CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Criminal Law Review (2nd BATCH)
No. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only thefiling of
PENALTIES
JADEWELL PARKING V. LIDUA
NATURE:
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional TrialCourt ofBaguio
City
FACTS:
Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to renderany
motorvehicle immobilized by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle isillegally
parked.Balajadia and the other respondents dismantled, took and carriedaway the
clampsattached to the wheel of the vehicles, which took place on May 7,2003.
Jadewell filed acomplaint for robbery against the respondents with the Officeof the
City Prosecutor on May 23,2003. However, the Informations were filed withthe MTC
on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed amotion to quash.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The MTC granted the motion to quash anddismissed the case and Jadewell s
subsequent motion for reconsideration.Jadewell s petition for certiorari with RTC was
likewise denied. Their motion forreconsideration was also denied.
CONTENTION OF JADEWELL:
They argued that the filing of the criminalcomplaint withthe Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of thecriminal information beforeCourt, is the
reckoning point in determining whether ornot the criminal action had prescribed.
CONTENTION OF BALAJADIA:
Respondents argued that
Zaldivia v. Reyes held
thatthe proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, referto
judicial proceedings
.Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia , held that the filing of theComplaint with the Office of the
ProvincialProsecutor was not a judicialproceeding. The prescriptive period
commenced from the allegeddate of thecommission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and
ended two months after on July 7,2003.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutoron May
23,2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense
HELD:
anInformation tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged isinvolved in an
ordinance.The respondent judge was correct when he applied therule in
Zaldivia v. Reyes
. In
Zaldivia v. Reyes
, 211 SCRA 277 (1992), the violation of amunicipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
alsofeatured similar facts and issues withthe present case. In that case, the offense
was committed onMay 11, 1990. TheComplaint was received on May 30, 1990, and
the Information was filed withtheMetropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990.When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
ProvincialProsecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to
run untilthe filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information
andinstitute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the MunicipalTrial
Court. The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information isunfortunate
as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the privaterespondents. It stands
that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances andtheir prescription period. It
also upholds the necessity of filing the Information incourt in order to toll the period.
Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effectsof its ruling: The Court realizes that
under the above interpretation, a crime mayprescribe even if the complaint is filed
seasonably with the prosecutor
s office if,intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedingsuntil it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading
of theapplicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their
plainlanguage. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but
arewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected
here is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules
of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the
representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor
of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the
Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of
the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent
finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the
Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two
months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within
which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
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For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known
at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing
of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
DENIED
1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NANG KAY alias SY KEE
G.R. No. L-3565 April 20, 1951
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Topic: Indeterminate Sentence Law )ISLAW
FACTS: In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Nang Kay alias Sy Kee was charged
with illegal possession of firearms in that in his possession were found three grease
guns and two Thompson Submachine guns, and empty magazines, without the
necessary license. In court he appeared without counsel and upon being arraigned,
he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1)
day, with the accessories of the law, and to pay costs. The firearms and ammunition
in question were ordered confiscated in favor of the Government. He now appeals to
this Court on the ground that the trial court failed to inform him at the arraignment of
his right to be assisted by counsel. The Solicitor General also questions the
correctness of the penalty imposed, expressing the opinion and making the
recommendation that the law on indeterminate sentence should have been
applied.
Counsel for the appellant makes citations of authorities to the effect that it is the duty
of the court to inform the defendant in a criminal case of his right to have counsel, and
that should the court fail to do so, its action constitutes a reversible error.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the accused was informed of his right to counsel.
Main Issue: whether the ISLAW should be applied.
RULING:
1. Whether the accused was informed of his right to counsel.
Yes.
In this, we agree with the said counsel. However, contrary to the claim of said counsel
that the record in this case shows that the court failed to inform the appellant of his
right to have counsel, we believe that the record merely fails to show that the court
complied with this duty. In other words, the record of the case is silent on this point.
Both the minutes of the court session during which appellant was arraigned as well
as the certificate of arraignment signed by the Clerk of Court merely show that the
case was called for arraignment, the accused appeared without counsel, and that
upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty to the charge. The transcript of the
stenographic notes taken down by the stenographer further states that the court
instructed the Clerk of Court to read the information which was translated to the
accused after which, the court asked the defendant for his plea. The accused then
pleaded guilty.
As we have already stated, the record of the case does not show whether or not the
court informed the appellant of his right to have counsel, but of course this cannot be
interpreted in the sense that the court failed to so inform him of such right. On the
contrary, because of the presumption that the law has been complied with, it is
to be presumed in this case that the court has complied with its duty and that
it has informed the appellant that he may have counsel, even a counsel de
oficio if he wanted to.
Main Issue: whether the ISLAW should be applied.
Yes. ISLAW is applicable but the trial court judge was correct in the penalty
imposed.
As to the application of the law on indeterminate sentence, the Solicitor General
merely says that the trial court failed to apply said law, and he recommends that it be
applied, without giving his reasons for said recommendation. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the letter of the law on indeterminate sentence (Act No. 4103)
as amended by Act No. 4225, particularly the latter part of section 1 thereof, supports
his contention, the offense in the present case being penalized by special
law. Said legal provision states that:
. . . and if the offense is punished by any other law (not the Revised Penal
Code or its amendments), the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
the minimum term prescribed by the same.
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Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act
56 and Republic Act No. 4 penalizes the criminal act of the appellant with
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10)years. So, if we
applied the law on indeterminate sentence, the penalty as recommended by the
Solicitor General would be not less than five (5) years and not more than a period
exceeding ten (10) years. That penalty could hardly be regarded as favorable to
the accused, considering his plea of guilty. We should not lose sight of the fact
that the law on indeterminate sentence as a rule is intended to favor the
defendant in a criminal case particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment,
depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record as a
prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence. Upon
favorable recommendation by that Board, the prisoner may be released on parole
upon the expiration of his minimum sentence. In fact the Governor General in his
message published in 31 Off. Gaz., No. 92, August 3, 1933, issued in connection with
the promulgation of the present law on indeterminate sentence, said that one of the
purposes of the law was to prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness.
Under the special law on illegal possession of firearms applicable to this case, already
referred to, if we had no law on indeterminate sentence in this jurisdiction, considering
the plea of guilty entered by the appellant, the trial court could well and lawfully have
given him a prison sentence of five (5) years. If we are now to apply the law on
indeterminate sentence in the instant case, the prison term would to be more than
five (5) years for the reason that the minimum could not be less than five (5) years
and the maximum necessarily would have to be more than five (5) years but not more
than ten (10) years. That would certainly be not in accordance with the purpose of the
law on indeterminate sentence; in fact it would run counter to its spirit.
Moreover, there are authorities to the effect that where the statute under which an
accused was convicted fixes the maximum and minimum punishment, or either of
them, it has been held that it is not necessary, under the indeterminate sentence law,
for the court to specify in the sentence such maximum and minimum punishment. . .
. (24 C. J. S. p. 109, Sec. 1582). Besides, it has also been held that the law on
indeterminate sentence being penal in character must receive a strict
construction in favor of the one to whom the penalty is exacted. (24 C. J. S. p.
1219, Sec. 1993).
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the application of the
law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the
lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be
applied. Under this opinion, it is obvious that the trial court did not err in sentencing
the appellant to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day.
2. BATISTIS vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively
authorized to distribute Fundador brandy products imported from Spain wholly in
finished form, initiated this case against Batistis. Upon its request, agents of the NBI
conducted a test-buy in the premises of Batistis, and thereby confirmed that he was
actively engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
counterfeit Fundador brandy products.
Upon application of the NBI agents based on the positive results of the test-buy,
Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of the Manila RTC issued a search warrant. The
search yielded 20 empty Carlos I bottles, 10 empty bottles of Black Label whiskey,
two empty bottles of Johnny Walker Swing, an empty bottle of Remy Martin XO, an
empty bottle of Chabot, 241 empty Fundador bottles, 163 boxes of Fundador, a half
sack of Fundador plastic caps, two filled bottles of Fundador brandy, and eight
cartons of empty Jose Cuervo bottles.
RTC Manila convicted Juno Batistis for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition under the Intellectual Property Code. The CA affirmed the conviction
for infringement of trademark, but reversed the conviction for unfair competition.
Hence, this petition for review to challenge the CAs affirmance of his conviction
for infringement of trademark.
ISSUE: WON BATISTIS IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
RULING: The SC affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty by imposing an
indeterminate sentence, conformably with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
pertinent jurisprudence. Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code provides the
penalty for infringement of trademark, to wit: Section 170. Penalties. - Independent
of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of
imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC imposing the the penalty of imprisonment
of TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
We rule that the penalty thus fixed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
We modify the penalty.
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Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides: and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an
indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr., the
imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum and minimum periods in
criminal cases not excepted from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law pursuant to its Section 2 is mandatory, viz: The requirement of imposing an
indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by
the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and
maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the
penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay, where the
Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial
court (Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison
sentence.
Yet, we cannot apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a
prosecution under a special law because there was the mitigating circumstance of his
voluntary plea of guilty in Nang Kay, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did
not have a similar circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused. Secondly,
the large number of Fundador articles confiscated from his house (namely, 241 empty
bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of Fundador plastic caps,
and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated that Batistis had been
committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby deserving for him
the indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision rendered by CA but modify the penalty to
imprisonment ranging from two years, as minimum, to three years, as maximum, and
a fine of P50,000.00.
3. PEOPLE vs. JARANILLA
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They
are entitled to an indeterminate sentence.
FACTS: Accused Gorriceta was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister,
Remia Valencia. While he was in front of the Elizalde Building on J. M. Basa Street,
he saw Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck.
Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city to
which Gorriceta refused as was on his way home. Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta
to take them to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from
his uncle's place and then drove to Mandurriao. Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta
parked the truck at a distance of about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial
hospital. Jaranilla instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction
of the plaza. After about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared, each of them was
carrying two fighting cocks and ran to the truck. Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start
the truck because they were being chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another
district of the city) on the same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.
It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three companions on the front
seat of the track. Gorriceta the driver, was on the extreme left. Next to him on his right
was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.
While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao airport, then under
construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan
and Benjamin Castro running towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after
Patrolman Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight that
the truck should stop, Gorriceta then stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of
the truck to go down. They did not heed the injunction of the policeman.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire i, while Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot
Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta and immediately started the
motor of the truck and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city.
Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front
of Gorriceta's house wo then parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned
Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to his room and,
after a while, heard policemen shouting his name and asking him to come down.
Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It was only at about eight o'clock in the
morning of the following day that he decided to come down. His uncle had counselled
him to surrender to the police and the policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters.
Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of Valentin Baylon
on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before midnight of January 9, 1966, he
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drove a friend to the housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at
Mandurriao. As he neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from the canal
on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house and he noticed a red Ford pickup truck parked
about fifty yards from the place where he saw the three men. Shortly thereafter, he
saw the three men carrying roosters. He immediately went to the police station at
Mandurriao and reported to Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro what he had just
witnessed. The two policemen requested him to take them in his car to the place
where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon arrival, however, the men and
the truck were not there anymore.
Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards Jaro. Upon
reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the policemen left the car and crossed
the runway which was a shortcut to intercept the truck. Trespeces then turned his car
around in order to return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard gunshots. He
stopped and again turned his car in the direction where shots had emanated. A few
moments later, Patrolman Castro came into view. The latter then asked Trespeces
for help because Jabatan, his comrade, was wounded.
Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police
department, conducted an autopsy and declared that the cause of death is shock,
hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.
Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at about six o'clock
in the morning and discovered that the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops
was broken. He found that six of his fighting cocks were missing. Each coop contained
six cocks. The coop was made of bamboo and wood with nipa roofing. The coops
were located at the side of his house, about two meters therefrom.
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten o'clock, a group of
detectives came to his house together with the police photographer who took pictures
of the chicken coops. The six roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two
days later, he was summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a rooster
which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily identified it as one of the
six roosters which was stolen from his chicken coop.
Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con homicidio with
the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt
of or with insult to the public authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta
as a state witness. Hence, the case was dismissed as to him. However, after the
prosecution had rested its case and before the defense had commenced the
presentation of its evidence, Jaranilla escaped from the provincial jail. There was no
promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as already stated, escaped from
jail.
In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the trial court
assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was robbery and that Patrolman
Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery" within the purview
of article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
In this appeal the appellants contend that the taking of roosters was theft and,
alternatively, that, if it was robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide
because the robbery was already consummated when Jabatan was killed.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused are guilty of robbery.
HELD: Yes
ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building.Any robbery
committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those mentioned in the
first paragraph of article 299, if the value of the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that
any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for
entrance or egress.
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks
or other similar tools.
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or
receptacle has been broken.
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.
In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in the English
translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original reads:
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ART. 302. Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular.El robo cometido en un
lugar no habitado o en un edificio que no sea de los comprendidos en el parrafo
primero del articulo 299
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated. as "uninhabited place", a term
which may be confounded with the expression "uninhabited place" in articles 295 and
300 of the Revised Penal Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is
different from the term lugar no habitado in article 302. The term lugar no habitado is
the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article 299.
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Articles 299 and 302
is that the malefactor should enter the building or dependency, where the object to be
taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should
enter the building (casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not
enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things.
Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay Palace Bazar at
Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches therefrom, the crime was theft and
not robbery because he did not enter the building. The show-window was outside the
store.
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were taken cannot be
considered a building within the meaning of article 302. Not being a building, it cannot
be said that the accused entered the same in order to commit the robbery by means
of any of the five circumstances enumerated in article 302.
The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was construed
as embracing any structure not mentioned in article 299 (meaning not an "inhabited
house or public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof)
used for storage and safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight
car used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The unnailing
of a strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary manner of sealing a freight car,
was held to constitute breaking by force within the meaning of article 512, now article
302. (U.S. vs. Magsino, 2 Phil. 710).
Baylon's coop is about five yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has
wooden stilts and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a
person of average height like Baylon. It is divided into six compartments or cages. A
compartment has an area of less than one cubic yard. A person cannot be
accommodated inside the cage or compartment. It was not intended that a person
should go inside that compartment. The taking was effected by forcibly opening the
cage and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized as
theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by single
criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to steal the
roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that
the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give
rise to two crimes of theft.
Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those circumstances
facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused intentionally sought the cover of
night and used a motor vehicle so as to insure the success of their nefarious
enterprise.
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in the information. They admitted their
previous convictions for theft.
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods. That penalty should be imposed in
its maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present.
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents. They
are entitled to an indeterminate sentence.
With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been noted that the
evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the malefactor who shot that
unfortunate peace officer. The killing was homicide because it was made on the spur
of the moment. The treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately
adopted by the offender.
The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night duty at the time
of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The killing should be characterized as a
direct assault (atentado) upon an agent of authority complexed with homicide. The
two offenses resulted from a single act.
The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on the part of
appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan. They conspired to steal the
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fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown by the manner in which they perpetrated the
theft. They went to the scene of the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's
residence, each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven by
Gorriceta.
The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take possession of the
roosters. It is not an indispenable element of theft that the thief carry, more or less far
away, the thing taken by him from its owner.
The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the People vs. Basisten,
where the homicide committed by a member of the band was not a part of the common
plan to commit robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable
for robbery with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a)
each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum
and (b) ordered to indemnify solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum
of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
4. PEOPLE vs. MARTINADO
FACTS: RTC --At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986,
Margarita Padrinao, a maid, was watching television at the house of her master, Juan
Matias. She then entered the sari-sari store of her master which is three arms' length
away from the place where she was watching television in order to feed the pigs. She
saw Juan Matias tending the sari-sari store. She also saw two customers drinking
softdrinks outside the window grills of the store. She identified them as Eliseo and
Hermogenes Martinado.
Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government employee (sic), passed by the same
sari-sari store on her way to make a phone call at a house located at nearby Villa
Maria Subdivision. She saw Juan Matias attending to three customers drinking
softdrinks at the sari-sari store. She identified them as Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes
Martinado and "Rolly". Margarita who had just feed the pigs heard a loud snore
coming from the store. She hurriedly went back to the store she saw Eliseo and
Hermogenes helping one another in stabbing Juan Matias. The two accused were
armed with pointed, thin instruments which each used in the stabbing. The stabbing
took place inside the store near the place where rice was being kept. Margarita then
shouted in a loud voice, "Tulungan ninyo po kami." Accused fled thru the gate at the
fence of the house. After she shouted, some people approached the store but
Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado had already fled. Eliseo was seen holding
something in his bloodied hand and Hermogenes was also seen holding something
in his hand which was bloodied. Elizabeth then entered the sari-sari store and she
saw Juan Matias lying down, face upward, inside the sari-sari store and had (sic) stab
wounds on (sic) his bloodied neck. He was still snorting, so Elizabeth called for help
to bring Juan to the hospital. Juan was brought to the Quezon City General Hospital
where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Angel Nieto, the Tanod executive officer of the Barangay also heard people shouting
"Harangin, harangin." He went out of the house into the street and he was able to see
three men coming from the direction of the house of Juan Matias and being chased
by the residents. He was able to observe two of the said three men. These two men
had bloodied hands and bloodied clothes. He then asked the residents why they were
chasing the three men and they replied that these men had just stabbed Juan Matias.
The trial court concluded that the accused conspired together and mutually helping
with one another, with intent of (sic) gain and with intent to kill, by means of violence
and intimidation employed upon the person of JUAN MATIAS y REYES that is by
attacking and stabbing the latter with a sharp pointed instrument, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away Seiko men's watch (5)
worth P 800.00, Men's ring worth P1,800.00, wallet containing cash in the
amount of P2,500.00 belonging to Juan Matias y Reyes.. Under the circumstances
above narrated, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide penalized under
paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code was committed. The motive of
the accused was to rob Juan Matias.
The accused through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 March 1989. Despite the
trial court's order to forward the records of the case to this Court, the clerk of court of
the court a quo erroneously transmitted the same to the Court of Appeals on 19
February 1990. The latter subsequently forwarded the records to this Court on 22
February 1990.
ISSUES:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED HERMOGENES
MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO CONSPIRED WITH A
CERTAIN "ROLLY" TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.
RULING: The court observed that only two (2) days after the alleged killing that the
loss of the victim's personal belongings was reported to the police authorities. They
then suggest that "[t]he wristwatch and the money contained in the wallet could have
been stolen when the cadaver was already in the Hospital or probably in the
Morgue;" that Elizabeth Carillo's declaration on the witness stand that she saw a
certain "Rolly" return and pick up a watch as he, together with the accused, were
fleeing from the victim's house, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that a
robbery was committed as the watch could have been Rolly's; and that the loss of
money was not proven and the witness who claims to have seen the alleged killing,
Margarita Padrinao, did not testify on the actual taking of property. However, the crime
of robbery was not proven to have been committed. No conclusive evidence proving
the physical act of asportation thereof by the accused themselves was presented by
the prosecution. This Court takes note of the fact that the original information filed
three (3) days after the incident in question was for Murder and no hint whatsoever of
robbery was made therein. The evidence further discloses that it was only at around
10:30 o'clock in the evening of 16 November 1986 that the widow of Juan Matias
reported to the Investigation Division of the Kalookan City Police Station that "they
found out that the Seiko wristwatch worth P800.00; GOLD ring worth P1,800.00 and
the amount of P2,500.00 contained in the wallet of his (sic) slain husband, JUAN
MATIAS were missing presumably (sic) taken by suspects (sic)."
It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide,
it is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential
element of a crime. In the absence of such proof, the killing of the victim would only
be simple homicide or murder, depending on the absence or presence of qualifying
circumstances. There is also the testimony of the victim's son, Nicanor Matias, a
substantial part of which is hearsay as he constantly alluded to the information his
mother had given him. It is pparent that nobody was able to observe that immediately
before the incident, Juan Matias was wearing a wristwatch and a gold ring and had a
wallet in his pocket which contained money; moreover, nobody witnessed the actual
taking by the accused of Juan Matias' personal belongings
For the second error, the accused capitalize on the Medico-Legal Officer's statement
that "the wounds would have been inflicted by one person because of the nature of
the wounds." The accused would attempt to mislead this Court by such conclusion
because they deliberately omitted the phrase immediately preceding the quoted
declaration "It is possible.Thus, all that the said witness did was to suggest that
there could have been one (1) assailant. It was only the accused who made the
categorical declaration to that effect. Alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of
fabrication. It cannot prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution
witness. For such a defense to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. 49
As found by the trial court, both accused were apprehended in the vicinity of the crime
scene shortly after the felony was committed. While Hermogenes was found trembling
under the lavatory in Rolly's house, Eliseo was accosted in the premises of the
Visayan Auto Repair Shop in the act of packing his clothes. Such deportment on the
part of the two accused displays guilty consciences. On the part of Eliseo Martinado,
such a conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that the escape from the Kalookan
City Jail on 6 August 1988. 50 Flight of the accused is an indication of his guilt or of a
guilty mind. 51
Conspiracy to exists does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to
the occurrence; it exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused
had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Direct proof of previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, 55 or inferred from acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. Conspiracy having been adequately established by the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, all the conspirators the accused herein
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective
individual participation for in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
However, the finding that robbery was committed on the occasion of the killing cannot
be sustained. Hence, the accused are liable only for homicide. The court appreciates
against both accused the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength which although not alleged in the second amended information, was duly
proven by the prosecution and may therefore be properly taken into
consideration. The victim, Juan Matias, a septuagenarian, was unarmed at the time
he was assaulted; Eliseo Martinado was about 21 years old while Hermogenes
Martinado was only 28 years old. They both ganged up on the old man who never
had the slightest inkling that the accused, who pretended to be his customers, would
attack him simultaneously with bladed instruments. It is obvious that they took
advantage of their individual and collective strength. The penalty then for the crime of
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homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code must be imposed in its
maximum period pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 64 of said Code.
The two accused are found guilty of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, and the absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset it, and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Hermogenes Martinado y Aguillon is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and
One (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four
(4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from confinement. 62 Accordingly,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum.
5. PEOPLE vs. GARDON
FACTS: AA testified that in March 1995, she and her younger brother AA lived in the
house of their maternal grandparents, BB and accused Celestino Gardon, in xxx,
Sorsogon. At about 6:00 oclock one night, while her grandmother was at the town
proper purchasing some goods and AA was sleeping in the other room, her
grandfather, Gardon, accosted her with a knife and ordered her to lie down. Gardon
then undressed her and took off his pair of shorts. He threatened to kill her if she told
anyone what happened. He then held her breast and inserted his penis into her
vagina. She felt pain in her vaginal area during the intercourse. She struggled to no
avail because Gardon pointed a knife to her chest. When she stood up, she noticed
blood oozing from her genitals to the floor. She did not tell her grandmother what
happened for fear that Gardon might make good his threat of harming her and her
brother.
The incident was repeated three (3) more times but AAA could only remember that
the fourth abuse happened at around 6:00 in the evening of August 29, 1997. AAAs
grandmother was at the town proper and she was left home with Gardon. That night,
AAA was washing the dishes when Gardon held her hand and pulled her towards a
room. He pointed a knife to her chest, told her to lie down and undress herself, and
took off his pair of shorts. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. Again, she felt
pain. She did not tell her grandmother about the incident but confided in her sister,
CC.
Dr. Nerissa B. Tagum (Dr. Tagum), the resident physician of Irosin District Hospital
who examined AAA, explained that she found old lacerations on the latters hymen
which could have been caused by the insertion of an instrument. She also mentioned
that AAAs vagina can admit two (2) fingers which is not normal for a 14-year old girl.
AAAs sister, CC, was also presented in court. She recounted that in September 1997,
AAA left their grandparents house in xxx and came to live with her in xxx. When she
told AAA to go back to xxx, AAA refused and told her that their grandfather, Gardon,
raped her four (4) times since March 1995. The sisters reported the matter to their
stepmother, DD. Afterwards, they went to the xxx police to lodge a complaint against
Gardon.
AAA narrated in agonizing detail punctuated by unfeigned tears that her own
grandfather, Gardon, had carnal knowledge of her through force and intimidation on
four different occasions although she remembered only those that happened in March
1995 and on August 29, 1997. She described how Gardon held a knife to her chest,
undressed her and succeeded to consummate his revolting lust. AAA attempted to
resist her grandfathers sexual assault, but the latters physical superiority, aided by
his knife-brandishing and clear moral ascendancy, prevailed.
The foregoing excerpt from AAAs account of the first incident of rape in March 1995
is plain and forthright. Her testimony regarding the August 29, 1997 rape is similarly
candid. The trial court, which had the unique opportunity to assess the truthfulness of
her narration, was thoroughly convinced of her credibility.
ISSUE:
WON Gardon is entitled to parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
HELD:
Gardon shall not be entitled to parole in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346,
Sec. 3 of which states that [p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
We should point out that the benefit of parole cannot be extended to Gardon even if
he committed the crimes for which he is now convicted prior to the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9346. Sec. 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the law shall not
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apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment. Although the law makes no reference to persons convicted to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua such as Gardon, the Court has consistently held
that the Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not apply to persons sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
in People v. Asturias, Serrano v. Court of Appeals, People v. Lampaza and People
v. Tan, to name a few cases, we in effect equated the penalty of reclusion perpetua
as synonymous to life-imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and ruled that the latter law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punishable with the said penalty. Consequently, we affirm the Court of Appeals in not
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in imposing upon appellants the
penalty of reclusion perpetua instead.[36]
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty without a minimum or maximum period.
Parole, on the other hand, is extended only to those sentenced to divisible penalties
as is evident from Sec. 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that it is
only after any prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him that
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider whether such prisoner may be
granted parole.
6. MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public funds: through
falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver
felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus
fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled.
In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds
malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.
FACTS: Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995.
Among his duties was to receive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the
revenue official receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given
to the taxpayer while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.
Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of
Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection,
name of taxpayer, the amount collected and the kind of tax paid. The original copy of
the MRC with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the
Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA). The Assessment Division of the
BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate
Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the real property transactions, which
contained, among other data, the number of the issued ROR, its date, name of payor,
and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax paid.
On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers from the central office
of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the
appellant.
Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the
Assessment Division of the BIR; triplicate copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs
submitted by appellant to COA; and appellants MRCs provided by the Finance
Division of the BIR. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the
RORs issued to the San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). A comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data
pertaining to 18 RORs with the same serial number, vary with respect to the name of
the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of
particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in
appellants MRCs and the attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the
CARs and PNBs RORs.
The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos.
1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and 2023438 totalled
Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COAs copies of the RORs submitted by
appellant, the sum of the taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of
Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued
to taxpayers and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled
receipts. Likewise, PNBs RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310,
2023837, 2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955, 3097386, 3503336, and
4534412, show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp
tax. Yet, appellants MRCs yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same
RORs, or a difference of Php499,491.15.
The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly
Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16 (A). The MRA contains, among
others, the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the
BOR as well as those issued by him for a certain month. In sum, although the RORs
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bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in the CARs and PNBs 12
copies of RORs is PhP615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00 was reported as tax
collections in the RORs triplicate copies submitted by appellant to COA and in his
MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a
demand letter requiring him to restitute the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant
ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for malversation of
public funds through falsification of public document against him."
RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. CA
promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction of the petitioner and the
penalties imposed by the RTC, observing that he had committed falsification through
his submission of copies of falsified MRCs and had tampered revenue receipts to the
BIR and COA; that he was presumed to be the forger by virtue of his being in the
possession of such public documents;10 and that he had certified to the MRAs and
had actually issued the tampered receipts. After the CA denied his motion for
reconsideration by its resolution, the petitioner appeals via petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial courts imposed the correct penalty for the 18 counts of malversation
of public funds.
RULING: NO. Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the
petitioner. He was duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code,24 the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more
serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public
document by a public officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P5,000.00.25 Prision mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12
years of imprisonment.26 In contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated,
and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the
property embezzled.
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties to be imposed on the petitioner,
therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering
that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are not
composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed should be
divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period, pursuant to
Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.27
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty
properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for
falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation. The tabulation of
the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
follows.
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is
imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. 28 The
maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range
of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense committed.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law was applicable here, save for the counts for which
the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was a
complex crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the
penalty for each count is the maximum period as shown in Table 1, supra, except for
the count dealt with in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving the misappropriated amount
of P4,869.00, for which the corresponding penalty for malversation as stated in Table
1 was prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. However, because such
penalty for malversation was lower than the penalty of prision mayor imposable on
falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period that was applicable.
On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should
come from the penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, except in Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower
is prision correccional in its full range.
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused
totaling P75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua, and a fine of P75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that
prescribed for malversation of public funds, the more serious offense.
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In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the P9,736.86 6 years and 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 1 day prision mayor
217 of the Revised Penal Code. It committed another error by fixing indeterminate of prision
sentences on some counts despite the maximum of the imposable penalties being mayor
reclusion perpetua. There is even one completely incorrect indeterminate sentence.
And, as earlier noted, the penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised P39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua
Penal Code was applicable in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving P4,869.00 due to its
being the higher penalty. P38,878.55 - Reclusion perpetua

The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit: P20,286.88 10 years 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
and 1 of reclusion temporal
TABLE 3 day prision
mayor
Amount Indeterminate sentence
misappropriated P42,573.97 - Reclusion perpetua
Minimum
Maximum term
term P40,598.40 - Reclusion perpetua
P19,775.00 10 years 18 years, 2 months and 21 days P42,140.45 - Reclusion perpetua
and 1 day of reclusion temporal
of P47,902.60 - Reclusion perpetua
prision
mayor P52,740.66 - Reclusion perpetua

P4,869.00 2 years 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of P75,489.76 - Reclusion perpetua

of prision prision mayor29 P54,984.47 - Reclusion perpetua
correccional
P45,330.18 - Reclusion perpetua
P13,260.90 10 years 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
and 1 of reclusion temporal P37,842.05 - Reclusion perpetua
day prision
mayor
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by
P17,419.00 10 years 18 years, 2 months and 21 days the Court of Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties imposed as stated in
and 1 of reclusion temporal this decision.
day prision
mayor PENALTY FOR COMPLEX CRIME

P11,390.00 6 years and 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of 7. PEOPLE vs. RICKY LADIANA AND MANUEL UY
1 day prision mayor
of prision
mayor [G.R. No. 174660; May 30, 2011]

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FACTS: Appellant Antonio Manuel Uy was one of the maintenance crew of the
Jeepney Shopping Center (JSC) in Pasay City, owned by Mr. Jerry Limpe. His co-
employees requested that he be ordered to leave the quarters and transfer to another
place. Hence, he was forced to rent a house. Cecilio Aranez, also a maintenance
crew, heard him saying, Balang araw, gaganti ako. Uys co-employees then had a
drinking spree that lasted until 3 in the morning, and they noticed that two persons
outside the guardhouse of the Jeepney Shopping Center were peeping inside. One
of them was appellant who later on left with his companion. In the morning of June
26, 2001, Uy sent a text message to their Supervisior that he was not feeling well and
would not be able to report for work. In the evening of the same day, a security guard
of Chang Juat Ltd. Company, saw Uy and his companion standing at the gate of JSC.
The following morning, Carpio Bahatan, a stay-in employee discovered the lifeless
bodies of Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahin at the 2nd and 3rd floor of the main building.
Another employee, Rico Arbas, discovered the dead body of the security guard,
Gilbert Esmaquilan, lying near the guard house which was inside JSC compound.
A piece of wood with blood stains was found about three to five meters from the body
of Gilbert Esmaquilan. Another blood-stained piece of wood was found in the locker
room within the compound but outside the main building of the Jeepney Shopping
Center. At the opening leading to the comfort room in the ground floor of the main
building, there were found pieces of jalousie slabs and frames scattered on the
ground. At the second floor, the lifeless body of Felix Aranez was found, lying face
down and with feet and hands tied with yellow plastic straw. A piece of cloth was stuck
in his mouth and his nape had an incise wound. A bunch of keys was found inside the
display cabinet which was in disarray. It was discovered that some pieces of jewelry
inside the display cabinet were missing. At the third floor, the dead body of Delfin
Biniahan was found lying on a folding bed between two glass cabinets. He sustained
injuries on the upper part of his body. The glass cabinets were splattered with blood.
The door of the Administrative Office had been destroyed and bore some traces of
blood.
At 8:57 in the morning of of June 28, 2001, Uy sent a text message to their supervisor,
which read, Boss, Gud morning. Bukas na ako papasok o kaya Lune ang sama
talaga ng trangkaso naba K C ako ng ulan nong Martes pag deliver naming. At 9:57,
he sent another text message to Roger Tan, which read, "Boss, balita daw na ako
ang suspek sa nangyari dyan boss matagal na ako sa companya kahit alam kong
inaapi ako nyo wala akong ginawa na masama sa trabaho ko."
In the morning of June 29 2001, Uy called up Richlie, his girlfriend and sister of Ricky,
and asked her to drop by the house of the latter in Antipolo City where he was. When
she arrived, Uy handed to her something wrapped in a newspaper. When she opened
the newspaper to look what was inside, she saw 4 pairs of earrings, a pairless earring,
and 5 ladies rings.
Uy confessed to Eduardo dela Cruz, that he and Ricky entered a place in Pasay City
and they killed two persons and seriously wounded another whom they left fighting
for his life. Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault which contained money and
that if "he can open the vault, and even if they die their family will live comfortably."
Further, appellant told Eduardo that nothing will be traced to him because his hands
were wrapped such that no fingerprints would be recovered from the crime scene.
The inventory conducted the accounting clerk of JSC revealed that 191 pieces of
jewelry in the amount of P304,140.00 and 2 imported bags worth P23,250.00 were
stolen. The stolen items had a total value of P327,390.00.
The RTC convicted Uy of robbery with homicide and imposed the penalty of death.
The CA affirmed the decision with modification of the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
a) Whether the trial court erred in convicting Uy of the crime charged
b) Assuming that he is guilty, whether the penalty imposed by the trial
court was proper
RULING:
a) NO. Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason,
or on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to
another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and
objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery.
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In this case, we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed
committed. As the CA correctly observed:
x x x The removal of the jalousies in the restroom of the Jeepney Shopping Center to
gain entrance, the destruction of the display cabinet where the items were kept, the
destruction of the lock leading to the cashier's office on the third floor of the building;
and the inventory of missing items makes the situation possess the first essential
element as stated above. In robbery by the taking of the property through intimidation
or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal
property be the owner thereof, robbery may be committed against a bailee or a person
who himself stole it. As long as the taker of the personal property is not the owner,
the second element exists. The third element is animus lucrandi or intent to gain which
is defined by the Supreme Court as "an internal act which can be established through
the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstance reveal a different intent
on the part of the perpetrator."
The Court also agrees with the finding of the Trial Court that: the intent to steal was
likewise proven from accused's statement to Eduardo dela Cruz to the effect that if
they were able to open the vault, their families would have lived a good life even if
they die in the process." On the other hand, the accused was proven to be a friend
of, and was with, Ricky Ladiana right after the commission of the crime as testified to
by Richlie Ladiana, his lover. Being so when the firearm of the fallen guard was found
from the abandoned house of Ricky, the conclusion is that Ricky and Antonio Uy have
been together at the shopping center and presumed the taker of a thing taken or doer
in the doing of a recent wrongful act. In the instant case, no special circumstance was
present to belie the presumption of the intent to gain of the accused-appellant. The
existence of the fourth element is incontestable. The homicide preceded the robbery
but committed on the occasion thereof, the purpose is to eliminate an obstacle to the
commission of robbery. The grudge of the appellant against his former co-workers
Felix Aranez and Delfin Biniahan is not sufficient to overcome the presumption and
evidence of intent to gain, it is clear that the victims were killed on the occasion of
robbery and to commit robbery. Essential in robbery with homicide is that there is a
nexus, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter
be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the
same time.
b) NO. The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC erred in appreciating the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and treachery when they were not
specifically alleged in the information. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
provides that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information,
otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if they are proven
during the trial.
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable under Article 294,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by
reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two (2) indivisible
penalties, and the crime is neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Considering that there was no
modifying circumstance which attended the commission of the crime, the CA correctly
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
8. PEOPLE vs. CONRADO LAOG
FACTS: AAA testified that she and her friend were walking on their way to apply.
Suddenly, appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and
forcibly brought them to a grassy area.Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the
head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw
this, she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe,
knocking her down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and
thereafter covered her body with thick grass. Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit
AAA in the head several times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face.
While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants,
removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of her,
sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant
also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out. When AAA regained
consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she reached her
uncles farm at daybreak.When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle,
BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Hospital. She later learned that Jennifer
had died.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that
he was at home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With
him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey
Laog. At around seven oclock, he was arrested by the police officers of San Rafael,
Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him to the police after he went wild
that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife
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inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being
charged with murder and rape.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes rape and
murder. The CA affirmed with modification for damages.
ISSUE: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes charged despite failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
RULING: It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution
of rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In
fact, a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape;
the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. Thus we have ruled
that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction in rape.
What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is
clear, unequivocal and credible.
In People v. Larraaga, this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime,
as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law
provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is
called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the
Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and
(5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily
prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding
thereto this provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. In the cases at bar, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy
was raped on the occasion and in connection with her detention and was killed
subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof. Considering that the prosecution
was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide
and rape.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single
penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or
on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA
and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with
homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer
to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help once she is able to run away, and
also to silence her completely so she may not witness the rape of AAA, the original
intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated, appellant purposely
covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that it may
not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage
blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But
AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide
were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone
other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings
in cases of robbery with homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical
injuries and other offenses have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
robbery.
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the
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circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation)
alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same
would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still
rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
only.
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head
with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner
by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her
in the head with a lead pipe to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing
her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that appellant intentionally used excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As
aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon
upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of
that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from
which the woman was unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim
is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking
advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressors
natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both
and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By
deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, accused-
appellant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon
gave him over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack caught
the victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accused-appellant
Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape
With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.
9. PEOPLE vs. CALABROSO
FACTS: Tranquilino Nacnac, a tricycle driver was found dead in Gabit, Barangay
Nuesa. He bore 22 stab wounds on the head, torso, and upper limbs. Upon
investigation, the sidecar of a motorcycle was spotted at the bottom of a 10-15 meter
deep ravine. It was confirmed to be the property of Nacnac as what was found with
the sidecar, were his wallet, his drivers license, and his vehicle registration. It was
found out that the night before the death of Nacnac, 4 men boarded his tricycle. They
were, Johnny Calabroso, Sonny Matos, Richard Sata, and Leonardo Dumrique.
Before these men boarded the tricycle of Nacnac, they were supposed to board the
tricycle of Danilo Cerveza. However, they were not able to push through with the trip
as the passengers wanted to pay 35 pesos instead of the 40 pesos that Cerveza
asked them to pay. Thereafter, they flagged down the tricycle of Nacnac, and he
agreed to transport them to Gabit, Barangay Nuesa, Roxas, Isabela.
It was gathered from the suspects that they were on their way to a party when they
boarded the tricycle of Nacnac. When they arrived, Dumrique gave Nacnac 12 pesos
as he knew that the regular fare was 3 pesos per head. But Nacnac demanded 40
pesos. Dumrique refused to pay, so Nacnac boxed him 5 times on the neck which
caused him to fall to the ground. Matos pacified them but Nacnac simultaneously drew
a veinte nueve from his waist. Dumrique, who was still lying on the ground, saw
Nacnac near his feet. Taking advantage of the situation to disable Nacnac, Dumrique
kicked him at his sex organ. Nacnac doubled up in pain. Calabroso then grabbed the
knife from Nacnac. When Calabroso was about to step backwards, Nacnac held his
right elbow, so Calabroso stabbed Nacnac. For his part, Matos tried to stop Calabroso
but the latter kept on swinging the knife. Sata, seated inside the tricycle, was stunned.
Dumrique was not able to do anything because he was still reeling from the punches
he received from Nacnac.
Thereafter, Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle while Calabroso pulled Matos
and joined Sata inside the tricycle. All 4 companions fled to Kiangan, Ifugao, leaving
the bloodied Nacnac behind. After removing the sidecar of the tricycle, they gathered
at the house of the former employer of Matos, with the motorcycle in tow. The other
three, decided to dispose of the motorcycle and left Matos behind. They came back
2 days later, the motorcycle was still in their possession. It was at that time, that they
were brought in to be questioned by the police.
They were charged with carnapping for taking away, in conspiracy with one another,
a TMX Honda motorized tricycle owned and driven by Tranquilino Nacnac, with intent
to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation. They were also charged with
robbery with homicide for taking away on the same day 40 pesos belonging to
Nacnac, again in conspiracy with one another, also with intent to gain and by means
of violence and intimidation; and, on the occasion and by reason thereof, inflicted
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upon Nacnac multiple stab wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused
his death.
The trial court appreciated the presence of conspiracy among the 4 accused in taking
away the tricycle of Nacnac as demonstrated by them when they all boarded the same
tricycle and sped away from the crime scene. As to the charge of robbery with
homicide, the trial court ruled that the claim that the victim was robbed of his money
was not duly established, but was nonetheless convinced that Calabroso and
Dumrique were responsible for his death. The court ratiocinated that since it was
already nighttime, Nacnac was justified in asking 40 pesos from the passengers; in
fact, it was the amount previously demanded by Cerveza. It further reasoned out that
Dumrique started the fight by refusing to pay the amount demanded by Nacnac while
Calabroso had no compelling reason to stab Nacnac, repeatedly at that, considering
that the latter had already been reportedly disarmed and was in fact alone.
Nevertheless, the lower court convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with
homicide, instead of homicide alone, and exonerated Sata and Matos since it was its
finding that Sata did not participate in the fight while Matos only attempted to pacify
the protagonists.
Accused-appellants Calabroso and Dumrique argued that the trial court erred in
convicting them of robbery with homicide since its discussion was clear that the
prosecution failed to establish the robbery. They also alleged that they did not
conspire in carnapping the tricycle. Moreover, they alleged that they used the tricycle
only as a getaway vehicle, without intent to gain, for when they reached Kiangan the
following morning they intended to surrender it, as they did, to the police.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in its conviction of the accused-appellants of
robbery with homicide, and carnapping (conspiracy)
HELD: (YES in part)
Robbery with homicide:
The trial court was categorical in its finding that "[n]obody declared that the victim was
robbed of anything."Yet it convicted Calabroso and Dumrique of robbery with
homicide. This is a glaring error. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence
fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can
be convicted only of the offense proved. To be specific, absent any evidence that the
accused indeed robbed the victim the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
cannot stand. Having ruled out robbery for want of evidence and satisfied of the equal
liability of Calabroso and Dumrique for the death of Nacnac, the trial court should
have convicted them only of homicide.
Dumrique did not actively participate in killing Nacnac nor did he join in any other
manner to further the objective of Calabroso. Conspiracy, which exists when two (2)
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and
decide to commit it, was not established between Dumrique and Calabroso. The trial
court, while ruling out conspiracy between the 2 in the killing of Nacnac, erroneously
held that Dumrique was equally responsible with Calabroso for the victim's death;
hence, Dumrique must be acquitted.
Carnapping (conspiracy):
All the elements of carnapping were present in the instant case. After Nacnac was
fatally stabbed Dumrique started the engine of the tricycle, while Calabroso dragged
Matos into the tricycle to join Sata who was already seated inside. Intent to gain is
presumed when one takes a property belonging to another against his will. The intent
to gain became an established fact when accused-appellants remained in possession
of the motorcycle even after the lapse of 2 days from the commission of the crime.
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.
That overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself or moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy. When Calabroso,
Matos and Dumrique joined Sata inside the tricycle and fled towards Kiangan after
Nacnac was stabbed they performed well-coordinated acts indicating a common
purpose to steal the vehicle. Conspiracy is also inferred not only from their conduct
before and during the commission of the crime but also thereafter, showing that they
acted in unison with each other.
Penalty:
Theory of the Solicitor General:
The killing of Nacnac is deemed absorbed in the "graver offense of qualified
carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated from." The carnapping and killing can be
considered as a "single or indivisible crime" or "a special complex crime" which is not
covered by Art. 48 of the Penal Code. Hence, accused-appellants Dumrique and
Calabroso should be held liable for qualified carnapping and penalized with reclusion
perpetua.
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The Supreme Court disagreed:
There is no direct relation, a causal connection, between the carnapping and the
killing, i.e., whether the killing be prior or subsequent to the carnapping, or whether
both crimes be committed at the same time. Therefore, the penalty applicable is
imprisonment of not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and not more
than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, since the carnapping was committed
without violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose upon accused-appellants a
prison term of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and ten (10) days as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days as maximum.
As regards the homicide, accused-appellant Johnny Calabroso is guilty, the
imposable penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal
the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) one day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court may impose upon accused-
appellant a prison term of eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
10. PEOPLE vs. LARRANAGA
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004
FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed
to come home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead
at the foot of a cliff.
Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was
pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape and
attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as
Marijoy.
After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted
before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He
identified appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James
Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime.
Rusia provided the following before the trial court:
1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman
and told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larraaga, James
Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in
front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and
forced them to ride the car.
2) Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.
3) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the
South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven
by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the
South Bus Terminal.
4) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a
pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped
Jaqueline.
5) That Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and
push her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were corroborated by other witnesses and thereafter,
he was discharged as an accused and became a state witness.
Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found.
The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said
decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was
consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when
the crimes were committed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.
HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such point to a joint design and community of interest. The appellants actions showed
that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The
Court affirmed the trial courts finding that the appellants indeed conspired in the
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commission of the crimes charged.
2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659,
provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the
resulting crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the
present case, the victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the
Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where
Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case
of Jacqueline.
3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the
imposable penalty to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty.
James Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty
for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is
reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With
regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should
be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing two (2) reclusiones
perpetua.
11. PEOPLE vs. MERCADO
FACTS: 12-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at around 9 oclock in the evening
of February 9, 1994, he and Richard Buama were picked up by accused-appellant
Elpidio Mercado near Mercados house in Sto. Tomas, Bukid, Pasig, Metro Manila.
Mercado arrived in a car, together with Eric Ona. Mercado suspected Florencio
Villareal and Richard Buama of being the ones who had broken into his store and
stolen money. Florencios friend, Rex Bugayong, was able to run from Mercado.
Florencio and Richard were pushed into Mercados car. Florencio said Mercado
poked a gun at Richard which made the latter say, Sasama na lang po ako. Wag
ninyo lang po akong sasaktan. (I will go with you. Just dont hurt me.)
Mercado drove the car to Tanay, Rizal. Florencio and Richard were seated at the
back, behind Mercado and Eric, respectively. Upon reaching Tanay at around 11
oclock in the evening Mercado took the three of them (Florencio, Richard, and Eric)
to an apartment. Florencio was led inside the apartment while Richard was held
outside by Mercado. When Florencio looked through the window, he saw Mercado
slap and box Richard. Then he was brought inside. Mercado later went upstairs.
According to Florencio, Richard asked if they could leave the place as he held his
stomach in pain, but Florencio replied that the door was padlocked. Eventually,
Mercado came down with Acebron.
Richard was made to sit on the floor in the kitchen of the apartment. Mercado then
told Aceborn that the had brought him a present (pasalubong) and that they were
going to kill two boys a small one and a big one who was dark. In reply, Aceborn
said, Pare, huwag yung maliit dahil kasing hawig ng anak ko, saka magbe-birthday
pa kinabukasan. (Buddy, not the small one because he resembles my son who will
celebrate his birthday tomorrow.) As the conversation was made within his hearing
distance, Richard became so scared that he could not answer when asked by
Acebron about a girls picture found in his wallet. This angered Acebron who boxed
Richards in the stomach.
Mercado thereafter ordered Richard to take off all his clothes and lie face down on
the kitchen floor. Mercado asked his aide Jeff to get a rope. Jeff brought a piece of
rattan rope and tied Richards hands, while Mercado tied Richards feet. This
happened at about 11:30 in the evening. Mercado also ordered Jeff to get rags with
which to blindfold and gag Richard and then asked Acebron to get a bolo or a big
knife. After getting a bolo, Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage compartment
of Mercado's car. They then drove away, leaving behind Florencio and Eric in the
apartment. After two hours, Mercado and Acebron came back. Florencio saw Acebron
washing the bloodstains off the bolo. He asked Mercado where Richard was, to which
Mercado replied, "Wala na. Pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone. I have already silenced him.")
Mercado and Acebron then took Eric and Florencio to a beerhouse in Tanay, Rizal
and warned them not to tell anyone about the incident or they and their families would
be killed. For fear of his life and that of his family, Florencio promised he would not.
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From the beerhouse, Mercado drove to Acebron's apartment, where the latter was
dropped off, and then proceeded home to Pasig with Eric and Florencio.
Mercado and Acebron were apprehendended and sentenced to death for the cre of
kidnapping with murder. Accused-appellants argue that Republic Act 7659 which
provides for death penalty violates the 1987 Constitution because it was too harsh
and inhumane.
ISSUE: W/N Mercado is criminally liable for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Murder.
HELD: YES. Accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping because, by placing the
victim in an enclosed place consisting of the luggage compartment of the car, they
detained or otherwise deprived him of his liberty. There was also actual restraint of
the victim's liberty when he was taken at gunpoint from Pasig to accused-appellants'
apartment in Tanay.50 The evidence proves that Mercado initiated the kidnapping of
the victim. Acebron's subsequent loading of the victim into the car's compartment after
tying the latter shows community of criminal purpose with Mercado. However,
although both were police officers, they acted in this case in their private capacities.51
The crime was committed by accused-appellants on February 9, 1994, after the
amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No.
7659. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as thus amended, provides:
"Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer;
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a conseguence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
(Underscoring supplied)
In People vs. Ramos,52 the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes
of kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to
death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the
"special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last
paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
"x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special
complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the
distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing
of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed
under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special
complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659."
Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court correctly found accused-appellants guilty of
kidnapping with murder and sentenced each of them to death.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray53 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling
of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should
accordingly be imposed.
It does not matter whether there are circumstances qualifying the killing as
murder.Under the last paragraph of Article 267, it is sufficient that the victim is "killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention." In any event, the killing of Richard Buama
as a consequence of his kidnapping was committed under circumstances which make
it murder. His limbs were tied and his mouth gagged before he was taken away. When
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his body was discovered, his limbs were still tied and his mouth gagged, indicating
that treachery attended the killing of Richard Buama.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P100,000.00 by way of moral
and exemplary damages to the Buama family as heirs of the deceased Richard
Buama pursuant to Articles 2206 and 2230 of the Civil Code. It is not disputed,
however, that Richard had not been legally adopted by the Buamas, and so the latter
cannot be considered his heirs, the term "heirs" being limited to the deceased's
"spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants and descendants" per the definition
of "heirs" under Articles 782 and 2206 of the Civil Code. For this reason, in one
case,54 the award of moral damages for the death of a brother caused by quasi-delict
was disallowed. In this case, since the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama are not
known, the awards of civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages to the
Buamas should be disallowed.
As to the award of P52,680.00 for actual damages incurred for wake and funeral
expenses, only the amount of P22,690.00 is supported by receipts (Exhs. J-2 to J-7).
Accused-appellants contend that these receipts constitute hearsay evidence because
the witness who identified them, Lourdes Vergara, admitted that she merely collated
the same but had otherwise no personal knowledge of the facts pertaining to their
issuance.55 In People vs. Paraiso,56this Court disregarded the list of burial expenses
for being hearsay since it was prepared by the victim's sister-in-law and not by the
victim's eldest son who testified thereon. The Court held that actual damages should
be based upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
One receipt (Exh. J-5) for P1,300.00 shows that it was issued by the Immaculate
Conception Parish Church in Pasig to Lourdes Vergara, and it was for Richard
Buama's burial mass. Another receipt (Exh. J-7), for the amount of P2,210.00 for
flowers for Richard Buama's wake, was issued by Lourdes Vergara herself as the
owner of the flower shop. These two receipts should be considered competent
evidence of the amount of expenses indicated therein, and therefore the total amount
of P3,510.00 should be awarded to Lourdes Vergara as actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City,
finding accused-appellants Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and Aurelio Acebron y Adora
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and imposing
upon each of them the DEATH PENALTY, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS
that the awards of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages are DELETED and accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay
jointly and severally to Lourdes Vergara the amount of P3,510.00 as reimbursement
for the expenses she incurred for the victim's wake and funeral.
12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO ESTACIO AND MARITESS
ANG
G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009
Kidnapping with murder
FACTS: At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with
Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street,
Quezon City where the three of them would meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the
victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim
and then "deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim]." Sumipo assumed,
however, that Maritess was just joking.
After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess for a short while, the
group boarded his car, Maritess taking the seat beside the victim who was driving, as
Estacio and Sumipo took the backseat.Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and
ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim complied, Estacio, with a gun
pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat,
sat beside the victim, tied the victims hands behind his back, and placed tape on his
mouth. While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they
replied that they would kill the victim so that he would not take revenge. On Estacios
instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a
secluded place, Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and
Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy place. Estacio with bloodied hands later
resurfaced.
The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo where he called up
by telephone the victims mother and demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother
replied, however, that she could not afford that amount. In the afternoon of the same
day, Maritess and Estacio went to Sumipos residence again where Estacio again
called up the victims mother, this time lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000
which she still found to be too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about future
calls, as they might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess assured him that that call
would be the last.The victims mother having agreed to the demand, Maritess and
Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills
at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as
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they were seated there, a patrol car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways.
Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chuas gun, watch, and necklace
from the proceeds of which he was given P7,000.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On
May 23, 1996, Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victims
mother that Estacio had admitted having killed her son, and that he offered to
accompany them to the crime scene.
RTC found both Estacio and Maritess guilty of "kidnapping on the occasion of which
the victim was killed (Kidnapping with Murder). CA affirmed, with modification, the
trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of kidnapping with murder?
RULING: NO. The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were
convicted was erroneously designated. Appellants were eventually charged with and
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, defined in the last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that
would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.
In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound
and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts
to facilitate his killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as
they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That
appellants intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the
conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would
be used to kill him so that it would not create noise. The subsequent demand for
ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants prior acts as kidnapping.
Where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of
the accused it cannot be inferred that the latters purpose was actually to detain or
deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the
crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be
considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder. The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by
treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated
place in Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate
the killing.
People v. Padica instructs: We have consistently held that where the taking of the
victim was incidental to the basic purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is
true even if, before the killing but for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one
place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill
them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latters purpose
was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of
the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not
exist and cannot be considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime
of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the aforecited case of Masilang, et.
al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim for ransom but they first
killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained the money, such
demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no detention or
deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only murder.
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended
to kill the victim can be readily deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and
cold-bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane
plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to
show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim
intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand
for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought,
as it was relayed to the victims family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient
interval for consultation and deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim
around five hours earlier.
x x x The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act
of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless
the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period
of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused. Absent such
determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom of
movement would at most constitute coercion. (Underscoring supplied)
The crime committed was thus plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery.
The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in
Bulacan against his will to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the
killing.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr.
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guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, with the generic aggravating circumstance
of use of motor vehicle. And in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on
June 24, 2006, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole.

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