fail to recognize her strengths,
and as such, she might feel the need to brag.
Research Overview
In an ecologically valid study of interpersonal perception, we
assessed self-perceptions, impressions, and metaperceptions for
core personality traits among peers in the rst 4 months of
acquaintanceship. Assessments were conducted after a rst
impression and again nearly 4 months later, an approach that
provides a snapshot view of interpersonal perceptions in the ear-
ly phase of acquaintanceship. We explore whether effects
change over time, but we do not make specic predictions about
specic patterns of change. Interpersonal problems were
assessed with the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP-C;
Alden et al., 1990), which measures generalized distress, domi-
nance, and afliation problems. Evidence is mixed as to whether
more or less awareness, positivity, or transparency is a sign of
psychological adjustment, and as such, we test our competing
hypotheses to determine which pattern best ts the data for gen-
eralized distress, dominance, and afliation problems. However,
we do not make specic predictions for each problem; thus, the
analyses are exploratory.
METHOD
Participants
Participants (NTime1 5 189; NTime2 5 175; Mage 5 19.78 years,
SD 5 .98 years; 36% male; 66.7% Caucasian, 23.7% Asian
American, 4.8% African American, 1.1% Middle Eastern, 3.2%
Hispanic, .5% other or did not indicate) were undergraduates in
a personality course. Students took part in the current study as
part of a larger set of class activities.
Measures
Metaperceptions (How Person X sees you) and impressions
(How you see Person X) were provided twice on a 10-item
measure of the Big Five (Ten-Item Personality Inventory; Gos-
ling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), and the items arrogant,
exaggerates abilities, intelligent, and funny were
assessed. Items were rated on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 15
(Strongly Agree) scale. Using the same scale, self-perceptions
(How you see yourself) were provided during Time 1 for the
same items.
Interpersonal problems were measured on the Inventory of
Interpersonal ProblemsCircumplex Scales (IIP-C; Alden et al.,
1990). The IIP-C is a 64-item measure of interpersonal problems
and associated distress. Items assess behaviors that an individual
does in excess (i.e., I do . . . too much) or nds difcult to do
(It is hard for me to. . .). The IIP-C provides coverage for the
full range of interpersonal content mapped by the IPC with
Blissfully Blind or Painfully Aware
8 eight-item scales (i.e., octant scales). Each octant scale is
labeled based on the central theme of its interpersonal problems,
with names provided in Figure 1. Internal consistency of the
scales is adequate in the current sample (Mean a 5 .80;
range 5 .70 to .85). Scores from the octant scales can be com-
bined to derive parameters that summarize an individuals inter-
personal problem prole. The primary dimensions of dominant
(M 5 .013, SD 5 .668; range 5 21.66 to 1.97) and afliative
(M 5 .204, SD 5 .671; range 5 21.68 to 1.96) problems were
calculated from the octant scales using standard circumplex
weighting procedures (Wiggins & Broughton, 1991). In addi-
tion, we included the average octant scale score in our analyses,
which provides a measure of generalized distress (Tracey,
Rounds, & Gurtman, 1996; M 5 1.940, SD 5 .636; range 5 .31
to 3.55). In contrast, the dimensional scores for dominant and
afliative problems provide measures of problems in each
domain, net of general severity. Importantly, each domain is
bipolar, such that agentic problems range from being domineer-
ing and controlling to being overly submissive and obsequious,
whereas communal problems range from being cold and with-
drawn to overly nurturing and smothering. Generalized distress
was not associated with dominance (r 5 .105, p 5 .143) or
afliation (r 5 .090, p 5 .209), but dominance and afliation
were negatively associated (r 5 .191, p 5 .007).
Procedures
As part of a class activity, students in a personality psychology
course were assigned to unacquainted groups of 48 people
(N 5 43 groups; M 5 5.28 per group) during the rst week of
class and met with the same group in class once a week for
approximately 20 minutes each week until the end of the semes-
ter (14 weeks; approximately three and a half months). During
the rst meeting, participants played the ice-breaking game
Two Truths and a Lie, where each person made three state-
ments about himself or herself, two of which were true and one
of which was a lie, and the other members guessed which state-
ment was a lie. This game provides some structure for a rst
impression while also allowing for individual differences to
emerge more readily than an interaction without structure (e.g.,
bragging, sharing personal information). After the game, partici-
pants provided metaperception ratings and impressions of each
group member as well as self-perceptions. Each subsequent
week, group members met to discuss class-related material and
engage in various class activities. Midway into the course, par-
ticipants completed the IIP, and at the end of the course, partici-
pants rated their classmates and provided metaperceptions for a
second time.
Analyses
There are many ways to measure the accuracy and valence of
metaperceptions (Carlson & Kenny, 2012), but the current arti-
cle adopted the prole approach. This approach models the
5
accuracy of metaperceptions as the prole correlation between
an individuals (Megs) metaperception across several traits and
the actual impression he or she makes on those same traits. This
indicates whether Meg knows how Jon perceives her character-
istic patterns of traits (e.g., whether she realizes that he sees her
as more outgoing than dependable or anxious). The valence of
metaperceptions was indexed as the degree to which a metaper-
ception prole was associated with a desirable prole (i.e.,
whether Meg thinks the impression she makes is similar to a
desirable impression). Transparency was indexed as the degree
to which a persons (Megs) metaperception prole was associ-
ated with his or her self-perception prole, controlling for the
actual impression he or she made (i.e., whether Meg assumes
Jon shares her self-perception above and beyond how much he
actually does share her self-perception).
All effects were modeled with the social accuracy model
(SAM; Biesanz, 2010), which is a cross-random effects multi-
level model that controls for the effects of dyads. Given the little
variance attributed to groups, group was not included in the
model. Analyses were performed in R (lme4 package; Bates &
Sarkar, 2007).1
To model meta-accuracy, or the prole agreement between
metaperceptions and impressions, each 14-item impression pro-
le was entered as a predictor of a given metaperception prole
at Level 1, and both the metaperceiver and judge were modeled
as random. This index measured awareness, but it did not reveal
whether people were aware of the distinctive impressions they
made or if they expected to be seen in positive ways. Raw prole
agreement also conates stereotype accuracy in ways that can
lead to spurious conclusions about the link between accuracy
and evaluative outcomes (e.g., well-being or liking; Wood &
Furr, 2016). For example, Meg might know what Jon thinks of
her, largely because her metaperception and his impression are
similar to the average prole, which is highly socially desirable.
Thus, her meta-accuracy will be strongly associated with fewer
problems because people with fewer problems make and think
they make typical (desirable) impressions rather than because of
her keen insight. Thus, we report results for meta-accuracy in
Table 1, but effects should be interpreted with caution.2
Distinctive meta-accuracy and positivity were indexed by
decomposing impressions into distinctive and normative com-
ponents, as outlined by Biesanz (2010). Specically, the norma-
tive impression prole, which was the average impression of the
sample, was subtracted from each individual impression prole.
This yielded a distinctive impression for each judge, or the way
a judge (Jon) perceived a metaperceiver (Meg) as unique from
the typical person. Distinctive impressions and the normative
impression were entered as simultaneous predictors of metaper-
ceptions, which yielded an index of distinctive accuracy (dis-
tinctive impression slope) and positivity (normative slope;
Model 1). As expected, the normative prole was strongly asso-
ciated with social desirability ratings provided by 12 research
assistants (Time 1 normative r 5 .989; Time 2 r 5 .991, p <
.001), suggesting that as found in past work (Wood & Furr,
2016), the normative prole is desirable. As such, we call the
 6

Table 1 Interpersonal Problems as a Moderator of Accuracy, Positivity, and Transparency

Dominance Problems Affiliation Problems

Basic Model Generalized Distress (NonassertiveDomineering) (ColdheartedOverly Nurturant)

Slopes Time 1 b Time 2 b Time 1 b Time 2 b Time 1 b Time 2 b Time 1 b Time 2 b

Meta-accuracy .416** .456** .088** .085** .012 .073** .075** .094**
[.384, .447] [.419, .493] [.138, .038] [.139, .031] [.062, .038] [.124, .021] [.026, .124] [.042, .146]
.471, .359 .511, .403 .420, .405 .503, .406 .362, .460 .393, .515
Model 1
Distinctive .154** .190** .016 .046* .028 .028 .040* .028
meta-accuracy [.128, .180] [.160, .219] [.025, .056] [.003, .089] [.011, .068] [.013, .068] [.001, .079] [.015, .070]
.133, .153 .151, .208 .125, .162 .160, .197 .117, .169 .160, .197
Positivity .828** .861** .240** .265** .072 .198** .133* .228**
[.762, .894] [.785, .937] [.344, .136] [.384, .146] [.179, .034] [.313, .083] [.028, .237] [.112, .344]
.994, .687 1.045, .703 .883, .787 .997, .735 .745, .917 .716, 1.013
Model 2
Meta-insight .156** .179** .021 .033 .006 .059** .015 .029
[.135, .177] [.156, .202] [.014, .056] [.003, .069] [.028, .040] [.092, .026] [.020, .050] [.006, .064]
.141, .168 .153, .193 .151, .159 .214, .136 .145, .164 .156, .194
Transparency .445** .495** .112** .103** .006 .041 .055 .065*
[.410, .480] [.457, .533] [.166, .057] [.162, .043] [.062, .049] [.018, .099] [.001, .110] [.006, .123]
.511, .368 .564, .433 .440, .432 .468, .521 .399, .470 .452, .537

Note. The 95% confidence intervals are shown. The dependent variable is the metaperception profile. Basic Model 5 slopes before IIP scores were entered as moderators; Metaaccuracy 5 impression slope;
Model 1: Distinctive accuracy 5 distinctive impression slope, Positivity 5 normative slope; Model 2: Meta-insight 5 impression slope, Transparency 5 self-perception slope. Italic numbers indicate simple slope
effects, or slopes one standard deviation below and one standard deviation above the relevant mean IIP score.
**p < .01. *p < .05. p < .10.
Carlson, Wright, Imam
Blissfully Blind or Painfully Aware
normative slope positivity. However, to demonstrate that the
normative prole yielded the same effects as the social desirabil-
ity ratings, models were rerun with the social desirability prole
in place of the normative prole.
Meta-insight and transparency were indexed by entering
impression and self-perception proles as simultaneous predic-
tors of metaperception proles (Model 2). This yielded an index
of meta-insight (impression slope) and transparency (self-per-
ception slope). Thus, Model 2 indexed the degree to which peo-
ple were able to detect how their partner perceived their
characteristic pattern of traits above and beyond how they saw
their own pattern of traits (meta-insight) and the degree to which
people assumed they were seen as they saw themselves, above
and beyond how they were actually seen (transparency).3
We tested our competing hypotheses by entering grand-
mean-centered IIP scores (generalized distress, dominance, or
afliation) as a Level 2 predictor of slopes. IIP scores are cross-
level moderators in this model, but they can be interpreted as
correlations with a prole correlation (e.g., the link between
problems and distinctive meta-accuracy slopes). Notably, the
interpretation of generalized distress is different from that of
dominance and afliation. Generalized distress is a unipolar
scale, and as such, a positive link between generalized distress
and, for example, distinctive meta-accuracy supports the Pain-
fully Aware Hypothesis, whereas a negative link supports the
Blissfully Blind Hypothesis. However, dominance and aflia-
tion scales are bipolar, and as such, signicant effects for these
problems suggest support for either hypothesis, depending on
direction of the problem. For example, if afliation is positively
linked to awareness, people who are excessively warm know
how others experience them (Painfully Aware) and people who
are excessively cold have less insight into how they are seen
(Blissfully Blind). The same interpretation applies to tests of
subjective reality, specically, whether problems are associated
with the valance of metaperceptions (Positivity and Negativity
Hypotheses) or to transparency (Transparency or Misunderstood
Hypotheses).
To aid in interpretation, simple slopes are reported for one
standard deviation above (high b) and below (low b) the mean-
level IIP scores. These slopes reveal the magnitude of the rele-
vant slope (i.e., prole correlation) when people were high or
low on the given IIP score. For example, when modeling dis-
tress, a high b reects the prole correlation for people one stan-
dard deviation above the mean of distress, whereas a low b
reects the prole correlation for people one standard deviation
below. To aid in interpretation of effects across the two time
points, we also explored whether effects changed over time by
testing whether time (Time 1 5 0, Time 2 5 1) moderated the
link between IIP scores and slopes (e.g., meta-accuracy). While
these effects test whether effects changed, a more powerful test
of longitudinal effects would include more than two time points.
This study was adequately powered to detect signicant pro-
le correlations, which are generally strong effects (e.g., distinc-
tive selfother agreement d 5 .64; Human & Biesanz, 2011).
For example, a 14-item prole for N 5 40 yields power of over
7
.90 for a large effect (Scherbaum & Ferreter, 2009). The sample
size is also consistent with past work testing cross-level modera-
tors of prole agreement (e.g., Human & Biesanz, 2011,
N 5 107; Lorenzo, Biesanz, & Human, 2010, N 5 73).
RESULTS
As shown in Table 1, people were aware of how their peers per-
ceived their characteristic pattern of traits (meta-accuracy).
While they were able to detect how they were seen as distinct
from the typical person (distinctive meta-accuracy), people also
tended to think they were seen in positive ways (positivity).
Finally, people were able to detect how they were seen different-
ly from how they saw themselves (meta-insight), but they also
tended to overestimate how much they were seen as they saw
themselves (transparency). This pattern suggests the typical per-
son was aware of the impressions he or she made but, at the
same time, felt valued and understood.
Generalized Distress
Was distress linked to distinctive meta-accuracy or positivity?
As shown in Table 1, in support of the Painfully Aware Hypoth-
esis, relative to people with less, people with more distress
tended to be more aware of what made them distinctive in the
eyes of their peers after 4 months (Time 2 b 5 .046, p 5 .035, d
5 .424). This effect was not signicant after a rst impression
(Time 1 b 5 .016, p 5 .448, d 5 .133), but the change was not
signicant (b 5 .017, SE 5 .017, p 5 .309, d 5 .121). In sup-
port of the Negativity Hypothesis, relative to people with less,
people with more distress tended to think they were seen in less
positive ways after a rst impression and 4 months (Time 1 b 5
.240, p < .001, d 5 .627; Time 2 b 5 .265, p < .001, d 5
.663), an effect that did not change (b 5 .027, SE 5 .022, p 5
.237, d 5 .059). Thus, Model 1 revealed that relative to people
with less, people with more distress were more aware of what
made them distinctive but also expected to be seen in less posi-
tive ways. Results showed the same pattern when the normative
prole was replaced with social desirability ratingsdistinctive
meta-accuracy: Time 1 b 5 .017 [.022, .056], p 5 .396; Time
2 b 5 .042 [.001, .084], p 5 .055; desirability: Time 1 b 5
.295 [.415, .175], p < .001; Time 2 b 5 .293 [.428, .159],
p < .001.
Was distress linked to meta-insight or transparency? Gen-
eralized distress was not signicantly associated with meta-
insight, although a marginal effect at Time 2 suggested the
same Painfully Aware pattern observed for distinctive meta-
accuracy (Time 1 b 5 .021, p 5 .224, d 5 .202; Time 2 b 5
.033, p 5 .074, d 5 .341; Db 5 .008, SE 5 .013, p 5 .543,
d 5 .073). In support of the Misunderstood Hypothesis, Mod-
el 2 revealed that relative to people with less, people with
more distress tended to assume others saw them as they saw
themselves less after a rst impression (Time 1 b 5 .112, p
< .001, d 5 .563) and after 4 months (Time 2 b 5 .103, p
8 Carlson, Wright, Imam
5 .001, d 5 .526), an effect that weakened slightly over
time (Db 5 .031, SE 5 .012, p 5 .010, d 5 .132).
Dominance Problems
Was dominance linked to distinctive meta-accuracy or positivi-
ty? As shown in Table 1, relative to people with fewer domi-
nance problems, people with more dominance problems were
not more or less aware of the distinctive impressions they made
(Time 1 b 5 .028, p 5 .154, d 5 .244; Time 2 b 5 .028, p 5
.178, d 5 .271; Db 5 .021, SE 5 .016, p 5 .196, d 5 .150).
Relative to people with fewer dominance problems, people with
more dominance problems did not necessarily think they were
seen in more or less positive ways after a rst impression (Time
1 b 5 .072, p 5 .182, d 5 .197), but in support of the Nega-
tivity Hypothesis, they did tend to think they were seen in less
positive ways after 4 months (Time 2 b 5 .198, p < .001, d 5
.520), a change that was signicant (b 5 .109, SE 5 .022, p
< .001, d 5 .240). This pattern also suggests that people with
more submissive problems tended to think they were seen in
more positive ways after 4 months of acquaintanceship. Nota-
bly, results showed the same pattern when the normative prole
was replaced with social desirability ratingsdistinctive meta-
accuracy: Time 1 b 5 .019 [.019, .057], p 5 .322; Time 2 b 5
.022 [.018, .062], p 5 .284; desirability: Time 1 b 5 .076 [
.200, .048], p 5 .229; Time 2 b 5 .200 [.331, .070], p 5
.003. In sum, Model 1 showed that people with more dominance
problems expected less positive evaluations after they were
acquainted with peers, but they were not more or less accurate
about the distinctive impressions they made.
Was dominance related to meta-insight or transparency? Rel-
ative to people with fewer dominance problems, people with
more dominance problems did not have more or less meta-
insight after a rst impression (Time 1 b 5 .006, p 5 .736, d 5
.061), but they did have lower meta-insight after 4 months
(Time 2 b 5 .059, p < .001, d 5 .641), a change that was sig-
nicant (b 5 .067, SE 5 .013, p < .001, d 5 .609). However,
transparency was not associated with dominance problems, sug-
gesting people with more problems did not necessarily assume
others saw them as they saw themselves more or less than the
typical person (Time 1 b 5 .006, p 5 .821, d 5 .032; Time 2
b 5 .041, p 5 .173, d 5 .220), although there was a slight
increase in transparency over time (Db 5 .034, SE 5 .012, p 5
.004, d 5 .145). In sum, Model 2 revealed that relative to people
with fewer dominance problems, people with more dominance
problems were less aware of how others experienced them dif-
ferently from how they experienced themselves, but they did not
necessarily overestimate or underestimate their transparency.
Affiliation Problems
Was afliation linked to distinctive meta-accuracy or positivity?
Table 1 revealed that relative to people with fewer afliation
problems, people with more afliation problems tended to be
more accurate about the distinctive rst impression they made
(Time 1 b 5 .040, p 5 .044, d 5 .351), but not the distinctive
impression they made after 4 months (Time 2 b 5 .028, p 5
.200, d 5 .272), although the change was not signicant (b 5
.019, SE 5 .017, p 5 .255, d 5 .136). Relative to people with
fewer afliation problems, people with more afliation prob-
lems tended to think they were seen in more positive ways after
a rst impression (Time 1 b 5 .133, p 5 .012, d 5 .367) and
after 4 months (Time 2 b 5 .228, p < .001, d 5 .601), an effect
that strengthened over time (Db 5 .083, SE 5 .022, p < .001,
d 5 .183). These effects also suggest that people who were espe-
cially disafliative tended to be less accurate about the distinc-
tive rst impression they made and tended to expect less
positive evaluations. Notably, results showed the same pattern
when the normative prole was replaced with social desirability
ratings, although rst impression accuracy was not signicant
(distinctive meta-accuracy: Time 1 b 5 .026, p 5 .186; Time 2
b 5 .014, p 5 .504; desirability: Time 1 b 5 .169, p 5 .006;
Time 2 b 5 .272, p < .001).
Was afliation linked to meta-insight or transparency? Rela-
tive to people with fewer afliation problems, people with more
afliation problems were not more or less aware of how they
were seen differently from how they saw themselves (Time 1 b
5 .015, p 5 .397, d 5 .153; Time 2 b 5 .029, p 5 .106, d 5
.316; Model 2; Db 5 .016, SE 5 .013, p 5 .244, d 5 .145). Rel-
ative to people with fewer afliation problems, people with
more afliation problems tended to assume others saw them as
they saw themselves more, although this effect was marginally
signicant for a rst impression (Time 1 b 5 .055, p 5 .052, d
5 .292; Time 2 b 5 .065, p 5 .030, d 5 .350; Model 2: Db 5
.009, SE 5 .012, p 5 .455, d 5 .038). In sum, people with more
afliation problems tended to feel more transparent but were not
necessarily more or less aware of how others experienced them
differently from how they experienced themselves.
DISCUSSION
The current research tested whether people with more interper-
sonal problems formed more or less accurate metaperceptions of
their peers and explored whether these individuals expected to
be seen in more or less positive or self-verifying ways. The pat-
tern of ndings differed across problems, suggesting that the
underlying mechanisms driving different forms of interpersonal
problems likely differ. With respect to generalized distress, peo-
ple who reported more diffuse problems tended to be more
aware of how they were distinctive in their peers eyes after 4
months of acquaintanceship, and a marginal effect suggested
they had some insight into how their peers experienced them dif-
ferently from how they experienced themselves. Thus, rather
than being blind to their effect on others, people with distress
were acutely aware once they were acquainted. Evidence for the
Painfully Aware Hypothesis is in line with a recent nding by
Mosch and Borkenau (2016), who showed that people with
higher self-esteem were less aware of how they were seen by
Blissfully Blind or Painfully Aware
peers. They argued that such a pattern suggests positive affect
interferes with analytic processing, a skill that might be neces-
sary for detecting the impressions one makes. Given that people
who report more distress also report greater neuroticism (Hop-
wood et al., 2009), our nding provides some support for the
idea that negative affectivity sharpens social acuity. With respect
to subjective reality, people with more distress expected to be
seen in less positive ways and tended to think others saw them
as they saw themselves less at both time points, suggesting these
individuals felt less valued and understood. On one hand, their
reported concern with a wide variety of interpersonal behaviors
might arise from their general assumption that others see the
worst in them and misunderstand them. On the other hand,
approaching interactions feeling as though others do not value
or understand the self probably sets the stage for a variety of
negative self-fullling prophecies. Indeed, expecting less posi-
tive or self-verifying evaluations likely prompts these individu-
als to approach others defensively, with hostility or with
avoidance.
For people with more dominance problems, interpersonal
decits emerged once peers were acquainted. After 4 months,
these individuals were less able to understand how others per-
ceived them differently from how they saw themselves (meta-
insight) and tended to assume they were seen in less positive
ways. One explanation for this pattern comes from work on
narcissism, a trait linked to dominance problems (Matano &
Locke, 1995). People with more narcissistic tendencies tend to
enjoy a good reputation in the early phase of acquaintanceship,
but over time, people tend to see these individuals in a nega-
tive light (Carlson & DesJardins, 2015; Carlson, Vazire, &
Oltmanns, 2011; Paulhus, 1998). While people higher in
narcissism seem to know their reputation sours, they do not
necessarily understand how their reputation changes (Carlson,
Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2011). Thus, people with more domi-
nance problems might realize that they are seen in less positive
ways over time but cannot identify the characteristic pattern of
impressions that change. These individuals might not be partic-
ularly bothered by lower positivity either if they attribute this
negativity to others failing to recognize their strengths or to
others jealousy. Notably, results also mean that people with
more submissive problems were aware of how they were seen
after 4 months and that people who were more obsequious
thought they were seen in more positive ways once they got to
know their peers.
People with more afliation problems seemed to be especial-
ly aware of the rst impressions they made and tended to have a
positive subjective reality. After a rst impression, these individ-
uals were more able to detect what made them distinctive in their
peers eyes (i.e., distinctive accuracy), perhaps because they
were especially motivated to befriend others. Interestingly, peo-
ple who are good judges of personality tend to engage in agree-
able behavior that elicits authentic behavior from targets
(Letzring, 2008). Similarly, people who are high in afliation
might engage in similar behavior that elicits more feedback
from others. People higher in afliation problems also tended to
9
expect to be viewed in more positive ways and tended to assume
others saw them as they saw themselves more at both time
points. This desirable, subjective sense of being valued and
understood might explain how they can be exceptionally gener-
ous but also might explain why they are overly intrusive (i.e.,
they likely feel closer to others than they really are). Notably,
these effects also suggest that people who were exceptionally
cold were less accurate early on and assumed others saw the
worst in them. Indeed, cold individuals might act on inaccurate
metaperceptions in ways that alienate others, and their negative
expectations of others impressions of them might lead them to
withdraw or lash out.
In sum, results suggest a nuanced link between interpersonal
problems and accurate metaperceptions. An intuitive hypothesis
is that poor awareness partially explains poor interpersonal func-
tioning and lower-quality relationships (Markey, Markey, Nave,
& August, 2014). Yet, results from the current study suggested
that cold (disafliative) and dominant problems were associated
with less accurate metaperceptions, whereas distress and aflia-
tive problems were linked to more accurate metaperceptions.
This pattern might reect the underlying motivations to connect
with others, such that people who are more detached or self-
focused (cold or dominant) are less attentive to how they affect
others, whereas people who are overly concerned with others
(afliation) or who are more neurotic (distress) might be espe-
cially attuned to social cues or to their own behavior. Results
also suggested that subjective reality is an important component
of interpersonal problems. People who reported more distress,
dominance problems, and disafliative problems tended to
expect less positive evaluations, an expectation that likely has
negative, cascading effects on their relationships. Likewise, peo-
ple who reported more distress and disafliative problems
tended to think others saw them as they saw themselves less.
Arguably, this sense of feeling less understood can also have
negative, cascading effects on relationships.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
There are important limitations to our design that will hopefully
be addressed with future research. First, interpersonal problems
were assessed via self-report, and given that people do not
always agree about their problems (Clifton, Oltmanns, & Tur-
kheimer, 2004), other ratings of interpersonal problems might
show a different pattern. Indeed, one explanation for the mixed
effects of awareness is that problems were self-reported. Most
evidence suggesting that meta-accuracy is adaptive comes from
work assessing judges reports of outcomes (e.g., Jons relation-
ship quality with Meg, Jons perceptions of Megs adjustment),
but metaperceiver-reported outcomes often show no link or are
negatively associated with accuracy (Carlson, 2016a, 2016b;
Mosch & Borkenau, 2016). That is, Megs meta-accuracy is
either unrelated to her self-esteem and how she feels about Jon
or predicts her liking Jon or herself less. Thus, future studies that
10
examine the moderating role of both self- and other-reported
interpersonal problems will provide a more comprehensive pic-
ture of if and when meta-accuracy is adaptive. That said, there
are blind spots in both self- and peer reports of psychopathology
(Carlson, Vazire, & Oltmanns, 2013), and the degree to which
self- or peer reports of interpersonal problems are more accurate
is an empirical question. Also, the IIP was initially developed as
a self-report tool to allow therapists to gauge a clients present-
ing problems and to monitor change over time. As such, it is
reassuring that people who say they have problems actually do
tend to expect the worst and, at times, misunderstand how others
see their characteristic patterns of traits (e.g., dominance, disaf-
liative problems).
Our design did not allow us to identify exactly how or why
people with interpersonal problems formed more or less accu-
rate, positive, or self-verifying metaperceptions. These individu-
als might be too used to their extreme patterns of behavior to
detect how they are unique from others (Leising, Rehbein, &
Sporberg, 2006), or they might value their behavior and thus are
not motivated to change their interpersonal style (Carlson,
2013). One key avenue for future research will be to measure
behavior in social interactions and use a cue utilization approach
(Brunswik, 1952) to identify cues people with problems use ver-
sus the ones that are actually informative. This would be an
important line of work that would shed light on the underlying
processes of interpersonal decits and reveal potential interven-
tion strategies designed to improve social acuity.
The current research assessed interpersonal perceptions
among classmates, but results might be different when percep-
tions are assessed in different contexts (e.g., cooperative, com-
petitive), for different types of relationships (e.g., romantic
partners, close friends, family members), or for other dimensions
of personality (e.g., emotions). For example, people with inter-
personal problems might misunderstand how others experience
their emotions (e.g., anger) and overreact when others do not
respond to their experiences because they assume their emotions
are more transparent than they really are. Thus, understanding
the generalizability of these effects will be an important step in
identifying whether there are some contexts or traits for which
people with problems form especially inaccurate or negative
views of social reality.
In sum, the current study provided a glimpse into the inter-
personal world of people with interpersonal problems. Results
painted a fairly dark picture, suggesting these individuals often
expected to be seen in less positive ways and tended to think
others saw them as they saw themselves less. Seeing ones social
world from this perspective might partially explain why these
individuals struggle with interpersonal relationships. At the
same time, the accuracy of metaperceptions seemed to depend
on the nature of the problems. People with more distress and
with a stronger desire to connect with others formed metaper-
ceptions that were tethered to reality, suggesting that these indi-
viduals were more aware of their effect on others, whereas
people who were colder or more self-focused seemed to be more
blind to how others experienced them.
Carlson, Wright, Imam
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following nancial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article:
Erika Carlsons efforts were supported by the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council (435-2015-0611). Aidan
Wrights efforts were supported by the National Institute of
Mental Health (L30 MH101760). The views contained are sole-
ly those of the authors and do not necessarily reect those of the
funding source.
Notes
1. Please see the supplemental materials for syntax and results when
group was controlled for.
2. As shown in Table 1, people with more distress tended to have
lower meta-accuracy after a rst impression (Time 1 b 5 .088, p <
.001, d 5 .552) and 4 months (Time 2 b 5 .085, p 5 .002, d 5
.552). The strength of this effect did not change (b 5 .002, SE 5
.016, p 5 .875, d 5 .011). Relative to people with fewer dominance
problems, people with more dominance problems tended to be less
aware of how their peers perceived their characteristic pattern of
traits after 4 months of acquaintanceship (Time 2 b 5 .073, p 5
.006, d 5 .497) but not necessarily after a rst impression (Time 1
b 5 .012, p 5 .643, d 5 .079). This change was signicant (b 5
.060, SE 5 .015, p < .001, d 5 .339). Relative to people with more
afliation problems, people with more afliation problems tended to
be more aware of how their peers perceived their characteristic pat-
tern of traits after a rst impression (Time 1 b 5 .075, p 5 .003, d 5
.500) and after 4 months (Time 2 b 5 .094, p < .001, d 5 .644), a
pattern that was stable (Db 5 .013, SE 5 .016, p 5 .428, d 5 .073).
3. Please see the supplemental materials for a more conservative
model that includes distinctive impressions, the normative prole,
and distinctive self-perceptions as simultaneous predictors of meta-
perceptions (Model 3). This model yields an index of distinctive
meta-insight (i.e., whether people know how they are seen as distinct
from the typical person and from their distinctive self-perception),
positivity, and distinctive transparency (i.e., the degree to which peo-
ple think they are seen as they see their own distinctive attributes).
We modeled distinctive meta-accuracy and meta-insight in different
models to explore their independent effects rather than in one
extremely conservative index (distinctive meta-insight).
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