FROM MOBILIZATION

TO REVOLUTION

Charles T i l l y

University of Michigan
,PROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION
March 1977
.. .........................

by Charles T i l l y

CRSO Working Paper 8156 Copies a v a i l a b l e through:

Center f o r Research on
S o c i a l Organization
University of Michigan
330 Packard S t r e e t
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
 CONTENTS
.
CENERAI PLAN OF THE BOOK
preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i
Chapter 1: Introduction g e n e r a l p l a n of t h e hook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i v

Chapter 2: T h e o r i e s and D e s c r i p t i o n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action t a b l e of c o n t e n t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

C l ~ a p t e r3: I n t e r e s t s . O r g a n i z a t i o n and M o b i l i z a t i o n l i s t of t a b l e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i.x
Chapter 4: The O p p o r t u n i t y t o Act Together listoffigures .............................
Chepter 5: Changing Forms of C o l l e c t i v e Action Chapter 1: I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1
C l ~ n p t e r 6: C o l l e c t i v e Violence The S t u f f of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1
Chapter 7: Rmrolutlonand R e b e l l i o n Studying C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.7
Chapter 8: Concludivns and llew Beginnings The Components of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.10

Groups. Events and Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.12

Appendices What You W i l l Find Here . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.15
Bibliography Chapter 2: T h e o r i e s and D e s c r i p t i o n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . .2.1

M a r x o n 1 8 4 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 .
Durkheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7 .
The Durkheiminn T r a d i t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.12

M i l l and t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. .19
C o l l e c t i v e Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.22

S t r a t e g i c I n t e r a c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.29 .
M i l l and Pseudo-Mill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.35

Weber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.38 .
S o c i a l Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. .42
Marxian Analyses s i n c e Marx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.48

C o l l e c t i v e H i s t o r y of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.53

Our Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.58 .

Chapter 3: I n t e r e s t s . O r g a n i z a t i o n and M o b i l i z a t i o n . . . . . . . . . .3.1

The Elementary Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-1

 iii iv
Violence: Concept and Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.4
A Simple Account of Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.3 Some Lineaments of Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.8
Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.12
Violence in America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6..10
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.17
Political Action and Involvement in Violence . . . . . . . . . 6-13
Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.26
Changing Contexts for Collective Violence . . . . . . . . . . .6.20
Measuring Moblization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ..41 Chapter 7: Revolution and Rebellion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ..
1
General Conditions for Moblization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.45
Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes. . . . . .7 .1
From Moblization to Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.50
Revolutionary Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
The Detection and Measurement of Collective Action . . . . . . . .3.58
Revolutionary Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7
Chapter 4: The Opportunity To Act Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 . Situations and Outcomes Combined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-9
From Mobilization to Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ..4 Proximate Causes of Revolutionary Situations . . . . . . . . . 7-18
Repression and Facilitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 .
.
3
Alternatives to the Existing Polity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-20
Repressive and Tolerant Governments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.14
Acceptance of Alternative Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-24
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. .27 Governmental Inaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.
.32
Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-29. Proximate Causes of Revolutionary Outcomes. . . . . . . . . . 7-36
Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-31 . Coalitions between Members and Challengers. . . . . . . . . . 7-38
Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4..33 Control of Substantial Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-41
The Measurement of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.34 Revolutionary Sequences and Collective Violence. . . . . . . 7-44
Power and Polity Membership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.41
Revolutionary Outcomes and Further Structural Changes. . . . . 7-50
Detecting Changes in Polity Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.44
Chapter 8: Conclusions and New Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
.
Opportunity/Threst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4..53
Back to the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
The Interplay of Mobilization and Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . .4.60
Theorizing About Collective Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8.8
Chapter 5: Changing Forms of Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.5 The Importance of History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8-13
The Forms of Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 .
5
The History of Collective Action in Modern France . . . . . . .8.19
Repertoires of Collective Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5..14 A Last Case in Point: Rural Collective Action in Burgundy. . .8.25
A Case in Point: The Strike. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
..25 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A..O'
Elections, Demonstrations and Political Systems . . . . . . . . . .5.38 Appendix 1: Procedures for the Studies of Strlkes and Collective
Collective Violence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
.
1
Chapter 6:
Violence in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A. I.
British Brawls as Collective Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.1
 TABLES
Appendix 2: M n t c r i a l s from t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e V i o l e n c e i n

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-14 T a b l e 3-1: Kerr 6 S i e g e l ' s S m a r y of S t r i k e P r o p e n s i t i e s .. . . . . . .3-22

Appendix 3: P r o c e d u r e s f o r t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s T a b l e 3-2: French S t r i k e R a t e s by I n d u s t r y . 1890-1960. . . . . . . . . .3-24
i n Great Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-36 T a b l e 4-1: Groups F i g u r i n g i n 1906-07 R o l l C a l l s o f French Chamber

Appendix 4: M a t e r i a l s Prom t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s of D e p u t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-49

i n Great Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A-55 T a b l e 6-1: P e r c e n t of A l l P o l i t i c a l Events P r e c e d i n g t h e Cermsn E l e c t i o l l S

Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a * . . . B-1 o f September 1930 and J u l y 1932 I n v o l v i n g D i f f e r e n t : , T y p e s of

A c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6-16
T a b l e 7-1: D.E.H. R u s s e l l ' s Armed F o r c e D i s l o y a l t y S c a l e . . . . . . . .7-43
 vii viii

I d e a l i z e d S k e t c h of C o n d i t i o n s f o r A c t i o n of a run-of-the-mill

Unita i n t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e Action. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13 Contender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-61

Competi~igAnalyses of C o l l e c t i v e Action . . . . . . . . . . . .2-6
I d e a l i z e d S k e t c h of C o n d i t i o n s f o r I n a c t i o n of a run-of-the-mill

Durkheim'a Analyaia of C o l l e c t i v e Action. . . . . . . . . . . .2-11

Contender...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-64
n y p o t h e t i c a l E f f e c t s of Lowered Coats of C o l l e c t i v e Action on
l l u n t i n g t o n ' a Basic Argument. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 2-14

T r a j e c t o r i e s of Slow nnd Rapid S o c i a l Change i n H u n t i n g t o n ' s

aZealot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11
.
Argument. .......................... .2-14
Four Models of Croup Readineaa t o Adopt New Means of C o l l e c t i v e

One of Douglas Hibba' C a u s a l Models of P o l i t i c a l Violence. . . 2-37 Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5-18

The A l t e r a t i o n of French S t r i k e Shapes, 1890-1954 . . . . . . . .5-32
T h e p o l i t y Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . .,. . . . . . . . . .3-2
Combinations of R e v o l u t i o n a r y S i t u a t i o n a and R e v o l u t i o n a r y Out-
The M o b i l i z a t i o n Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-7

Components of O r g a n i z a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3-18
comes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-11.
S y n d i c a l i s t . Marxist and B r i n t o n i a n Mapa of R e v o l ~ l t i o n o r y
Pour I d e a l P a t t e r n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action. . . . . . . . . . . .3-57

S n y d e r ' s Code f o r Labor Support of C a n d i d a t e s . . . . . . . . . 3-61

Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-13
S i t u a t i o n s and Outcomes i n D i f f e r e n t Typea of Power T r a n s f e r s . .7-15
Repression, T o l e r a t i o n , F a c i l i t a t i o n and Coercion. . . . . . . 4-16
The Timing of C o l l e c t i v e Violence i n Tension-Release and Con-
Repression i n E g a l i t a r i a n and O l i 8 a r c h i c Governments. . . . . .4-17

T o l e r a n c e v a . Rebreaaion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-19
t e n t i o n Models of Revolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-47
R e p r e s s i v e P a t t e r n s i n D i f f e r e n t Typea of Regime. . . . . . . .4-20 ,

Repression a s a F u n c t i o n of S c a l e and Power. . . . . . . . . . 4-23

l l y p o t h e t i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of governmental r e p r e s s i o n a s a f u n c t i o n

of t h e s c a l e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and t h e power of t h e a c t o r . .4-24

I n t e r e a t s and Returna from C o l l e c t i v e Action f o r an O p p o r t u n i s t

Contender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-35
H y p o t h e t i c a l Schedule of Returna from C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . . . . 4-37

Gainin8 va. Losing Schedules of R e t u r n a . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-38

llow M o b i l i z a t i o n L i m i t a C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . 4-40

C o l l e c t i v e Action a s a F u n c t i o n of T h r e a t s and O p p o r t u n i t i e s . .4-54

Asymmetrical E f f e c t of T h r e a t and O p p o r t u n i t y on C o l l e c t i v e

Action. ........................... .4-56

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTLON petition f o r government i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t high food p r i c e s , country-
The S t u f f of C o l l e c t i v e Action
men s e i z e d and s o l d food a t t h e i r own p r i c e s , townsmen.attacked t h e c o l -
1765 was a l i v e l y y e a r i n England. a s i t was i n America. News coming
l e c t o r s a p p o i n t e d f o r England's own v e r s i o n of t h e Stamp Act.
i n from t h e American c o l o n i e s d e s c r i b e d t h e u s u n l c o n f l i c t s : r u n - i n s between
That was n o t a l l . Near lpswich, on t h e 1 2 t h of August:
smugglers and customs men, s k i r m i s h e s of I n d i a n s w i t h s e t t l e r s , a t t e m p t s
S e v e r a l p e r s o n s r i o t o u s l y assembled t o p u l l down t h e house.
of f r o n t i e r s m e n t o t n k e t h e law i n t o t h e i r own hands. But t h e b i g news

from America was t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e British-imposed Stamp Act. The u s e

of i n d u s t r y , l a t e l y e r e c t e d a t Nncton . . . carried t h e i r bold-

n e s s t o such l e n g t h t h a t , n e i t h e r t h e e x p o s t u l a t i o n s of t h e
of c o s t l y stamped paper f o r o f f i c i a l t r a n s a c t i o n s was supposed t o b e g i n on
m a g i s t r a t e 8 a g a i n s t t h e i l l e g n l i t y of t h e i r d e s i g n , which they
t h e f i r s t of November. Long b e P o r e . t h e n , anonymous n o t i c e s and determined
openly avowed, t h e consequences of t h e r i o t proclamation a c t
crowds t h r e a t e n e d anyone who showed s i g n s of w i l l i n g n e s s t o comply w i t h t h e
b e i n g r e a d , which were e x p l a i n e d t o them, nor t h e appearance of
Stamp Act. I n Roston and elsewhere,'groups of c i t i z e n s produced c o l o r f u l
a body of r e g u l a r h o r s e end f o o t , c a l l e d i n a s p o r t of t h e posse
s t r e e t t h e a t e r , complete w i t h g a l l o w s , h a n d - l e t t e r e d s i g n s , and e f f i g i e s
comitatus, seemed t o make t h e l e a s t impression on them; nny,
of r o y a l o f f i c i a l s . Sometimes they sacked t h e . houses o r o u t b u i l d i n g s of
though t h e proclamation was t h e n r e a d t o them w i t h an a u d i b l e
d e s i g n a t e d stamp a g e n t s and government o f f i c e r s . They succeeded i n b l o c k i n g

t h c A c t ' s n p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e American c o l o n i e s . With t h e i r a l l i e s i n Eng- v o i c e , and t h e y seemed t o h e a r i t w i t b a t t e n t i o n . n o t o man s t i r r e d

l n n d , they o b t a i n e d r e p e a l i n March, 1766. That c o n c e r t e d r e s i s t a n c e (Annual R e g i s t e r 1765: 116-117).

s t a r t e d t e n y e a r s of n e a r l y c o n t i n u o u s s t r u g g l e w i t h i n t h e American c o l o n i e s ,
On t h e c o n t r a r y . A s t h e t r o o p s r e a d i e d themselves f o r t h e a t t n c k , t h e
and ended i n a g r e a t s t r u g g l e between t h e c o l o n i e s and England. America
crowd o f a hundred o r s o " f e l l upon both h o r s e s and men w i t h such arms
was a l r e a d y on i t s way t o r e v o l u t i o n .
a s they had, peasemakes, hedge-stakes, c u d g e l s , e t c . , but i n f i v e minutes
I n Englnnd, t h e r e was some s y m p a t h e t i c r e a c t i o n t o t h e American
t h e a f f a i r was over." The s o l d i e r s a r r e s t e d seven men a s examples, and
cause. For exnmple, a t t h e beginning of March, 1766, " . . .a body of
dispersed the r e s t .
upwards of two hundred mcmbers of t h e house of Commons c a r r i e d up t h e b i l l
Was t h a t a r i o t ? I n t h e t e c h n i c a l l e g a l s e n s e , i t was: twelve o r
t o t h e house of P e e r s , f o r r e p e a l i n g t h e American stamp-duty a c t ; an i n -
more p e o p l e had, i n d e e d , assembled w i t h on a p p n r e n t i n t e n t whtch l o c a l o f -
s t a n c e of such a number going up w i t h a s i n g l e b i l l , h a s n o t been known
f i c i a l s could reasonably r e g a r d a s i l l e g a l ; they had n o t d i s p e r s e d w i t h i n
i n t h e memory of t h e o l d e s t man" (Annual R e g i s t e r 1766: 72). Nevertheless,
t h e hour t h e law a l l o t t e d them from t h e time t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s hod
i n 1765 and I766 most of England's v i s i b l e c o n f l i c t concerned domestic
rend t h e r i o t a c t . I n t h e l o o s e r s e n s e o f f r e n z y , c o n f u s i o n o r wanton
issues. T a i l o r s went on s t r i k e , weavers marched on P a r l i a m e n t t o demand
d e s t r u c t i o n , however, t h e e v e n t does n o t q u a l i f y a s a r i o t . Both s i d e s
t h e e x c l u ~ i o no f f o r e j g n c o m p e t i t i o n , t h e s h e r i f f s of London paraded t o
a p p a r e n t l y knew what they were d o i n g , and d i d i t a s b e s t t h e y c o u l d . wonder t h e poor people of S u f f o l k r e s i s t e d t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h e sy8tem.

That was g e n e r a l l y t r u e of t h e many " d i s o r d e r s " r e p o r t e d i n t h e Annual The move a g a i n s t t h e Nacton poorhouse was one of many ouch c o n f l i c t s

R e g i s t e r f o r 1765. i n 1765. As The Gentleman's Magazine r e p o r t e d f o r t h e week b e f o r e tlic

I n t h e c a s e of Nacton, t h e "house of i n d u s t r y " t h e crowd proposed Nacton c o n f r o n t a t i o n :

t o d e s t r o y was a r e c e n t l y - b u i l t workhouse. Poor E n g l i s h v i l l a g e r s had

Some thousands of r i o t e r s assembled i n t h c neigllborliood oE
l o n g drawn r e l i e f from t h e i r own p a r i s h e s w h i l e l i v i n g a t home. The pay-
Saxmundham i n S u f f o l k , and d e s t r o y e d t h e industry-liousc, i n which
ments were m i s e r a b l e , b u t t h e y a s s u r e d s u r v i v a l . And t h e payments were
t h e poor were employed. T h e i r p r e t e n a e was t o r e l e a s e t h e poor t o
a right. That was "outdoor r e l i e f . " "Indoor r e l i e f " was now t h r e a t e n i n g
a s s i s t i n t h e h a r v e s t u o r k ; b u t t h e f n c t was t o d e f e a t a l a t e a c t of
t o d i s p l a c e t h e o l d e r system. From t h e 1730s onward, many E n g l i s h l o c a l
p a r l i a m e n t , l a t e l y o b t a i n e d f o r t h e r e l i e f of t h c poor of t h e hun-
a u t h o r i t i e s responded t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g numbers of poor w i t h two i m p o r t a n t
d r e d s of W i l f o r d , and e,
etc. I n t h i s r i o t . t h e m i l i t a r y ware
i n n o v a t i o n s : l o c k i n g up t h e poor t o work under p u b l i c s u p e r v i s i o n ; com-
c a l l e d i n , and s e v e r a l l o s t t h e i r l i v e s b e f o r e t h e r i o t e r s were
b i n i n g t h e poor-law e f f o r t s of a number of a d j a c e n t p a r i s h e s i n t o a
d i s p e r s e d (GM 1765: 392).
single administration. P a r l i a m e n t a r y l e g i s l a t i o n had l e g a l i z e d b o t h e f -
A t Saxfnundham, n o t o n l y t h e poor, b u t a l s o many of t h e i r l e s s impoverished
forts. The b u i l d i n g of workhouses f o r m u l t i p l e p a r i s h e s combined t h e two
n e i g h b o r s c o n s i d e r e d t h e new i n s t i t u t i o n improper and i n t o l e r a b l e .
of them. It a l s o p e r m i t t e d many p a r i s h e s t o r e d u c e t h e i r r e l i e f payments
During t h e second week of August, 1765, i n f n c t , much of S u f f o l k was
and t o s h i p t h e i r l o c a l paupers elsewhere. The poor f o u g h t i n d o o r r e l i e f
a l i v e with rebellion. A l a r g e crowd o f people f i r s t a n t h e r e d a t Wickham
i n t h e name of e s t a b l i s h e d r l g h t s .
Market, when tlie D i r e c t o r s of t h e Poor f o r Loes and Wilford Hundreds met
I n t h e 17508, t h e l a n d l o r d s and p a r s o n s of t h e p a r i s h e s n e a r l p s w i c h ,
t o p l a n a new poorhouse; t h e crowd f o r c e d t h e D i r e c t o r s t o s i g n a repudia-
i n S u f f o l k , caught tlie reform f e v e r . Admire1 Vernon donated a s i t e on
t i o n of t h e i r plan. For a week. t h e group went from workhouse t o workl~ouse
Nacton lleath f o r a new workhouse. A blue-ribbon committee s u p e r v i s e d i t s
t e a r i n g t h e b u i l d i n g s down and demanding t h a t t h e o v e r s e e r s commit them-
construction. The Nncton House of I n d u s t r y , a model of i t s k i n d , s t a r t e d
selves not t o rebuild. They demanded " t h a t t h e poor should be maintained
e n r o l l i n g paupers from a number of a d j a c e n t p a r i s h e s i n 1758. The p a r i s h
a s u s u a l ; t h a t t h e y s h o u l d range a t l i b e r t y and be t h e i r own mnstcrs"
poor went t o work weaving s a c k s , making cordage and s p i n n i n g wool (Webb 6
(Webb 6 Webb 1963: 141-142). R i o t s t h e s e were. i n t h e l e g a l s e n s e of tlie
Webb 1963: 1 2 7 ) . By 1765. however. t h e e l i t e s u p e r v i s i o n had s l a c k e n e d .
word. They were c l e a r l y much more than t h a t .
I t had proved d l f f l c u l t t o f i n d p r o f i t a b l e work f o r t h e i n c a r c e r a t e d pau-
The c o n f r o n t a t i o n s a t Nacton and Snxmundham a c t e d o u t p e r v a s i v e
pers. The c o o p e r a t i n g p a r i s h e s , f u r t h e r m o r e , had dumped i n t o t h e poorhouse
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n f l i c t s i n G r ~ a tB r i t a i n a s a whole.
young and o l d , s i c k and w e l l , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o work. Small
While David Nume and Adam Smith worked o u t t h e r e l e v a n t t h e o r i e s , o r d i n a r y c e n t u r y B r i t a i n were f i g h t i n g t h e l o s i n g b o t t l e of t h e moral economy

B r i t o n s f o u g h t a b o u t who had t h e r i g h t t o d i s p o s e of l a n d , l a b o r , c a p i t a l a g a i n s t t h e r i s e of p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m .

and commodities. A t t a c k s on poorhouses, c o n c e r t e d r e s i s t a n c e t o e n c l o s u r e s , Not t h a t t h e f i g h t e r s on e i t h e r s i d e were mere t h e o r i s t s , s i m p l e

food r i o t s and a number of o t h e r common forms of e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n f l i c t i d e o l o g u e s , h a p l e s s v i c t i m s of s h a r e d d e l u s i o n s . Real i n t e r e s t s were i n

a l l s t a t e d an i m p l i c i t two-part t h e o r y : t h a t t h e r e s i d e n t s of a l o c a l play. The p a r t i c i p a n t s saw them more o r l e s s c l e a r l y . A t two c e n t u r i e s '

community had a p r i o r r i g h t t o t h e r e s o u r c e s produced by o r c o n t a i n e d d i s t a n c e , we may f i n d some of t h e i r pronouncements q u a i n t , incomprehensible,

w i t h i n t h a t community; t h a t t h e community a s such had a p r i o r o b l i g a t i o n o r h o p e l e s s l y romantic. I n c o m f o r t a b l e r e t r o s p e c t , we may q u e s t i o n t h e

t o a i d i t s weak and r e s o u r c e l e s s members. The r i g h t and t h e o b l i g a t i o n means t h e y used t o forward t h e i r i n t e r e s t s : s c o f f a t t e a r i n g down poor-

should t a k e p r i o r i t y o v e r t h e i n t e r e s t of any p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l and houses, anger a t t h e u s e of t r o o p s a g a i n s t unarmed crovds. Yet i n r e t r o -

o v e r any i n t e r e s t o u t s i d e t h e community. It s h o u l d . e v e n t a k e p r i o r i t y s p e c t we a l s o s e e t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s followed a b a s i c , v i s i b l e l o g i c .

over t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e Crown, o r of t h e c o u n t r y a s a whole. That was, The more we l e a r n a b o u t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y changes i n G r e a t B r i t a i n , t h e

i n E.P. Thompson's t e r m s , t h e i l l - a r t i c u l a t e d b u t powerful t h e o r y of t h e c l e a r e r and more c o m p e l l i n g t h a t l o g i c becomes.

"moral economy. " The s t r u g g l e d i d n o t simply p i t d i f f e r e n t wnys of t i l i n k i n g a b o u t t h e

Meanwhile, many merchants, m a n u f n c t u r e r s , l a n d l o r d s and l o c a l a u t h o r - world a g a i n s t each o t h e r . Two modes of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n locked i n a

i t i e s favored a n o t h e r , newer, f o u r - p a r t t h e o r y : t h a t a l l goods, i n c l u d i n g b a t t l e t o t h e death. The o l d mode v e s t e d power i n l a n d and l o c a l i t y .

l a b o r power, should be d i s p o s a b l e p r o p e r t y ; t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l p r o p e r t y The new mode combined t h e expansion o f c a p i t a l i s t p r o p e r t y r e l a t i o n s

owner h a d , t h e r i g h t , and t o some e x t e n t t h e o b l i g a t i o n , t o u s e i t t o h i s w i t h t h e r i s e of t h e n a t i o n a l s t a t e . Many o t h e r changes flowed from t h a t

own a d v a n t a g e ; t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t , a s s r t i c u l a t e d by t h e s t a t e , f a t e f u l combination: l a r g e r - s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , i n c r e a s i n g commercinliza-

had p r i o r i t y o v e r p a r o c h i a l i n t e r e s t s ; t h a t on t h e whole t h e c o l l e c t i v e in.- t i o n , expanded communications, t h e growth of a p r o l e t s r i a t , a l t e r a t i o n e

t e r e s t w i l l b e s t be s e r v e d by t h e r a t i o n a l , u n c o n s t r a i n e d p u r s u i t of i n - of t h e v e r y t e x t u r e of d a i l y l i f e . The new mode won. The world of t h e

dividual interests. C.B. Macpherson h a s c a l l e d i t t h e t h e o r y of "posses- moral economy d i s s o l v e d . But when o r d i n a r y e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i m n s

s i v e individualism." The f o u r - p a r t t h e o r y i s f a m i l i a r nowadays. It ex- a c t e d c o l l e c t i v e l y a t a l l , u s u a l l y t h e y a c t e d a g a i n s t one f e a t u r e o r

p r e s s e s some founding p r i n c i p l e s of o u r own e r a . But i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h a n o t h e r of t h i s new world. On t h e whole, t h e y a c t e d i n d e f e n s e o f p a r t i c -

c e n t u r y t h e t h e o r y of p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m was s t i l l new and c o n t e s t - u l a r f e a t u r e s of t h e moral economy.

able. To become dominant, i t had t o d i s p l a c e t h e r i v a l t h e o r y of t h e The e f f o r t t o understand t h e e v e n t s of 1765 t h u s t a k a s u s i n s e v e r a l

"moral economy." Although t h e y d i d n o t dream of s a y i n g i t i n t h o s e t e r m s , very d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . It r e q u l r e s some knowledge of t h e p a r t i c u l a r

t h e c o n t e s t a n t s a t Nacton, Saxmundham and many o t h e r p l a c e s i n e i g h t e e n t h - c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s found themselves: t h e problems

 1-8
1-7

t h e y f a c e d , t h e enemies b e f o r e them. t h e means of a c t i o n a t t h e i r d i a - t h e l e s s o n s of t h e i r p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . As w i t h t h e s t u d e n t of food,

p o s a l , t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s of what was happening. In eighteenth-century o r s e x , o r s p e e c h , t h e determined s t u d e n t o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r u n s t h e

B r i t a i n , t h e m a g i s t r a t e s ' e f f o r t s t o c o n s o l i d a t e poor law a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . r i s k e i t h e r o f l a b e l i n g t h e obvious o r o f u r g i n g hypotheses which common

t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e l a n d l e s s poor t o swings i n p r i c e s , t h e s t r e n g t h sense contradicts.

of o t r a d i t i o n i n v o l v i n g l o c a l d i r e c t a c t i o n a g a i n s t m a l e f a c t o r s a r e a l l I t i s more d e l l c a t e than t h a t . Deep i n e v e r y d i s c u s s i o n of c o l l e c -

crucial. Understanding 1765 a l s o c a l l s f o r an a n a l y s i s of t h e l a r g e - t i v e a c t i o n s t i r s t h e l a v a of a v o l c a n i c e r u p t i o n : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s

s c a l e changes behind t h e c o n f l l c t s of t h e moment; i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h obout power and p o l i t i c s : i t i n e v i t a b l y r a i s e s q u e s t i o n s of r i g h t and

c e n t u r y we can s o r t o u t l i t t l e of t h e p a t t e r n of c o n f l i c t u n t i l we d e t e c t wrong, j u s t i c e and i n j u s t i c e , hope and h o p e l e s s n e s s ; t h e v e r y s e t t i n g of

t h e c o n J o i n t expansion of c a p i t a l i s m and r i s e of t h e s t a t e . I t takes us, t h e problem is l i k e l y t o i n c l u d e judgments a b o u t who has t h e r i g h t t o a c t .

f i n n l l y , t o a g e n e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e ways t h a t people a c t t o g e t h e r and what good i t does. Consider t h e s e words from s newspopcr e d i t o r i a l

i n p u r s u i t of s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s . I t t a k e s u s , t h a t i s , i n t o t h e s t u d y of (Detroit Free'Preas October 1 5 , 1975):

collective action.
Present-day l i b e r a l i s m had i t s r o o t s i n t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y f a i t h
Studylng C o l l e c t i v e Action
i n t h e i d e a of human p r o g r e s s ; t h a t t h e l i v e s of men could be made
The t h i r d I n q u i r y -- t h e s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n -- is the chief
b e t t e r by c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . I n i t s extreme form, I t was always a
concern o f t h i s book. I w i l l o f t e n i l l u s t r a t e from s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l
n a i v e f a i t h , based on a n a i v e view of human n a t u r e .
c i r c u m s t a n c e s and w i l l f r e q u e n t l y propose explanations i n v o l v i n g s t s t e -
The 2 0 t h c e n t u r y h a s been a more tumultuous time. and i t h a s
making, t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , o r some o t h e r b i g
meant c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h t h e i d e a of chong.lng t h e
s t r u c t u r n l change. But t h e pages t o f o l l o w w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e gen-
human c o n d i t i o n . Consider i t s m u l t i p l e t r a g e d i e s : Two world w a r s ,
e r a l a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n .
t h e G r e a t Depression, t h e o f t e n b e w i l d e r i n g impact of technology on
The a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n is a r i s k y a d v e n t u r e . For one
p e o p l e , t h e a f t e r e f f e c t s of c o l o n i a l i s m and i n a t i t u t i o n o l i z c d r a c i s m ,
t h i n g , t h e r e o r e t o o many e x p e r t s around. I t i s a b i t l i k e food, o r s e x ,
t h e growth i n t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of w e a l t h and i n f l u e n c e , t h e 11-bomb,
o r speech. Almost a l l of u s know enough obout food, s e x and speech t o s u r -
the Cold War, t h e near-breakdown of mony c i t i e s .
v i v e i n o u r own environments, and none of u s l i k e s t o b e t o l d he is i g -

n o r a n t i n any of t h e t h r e e r e g a r d s . Yet from a s c i e n t i f i c p o i n t of view, ("Heavy s t u f f , t h a t C o l l e c t i v e Action!" s a i d t h e n o t e inked on t h e e d i t o r -

we a l l have l o t s t o l e a r n a b o u t a l l t h r e e . The same is t r u e of c o l l e c t i v e i a l when someone tacked i t on o u r r e s e a r c h g r o u p ' s b u l l e t i n board.) In

oction. Like t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p e o p l e of Nacton, we a l l draw on a r i c h . some s e n s e , ' e v e r y p o s i t i o n one t a k e s on t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y . f e a s i b i l i t y o r

c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e of a c t i n g on s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s . Among u s , f u r t h e r m o r e , e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s a p o l i t i c a l p o a i t i o n . The t o n e of

seasoned o r g a n i z e r s a r e around t o s h a r e --,and even t o l e c t u r e u s on --

l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n s i n t h i s book is g e n e r a l l y h o s t i l e t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e ac- a l s o hard t o b u i l d p u r p o s i v e models which s p e c i f y t h e c o n s t r a i n t n l i m i t i n 8
t i o n of governments and f a v o r s b l e t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of o r d i n a r y t h e p u r s u i t of i n t e r e s t s , g r i e v a n c e s and a s p i r a t i o n s .
people; t h a t , t o o , is a p o l i t i c a l s t a n c e .
So why n o t t r y a s y n t h e s i s ? Why n o t combine c n u s a l models of con-
These r i s k s p r o v i d e , a l a s , a s t r o n g t e m p t a t i o n t o d r e s s up t h e t o p i c
s h a i n t s w i t h p u r p o s i v e models o f c h o i c e s among a v a i l a b l e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n ?
i n f a n c y , o b s c u r e terminology and fearsome a b s t r a c t models. Yet p l a i n
The s y n t h e s i s i s s u r p r i s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o a c h i e v e . Before t h i s book j s
t a l k a l s o h a s i t s d i s a d v a n t a g e s : p e o p l e o f t e n respond more t o t h e over-
o v e r , we w i l l have s p e n t a good d e a l of time o s c i l l a t i n g between t h e two
t o n e s and u n d e r t o n e s than t o t h e s o l i d i n f o r m a t i o n . Without some s t a n d s r d -
a l t e r n a t i v e s , and t r y i n g t o draw them t o g e t t i e r .
i z a t i o n of terms and some e f f o r t a t a b s t r a c t i o n we r u n t h e f u r t h e r r i s k
The Components of C o l l e c t i v e Action
of bogging down i n more and more fastidious d e s c r i p t i o n of tlie d e t a i l s of
The a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n h a s f i v e b i g componcnts: i n t e r e s t .
particular actions. We must f i n d t h e b a l a n c e p o i n t between i m p r e c i s i o n
o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n , o p p o r t u n i t y and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i t s e l f . Tl~e
and o b s c i ~ r a n t i a m .
i n t e r e s t s which concern u s most e r e t h e g a i n s and l o s s e s r e s u l t i n g from a
Another r j s k r e s u l t s from t h e f a c t t h a t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s t r a d d l e s
g r o u p ' s i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o t h e r groups. L a t e r on we w i l l have t o worry
s d i v l d e which o r d i n a r i l y R e p a r a t e s one major kind of s o c L a l a b o u t what c o n s t i t u t e s a r e l e v a n t group. and how t o i d e n t i f y o r measure
a n a l y s i s from a n o t h e r . That i s t h e d i v i d e between c a u s a l and p u r p o s i v e r e a l , durable interests.
e x p l a n a t i o n ( s e e Coleman 1973: 1-5). We may choose t o c o n s i d e r t h e a c t i o n
The o r g a n i z a t i o n which c o n c e r n s u s most i s t h a t a s p e c t ol: a g r o u p ' s
of a n i n d i v i d u a l o r of a group a s t h e r e s u l t a n t of f o r c e s \ e x t e r n a l t o t h e
s t r u c t u r e which most d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s i t s c a p a c i t y t o a c t on i t s t n t c r e s t s .
i n d i v i d u a l o r group; t h o s e e x t e r n a l f o r c e s supposedly cause t h e behavior.
C l e a r l y one of t h e problems is t o d e t e r m i n e which fentclres of o r g n n i z o t i o n
I n t h i s c a s e , we a r e l i k e l y t o t h i n k we have a good e x p l a n a t i o n when a
-
do make a difference. Is i t p o s s i b l e , f o r example, t h a t how committed mem-
c a r e f u l l o o k a t t h e a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n p e r m i t s u s t o deduce more o r l e s s
b e r s a r e makes l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e t o tlie form and i n t e n s i t y of t h e i r c o l -
a c c u r a t e l y how t h e a c t o r w i l l behave.
lective action? Is i t p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e n e a t n e s s of an o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we may c o n s i d e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r group t o b e making
d i v i s i o n of l a b o r m a t t e r s g r e a t l y ?
c h o i c e s a c c o r d i n g t o some s e t of r u l e s , i m p r i c i t o r e x p l i c i t ; t h a t approach
Hobi.lizstion i s t h e p r o c e s s by which a group a c q u i r e s c o l l e c t i v e
is p u r p o s i v e . Then we a r e l i k e l y t o t h i n k we have a sound e x p l a n a t i o n
c o n t r o l o v e r t h e r e s o u r c e s needed f o r a c t i o n . Those r e s o u r c e s may b e l a b o r
when we c a n impute t o t h e a c t o r a r u l e which l e a d s l o g i c a l l y t o most o r
power, goods, weapons, v o t e s and any number of o t h e r t h i n g s , j u s t s o l o n g
a l l of t h e c h o i c e s we o b s e r v e t h e a c t o r making. I n t h e realm of c o l l e c - a s they a r e u s a b l e i n a c t i n g on s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s . Sometimes a group such
t i v e a c t i o n , i t is hard t o b u i l d c a u s a l models which g i v e s e r i o u s a t t e n - ,- a s s community h a s a complex i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e , b u t few pool.ed r e s o u r c e s .
t i o n t o t h e i n t e r e s t s , g r i e v a n c e s and a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e a c t o r s . It is Sometimes i t is r i c h i n r e s o u r c e s , b u t t h e r e s o u r c e s a r e a l l under i n d i v i d -
ual control. The analysis of mobilization deals witti the ways that groups the group. Witti respect to organization, they focus on relntl.vely well-

acquire resources and make them available for collective action. defined groups. They therefore neglect two fascinating sorta of questions:

Opportunity_ concerns the relationship between a group and the world how new groups oriented to new world-views come into being, nnd under wl~ot

around it. Changes in the relationship sometimes threaten the group's in- conditions ill-defined sets of people such as pnnsersby or friendship nct-

terests. They sometimes provide new chances to act on those interests. works become important collective actors. In regard to mobilization. they

The trouble with studying opportunity is that it is hard to reconstruct the atress the factors of production -- land, labor, capital, technology --
opportunities realistically available to the group at the time. Knowledge and neglect the possibility that attitudes are more important resources

of later outcomes makes it too easy to second-guess a group's action, or for collective action than any of these. On the side of opportunity, tlie

inaction. We con minimize that disadvantage by looking only at contempor- analyses in this book atress political opportunity. coalitlon, repression.

ary collective action or by concentrating on situations in which the op- relations among governments and well-defined contenders for power over

portunities are rigorously defined and strictly lindted. But then we lose those governments. When it comes to collective action as such, most of

our ability to follow large-scale changes, in their real complexity, over the concrete discussion deals with contentious gatherings: publicly visible

considerable periods of time. assemblies in which conflicting interests are cle~rlyin play.

Collective action consists of people's acting together in pursuit of Groups, Events and Movements

common interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of We find our subject-matter in the overlaps of three intersecting

interests, organization, mobilization and opportunity. The most persistent areas. Sometimes we are interested jn a particulnr population in its own

problem we will face in analyzing collective action is ita lack of sharp terms. For example, we want to know what was happenlng to poor people in

edges: people v ~ r ycontinuously from intensive involvement to passive eighteenth-century Suffolk. Sometimes we are chiefly concerned with a set

compliance, interests vary from quite individual to nearly universal. To- of beliefs. For instance, we wont to follow the r i ~ eand fall of ideas

ward the end of this book, we will pursue that complexity into the analysis about the proper treatment of the poor and incompetent. Sometimes certain

of revolutionary processes. Our chief effort, then, will flow along the kinds of action attract our attention; we might want to understand the con-

lines going from organization to mobilization to collective action to rev- ditions in which people take the law into their own hands. The study of

olution. Especially from mobilization to revolution. collective action ordinarily requires us to deal with nt least two of these

In dealing with each of these problems, the analyses which follow areas at once. We could dlagram tlie situation like tl~is:

make serious, debatable choices. With respect to interests, they give

priority to economic and politico1 life. They favor a group's own articu-

lation of its interest over the assumptions of contemporary observers and

over our own retrospective judgment as to what would have been best for
 1-14

We can t a k e groups a s o u r b a s i c u n i t s f o r t h e s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
F i g u r e 1-1 U n i t s i n t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e Action Then we t y p i c a l l y s t a r t w i t h s p o p u l a t i o n which h a s some common s t r u c t u r e

and s h a r e d b e l i e f s . We a r e l i k e l y t o a c c e n t t h o s e n c t i o n s whicll we t h l n k

r e s u l t from t h a t combination of s t r u c t u r e and b e l i e f s . We pay r e l n t l v e l y

l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o o t h e r v e r s i o n s of t h e some b e l i e f s o r t o o t h e r n c t i o n s

of t h e same kind. H i s t o r i e s of t h e working c l a s s o f t e n t a k e t h i s form:

much a t t e n t i o n t o changes i n l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s ; work and i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a -

t i o n ; p l e n t y of m a t e r i a l on b e l i e f s and o u t l o o k ; a n a l y s i s of t h o s e a c t i o n s

which appear t o e x p r e s s t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e working-class p o p u l a t i o n and

its beliefs.

We can a l s o t a k e e v e n t s a s o u t s t a r t i n g p o i n t . We b e g i n wit11 a

p a r t i c u l a r r e v o l u t i o n , ceremony o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Or we b e g i n w i t h a c l a s s

of e v e n t s : a t t a c k s on poorhouses, d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , revolutions i n g e n e r a l .

I n e i t h e r c a s e , we become concerned a b o u t p o p u l a t i o n s and h e l i e f s t o t h e

e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e involved d i r e c t l y i n t h e e v e n t s . Analyses of "col-

l e c t i v e behavior" comnonly t a k e t h i s t a c k . At t h e i r a b s t r a c t extreme.

they s t r i v e f o r g e n e r a l laws g o v e r n i n g a l l a c t i o n s of c e r t a i n k i n d s of

.
p o p u l a t i o n s : l a r g e crowds. f o r example, o r p e o p l e h i t by d i s a s t e r .

The n o t i o n of a "movement" i s more complicated than t h e l d e a s of

groups and e v e n t s . By a s o c i a l movement we o f t e n mean a group of p e o p l e

i d e n t i f i e d by t h e i r a t t a c h m e n t t o some p a r t i c u l a r s e t of b e l i e f s . In t h a t

c a s e , t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n can change d r a s t i c a l l y , b u t s o l o n g a s

some group of p e o p l e i s s t i l l working w i t h t h e same h e l i e f s , we c o n s i d e r

t h e movement t o s u r v i v e . Thus t h e Women's Movement s u r v i v e s major changes

i n composition and i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . But movement a l s o commonly means

action. People w r i t i n g h i s t o r i e s of t h e women's movement a r e q u i t e l i k e l y

t o i n c l u d e p a s t h e r o i n e s who were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n b e l i e f s and p e r s o n a l

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from c u r r e n t a c t i v i s t s , j u s t s o long a s t h e i r a c t i o n s were z a t i o n , e l e c t o r a l p o l i t i c s and formally-organized i n t e r e s t groups. A l l of

s i m i l a r o r had s i m i l a r e f f e c t s . The f a c t t h a t p o p u l a t i o n , b e l i e f and ac- them have f i g u r e d i m p o r t a n t l y i n t h e modern Europenn and American e x p e r i -

t i o n do n o t always change t o g e t h e r c a u s e s s e r i o u s problems f o r s t u d e n t s of ences with c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .

s o c i a l movements. When they d i v e r g e , s h o u l d we f o l l o w t h e b e l i e f s , whatever The f o c u s on t h e modern West a l s o c o a t s u s something. It gives us

p o p u l a t i o n s and a c t i o n s they become a s s o c i a t e d w i t h ? Should we f o l l o w t h e l i t t l e chance t o t h i n k a b o u t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e absence of a a t r o n g

p o p u l a t i o n . wliotever b e l i e f s and a c t i o n s i t a d o p t s ? Should we f o l l o w t h e s t a t e , a b o u t p e o p l e whose s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s a r e orgnnized mainly around kin-

action, regardless of who does i t and w i t h what i d e a s ? s h i p , a b o u t e x o t i c movements such a s ~ e l a n e s i a t ic a r g o c u l t s . The conclu-

What You W i l l Find Here s i o n s may, a t b e s t , a p p l y o n l y t o t h e modern u r b a n - i n d u s t r l a l world. Still.

T h i s book w i l l g e n e r a l l y a v o i d t h e a n a l y s i s of s o c i a l movements a s making s e n s e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n t h a t world i s a b i g enough t a s k f o r

such. N e v e r t h e l e s s , p l e n t y of m a t e r i a l o t h e r people have analyzed under one book.

t h a t heading w i l l come i n t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n . We w i l l a l t e r n a t e between The remaining c h a p t e r s f o l l o w a s i m p l e p l a n . Cllspter 2 c a t a l o g s

groups and e v e n t s a s o u r s t a r t i n g p o i n t s f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e ac-

tion. Sometimes we w i l l b e g i n by a s k i n g what p e a s a n t s a r e up t o , and how

I competing t h e o r i e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n o r d e r t o l a y o u t t h e c h o i c e s

b e f o r e u s and t o i d e n t i f y t h e major d i s a g r e e m e n t s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s .

that h e l p 8 u s understand r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Sometimes we w i l l be- Chapter 3 p r e s e n t s and i l l u s t r a t e s a s i m p l e s e t of c o n c e p t s and models f o r

g i n by a s k i n g what food r i o t s a r e a b o u t , and how t h a t h e l p s u s understand

I t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , then works o u t t h e i r implications f o r

the collective a c t i o n of poor people. Sometimes we w i l l t r y t o s t a r t t h e ways groups a c q u i r e t h e a b i l i t y t o a c t ; t h a t c h a p t e r d w e l l s on l n t e r -

both p l a c e s a t once, s e a r c h i n g f o r c o n n e c t i o n s between food r i o t s and pea- e s t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n and m o b i l i z a t i o n . Chapter 4 adds o p p o r t u n i t y t o t h e

s a n t s o c i a l l i f e , o r between some o t h e r c l a s s of e v e n t s and some o t h e r kind a n a l y s i s ; i t d w e l l s on c o n f l i c t , r e p r e s s i o n and s t r u g g l e s f o r p w e r .

of s o c i a l group. Chapter 5 c l o s e s i n on t h e s p e c i f i c forma of c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n : how they

From M o b i l i z a t i o n to Revolution
- o f f e r s both a p a r t i a l s y n t h e s i s and v a r y , how they r e l a t e t o each o t h e r . and h w they a l t e r under t h e impact

a proposal f o r f u r t h e r inquiry. A s o r e s u l t , i t does not contain a sus- of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , s t a t e m a k i n g and o t h e r b i g s o c i s l changes. Chnpter

t a i n e d a n o l y a i s of a s i n g l e body of e v i d e n c e . The i l l u s t r a t i o n s and 6 c l o s e s i n on v i o l e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n w h i l e Chapter 7 a p p l i e s t h e g e n e r a l

f i n d i n g s r u n from b r a w l s t o s t r i k e s t o r e v o l u t i o n s . A t one p o i n t o r w- l i n e of r e a s o n i n g t o r e b e l l i o n s and r e v o l u t i o n s . Chapter 8 then sums up

other t h e d i s c u s s i o n r a n g e s o v e r much of t h e world. Most of t h e m a t e r i a l . c o n c l u s i o n s , and i n v e n t o r i e s new problems encountered a l o n g t h e way.

however, comes from t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of Western Europe end North America

o v e r t h e l o s t few c e n t u r i e s . That f o c u s g i v e s u s much o p p o r t u n i t y t o con-

s i d e r s t a t e m a k i n g , t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , urbani-
CIIAPTER 2: TIIEORIES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION c o n s e r v a t i v e c o a l i t i o n of l a n d l o r d s and b o u r g e o i s formed, wit11 p a s s i v e

Marx on 1848 s u p p o r t from t h e more c o m f o r t a b l e segments of t h e p e a s a n t r y . Thus

Well o v e r a c e n t u r y ago. K a r l Narx s e t o u t h i s a n a l y s i s of t h e began t h e p r o c e s s which l e d t o Louis Napoleon's coup d ' 6 t a t and t h e

French Revolution of 1848, and of t h e i n t e r n a l s t r u g g l e s which engaged e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a n empire, a n empire devoted t o c a n c e l i n g t h e g a i n s

of t h e r e v o l u t i o n and i n s u r i n g a g a i n s t i t s r e c u r r e n c e . Morx' accottnt

France f o r t h e n e x t f o u r y e a r s . To Marx, t h e r e v o l u t i o n was t h e work

of a temporary c o a l i t i o n among t h e P a r i s i a n p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e p e t t y c o n t a i n e d a good d e a l more -- n o t l e a s t t h e r e l e n t l e s s w i t he t r a i n e d

b o u r g e o i s i e and an e n l i g h t e n e d fragment of t h e b o u r g e o i s i e . Among on t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s of '48 -- b u t t h e s e a r e t h e main l i n e s

of t h e a n a l y s i s .
tlie mnny segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n w i t h i n t e n s e g r i e v a n c e s a g a i n s t
Twelve decades of h i s t o r i c a l work have i d e n t i f i e d some gaps and
t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s , t h e s e were t h e ones who combined a

high d e g r e e of i n t e r n a l communication, a c o n s c i o u s n e s s of common e r r o r s i n Marx' a n a l y s i s . For one example, Marx d i d n o t s e e t h a t many

French workers were a l r e a d y s y m p a t h e t i c t o Bonaporte i n 1848. For

i n t e r e s t s , and a c o l l e c t i v e v i s i o n , however f l e e t i n g , of f u t u r e
a n o t h e r , h e n e i t h e r a p p r e c i a t e d t h e e x t e n t of t h e armed r e s i s t a n c e
t r a n s f o r m u t i o n s which could improve t h e i r l o t .
t o t h e 1851 coup nor recognized t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e involvement oE
Altliough each group had i t s own communications s t r u c t u r e , i t s

own i n t e r e s t s and i t s own v i s i o n , i n Marx' a n a l y s i s tlie c r i s i s of landwning peasants i n that insurrection. Yet t h e arguments Morx

1846-47 drove them t o g e t h e r and made t h e regime v u l n e r a b l e . Thus stated i n The E i u h t e e n t h Brumaire of L o u i s Bonaparte and The Claos

S t r u g g l e s i n France have s t o o d t h e passage of time r a t h e r w e l l . In

they j o i n e d i n t o p p l i n g t h e regime, a s a m i s e r a b l e b u t i n c o h e r e n t

p e a s a n t r y s o t by, a s t h e b o u r g e o i s of f i n a n c e and b i g i n d u s t r y wrung h i s book-length c o n f r o n t a t i o n of Marx' account wit11 t h e Second Republic

t h e i r hands, a s t h e g r e a t l a n d l o r d s looked f o r t h e i r own ways t o s c h o l a r s have come t o k n w , Roger P r i c e o f f e r s many a c a v i l and n o t a

few nuances, b u t ends up i n b a s i c agreement. The brood l i n e s of Marx'

p r o f i t by t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of a regime which had shunted them a s i d e .
*
a n a l y s i s have s u r v i v e d more then a hundred y e a r s of h i s t o r i c a l c r i t i c i s m .
The c l a ~ sb a s e of each p a r t i c i p a n t l i m i t e d i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y

v i s i o n and checked i t s a c t i v i t y . The c l a s s b a s e s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y

c o a l i t i o n a s a whole, Marx thought. condemned i t t o d e f a u l t on t h e

* For a determined a t t e m p t t o review and r e v i s e Morx' arguments

concerning t h e d c t e r m l n o n t s of worker m i l i t n n c y , which c o n c l u d e s

promises of s p r i n g 1848. D e s p i t e t h e e x t e n s i o n of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
w i t h a more e x t e n s i v e r e s t a t e m e n t than P r i c e f i n d s n e c e s s a r y f o r
c o a l i t i o n t o p r o l e t a r i a n s and b o u r g e o i s i n a few advanced c e n t e r s
1848, s e e J . A . ~ a n k s 'Marxist S o c i o l o g y i n Action.
o u t s i d e of P a r i s , tlie r e v o l u t i o n a r y l e a d e r s h i p compromised. It f a i l e d

t o expand i t s program o r i t s power. The c o a l i t i o n began t o d i s i n t e g r a t e

a s t h e workers and t h e b o u r g e o i s w i t h i n i t headed s e p a r a t e ways. A

 Few i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s l a s t a s l o n g a s a personal disorganization. While h e saw t h e L u m p e n p r o l e t a r i a t o s

century. Some endure because s c h o l a r s l o s e i n t e r e s t s i n tlie e v e n t s . l i a b l e t o crime and d i s o r d e r , he a l s o sow a world of difference between

o t h c r s because t h e y f i t p r e v a i l i n g p r e j u d i c e s and d o c t r i n e s . the , brawling and making r e v o l u t i o n s . I f you want t o a n a l y z e major c o n f l i c t s ,

remaining few because t h e y e x p l a i n what happened b e t t e r t h a n t h e i r we h e a r him t e l l i n g u s , i d e n t i f y t h e major c l a s s e s and i n t e r e s t s which

a v a i . l a b l e c o m p e t i t o r s do. Although t h e r i s e of Marxist d o c t r i n e s emerge from t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r o d u c t l o n . Catalogue t h e r c s u l t l n g

and p o l i t i c a l movements h a s undoubtedly promoted t h e a c c e p t a n c e of c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t . Examine each c l a s s you have enumerated i n terms

Morx' h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s e s a s w e l l , i t h a s a l s o d i r e c t e d c r i t i c i s m of i t s p r e p a r e d n e s s t o a c t on i t s i n t e r e s t s . Work o u t tlie c l a s s b a s e s

and new r e s e a r c h t o h i s main arguments. That t h e y hove s u r v i v e d of t h e c h i e f i n s t i t u t i o n s and l e a d e r s involved i n t h e c o n f l i c t . Wntch

t e s t i f i e s t o t h e i r e x p l a n a t o r y power. o u t f o r c r i s e s which make t h e dominant c l o s s e a v u l n e r a b l e , sod e x p e c t

I f t h a t i s s o , we might pay a t t e n t i o n t o Marx' mode of a n a l y s i s . t h e organized underclasses t o s t r i k e . There i s much more t o i t , b u t

T m p l l c i t l y . Harx d i v i d e d t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n i n t o s o c i a l c l a s s e s t h o s e a r e Marx' e s s e n t i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s .

based on t h e l r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g means of p r o d u c t i o n . We a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a t h e o r y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n : of t h e

E x p l i c i t l y , he i d e n t i f i e d t h e major v i s i b l e a c t o r s i n t h e p o l i t i c s c o n d i t i o n s i n which p e o p l e a c t t o g e t h e r i n p u r s u i t of common e n d s .

of t h e time w i t h t h e i r c l a s s b a s e s , o f f e r l n g judgments of t h e i r b a s f c Harx' t h e o r y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s d e b a t a b l e . It i s not s e l f -

i n t e r e s t s , c o n s c i o u s a s p i r a t i o n s , a r t i c u l a t e d g r i e v a n c e s and c o l l e c t i v e e v i d e n t t h a t s o c i a l c l a s s e s and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e t h e p r i n c i p a l

rcadiness for action. Classes a c t , o r f a i l t o a c t . In general, actors i n politics. It i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e t h a t p r i o r o r g a n i z a t i o n

i n d i v i d u a l s and i n s t i t u t i o n s a c t on b e h a l f of p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l s t r o n g l y a f f e c t s a group'a r e a d i n e s s t o n c t . It can e a s i l y be

classes. (There is an i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n : i n analyzing Louis m a i n t a i n e d , c o n t r a r y t o Harx, t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s i n mass movements

Napoleon's s e i z u r e of power. Marx allowed t h a t t h o s e who run t h e t e n d t o i g n o r e t h e i r own t r u e i n t e r e s t s . The Morxinn t h e o r y emplinsizes

s t a t e may a c t , a t l e a s t f o r a w h i l e , i n t h e i r own p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t t h e c o l l e c t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n .

w i t l ~ o u tr e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r c l a s s b a s e . ) In analyzing readiness to Nowadays, ~ a r x 't h e o r y sounds f a m i l i a r . I n some wnyu i t seems

a c t . Uarx a t t a c h e d g r e a t importance t o t h e e a s e and d u r a b i l i t y of obvious. Yet i n tlie n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . i t broke d e c i s i v e l y w l t h tlie

communications w i t t ~ i . nt h e c l a s s , t o t h e v i s i b l e p r e s e n c e of a c l a s s p r e v a i l i n g s c c o u n t s of mass a c t i o n . Other t h e o r i e s t r e n t e d " t h e

enemy. When Morx' p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s a c t e d , they d i d s o o u t of common people" a s i n c a p a b l e of c o n t i n u o u s , c a l c u l a t i n g p u r s u i t of t h c i r

i n t e r e s t s , mutual awareness and i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s , a s responding mainly t o impulses -- good impulses

A s compared w i t h o t h e r a n a l y s t s of t h e same e v e n t s , Harx a t t a c h e d o r bffd -- and t o m a n i p u l a t i o n by e l i t e s . Today t h e Hdrxlon view a g a i n

l i t t l e importance t o g e n e r a l i z e d t e n s i o n , momentary impulses o r has important competitors. The condescending n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y view

of mass action has remained popular with critics of democracy. It Figure 2-1: Competing Analyses

has lingered on in academic analyses of "mass society." And that theory. of Collective Action
too, has rivals.

Among processional students of politics, at least three additional

lines of argument have acquired eloquent advocates. We can identify

the lines loosely with three other nineteenth-century and early

Marxian

organization
of production
- solidarity

collective
twentieth-century figures: Emile Durkheim. John Stuart Mill and Max
conflicting
Weber. Figure 2-1 sketches out the general logic of Marxian, Durkheim- interests
I I
Ian, Millian and Weberisn analyses. The Marxisn analysis, as we have Durkheimian
just seen, generally traces collective action back to solidarity
NON-ROUTINE ROUTINE 1
within groups and conflicts of interest between groups, considers division of labor
J solidarity (cl
discontent dividual
the solidarity and tlie conflicts of interest to reinforce each other, interest

and bases both of them on the organization of production. Durkheim routine action
collective
treated collective action as a relatively direct response to processes I ec tion II I
of integration and disintegration in whole societies. As the diagram

suggests, his followers have developed rather different explanations

of routine and non-routine collective action. The non-routine forms.

according to Durkheimians, grow from the discontent and pursuit of

interest action action
individual interests produced by disintegration of the division of

labor; under conditions of routine integration, on tlie other hand,

aolidnrity leads to collective action, which in its turn reinforces Weberian

solidarity. Mill rooted collective action in the strictly calculating

pursuit of individual interest. The distinctive approach of Millians, ON-ROUTINE ROUTINE

interest collective interest - , collective
as the diagram indicates, is the analysis of the various decision
belief organization belief -. organization
rules which translate individual interests into individual action and

which aggregate individual actions into collective action. Max Weber,

finally, portrayed collective action as the outgrowth of commitment to

c e r t a i n systems of b e l i e f . Weberians, l i k e Durkheimions, tend t o propose I n The D i v i s i o n of Labor i n S o c i e t y and i n S u l c i d e , Durkheim l n i d o u t

d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r r o u t i n e and non-routine c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n : a view o f something c a l l e d a " s o c i e t y " d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g u n s t e a d i l y i n

i n t h e non-routine forms t h e s h a r e d b e l i e f s of t h e group have a s t r o n g , r e s p o n s e t o a v a r i e t y of p r e s s u r e s . Spenking a b s t r a c t l y , Durkheim

d i r e c t impsct on t h e g r o u p ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , w h i l e a s a c t i o n r o u t i n i z e s summed up t h o s e p r e s s u r e s a s a growth i n t h e volume and d e n s i t y of

two t h i n g s happen: o r g a n i z a t i o n grows up t o m e d i a t e between t h e b e l i e f s society. Speaking c o n c r e t e l y , he d i s c u s s e d o c c u p o t i o n o l changes.

and t h e a c t i o n , and group i n t e r e s t s p l a y a l a r g e r and more d i r e c t r o l e The p r e s s u r e s e m p h a t i c a l l y i n c l u d e d t h e i n t e r n a l l o g i c of Lndus-

i n collective action. trialization. On t h e v e r y f i r s t page of D i v i s i o n of Labor, Durkhcim

Marx. Durkheim, M i l l and Neber had d i s t i n c t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t views t e l l s us

of t h e world, and bequeathed t o t h e i ; heirs significantly different

We need have no f u r t h e r i l l u s i o n s about t h e t e n d e n c i e s of modern
a n a l y s e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . L e t u s review c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a n a l y s e s
industry: i t advances s t e a d i l y towards powerful mochines.
i n t h e Durkhcimian, M i l l i o n and Weberian t r a d i t i o n s b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o
towards g r e a t c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of f o r c e s and c a p i t o l , and c o n s e q u e n t l y
t h e Mnrxian l i n e of argument.
t o t h e extreme d i v i s i o n of l a b o r . Occupations a r e i n f i n i t e l y
Durkheim
s e p a r a t e d and s p e c i a l i z e d , n o t o n l y i n s i d e t h e f a c t o r i e s , b u t
Durkheim c r y s t a l l i z e d a widespread n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y view o f .
e a c h product i s i t s e l f a s p e c i a l t y dependent upon o t h e r s (Durkhelm
what i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was doing t o t h e world. He f a s h i o n e d i t i n t o
1933: 39).
a s e t of arguments which have remained dominant i n s o c i o l o g y , e s p e c i a l l y
The " s o c i e t y , " a c c o r d i n g t o Durkheim, e x e r t s i t s c o n t r o l o v e r i n d i v i d u a l s
h e r i c a n , s o c i o l o g y , up t o o u r own time. A s T a l c o t t Parsons put i t :
v i a t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a shared consciousness. A s Durkheim p u t s i t ,

. . . it was t h e problem of t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e s o c i a l system, "The t o t a l i t y of b e l i e f s and s e n t i m e n t s common t o a v e r a g e c i t i z c n s of t h e

of wliat l ~ o l d ss o c i e t i e s t o g e t h e r , which was t h e most p e r s i s t e n t same s o c i e t y forms a d e t e r m i n a t e system which h a s i t s own l i f e ; one may

p r e o c c u p a t i o n of Durkheim's c a r e e r . I n t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h e time, c a l l i t t h e c o l l e c t i v e o r common conscience" (Durkheim 1933: 79). The

one could n o t have chosen a more s t r a t e g i c f o c u s f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g advancing d i v i s i o n of l a b o r , he s a y s , t h r e a t e n s t h e s h a r e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s

t o s o c i o l o g i c a l theory. Moreover, t h e work Durkheim d i d i n t h i s based on t h e e s s e n t i a l s i m i l a r i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s , and t h e r e b y t h r e a t e n s

f i e l d can b e s a i d t o have been n o t h i n g s h o r t of epoch-making; he t h e primacy of t h e needs and demands of t h e s o c i e t y a s a whole o v e r t h e

d i d n o t s t a n d e n t i r e l y a l o n e , b u t h i s work was f a r more s h a r p l y impulses and i n t e r e s t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l . A new s h a r e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s

focused and d e e p l y p e n e t r a t i n g than t h a t of any o t h e r a u t h o r of based on i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e and common f a t e i s both p r o b l e m a t i c and slow

h i s timc (Parsons 1960: 118). t o emerge. I n t o t h e gap between t h e l e v e l of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and t h e

l e v e l of s h a r e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s moves e.
 To be precise, anomie is Durkheim's name for that gap between the shared consciousness, and the free-for-all which results from anomie.

degree of differentiation and the extent of regulation of social relations; Later. in The Elementary Forms of the Religious E,we find Durkheim

from it he derives a set of undesirable results: individual disorienta- analyzing the solidarity producing consequences of ritualized, approved

tion, destructive social life, extensive conflict. Uis concrete examples forms of collective action. In an amazingly anthropomorphic passage. IIC

again come almost entirely from the industrial world. They are the says:

economic crash, the conflict between management and labor, the separation
When a society is going through circumstances which sadden, perplex
of work arid family life, and so on through the standard concerns of
or irritate it, it exercises a pressure over its members, to make
nineteenth-century reformers.
them bear witness, by significant acts, to their sorrow, perplexity
In Suicide. Durklieim sketches the consequences of a rapid growth in
or anger. It imposes upon them the duty of weeping, groaning or
power and wealth:
inflicting wounds upon themselves or others, for these collective

Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and manifestations, and the moral communion which they show and

things. So long as the social forces tlius freed have not regained strengthen, restore to the group the energy which circumntances

equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all threaten to take away from it, and tlius they enable it to hecome

regulation is lacking for a time . . . Consequently, there is no settled (Durkheim 1961: 459).

restraint upon aspirations . . . With increased prosperity desires The basic Durkheimisn idea presents s society strained by a continuous

increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost struggle between forces of disintegration (notably rapid differentiation)

thcir autl~ority,the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates and forces of integration (notably new or renewed commitment to al~sred

them and makes them more exigent and impatient of colitrol. The beliefs). From the basic notion Durkheim derives models of three

state of de-regulation or anomy is thus further heightened by different kinds of collective action: let us call them routine, snomic.

passions being less dlsclplined, precisely when they need more and restorative.

disciplining (Durkheim 1951: 253). We might sum up Durkheim's snalysin of collective action in a aimplc

We begin to see that Durkheim not only propounded a theory of social diagram:

chnnge, but also proposed a theory of collective action.

In fact, he proposed two or three of each. When it comes to the

link between large-scale social change and collective action, we find

Durkheim distinguishing sharply between the orderly pursuit of shared

interests which occurs when the division of labor is not outrunning the
 F j g u r e 2-2: Durklieim's A n a l y s i s The shaded a r e a above t h e d i a g o n a l i s n n f e ; t h e r e , t h e development of

of C o l l e c t i v e Action s h a r e d b e l i e f i s e q u a l t o or g r e a t e r than t h e s t r e s s imposed by

d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and o t h e r c a l a m i t i e s . The a r e a below t h e d i n g o n n l is

dangerous: t h e r e , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o u t s t r i p s t h e e x t e n t of s h a r e d b e l i e f .

Routine c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n g o e s on i n t h e s a f e a r e a , and renews s h a r e d

belief routinely. Anomic c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n c r e a s e s a s t h e n o c i e t y

s l i d e s down from tlie d i a g o n a l . and p e r p e t u a t e s i t n e l f by s h a k i n g slinred

SIIARED
RELIEF b e l i e f s even more tlian t h e y were a l r e a d y shaken. Restorative col.lective

a c t i o n o c c u r s n e a r t h e d i a g o n a l , and moves t h e s o c i e t y back i n t o t h e s a f e

area. Although t h e language ts a l i t t l e odd, tlie argument is very f a m i l i a r .

Durkheim'a t h e o r y , i n c o n t r a s t t o Marx'. l e a d s u s t o e x p e c t anomic

and r e s t o r a t i v e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o r i s e a s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a c c e l e r n t e n .

I t l e a d s u s t o a n t i c i p a t e f i n d i n g tlie p o p u l a t i o n s newly c r e a t e d o r d i s -

placed by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a t t h e c e n t e r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . It
DIFFERENTIATIONpp ,
p r e d i c t s s c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n among s u i c i d e , c r i m e , violence rind non-

routine collective action. I n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . most t h e o r i e s

f o r c o l l e c t i v e b e h a v i o r embody some v e r s i o n of tlie Durkhejmian argument.

Indeed, t h e s t a n d a r d a n a l y s e s of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , u r b s n i e n t I o n , deviance.

s o c i a l c o n t r o l , s o c i a l d i s o r g a n i z ~ t i o nand c o l l e c t i v e behavior which

e m e r g e d i n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a l l b b r e t h e Durkheimian stomp.

The Durkheimian T r a d i t i o n

To s e e t h i s c l e a r l y , we need o n l y exnmine an i n f l u e n t i n 1 book from

t h e 19608: Samuel H u n t i n g t o n ' s P o l i t i c a l Order i n Changlng S o c i e t i e s .

Huntington a r g u e s t h a t t h e e x t e n s i v e domestic c o n f l . i c t i n d e v e l o p i n g

c o u n t r i e s a f t e r World War I1 r e s u l t e d from t h e f a c t t h a t p o l i t t c a l

i n s t i t u t i o n s developed o n l y s l o w l y , w h i l e r a p i d s o c i n l change b o t h

p l a c e d new s t r a i n on e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and promoted tlie

participation of new, demanding groups in political life. Concretely: Figure 2-3: Iluntington's

Social and economic change -- urbanization, increases in literacy Basic Argument

and education, industrialization, mass media expansion -- extend

political consciousneaa, multiply political demands, broaden political

A
participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of
RIGIDITY , .'
political authority and traditional political institutions; they

enormoua1.y complicate the problems o,F cresting new bases of political

association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and

effectiveness. The rates of social mobilization and the expansion

of political participation are high; the rates of political organization

and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability REVOLUTION

and disorder (Huntington 1968: 5 ) .

Tlle larger the discrepancy between institutionalization and modernization.

>
the greater the disorder. At the extreme lies revolution: "The MODERNIZATION

political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political

consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics

at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions

Figure 2-4: Trajectories of Slow and Rapid Social
to assimilate them" (Huntington 1968: 266).
Change in Huntington's Argument
In this formulation, either a speedup of instittltionalization or a

slowdown of modernization will decrease the amount of disorder. But if

SLOW SOCIAL CHANGE RAPID SOCIAL CHANCE
political institutions are very rigid, they will inhibit essential social I
change. Schematically, Huntington's analysis takes the pattern of Figure
I R

2-3. Furthermore, the argument describes different paths through these

possibilities, depending on the pace of social change:

R
Slow social cl~onge,then, is likely to be orderly throughout its course. 2. Inability of authorities to develop policies which mnintaln the

Rnpid social change brings a likelihood of disorder, and a possibility confidence of ordinary people.
L

of revolution. The similarity to Durkheim is impressive. Institutional-

3 . . Events, often fortuitous, which deprive tlie elite of thetr
ization takes the place of Durkheim's shared beliefs, modernization the
means of enforcing conformity, or which lead revolutionary groups
place of Durklieim's differentiation. Huntington's model is much more
to believe they can deprive the elite of those means.
clearly political than Durkheim's. On the one side of Huntington's , Johnson then links these very general phenomena to individual behavior
argument, the capacity of political institutions (not of society in
through the sequence:
general) to handle new demands becomes crucial. On the other, the
rapid change
political mobilization of new groups and the production of new political

problems are the chicf means by which modernization incites disorder. \ systemic disequilibrium

Yet Durkheim could not have disagreed very vociferously; at most he

. \ overtaxing of existing means of homeostatic and purposive
response to change

\
would hove insisted on the importance of non-political restraints, individual disorientation

-panic-anxiety-shame-guilt-depression,ctc.
especially religion, ritual, and occupational organization. The
formation of movements of protest
Durkheimian argument is very much alive. (For an empirical evaluation

of onc part of Huntington's argument -- casting doubt on rapid mobiliza- True to his Durkheimian heritage, he proposes the suicide rate as o

tion as a major source of political disorder -- see Przeworski 1975). prime index of disequilibrium.

Another version from the 1960s appears in Chalmers Johnson's The Durkheimian kernel in Johnson's scheme hns around it a husk

Revolutionary Change. Johnson identifies three clusters of causes for of post-Durkheimisn,words and ideas. Johnson's analysis of revolution

revolution: differs from Huntington's in several important regards. It is even more

strictly political than Huntington's. The pivotal vnriablc is tlie

1. A disequilibrated social system, especially one with power
authority of the established elite. Yet the central idea treots disorder
deflation: "the fact that during a period of change the inte-
as the outcome of a process in which social change weakens the controls
gration of a system depends increasingly upon the maintenance and
and attachments which under more stable conditions hold people in their
deployment of force by the occupants of the formal authority
places.
statuses" (Johnson 1966: 90).
Let us take a third recent example: Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel.

Gurr seeks to provide a general explanation of "political violence."

Political violence includes all collective attacks on major political

actors -- e s p e c i a l l y a g e n t s of t h e s t a t e -- w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r community. Gurr complements h i s argument w i t h an a n a l y s i s of 1 , 1 0 0 " s t r i f e

I n s t e a d of e l a b o r a t i n g a t h e o r y of how p o l i t i c a l communities o p e r a t e , e v e n t s " which o c c u r r e d i n 114 s t a t e s o r c o l o n i e s from 1961 through 1965.

however, Gurr c o n c e n t r a t e s on e x p e r i e n c e s which happen t o i n d i v i d u a l s I n t h e f i r s t round of a n a l y s i s , Gurr t a k e s t h e r e s u l t s a s c o n f i r m i n g t h e

nnd then cumulaee i n t o mass a c t i o n . i n f l u e n c e of some of t h e v a r i a b l e s which presumably produce RD, some

G u r r ' s c e n t r a l arguments concern a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s . Individuals v a r i a b l e s measuring b e h a v i o r which presumably r e f l e c t JUST and,

nnger when they s e n s e a l a r g e gap between what they g e t and what t h e y e s p e c i a l l y , a c l u s t e r of v a r i a b l e s o u t s i d e t h e c o r e t h e o r y : Social

deserve. That can happen through a d e c l i n e i n what they g e t , o r s r i s e and S t r u c t u r a l F a c i l i t a t i o n . A l a t e r f o r m u l a t i o n c o n t a i n s much l e s s

i n what t h e y f e e l t h e y d e s e r v e . Given t h e chance, angry p e o p l e r e b e l . psychology. I n t h e new s e t of models, t h e major p r e d i c t o r s t o t h e

Whcn many people go through t h a t same e x p e r i e n c e of i n c r e a s i n g R e l a t i v e magnitude of p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e r e p r e s e n t " ' c l e a v a g e s ' and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y

D e p r i v a t i o n p l u s widening o p p o r t u n i t y f o r r e b e l l i o n a t t h e same time. inequalities . . . relative impoverishment and f o r e i g n economic e x p l o i -

p o l i t i c a l violence generalizes. Gurr once summarized t h e argument i n tation . . . short-term d e c l i n e s i n economic c o n d f t i o n s . . . rcgimc
t h i s way: i m p o s i t i o n of new p o l i t i c a l s a n c t i o n s . . . historical p e r s i s t e n c e of

blsgnitude of dissident-initiated conflicts . . . level of economic development ...

poJ.itica1 = RD + (RD x JUST x BALANCE) +
violence e x t e r n a l i n t e r v e n t i o n on b e h a l f of d i s s i d e n t s " (Gurr h Duval 1973:

"wl~ere RD i s t h e scope nnd i n t e n s i t y of r e l a t i v e d e p r i v a t i o n ( d i s - 138-139). These v a r i a b l e s do appear t o account J o i r l t l y f o r a good d e a l

c o n t e n t ) i n a p o p u l s t i o n ; JUST i s t h e scope and i n t e n s i t y of b e l i e f s of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n i n major domestic c o n f l i c t s from 1961

i n t h a t p o p u l a t i o n a b o u t t h e j u s t i f i a b i l i t y and u t i l i t y of engaging through 1965. I n t h i s r e f o r m u l a t i o n , Ilowever, t h e Durkl~elmlsn L i n t h a s

i n o v e r t s t r i f c ; BALANCE r e f e r s t o t h e b a l a n c e of o r g a n i z a t i o n and almost bleached away. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e models embody a c e n t r a l

c o e r c i v e c a p n c i t i e s between d i s s i d e n t s and regimes; and is an e r r o r argument, t h e argument a c c e n t u a t e s t h e p r i n c i p a l a c t o r s ' i n t e r c a t s and

term" (Curr h Duval 1973: 137). S i m i l a r i d e a s hove o f t e n emerged i n capacity t o act.

t h e a n a l y s i s of American g l ~ e t t or e b e l l i o n s . of L a t i n Anlerican p a l a c e The s t a n d a r d Durkheiminn arguments, a s we have s e e n , s e l e c t h e a v i l y

coups, and of t h e French Revolution. We saw p a r t of t h e argument from among t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n - organization,

formulated i n Durkhelm's t r e a t m e n t of s u i c i d e . Gurr h a s e x p l i c a t e d t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n , o p p o r t u n i t y and i n t e r e s t s . On t h e whole, they n e g l e c t

l o g i c of t h i s l i n e of n n a l y s l s , and developed means of measuring n t h e a n a l y s i s of o r g a n i z a t i o n and m o b i l i z a t i o n i n f a v o r o f a vlcw of

number of t h e v a r i n b l e s involved -- a l t h o u g h n o t , na i t happens, t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s a r e s u l t a n t of i n t e r e s t p l u s o p p o r t u n i t y . The

measure RD and JUST d i r e c t l y . p r e v a l e n t v e r s i o n of i n t e r e s t , f u r t h e r m o r e , is n t t i t u d i n a l : the

m o t i v a t i o n s , a n x i e t i e s and needs of i n d i v i d u a l s . Opportunlty, i n t h e

Durkheimian l i n e , c o n s i s t s mainly of t h e p r e s e n c e o r absence of s o c i a l does s o i n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h e p u r s u i t of h i s i n t c r e s t s i n t h e long run.

c o n t r o l s d v e r t h c e x p r e s s i o n ' o f t h o s e m o t i v a t i o n s , a n x i e t i e s and needs. As Buchanan and T u l l o c k s a y of Mill's most d i s t i n g u i s h e d predccesnor:

Tf we t a k e Durkheimian arguments s e r i o u s l y , we w i l l e x p e c t t o f i n d
Hume r e c o g n i z e d , of c o u r s e , t h a t were i t poossible, t h e i n d i v l d ~ l a l ' s
s h a r p d i s c o n t i n u i t y between r o u t i n e and non-routine c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ;
own i n t e r e s t would b e s t b e s e r v e d by t h e a d h e r i n g t o t h e c o n v c n t i o n a l
t h e i r c a u s e s , c o n t e n t and consequences w i l l a l l d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y .
r u l e s of e l l o t h e r p e r s o n s b u t himself w h i l e remaining f r e e t o v i o l a t e
We w i l l h y p o t h e s i z e t h a t t h e f a s t e r and more e x t e n s i v e t h e s o c i a l change,
these rules. However, p r e c i s e l y because such r u l e s a r e s o c i a l l y
t h e more widespread t h e onomic and r e s t o r a t i v e forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ;
d e r i v e d , they must a p p l y g e n e r a l l y . Ilence each i n d i v i d u a l must
c o n c r e t e l y , we w i l l e x p e c t r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o r u r b a n i z a t i o n t o
r e c o g n i z e t h a t , were he t o b e f r e e t o v i o l a t e c o n v e n t i o n , o t h c r s
produce e x c e p t i o n a l l y high l e v e l s of c o n f l i c t and p r o t e s t . We w i l l
must be s i m i l a r l y f r e e , and a s compared w i t h t h i s c h a o t i c s t a t e of
srlppose t h a t i n d i v i d u a l d i s o r d e r and c o l l e c t i v e p r o t e s t a r e c l o s e l y
a f f a i r s , h e w i l l r a t i o n a l l y choose t o a c c e p t r e s t r i c t i o n s on h i s
t i e d t o each o t h e r , and sometimes i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . We w i l l a r g u e
own b e h a v i o r (Buchsnan h T u l l o c k 1962: 315):
t h a t t h e more c o h e r e n t and compelling a g r o u p ' s b e l i e f s , t h e l e s s l i k e l y
The key a n a l y t i c q u e s t i o n s concern t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of i n d i v i d u a l
i t is t o engage i n d i s o r d e r l y b e h a v i o r . We w i l l imagine t h a t s h i f t s i n
d e c i s i o n s , t h e c o l l e c t i v e consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e d e c i s i o n r u l e s ,
i n d i v i d u a l d l s s o t i n f a c t i o n s and a n x i e t i e s a r e t h e s t r o n g e s t and most
and t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e two.
r c l i a b l e p r e d i c t o r s of c o l l e c t i v e c o n t e n t i o n .
M i l l and t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s a r e i m p e r f e c t exemplars of t h e r e l e v a n t
Some v e r s i o n of t h e Durkheimian f o r m u l a t i o n hns been t h e dominant
t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y l i n e of argument. T h e i r account of collective a c t i o n
e x p l a n a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n -- e s p e c i a l l y c o n t e n t i o u s and non-
d e a l t almost e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h t h e s t a t e . I t gave nlmost no a t t e n t i o n
routine collective action -- f o r c l o s e t o a century. I t still appeals
e i t h e r t o t h e s t r i v i n g of groups between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and t h c s t a t e
t o many people today. N e v e r t h e l e s s , even i n America, Durkheim's a n a l y s i s
a s a d e t e r m i n a n t of p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s o r t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e
hns never q u i t e squeezed o u t i t s major r i v a l s : arguments i n t h e t r a d i -
b e h a v i o r of t h e groups themselves. "The i n d i v i d u a l i s m of t h e u t i l i t o r i o n s .
t i o n s of M i l l . Weber and Marx.
t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n of s o c i a l phenomena by e humah psychology supposedly
M i l l and t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s
p r i o r t o s o c i e t y , " colmnents John Plamenatz (1949: 158). " n l s o made
John S t u a r t M i l l r e p r e s e n t s t h e t r e a t m e n t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s
them i n d i f f e r e n t t o s o c i a l c l a s s e s . They conceived of ~ o c i e t ya s
a s t r i c t l y c a l c ~ ~ l a t i npgu r s u i t of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t . Among t h e E n g l i s h
composed of a number of competing i n d i v l d r l n l s and n o t of r i v a l g r o ~ ~ p s . "
U t i l i t a r i a n s , we f i n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l a c q u i e s c i n g i n a s e t of b i n d i n g
For John S t u a r t M i l l , i t would be more a c c u r a t e t o s a y Ile feRred
p o l i t i c a l arrangements (n s t e t e , t h e r u l e s of t h e game o r some system
c l a s s a c t i o n than t o s a y be ignored i t . I n a c h a p t e r of h i s 9 r c s e n t a t i v e
of c o o p e r a t i o n ) a t t h e expense of some of h i s s h o r t - r u n i n t e r e s t s . He
 Government titled OF THE INFIRMITIES AND DANCERS TO WllICH REPRESENTATIVE A good constitution and a valid theory of political obligation,

GOVERNMENT IS LIABLE, Mill wrote "If we consider as a class, politically thought Mill, would facilitate that outcome.

speaking, any number of persons who have the same sinister interest -- By contrast with Mill, twentieth-century theorists of indivldunl

that is, whose direct and apparent interest points toward the same interests show relatively little interest in the general problem of

description of bad measures; the desirable object would be that no class, political obligation. Instead, they show much interest in two other

and no combination of classes likely to combine, should be able to problems: the consequences of alternative decision rules and tlie

' exercise a preponderant influence in the government" (Mill 1950: 342). causes and effects of different forms of interest-group politics. Yet

(The term "sinister interest" comes from Bentham.) At some points in Mill is a useful symbol for a line of argument which leads us to expect

hia political career. Mi11 feared the class action of landowners: at collective action to fluctuate largely as a consequence of changing

others, of landless laborers (Duncan 1973: chapter 6). But at all decision rules and the changing costs of accomplishing various individ-

points he considered it natural and inevitable that a class given an ual interests.

opportunity to act on a particular narrow interest would do so. The Collective Choice

task of government -- and of a theory of representative government -- The clearest contemporary expressions of this view appenr in

was to forestall that opportunity, to make likely action on the common models of collective choice: the determinants of alternative outcomes '

interest of the entire population. in situations in which two or more parties make choices affecting the

tlill's liberal solution and his cautious optimism foreshadowed outcomes. In a sense, all of microeconomics deals with collective

those of twentieth-century pluralists: choice. Microeconomic models have been tlie best developed and most

popular in the field. Nonetheless, political scientists, psychologists,

The reason why, in any tolerably constituted society, justice
sociologists, logicians, statisticians and mnthemtlcinns have all
and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point,
accompanied the economists in their search. Come theory, some forms
is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost
of voting analysis, some approaches to formal organization, many
always divided: some are interested in what is wrong, but some,
treatments of public goods and a few analyses of power illustrate
also, have their private interest on the side of what is right;
the relevant work within this tradition (for a careful review, see
and those who are governed by higher considerations, though too
Taylor 1975).
few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others, usually
James Coleman's general treatise on collective choice offers the
after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough
following examples of applications: a simple legislature, realization
to turn the bnlance in favour of the body of private interests
of interests as a func'tion of their conceqtrntion, paying the cost of
which is on the some side with them (Mill 1950: 343).
o p u b l i c facility, formation of a c o n s t i t u t i o n , p a t t e r n s of i n f l u e n c e p a r t of t h e s e c r e t of t h e i r s u c c e s s ; second, i n our own a g e on enor-

i n i n f o r m a l groups, exchange between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and c o n s t i t u e n t s , mously i n c r e a s i n g s h a r e of i m p o r t a n t r e s o u r c e s h a s been coming under

o p o r l i a m c n t a r y system, money a s power i n l e g i s l a t i v e i s s u e s , committee t h e c o n t r o l of c o r p o r a t e a c t o r s . Consequence: " . . . among the variety

s t r u c t u r e i n a l e g i s l o t u r e , , ~s i m p l e b u r e a u c r a t i c s t r u c t u r e (Colemon of i n t e r e s t s t h a t men have, t h o s e i n t e r e s t s t h a t have been s u c c c s s f u l l y

1973: 96-126). I n a l l t h e s e c a s e s , Coleman works w i t h some v e r s i o n c o l l e c t e d t o c r e a t e c o r p o r a t e o c t o r s a r e t h e i n t e r e s t s t h a t dominate

o f a b a s i c equation: t h e s o c i e t y " (Coleman 1974: 49). We a r e no l o n g e r d e o l i n g wltli t h e

consequences of d e c i s i o n r u l e s i n any s i m p l e s e n s e . Yet t h e problem is

very s i m i l a r . ~ o l e m nis s t i l l a n a l y z i n g how t h e method of a g g r e g a t i n g

i n w b i c h v is t h e v a l u e of a g i v e n e v e n t w i t h i n an a r r a y of k p o s s i b l e
i i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h o s e i n t e r e s t s -- wliotever those

events. jXji i s t h e sum o v e r j a c t o r s of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s i n interests are. Under t h e c o n d i t i o n s Coleman d e s c r i b e s , an i n c r c o s i n g

t h a t e v e n t , vk i s t h e v a l u e t o an i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r of a p a r t i c u l a r s h a r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t l i a t

e v e n t , and ckj i s t h e c o n t r o l a c t o r j h a s o v e r e v e n t k . changes t h i n g s , i s c a r r i e d on by, w i t h i n , o r a g a i n s t c o r p o r o t e o c t o r s .

I n example 6 , t h e exchange between a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and h i s H i l l i a n a n a l y s i s i d e n t i f i e s a s i t u a t i o n which H i l l would have obhorred.

c o n s t i t u e n t s , Coleman assumes o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who is t o t a l l y i n t e r e s t e d A l b e r t Hirschmon s u p p l i e s a complement t o C o l e m n ' s a n a l y s i s . In

i n r e e l e c t i o n and s i x b l o c s of v o t e r s who have no i n t e r e s t i n t h e t h e v e r y t i t l e of Exit, Voice, and L o y o l t y , h e i d e n t i f i e s t h e t h r e e

outcome of t h e e l e c t i o n o s such b u t have v a r y i n g i n t e r e s t s w i t h r e s p e c t main r e s p o n s e s t h e members o r c l i e n t s of a c o r p o r o t e a c t o r m y g i v e t o

t o a half-dozen d i f f e r e n t l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n s , a s w e l l a s v a r y i n g i t s d e c l i n i n g performance. The c o n s t i t u e n t s of o c o r r u p t s t o t c m y ,

d e g r e e s of c o n t r o l o v e r t h e e l e c t i o n ' s outcome. He i s a b l e t o show a t a p r i c e , v o t e w i t h t h e i r f e e t ; t h e y may m. They may thetr

good t h e o r e t i c a l grounds f o r e x p e c t i n g t h e l e g i s l a t o r t o f o l l o w t h e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n more o r l e s s a g g r e s s i v e l y ; t l i a t r e s p o n s e , t o o , w i l l hove

c o n s t i t u e n c y where t h e r e is consensus. Less o b v i o u s l y , he g i v e s its price. Or they may w a i t o u t t h e bod t i m e s i n hopes of b e t t e r -

grounds f o r a t t r i b u t i n g g r e a t e r chances of s u c c e s s t o t h e a c t o r whose remin a.
Loyolty, 'too, h a s o p r i c e : e n d u r i n g t h e substondord

i n t e r e s t s a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n few l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n s a n d / o r a l l i e d performance. A l l t h r e e r e s p o n s e s c o s t something. The a n a l y t i c problem

w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r o c t o r s (Colemon 1973:. 115-117). is t o s p e c i f y t h e t r s d e o f f s among e x i t , v o i c e and l o y a l t y , and t o s e e

Colemon h a s extended t h e same s o r t of i n q u i r y t o t h e s t r u c t u r e how t h e t r a d e o f f s vary.

of s o c i e t y a s a whole. Ile p u t s t o g e t h e r two c r u c i a l o b s e r v a t i o n s : For t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , H i r s c l ~ m n ' s f o r m u l e t i o n

-
first, in t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e c o r p o r a t e a c t o r s e a c h a t t e n d t o a narrower improves g f e a t l y on a s i m p l e analogy w i t h a p r i c e system. In a simplc

range of i n t e r e s t s t h a n n o t u r a l persons do; t h a t is t h e i r r a t i o n a l e , p r i c e system, t h e i n e f f i c i e n t f i r m f a c e s t h e l o s s of i t s customers t o

i t s c o m p e t i t o r s , b u t no o t h e r s a n c t i o n . The model of a s i m p l e p r i c e s e l f - i n t e r e s t of t h e a v e r a g e p a r t i c i p a n t . One l i k e l y c a n d i d a t e w h l c t ~

system o f t e n a p p l i e s p o o r l y t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , s i n c e t h e c o s t s of Olson i d e n t i f i e s i s t h e p r o v i s i o n of s e l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e s o t h e r than

e x i t a r e f r e q u e n t l y t o o high. When tlie government i s c o r r u p t , most t h e outcome of t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o particular members of t h e group.

a c t o r s have t o c l ~ o o s ebetween s t a t i n g t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n and s u f f e r i n g Another i s c o e r c i o n , which is t h e n e g a t i v e c o u n t e r p a r t of s e l e c t i v e

i n ~ i l e n c e ,between v o i c e and l o y a l t y . However, tlirschman a r g u e s , incentives. It is a l s o possible t h a t people a r e a c t i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y --

v o i c e i s a t i t s most e f f e c t i v e when e x i t i s p o s s i b l e (and t h e r e f o r e b u t t h e n we must e x p l a i n why.

a r e a l i s t i c t h r e a t ) b u t n o t s o e a s y t h a t people r u s h away a s soon a s Many o t h e r s t u d e n t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n have t r i e d t o p i c k up

perrormnnce d e c l i n e s . Voice t h e n c a r r i e s t h e t h r e a t of e x i t . A t h e problem where Olson l e f t i t . Some c r i t i c i z e Olson's a n a l y s i s .

modicum of l o y a l t y -- of reluctance t o leave -- strengthens the corrective Some t r y t o r e f i n e and q u a l i f y i t . Some go buck t o t h e c l s s s i c p o l i t i c a l

e f f e c t of v o i c e . Hirschmnn c l a r i E i e s tlie s t r a t e g i c choice^ f o r c o l l e c t i v e i d e a of a government ( o r a n o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h powers o f compulsion)

s c t i o n i n a world of g l a n t c o r p o r a t e a c t o r s . which o v e r r i d e s i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s t o s e r v e t h e common good; i n t h a t

Mirschman's a n a l y s i s s t e e r s u s i n t o t h e world of c o l l e c t i v e goods, c a s e , i t does n o t m a t t e r whether t h e c o e r c i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n came i n t o

n s w e l l a s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . A c o l l e c t i v e good i s " . . . any good b e i n g through a d e l i b e r a t e p r i o r agreement, a c o n q u e s t , a d e c e p t i o n o r

s u c l ~t h a t , i f any person Xi i n a group X1 . . . Xi . . . X consumes i t , something e l s e .

i t cannot f e a s i b l y be w i t h h e l d from t h e o t h e r s i n t h a t group" (Olson Other people have t r i e d t o i d e n t i f y a s p e c t s of r a t i o n a l i t y which

1965: 14). Examples a r e a smog-free environment and m i l i t a r y d e f e n s e . Olson n e g l e c t e d . One promising s u g g e s t i o n s e p a r a t e s 1 ) t h e a v e r a g e

Mancur Olson t r e a t s c o l l e c t l v e a c t i o n , i n e s s e n c e , a s t h e e f f o r t t o p a r t i c i p a n t ' s r e t u r n from c o l l e c t i v e a c t l o n and 2) t h e p o s s i b l e r e t u r n

produce c o l l e c t i v e goods. That p e r m i t s him t o a p p l y tlie economic t o tlie p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r who o r g a n i z e s on a c t i o n . A s Frohllch,

t h e o r y of p u b l i c goods t o s new domain: t h e a c t i o n s of l a b o r u n i o n s , Oppenheimer end Young (1971: 6) p u t i t , c o l l e c t i v e goods "wilJ be

i n t e r e s t groups and s i m i l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . One r e s u l t i s Olson's s u p p l i e d when someone f i n d s i t p r o f i t a b l e t o s e t up an o r g a n i z a t i o n ( o r

s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o s common assumption: t h a t t h e e x l s t e n c e and a c t i v i t y make u s e of some e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n ) , c o l l e c t r e s o u r c e s , ond s u p p l y

of s o c l ~o r g a n i z a t i o n s flows n a t u r a l l y from t h e r a t i o n n l p u r s u i t of t h e goods i n question." The e n t r e p r e n e u r a r r a n g e s f o r t h e s u p p l y of

shared i n t e r e s t s . t h e c o l l e c t i v e good i n r e t u r n f o r d o n a t i o n s , e x t o r t i o n s , p u r c h a s e s nnd

I n most c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a c c o r d i n g t o O l s o n ' s a n a l y s i s , t h e a v e r a g e taxes. If t h e sum of d o n a t i o n s , e x t o r t i o n s , purchases and t a x e s 1s

group member's e s t i m a t e d a d d i t i o n a l r e t u r n from p n r t i c i p a t l o n i n t h e s m a l l e r than t h e v a l u e of t h e c o l l e c t i v e good t o n l l r e c i p i e n t s , y e t

e f f o r t w i l l be l e s s than t h e c o s t of t h e e f f o r t i t s e l f . If c o l l e c t i v e l a r g e r than t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r ' s c o s t i n s u p p l y i n g i t , t h e c o l l e c t i v e

a c t i o n does o c c u r , t h e n , i t s e x p l a n a t i o n must l l e o u t s i d e t h e r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s e r v e s t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r a s w e l l ns t h e c o l l e c t i v e

interest .
 F r o h l i c h , Oppenheimer and Young work o u t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s
oE such an approach i n microeconomic language. The t h e o r y l e a d s t o
some interesting hypotheses c o n c e r n i n g c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . For example:
"The more a p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r depends upon d o n a t i o n s , t h e more
wary h e w i l l be of c o l l e c t i v e goods t h a t a r e d u r a b l e o r have
high i n i t i a l c o s t s of s u p p l y . "
"A p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r w i l l d i v e r s i f y h i s a c t i v i t i e s more and
more I n t o t h e p r o v i s i o n of p r i v a t e goods a s t h e s i z e of h i s o v e r a l l
operation increases . . ."
"If h i s chances of v i c t o r y a r e n e a r z e r o , a n o p p o s i t i o n l e a d e r
w i l l d i f f e r e n t i a t e h i s program s h a r p l y from t h a t of t h e incumbent
l e a d e r , a n d / o r p l a n h i s a c t i o n s t o maximize t h e s u r p l u s he can
o b t a i n from remaining i n o p p o s i t i o n . "
"Competitors o p e r a t i n g under s d e c i s i o n r u l e w i l l p l a c e a h l g h e r
premium on f i r m commitments on t h e p a r t of t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s
than t h o s e who do n o t ."
"Whenever s c o m p e t i t o r makes a d e f i n i t e promise t o s u p p l y a
c o l l e c t i v e good i n exchange f o r c o n t r i b u t i o n s from a g i v e n
s u p p o r t e r o r group o f s u p p o r t e r s , h e w i l l t r y t o h i d e t h i s
f a c t from a s many people a s p o s s i b l e . " ( F r o h l l c h , Oppenheimer
and Young 1971: 139-141.)
Thus tlie t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s becomes n major
p a r t of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e form and i n t e n s i t y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
A s i n most M i l l i a n work. t h e i n t e r e s t s i n q u e s t i o n a r e g i v e n and f i x e d .
Yet t h e a n a l y s i s p e r m i t s both u n c e r t a i n t y and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n
c o n c e r n i n g a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
The same emphasis on t h e i n c e n t i v e s and t a c t i c a l problems OF
p o l i t i c a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s a p p e a r s i n t h e r e c e n t work of John UcCarthy
and Mayer Zald. L o o k i n g ' e t American s o c i s l movements, ElcCnrthy and Zald
o b s e r v e tlie r i s e of p r o f e s s i o n a l l y - s t a f f e d movement o r g a n i z a t i o n s such
a s Common Cause and t h e N a t i o n a l Council of S e n i o r C i t l z e n s f o r I l c e l t h
Care through S o c i a l S e c u r i t y . R e f l e c t i o n on such o r g a n i z a t i o n s l e a d s
them t o two c r i t i c i s m s o f c l a s s i c a n a l y s e s of s o c i a l movements:
1 ) t h e i r s t r o n g emphasis on g r i e v a n c e s and s t a t e s of mind a s opposed
t o o r g a n i z a t i o n a l end t a c t i c a l problems; 2) t h e i r assumption of a n
i d e n t i t y among t h e a g g r i e v e d p o p u l a t i o n , t h e s u p p o r t f o r a movement,
and t h e s o u r c e s of l e a d e r s h i p o r a c t i v i s m . Against t h e " c l a s s i c model"
t h e y a r g u e t h a t a l l movement o r g a n i z a t i o n s , whatever t h e g r i e v a n c e s t o
which t h e y respond, f a c e t h e common, p r e s s i n g problems of a c q u i r i n g
enough r e s o u r c e s t o do t h e i r work. I n a s i m i l a r environment, t h e
common problems tend t o produce common s o l u t i o n s , such a s t h e pro-
f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e s t a f f and t h e t u r n i n g t o p e o p l e o u t s l d e t h e
aggrieved population f o r support. The common s o l u t i o n s , i n t u r n ,
produce t h e i r own problems - for example, r e s l ' c o n f l i c t s among t h e
i n t e r e s t s of t h e movement o r g a n i z a t i o n a s s u c h , t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e
o u t s i d e r s who p r o v i d e major s u p p o r t f o r tlie o r g o n l z a t i o n , and t h e I n t e r -
e s t s f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n presumably f i r s t n r o s e . If
we a r e a l o n g way from Mill's concern w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r good
government, we a r e a very long way from Durkheim's anomic i n d i v i d u a l s .

The a n a l y s i s is s t i l l e s s e n t i a l l y M i l l i a n ; i t t e n d s t o t a k e t h e i n t e r e s t s

f o r g r a n t e d , and t o emphasize t h e c a u s e s and e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t means

of a c t i o n on t h o s e i n t e r e a t s .

Strategic Interaction B-
We have followed t h e p a t h from John S t u a r t M i l l which l e a d s t o
i And we can d e s c r i b e some extreme t y p e s of i n t e r a c t i o n by p l a c i n ~
s o c i a l movements v i a c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e and c o l l e c t i v e goods. There
b o u n d a r i e s around a l l p o s s i b l e outcomes:
a r e o t h e r , l e s s t r o d d e n , p a t h s , which c o u l d t a k e us t o t h e same

destination. The most i m p o r t a n t p a s s through t h e s t u d y of s t r a t e g i c

interaction: b a r g a i n i n g , warmaking, game-playing and t h e l i k e . Here

we tend t o t a k e b o t h t h e i n t e r e s t s and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of o u r a c t o r s

a s g i v e n , and t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t a c t i c s and s t r a t e g y a s f u n c t i o n s of

v a r y i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s and of v a r y i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h o s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s .

I m p l i c i t l y , most s t u d i e s of s t r a t e g i c ' i n t e r a c t i o n b e g i n w i t h some

v e r s i o n of t h e f o l l o w i n g scheme:

B GAINS I n t h e p u r e - c o n f l i c t c a s e , no p o s s i b l e outcome p r o v i d e s g a i n s f o r

I both p a r t i e s . I n t h e pure-cooperation c a s e , t h e w o r s t t h a t can

A LOSES A GAINS happen is t h a t n e i t h e r g a i n s . I n t h e open c a s e , a l l f o u r q u a d r a n t s

a r e available.

B LOSES 'The same diagram s e r v e s t o t r a c e t h e patli of a s t r a t e g i c i n t e r -

I n t h e s i m p l e two-party i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h a s i n g l e outcome, an end p o i n t a c t i o n through a s e r i e s of i n t e r m e d i a t e outcomes:

anywhere i n q u a d r a n t 2 means t h a t A g a i n s w h i l e B l o s e s , a n , e n d p o i n t

i n q u a d r a n t 3 means t h a t b o t h l o s e , and s o on. The p o s s i b l e outcomes

of a zero-sum i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l f a l l i n t o a s t r a i g h t l i n e :
 I n its many v a r i a n t s , t h i s approach c l a r i E i e s t h e a n a l y s i s of o u t -
I
comes and p a t h s t o outcomes. ks i n s t u d i e s of c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e , t h e

a n a l y s t t y p i c a l l y manipulates t h e relevant i n c e n t i v e s , information.

d e c i s i o n r u l e s and a v a i l a b l e s t r a t e g i e s . He does n o t a t t e m p t t o

e x p l a i n how and why i n c e n t i v e s , i n f o r m a t i o n , d e c i s i o n r u l e s and a v n i l -

\\ BOTH a b l e s t r a t e g i e s vary. That i s g e n e r a l l y t r u e , f o r example. of t h e

77 DISARMED
t h e o r y of games. I t i s "a g e n e r a l framework f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of i n t e r -

a c t i o n s among s e v e r a l a g e n t s who a r e m u t u a l l y i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . . . and

whose i n t e r e s t s a r e t o some d e g r e e c o n f l i c t i n g " (Kramer and l l e r t z b e r g

1975: 379). Game t h e o r i s t s t y p i c a l l y o r g a n i z e t h e i r a n a l y s e s around

a'payoff'matrix. I n a n e l e m e n t a r y v e r s i o n , we have two s h a r p s h o o t i n g

p i r a t e s , Hook and Blackbeard, d u e l l i n g o v e r a t h o u s a n d - d o l l a r c h e s t of

gold. N e i t h e r one e v e r m i s s e s h i s mark, b o t h f i r e st o n c e , b u t t h e i r

o l d p i s t o l s f a i l one t i m e o u t of two. The s u r v i v o r , i f any. t a k e s t h e

gold; i f b o t h s u r v i v e , t h e y s p l i t t h e t r e a s u r e evenly. The payoff

matrix looks l i k e t h i s :

BLACKBEARD

FIRES MISFIRES

FIRES
HOOK
I n t h i s i n s t a n c e (adapted from Kenneth Boulding ' s C o n f l i c t and Defense,
MISFIRES
p. 50). t h e s h o r t - s i g h t e d i n t e r e s t of e a c h p a r t y i s t o arm a g a i n s t t h e

o t h e r , and t h e s h o r t - s i g h t e d e q u i l i b r i u m h a s both worse o f f because of

arming. The d o t t e d l i n e r e p r e s e n t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a l o n g e r - s i g h t e d ,

more advantageous c q u l l l b r i u m through disarmament.

( I n each c a s e , t h e payoff t o Hook l i e s above tlie d i a g o n a l , t h e payoff O v e r a l l , grab-and-run is a more f a v o r a b l e a t r a t e g y f o r e i t h e r p l r a t e .

t o Blackbeard below t h e d i a g o n a l . ) L e f t i n t h i s form, t h e d u e l i s n o t But i f Hook is s u r e t h a t Blackbeard w i l l g r a b and r u n , h e may b e

much of a game. Each p i r a t e h a s two chances i n f o u r of d y i n g , one tempted t o f i r e . I f Blackbeard is s u r e t h a t llook w l l l r u n , he w l l l be

chance of g a i n i n g a thousand d o l l a r s , and one chance of g a i n i n g 500. i n c l i n e d t o g r a b and r u n h i m s e l f ; Hook, b e i n g f o s t e r , is more l i k e l y

I f each v a l u e s h i s own l i f e a t a thousand d o l l a r s , i n t h e i n s t a n t b e f o r e t o e s c a p e w i t h t h e l o o t , b u t t h e r e i s some chance Blackbenrd w i l l g e t

f i r i n g each p i r a t e aliould e s t i m a t e h i s p r o b a b l e gairi a s t h e r e f i r s t , a good chance t h a t t h e y w i l l s p l i t t h e t r e a s u r e , and no

chance t h a t e i t h e r w i l l d i e .

T h i s f a n c i f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n makes t h e e s s e n t i a l p o i n t : a game-

t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l y s i s p o r t r a y s a s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n a s t h e outcome
Not very encouraging. Without a chance t o r u n away, t o b a r g a i n o r
of one o r more w e l l - d e f i n e d , d e l i b e r a t e d e c i s i o n s on t h e p a r t of each
t o c h e a t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e s i z e of t h a t e s t i m a t e w i l l n o t a f f e c t Hook's
of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . The d e c i a i o n is a f u n c t i o n of t h e outcomes each
o r Blackbeard's b e h a v i o r .
p a r t i c i p a n t c o n s i d e r a l i k e l y t o f o l l o w from t h e v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e com-
To c o n v e r t t h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n t o an i n t e r e s t i n g game, we muat
b i n a t i o n s of h i s own a c t i o n and t h e a c t i o n of t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p o t i t e .
g i v e each p i r o t e a c h o i c e of s t r a t e g i e s , and i n t r o d u c e some u n c e r t a i n t y
So f a r , t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s of game t h e o r y t o t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e
a b o u t which s t r a t e g y each w i l l choose. We can do t h a t by a ) g i v i n g
a c t i o n have been i n d i r e c t . At i t s b e a t , game t h e o r y l i e l p s u s under-
each p i r a t e t h e c h o i c e between f i r i n g , a s b e f o r e , o r t r y i n g t o run o f f
s t a n d t h e s t r a t e g i c problems of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s , and h e l p s u s s e e
w l t h t h e c h e a t w l ~ l l et h e o t h e r p i r a t e is l o a d i n g h i s gun, b ) n o t i c i n g
how tlie a v a i l a b l e means of i n t e r a c t i o n l i m l t t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
t h a t one is a slower r u n n e r , t h e o t h e r a worse s h o t . One p l a u s i b l e
r e a l i z i n g t h e b e a t i n t e r e s t s of any p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r , o r of a l l
m a t r i x r e s u l t i n g from t h o s e changes is:
acotrs together.

Analyses of b a r g a i n i n g l i k e w i s e c o n c e n t r a t e on outcomes and p a t h s

BLACKBEARD
t o outcomes. A s h e n f e l t e r and Johnson, f o r example, a n a l y z e s t r i k e
FTRE CRAB AND RUN
activity. They b e g i n w i t h a t h r e e - p a r t y b a r g a i n i n g model which i n v o l v e s

FIRE a f i r m , i t s workers and t h e workers' union l e a d e r s h i p . The s t r i k e ,

i n t h a t model, i s a consequence of t h e f i r m ' s u n r e a d l n e s a t o accede t o

wage demands p r i o r t o open c o n f l i c t , which i n t u r n depends i n p a r t on

G M
AND
t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between what t h e workers want and what t h e union l e a d e r s
RUN
t h i n k they can g e t . The f i r m - l e v e l model t h e r e f o r e i n c o r p o r a t e s a
series of conditions (the size of wage illcrease acceptable to the workers, their theoretical content, or lack of it. Some (like Ted Curr's

the speed at which the workers' expectations decline during a strike, earlier work) attempt to estimate essentially sttitudinal models in an

and so on) which predict to that unreadiness. econometric style. Some (like Gurr's reformulation of his initial

For lack of evidence to test their models at the level of the firm, argument) are eclectic efforts to assemble individually plausible

Ashenfelter and Johnson make some plausible inferences to determinants variables into equations which state their joint effects and inter-

of strike activity at s larger scale. At the level of the labor force , relations. In either case, we find relatively little of the MillCan

os a whole, they build models involving unemployment levels, previous concern with the effects of alternative decision rules in the context

changes in real wages and corporate profits. Estimating their principal of fixed interests and changing opportunities to act on those ioterests.

equations on numbers of strikes reported quarterly in the U . S. from Douglas Hibbs' cross-national study of "mass political violence"

January 1952 through June 1967, they achieve a good fit to the observed exemplifies the best in pseudo-Million onolyseo. Hibbs analyzes counts

time series. They conclude thst strike activity is, in fact, mainly of riots, armed attacks, political strikes, ossassinstions. deaths

a function of the tightness of the labor market and of previous rates from political violence and antigovernment demonstrations in 108 countries

of change in real wages (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969: 47). (All the summed for two adjacent decsdes: 1948-57 and 1958-67. Via factor

substantial work done so far points to a general tendency for strike analysis, Hibbs combines these diverse events into two dimensions:

activity in contemporary western countries to rise in good times and Collective Protest and Internal War. Then he combs the existing

to decline in bod.) In both the emll-scale model they formulate literature for proposed predictors of these variables, cautiously

and the large-scale model they estimate, Ashenfelter and Johnson por-

tray strike activity as one outcome of a coherent bargaining process

II working them into causal models. One of Hibbs' diogroms of the cstimted

causal relationships (expressed here os standardized regression co-

in which all parties watch closely their opportunities to act on their efficients) appears in Figure 2-5. The diagram indicates, among other

interests. The Cormul.ation differs from those of game theory, but the things, thst the negative sanctions (censorship, restrictions on political

tone of the analysis is still resolutely Millian. activity) imposed by the government during tlie second decade predicted

Mill and Pseudo-Mill strongly to the country's level of internal war and of collective

At the edge of the Millian tradition stand s number of quantitative protest, while the membership of the nstlonsl Communist Party in 1960

analyses of conflict and collective action. We might better call them predicted weakly to the level of collective protest during the second

pseudo-Millisn. They resemble the work of collective-choice ond col- decade.

lective-goods theorists in that the models and estimating procedures ~ibbs'work is representative in that it formulates and tests

typically take on econometric form. They are pseudo-Millian because of general arguments by means of comparisons of aggregated measures for
 considerable numbers of whole countries. It does not examine variation
Figure 2-5: One of Douglas Hibbs'
within countries, among groups or from one time period to another; it
Causal Models of Political Violence
does not treat the determinnnts of particulsr events or deal with their

internal development. With the expanded use of computers, multivariate

statistical analysis and international banks in the 19608, a large

Elite Electoral Internal War D2 number of studies in the same style appeared. tlibb's study summarizes

and improves upon the entire lot.

As compared with Durkheimlan work, Million analyses of collective

action have regularly involved careful. formalization and statistical

estimation of their arguments. Where Durkheimians postulate two or

Product pc 1960 Sanctions D2
three rather distinct types of collective action arising out of different

patterns of social change, Millians tend to think of all collective

action as expressing the same fundamental rationality. The price of

these advantages has been some loss of richness, some concentrnti'on on

situations in which the choices and interests are exceptionally clear,

some tendency to emphasize variables which are easy to quantify. So

far we have a good deal of rigor, but no models of revolution so

Membership 1960
suggestive as those of Huntington or Johnson. The Millinn emphasis on

the rational pursuit of interests is a welcome antidote to notions of

(Abbrcviatlons: In = log-normal transformation; D2 = second decade, crowd action as impulsive and irrational. Yet so far the followers of
1958-67; pc - per capita) Mill have'not given us much insight into the way those interests arise

and change. They have not said much about the way people define,

articulate and organize their interests. For further ideas on those

questions, we may turn to the tradition of Max Webcr.

-
Weber

In Max Weber's treatment , groups commit themselves to coll.ective

definitions of the world and of themselves. The definitions incorporate

 2-39

g o a l s , e n t a i l s t a n d a r d s of b e h a v i o r , and i n c l u d e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e

power of a u t h o r i t i e s . C o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t i e s a c t on b e h a l f of t h e
of t h e charisma i n q u e s t i o n -- which s t a t e s d r a m a t i c a l l y t h e p r o c e s s of

t u r n i n g something e x t r a o r d i n a r y i n t o something o r d i n a r y , i n t o something

groups. Sometimes t h e a u t h o r i t i e s a c t on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l
u n d e r s t o o d and c o n t r o l l a b l e . ) The r o u t i n i z o t i o n of charisma i n v o l v e s
r o l e s , sometimes on t h e b a a i s of t h e i r r a t i o n a l - l e g a l d e s i g n a t i o n a s
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of t h e b e l i e f s w i t h t h e e x i g e n c i e s of o r g a n i z a t i o n ,
a g e n t s f o r t h e group, sometimes on t h e b a s i s o f t h e i r e x t r a o r d i n a r y
development of r e l i a b l e means f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r u e and f a l s e v e r s i o n s
personal character -- t h e i r charisma. Which of t h e a e b a s e s t h e group
of t h e b e l i e f s , p r o v i s i o n f o r s u c c e s s i o n t o t h e l e a d e r a h i p .
a d o p t s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t s i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n and i t s f a t e . Whether i n
Weber s e e s s i x main mechanisms by which c h a r i s m a t i c groups s o l v e
t r a d i t i o n a l , c h a r i s m a t i c o r r a t i o n a l - l e g a l form, however, t h e j u a t i f i -
t h e problem of s u c c e s s i o n (Weber 1972: 143-144):
cations a l l constrain the authorities' actions. I n Weber's a c c o u n t ,

t h e s t r u c t u r e and a c t i o n of t h e group a s a whole s p r i n g l a r g e l y from t h e 1. a s e a r c h f o r a n o t h e r c h s r i a m a t i c l e a d e r o f t h e same t y p e ;

i n i t i a l commitment t o a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of b e l i e f system. Beliefs
2. r e v e l a t i o n through some procedure honored by t h e group;
hnve t h e i r own l o g i c and f o r c e . 3. t h e o l d l e a d e r ' s p e r s o n a l d e s i g n a t i o n of a s u c c e s s o r , w i t h
Weber o f f e r e d h i s f u l l e s t a c c o u n t of t h e o r i g i n s of t h e fundamental t h e group'a a p p r o v a l ;
b e l i e f s i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n s of charisma: t h e d i v i n e g i f t of g r a c e and
4. r i t u a l d e s i g n a t i o n by t h e body of s u r v i v i n g l e n d e r a ;
its secular equivalents. According t o Weber, r e l i g i o u s and i d e o l o g i c a l 5. r e l i a n c e on k i n s h i p , w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t charisma i s i n h e r i t a b l e ;
v i r t u o s o s o r e c o n t i n u a l l y f o r m u l a t i n g new d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e world and 6. t r a n s f e r of charisma t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e t o i t a
of themselves. Only a few, however, a t t r a c t anyone b e a i d e s t h e i r o f f i c i a l s and r i t u a l s .
inventors. I n t h o s e few c a s e s , a group of f o l l o w e r s commit themselves The c h o i c e among t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s then l i m i t s what t h e group can do

both t o t h e b e l i e f system and t o a n acknowledgment of t h e charisma - next. But a l l t h e c h o i c e s r e q u i r e t h e c r e a t i o n of a c e r t a i n amount of

t h e e x c e p t i o n a l moral q u a l i t i e a -- of t h e l e a d e r s , o b j e c t s and r i t u e l s o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , w i t h i t s own momentum and i t s own e x i g e n c i e s .
c o n s e c r a t e d by t h o s e b e l i e f s . I f t h e group s u r v i v e s t h a t p r o c e s a , we have a n o t h e r d u r a b l e collective
Where many more p e o p l e , f o r whatever r e a s o n , f i n d t h a t t h e new a c t o r o p e r a t i n g under t h e d i r e c t i o n of i t s own constituted a u t h o r i t i e s .

d o f i n i t i o n s of t h e world p r o v i d e more c o h e r e n t answers t o t h e problem Weber's d i s c u s s i o n of t h e "everydaying" of charisma f i t s n e a t l y

of meaning they f a c e t h a n do t h e o l d d e f i n i t i o n s a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e t o i n t o h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y of s o c i a l change. Weber p o r t r a y s t r a d i t i o n a l
them, they j o i n and t h e group expands. Then t h e group a s a whole a u t h o r i t y a s a s o r t of e q u i l i b r i u m i n t o which s o c i a l l i f e t e n d s t o

f a c e s t h e problem of t h e " r o u t i n i z a t l . o n of charisma". (Weber's German

f a l l i f no s t r e n u o u s d i s r u p t i o n o c c u r s . But two opposing s o u r c e s of
f o r r o u t i n i z a t i o n is V e r n l l t i g l i c h u n g -- l i t e r a l l y t h e "everydaying" d i s r u p t i o n a r e always p o s s i b l e : t h e power of r a t i o n a l i t y and t h o
 2-41
power of charism. Each represents the force of a coherent idea, of a
pure principle, when applied to history.
Bureaucratic rationalization, says Weber, "can be a revolutionary
force of tlie first rank against tradition, and often has been. But it
revolutionizes by means of techniques . . . from outside, things and
arrangements first" (Weber 1972: 657). The rational rearrangement of
the environment eventually transforms people and their world-views.
Chnrl.sma, in Weber's analysis, works in exactly the opposite way: first
transforming tlie inner life, then leading people to transform their
worlds. "It is in this purely empirical and value-free sense the
supremely and specifically 'creative' force in history" (Weber 1972:
658). As Frnncesco Alberoni points out, in Weber's view "Charisma
does not grow from bureaucracy, but counterpoises itself to bureaucracy;
it appears as something gratuitous, miraculous, irrational" (Alberoni
1968: 15).
As Alberoni also points out, Weber's theorizing stops at exactly
that point. Weber gives us a dramatic, compelling sense of social
change as a product of the irruption of charisma into history and of
the diffusion of rationalization through history. Me provides a sense
of tlie historical power of a movement oriented to a coherent idea. Yet
lie offers no theory of the circumstances under which charismatic move-
ments arise. His giant comparison of civilizations gives us a heroic
historical analysis of the way one rationalizing movement -- that of
modern western Europe -- developed, but no manageable general scheme for
the explanation of rationalizing movements. As a result, Weber's followers
have had to complement their Weberian treatments of the life-courses of
movements with non-Weberion explanations of why people formed and joined
the movements in the first place.
Nevertheless, Weber's formulation agrees with Durkheim's in sug-
gesting that rapid social change (hence, presumably greater likelihood
that existing beliefs will become inadequate as guides to routine social
life) will produce widespread non-routine collective action. Then
Weber goes his own way in implying that there are really two main
categories of collective actors. those oriented to deviant beliefs and
those oriented to beliefs which hove won general acceptonce; routinizotion
and diffusion turn one into the other. By extension, the Weberian theory
also suggests that commitment to a group is on incentive, rather than a
barrier, to participation in collective action -- including non-routine
collective action. Today, political analysts commonly invoke essentlnlly
Weberian explanations of tlie collective actions of notional states and
complex organizations. They are less likely to apply Weber to tlie actions
of crowds, political movements or revolutionary groups.
Social Movements
Studies of collective action within the Weberian tradition hove
commonly employed the framework of the social movement. In his brief
conceptual work on the subject. Paul Wilkinson defines a sociol movement
. . . a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any
direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality,
revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' community ...A social
movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this
may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization
to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the
 c o r p o r a t e group . . .A s o c i a l movement's commitment t o change and proceeds l o g i c a l l y : t h e c h a r a c t e r of campus d i s c o n t e n t , c o n s c r i p t i o n a s

t h e r a i s o n d ' k t r e of i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n a r e founded upon t h e c o n s c i o u s a r e a l i t y and a s an i s s u e , t h e b a s e and p r o c e s s of r e c r u i t m e n t t o t h e

v o l i t i o n , normative commitment t o t h e movement's aims o r b e l i e f s , movement, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l problems and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s o f t h e movemcnt.

and a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e f o l l o w e r s o r members p o l i t i c a l outcomes of movement a c t i o n s . For example, Useem p o l n t s o u t

(Wilkinson 1971: 27). t h e g r e a t importance of t h e f r a g i l e s t u d e n t d r a f t deferment a s s s t i m u l u s

T h i s d e f i n i t i o n , a l t h o u g h c l e a r e r t h a n most of t h o s e one e n c o u n t e r s on t o j o i n i n g t h e movement. For a n o t h e r , he a n a l y z e s t h e s . i g n l f l c a n c e of

e t o u r through t h e l i t e r a t u r e of s o c i a l movements, conveys t h e u s u a l temporary c o a l i t i o n s between R e s i s t a n c e and o t h e r p r o t e s t groups s e e k i n g

meaning of tlie term. The u n d e r l y i n g c o n c e p t i o n r e f l e c t s t h a t o f Weber: s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t g o a l s ; i n h i s view, t h e decay of c o a l i t i o n s w i t h

a group of people somchow o r i e n t themselves t o t h e same b e l i e f system s u c h groups a s SDS a c c e l e r a t e d t h e d e c l i n e of R e s i s t a n c e a s a movement.

Useem's agenda is c l a s s i c . We f i n d i t d i r e c t i n g s t u d i e s of r e v o l u -
and a c t t o g e t h e r t o promote change on tlie b a s i s of t h e common o r i e n t a t i o n .

Thus t h e s t a n d a r d q u e s t i o n s become: llow do such systems of b e l i e f s t i o n a r y movements, r e l i g i o u s movements, e t h n i c movements. movcmcnta of

a r i s e and a c q u i r e f o l l o w i n g s 7 How do they c o n s t r a i n t h e i r a d h e r e n t s 7 reform. Useem himself h a s a p p l i e d t h c same scheme t o a wide v a r i e t y of

How do they and t h e groups which form around them change, r o u t i n i z e , American p r o t e s t movements. He ends t h a t s u r v e y w i t h two major c o m p l a i n t s

disappear7 a b o u t e x i s t i n g a n a l y t i c e l schemes: 1 ) a l t h o u g h t l ~ c yp r o v i d e a r e n s o n a b l e

We a r e n o t s u r p r i s e d , t h e n , t o f i n d Michael Useem beginning h i s g r i p on t h e i n t e r n a l development of a movemcnt once i t h a s begun, t h e y

d i a c u s s i o n of t h e R e s i s t a n c e , t h e American movement of t h e 1960s a g a i n s t c o n t a i n no s e r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e g e n e s i s of p r o t e s t movements;

m i l i t a r y c o n s c r i p t i o n , w i t h t h e s e words: 2) t h e i r a c c o u n t s of t h e p r o c e s s by which such movements m o b i l i z e f o r

a c t i o n a r e q u i t e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . . " A t t e n t i o n must b e d i r e c t e d . " c o n c l u d e s

The formati,on of a p r o t e s t movement i s g e n e r a l l y c o n t i g e n t on
.Useem. " a t t h e c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n major i n s t i t u t i o n a l systems i n America,
t h e p r e e x i s t e n c e of a group of people u n i t e d around a s e t of
b o t h a s s o u r c e s of p r o t e s t and a l s o f o r t h e r o l e they p l a y i n s l ~ a p i n g
p o l i t l c a l p r i n c i p l e s d e a l i n g w i t h a s o l u t i o n t o a s o c i a l problem.
t h e program, o r g a n i z a t i o n , and growth of tlie movemcnt. S i n c e mnny
Some p r o t e s t s e r u p t s p o n t a n e o u s l y and r e f l e c t l i t t l e c o n s c i o u s
t y p e s o f c o l l e c t i v e b e h a v i o r and s o c i a l movements do n o t s h a r e such r o o t s ,
e f f o r t by a p o l i t i c i z e d l e a d e r s h i p . But many movements, t h e
a t t e m p t s t o develop a s i n g l e t h e o r y f o r e x p l n i n i n g a f u l l r a n g e of
Resistance included, a r e i n s t i t u t e d only a f t e r a lengthy maturation
c o l l e c t i v e phenomena a r e bound t o o v e r l o o k f a c t o r s t h a t p l a y a r o l e i n
p r o c e s s i n which a s u b s t a n t i a l number of p e o p l e come t o view a
p r o t e s t , but not o t h e r t y p e s o f , movements" (Useem 1975: 51).
new p r o t e s t program a s v a l i d and r e a l i s t i c (Useem 1973: 37).

Given t h a t b e g i n n i n g , Useem's own i n q u i r y i n t o American d r a f t r e s i s t a n c e

 Anyone who runs through the many writings on American social
movements will notice, in fact, a good deal of agreement about tlie
characteristic life histories of movements and widespread disagreement
about why and how movements arise in the first place. Joseph Gusfield's
Symbolic Crusade, a thoughtful analysis of the American Temperance
movement, distinguishes among three types of movement: class, status
and expressive. The class movement, according to Gusfdeld, organizes
instrumentally around some specific interest of its public. The status
movement orients itself toward the enhancement or maintenance of the
group's prestige. Expressive movements "are marked by goalless behavior
or by pursuit OF goals which are unrelated to the discontents from which
the movement had its source" (Gusfield 1966: 23). In all three cases
the character of tlie public and the character of the goal provide the
major explanations of the movement's content.
Temperance, in Gusfield's view. is largely a status movement; it
arose as a defense of old elites against their declining prestige. In
the twentieth century:
The polarization of the middle classes into abstainers and moderate
drinkers is port of a wider process of cultural change in which
traditional values of the old middle class are under attack by
new components of the middle stratum. In this process of change,
Temperance is coming to take on new symbolic properties as a
xehicle of status protest (Gusfield 1966: 139).
Gusfield sees post-Prohibition Temperance as coalescing with a new
fundamentalism against self-indulgent, morally lax, consumption-
oriented modernism - and thus expressing the status anxieties of the
old middle class in the twentieth century.
Roberta Ash embeds her own brief discussion of Temperance in a
survey of nineteenth-century middle-class movements. They were more
or less interchangeable, she says, but Temperance mingled "a desire to
ameliorate the lot of workers, to destroy a less genteel life style
and perhaps unconsciously express frustration st the loss of political
power ... " (Ash 1972: 136). The characterization differs somewhat
from Gusfield's, but the basic pro~edureis the same: account Eor the
movement's genesis and content by means of the structural situation in
which the adherents find themselves at the start. In her general
analysis of social movements in America, Ash portrays changes in the
organization of production as producing new structural problems for
different social groups; when ideologically legitimate means for acting
on those problems are not available, the groups tend to create social
movements for the solutions of their problems. She eventually comes to
the'conclusion that the "status politics" which ark so important to
Gusfield's analysis actually turn out to be class politics, misdirected
or in disguise.
The analyses of Gusfield and Ash are only loosely Weberian. They
accept the Weberian idea of a social movement with its own rotionole,
momentum and life history. Yet they do not assign such s compelling
, . parer to the idea around which the movement organizes in the first
i place, and they expend much of their effort in tracing the correspondences
I
1
t
between the social situations of the actors and the contents of the
movements they form or join. Furthermore, Ash self-consciously adopts
Marxian ideas concerning the origins of structural change. Yet in
identifying the social movement as a coherent object of study and in
treating its formation as a break with legitimate, routine social life,
both Ash and Guafield align themselves with Max Weber.
The Weberian tradition has been rich in inspiration for case studies
and poor in inspiration for further theorizing. In both regards it
differs from the Durkheimian and Millian traditions: both of them have
stimulated reformulation after reformulation, but have proved very hard
to apply to individual, concrete cases. Alberoni and Useem have already
identified the problem for us. Weber left almost untouched the analysis
of the genesis and mobilization of charismatic movements. At the same
timc, he taught that such movements had their own logic, and represented
a sharp break with routine, legitimate social life. The assumptions
of autonomy and separateness make it awkward for the student of a movement
to fill the gap in Weber's analysis by appealing to the everyday interests
of the participants.
Nevertheless, students of social movements who were serious about
origins and mobilizntion have normally gone outside the Weberian frame-
work for their explanations. Ash turns to an unexpected combination:
neo-Marxism and the work of Edward Shils. Useem's proposal to study
"institutional contradictions" is Marxist in inspiration. Anthony
Oberechall's general work on Social Conflict and Social Movements
essentially breaks the subject into three parts: 1) an analysis of social
conflict, which is quite eclectic in its theoretical origins; 2) an
nnalysia of the mobilization of conflict groups, which relies especially
on the Millian framework of Mancur Olson; 3) an analysis of the life
histories of conflict groups, which resembles classic treatments of
social movements. In Oberschsll's analyses, the strong emphasis on
real interests and strategic problems with regard to social conflict
end mobilization wars against the autonomy end separotencss inllcrcnt in
the idea of a "movement." In this case, the interests nnd strategy
win; the notion of a social movement as anything more thnn a set of
mobilized conflict groups collapses.
So why bother with Weber? Because Weber and the Weberians have
pursued several problems in collective action more persistently and
effectively than have the followers of Durkheim and Hill. People
sometimes group around distinctive definitions of thc world and of
themselves: why and how? There something about the growth of
Temperance or Abolitionism that neither an analysis of whole social
classes nor a study of specific associations exhausts: what is It?
A group's conception of its aims and rights does inform its action
and influence its very readiness to act: can't we take that into
account? Weber left us an important agenda.
Marxian Analyses since Morx
The classic Marxist analysis derives shared interests from common
position in the organization of production, changes in interest from
shifts in the organization of production. Any set of people in a
common relationship to the means of production form a class, but
classes very greatly in internal structure and common consciousness.
Shared aims and beliefs emerge from shared interests, as mediated by
a class' internal structure and its relationship to other classes.
Collective action likewise results from shared interests, ss mediated
by internal structure, relationship to other classes end common conscious-
ness. Thus the broad logic runs:
 organization
i n England; 2) t h e f u r t h e r i d e a t h a t t h e c l a s s c o a l i t i o n mnklng t h e
production
r e v o l u t i o n h a s s t r o ~ ~ g li nyf l u e n c e d t h e subsequent p o l t t i c n l o r g a n i z a t i o n
consciouaneaa
of t h a t c o u n t r y , w i t h a c o a l i t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t s and l a n d l o r d s , f o r

i n s t a n c e . t e n d i n g t o produce f a s c i s m . Thus p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy

becomes t h e h i s t o r i c a l l y - s p e c i f i c consequence of t h e e a r l y emergence

t o other
of a g r a r i a n c a p i t a l i s m i n c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s , a c i r c u m s t n n c e perhops

never t o be repeated again. Moore p r o v i d e s evidence f o r h i s twtn

Marxian a n a l y s e s s i n c e Marx have v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t h e r e l a t i v e
t h e s e s v i a extended compariaona of t h e h i s t o r i e s of England. France.
weight and autonomy t h e y have a s s i g n e d t o t h e s e v a r i a b l e s . They have
t h e United S t a t e s . China. J a p a n and I n d l a , p l u s numerous e x c u r s i o n s
a l s o v a r i e d i n how much t h e y have recognized o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t a c t o r s
t o Germany and Russia.
than s o c i a l c l a s s e a : s t a t e s , e t h n i c g r o u p s , r e l i g i o u s movements, and
R e v o l u t i o n t a k e s on a n i n t e r e s t i n g r o l e i n Moore's scheme. The
s o on. The s t r i c t e r t h e Marxism, t h e l e s s s i g n i f i c a n c e a t t r i b u t e d t o

these other actora. By a s t r i c t s t a n d a r d , many people i n t h e Marxian

major r e v o l u t i o n -- t h e English C i v i l War, t h e French Revolutton. and

t r a d i t i o n do n o t q u a l i f y a s M a r x i s t s a t a l l . Nonetheless, they stand

s o on -- a c t s a s a c r u c i a l s w i t c h i n t h e t r a c k a l o n g w l ~ i c ha p a r t i c u l a r

c o u n t r y moves. Yet r e v o l u t i o n d i s s o l v e s a s a phenomenon & generis.

o u t from t h e f o l l o w e r s of Durkheim, M i l l and Weber by i n s i s t i n g on t h e
,. f o r i t becomea simply t h e maximum moment of c o n f l i c t s which endure
p r i o r i t y of m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t s and by f o l l o w i n g t h e g e n e r a l l o g i c of
long b e f o r e and l o n g a f t e r t h e t r a n s f e r of power; i n d e e d , t h e c n s e of
Marx' e x p l a n a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Although t h e r e a r e s t r i c t l y
Germany shows t h a t t h e fundamental t r a n s f e r s of power which occupy
contemporary examples, two of t h e most u s e f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n s f o r o u r
t h e c e n t e r of Moore's a n a l y s i s can occur w i t h o u t any r e v o l u t i o n a t
p u r p o s e s ' a r e t h e h i s t o r i c a l s y n t h e s e s of B a r r i n g t o n Moore, J r . and
a l l i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l s e n s e of t h e word:
E r i c Wolf.

The complex web of Moore's S o c i a l O r i g i n s of D i c t a t o r s h i e d The n o t i o n t h a t a v i o l e n t popular r e v o l u t i o n is somehow n e c e s s a r y

Democracy hangs on two pegs: 1) the idea that the c l a s s coalitions i n o r d e r t o sweep away "feudal" o b s t a c l e s t o i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n
involved i n t h e g r e a t modernizing r e v o l u t i o n s -- hence the character i a p u r e nonsense, a s t h e c o u r s e of German and J a p a n e s e h i s t o r y
of t h o s e r e v o l u t i o n s -- have depended e s p e c i a l l y on t h e f a t e s of t h e demonstrates. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e p o l i t i c a l consequences
a g r a r i a n c l a s s e a i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e c o m e r c i a l i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e from dismounting t h e o l d o r d e r from above a r e d e c i d e d l y d i f f e r e n t .
and t h e growth of t h e a t n t e , w i t h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n of t h e p e a s a n t r y and As they proceeded w i t h c o n s e r v a t i v e m o d e r n l z a t i o n , t l ~ e s esemi-
t h e c o o p t a t t o n of t h e a r i s t o c r a c y and g e n t r y , f o r example, b e i n g c r u c i a l p a r l i a m e n t a r y governments t r i e d t o p r e s e r v e a s much of t h e o r i g i n a l
 social structure as they could, fitting large sections into the To ensure continuity upon the land and suatenance for his household,

new building wherever possible. The results had some resemblance the peasant most often keeps the market at arm's length, for unlim-

to present-day Victorian houses with modern electrical kitchens ited involvement in the market threatens tiis hold on his source of

but insufficient bathrooms and leaky pipes hidden decorously livelihood. He thus cleaves to traditional arrangements which

behind newly plastered walls. Ultimately the makeshifts collnpsed guarantee his access to land and to the labor of kin and neigh-

(Moore 1966: 438). bors . . . Perhaps it is precisely when the peasant con no longer
We find ourselves at the opposite pole from Chalmers Johnson's "dis- rely on his accustomed institutional context to reduce his risks,

equilibration" and "dysfunction." In Moore's analysis, the major but when alternative institutions are either too chaotic or too

conElicts which occur -- including the revolutions themselves -- are restrictive to guarantee a viable commitment to new ways, that

port of the very logic of the political systems they shake apnrt. the psychological, economic, social and politico1 tensions all

The second case in point is Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twentieth mount toward peasant rebellion and involvement in revoli~tion

Century. Wolf takes on the revolutions of Mexico;Russia, China, Viet (Wolf 1969: xiv-w).

Nam, Algeria nnd Cuba. He extracts from them importnnt lessons about the From that springboard. Wolf lesps to a close examination oE the experience

response of peasants the world over to being drawn into the capitalist of the peasantry in each of his countries, to scrutiny of the conditions

world economy. Even less concerned to lay out an explicit theoretical under which each of the revolutions in question broke out. and to com-

structure thnn Moore, Wolf nevertheless builds a powerful analysis of parative analyses of the determinants of the considerably different

the structural foundations of peasant life, the precise ways in which forms of involvement of these various peasant populations in their

the expansion of national and internationnl markets shakes those national movements.

foundations, the conditions under which peasants resist the threat with Some common features emerge: the crucial role of the middle

force, and the circumstnnces under which that resistance (however peasants, rather than the rural proletarians or the kulaki; the in-

reactionary its inception) serves revolutionary ends. fluence of alliances with-disaffected intellectusla; the initially

The most general argument is simple and telling: defensive and inward-looking character of all the peasant rebellions;

the frequent occurrence of a deadlock of weak contenders for power,

The major aim of the peasant is subsistence and social status gained
ultimately favorable to well-organized central groups allied with
within a narrow range of social relationships. Peasants are thus
military power; the final inability of peasants to accomplish their
unlike cultivators, who participate fully in the market and who
political ends, however successful their rebellions in the short run.
commit themselves to a status game set within a wide social network.
in the absence of strong alliances with determined and organized non-

peasants.
 Wolf's sense of the variables involved will probably contribute
more to our understanding of political conflict than his enumeration of
the conatants. He shows very effectively (in a line of argument similar
to Moore's) that the coalitions formed by rebellious peasants strongly
affect whether their actions go beyond the immediate redress of grievances.
that where comercialization has proceeded so far as to dissolve the
traditional organization of the peasant community, rebellion does not
occur (contrary to the mass-society notion that atomized and anguished
people make ideal rebels), that a center-outward pattern of rebellion,
as in Russia, China, and Viet llam, favors the expanded power of a single
party, as opposed to on army andlor a national bourgeoisie.
The Collective History of Collective Action
Both Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf are non-historians who turned
to history for evidence concern processes going on in the contemporary
world. They have plenty of companions within the hiatorical profession.
Among recent historians of collective action. Marxian thinking has
prevailed. Georges Lefebvre, the great, long-lived historian of the
French Revolution, provided much of the inspiration, if not much of the
techniques. He forwarded the idea of multiple, semi-autonomous revolutions
. .
converging into a single Revolution. He demonstrated that the semi-
autonomous revolutions -- especially the peasant revolution -- were
accessible to study from the bottom up. But he did not systematize the
study of the populations involved.
Albert Soboul did. Soboul has no doubt been Eefebvre's most
influential heir in both regards. His 1958 thesis. & sans-culottes
pariaiens en l'an 11, shone a torchlight on faces previously deep in
shadow: the faces of the day-to-day activists of the Parisinn sections.
(The "sections" were essentially neighborhood governmenta and political
associations.) It did so mainly through the straightforward but extremely
demanding analysis of the papers of the sections themselves, and the
painstaking reconstitution of their membership.
At about the same time. Richard Cobb was carrying out a close study
of the composition and characteristics of the volunteer Revolutionary
Armies which played such a crucial role in the early yearsof theRevolution.
K8re Tdnnesaon was following the Parisian sans-culottes through the Yenr
111. George Rudd was analyzing the composition of the revolutionary crowds
on the great Journ<es, Adeline Dnumard. Louis Chevalier and Fmnsois
Furet were closely scrutinizing the changing composition and wealth of
the Parisian population from the late eighteenth century to 1848, and
RQmi Gossez was applying many of the same microscopic procedures to the
Revolution of 1848. These historians varied greatly in preconceptions.
techniques and subject matter. What brought them together, with dozens
of their compatriots, as exponents of s new brand of history is the
deliberate accumulation of uniform dossiers on numerous ordinary indivi-
uals in order to produce solid information on collective chsracteristica
not readily visible in the experiences of any one of them. The solid
information was often numerical. although the quantification involved was
ordinarily elementary.
The adoption of this sort of "collective historyv did not guarantee
success. It could have been a terrible waste of time. Indeed, it
have been a waste of time, if old theories about the blind spontaneity
of the masses were correct. As it turned out, however. collecrive history
yielded great returns when applied to French political conflicts. llistorians
nar understand how wide and deep was the political mobilization of ordinary
Frenchmen in 1789 and 1848, how coherent the action of the so-called mob,
how sharp the rifts within the coalition which made the Revolution of 1789
lied become by 1793. The Marxist approach to the study of French political
conflicts gained new strength, both because Marxists were more inclined
than others to take up the close study of the "little people" which this
sort of collective history involved, and because the Marxist tradition
provided more powerful means of analyzing major divisions within the
population than its rivals did.
Outside of France, the greatest impact of collective history on
the study of collective action appeared in England. England has its own
tradition of collective biography, exemplified by the parliamentary
analyses of Lewis Namier. In the field of collective action, however,
the distinctive English contribution did not consist of formal individual-
by-individual analysis of participants. It was the application of the
logic of collective hiogrnphy to events, complemented by the identification
and analysis of evidence concerning the character, outlook and behavior
of ordinary participants in major conflicts and movements. As a prime
example of the first we have Hobsbawm and Rudd's Captain Swinp; the book
reports a thorough systematic study of the many local conflicts comprising
the Swing Rebellion, the great agricultural laborers' revolt of 1830.
As the dominant work of the second type we have E. P. Thompson's The
Making of the English Working Class, a richly-documented portrayal of
workers' struggles from the period of the French Revolution to the
beginning of Chartism.
A recent English example combines the Hobsbawm-Rudd and Thompson
approaches. John Foster's Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution
traces the development of class consciousneaa and working-class collective
action in three industrial tarns -- Oldl~am. Northampton and South
Shields -- during the first half of the nineteenth century. Severs1
features of Foster's study are extraordinary. He is meticulous and self-
conscious in his theorizing; he carefully spells out the empirical
implications of an essentially Leninist argument: a labor aristocrscy
forms, and serves for a time as a vanguard of class-conscious collective
action, but is eventually split, its fragments coopted or isolated in
the capitalist counterattack. Foster is equally meticulous in assembling
and presenting his evidence; it includes close analyses of marriage
patterns, collective biographies of working-class activists and treatments
of changes in the labor force. Finally, Foster devotes great attention
to the opponents and exploiters of the workers: the local bourgeoisie.
Indeed, one of Foster's most illuminating discussions treats the bourgeois
adoption of rigorous religious practice as a means of taming and shaming
the workers.
It is no accident that solid Marxist analyses abound in European
historical work and are rare in studies of contemporary America. There
are two basic reasons. The first is simply thnt Marxism has remained a
lively, evolving body of thought in Europe while sometimes fossilizing
and sometimes having to hide underground in America. The second is that
Marxist ideas are most adequately developed in regard to the experience
Marx himself treated most fully: the conflicts surrounding the growth
of capitalism in Europe. The Marxist scholar's task is to adapt to
other settings a model which is already well fitted to the European
historical experience.
Among the determinants of collective action, Marxists have generally
given grent attention to interests and organization, have sometimes dealt
w i t h m o b i l i z a t i o n , b u t have g e n e r a l l y n e g l e c t e d o p p o r t u n i t y . As compared Our Task

w i t h Durkheimian, M i l l i o n and Weberian a n a l y s e s , t h e Marxian t r e a t m e n t I f we t r y t o a d j u d i c a t e among t h e t h e o r i e a of c o l l c c t i v c a c t i o n I

of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s t r e s s e s t h e u b i q u i t y of c o n f l i c t , t h e importance have aomewhat a r b i t r a r i l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h Marx, M i l l , nurkheim and Weber,

of i n t e r e a t a r o o t e d i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o r p r o d u c t i o n , t h e i n f l u e n c e of we f i n d o u r s e l v e s i n a f r u s t r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n . The s i t u a t i o n , n l a a , is

s p e c i f i c forms of o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e c h a r a c t e r and i n t e n s i t y of c o l l e c t i v e common i n t h e a o c i a l s c i e n c e s . The t h e o r i e a a t hand c l e a r l y l e a d i n

action. M a r x l s t a have n o t paid a s much a t t e n t i o n a s Weberians have t o d i f f e r e n t directions. Yet i n many a r e a s they a r e t o o incomplete o r t o o

t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of p r e v a l e n t b e l i e f ayatems. o r t o , t h e p r o c e a a e s by imprecisely a p e c i f i e d t o permit e i t h e r c l e a r confrontations with o t h e r

.
which movements r i s e and f a l l . They have n o t matched t h e M i l l i a n s i n theories o r decisive testing against the facts. Where .they a r e w e l l

p r e c i s e modeling of decision-making p r o c e s s e s . There i s , however, no s p e c i f i e d , f u r t h e r m o r e , i t o f t e n t u r n a o u t t h a t they a r e t a l k i n g about

obvious a n a l y t i c ground on which t h e Durkheimians have t h e advantage d i f f e r e n t things: t h e o r i e s of c o l l e c t i v e c h o i c e a p p l y t o s i t u a t i o n s i n

o v e r t h e Marxiana. which t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e l i m i t e d and w e l l d e f i n e d , t h e o r i e s of c o l l e c t i v e

That w i l l be t h e g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e of t h e a n a l y s e s t o f o l l o w : b e h a v i o r r e f e r t o what happens when t h e s t a n d a r d c h o i c e s a r e suspended,

doggedly anti-Durkheimian, r e s o l u t e l y pro-Marxian, b u t sometimes i n d u l g e n t and s o f o r t h .

t o Webe: and sometimes r e l i a n t on M i l l . Good Durkheimiana w i l l f i n d l i t t l e I n Kenneth Boulding'a t e r m s , t h e o r i e s i n t h e t r a d i t i o n of M i l l d e a l

comfort i n my arguments o r i n such e v i d e n c e a s I p r e s e n t : no s u p p o r t i n mainly w i t h exchange ayatems ( t h o a e i n which t h e i n c e n t i v e f o r one person

e i t h e r r e g a r d f o r uprooted masses a s makers of r e v o l u t i o n s , r a p i d s o c i a l o r group t o a c t i s t h e d e s i r a b l e r e t u r n someone e l s e w i l l g i v e them i n

cllange a s a g e n e r a t o r of anomic c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and s o on. Orthodox response). Durkheimian t h e o r i e s d e a l mainly w i t h i n t e g r e t i o n systems

M a r x i s t s w i l l f i n d themaelves aomewhat more a t home than t h e Durkheimiana, ( t h o s e i n which t h e i n c e n t i v e is a s e n s e of common f a t e o r i d e n t i t y ) .

b u t w i l l s t i l l f i n d much t o d i s a g r e e w i t h -- n o t a b l y the considerable Weber'a l i n e emphasizes t h r e a t systems ( t h o a e i n whlch t h e i n c e n t i v e i s

importance a t t a c h e d t o p o l i t i c a l p r o c e a a e s and t o i n t e r e a t a which a r e an u n d e s i r a b l e r e s p o n s e a n o t h e r group w i l l v i s i t on t h e a c t o r i f h e f a i l s .

n o t obvioualy and d i r e c t l y based on c l a s s c o n f l i c t . Followers of Weber t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way). The Marxian l i n e of t h i n k i n g d e a l s mainly

w i l l d e s p a i r a t t h e v i r t u a l absence of charisma snd a t my avoidance of w i t h t h r e a t 8 and exchange, a l t h o u g h i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h i n groups -- especially

t h e a o c i a l movement a s a u n i t of a n a l y s i s ; a t l e a s t they w i l l g l o a t within classes -- becomea a n i m p o r t a n t c o n d i t i o n f o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n by

o v e r t h e conccaalons made t o s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n s of r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s t h o a e groups.

a s b a s e s of c o l l e c t i v e ~ a c t i o n . M i l l i a n a w i l l r e j e c t much of t h e d i a - We can c r i t i c i z e t h e a v a i l a b l e t h e o r i e s on l o g i c a l grounds, a p p r a i s e

c u a a i o n a s i m p r e c i s e and unparsimonioua, y e t they should f i n d f a m i l i a r t h e i r f r u i t f u l n e s s i n g e n e r a t i n g h y p o t h e s e s , e x p l a n a t i o n s and r e s e a r c h

t h e e f f o r t s t o a n a l y z e t h e s t r a t e g i c problems of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s . s t r a t e g i e s , examine how w e l l t h e y work i n t h e i r ovn f i e l d s of a p p l i c a t i o n .

and a s s e s s t h e f i d e l i t y o r e f f e c t i v e n e s s w i t h which t h e i r a d v o c a t e s employ t h e r e a tendency f o r p o l i t i c h l i f e t o become l e s s and l e s s t u r b u l e n t ,

them. I n t h e i r p r e s e n t a t n g e o f development, however, we cannot d e v i s e a more and more r o u t i n i z e d , a s a c o u n t r y g e t s o l d e r and r i c h e r ? To what

s e t of g e n e r a l t e s t s which w i l l c o n v i n c i n g l y e s t a b l i s h t h e i r r e l a t i v e e x t e n t (and when) a r e s o c i a l c l a s s e s t h e c h i e f p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s ? Our

validity. q u e s t i o n s r u n t h e whole range of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s n e s from t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n

N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e accumulating l i t e r a t u r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of groups f o r a c t i o n t o t h e working o u t of r e v o l u t i o n .

offers an inviting t e r r a i n for theoretical exploration. My p l a n h e r e i s The pages t o f o l l o w w i l l n o t l a y o u t f i r m answers t o t l ~ c s eq ~ ~ e s t i o n s .

t o draw on i t i n proposing g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s , hypotheses f o r t h e s t u d y -- T h e i r purpose is more l i m i t e d . They l a y o u t a s e t of c o n c e p t s which a p p l y

contempornry o r h i s t o r i c a l -- of c o n c r e t e c a s e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . a c r o s s t h i s wide r a n g e of problems; they t h e r e b y h e l p i d e n t i f y t h e con-

We r e t u r n t o some of t h e problems posed, b u t n o t r e s o l v e d , by Marx' n e c t i o n s among t h e problems. The f o l l o w i t ~ gc h a p t e r s s t a t c some g e n c r n l

a n a l y s e s of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s : how do b i g s t r u c t u r a l arguments concerning t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s i n v o l v e d , and i l l u s t r a t e t h e

changes a f f e c t t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a t t e r n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ? Among t h e arguments w i t h a number of d i f f e r e n t c o n c r e t e c a s e s . Now and then t l ~ e y

b i g changes. I want e s p e c i a l l y t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e e f f e c t s of u r b a n i z a t i o n . pause t o sum up t h e e x i s t i n g e v i d e n c e on some mnjor c o n t r o v e r s y concerning

i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , state-making and t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m . Among collective action.

p r e v a i l i n g p a t t e r n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , I would p a r t i c u l a r l y l i k e t o The i l l u s t r a t i o n s and t h e e v i d e n c e d e a l mainly w i t h d i s c o n t l n u o u a .

know w l ~ a tk i n d s of groups g a i n o r l o s e t h e c a p a c i t y t o a c t t o g e t h e r contentious collective action: s t r i k e s , demonstrntiona and t a x r e b e l l i o n s

e f f e c t i v e l y , and how t h e forms of a c t i o n themselves change. r a t h e r than workaday ward p o l i t i c s . That i s no a c c i d e n t . The Elnrxian

I n t h i s n b s t r a c t f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e problems look l i k e a d e s e r t : huge, t r a d i t i o n on which I r e l y h a s d e a l t moat f u l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h

dry and f o r b i d d i n g . Happily, a l l r e n l d e s e r t s c o n t a i n o a s e s ; s o does s i t u a t i o n s of open c o n f l i c t . ).ly own e m p i r i c a l work h a s c o n c e t ~ t r a t e don

t h i s one. Some of tlie s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s which f o l l o w from t h e ~ b s t r n c t c o n f l i c t r a t h e r t h a n consensus. A t a number of p o i n t s l a t e r i n t h e book

problem a r e engaging nnd i m p o r t a n t . Some a r e even answerable: 1s i t I a r g u e and i l l u s t r a t e t h e g r e a t c o n t i n u i t y between open c o n f l i c t and

t r u e t h a t tlie p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of o r d i n a r y p e o p l e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s r o u t i n e c o n t e n t i o n f o r power. S t i l l , t h e r e l a t i v e weakness of t h e

w i t h u r b a n i z a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and t h e growth of n a t i o n a l s t a t e s ? e v i d e n c e concerning everyday, r o u t i n i z e d , peaceful c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n

Is i t t r u e t h n t r e p r e s s i o n can o n l y work f o r a w h i l e , because sooner o r w i l l l e a v e open t h e possibility t h a t Weber and Durkheim were r i g h t : thnt

l a t e r people become s o f r u s t r a t e d t h e y s n a t c h a t any chance t o r e b e l ? t h e r e r e a l l y i s a s e p a r a t e realm of c o n t e n t i o u s , e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o l l e c t i v e

Why h a s t h e a n t i - t a x r e b e l l i o n , once t h e most common o c c a s i o n f o r l a r g e - a c t i o n which r e q u i r e s a s e p a r a t e mode of e x p l a n a t i o n . I do not t h i n k

s c a l e p o p u l a r v i o l e n c e i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , almost d i s a p p e a r e d ? I n our so. But t h e s k e p t i c a l r e a d e r may refer t o t r e a t w l ~ a t f o l l o w s a s an

own t i m e , why l ~ a v es t r i k e s and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s become s o f r e q u e n t ? Is a n a l y s i s of d i s c o n t i n u o u s , c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and t o r e s e r v e

judgment about the rest . CHAPTER 3: INTERESTS, ORCANIZATLON AND MOBILIZATION

The remainder of this book proposes strategies for the study of The Elementaty'Mddels

mobilization, repression, struggles for power and related processes. It To get anywhere at all, we will l~oveto hew out rough models of inter-

returns repeatedly to the problems of observing and measuring the political action among groups, and of a single group's collective action. At flrst

processes reliably, because those problems of observation and measurement chop, the model of interaction is quite static. Let us call it our pollty
have been handled thoughtlessly in the past. In passing -- but only in model. Its elements are a population, a government, one or more contenders.

passing -- the following discussion comments on previous work concerning a polity and one or more coalitions. We define a population of interest

collective action, conflict and revolution. Our main concern is with the to us by any means we please. Within that population we search For one or

work that has yet to be done. more of the following:

a government: an organization which controls the prlncipal con-

centrated means of coercion within the population.

a contender: any group which, during some specified period, applies

pooled resources to influence the government. Contenders include

challengers and members of the polity. A =is any contender

which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the

government; a challenger is any other contender.

a polity consisting of the collective action of the members snd the

government.

a coalition: a tendency of a set of contenders andlor governments to

corrdinate their collective action.

Figure 3-1 presents these elements schemntically.

 To a p p l y t h e p o l i t y model t o an a c t u a l p o p u l o t i o n , we hove a c h o i c e
F i g u r e 3-1: The P o l i t y Model of s t a r t i n g p o i n t s . We can i d e n t i f y a government, thcn i d e n t i f y t h e pop-

u l a t i o n o v e r which t h a t government e x e r c i s e s ( o r c l a i m s ) c o n t r o l ; t h e g r e a t

b u l k of p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s s t a r t s t h a t way, and w i t h i n p o l l t i c a l a n n l y s i s

n a t i o n a l s t a t e s a r e t h e most comnon p o i n t s of r e f e r e n c e . We c a n , however,

POPULATION
s t a r t by i d e n t i f y i n g a p o p u l a t i o n , t h e n i d e n t l f y a l l governments e x e r c i s i n g

c o n t r o l w i t h i n t h a t p o p u l a t i o n a n d / o r d e s i g n a t e one such government a s t h e

POLITY
p o i n t of r e f e r e n c e .

I n t h e f i r s t approach, we might t a k e t h e U.S.S.R. a s our p o i n t of

d e p a r t u r e , and t h e n i n t e r e s t o u r s e l v e s i n a l l p o p u l a t i o n s o v e r which

. /
t h e U.S.S.R. exercises jurisdiction. The c r i t e r i a we u s e f o r "government"

and " j u r i s d i c t i o n " w i l l c l e a r l y d e t e r m i n e how l a r g e a p o p u l o t i o n w i l l

f a l l i n t o o u r a n a l y s i s : by a weak c r i t e r i o n much of A s i a and E a s t e r n Europe

would q u a l i f y ; by a s t r o n g c r i t e r i o n , g i v e n t h e f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e

U.S.S.R., we could end up w i t h n o t h i n g b u t t h e c e n t m l b u r e a u c r a c i e s .

I n t h e second approach, we might t a k e t h e p o p u l a t i o n r e s i d i n g with-

------ coalition
i n t h e mapped b o u n d a r i e s of a n o t i o n a l s t a t e ; t h a t would produce a r e s u l t

s i m i l a r t o t h e f i r s t approach, w i t h t h e main d i f f e r e n c e s due t o m l g r o t i o n

a c r o s s t h e boundary i n b o t h d i r e c t i o n s . However, we might a l s o t a k e n l l

n a t i v e s p e a k e r s of R u s s i a n , a l l e t h n i c Kurds, a l l p e r s o n s l i v i n g w i t h i n

500 k i l o m e t e r s of t h e Black Sea. Those s t a r t i n g p o i n t s w i l l produce very

d i f f e r e n t p o p u l a t i o n s . r~ndvery d i f f e r e n t s e t s of r e l e v a n t governments. In

t h i s approach, t h e s t i c k i e s t problem i s l i k e l y t o b e how d u r a b l e t h e a t t n c h -

! ment of i n d i v i d u a l s t o t h e p o p u l a t i o n must b e b e f o r e wc i n c l u d e them. Do

. ,
! American t o u r i s t s i n Moscow c o u n t ? I f n o t , what a b o u t American d i p l o m a t s

who spend f o u r o r f i v e y e a r s i n Moscow? Americans whom t h e Russians put' i n

j a i l for four o r f i v e years? We w i l l s o l v e t h e s e problems a r b i t r a r i l y o r --

 the contender; as a process, an incrense In the reanurces or in tile
better -- as a F~rnctionof the questions we are asking. The solutions, how-
degree of collective control (we can call n decline in either one
ever, will affect the answers to our questions.
demobilization).
In the primitive, stntic version of this model, all contenders are

attempting to realize their interests by applying pooled resources to each

collective action: the extent of a contender's Joint action in pursuit
other and to the government. They vary in the success with which they get
of common ends; as a process, the joint action itself.
back resources in return; the biggest division in that regard separates the
Interest, organization, mobilization and collective action are four of the
high-return members of the polity from the low-return challengers. Among
five components we reviewed earlier. The fifth was opportunity.
other things, all contenders (members and challengers alike) are struggling
Opportunity describes the relationship between the populatloli's Ln-
for power. In the model, an increase in power shows up as an increasing
terests and the current state of the world around it. In this First rough
rate of return on expended resources. All challengers seek, among other
'statement of the model, it has three elements:
tlllngs, to enter the polity. A11 members seek, among other things, to

remain in the polity. Changes in tlie resources controlled by each contender

power: the extent to which the outcomes of the population's inter-
nnd by the government, changes in the rates at which the contenders and the
actions with other populations favor its interests over those of
government give and take resources and changes in the coalition structure
the others; acquisition of power is an incrense in the fnvorability
add up to produce entries into the polity, and exits from it. The model
of such outcomes, loss of power a decline in their fnvorabillty;
conveys a familiar image of interest-group politics.
political power refers to the outcomes of internctions with govern-
The second model describes the behavior of a single contender. Let us
ments.
call it our mobilization model. Four important, variable characteristics
repression: the costs of collective action to the contender reaultin~
of contenders are:
from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by a-
interests: the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to nother group which raises the contender's cost of collective action;
the population in question as a consequence of various possible inter-
an action which lowers the contender's cost is a form of facilitntton;
actions with other populations.
let us reserve the term politicnl repression and political fncilita-

tion for the relationships between contender(s) and government(s).

orgnnizotion: tlie extent of common identity and unifying structure

among the individuals in the population; as a process, an increase in

opportunitylthreat: the extent to which other groups, including govern-
common identity and/or unifying structure (we can call a decline in
ments, are either a) vulnernble to new claims which would, if success-
common identity and/or unifying structure disorganization).
ful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests or b) thrent-

ening to make claims which would, if successfu.l. reduce the contender'e

mobilization: the extent of resources under the collective control of
realization of its interests.
Repression and power refer to closely related transactions. Repression Figure 3-2: The Mobilization Model
refers to the volume of collective action as a function of the costs of

producing it, while power refers to the returns from collective action as

o function of its volume. If by some unlikely chance the volume of collec-

tive action were to increase while total costs and total returns remained

constant, by definition both repression and parer would fall. In general,

however, a group which is subject to heavy repression -- that is, pays a

high coat per unit of collective action -- also has little power (that is.

gets R low return per unit of collective action).

Interests and opportunity/threat are also closely connected. Loosely

REPRESSlONl
speaking, interest refers to advantages and disadvantages which would FACILITATION
theoretically result from possible interactions with other groups, oppor-

tunitylthreat to the Jlkelihood that those interactions will really occur.

A Simple Account of Collective Action

Before moving on to the difficulties hidden behind these elementary

concepts, let us consider the simplest version of an argument linking them.

Figure 3-2 presents it in schematic form. The diagram declares that the

mnin determinants of s group's mobilization are its organization, its

interest in possible interactions with other contenders, the current

~~portunitylthreat
of those interactions and the group's subjection to

repression. The diagram says that the group's subjection to repression is

mainly a function of the sort of interest it represents. It treats the

extent of a contender's collective action as a resultant of its power,

its mobilization, and the current opportunities and threats confronting its

interests. And so on.

It is easy to add hypothetical connections. For instance, it is

quite possible that the form of s contender's organization, as such, affects

the repression to which other contenders and governments subject it; when the costs of organizing and mobilizing are also Eeirly low and equal. When

voluntary associations become legal vehicles for one kind of interest, he comes to consider the drawbacks of pragmatic two-party politics, Robert

they tend to become legal for other kinds of interest. My provisional srgu- Dahl offers some intriguing reflections:

ment, however, is that such effects are secondary as compared with the
Consider the lot of the political dissenter . . . If he enters
particular interest embodied in the contender. Repression depends mainly
into a third party, he is condemned to political impotence ...
on that interest, end especially on the degree to which it conflicts with
It is natural for him to interpret political conflict among
the interests of the government and members of the polity.
national leaders as sham battles within a unified power elite ...
Likewise. a number of these connections are reciprocal over the
For the political dissenter, continued political impotence and
longer run. For example, in the longer run a contender's form, pace and
rejection breed frustration. Frustration may produce epothy
extent of mobilization surely affect the repression which other groups
and withdrawal from politics, but frustration may also turn to
apply to it. So does power position. A mobilizing group which concentrates
hostility. resentment, vengefulness, and even hatred for national
on building sn arsenal is likely to run afoul of the law, although the more
leaders in both parties. The political dissenter, then, is
powerful the group is in other respects the more likely it is to get away
likely to become alienated from the political system -- from
with it. Over the longer run a group's form of organization and of mobili-
its prevailing practices. its institutions, its personnel, and
zation both affect its interest. Roberto Michele made the classic statement
their assumptions (Dahl 1966: 65-66).
of the dilemma: to act on an interest, a group of people have to organize

and mobilize; but complex and effective forms of organization give their Dahl does not claim to be building a general account of collective action.

managers new interests to advance or defend, and the new interests often The work just quoted deals with the conditions for different patterns of

conflict with the interests around which the group organized and mobilized political opposition in democracies. Nevertheless it is legitimate and

in the first place. This, then, is a short-run model; it deals with the useful to generalize Dahl's argument, for it contains the main proposals

determinants of collective action at the moment of action. pluralist theory offers for the analysis of collective action in genernl.

Although these short-run connections are plausible, they are not self- Dahl's reflections place a remarkable emphasis on individual, as

evident. Some of them contradict standard arguments concerning political opposed to group, aspirations end grievances. They assume that an indi-

processes. For instance, many "pluralistic" analyses of politics in vidual defines his interest. then searches for a way to forward that

parliamentary democracies make two assumptions which compete with those interest within the existing poljtical system. They contain an indirect

of our model: first. that repression is relatively low and spread evenly observation that the costs and returns of collective action differ from

across the whole range of contenders and potential contenders; second, that one potential actor to another as a result of the particular lineaments .
 for the ways a contender's collective action affects its opportunities
of the American political system. Neither repression nor mobilizing costs
and its power. The model provides no place for strategic interactions and
seem to play a significant part in Dahl'a explanation of differentials in

political participation. no place for the conquest or loss of power. Collective action affects s

"Political participation" itself, in this view, consists of voting. group's parer, but that effect takes time. As we move along, we will have

to treat time-sequences more explicitly and carefully.

party work, holding office and communicating with legislators: people

whose problems these procedures won't solve tend to withdraw or to act Finally. the model is essentially quantitative. It concerns the

amount of collective action. the extent of organization, and so on.

outside the political system. The extent to which a group's interests

are facing new threats or new opportunities becomes, in Dahl's argument Unquestionably, the = of organization, of interest, of mobilization

and the plurallst argument in general, the chief determinant of its effects the =of collective action of which a contender is capable: in
many circumatances it affects the quantity of collective nction an well:
collecti.ve action. Furthermore, the argument draws sharp distinctions

among normal politics, abnormal politics and collective action outside In Karl Marx' analysis of 1848, which we looked at in the last chapter,

the social and geographic fragmentation of the peasantry helps explain

the realm of politics. In all these regards. our collective-action model
their inaction in the face of assaults on their interests. We will have
lead^ in other directions: assuming groups as the political participants,

attributing major importance to repression and to mobilizing costs, mini- much to do with these qualitative relationships later on.

mizing the political/nonpolitical distinction and arguing that the main If we were to apply the elementary mobilization model to the changing

difference between "normal" and "abnormal" political action is the power collective action of different groups of workers in the course of indust-

position of the groups involved.

rialization -- which is one of the purposes for which it is intended --
we would find ourselves pursuing two somewhat separate bunches of questions:
The comparison of our barebones mobilization model with the pluralist
first, how the shared interests, general organization and current mobilization
assumptions also helps display some worrisome gaps in the mobilization
of a trade affected its members' capacity for acting together; second, how
argument. For one thing, the model does not directly represent the effects
its current relationship to the government and to powerful contenders
of beliefs, customs, world views, rights or obligations. Instead, in this
effected the costs and returns of each of the available opportunities to act
elementary version, it assumes that beliefs, customs, world views, rights

and obligations affect collective action indirectly through their influence

on interest, organization, mobilization and repression. This assumption,

and others like it, will need attention later on.

For another thing, the model has no time in it. Collective action

does. The most obvious defect of the model is that it makes no allowance
on common g r i e v a n c e s and a s p i r a t i o n s . Under t h e f i r s t heading come.questions
tively, some c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s f a i l t o contend f o r power, nnd many a c t o r s
a b o u t t h e s p a t i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e i n d u s t r y . t h e e x t e n s i v e n e s s of t h e
come and go: i n d i g n a n t women now, angry f a r m e r s t h e n , temperance ndvocntes
i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i o ~ ~network,
s t h e e x i s t e n c e of u n i o n s , and s o on.
some o t h e r time. A v a l i d t h e o r y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n must e x p l a i n t h e
Under t h e second a r e q u e s t i o n s concerning t h e e x i s t e n c e of c o a l i t i o n s w i t h
comings and goings. I t must a l s o e x p l a i n why some groups never sl~owup a t .
power-holders, t h e e x t e n t of l e g i s l a t i o n p e n a l i z i n g l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s , t h e
all. P a r t of t h e e x p l a n a t i o n l i e s i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l problems we wLll
rewards s v l i l n b l e t o v i c t o r s i n e l e c t i o n s o r i n s t r i k e s , e t c .
t a k e up l a t e r . But p a r t of i t s u r e l y r e s i d e s i n t h e f a c t t h o t groups have
Much of t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l propose arguments concerning
varying interests in collective action.
s u c l ~s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s . I t w i l l o f f e r c o n c e p t s t o c l a r i f y t h e arguments
T h e o r i e s i n t h e t r a d i t i o n of John S t u a r t lI111 g i v e u s l i t t l e guidance
a s w e l l a s s t r a t e g i e s of measurement and a n a l y s i s . I f , equipped o n l y w i t h
i n t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t . Yet they s u g g e s t t h a t t h e
o u r elementary model, we p r e s s e d o u r i n q u i r y i n t o working-class c o l l e c t i v e
n a t u r e of t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s c e n t r a l decision-making s t r u c t u r e s -- i t s mnrket.
a c t i o n , we would soon need f c r t h e r assumptions about r i g h t s , b e l i e f s , and i t s system of v o t i n g , o r something e l s e of t h e s o r t -- strongly aifects
t h e r u l e s of t h e p o l i t i c a l game. The l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n w i l l o f t e n t a r r y which p e o p l e have an i n t e r e s t i n a c t i n g t o g e t h e r , and w i l l t h e r e f o r e do s o .
o v e r such problems.
Durkheimisn t h e o r i e s t e l l u s t o walch t h e c r e a t i o n and d e s t r u c t i o n
For t h e moment, n e v e r t h e l e s s , we s h o u l d s t i c k w i t h i n t e r e s t s , o r g s n i - of groups by t h e changing d i v i s i o n of l a b o r . They t e l l u s t o e x p e c t g r e a t e r
z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n , . c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , repression-facilitation, power a c t i o n ( o r a t l e a s t a d i f f e r e n t kind of a c t i o n ) from t h e groups b e i n g most
and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t . Let u s go around o u r diagram i n t h a t o r d e r , r e f i n i n g completely and r a p i d l y transformed. For Durkheim, i n d i v i d u n l and c o l l e c -
a s we go. Then we can r e s t a t e t h e model b e f o r e a p p l y i n g i t t o t h e a n a l y s i s t i v e i n t e r e s t s g e n e r a l l y c o n f l i c t i n t h e s h o r t run. I n d i v i d u a l Jmpulses
of d i f f e r e n t forms of c o n f l i c t . T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l t a k e u s through i n t e r e s t , and i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s e r e roughly e q t r i v s l e n t ; t h e c r u c i a l v a r i a t i o n from
o r g a n i z a t . i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Chapter 4 w i l l then
one group o r s o c i e t y t o a n o t h e r is how much t h o s e i n d J v i d u a 1 impulses and
add r e p r e s s i o n - f a c i l i t a t i o n , power and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t t o t h e a n a l y s i s i n t e r e s t s a r e under s o c i a l c o n t r o l .
b e f o r e r e c o n s i d e r i n g both o u r models and t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r r e a l - l i f e Weberian t h e o r i e s a l s o draw bur a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d i v i s i o n of l n b o r ,
conflict. b u t l e a d us t o a n t i c i p a t e g r e a t e r a c t i v i t y from groups w l ~ i c hhave a t t a c h b d
Interests themselves t o new systems of b e l i e f . Stlared b e l i e f i t s e l f l e a d s t o a d e f -
Elont a n a l y s e s of m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d ' c o n t e n t i o n f o r power t a k e t h e groups i n i t i o n of i n t e r e s t , and s t i m u l a t e s a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o t h a t d e f i n i t i o n .
i n v o l v e d , and t h e i r I n t e r e s t s , f o r g r a n t e d . Once we n o t i c e who i s a c t i n g , i t The Mnrxian l i n e , f i n a l l y , is w e l l known: t h e changing o r g a n i z a t i o n
r a r e l y seems d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n why t h e y , and n o t o t h e r groups, a r e a c t i n g . of p r o d u c t i o n c r e a t e s and d e s t r o y s s o c i a l c l a s s e s which a r e d e f i n e d by d i f -
Yet many groups f a i l t o m o b i l i z e , some mobilized groups f a l l t o a c t c o l l e c - f e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o t h e b a s i c means of p r o d u c t i o n ; o u t O F t h e o r g a n i -
z a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n a r i s e fundamental c l a s s d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t e r e s t . a r t i c u l a t e d them f a l s e l y . For a n o t h e r , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e e v i d e n c e i s very
A c l a s s a c t s t o g e t h e r , i n t h e Marxian a c c o u n t , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t h a s hard t o i d e n t i f y , assemble.and s y n t h e s i z e : people o f t e n s a y conflicting
e x t e n s i v e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t s i n t e r e s t s a r e things, o r nothing a t a l l . But t h e second c h o i c e -- inferring interests
c u r r e n t l y being t h r e a t e n e d . from a g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between i n t e r e s t s and s o c i a l
The M i l l i o n , Durkheimian. Weberian and Marxian views produce position -- a l s o h a s s e r i o u s drawbacks. I t t a k e s c o n f i d e n c e , even

competing s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n t e r e s t and a r r o g a n c e , t o o v e r r i d e a g r o u p ' s own v i s i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s i n l i f e .

organization. A major p a r t of t h e disagreement c o n c e r n s t h e p r o p e r way General i n t e r e s t schemes commonly r e v e a l a c o n f l i c t between s h o r t - r u n
t o i d e n t i f y a population's i n t e r e s t i n t h e f i r s t place. The b a s i c and long-run i n t e r e s t s . (Much i n t e r e s t i n g game t h e o r y d e a l s w i t h
c h o i c e s a r e two. We can: s i t u a t i o n s i n which s h o r t - r u n i n t e r e s t l e a d s t o s t r a t e g i e s c o n t r a r y t o

1) i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t from t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s own u t t e r a n c e s and t h e long-run i n t e r e s t of t h e p a r t i e s . ) I n t h a t c a s e , w h i c l ~is t h e " r e a l "

actions; interest? F i n a l l y , we a r e t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n why people behave n s they

2) i n f e r i t from a g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s of t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between do; t h e g o a l s t h e y have f a s h i o n e d f o r themselves appear t o i n f l u e n c e

i n t e r e s t and s o c i a l p o s i t i o n .
M i l l i o n t h e o r i s t s tend t o do some v e r s i o n of t h e f i r s t ; they t r y t o
ground t h e i r a n a l y s e s on u t i l i t i e s o r p r e f e r e n c e s r e v e a l e d d i r e c t l y
o r i n d i r e c t l y by t h e a c t o r s . Elarxists o f t e n do some v e r s i o n of t h e
second; they d e t e r m i n e o g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t a p r i o r i from i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p
Lo t h e means of p r o d u c t i o n . There a r e many e l a b o r a t i o n s and compromises
between t h e two. For example, some a n a l y s t s i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t of
workers a t one p o i n t i n time r e t r o a c t i v e l y from an i n t e r e s t they a r t i c u l a t e
later. Many t r e a t m e n t s of s o c i a l movements t a k e t h a t t a c k , l o o k i n g back
t o t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of t h e movement f o r t r a c e s of awareness of g o a l s which
t h e i r b e h a v i o r even when t h o s e g o a l s a r e t r i v i a l , vague, c l n r e o l i s t i c Or
self-defeating. My own r e s p o n s e t o t h i s dilemma c o n t a i n s two r u l e s :
1 ) t r e a t t h e r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n a s p r e d i c t o r s of t h e i n t e r e s t s
people w i l l p u r s u e on t h e a v e r a g e and i n t h e l o n g run. b u t 2) r e l y , a s
much a s p o s s i b l e , on p e o p l e ' s own a r t i c u l a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s a s nn
e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e i r b e h a v i o r i n t h e s h o r t run.
We e s c a p e t h a t f e r o c i o u s dilemma, however, o n l y t o r u s h o n t o t h e
h o r n s of a n o t h e r : i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s v s . group i n t e r e s t s . Even i f
we i d e n t i f y b o t h w i t h c o n f i d e n c e , they need n o t c o i n c i d e , ond m y well.
conflict. Much t h e o r i z i n g i n t h e v e i n of John S t u a r t M i l l h a s d e a l t

would l o t e r become c l e a r and dominant. w i t h p r e c i s e l y t h a t dilemma -- sometimes by s t r i v i n g t o show t h a t

The f i r s t c h o i c e -- i n f e r r i n g t h e i n t e r e s t from t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s i n d i v i d u a l p u r s u i t of s e l f - i n t e r e s t w i l l s e r v e t h e common good, some-
own u t t e r a n c e s and a c t i o n s -- is open t o s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n s . For one t i m e s by a t t e m p t i n g t o i d e n t i f y and e x p l a i n t h o s e s i ~ u a t i o n si n which
t h i n g . many groups a p p e a r t o be unaware of t h e i r own r e a l i n t e r e s t s . a genuine c o n f l i c t d o e s emerge. sometimes by l o o k i n g f o r d e c i s i o n r u l e s
E i t h e r they have not a r t i c u l a t e d t h e i r s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s o r they have which w i l l cumulate i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s t o t h e c o l l e c t i v e advnntnge.
 t r a n s l a t e i n d i v i d u a l p r e f e r e n c e s i n t o c o l l e c t i v e outcomes. I n t h e annly-
I n a famous psaaage of The Wealth of Nations (Chapter 3. Book 4 ) , Adam

Smith s e t t h e t o n e of t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e : s e a t h a t f o l l o w , I w i l l o c c a s i o n a l l y w r e s t l e w i t h t h e s e t h e o r e t i c a l prob-

lems. Usually. however. I w i l l t r e a t them a s p r n c t i c n l m a t t e r s : how t o de-

Every i n d i v i d u a l i s c o n t i n u a l l y e x e r t i n g himself t o f i n d o u t t h e
t e r m i n e , i n p a r t i c u l a r t i m e s end p l a c e s , which i n t e r e s t s a r e lmpprtant and
most advantageous employment f o r whatever c a p i t a l he can command.
how t h e people involved a g g r e g a t e them.
It is h i s own advantage, i n d e e d , and n o t t h a t of t h e s o c i e t y ,
Organization
which he h a s i n view. But t h e s t u d y of h i s own advantage n a t u r a l l y ,
H a r r i s o n White h a s made a powerful d i s t i l l a t e of t h e most i n s i p i d
o r r a t h c r n e c e s s a r i l y , l e a d s him' t o p r e f e r t h a t employment which
wines i n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l c e l l a r -- group taxonomies. There we f i n d o n l y
is most advantageous t o t h e s o c i e t y .
two e l e m e n t s . There a r e c a t e g o r i e s of p e o p l e who s h a r e some c h n r a c t e r i a -
On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e argument by Mancur Olson which we reviewed
t i c : they a r e a l l female, a l l Sunni Muslims, a l l r e s i d e n t s of Timbuktu, o r
e a r l i e r ( d e s p i t e i t s d e b t t o Adam Smith) i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l
something e l s e . A f u l l - f l e d g e d c a t e g o r y c o n t a i n s people a l l of whom recog-
i n t e r e s t and group i n t e r e s t u s u a l l y do c o n f l i c t . At l e a s t t h e y c o n f l i c t
n i z e t h e i r common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and whom everyone e l s e r e c o g n i z e s a s
i n t h i s sense: each i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r o r d i n a r i l y h a s an i n c e n t i v e t o
having t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . There a r e a l s o networks of people who a r e
a v o i d c o n t r i b u t i n g h i s s h a r e t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s which w i l l b e n e f i t
l i n k e d t o e a c h o t h e r , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , by a s p e c i f i c kind of i n t e r -
everyone. Adnm Smith r e s o l v e s t h e dilemma by denying i t ; by i m p l i c a t i o n ,
p e r s o n a l bond: a c h a i n of p e o p l e each of whom owes someone e l s e i n t h e s e t
he d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e i s a n y t h i n g s p e c i a l a b o u t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which
a t t e n d a n c e a t h i s o r h e r wedding, l e t u s s a y , o r t h e s e t of i n d i v i d u a l s de-
t h e p r o p e r s t u d y of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n w i l l n o t e x p l a i n . Mancur Olson.
f i n e d by s t a r t i n g a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h some person, i d e n t i f y i n g everyone t h a t
however, makes t h a t very ' l i n k p r o b l e m a t i c .
person t a l k s w i t h s t l e a s t once e v e r y day, then i d e n t i f y i n g everyone tlley
We a r e n o t d e f e n s e l e s s s g a i n s t t h e dilemma. We should remain c l e a r
t a l k w i t h a t l e a s t once e v e r y d a y , and s o on u n t i l no new persona j o i n t h e
t h a t c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s e x i s t . however l a r g e a p a r t t h e p u r s u i t of
list. I f t h e common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l bond I s o r d i n n r y ,
i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s may p l a y i n t h e accomplishmentof t h o s e c o l l e c t i v e
t h e c a t e g o r i e s and networks d e f i n e d by them tend t o be l a r g e . C l e a r l y we
interests. We should d e l i b e r a t e l y t r e a t t h e d e g r e e of c o r ~ f l i c tbetween
can s h r i n k t h e c a t e g o r i e s and networks by i n s i s t i n g on c r i t e r i a ( o r combln-
i n d i v i d u a l end c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s a s a v a r i a b l e a f f e c t i n g t h e l i k e -
a t i o n s of c r i t e r i a ) which occur r a r e l y : female Sunni Muslim r e s i d e n t s of
l i h o o d and c h a r a c t e r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . We s h o u l d t r e a t t h a t d e g r e e
Timbuktu, p e r h a p s , o r d a i l y c o n v e r s a t i o n p l u s i n v i t a b i l i t y to n wedd4.ng.
of c o n f l i c t , more p r e c i s e l y , a s i n c r e a s i n g t h e c o s t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
The more i n t e r e s t i n g combination i s t h e one White c n l l n n c a t n e t :
t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s and t o t h e group a s a whole. And we 6ho11ld p u r s u e t h e
a s e t of i n d i v i d u a l s comprising both a c a t e g o r y and a network. The c a t n e t
a n a l y s i s of t h e ways t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e arrangement^ f o r making d e c i s i o n s
c a t c h e s g r a c e f u l l y t h e s e n s e of "groupness" which more complicated con-

cepts m i s s . For t h a t r e a s o n , I w i l l s u b s t i t u t e t h e word group f o r t h e e x o t i c

cntnet. A s e t of i n d i v i d u a l s is s group t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t comprises T h i s n o t i o n o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r e s s e s t h e g r o u p ' s i n c l u s i v e n e s s : llow

b o t h s c a t e g o r y and a network. c l o s e i t comes t o a b s o r b i n g t h e members' whole l i v e s . (For " i n c l u s i v e n c s a "

The i d e a of o r g a n i z a t i o n f o l l o w s d i r e c t l y . The more e x t e n s i v e i t s we have o u r c h o i c e of t h r e e r e l a t e d s t a n d a r d s : t h e nmount of time, t h e

common i d e n t i t y and i n t e r n a l networks, t h e more o r g a n i z e d t h e group. amount of energy, o r t h e p r o p o r t i o n of a l l s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i n wlilcll t h e

CATNESS X NETNESS ORGANIZATION. S c h e m a t i c a l l y , F i g u r e 3-3 sums up t h e members and o t h e r p e o p l e a r e t a k i n g i n t o account t h e f a c t o f group mem-

r e l a t i o n s h i p s among t h e c o n c e p t s . "All B r a z i l i a n s " comprise a s e t of peo- bership.) O t h e r f e a t u r e s of a g r o u p ' s s t r u c t u r e one might want t o c o n s i d e r

p l e o n l y weakly l i n k e d by i n t e r p e r s o n a l networks, b u t s t r o n g l y i d e n t i f i e d i n j u d g i n g l~ow"organized" i t is a r e i t s e f f i c i e n c y and i t s e f f c c t i v e n e s s

by themselves and o t h e r s a s a s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y of b e i n g : low on n e t n e s s , -- o r t h e s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s presumably e f f e c t i n g e f f i c i e n c y and e f f e c -

high on c a t n e s s . The p r i n t e r s ' union l o c a l s p o r t r a y e d i n L i p s e t , Trow t i v e n e s s , such a s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , c e n t r a l i t y and s t r n t l f i c a t i o n . I stress

and Coleman's Q Democracy have b o t h d i s t i n c t , compelling i d e n t i t i e s i n c l u s i v e n e s s on two grounds: 1 ) t h e (unproved) l ~ y p o t h e s l st l i s t i t i s t h e

and e x t e n s i v e , a b s o r b i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l networks: l i i g l ~on b o t h c a t n e s s and main a s p e c t of group s t r u c t u r e which a f f e c t s t h e a b i l i t y t o m o b i l i z e ; 2 )

n e t n e s s , t h e r e f o r e on o r g a n i z a t i o n . t h e i n t r i n s i c d i f f i c u l t y of s e p a r a t i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y from

t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n we a r e t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n . By t h e

F i g u r e 3-3: Components of O r g a n i z a t i o n s t a n d a r d of i n c l u s i v e n e s s , an i s o l a t e d community w i l l tend t o be h l g h l y

o r g a n i z e d , b u t s o w i l l some o c c u p a t i o n a l g r o u p s , some r e l i g i o u s groups

and some p o l i t i c a l groups.

We need t h e s e d e f i n i t l o n s i n o r d e r t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e groups which c o u l d ,

i n p r i n c i p l e , mobilize. We a l s o need them t o s p e c i f y what i t means t o soy

t h a t o r g n n i z a t i o n promotes m o b i l i z a t i o n . The number of p o t e n t i a l mobilizers

is enormous. The t s s k of enumerating a l l of them f o r a g i v e n p o p u l a t i o n

,&n
would l o o k something l i k e t h i s :
s u a l Crowd F r i e n d s h i p Network
1 ) i d e n t i f y e v e r y s i n g l e s t a t u s d i s t i n c t i o n employed v i t h l n t h e
* Low
NETNESS
> High populst ion;

2 ) s e l e c t t h o s e d i s t i n c t i o n s which imply some d i f f e r e n c e i n i n t e r e s t

between t h o s e i n one c a t e g o r y and t l ~ o s ei n a n o t h e r ;

3) produce t h e (tremendous) l i s t c o n s i s t i n g of a l l combinntions o f

the selected distinctions:

 4) e l i m i n a t e those, wlilch llave no r e a l p e r s o n s w i t h i n them (e.g. p r o c e d u r e i s t h a t a group must have a c t e d t o g e t l i e r somewhow t o b c mentioned
Chinese-.lewish-cowboy-grandmother); i n h i s t o r i c a l accounts. I t i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a r e l i a b l e way of determining

5 ) s e l e c t t h o s e w i t h some minimum p o s s i b i l i t y of i d e n t i f y i n g and what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s s e t o f f t h o s e groups which m o b i l i z e from a l l t l ~ o s c

communicnting w i t h each o t h e r . o t h e r s which c o u l d , i n t h e o r y , have mobilized.

We have an a l t e r n a t i v e . I n s t e a d of a t t e m p t i n g t o p r e p a r e an unbinaed
T h i s f a n t a s t i c t a s k is probably o u t of r e a c h f o r l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n s organ-
l i s t of a l l p o t e n t i a l m o b i l i z e r s , we can t n k c one o r two dimensions o r
i z e d i n complicated ways, a l t h o u g h Edmonson (1958) d i d a n a l y z e a p p a r e n t l y
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n which a r e of t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t , s e n r c l ~f o r e v i d e n c e oC
e x h a u s t i v e l i s t s of s t a t u s terms f o r North American I n d i a n groups. But
group f o r m a t i o n , and then of m o b i l i z a t i o n , a t d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s a l o n g t h e
o n e m i g l ~ tbe a h l e t o c a r r y o u t s t e p s 1 and 2 a s sampling o p e r a t i o n s , i f
dimension, l e t t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s t e s t more g e n e r n l a s s e r t i o n s con-
t h c r e were an unbiased s o u r c e of s t a t u s d i s t i n c t i o n s ; t h e n t h e l i s t f o r
c e r n i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of o r g a n i z a t i o n and m o b i l i z a t i o n . Voting a n a l y s t s
s t e p 3 could b e a s s m a l l a s one d e s i r e d . I f s t e p s 4 and 5 l e f t no c a t e -
and s t u d e n t s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t sometimes do on i m p o r t a n t p n r t of t h e
g o r i e s , one could go back t o 1 and 2 o v e r and o v e r .
n e c e s s a r y work. I n v o t i n g s t u d i e s , i t i s common t o t a k e t h e e n t i r e popu-
Gamson's procedure f o r i d e n t i f y i n g " c h a l l e n g i n g groups" i n American
l a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l v o t e r s i n some t e r r i t o r y , d i v i d e i t up i n t o mnjor demo-
p o l l t i c s b e a r s a g e n e r a l resemblance t o t h i s i d e a l p l a n , b u t s t a r t s much
g r a p h i c c a t e g o r i e s , t h e n examine d i f f e r e n t i a l s among t h e c a t e g o r i e s i n o r -
f a r t h e r along i n t h e mobilization process. ("Challenging groups" a r e
g a n i z a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and v o t i n g p r o p e n s i t i e s . I n s n n l y s e s of
t h o s e w h i c l ~ i n t h e p e r i o d from 1800 t o 1945 made a new, c o n t e s t e d b i d t o
s t r i k e s , i t i s common t o t a k e an e n t i r c l a b o r f o r c e , d i v i d e i t i n t o indus-
cllangc tile o r g a n i z a t i o n o r b e h a v i o r of t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l system;
t r i e s and t y p e s of f i r m s , t h e n document v a r i a t i o n i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of
t h e y a r e a s p e c i a l c a s e of t h e groups which, not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , I e a r l i e r
work, t y p e and i n t e n s i t y of u n i o n i z a t i o n and p r o p e n s i t y t o s t r i k e .
c a l l e d "challengers".) Gamson s c a ~ i snumerous h i s t o r i c a l s o u r c e s f o r any
D i f f e r e n t ways of d i v i d i n g up t h e e l e c t o r a t e o r t h e l a b o r f o r c e w i l l
mention whatsoever of a group making new c l a i m s , and p l a c e s a l l group namea
produce d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . But t h a t can be an advantage: i t h e l p s u s de-
i n a pool from which he then draws groups st random f o r c l o s e s t u d y . After
c i d e which d i f f e r e n t i a l s a r e d u r a b l e and g e n e r a l . For example, some y e a r s
somc e l i m i n a t i o n s f o r d u p l i c a t i o n , l a c k of g e o g r a p h i c s c o p e , e t c . and a f -
ago C l a r k Kerr and Abraham S i e g e 1 made a p l a u s i b l e and widely-accepted
t e r a l a r g e s c o r c h f o r a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n concerning t h e groups drawn,
a n a l y s i s of i n d u s t r i a l s t i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s . F i r s t , they s u m r i z e d t h e
Gamson h a s an unbiased, well-documented sample of a l l c h a l l e n g i n g groups
o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of s t i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s i n A u s t r a l i a , Czechoslovakia, Germany,
meetins h i s c r i t e r i a over t h e e n t i r e period. Within t h e sample, he c a n
I t a l y . t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , New Zealand. Norway, Sweden. S w i t z e r l a n d , t h e United
then s t u d y changes i n t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c h a l l e n g i n g groups o v e r time,
Kingdom and t h e United S t a t e s d u r i n g v a r i o u s p e r i o d s from World War I t o
d i f f e r e n c e s between s u c c e s s f u l and u n s u c c e s s f u l c h a l l e n g e r s , and a number
t h e l a t e 19401~. T h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e ~ e n e r a lp a t t e r n a p p e a r s 411 Tnblc
o f o t h e r i m p o r t a n t problems. For o u r p u r p o s e s , t h e weakness oE Camson's
3-1. llaving i d e n t i f i e d t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s , they t r i e d t o e x p l a i n them.
 3-23
They s e t t l e d on t h e p r e s e n c e of a n " i s o l a t e d maan" -- a liomogenco~~s
w o r k f o r c e , s e g r e g a t e d from o t h e r workers -- a s t h e major c o n d i t i o n pro-

d u c i n g high s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t y . They a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t ,

T a b l e 3-1: Kerr C S i e g e l ' s Summary of S t r i k e P r o p e n s i t i e s I f t h e j o b i s p h y s i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t and u n p l e a s a n t , u n s k i l l e d o r

s e m i s k i l l e d , and c a s u a l o r s e s s o n s l , and f o s t e r s an independent s p i r i t

PROPENSITY TO STRIKE INDUSTRY ( a s i n t h e l o g g e r i n t h e woods), i t w i l l draw tough, i n c o n s t a n t com-

lligh mining b a t i v e , and v i r i l e workers, and they w t l l be i n c l i n e d t o s t r i k e . If

m a r i t i m e and l o n g s h o r e t h e j o b i s p h y s i c a l l y e a s y and performed i n p l e a s a n t s u r r o u n d i n g s ,

s k i l l e d and r e s p o n s i b l e , s t e a d y , and s u b j e c t t o s e t r u l c s and c l o s e

Medium High lumber s u p e r v i s i o n , i t w i l l a t t r a c t women o r t h e more s u b m i s s i v e t y p e of man
textile who w i l l abhor s t r i k e s (Kerr 6 S i e g e l 1954: 1 9 5 ) .

Medium chemical But t h i s was, f o r t u n a t e l y . a secondary h y p o t h e s i s .

printing I n e i t h e r v e r s i o n , t h e argument h a s two l e v e l s : 1 ) t h e i d e n t i f i c n t i o n
leather of some s t a n d a r d d i f f e r e n t i a l s among i n d u s t r i e s i n s t r i k e - p r o p e n s i t y ; 2)
g e n e r a l manufacturing t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of whatever d i f f e r e n t i a l s a c t u a l l y a p p e a r . Both f a c e t s of
construction t h e Kerr-Siege1 a n a l y s i s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e second, a p p e a r t o b e wrong. For
food 6 k i n d r e d p r o d u c t s
t h e c a s e o f France, T a b l e 3-2 p r e s e n t s r a t e s of s t r i k e s and man-days i n

s t r i k e s f o r major i n d u s t r i e s from 1890 t o 1960. The d a t a stlow no more

Medium Low clothing
t h a n a moderate s t a b i l i t y i n r e l a t i v e s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s from one p e r i o d
gas, water, e l e c t r i c i t y
t o tlie n e x t . They show a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e i n r c l a t l v e s t r i k e pro-
hotels, restaurants, 6
other services p e n s i t i e s as measured by frequency of s t r i k e s and hy t o t a l man-days.

Although a g r i c u l t u r e does s t i c k a t t h e bottom of t h e l i s t , s o do t r a n s p o r t

Low railroad
and t e x t i l e s . Food i s a l s o c o n s i s t e n t l y low, c o n t r a r y t o t h e p r e d i c t i o n .
agriculture
There is l e s s c o n s i s t e n c y a t t h e t o p : q u a r r y i n g t u r n s o u t t o linve m n y
trade
s t r i k e s , but r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t , a m 1 1 ones. Mining t u r n s o u t t o linve few

Source: Kerr 6 S i e g e l 1.954: 190 s t r i k e s , b u t b i g , long ones. I n any c a s e , t h e o t h e r French i n d u s t r i e s

which rank r e l a t i v e l y high i n s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t y -- chemlcals, c o n s t r u c t i o n ,

b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s and s m e l t i n g -- a r e n e i t h e r high on a l l i n d i c e s nor ob-

v i o u s i l l u s t r a t i o n s of tlie g r e a t e r s t i k e - p r o p e n s i t y o f i s o l a t e d , homogen-
 eous a n d / o r "tough" industries. 3-25

T a b l e 3-2: French S t r i k e R a t e s by I n d u s t r y , 1890-1960 I n o r d e r t o g e t a t t h e '!isolated mass" p o r t i o n o f t h e argument, Fdward

S h o r t e r and I regrouped t h e French s t r i k e d a t e by sm11 d i s t r i c t i n t o

S t r i k e s p e r 100,000 Man-Days Lost p e r 100 M i l l i o n
Labor Force Labor Force. . t h r e e t y p e s of a r e a s : mono-industrial, poly-industrial, metropolitan.
Industry 1890-1914 1915-1935 1915-1932 1950-1960
The Kerr-Siege1 a n a l y s i s p r e d i c t s a s t r o n g tendency f o r t h e mono-industrial
Quarrying* 30 22 40 Ill*
a r e a s t o have h i g h e r s t r i k e r a t e s , g r e a t e r m i l i t a n c y , and s o on. In f a c t ,
Cl~emlcels 24 10 54 62
i t i s t h e o t h e r way round: on t h e whole, m e t r o p o l i t a n d i s t r i c t s outshadow
Construction 24 15 50 31
poly-industrial d i s t r i c t s , and t h e one-industry d i s t r i c t s come i n l a s t
Uuilding M a t e r i a l s
( S h o r t e r 6 T i l l y 1974: 287-295). When Muhammnd F i a z a r r s y c d French indus-
Ceramics 23

Mining . 19 5 151 * t r i e s by t h e i r d e g r e e of g e o g r a p h i c s e g r e g a t i o n o v e r t h e c o u n t r y o s a

whole, he d i s c o v e r e d no r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n o l a t i o n and s t r i k e proyen-

P r i n t i n g 6 Paper 1.6 11 37 15

Smelting 14 17 220 70 s i t y ; such f a c t o r s a s u n i o n i z a t i o n and p l a n t s i z e , on t h e o t h e r hand, s i g -

n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d t h e r e l a t i v e p r o p e n s i t y t o s t r i k e ( F i a z 1973). Ltke-
Leother 6 llides 13 14 77 13
w i s e , t h e a n a l y s e s Snyder and K e l l y have done f o r I t a l y , 1878-1903, indicate
Metalworking 12 10 46 88
t h a t once obvious o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f e a t u r e s such a s s i z e and u n i o n i z o t l o n
Transport I) 8 14 86
a r e allowed f o r , i n d u s t r y a s s u c h h a s no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on t h e broad
Textiles 8 7 72 27
q u a n t i t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f s t r i k e s (Snyder 6 Kelly 1976). 111 these '
Garments a 2
t r i a l s , a t l e a s t , no v e r s i o n of t h e Kerr-Siege1 argument h o l d s up.
Wood Industries 8 9 19
These examples o f f e r a n i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n t o u s e r s of a group-compari-
Food I n d u s t r i e s 5 6 10
s o n s t r a t e g y : t h e l e s s compelling your a p r i o r i r e a s o n s f o r employing a
Agriculture, Fish,
Forest 0.4 0.3 n.a.
p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a s a b a s i s f o r t h e s t u d y of d i f f e r e n t i n l s i n o r -
T o t a l Non-Agri-
g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h e more i m p o r t a n t i t is
culture 7 6 37
t o compare t h e e f f e c t s of u s i n g d i f f e r e n t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . Each a p p l i c e -

*Quarrying and Nining combined i n 1950-1960. t i o n of a new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o t h e d a t a i s , i n i t s c r u d e way, t h e t r i a l

Source: S h o r t e r 6 T i l l y 1974: 201. of a new theory. The c o r o l l a r y a p p l i e s more g e n e r a l l y : t h e b e t t e r - s p e c i f i e d

your t h e o r y , t h e nore l i k e l y you a r e t o f i n d some a c c e s s i b l e c o r n e r of

r e a l i t y i n which t o t r y i t o u t . The b e t t e r - s p e c i f i e d your t h e o r y , t h e l e s s

you w i l l have t o worry a b o u t t h e monumental t n s k of enumerating a l l groups

a t r i s k t o o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . An obvious
sermon,. b u t one l i t t l e heeded. u n i t s , t h e s u p l a u n i t of which t h e u n i t is o member, o r e x t e r n o l u n i t s ,
The Kerr-Sicgel a n o l y s i s p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r l e s s o n a s w e l l . Strikes u n l e s s tlie n s s e t s whose c o n t r o l t h e u n i t goined a r e newly-produced
o r e s form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . To e x p l a i n group d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n any kind ones . . . A mere i n c r e a s e i n t h e a s s e t s o f members, of s u b - u n i t s , or
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g s t r i k e s , we w i l l have t o t a k e i n t o a c - even o f t h e u n i t i t s e l f does n o t mean t h a t m o b i l i z a t i o n llas o c c u r r e d ,
count a l l o u r components: i n t e r e s t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n and oppor- though i t i n c r e a s e s t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n p o t e n t i a l . The change i n t h e cap-
tunity. Kerr and S i e g e l a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n t h e d i f f e r e n t i a l s w i t h i n t e r - a c i t y t o c o n t r o l and t o u s e a s s e t s i s what is s i g n t f i c s n t .
e s t s and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o n e . The reasoning a b o u t i s o l a t e d masses and
E t z i o n i o f f e r s a rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a s s e t s , o r r e s o u r c e s : coercive
toughness g i v e s s p a r t i c u l a r (ond i n a d e q u a t e ) account of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
( e . g . weapons, armed f o r c e s , m a n i p u l ~ t i v et e c h n o l o g i e s ) ; u t i l i t a r i a n (e.g.
s t r u c t u r e and i n d i v i d u a l workers' i n t e r e s t s c h a r o c t e r i s t i c of d i f f e r e n t
goods, i n f o r m a t i o n s e r v i c e s , money); normative (e.8. loynlties, obligatlons).
industries. Rut i t s a y s n o t h i n g a b o u t d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n m o b i l i z s t i o n o r
A group m o b i l i z e s i f i t g a i n s g r e a t e r c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l o v e r c o e r c i v e ,
opportunity t o s t r i k e .
u t i l i t a r i a n o r normative r e s o u r c e s , d e m o b i l i z e s i f i t l o s e s t h o t s o r t of
To be more e x a c t , Kerr and S i e g e l assume i m p l i c i t l y e i t h e r 1 ) t h o t
control.
m o b i l l z o t i o n ond o p p o r t u n i t y a r e rougllly e q u a l a c r o s s i n d u s t r i e s o r 2)
In p r a c t i c e , E t z i o n i ' s c l s s s i f i c s t i o n of r e s o u r c e s is d i f f i c u l t t o main-
t h a t whatever d j f f e r e n c e s i n m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y do e x i s t have
tain. I t r e f e r s t o t h e i r use r a t h e r than t h e i r i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r . The
no independent e f f e c t s on s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t y ; t h e y r e s u l t from t h e d i f f e r -
s e r v i c e a r e v o l u t i o n a r y c a b a l draws from i t s 272 l o y a l memhers is 1.ikcly
e n c e s i n i n t c r e s t and o r g a n i z s t i o n . Those assumptions, t o o , a r e h y p o t h e s e s
t o b e st once c o e r c i v e and u t i l i t a r i a n . The r e s o u r c e is l o b o r power of s
- dubious ones. Before a c c e p t i n g i n t e r e s t and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o n e a s
c e r t a i n kind. Furthermore, l o y a l t y and o b l i g o t i o n a r e not s o much r e -
f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , we w i l l have t o l o o k a t t h e e v i -
s o u r c e s a s c o n d i t i o n s s f f ' e c t i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t r e s o u r c e s w i l l b e de-
dence c o n c e r n i n g m o b i l i z s t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y .
l i v e r e d when c a l l e d f o r . If.we a r e a c t u a l l y comparing t h e c u r r e n t mobilizo-
Mobilization
t i o n l e v e l s of s e v e r a l groups, o r t r y i n g t o gouge o g r o u p ' s change over
The word " m o b i l i z a t i o n " c o n v e n i e n t l y i d e n t i f i e s t h e p r o c e s s by which
t i m e , we w i l l o r d i n a r i l y do b e t t e r t o f a l l back on t h e e c o n o m i s t ' s f o c t o r s
a group goes from b e i n g o p a s s i v e c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s t o an a c t i v e
of p r o d u c t i o n : l a n d , l a b o r , c a p i t o l , perhaps t e c l ~ n i c o le x p c r t i s c o s w e l l .
porticipsnt i n public l i f e . Demobilization is t h e r e v e r s e p r o c e s s . Amitai
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a l l of t h e r e s o u r c e s have w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d market
E t z i o n i (1968: 388-389) p u t s i t t h i s way:
v a l u e s i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n st l a r g e , r e l i a n c e on p r o d u c t i o n f o c t o r s w i l l h e l p
We r e f e r t o t h e p r o c e s s by which s u n i t g a i n s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e US s e t r a t e s of r e t u r n f o r r e s o u r c e s expended i n tlie p o l i t i c a l o r e s n a . We
c o n t r o l of a s s e t s i t p r e v i o u s l y d i d n o t c o n t r o l a s m o b i l i z a t i o n ... can then r e p r e s e n t l o y a l t i e s , o b l i g a t i o n s , commitments and s o f o r t h a s de-
By d e f i n i t i o n , i t e n t a i l s a d e c l i n e i n t h e n s a e t s c o n t r o l l e d by aub- t e r m i n a n t s of t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t eoch r e s o u r c e nominally under group con-
 3-28

trol will be available:

[~~~~!~~j)
Loyalty refers to the breadth of membera' commitments to deliver

resources. It has three dimensions:

mobilization level = sum
when called -- the amount of resources committed

II
production
nominally under -- the range of resources involved
group control
-- the range of circumstances in which the resources will be delivered.

A commitment to deliver substantial resources of only one kind in a

Political life mokes the probabilities hard to estimate a priori and un-
narrowly-specified situation bespeaks relatively little loyalty. A commit-
likely to remnin constant from one possible type of action to another:
ment to deliver many resources of different kinds regardless of the
the militants who will vote or picket will not always go to the barricades.
situation reveals great loyalty. Real-life organizations lie somewhere
This formulation poses the problem explicitly. We can then ask, as a
between the two extremes.
question for research, whether the use of elections as a reference point
Albert Hirschman turns this observation inside out; he considers loyolty
produces the same polnt in time (or for the some group at different points
as one of the major alternative modes of demand for on orgnnizntion'e
in time) than does the use of street demonstrations.
services. (We looked at Hirschman's analysis briefly while reviewing the
We can also close in on the old problem of differences between a dis-
Million approach to collective action.) In the context of response to
ciplined professional stoff and committed volunteers: it should appear not
I decline in the performance of organizations, he distinguished three
only as a difference in the morket value of the labor under group control,
possible reactions of consumers, clients or members of a given organizetion:
but also as a variation in the probability that the available labor will

actually do the different things whicl~might be demnnded of it: stuff

exit, voice end loyalty. Economics, Hlrschman comments, treats exit -- a

envelopes, picket, lobby, bribe, kidnap, bomb, write legal briefs.

cessation of demand for the commodity or service -- as the normal response

to declining quality. In the case of schools, governments and other orgoni-

The formulotion neatly states an old political dilemma: the choice
zations whose performances fluctuate, he argues, two other responses are
bctween loyalty and effectiveness. Effective employees or members often
common. The relevant public may voice its dissatisfaction, with implicit
use their effectiveness to serve themselves or to serve others instead of
or explicit threats of exit. Or it may tolerate unsatisfactory performance
the orgnnization to which they are attached, while loyal employees or mem-
for a while because the costs of exit or voice are greater than the loss
bers are often ineffective; sometimes the solution of the tax farmer (who
of quality. That tolerance is a measure of subjective returns from the
uses his power to enrich himself, but at least has enougli effectiveness to
organization, hence of loyalty.
produce n surplus for his nominal masters) is the best nvailable. Some-
The economic problem is to work out the trodeoffs among exit, voice
times the disloyalty of the professionals is so great as to make loyal amn-
and loyalty. That specifies the conditions under wl~ichone or anotllcr
teurs n more desirable alternative.
occurs. For our purposes. Iiowever, the value of Hirschman's analysis is
to help us calculate the probability that resources ostensibly on call will
actually be delivered. Exit is the analogue of refusal to deliver, while
voice and loyalty are alternative ways of continuing to yield. At least
in the short run, voice raises the cost of group access to the resources.
In general, fl group which puts a large proportion of its membership
into remunerated positions within its own organization (for example, a
bureaucratized priesthood) raises the cost of exit, and thereby makes voice
and loyalty more likely responses to its performance. It does so at the
cost of committing an important share of its mobilized resources to the
maintenance of the organization itself.
The alternative of placing its members elsewhere -- as a victorious
--
politics1 party often dispofies of government jobs reduces the internal
drain on the organization. However, it also lowers the cost of exit, unless
members continue to hold their posts at the pleasure of the organization.
Building an all-embracing moral community also raises tlie relative costs
of exit. Earlier I suggested that tlie most important element of organization.
so far as impact on mobilization was concerned, was the group's inclusiveness
of different aspects of social life. The creation of a moral community is
therefore on extreme case of organization-building in general. On the whole,
the higher the level of organization, the greater the likelihood of voice
or loyalty. If a group emphasizes coercion, however, it probably shifts the
likelihood away from voice, toward exit or loyalty.
The major variables affecting the probability of delivery are therefore
the extent of competing claims on the resources involved, the nature of the
action to which the resources are to be committed, and how organized the
mobilizing group is. If the resources are free of competing claims, if
the action clearly defends the interests of every member and if the group
is an all-embracing moral community, the probability of delivery is close
to 100 percent. Loyalty is then at its maximum, the probability of depnr-
ture or contestation -- exit or voice -- is at its minimum.
Indeed, a significant part of the work of mubilizntion goes into
changing these three variables: reducing the competing claims on resources
controlled by members, developing a program which corresponds to the per-
ceived interests of members, building up a group structure which minimizes
exit and voice. In her survey of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
American communes, Rosabeth Moss Kanter identifies a series of "commitment
mechanisms." "For communes," she tells us :
the problem of commitment is crucial. Since the community
i represents an attempt to estahlish an ideal social order within
the larger society, it must vie with the outside for the members'
I
i loyalties. It must ensure high member involvement despite
external competition without sacrificing its distinctiveness or
ideals. It must often contravene the earlier socialization of
I its members in securing obedience to new demands. It must calm
internal dissension in order to present a united front to the
world. The problem of securing total and complete commitment
I
is central (Kanter 1972: 65).
I She is describing a mobilization program which concentrates on the lahor-
power and loyalty of the members themselves.
What organizational arrangements promote that sort of mobil.ization?
I Ksnter compares nine nineteenth-century comm~~nal
movements (including the
I
Shakers, Harmony, Jerusalem and Oneida) which lasted 33 yeflrs or more with
I
twenty-one (including Modern Times. Oberlin, Brook Farm and the Iowa The social arrangements build loyalty. and enliance mobilization.

Pioneer Phalanx) which lasted 16 years or less. The commitment mechanisms Most social groups are unlike communes. They differ in the priorl.ties

wliicli were substantially more common among the long-lived communes included: they assign to exit, voice and loyalty. The professionals Concentrate on

eexual and material abstinence I accumulating resources free of competing claims, the rat'on~lists on
I '
prohibition of nonresident members adapting their program to current group interests, the moralists on building

signing over property at admission an inclusive group which commands assent for its own sake. An exploitative

non-reimbursement of defectors for property and labor group will concentrate on the first while appearing to concentrate on the

provision of medical services second or the third: actually working to free resources while appearing to

insulation mechanisms, such as a special term for the Outside, shape a program to the interests of its members or to build a satisfying
ignoring of' outside newspapers, speaking a foreign language and/or
a special jargon group. Religious frauds often take this latter form.

rules for interaction with visitors Thus any group's mobilization program breaks down into these components:

discouragement of pairing: free love or celibacy required 1. accumulating resources

physical separation of family members 2. increasing collective claims on the resources

communal ownership of clothing and personal effects a. by reducing competing claims

no compensation for labor 1 b. by altering the program of collective action

no charge for community services c. by changing the satisfaction due to participntion in

communal work efforts the group as such.

daily meetings, and most time spent with other group members A successful mobilization program does all of them at once.

mortification procedures such as confession, mutual surveillance Groups do their mobilizing in a number of different ways. We can
and denunciation, or distinctions among members on moral grounds
make crude distinctions among defensive, offensive and preparatory mobili-
institutionalization of awe for the group and its leaders through
the attribution of magical powers, the legitimation of group demands zation. In defensive mobilization, a threat from outside induces the members
through appeals to ultimate values, and the use of special forms
of address (Kanter 1972: chapter 4). of a group to pool their resources to fight off the enemy. Eric Wolf (1969)

Kanter's list begins to give us a feeling for the real-life manifestations has pointed out how regularly this sort of response to the representatives

of the process Max Weber called the routinization of charisma. Faith and I of capitalism and state power has preceded peasant rebellions. Standard

magic play a part, to be sure. But so do a concrete set of social arrange-

i European forms of rural conflict -- food riots, tax rebellions, invasions
ments which place the available resources at the disposal of the group, and of fields, draft resistance and so on -- typically follow the same sort of

make either voice or exit costly ways to respond to unsatisfactory performance. defensive mobilization. This large class of actions challenges the common
I
assumption (made by Etzioni, among others) that mobilization is always a the face of a threat of firings, wage reductions or cutbacks in privileges.

top-down phenomenon, organized by leaders and agitators. It normally required risky organizing efforts by local leaders who were

Offensive mobilization &, however, often top-down. In the offensive willing to get hurt.

case, a group pools resources in response to opportunities to realize its The preparatory part of the strategy was always difficult, since it

interests. A common form of offensive mobilization consists of the diffusion required the members to forego present satisfactions in favor of uncertain

of a new organizational strategy. In the late 18208, for example, the future benefits. As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory

success of O'Connell's Catholic Association in forcing the expansion of mobilization, in fact, we see the increasing force of Hancur Olson's

the political rights of British and Irish Catholics inspired the creation statement of the free-rider problem: a rational actor will ride for nothing'

of political associations aimed at expanding the franchise and gusranteeing if someone else will pay the fuel and let him aboard. But if everyone

rights to assemble, organize end act collectively. A coalition of bourgeois tries to ride free the vehicle goes nowhere. Preparatory mobilization,

and substsntinl artisans arose from that strategy, and helped produce the especially in the face of high risks, requires strong incentives to overcome

great Reform Rill of 1832. In this instance, the top-down organizational the reasonable desire to have someone else absorb the costs.

efforts of such leaders as Francis Place and CJilliam Cobbett were crucial. As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory mobilization, we

Nevertheless, in pariah after parish the local dissidents decided also see that the distinction between offensive and preparatory is less clear

on their own that it was time to organize their own association, or (more than the distinction between offensive and defensive. Both offensive and

likely) to convert their existing forms of organization into a political preparatory mobilization require foresight and an active scanning of the

association. world outside the group. Both are unlikely in any but the smallest groups

Preparatory mobilization is no doubt the most top-down of all. In this without active leadership and deliberate organizational effort. One frequent

variety, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities pattern is for leaders to employ resources which are already mobilized to

and threats. The nineteenth-century trade union is a classic case. The assure the commitment of other resources to collective ends. That happens,

trade union built up s store of money to cushion hardship -- hardship in the for example. when priests play on their congregations, already obliged to

form of unemployment, the death of a breadwinner or loss of wages during a assemble, for cash contributions. It also happens when landlords send

strike. It also pooled knowledge and organizational skills. When it bailiffs to claim part of the crop. or when word heelers trade jobs for votes.

escaped the union-busting of employers and governments, the trade union These are concrete examples of the "selective incentives" for participation

greatly increased the capacity of workers to act together: to strike, to whose importance Mancur Olson has stressed.

boycott, to make collective demands. This preparatory mobilization often Unlike defensive mobilization, neither offensive nor preparatory

began defensively, in the course of a losing battle with employers or in mobilization occurs very often as a simple extension of the group's everyday
routines for doing its work: gathering at the market, shaping up for hiring
at the dock, getting together for a little poaching. Offensive and prepara-
tory mobilization resemble each other; the main difference is whether the
opportunities to which the group responds are in the present or the future.
So the basic distinction runs between defensive hnd offensive modes of
mobillzntion.
A population's initinl.wenlth and power significantly affect the proba-
bility that its mobilization will be defensive or offensive. Common sense
says that the rich mobilize conservatively, in defense of their threatened
interests, while the poor mobilize rndically, in search of what they lack.
Common sense is wrong. It is true that the rich never lash out to smash
the status quo, while the poor sometimes do. But the rich are constantly
mobilizing to take sdvant~geof new opportunities to maximize their interests.
The poor can rarely afford to.
The poor and powerless tend to begin defensively, the rich and powerful
offensively. The group whose members are rich can mobilize a surplus without
threatening a member's othcr amusements end obligations. A group with a
poor constituency has little choice but to compete with daily necessities.
The group whose members are powerful can use the other organizations they
control -- including governments -- to do some of their work, whereas the
powerless must do it on their own. The rich and powerful can forestall claims
from othcr groups before they become articul'ated claims, and can sfford to
seize opportunities to make new claims on their own. Tlie poor and the power-
less often find that the rich, the powerful and the government oppose and
punish their efforts at mobilization. (The main exception, an important one,
is the powerless group whlch forms a coalition with a rich, powerful patron;
European Fascists of the 1920s mobilized rapidly in that fashion.) As a
result. any mobilization at all is more costly to the poor and powerless;
only a threat to the little they have is likely to move them to mobilize.
Tlie rich and powerful are well-defended against such threats: they rnrely
have the occasion for defensive mobilization.
If, on the other hand, we hold mobilization constant and consider
collective action itself, common sense is vindicated. Relatively poor and
powerless groups which have already mobilized are more likely to act
collectively by claiming new rights, privileges end advantages. At the
same level of mobilization the rich and powerful are more likely to act
collectively in defense of whet they already have. Thus the well-docu-
! mented tendency of strikes to become more frequent and more demnnding in
! times of prosperity, when workers have more slnck resources to devote to
acting together, and employers have more to lose from the withholding
of labor.
Mobilization implies demobilization. Any process by wllich s group
loses collective control over resources demobilizes the group. Now could
that happen7 Anything which destroys resources tends to hnve that effect:
war, neglect, potlatch. But the more common source of demobilization is
I
the transfer of control over certain kinds of resources to another group:
a subunit of the group in question, a large unit of which the group itself
is a part, a group outside. A lost war, for example, frequently produces
all three sorts of demobilization in the losing country. Hen and women
return from military service to the service of their fomilics; the govern-
ment, for a time, gives up some of its control over its own operations to
a concert of nations of which it is a part; other countries seize some of
the loser's territory, population, equipment or wealth. Whether such
processes produce a negative sum, a positive sum or a zero sum depends
entirely on the relative rates at which new resources are being created, up resources as people in other categories ncquire them. \hen conscrip-

nnd old ones destroyed. tion occurs, a group gives up labor power. In the European feudal period.

Often two groups, one containing the other, mobilize st approximately the "group" was charscteristically a fief. The vassal's personal obli-

the same time. A confusion between the two levels has regularly dogged gation to the overlord tied his fief to the overlord's fief, to he sure;

discussions of mobilization, since Karl Deutsch's initial formulation of but the fief owed the knight service. As states grew stronger. communities

the idens (1953). The most notable examples from our own era involve typically became the units which owed n certain numher of recruttn. The

national states and smaller units within them: parties, unions or even usual mechanism of the draft consisted of the assignment of s quota to s

organized ethnic groups. (Many Africenists, for instance, have noticed commune, with some sort of collective decision (frequently the drawing oE

the strengthening of the ostensibly traditional groups which outsiders lots) determining which of the eligible young men would go. The purchase

call "tribes" with the growth of new states). of substitutes by those who could afford it, as shockin8 as it nppesrs to

Political theorists, both totalitarian and democratic, have often egalitarian eyes, expresses precisely this sense of a debt owed by n

considered the mobilization at one level end at the other to be comple- comunity, rather than en individual, to the state: Community X owes six

mentary. The party, in such an account, sccumulates loyalties which conscripts. Under these circumstances, resistance to the draft united s

transfer to the state. There is actually, however, little guarantee that community, not just a group of young people, against the ntate. The greot

this harmony will prevail. In the usual situation, the smaller and larger counter-revolution of the ~endgeagainst the French revolutionsry state,

units compete for the same resources. They may follow well-defined rules in 1793, began with solidery resistance of commt~nltiesto the demnnd for

of combat, and one of them may consistently have the upper hand, but they conscripts. The c m u n i t y as e whole stood to lose part of its supply

compete nonetheless. Likewise, two or more groups mobilizing simultaneously of labor, love, loyalty end procreative power.

within some larger group which is also mobilizing commonly struggle over The spread of the political theory end practice of "possessive jndi-

control of the same resources. The Teamsters and the Transport Workers vidualism" (as C. 8 . Hscpherson calls it) shifted tlie military obll&stion

fight for jurisdiction over the same drivers. lJhen union members pay more toward the individual, but only incompletely. Within French villnges, the

taxes they l~aveless for union dues. Illen all a person's time goes into classe oE young men coming up for the draft in the same yeor remnins one

o religious sect, he has none left either for union membership or for of the principal solidar~groups, one which symbolizes its Jons through

rituals, banquets and ceremonial gifts. In most western countries. religious

government service. Military conscription withdrew8 a man from his obli-

gations to s circle of friends end relatives. groups and some of the professions have, in tlie course of acquiring

This lest example underscores the collective character of the process. distinct political identities. worked out special compacts with the state

We ere not simply dealing with the fact that people in some categories give exempting some of their members -- nt least their priests -- from service,
and s e t t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e s e r v i c e of o t h e r s . I n t h e United S t a t e s , a b s o l u t e o r p r o p o r t i o n a t e monpower committed t o c o l l e c t i v e ends i n c r e a s e s .

t h e American Medical A s s o c i a t i o n h a s achieved t h a t s o r t of g u a r a n t e e f o r An i n c r e a s e of r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n a u n i t normally f a c i l i t a t e s i t s m o b i l i z n t i o n ,

i t s members, w h i l e t h e American C h i r o p r a c t i c A s s o c i a t i o n h a s n o t . The simply by p e r m i t t i n g s u b u n i t s t o keep r e c e i v i n g r e s o u r c e s w h i l e t h e l o r g e r

R e l i g i o u s S o c i e t y of F r i e n d s h a s , t h e Black Muslims have n o t . This tying u n i t g a i n s c o n t r o l o v e r more than i t had b e f o r e . But i t is t h a t i n c r e a s e

of r e l i g i o u s exemptions t o s p e c i f i c group memberships caused g r e a t c o n f u s i o n i n c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l i t s e l f which c o n s t i t u t e s m o b i l i z a t i o n . Without some

i n t h e 1960s a s young Americans opposed t o t h e Vietnam war begal; a p p l y i n g m o b i l i z a t i o n , a group may p r o s p e r , b u t i t cannot contend f o r power;

f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n a s c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t o r s on g e n e r a l moral grounds c o n t e n d i n g f o r power means employing mobilized r e s o u r c e e t o i n f l u e n c e o t h e r

w i t h o u t c l a i m i n g a f f i l i a t i o n w i t h one of t h e p r i v i l e g e d s e c t s . I groups.

I n t h e America of t h e 1960s. something e l s e was going on a s w e l l . 1 I d e a l l y , t h e n , we a r e l o o k i n g a t a s e t of groups, and t r y i n g t o

I
In d i f f e r e n t ways, groups of b l a c k s and groups of young p e o p l e began t o e s t i m a t e f o r each group and f o r each r e s o u r c e under t h e c o n t r o l of any

c l a i m a c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t t o withhold t h e i r members from m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . of t h e groups two d i f f e r e n t e n t i t i e s : a ) t h e v a l u e of t h e r e s o u r c e nominally

I do n o t mean they were widely s u c c e s s f u l e i t h e r i n m o b i l i z i n g t h e i r own under group c o n t r o l , and b) t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e w i l l be

populations o r i n holding o f f t h e s t a t e . Both groups c o n t a i n competing d e l i v e r e d when c a l l e d f o r , g i v e n some s t a n d a r d assumption obout t h e u s e s

m o b i l i z e r s p u r s u i n g competing e n d s , and have many members who r e f u s e t o t o which t h e r e s o u r c e s w i l l b e p u t . To my knowledge, no one h a s e v e r come

commit t h e i r r e s o u r c e s t o any of t h e m o b i l ' i z e r s , even though t h e y a r e w i l l i n g c l o s e t o e s t i m a t i n g t h e s e q u a n t i t i e s f o r any s e r of groups. We have o n l y

t o y i e l d them t o t h e s t a t e . Yet t h e c l a i m was t h e r e , i n t h e form of rough approximations.

o r g a n i z e d campaigns t o r e s i s t o r evade t h e d r a f t . The demands f o r t h e Measurinu M o b i l i z a t i o n

e x c l u s i o n of c o r p o r a t e and m i l i t a r y r e c r u i t e r s from campuses l i k e w i s e How t o do i t ? I f t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of d i v e r s e r e s o u r c e s f e l l i n t o a

mnde c l a i m s f o r c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of manpower. The s t a n d a r d sequence w i t h i n any p a r t i c u l a r p o p u l o t i o n , one could produce a

c l a i m was a s i g n t h a t some m o b i l i z a t i o n was o c c u r r i n g ; groups, r a t h e r than s c a l e of m o b i l i z a t i o n w i t h o u t having d i r e c t meosures of each of t h e component

i n d i v i d u a l s , were s t r u g g l i n g over t h e r i g h t t o p r e c i o u s r e s o u r c e s : t h e I resources. We might t a k e a s a methodolop.ica1 model t h e s c a l e s f o r

l a b o r power of young people. With t h e end of t h e d r a f t and t h e withdrawal " c e n t r a l i t y " of v i l l a g e s which Frank Young h a s c o n s t r u c t e d ( s e e Young 1966).

of American t r o o p s from t h e Vietnam war, t h e groups involved demobilized. Such a s c a l e would resemble t h e f o l l o w i n g s e t :

I do n o t t h i n k t h e y , o r t h e i r c l a i m s , have d i s a p p e a r e d . 1 ) No one w i t h i n t h i s c a t e g o r y e v e r i d e n t i f i e s i t a s a group, s o

Reminder: m o b i l i z a t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e f a r a s can be determined from some s t a n d a r d s e t of s o u r c e s .

c o n t r o l o v e r r e s o u r c e s . r a t h e r t h a n t h e s i m p l e a c c r e t i o n of r e s o u r c e s .
2 ) Members of t h i s c a t e g o r y sometimes i d e n t i f y themselves a s a group.
A group t h a t grows i n s i z e h a s more manpower i n i t . That does not mean t h e
 3) The group has a standard name known to members and nonmembers
alike.
4) Members of the group sometimes appear in public as a group.
identified by name.
5 ) The group has standard symbols, slogans, songs, styles of dress
and/or other identifying marks.
6) The group contains one or more organizations which some members
of the group recognize as having the authority to speak for the
group as a whole on some matters.
7) The group contains one or more organizations controlling well-
defined buildings and spaces which are at least nominally open to
members of the group as a whole.
8) Thc group has at lenst one common store of major resources --
money, labor, weapons, information or something else -- held in
the name of the group as a whole.
9) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises extensive
control over group members' allocation of time and energy in the
name of the group as a whole.
10) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises
extensive control over the personal relations of members of the group.
The first four items on the list clearly belong under the heading "organi-
zation" rather than "mobilization." The fifth bal.ances uncertainly between
the two. Thus the lower end of the scale rests on the assumption of a
close association between organization and mobilization. Obviously such
a scale could not be used to establish the existence of that relationship.
In my own research group's work on collective action in Europe and
America, we have approached the measurement of mobilization in two
simple ways. They fall short of the comprehensive accounts and internally
consistent scales we would like to have; the real world is hard.
The first and more obvious way is to take one or two widely-available
indicators of mobilization, such as union membership, and prepare comparable
series of those indicators for the set of groups under study. In this case,
we make no a priori effort to combine available indicators. On the contrary,
we hope to learn something about their relationships from the analysis.
In our studies of French strike activity from 1830 to 1968. Edward Shorter
and I recurrently use number of union members andlor years of continuous
existence of a local general labor organization (a bourse de travail) as
indicators of a local labor force's mobilization level (Shorter and Tilly
1974). David Snyder (1974) uses union membership in his time-series analyses
of strikes in Italy, France and the U.S. from various points in the nine-
teenth century to 1970. Joan Lind, studying strikes and labor-related
street demonstrations in Sweden and Great Britain from 1900 to 1950,
measures mobilization via union membership and union income. With interesting
exceptions to be discussed later on, alternative indicators of mobilization
turn out to be strongly correlated with each other, and to have a signi-
ficant positive effect on the level of strike activity.
The second and riskier way we have indexed mobilization is to build
different versions of the sort of ordinal scale I have just sketched from
descriptions -- statistical or otherwise -- of the groups in question.
Ronald Aminzade's study of Marseillaise workers illustrates this tack.
Aminznde was trying to assess the influence of organizational charac- Louis Napoleon's 1851 coup d16tat: for the insurrections of August 1870

teristics, prior experience with collective action and mobilization level and March 1871 in Marseille, he reconstructed a list of 429 portlcipnnts

on the involvement of different groups of workers in Marseille from 1830 from police dossiers on persons involved in the revolutionary International,

to 1871. Drawing on evidence from French archives and from published from conviction records for the 1870 ins~~rrection
and Erom arrest records

works, he found that he could assemble more or less continuous descriptions for the 1871 insurrection. Individual indicators of mobilization correlate
for each of twenty-one occupational categories concerning a) the presence with involvement in one or another of these events from 0 to +.8. The

or absence and b) the general pattern of activity of guilds (more exactly, correlations of participation with the combined mobilization index are:

compagnonnages), cooperatives, trade unions, mutual benefit societies, and

1848: +. 333
resistance societies. For 1848, he was also able to ascertain whether the
1851: +.571
occupational group had its own representation to the Republican Central
1870-71: +.473
Committee. its own political club, and any collective privileges formally
There is a substantial relationship between mobilization level -- as
recognized by government regulations. (Informtion on membership and on
crudely measured by Aminzade -- and involvement in Marseille's major
funds controlled was also ovailable, but not regularly enough for the
revolutionary movements from 1848 to 1871.
construction of continuous series.)
General Conditions for Mobilization
Aminzade then combined this information into three indicators:
According to our mobilization model, the broad factors witl~ina popu-
1) total number of occupational organizations
lation affecting its degree of mobilization are the extent of Its shared

2) total years of prior existence of different organizational interest in interactions with other popu.lntions. and the extent to which

forms it forms a distinct category and a dense network: its interest end its

3) total number of collective actions previously carried out
by these organizations
the third being the most debatable as an index of mobilization.
essentially ranked each occupational group as high or low on each of the
organization. Outside the group, its power, Its subjection to repression and
the current constellation of opportunities and threats most strongly affect
its mobilization level. Power, repression and opportunitylthreat will
Aminzade
come in for detailed discussion in the next chapter. Interest and organi-

three items (2 = high; 1 - low) and summed them into a six-point scale
zation have already hod their share of attention. Yet it would be good to

(6 - three highs; 1 - three lows). Using the scores for the periods just
review their impact on mobilization before rushing on to examine collective

action itself.
preceding the events in question, he analyzed occupational differentials in
Anthony Oberschall has provided a neat synthesis of a good deal of
arrests during Marseille's insurrection of June, 1848 and in the course of
recent thinking about these relationships. Oberschnll deliberately counters
hrkl~eimlanthinking -- especially its "mass society" variety -- by insisting Thus, comunism and fascism have gained strength in social systems

on the importance of some forms of prior group coherence to the mobilization undergoing sudden and extensive changes in the structure of suthor-

of conflict groups. Among other things, he points out that newly mobilizing ity and community. Sharp tears in the social fabric caused by

conflict groups usually reduce their organizing costs by building, inten- widespread unemployment or by major military defeat are higl~ly

tionally or unintentionally, on existing group structure. Instead of favorable to mass politics. Social classes which provide dispro-

starting from a shared interest but no organization, existing groups coalesce portionate support for mass movements are those that possess the

and reorganize. Thua the conflict group escapes, to some extent, from the fewest social ties among their members. This means above all the

great cost of starting at zero mobilization. lower social classes. However, since there are sections of all

Considering that prior organization, Oberschall cnlls particular social classes which tend to be sociolly atomized, members of

attention to two dimensions: the character of links within the population all social classes are to be found among the participants in mans

(communal orgonizatlon, associational organization, or little organization politics: unattached (especially free-lance) intellectuals, morginol

of any kind) and to the ties between the population and other groups (inte- (especially small) businessmen and farmers, and isolated workers

grated with other groups vs. segregated from them). In combination, the two have engaged in mass politics in times of crisis (Kornhauser 1959: 229).

dimenslons produce a sixfold classification of populations: We have already encountered the same line of argument in our review of

internal links Durkheimian analyses of collective action.

comunal weak associationol Oberschall counters with the argument that populations with weak internal
ties to integrated structure rarely act at all. He also argues that each combination of
other
groups segregated internal structure and external ties produces a different variety of

mobilization and collective action. In general, he sees ties to other

We will use a related classification later on, when we try to distinguish
groups (especially elite groups) as constraints on the formation of conflict
the major varieties of collective action.
groups; in that one regard, he tends to agree wlth the moss-society theorists.
Oberschnll's analysis directly confronts mass-society theory. The
But in his analysis, segmented populations with either extensive comunnl
mass-socjety argument says that populations in the central column, especially
or extensive associational structure are especially likely to produce
,
--
those which are segregated from the'rest of society, ore the great breeders
or become -- conflict groups. To put it in mass-society terms, they are
of protest movements. One of the best-known statements of the theory runs:
more, not less, "available" for social movements.

Groups which are particularly vulnerable to mass movements manifest Oberschall then proposes a useful series of hypotheses about the

mnjor discontinuities in their structure during periods of change. mobilization of conflict groups:
1. In a segmented context, the greeter the number end variety of Although the third hypothesis provides en escape clause, the mnin srgumcnt

organizations in a collectivity, and the higher the participation of strongly emphasizes the influence of prior organization. So does the

members in this network, the more rapidly and enduringly does varied evidence which Oberschall reviews. Perhaps too strongly, or rather

mobilization into conflict groups occur, and the more likely it is too exclusively: the argument I have been building up here gives greater

thst bloc recruitment, rather than individual recruitment, will weight to interests, mobilization strategy, repression end power position.

take place (Oberschall 1973: 125). Nevertheless, the two lines of argument agree in denying thst unattached

individuals and homogenized masses have any special propensity to form

2. The more segmented s collectivity is from the rest of the
or join social movements.
society, and the more viable end extensive the communal ties within
Oberschall's hypotheses focus on just that issue: joining or not
it, the more rapid and easier it is to mobilize members of the
joining. For that reason, the c o m u n s l end of his classification remains
collectivity into en opposition movement (p. 129).
more mysterious than the asaociationnl end. It is valuable to point out.

3. If a collectivity is disorganized or unorganized along trsdi- as Oberschall does, thst events such as great peasant revolts do not

tional c o m u n s l lines and not yet organized along associations1 lines, ordinarily sweep up society's rootless, disorganized, leftover people, but

collective protest is possible when members share c o m o n sentiments draw in coherent but aggrieved eroups of people who remain attached to

of opression and targets for hostility. These sentiments are more each other and to their socisl settings. But to speak of "recruitment"

likely to develop if the collectivity is segmented rather then compromises the insight.

vertically integrated with other collectivities of the society. The implicit model has modern contours. It applies easily to such

Such protest will, however, tend to be more short-lived and more membership organizations as labor unions, political parties and religiocts

violent than movements based on c o m u n a l or sseociational orgsni- organizations. It does not apply so easily to the eighteenth-century .

zstion (p. 133). countrymen who tore down poorhouses and then went back to work in their

shops and fields. It distorts the experience of nineteenth-century artisans

4. Participants in populnr disturbances and activitiat in oppo-
who built barricades in the streets near their shops during the revolutions
sition organizations will be recruited primarily from previously
of 1848. The eighteenth-century people of Nacton and the nineteenth-
active end relatively well-integrated individuals within the
century people of Paris mobilized end acted collectively. all right. Btlt
collectivity, whereas socially isolated, atomized, end uprooted
they did not form or join a "socisl movement" or even s "conflict group"
individuals will be underrepresented, at least until the movement
in the sense ,required by Oberschall's model.
has become substantial (p. 135).
To cover the whole range from anti-poorhouse crowds to revolutionary
artisans to political parties to religious cults, we need a very broad action. In this general statement, the argument is not very controversial.

view of mobilization. It must accommodate a great variety of resources. It rejects Durkheimian theories which trace routine co11,ective action

and not be tied to any particular organizational form or type of interest. back to society's integration and which trace non-routine collective action

In that spirit, the three major principles we have laid down so far are back to society's disintegration. Still a grent many Weberian, Marxinn and

brond indeed; schematically: Millian analyses will fit, with a bit of shoving, into the boxea defined

1. (quantity of resources (probability by interests, organization and mobilization.

x = mobilization
collectively controlled) of delivery) At thia level of argument, the main differences among the Weberian,

Marxian and Millian analyses are in the weighta they assign to the various
mobilization = f(organization)
2.
determinants of collective action. On the whole, Weberian arguments --
3. organization - catness x netness especially as they appear in analyses of social movements and their

The first and third are, obviously, definitions. The second is a proposition. routinization -- assign different weighta to interests in routine and

but one which needs a good deal more specification before it has much value. non-routine collective action. In a full-fledged social movement. runs

The specification will drive us back toward the same problems Oberachall the argument, interests have a leas immediate effect because the group's

emphasizes: the differences between segmented and integrated populations, beliefs override or redefine them. The Weberian approach tends to treat

the contrasting mobilization patterns of communal and associational the costs and effects of organization as great, but then to consider the

groups, the conditions for organizational effectiveness. In short, we are group's interests and organization a sufficient explanation of ita actions.

on the right path, but not very far along. Let us try to stride on by Implicitly, that is, it treats the coats of mobilization and collecttve

dealing with collective action itself. action as slight.

From Mobilization to Collective Action Marxian analyses likewise give high weights to interests and organi-

Collective action is joint action in pursuit of common ends. Up to zation. low weighta to the costa of mobilization and collective action as

this point, I have argued that the extent of a group's collective action such. The difference from the Weberian line. in thia regard. is in the

is a function of 1) the extent of its shared interests (advantages and strong Marxian emphasis on material interests -- more precisely, on interests

disadvantages likely to result from interactions with other groups). .defined by relationship to the predominant means of production -- and in
2) the intensity of its organization (the extent of common identity and the argument that the organization of production underliea and dominates

unifying structure among its members) and 3) its mobilization (the amount other forms70r organization.

of resources under its collective control). Soon I will add repression, Milliana are the only one of our four clusters who commonly assign

major importance to the costa of coll,ective action itself. The standard

power, and opportunity/threat to those determinants of a group's collective
Millian analysis jumps from defined interests to collective action with relation to their interests, and are expcnding valuable resources In the

scant attention to organization and mohilization. Starting from the effort. If we can imagine assigning relative values to the collective

challenge laid down by Msncur Olson, Millians have sharpened the analysis goods produced and the resources expended, we can think of a contender
/
of collective action by connecting it to the production of collective goods. as gaining, losing or breaking even. Diagramatically:

The ideal col.lective good is inclusive and indivisible. If any member

of the group receives it, all receive it. There is no way of breaking

it up into shares. The draining of a swamp to prevent malaria is s fairly

pure example. Real goods vary considerably in how much they approximate

that ideal. Police protection, for example, is ideally a pure collective

good; ideally, it is inclusive and indivisible. In practice, some people

get little or no police protection, and others buy up extra shares for COLLECTIVE
GOODS
themselves. We therefore have to say that action is collective to the
OBTAINED
--
extent that it produces inclusive, indivisible gooda.

L
LOSS
The definition I have proposed is more relaxed in some regards and

more restrictive in others. Joint action in pursuit of c m o n ends often

fails to produce any goods at all, but so long as it &?& to produce O RESOURCES EXPENDED
collective goods I propose to include it. On the other hand, some collec-

tive gooda (and many collective bads) are produced unintentionally, as

by-products of Individual efforts. I propose to exclude them from the

definition of collective action. That choice has its disadvantages; it

requires us to think about what an unsuccessful action might have produced

and to be sure that people really did act jointly, instead of simply

searching around for the appearance of collective goods. Yet it has

the advantage of focusing the analysis more clearly on the explanation

of the action itself, instead of aiming at its outcomes.

Let us borrow the basic Millian insight: collective actors are

attempting to produce collective goods that have a specific value in

 111 t h e shaded a r e a above t h e d l a g o n a l , t h e v a l u e of t h e c o l l e c t i v e goods opportunities -- t h a t i s , by i n c r e a s i n g i t s power o r r e d u c i n g Lta s l r b j c c t i o n

o b t n i n e d i s g r e a t e r than t h e v a l u e of t h e r e s o u r c e s expended; t h a t i s t o repression.

o gain. Below t h e d i a g o n a l we have l o s s e s , and t h e d i a g o n a l i t s e l f is a ' I f t h i n g s were t h i s s i m p l e , we would e x p e c t e v e r y group t o m o b l l i z e

brca k-even 1 i n e . t o i t s utmost c a p a c i t y t o m a n i p u l a t e o p p o r t u n i t i e s a s much a s p o s s i b l c

I n any r e a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h e r e a r e r e a l l i m i t s on how much of and t o maneuver i t s e l f i n t o t h e h i g h e s t a v a i l a b l e p o s i t i o n above t h e d l a -

t h e s p a c e i n t h e diagram is a v a i l a b l e t o t h e a c t o r . We have t a l k e d about gonal. To some e x t e n t , t h a t i s a r e a s o n a b l e simplification of whnt goes

t h e two main l i m i t s a s m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y . To modify t h e d i a - on i n power s t r u g g l e s . But i t i g n o r e s important r e a l i t i e s : m o b l l l z a t i o n

gram: i t s e l f is c o s t l y . The g r o u p ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n i t s e l f s e t s i m p o r t a n t l i m i t s

on t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , m o b i l i z a t i o n s t r a t e g i e s and m a n i p u l a t i o n s of

o p p o r t u n i t y i t c a n o r w i l l undertake. And i t s i n t e r e s t s d e f i n e w h i c l ~s o r t s

OPPORTUNITY of g a i n s and l o s s e s a r e a c c e p t a b l e o r u n a c c e p t a b l e .

To p u t i t a n o t h e r way, groups d i f f e r c o n s i d e r a b l y i n t h e r e l o t l v e

v a l u e s they a s s i g n t o c o l l e c t i v e goods and t o t h e r e s o u r c e s which must bc

COLLECTIVE
expended t o a c q u i r e them. Many, perhaps most, groups behave l i k e p e a s a n t s
GOODS
who a r e s e e k i n g . t o draw a t a r g e t income from t h e i r l a n d ; i n s t e a d of lo-
OBTAINEI)
c a t i n g themselves a t t h e p o i n t of maximum p r o f i t , t h e y aim f o r a c e r t a i n

return. I f t h e y c a n , they expend t h e minimum r e s o u r c e s r c q u i r c d f o r t l ~ s t

reason. Thus a group of workers f i r s t d e c i d e they want an elght-hour day.

0 RESOURCES EXPENDED
t h e n c a l c u l a t e what e f h r t t h e y w i l l have t o expend i n o r d e r t o win t h a t

particular objective.
The group cannot expend more r e s o u r c e s t h a n i t h a s c u r r e n t l y m o b i l i z e d ;
Some groups v a l u e a g i v e n c o l l e c t i v e good s o h i g h l y t h a t t h e y a r e
t h n t s e t s an unbreakable l i m i t i n one d i r e c t i o n . The o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r
w i l l i n g t o i n c u r what o t h e r groups r e g a r d a s n e t l o s s e s i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e
gain nre f i n i t e ; that s e t s a l i m i t in the other direction. L a t e r on we
t h e i r cherished objectives. From t h e viewpoint of t h e a v e r a g e group, they
w i l l look c o r e f u l l y a t l i m i t s on o p p o r t u n i t y . For t h e moment i t i s enough
a r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h a p o s i t i o n below t h e break-even llne. We can mnke a
t o s e e t h a t both m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y l i m i t t h e p o s s i b l e g a i n s Erom
d i s t i n c t i o n among f o u r group s t r a t e g i e s : 1 ) t h e z e a l o t s who, compared t o
collective action. I t f o l l o w s , c l e a r l y , t h a t a change i n m o b i l i z a t i o n o r
o t h e r groups, s e t a n e x t r e m e l y h i g h v a l u e on some c o l l e c t i v e good i n terms
o p p o r t u n i t y w i l l produce a change i n t h e s e t of g a i n s and l o s s e s a v a i l a b l e

t o a group. Zero m o b i l i z n t i o n - zero gains o r losses. A group can i n c r e a s e

of t h e r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d t o a c h i e v e t h a t good: w l l l i n g t o expend l i f e and

lLmb, f o r i n s t a n c e , i n o r d e r t o a c q u i r e self-government; 2) t h e m i s e r s . who

t h c range of g a i n s and l o s s e s a v a i l a b l e by m o b i l i z i n g o r by m a n i p u l a t i n g
 F i g u r e 3-4 Four I d e a l P a t t e r n s of C o l l e c t i v e Action
v a l u e t h e r e s o u r c e s t h e y a l r e a d y hold s o h i g h l y t h a t h a r d l y any a v a i l a b l e
ZEALOT MISER
c o l l e c t i v e good can draw them i n t o expending t h e i r mobilized r e s o u r c e s on

c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ; we s h o u l d e x p e c t m i s e r s t o a c t t o g e t h e r d e f e n s i v e l y
OPPORTUNITY
when t h e y a c t a t a l l ; 3 ) t h e run-of-the-mill c p n t e n d e r s who aim f o r a

l i m i t e d s e t of c o l l e c t i v e goods, making t h e minimum e x p e n d i t u r e of r e -

s o u r c e s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e s e gooda, and remaining i n -

a c t i v e when t h e c u r r e n t combination of m o b i l i z a t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y makes

a n e t l o s s on t h e exchange l i k e l y ; 4 ) t h e o p p o r t u n i s t s who s t r i v e t o

maximize t h e i r n e t r e t u r n -- t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n v a l u e between r e s o u r c e s

expended and c o l l e c t i v e gooda o b t a i n e d -- r e g a r d l e s s of which c o l l e c t i v e RESOURCES EXPENDED

goods they a c q u i r e .

. F i g u r e 3-4 p r e s e n t s t h e t o u r i d e a l t y p e s s c h e m a t i c a l l y . In this

s i m p l i f i e d p i c t u r e . o p p o r t u n i t y and m o b i l i z a t i o n a r e t h e same f o r a l l
RUN-OF-THE-MILL
types. The diagrams v a l u e t h e r e s o u r c e s expended and t h e c o l l e c t i v e

goods a c q u i r e d s t a v e r a g e s o v e r a l l groups i n s t e a d of showing t h e r e l a t i v e

v a l u e s u s u a l l y a s s i g n e d t o mobilized r e s o u r c e s and c o l l e c t i v e goods by . , .

each t y p e of group. According t o t h e diagram, z e a l o t s f i n d a c c e p t a b l e ACCEPTABLE

o n l y a narrow r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e goods; t h e goods a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y

t h o s e t h ~ ot t h e r groups v a l u e most h i g h l y . They a r e w i l l i n g t o spend up

t o t h e l i m i t of t h e i r mobilized r e s o u r c e s t o a c q u i r e t h o s e c o l l e c t i v e

goods, even i f by t h e s t a n d a r d s of o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s t h e y a r e t a k i n g l o s s e s .

Misers w i l l o n l y spend a s h a r e of t h e i r mobilized r e s o u r c e s f o r a v e r y

v a l u a b l e r e t u r n i n c o l l e c t i v e goods. They w i l l n e v e r spend up t o t h e

l i m i t s e t by t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n . Run-of-the-mill c o n t e n d e r s resemble

z e a l o t s . e x c e p t t h a t t h e y a r e w i l l i n g t o s e t t l e f o r a w i d e r r a n g e of c o l -

l e c t i v e goods. and u n w i l l i n g t o s e t t l e f o r a l o s s . Finally, opportunists

w i l l t a k e any c o l l e c t i v e goods t h e y c a n g e t . They w i l l . spend up t o t h e i r

l i m i t t o g e t i t , j u s t s o long a s t h e y make a p r o f i t .
 I

i
cut examples, such as strikes, elections, petitions and attacks on poor-
The diagram invites further theorizing. For example, it is reasonable

to suppose that zealots tend to maintainhigher levels of mobilization than

houses we still face the practical problems of gauging their mngnitudes --
I
especially if we want to any "how much" collective action one group or
other klnds of actors. They therefore have more chances to acquire their I
another engaged in over some period of time. As with the meosurcmcnt of
desired collective goods, but they also run a greater risk of heavy losses.
mobilization, we commonly have the choice between a) indicators of collective
Opportunists, on the other hand, probably work more effectively at moving

up the opportunity line by aucll tactics as forming coalitions with other

powerful contenders. Some of these strategic questions will become impor-

1. action which come to us in a more or lees qunntitatlve form, but are too

narrow or too remote to repreaent adequately the range of action we have

in mind, or b) indicators derived from qualitative descriptions, which

tant in our later discussions of power.
are usually discontinuous, which often vary in coverage from one group or
Every political system sorts its contenders among zealots, misers, op-
period to another, and which are always hard to convert reliably into
portunists and run-of-the-mill contenders. No doubt every political sys-
meaningful numbers.
tem rewards the opportunists more than the run-of-the-mill, and the run-of-
i David Snyder's time-series analyses of Italian. French and American
the-mill contenders more than the zealots or the misers. That is even
strikes provide a case in point. Snyder uses number and proportion of

i
true. I fear, after zealots seize power. They. too, reward opportunists
labor union members in the civilian labor force as a mobilization measure.
and punieh zealots.
Data for long periods are difficult to locate and hard to make comparable.
Oddly enough, the opportunist is the least likely of the four extremes.
I but when they are available at all they are usunlly in quantitative form
Regardless of group stmtegy, the return the group seeks is rarely or never
from the start. On the side of collective action, Snyder uses two sets of
o simple profit on collective action. Groups care about the character of
variables. First come the strike-activity measures: number of strikes.
the collective goods. Labor unions usually don't want papal dispensations.
number of participants in atrikes, mean duration of strikes, days lost.
clans usually don't want recognition as bargaining agents. In fact, both
proportion ending in success or failure, proportion making offensive or de-
the supply and the demand are "lumpy", clumped, discontinuous. For that
!
fensive demands, and so on. Ultimately, all of these come from official
reason, we cannot simply graft the analysis of collective action on the existing
sources, where they appear as summary statistics or as uniform descriptions
microeconomics of private goods. The existing economics of collective
of all the strikes reported for some period, area and definition of the
goods comes closer. But it, too, has yet to solve the problems of interest,
relevant labor force. As in the case of union membershfp, it tokes some
organization and mobilizstion we have encountered.
ingenuity and effort to wrest comparable measures from the sources, but
The Detection and Measurement of Collective Action
the quantification itself is not very difficult.
When trying to study joint action in pursuit of common ends, we face
That is certainly not true of Snyder's second set of measures. Tliey
the practical problems of detecting the action, and then determining how
concern other forms of collective action by workers. Snyder's list (from
joint it is and how common its ends. If we confine our attention to clesr-
Snyder 1974: 114) r u n s :
F i g u r e 3-5: S n y d e r ' s Code f o r
Economic and D i r e c t l y Job R e l a t e d A c t i o n s
Labor Support of C a n d i d a t e s
1) employment i n f o r m a t i o n and placement

2) l o c a l c o n t r o l of working c o n d i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g g r i e v a n c e
The coder i s e v a l u a t i n g a a i n g l e - y e a r sununary of a b s t r a c t s from h i s t o r i c a l
procedures. l o c a l a d j u s t m e n t s of n a t i o n a l c o n t r a c t s , e t c .
s o u r c e s c o n c e r n i n g a p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s s u p p o r t of c a n d i d a t e s f o r
3) n e g o t i a t i o n of e x t r a l o c a l c o n t r a c t s ( u s u a l l y n a t i o n a l )
elective office.
4) disbursement of s t r i k e funds

Economic, But Not Job R e l a t e d A c t i o n s -

Code Evaluation Criteria

1) a i d t o members f o r a c c i d e n t , s i c k n e s s , unemployment, b u r i a l 0 none a t a l l no s u p p o r t o f c a n d i d a t e s

2) p r o v i s i o n of social/recreationalleducational f a c i l i t i e s
s m a l l amount endorsement of c a n d i d n t e e i n
3) finencjpg c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t a ( b o t h p r o d u c t i o n and consumption)
p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l of t h e orgnni-
P o l i t i c a l . Actions zatior!
1) lobbying a c t i v i t i e s
moderate speechmaking, e t c . . by l a b o r
2) d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l
leaderslrnembers i n s u p p o r t of
3) s u p p o r t of c a n d i d a t e s f o r e l e c t i o n

4) c o a l i t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l p a r t y
candidates and endorsement in

printed material
Snyder read through a l a r g e number of economic, l a b o r , s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l

h i s t o r i e s f o r each of h i s t h r e e c o u n t r i e s , a b s t r a c t i n g any mention of any good d e a l a c t i v e compaigning by members

of t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s , r e g r o u p i n g t h e a b s t r a c t s i n t o o r g a n i z a t i o n - y e a r sum- f o r candidates (pnssing o u t l e a f -

m a r i e s . t h e n coding cnch of t h e e l e v e n i t e m s i n a s t a n d a r d way. For l e t s , going door t o d o o r , c t c . )

example, t h e code f o r s u p p o r t of c a n d i d a t e s a p p e a r s i n F i g u r e 3-4. Snyder -

and i t e m s l i s t e d nbove

summed t h e s c o r e s f o r each o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t o f o u r g e n e r a l s c o r e s -- one each

great deal f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t oE c a n d i d a t e s
f o r h i s Job R e l a t e d , Economic-Not-Job-Related and P o l i t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s ,
-
and i t e m s l i s t e d above
and o summary C o l l e c t i v e Action s c o r e . F i n a l l y , he weighted each o r g a n i z a -

t i o n f o r t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e l a b o r f o r c e i t c o n t n i n e d , and summed each

Source: Snyder 1974: 302
weighted s c o r e over a l l o r g a n i z a t i o n s f o r a country-year t o t a l . Snyder's
a n a l y s e s of t h e u n i o n i z a t i o n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and s t r i k e v a r i a b l e s f o r analysis, the pattern of collective violence w i l l yield valuable inforontion

France and I t a l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e b e s t summary of t h e l r r e l a t i o n s h i p s a b o u t t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s a whole. My c o l l o b o r a t o r e and I

runs, schematically: hove done d e t a i l e d enumerations and d e s c r i p t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e violence

i n I t a l y , Germany, France and England over s u b s t a n t i a l b l o c k s of time w i t h

e x a c t l y t h a t purpose i n mind.

L e t u s c o n c e n t r a t e on c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e w i t h i n a p o p u l a t i o n under t h e

c o n t r o l of a s i n g l e government. L e t u s a g r c e t o pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o

war, t o f u l l - f l e d g e d games, t o i n d i v i d u a l v i o l e n c e and t o h i g h l y d i s c o n t i n u -

ous i n t e r a c t i o n s . We a r e t h e n s t i l l f r e e t o exnmine e v e n t s i n w l ~ i c h t h e
~ d w b r dS h o r t e r end I had i m p l i c i t l y adopted a d i f f e r e n t mbdel:
damage was o n l y i n c i d e n t a l t o t h e aims o f most of t h o s e i n v o l v e d . In our

U N ~ N Z A f; T ~ ~
own i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , my r e s e a r c h group h a s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t w c con, wittiout

huge u n c e r t a i n t y , s i n g l e o u t e v e n t a o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n a p o r t l c u l a r n a t i o n a l

s t a t e i n which a t l e a s t one group above some minimum s i z e (commonly

THER COLLECTIVE ACTION
twenty o r f i f t y p e r s o n s ) s e i z e s o r dsmoges someone o r something from

a n o t h e r group. We u s e newspapers, a r c h i v a l s o u r c e s and h i s t o r i c n l works

Rut we n e i t h e r formulated t h a t model c l e a r l y nor ( e x c e p t f o r some a n a l y s e s
f o r t h e purpose. As t h e minimum s i z e goes down, c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e be-
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s t r i k e a c t i v i t y and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e )
g i n s t o f a d e i n t o b a n d i t r y . b r a w l i n g , vandalism, t e r r o r i s m and s wlde
made much of on e f f o r t t o e s t i m a t e i t . Thus Snyder's work i n d e s c r i p t i o n
v a r i e t y of t h r e a t e n i n g n o n v i o l e n t e v e n t s , s o f a r a s o u r a b i l i t y t o d i s -
and measurement l e a d s u s t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e p r o c e s s e s we a r e a n a l y z i n g .
t i n g u i s h them on t h e b a s i s o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d is concerned.
Aside from s t r i k e s , o u r r e s e a r c h group's most e x t e n s i v e f o r a y s i n t o
We u s e t h e community-population-day a s a n elementnry u n i t . On o
t h e meosuremellt of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n have d e a l t w i t h v i o l e n t e v e n t s . (For
p a r t i c u l a r d a y , d i d t h i s segment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of t h i s community
g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s end p r e l i m i n a r y r e s u l t s , s e e T i l l y , T i l l y and T i l l y
engage i n c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , a s j u s t d e f i n e d 7 Is s o , we hove t h e elemen-
1975.) For r e a s o n s which w i l l become c l e a r e r i n t h e c o u r s e of my l a t e r
t a r y u n i t of a v i o l e n t e v e n t . Did an o v e r l a p p i n g s e t of p e o p l e c a r r y on t h e
d i s c u s s i o n s of v i o l e n c e a s s u c h , c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e s e r v e s a s a u s e f u l
a c t i o n i n a d j a c e n t community? I f s o , b o t h communities were involved jn
" t m c e r " of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l . Although c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s
t h e same e v e n t . Did a n o v e r l a p p i n g s e t of people c o n t i n u e t h e a c t i o n t h e
which produce damage t o p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s a r e by no means a random sample
f o l l o w i n g day? I f s o . t h e i n c i d e n t l a s t e d a t l e a s t two days. Introduce
of a l l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , t h e p r e s e n c e of v i o l e n c e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s t h e
a b r e a k i n time. s p a c e o r p e r s o n n e l , and we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h two o r more
l i k e l i h o o d ' t h a t t h e e v e n t w i l l b e n o t i c e d and r e c o r d e d . With prudent
 3-65

distinct events. The result of this modular reasoning is both to greatly 20-100 persons: eine Anzahl. ein Trupp. Schwsrm. Ilac~femeistmit

simplify the problem of bounding the "same" incident and to fragment into spezifizierenden ~ u A t z e nwie "ein Haufe Arbeiter", "ein Haufe Volks".

many separate incidents series of interactions (such as the Spanish Civil

100-1000 persons: Rotte, Zusamenrottierung, Haufen, grsssere Haufen,
War as a whole) which many analysts have been willing to treat as s single
zshlreiche oder gr5ssere Menge, einige Hundert.
unit. More details on definitions and procedures are in the appendix.

For some purposes, like the comparative study of revolutions, a 1000-2000 pe'rsons: Menge, grosse Menge, grosser Volksaufl.nuf. Hsssen,

broader criterion may serve better. Still other investigations will re- unzthlige Menschenmasse (Volkmann 1975: 89).

quire more stringent standards: more participants, a certain duration, some-

one killed, a particular minimum of property damage. But the general He 1s thus able to estimate sizes for another 60 events. leaving almost

reasoning of such choices would be the same: identify the events above exactly half without either a numerical statement or a codable verbal

a certain magnitude, or at least a representative sample of them, before description. Presumably Volkmann judged whether at least 20 persons took

trying to sort them out in terms of legitimacy or in terms of the aims part from the nature of the action itself.

of the participants. In s study of "mass disturbances" in Japan from 1952 to mid-1960,

I, '
Let us consider some alternative ways of handling the enumeration done independently of our research group, Yoshio Sugimoto adopted some of

of events. Reacting to what he regards as the weakness of our concentra- our definitions and procedures. Ile used a Gmber of Japanese newspapers

tion on violent events. Heinrich Volkmann has delineated a class of events to identify all events involving st least fifty people in which the police

called "social protests". In general, he thinks of a social protest as intervened and there was some detectable violence. Ile identified 945

"any collective disturbance of public order on behalf of common objectives" such events in his 8.5-year period. Sugimoto's measurement of magnitudes

(Volkmann 1975: 33). Events qualify when at least twenty persons take followed the same pattern: number of events, size, duration. But, follow-

part.
..'
Looking at Germany (as defined by the frontiers of 1937) during ing Sorokin and Gurr, he added a fourth dimension: intensity. The inten-

the revolutionary years f r y 1830 through 1832, he finds 165 events sity measurement is unusual.. Instead of simply scoring the injuries,
. :;..,, -.
meeting the criteria in the of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung. property damage and arrests that occurred in any particular event, Sugimoto

Just as in the case of Prance we use certain key words ("multitude", attempted to estimate their probability as function of the various kinds

.
"rassemblement", "reunion", "f oule". "attroupement", etc ) to establish of action that made up the event. llaving broken down every event into

the presence of at least fifty people when our reports contain no numeri- phases consisting of only one kind of action. he then sorted all action

cal estimate, Volkmann establishes rough numerical equivalents for certain phases from all events in his sample by type of action. Items 31 to 40 on

terms. He does so by taking the 22 accounts which contain both a numerical the 70-item list (with numbers of action phases s h a m in parenthesis)

estimate and a verbal description of'magnitude. The claaaificstion runs:

were, f o r example:
p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s from a t t a c k (109)
p i c k e t a g a i n s t c a r s (105)
a t t e m p t t o b r e a k p i c k e t l i n e (312)
s k i r m i s h (1133)
a t t e m p t t o throw someone i n t o t h e s e a (3)
f o r c e f u l removal of o b j e c t s (10)
a t t e m p t t o t r a m p l e down f i e l d s (1)
a t t e m p t t o d i g a w e l l (1)
a t t e m p t t o dam w a t e r i n a r i v e r (5)
a t t e m p t t o hammer p i k e s i n t o ground (1)
For each of t h e s e v e n t y t y p e s of a c t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e d , he summed i n j u r i e s ,
p r o p e r t y damnge and a r r e s t s . The " p r o b a b i l i t y " of i n j u r y a s s i g n e d t o each
a c t i o n i s t h e p r o p o r t i o n of a l l a c t i o n s i n t h e c l a s s which produced i n -
juries. Sugimoto t h e n combined t h e t h r e e i n d i v i d u a l s c o r e s f o r each
action-phase by means of t h e weighta d e r i v e d from a f a c t o r a n a l y s i s of t h e
t h r e e , computed t h e magnitude of t h e a c t i o n - p h a s e by m u l t i p l y i n g
intensity x s i z e x duration
and then computed t h e magnitude of t h e e v e n t a s a whole by summing t h e
magnitudes of a l l i t s a c t i o n - p h a s e s . The r e s u l t was probably t h e most
r e f i n e d measure of magnitude e v e r computed f o r a l a r g e sample of v i o l e n t
even t a .
What i s more, Sugtmoto made good u s e of h i s r e f i n e d measures. He
shows t h a t t h e magnitude of a g r a r i a n d i s t u r b a n c e s was g r e a t e r i n r e g i o n s
where l a n d h o l d i n g was r e l a t i v e l y e q u a l b e f o r e t h e l a n d r e f o r m s , and where
t h e pace of t h e reform was more r a p i d , t h a t t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of l a b o r
uniona s t r o n g l y promoted d i s t u r b a n c e s i n v o l v i n g w o r k e r s , and many o t h e r
f i n d i n g s of e q u a l i n t e r e s t .
Let u s t a k e a l a s t example which is e n t i r e l y independent of my g r o u p ' s
work. Drawing on t h e Annual R e g i s t e r from 1815 t o 1848, C h a r l e s T a y l o r
(1966) p r e p a r e d an i n d e x of " p o l i t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n " by E n g l i s h workingmen.
I t s i n g l e d o u t e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e n a t i o n a l government, i n c l u d i n g
"meetings t o demand a reform of t h e f r a n c h i s e . r i o t s t o p r o t e s t t h e i n t r o -
d u c t i o n of new poor law and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s t o s u p p o r t aome p a r t i c u l a r group
cause" (Taylor 1966: 1 5 ) . The c o n t e x t makes i t a p p e a r t h a t Taylor a l s o
s c o r e d p e t i t i o n s , group v i o l e n c e , t h e f o r m a t i o n of a s s o c i a t i o n s and t h e
founding of p u b l i c a t i o n s , j u s t s o long a s they b o r e e x p l i c i t l y on t h e
p o l i t i c a l system. He weighed each i n s t a n c e from 1 t o 5 depending on i t s
d u r a t i o n and t h e number of p a r t i c i p a n t s . He then used t h e index t o demon-
s t r a t e s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a c o u n t y ' s l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l a r t t c -
u l a t i o n over t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d and t h e c o u n t y ' s urban p o p u l a t i o n , d e n s i t y ,
growth r a t e and n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o r f o r c e .
I n my own g r o u p ' s e f f o r t t o i n d e x R r t t l s l ~ c o l l e c t i v ea c t i o n d u r i n g
t h e same span of time, we have avoided r e l y i n g on a p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i o n
a t t h e s t a r t , i n hopes of c a p t u r i n g a wide r a n g e of a c t i o n ; then we have
some chance t o d e t e r m i n e whether c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o n a t i o n a l
p o l i t i c s and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l r i s e and f a l l t o g e t h e r . o r
whether t h e r i s e of n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s r e p r e s e n t s a n e t s h i f t w i t h i n t h e
body of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . (For d e t a i l s , s e e t h e Appendjx.) That impor-
t a n t e x c e p t i o n a s i d e , t h e two approaches t o t h e measurement of c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n have much i n common.
I n l i n e w i t h t h e hope of assembling e v i d e n c e on t h e p a t t e r n o f col-
lective sction as a wliol.e, we have coded many features of the violent
events: chsracteristica of tlie setting, types of participants, forms of
action, outcomes. In thinking of the magnitude of collective action
involved, we hsve followed the model of strike analysis. We have at-
tempted to estimate the total person-days absorbed by the action, and to
disaggreeate that estimate into its components: number of participants,
duration. For the total amount of collective action produced by e given
population in a certain period of time, we then hsve a three-dimensional
figure which can assume quite different proportions:
Croup A produces a few long events of medium size, while Group B produces
many large, short events; the volume of collective action as measured by
person-days, however, is about the-same in the two hypothetical cases.
This simple sort of representation brings out the fact that in France
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century both strikes and collective
violence shifted from a pattern of small size and long duration to large
size and short duration; the number of strikes and the person-days in
strikes expanded greatly, whlle the number of violent events and person-
days in violence did not rise significantly faster than the French popu-
lation.
Some of the reasons for these changes are obvious, and some require
reElection and research. rile twentieth-century rise of the big demun-
strstion and the one-day protest strike as modes of collective action
and as contexts for collective violence played s large part in the net
shift toward large, short, violent events. To ask why they rose, however.
is to ask about the expanding importance of special-purpose nssociotlons,
the changing relations between organized labor and the notional govern-
ment, the movement of protests toward large cities and big plants. In
short, the alterations an the forms of collective sction result from
changes in its determinants.
Interest, organization and mobilization, however. are not tlie only
determinants of the intensity and character of collective actlon. Op-
portunity matters. too. We must look st the three major components of
opportunity -- power, repression/facilitstion and opportunitylthreot --
before we have a rounded picture of collective action.
CHAPTER 4: THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACT TOGETHER c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n too poorly t o help u s here.

From M o b i l i z a t i o n t o O p p o r t u n i t y Real c o n t e n d e r s a r e more a c t i v e than Durkheim's p o r t r a i t i m p l i e s .

We began t h e l a s t c h a p t e r w i t h two models. The " m o b i l i z a t i o n model" They p u r s u e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . They s t r u g g l e f o r p a r e r . On t h e wny, they

d e s c r i b e s t h e b e h a v i o r of a s i n g l e c o n t e n d e r i n terms of i n t e r e s t , o r g a n i - maneuver, form and b r e a k c o a l i t i o n s , t r y a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s , win and

z n t i o n , power and o t h e r v a r i a b l e s . That model we have k e p t much i n view. lose. Our p r i m i t i v e models a i m p l i f y a l l t h i s c o n t e n t i o n by d e a c r i h i n g i t

We I ~ o v e , however, looked mainly a t one s i d e of i t : t h e s i d e d e a l i n g w i t h a s a s e r i e s of r e s p o n s e s t o changing e s t i m a t e s of t h e c o s t s and h e n e f i t s

the contender's i n t e r n a l structure. S c h e m a t i c a l l y , we have c o n c e n t r a t e d l i k e l y t o r e s u l t from v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h governments and

on t h e f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s : with o t h e r contenders. The c e n t r a l assumptions run:

1. C o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n costs something.
2. A l l contenders count c o s t s .

3. C o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n b r i n g s b e n e f i t s , i n t h e form of c o l l e c t i v e

goods.
By i t s e l f , t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e model i s i n a d e q u a t e . It d e a l s only with
4. Contenders c o n t i n u o u s l y weigh expected c o a t s n g n l n s t expected
t h e c a p a c i t y t o a c t , n o t w i t h t h e immediate i n c e n t i v e o r o p p o r t u n i t y t o
benefits.
act. Those i n c e n t i v e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s f i n d t h e i r p l a c e s i n t h e o t h e r
5. Both c o s t s and b e n e f i t s a r e u n c e r t a i n because a ) c o n t e n d e r s have
h a l f of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model, and i n t h e p o l i t y model.
i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e of t h c p o l i t y ;
The " p o l i t y model" r e l a t e s c o n t e n d e r s t o a government and t o o t h e r
b ) a l l p a r t i e s engage i n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n .
contenders -- b o t h c h a l l e n g e r s and members of t h e p o l i t y -- via coalitions
We sum up t h e r e l e v a n t c o s t s and b e n e f i t s under t h e h e a d i n g s r e p r e a s i o n /
and s t r u g g l e s f o r p a r e r . So l o n g a s we were examining t h e i n t e r n a l s t r u c -
f a c i l i t a t i o n , power and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t . On t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s i d e , t h e
t u r e of a c o n t e n d e r , we could t a k e i t s e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s f o r g r a n t e d . As
main r e l a t i o n a h i p a i n t h e model r u n :
we move i n t o t h e world of o p p o r t u n i t y , we must pay s u s t a i n e d a t t e n t i o n t o

other actors. T h e i r s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses comprise t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s COLLECTIVE ACTION

o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o a c t on i t s i n t e r e s t s .
OPPORTUNITY/THREAT
I n Durkheimian t h i n k i n g , t h e main word f o r t h i s s e t of r e l a t i o n s be-

tween t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r and i t s environment i s s o c i a l c o n t r o l . Social Remember t h a t t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p a r e f e r t o t h e moment of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .

c o n t r o l c o n s i s t s of t h e e f f o r t s of a u t h o r i t i e s , o r of s o c i e t y a s n whole, Over t h e long r u n , t h e e x t e n t and form of a c o n t e n d e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n

Thia i d e a of s o c i a l c o n t r o l a s s i g n s a a f f e c t i t s power. t h e r e p r e s s i o n t o which i t i s a u h J e c t e d , and t h e f u r t h e r

t o b r i n g d e v i a n t s back i n t o l i n e .

I t f i t s t h e r e a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s i t f a c e s . Thia v e r s i o n of t h e model i g n o r e s time.

passive, uncreative role t o collective actors.
Let us consider each component of the timeless model in turn. Despite the two faces of repression/facilitation, the elementary mo-

Repression and Facilitation bilization model shows no direct connection between repressionlEacilitation

Contention for power always involves at least two parties. The be- and collective action. Instead, it portrays repression/facilitstion as

havior of the second party runs along a range from repression to facili- acting on power, which in turn influences collective action. That is be-

tation. Let us recall the definitions: repression is any action by another cause the elementary model refers to the moment of action alone. At that

group which raises the contender's cost of collective action. An action moment, the prior effects of repression translate into power: into tlie cx-

which lowers the group's cost of collective action is a form of facilita- tent to which the outcomes of the contender's various possible interactions

-
tion. (We cell repression or facilitation political if the other party is with other contenders favor its interests over those of the others.

s government.) A group bent on repressing or facilitating another group's Governmental repression is the best-known case. For example, the

action has tlie choice of working on the target group's mobilization or United States government's outlawing of the Communist Party during the Cold

directly on its collective action. For example, a government can raise a War essentially guarsnteed that the party would lose lenders to jail when

group's mobilization costs (and thereby raise its costs of collective ac- it acted together in sny visible way. That is a high cost to pay for col-

tion) by disrupting its organization, by making comunicstions difficult lective action. The law also raised the party's cost of mobilization by

or inaccessible, by freezing necessary resources such as guns and manpower. penalizing individuals who dared to contribute time, money or moral support

Standard repressive measures such as suspending newspapers, drafting to its work. From a government's point of view, raising the costs of mobi-

strikers, forbidding assemblies and arresting leaders illustrate the anti- lization is a more reliable repressive strategy than raising the costs of

mobilization avenue. Or a government can operate directly on the costs of collective action alone. The anti-mobilization strategy neutralizes tlie

collective action by raising the penalties, making the targets of the ac- actor as well as the action, and makes it less likely that the actor will

tion inaccessible or inducing a waste of the mobilized resources; the be able to act rapidly when the government suddenly becomes vulnerable, a

egentprovocatex, the barricades around the city hall, the establishment new coalition partner arises, or something else quickly shifts the probable

of military tribunals for insurgents fall familiarly into the strategy of costs and benefits of collective action. Raising the costs of collective

moving directly against collective action. Facilitation likewise has two action alters the pattern of effective demand from mobilized groups, while

faces, both familiar: pro-mobilization activities such as giving a group raising the costs of mobilization reduces demand across the board.

publicity, legalizing membership in it and simply paying it off; activities Governmental repression is uniquely important because governments

directly reducing the group's costs of collective action, such as lending specialize in the control of mobilization and collective action: police

information or strategic expertise, keeping the group's enemies out of the for crowd control, troops to back them, spies and informers for infiltra-

action, or simply sending forces to help the action along. tion, licensing to keep potential actors visible and tame. Yet groups
o u t s i d e government a l s o r e p r e s s each o t h e r , i n t h e s e n s e of m a n i p u l a t i n g of t h e game, and i n t h e i r changes; a t a given time, i t may b e l e g n l t o p e t -

each o t h e r ' s c o s t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . That is obvious i n t h e c a s e of i t i o n , a s s o c i a t e , v o t e a s a b l o c , a c q u i r e n p a t r o n i n t h e l e ~ i s l s t i ~ rand

e

quasi-governments such a s l a r g e f i r m s : simply c o n s i d e r how much t h e s t r u c - assemble a s a f o r m a l l y - c o n s t i t u t e d community, b u t n o t t o d e m o n s t r a t e ,

t u r e and p o l i c y of t h e f i r m a f f e c t t h e chances f o r u n i o n i z a t i o n and t h e r e - s t r i k e , b o y c o t t , form m i l i t a s o r i n v a d e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . The r e p r e s s i o n

fore for strike activity. It i s l e s s obvious i n t h e c a s e of r o u t i n e compe- and f a c i l i t a t i o n r e s i d e i n t h e government's a c t i o n t o a l t e r t h e r e l a t i v e

t i t i o n among o t h e r groups: t h e v o l u n t e e r f i r e companies which burned each c o s t s of d i f f e r e n t forms o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . L e g a l i t y m a t t e r s because

o t h e r ' s premises and h e l d d e a d l y s h o o t o u t s i n tlie s t r e e t s of n i n e t e e n t h - l a w s s t a t e t h e c o s t a and b e n e f i t s which governments a r e prepared ( o r a t

c e n t u r y P h i l a d e l p h i a ended up r e s e t t i n g t h e r e l a t i v e a b i l i t y of each f i r e l e a s t empowered) t o a p p l y t o o n e form of a c t i o n o r a n o t h e r .

company t o w i e l d p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e ( L a u r i e 1972). The f i g h t s between Impressed by t h a t f a c t . I once thought we should index f l u c t u a t i o n s

groups of young b l a c k s nnd I r i s h f o r c o n t r o l of l o c a l t u r f s i n Boston s i g n i - i n a government's r e p r e s s i v e n e s s by watching c a r e f u l l y i t s flow o f l e g i s -

f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e g r o u p ' s f u t u r e c o s t s of assembling and a c t i n g t o g e t h e r . lation. A c l o s e r l o o k a t t h e way t h e m a g i s t r a t e s o f e i g h t e e n t h - and nine-

I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e n , r e p r e s s i o n sums t h e e f f e c t s of t h e a c t i o n s of a l l o t h e r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i t a i n d i d t h e i r work of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n ,

groups, i n c l u d i n g governments, on a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p ' s c o s t of c o l l e c t i v e however, diminishedmy c o n f i d e n c e . Eighteenth-century l e g i s l a t i o n multip-

action. l i e d t h e number of c a p i t o l o f f e n s e s . Penalties for offenses against

If d i f f e r e n t forms o f r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n sometimes concen- p r o p e r t y l e d t h e way: p l u n d e r i n g shipwrecks, food r i o t i n g , m n y forms o f

t r a t e on m o b i l i z a t i o n and sometimes on c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i t s e l f , they a l s o f o r c i b l e e n t r y and t h e f t became p u n i s h a b l e by hanging. Moreover, t h e b l l l s

I
s e l e c t i n two o t h e r i m p o r t a n t r e g n r d s : t h e t a r g e t groups and t h e v a r i e t i e s which extended t h e d e a t h p e n a l i t y were c h o r o c t e r i s t i c a l l y s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t

of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n encouraged o r d e t e r r e d . S e l e c t i v i t y by group is t h e l e g i s l a t i o n ; i n f a c t , t h e c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s o f t e n appeared a s i n c i d e n t a l

more obvious. I n r e c e n t y e a r s , a g e n c i e s of t h e U.S. government have f e a t u r e s of complex b l l l s designed t o advance t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t s o f

worked t o impede t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of groups a s d i v e r s e a s t h e Symbion- shipowners, merchnnts, l a n d l o r d s o r o t h e r p r o p e r t y - h o l d e r s (Hoy 1975).

e s e L i b e r a t i o n Army, t h e Vietnam V e t e r a n s A g a i n s t t h e War, and t h e Demo- T h i s much seems q u i t e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r i s e

c r a t i c Party. Agencies of t h e government have a l s o worked t o f a c i l i t a t e I of " p o s s e s s i v e i n d i v i d u a l i s m . " But one f a c t is i n c o n v e n i e n t : t h e a p p l i c o -

t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of t h e B l a c k s t o n e Rangers, tlie American Medical Asso- t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y became l e s s f r e q u e n t d u r i n g t h e eigliteentli cen-

c i a t i o n and t h e A.P.L.-C.I.O. P o l i t i c s ss u s u a l i n v o l v e s a g r e a t d e a l of t u r y ( B e a t t i e 1974). What a r e we t o make of t h a t 7 Perhaps t h e d e t e r r m t

conlition-making among and a g a i n s t d i f f e r e n t c o n t e n d e r s f o r power. Divi- worked s o w e l l t h a t fewer c a p i t a l o f f e n s e s were committed. Perhaps j u r i e s

s i o n s of t h e government p l a y i m p o r t a n t p o r t s on b o t h s i d e s . tempered t h e law'^ s e v e r i t y by r e f u s i n g t o c o n v i c t . Perhaps, a s Douglna

S e l e c t i v i t y by t y p e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n shows up i n t h e v e r y r u l e s Hay s u g g e s t s , t h e combination of widespread t h r e a t s and d e c l i n i n g execu-

t i o n s r e s u l t e d Erom a system of g e n e r a l t e r r o r < s e l e c t i v e r e ~ r e s s i o nand The f i r s t and t h i r d e l e m e n t s a r c b o t h m a t t e r s of t h e law a s m i t t e n
e x t e n s i v e patronage. I n any of t h e s e e v e n t u a l i t i e s , t h e r e a d i n g o f r e p r e s - by j u d g e s , l e g i s l a t o r s and l a w y e r s . One m i g l ~ thope t o ~ e a tt them by

s i v e n e s s from l e g i s l a t i o n a l o n e is f a u l t y . s t u d y i n g c u r r e n t l e g i s l a t i o n and j u r i s p r u d e n c e . But t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

E.P. Thompson's a n a l y s i s o f t h e background o f t h e Black Act of 1723 and a p p l i c a t i o n of e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n a r e s u b t l e , v a r i e d and s c a t t c r c d .

is a c a s e i n point. The Black Act s e t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y f o r no fewer I n B r i t a i n , t h e J u s t i c e s o f t h e Peace had g r e a t d i s c r e t i o n . They used i t .

than f i f t y o f f e n s e s , e s p e c i a l l y armed and d i s g u i s e d h u n t i n g , poaching, On t h e one hand, they never e x e r c i s e d t h e i r l e g a l powers t o tlie f u l l e s t

rick-burning and o t h e r a t t a c k s on r u r a l p r o p e r t y . Thompson shows t h a t i t p o s s i b l e e x t e n t ; t h e r e were groups on which t h e f u l l r i g o r o f tlic law d i d

was e s s e n t i a L l y c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n ; i t was engineered by S i r Robert Walpole n o t descend, laws which remained unused, numerous i n s t a n c e s i n w h l c l ~o n e

and h i s f r i e n d s t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r e x c l u s i v e enjoyment o f t h e i r e s t a t e s person was punished a s a n example w h i l e t h e o t h e r o f f e n d e r s were l e f t t o

o v e r t h e r e s i s t a n c e of t h e s m a l l f a r m e r s nearby. At a s u p e r f i c i a l r e a d i n g . a c q u i r e c o n t r i t i o n and f e a r by proxy. I n t h e c a s e o I t h e p r o v i n c i a l hvn-

one might e a s i l y t a k e t h e Black Act a s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e manner i n g e r r i o t s of 1766:

which l e g i s l a t i o n makes t h e r i s e a n d f a l l of r e p r e s s i o n v i s i b l e . . . and

. . . the magistrates not o n l y r e f r a i n e d from e f f e c t i v e measures t o
t h u s , perhaps, makes i t q u a n t i f i a b l e .
c r u s h t h e i n t i t i a l d i s o r d e r s , they a c t u a l l y a b e t t e d o t h e r members of
Thompson, however, p o i n t s o u t t h e d i f f i c u l t y :
t h e landed and i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r encouragement o f tlic

On t h e one hand, i t . i s t r u e t h a t t h e law d i d m e d i a t e e x i s t e n t c l a s s p e o p l e t o r e g u l a t e mnrkets and r e d u c e t h e p r i c e s of p r o v i s i o n s by

r e l a t i o n s t o t h e advantage of t h e r u l e r s ; n o t o n l y is t h i s s o , b u t force. .. By t h i s means, t h e y d i v e r t e d t h e r i o t e r s towards middle-

a s t h e c e n t u r y advanced t h e law became a s u p e r b i n s t r u m e n t by which men .and l a r g e f a r m e r s , and away Erom t h e landed and i n d u s t r i a l . i n -

t h e s e r u l e r s were a b l e t o impose new d e f i n i t i o n s o f p r o p e r t y t o terests. U n l i k e o t h e r a g r a r i a n d i s o r d e r s of tlie c e n t u r y , t h e r i o t s

t h e i r even g r e a t e r advantage, a s i n t h e e x t i n c t i o n by law of i n d e f i n - of 1766 d i d n o t i n v o l v e d i r e c t a t t a c k s on londowneru o r mnnufacturcrs.

i t e a g r a r i a n u s e - r i g h t s and i n t h e f u r t h e r a n c e of e n c l o s u r e . On t h e Thus wtiile n o t a c t u a l l y i n c i t i n g t h e r i o t s , t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e magis-

o t h e r hand, t h e law mediated t h e s e c l a s s r e l a t i o n s through l e g a l t r a t e s c e r t a i n l y gave them d i r e c t i o n . Only b e l a t e d l y , when t h e s c a l e

forms, which imposed, a g a i n and a g a i n , i n h i b i t i o n s upon t h e a c t i o n s of d i s o r d e r f r i g h t e n e d them, dLd t h e g e n t r y - m n g i s t r a t e s c l o s e r a n k s

of t h e r u l e r s (Thompson 1975: 264). w i t h t h e a r i s t o c r a c y and o t h e r r u r a l l e a d e r s t o c r u s l ~what t h e y had

come t o f e a r was t h e s t a r t of s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n ( S h e l t o n 1973: 95-96).

We have t o d e a l w l t h n o t one element -- legislation alone -- b u t with three:

t h e l e g i s l a t i o n a s such; t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e l e g i s - When i t s u l t e d them, on t h e o t h e r hand. t h e J u s t i c e s of t h e Pence o f t e n

l a t i o n ; t h e l i m i t s s e t on t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n ' s e f f k c t by o t h e r . e x i s t i n g law. used portmanteau laws c o n c e r n i n g p u b l i c o r d e r . They a r r e s t e d people f o r

vagrancy, t r e s p a s s i n g , breach of t h e peace, unlawful assembly o r h i n d r a n c e
d e m o l i s h i n g t u r n p i k e s , p u l l i n g down houses. s e d i t i o n , " c u t t i n g and
of an o f f i c e r i n t h e p u r s u i t of h i s d u t y . Sometimes they r e i n t e r p r e t e d
maiming", "mobbing and r i o t i n g " and "attempted murder". And t h e l a s t
an e x i s t i n g law, such a s t h e law of t r e a s o n , t o cover t h e form of c o l l e c -
b a t c h o f t r a n s p o r t e d p r o t e s t e r s t o bc s e n t t o A u s t r a l l a from England
t i v e a c t i o n a t hand.
were 21 a r s o n i s t s who a r r i v e d t h e r e i n half-a-dozen s h l p s i n 1852.
B r i t i s h m a g i s t r a t e s of t h e e i g h t e e n t h and n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s pro-
A f t e r t h i s , t m n s p o r t a t i o n c e a s e d i n Tasmania nu i t had t e n y e a r s
bably had unusual freedom of a c t i o n , a s compared w i t h t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s
e a r l i e r i n Sydney; and when i t r e v i v e d b r i e f l y i n Western A u e t r n l i a
Jn o t h e r w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e P r u s s i a n Junker who judged
between 1860 and 1868, t h e r e was n o t a s i n g l e Englisli, Welull o r
h i s own t e n a n t s a s Landrat and t h e humbler French n o t a b l e who h e l d c o u r t
S c o t t i s h p r o t e s t e r among t h e 9,000 c o n v i c t s t h a t went o u t . Ilcnce-
o v e r h l s n e i g h h o r s a s j u g e d e p a i x a l s o chose t h e i r weapons from a l a r g e
f o r t h , such p r o t e s t e r s a s remained t o b e sentenced were c o n f i n e d t o
legal arsenal.
j a i l s a t home; and, a s we noted e n r l l c r , i n d i c t m e n t s f o r such o f f e n s e s
The e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n w i t h i n t h e system d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e
were, by t h e 1860's. i n f a i r l y steady decline (Rudk 1973: 22-23):
d i s t i n c t i o n between l e g a l and i l l e g a l means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s i n s i g -

nificant. T t means we must d e r i v e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n from l e g a l p r a c t i c e i n - A s Rude p o i n t s o u t , t h i s u s e of t h e c r i m i n a l r e c o r d s h i f t s t h e a n a l y t i c

s t e a d of r e l y i n g n a i v e l y on t h e s t a t u t e books. Criminal s t a t i s t i c s thus s l ~ o et o t h e o t h e r f o o t . I n s t e a d of assuming a c o n s t a n t p a t t e r n of r e p r e s -

r e c e i v e a new l e a s e on l i f e . s i o n and r e a d i n g t h e r e p o r t e d c o n v i c t i o n s a s a h i s t o r y o f c r i m i n a l n c t i J i t y .

Criminnl s t a t i s t i c s a r e p r o p e r l y s u s p e c t a s a comprehensive ( o r even wewant t o "hold c o n s t a n t " t h e c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y and f o r c e t h e r e c o r d t o

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) r e c o r d of a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n s of t h e law. Yet they do un- t e l l u s about r e p r e s s i o n . Not e a s y , b u t a t l e a s t we can a n a l y z e t h e punish-

q u e s t i o n a b l y r e f l e c t t h e a c t i o n p f t h e j u d i c i a l a p p a r a t u s . and t h e r e f o r e ment meted o u t f o r s i m i l a r o f f e n s e s i n d i f f e r e n t t l m e s and p l a c e s , watch

p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e on changes i n t h a t a c t i o n . George Rude n o t e s t h e marked tlie waxing and waning involvement o f d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s

d e c l i n e i n t h e B r i t i s h u s e of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y a g a i n s t p r o t e s t a f t e r 1800: ( f o r example, t h e i n c r e n s i n g r o l e of p r o f e s s i o n a l p o l l c c i n n i n e t e c n t l i

and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s ) , a t u d y i n g t h e changing l i f e h i s t o r i e s of t y p i c a l
Once a r s o n , r i o t and a t t a c k s on p r o p e r t y had v i r t u a l l y ceased t o
complaints.
b e c a p i t a l o f f e n c e s , t h e w o r s t he would have t o f a c e -- and t h i s
I n l o o k i n g a t much t h e same m a t e r i a l a s Rudg, E.P. ll~ompsonn o t e s
was t e r r i f y i n g enough -- was a term of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . I t is n o t
t h e f r e q u e n t e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y u s e o f exemplary punlshment -- especially
s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e t y p i c a l c r i m e s f o r which pro-
t h e p u b l i c hanging -- i n s t e a d of widespread p r o s e c u t i o n a s a d e t e r r e n t t o
t e s t e r s were t r a n s p o r t e d i n t h e 1 8 4 0 ' s -- t h e C h a r t i s t s and Re-
t h e rambunctious e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E n g l i s h popular c l a s s e s , and i t s
h e c c a ' s Daughters, f o r example -- were f o r former c a p i t a l o f f e n ~ e sl i k e
l a t e r d e c l i n e i n f a v o r o f a tendency t o p r o s e c u t e a l l ofCenders, t o Jncnr-
c e r a t e them i n s t e a d o f s u b j e c t i n g them t o banishment o r b r i e f agony, t o of t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f i r r e g u l a r l o c a l f o r c e s i n t o t h e n o t i o n a l p o l i c e

remove punishment from t h e p u b l i c view, t o dream of reforming t h e i n d i v i d - ( s e e T i l l y . L e v e t t , Lodhi and Munger 1975). i n t h e United S t a t e s , no
ual. Thompson i s t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r l y s k e p t i c a l t h a t anyone could e s t i m a t e n a t i o n a l p o l i c e emerged, b u t p a r a l l e l changes i n p o l i c i n g a c c u r r e d . There

e i t h e r t h e amount o f p r o t e s t o r t h e d e g r e e o f r e p r e s s i o n by f o l l o w i n g such we s e e t h e s h i f t from " e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l " t o " b u r e a u c r a t i c " police forces

s t a t i s t i c s a s a r r e s t s , imprisonments and e x e c u t i o n s . Yet h i s v e r y o b j e c t i o n ( L e v e t t 1974). I n t h e e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l s t a g e , t h r e e k i n d s of f o r c e s shared

h e l p s s p e c i f y what h a s t o b e measured. C l e a r l y we have t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : 1 ) c i t i z e n f o r c e s ; t h e y were c a l l e d such t h i n g s a s

between t h e volume and t y p e of r e p r e s s i v e a c t i v i t y , on t h e one hand, and p o s s e and d e p u t i e s when t h e government d i d n o t a u t h o r i z e them; 2) r e g u l n r

i t s symbolic s i g n i f i c a n c e , on t h e o t h e r . t r o o p s ; 3) c o n s t a b l e s and s i m i l a r o f f i c e r s , o f t e n s h o r t - t e r m o r p a r t - t i m e ,

S i n c e groups v a r y s o much i n t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c u s e of one s o r t o f t e n g i v e n l i t t l e o r no r e g u l n r remuneration, o f t e n drawing most of t h e i r

of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n o r a n o t h e r , t h e s e l e c t i v i t y of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i - p o l i c e income from f e e s : f i n e s , a s h a r e of recovered p r o p e r t y , rewords

t a t i o n with r e s p e c t t o t y p e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n u s u a l l y e n t a i l s a s e l e c - posted f o r t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of major c r i m i n a l s , and s o on. Thesc f o r c e s

t i o n by kind of a c t o r a s w e l l . No doubt a b r i d g i n g t h e r i g h t of assembly had l i t t l e i n c e n t i v e t o c a r r y on comprehensive p a t r o l s , t o d e a l w i t h

i s l e s s s e l e c t i v e t h a n o u t l a w i n g t h e Communist P a r t y . Even when t h e a s - ~ o u t i n ep u b l i c o r d e r o f f e n s e s , o r t o p r o t e c t t h e poor. The t h i r d group

sembly laws a r e e q u i t a b l y e n f o r c e d , however, t h e y f a l l w i t h s p e c i a l f o r c e were " e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l " i n t h a t t h e y made t h e i r l i v i n g s by competing f o r

on t h o s e groups which can o n l y make c o n t a c t by g a t h e r i n g i n p u b l i c s p a c e s . the available fees. With a growing, i n c r e a s i n g l y s e g r e g a t e d and i n c r e a s -

I n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . t h e workers who c u s t o m a r i l y g o t t o g e t h e r i n pubs i n g l y foreign-born working c l a s s g a t h e r i n g i n n l n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c i t i e s ,

o r on t h e s t r e e t found themselves more g r e a t l y hampered by r i o t a c t s t h a n however, American p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l s became i n c r e a s i n g l y i n t e r e s t e d i n

did the rich. The r i c h could e s c a p e t o t h e i r s a l o n s and p r i v a t e c l u b s . forming r e g u l a r p o l i c e f o r c e s which would p a t r o l t h e e n t i r e c i t y . d e a l w i t h

The n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y c a s e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g because of v i c t i m l e s s o f f e n s e s such a s p u b l i c drunkenness, and c o n t o i n rnaJor t h r e a t s

t h e g r e a t p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n of p o l i c i n g which o c c u r r e d i n most w e s t e r n of h o s t i l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Thus they o r g a n i z e d b u r e a u c r a t i z e d , s o l a r i e d .

c o u n t r i e s a s t h e c e n t u r y moved on. Some of t h e a p p a r e n t l y huge expansion uniformed f u l l - t i m e f o r c e s .

of p o l i c e f o r c e s i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y r e s u l t e d from t h e b u r e a u c r a t i z a - The same g e n e r a l change took p l a c e i n England. Robert Storcli p o i n t s

t i o n o f v o l u n t e e r and p a r t - t i m e p o l i c i n g . I n France, t h e r e g u l a r n a t i o n a l o u t t h a t a s t h e middle and working c l a s s e s drew a p a r t , n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y

f o r c e s r o s e from a b o u t 5,000 policemen and 1 6 , 0 0 0 gendarmes ( f o r a combined middle c l a s s l e a d e r s i n c r e a s i n g l y f e l t t h e need f o r a f o r c e which would

r a t e of 57 p o l i c e p e r 100,000 p o p u l a t i o n ) i n 1848 t o a b o u t 1 6 , 0 0 0 p o l i c e - c o n t a i n and c i v i l i z e t h e workers:

men and 21,000 gendarmes ( f o r a combined r a t e of 97 p e r 100,000 p o p u l a t i o n )

I
The d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f a common s p h e r e of enjoyment was of c o u r s e
i n 1897. But a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e i n c r e a s e i n policemen consisted
 p a r a l l e l e d by a p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n of t h e c l a s s e s -- classically R e p r e s s i v e and T o l e r a n t Governments

d e s c r i b e d by Engela -- unprecedented i n w e s t e r n h i s t o r y . The V i c t o r - L e t u s s e t t h e s e i d e a s down more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y . The r e p r c s s i v c n e s s

ian'bour&oisie wliicl~ s e t t h e moral t o n e of c i t i e s l i k e Manchester of a government i s never a s i m p l e m a t t e r o f more o r l e s s . I t is aLways

. ,

and Leeds were n o t l i k e l y t o p a t r o n i z e t h e c o c k p i t a s t h e P r e s t o n s e l e c t i v e , and always c o n s i s t s of some combination of r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r n -

g e n t r y of t h e l a t e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . had done, nor to-shower c o i n s t i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n . Governments respond s e l e c t i v e l y t o different s o r t s

on s Guy Fawkes crowd a s Wakefield T o r i e s s t i l l f e l t a t l i b e r t y t o of groups, and t o d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of a c t i o n s . Sometimes t h e discriminations

d o a t mid-century. Such gentlemen were much more i n c l i n e d t o e i t h e r a r e f i n e indeed: t h e same government which s m i l e s on c l ~ u r c hs e r v i c e s b r i n g -

mind t h e i r own b u s i n e s s and b u s i n e s s e s o r e l s e t o p a r t o n i z e temperance i n g t o g e t h e r a thousand p e o p l e assembled t o pray f o r s a l v a t i o n s l ~ o o t s

o r r a t i o n a l r e c r c a t i o n s o c i e t i e s o r mechanics' i n s t i t u t e s . I t was w i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n i n t o a crowd of a thousand workers assembled t o pray

a l s o they who s u p p o r t e d t h e moral-reform m i s s i o n a s s i g n e d t o t h e po- for justice.

l i c e and added t o i t i n t h e language o f numerous l o c a l improvement Governments which r e p r e s s a l s o f a c i l i t a t e . While r a i s i n g t h e c o s t a

acts. The ncw demands f o r c i v i l o r d e r i n rdneteenth-century England o f some k i n d s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o some k i n d s of groups. they lower

produced a novel t y p e o f s u r r o g a t e t o r e p l a c e o l d e r and perhaps more t h e c o s t s of o t h e r k i n d s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o o t h e r k i n d s of groups.

p e r s o n a l l i n e s of a u t h o r i t y a n d , d e f e r e n c e which were now conceived They do s o i n two d i f f e r e n t ways: a ) b y ' s i m p l y d i m i n i s h i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t y

t o be moribund. The p o l i c e , a "bureaucracy o f o f f i c i a l m o r a l i t y . " were o f s p e c i f i c v a r i e t i e s of m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d l o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and b)

produced t o tiy t o f i l l t h i s vacuum and t o a c t a s a l e v e r of moral by p r o v i d i n g p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e s f o r s p e c i f i c v a r i e t i e s o f mobill.zation

reform on t h e m y s t e r i o u s t e r r a i n of t h e i n d u s t r i a l c i t y ' s i n n e r c o r e andlor c o l l e c t i v e action. At t h e extreme, f a c i l i t a t i o n t h e r e f o r e t u r n s

( S t o r c h 1976: 4 9 6 ) . i n t o compulnion: p u n i s h i n g n o n - p e r f o r m n c e i n s t e a d o f simply rewarding

performance. For p r e s e n t purposes, however. we can t r e o t f a c i l i t a t i o n

What is more, t h e poor of E n g l i s h c i t i e s r e s i s t e d t h e growth of r e g u l a r
and compulsion a s a s e a m l e s s continuum.
police forces. They sow t h e p o l i c e , i u i t e r i g h t l y , a s s p e c i a l i s t s i n i n -
T o l e r a t i o n i s t h e s p a c e between r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n . For
t r u d i n g on t h e i r l i f e s p a c e , k e e p i n g them under s u r v e i l l a n c e , i n t e r f e r i n g
some combinations o f groups and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , a g i v e n government
i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n and e n t e r t a i n m e n t . They a s s a u l t e d p o l i c e who c l o s e d
does not r e a c t a t a l l : t h e r e s i d e n t s of an urban neighborhood g e t to-
pubs d u r i n g church s e r v i c e s o r t r i e d t o break up crowds of i d l e r s on tlie
g e t h e r t o w r i t e a l e t t e r t o t h e e d i t o r a b o u t l o c a l houslng f o r t h e e l d e r l y ,
street. The r e s i s t a n c e was, t o b e s u r e . s e l f - d e f e a t i n g : i t o n l y gave t h e
and t h e government n e i t h e r impedes them nor h e l p s them; s t r i k i n g s t u d e n t s
f e a r f u l middlc c l a s s e s s t r o n g e r i n c e n t i v e s t o expand and r e g u l a r i z e t h e
s t a y away from c l a s s e s , and t h e p o l i c e s t u d i o u s l y i g n o r e them.
police forces. Thus an o s t e n s i b l y g e n e r a l p r o t e c t i v e measure i n c r e a s e d
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t tlie a c c e p t a b i l l t y of n c t i o n s and o f groups t o a
t h e r e p r e s s i o n d i r e c t e d a t urban workers.
given government each f a l l i n t o a s i n g l e rank o r d e r , we have a s i m p l e way
F i g u r e 4-1: R e p r e s s i o n , T o l e r a t i o n , F a c i l i t a t i o n and Cocrcion
of r e p r e s e n t i n g both t h e l i m i t s o f t o l e r a b l e b e h a v i o r and t h e g e n e r a l

l e v e l of governmental r e p r e s s i v e n e s s . F i g u r e 4-1 o f f e r s a s i m p l e d e s c r i p -

t i o n of r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r a t i o n and f a c i l i t a t l o n . I n t h i s i d e a l i z e d dia-

gram, any group l e s s a c c e p t a b l e then D g e t s r e p r e s s e d no m a t t e r what i t

Nigh
docs. Any a c t i o n l e s s a c c e p t a b l e than B g e t s r e p r e s s e d no m a t t e r which ercion

group d o e s i t . AC t h e r e f o r e r e p r e s e n t s t h e amount o f r e p r e s s i o n . Any acilitntion

group more a c c e p t a b l e t h a n E and any a c t i o n more a c c e p t a b l e than F re- 17

.U
-I
c e i v e governmental s u p p o r t . EG r e p r e s e n t s t h e g e n e r a l e x t e n t of govern-
2
(U
mental f a c i l i t a t i o n , CG t h e g e n e r a l e x t e n t of governmental t o l e r a n c e . 0
X
With t h e s e t o o l s , we can manufacture t h e two i d e a l t y p e s of regimes r(
d
4
.
.a
shown i n F i g u r e 4-2: E g a l i t a r i a n and O l i g a r c h i c . I n t h e extreme c a s e of
U

e g a l i t n r i a n i s m , tlie a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e group makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e

8
4
l i k e l i h o o d t h a t tlie government w i l l r e p r e s s o r f a c i l i t a t e a gtven s o r t o f

a c t i o n by t h a t group. In t h e extreme c a s e of o l i g a r c h y , t h e s o r t of ac-

Low
A
t i o n undertaken makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e government Low
A c c e p t a b i l i t y of Croup
w i l l r e p r e s s t h e a c t i o n of a group w i t h a given amount of power.

I n t h a t never-never world where e v i d e n c e is f r e e , c l e a r and r e l i a b l e ,

we c s n compare r e a l regimes i n t h e s e r e g a r d s , and t h u s b e on o u r way t o

t e s t i n g arguments c o n c e r n i n g such t h i n g s a s t h e tempering e f f e c t s of par-

l i a m e n t a r y systems on t h e r e p r e s s i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Real e v i d e n c e

would a l s o g i v e u s tllemeans of j u d g i n g t h e u t i l i t y o f t h e p o l i t y model

p r e s e n t e d e a r l i e r : t h e c l e a r e r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between members and c h a l -

lengers.
 4-17
F i g u r e 4-2: Repression i n E g a l i t a r i a n and O l i g a r c h i c Governments
A. EGALITARIAN
t h e s h a r p e r tand more n e a r l y v e r t i c a l should b e t h e l i n e between r e p r e s -

s i o n and t o l e r a t i o n . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t governments a r e t r u l y e g a l i t a r i a n

and t h a t t h e t r a n s i t i o n from t o l e r a t i o n t o r e p r e s s t o n i s g r a d u a l insLend

Facilitation of a b r u p t , t h e d i v i s i o n of c o n t e n d e r s i n t o manhers and c l m l l c n g e r a i s m i s -
C
0

leading.

The r e c t i l i n e a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n we have been u s i n g s o f a r i s not v e r y

Toleration realistic. L e t u s n e g l e c t t h e u n r e a l i t y i n t r o d u c e d by having no g r a y a r e a s ,
9
no governmental wavering and no t a c t i c a l maneuvering. Even w i t h g r e a t

certainty a s t o when t h e government w i l l and w i l l not r e p r e s s , t o l e r a t e o r

f a c i l i t a t e , F i g u r e 4-3 i s more l i k e everyday r e a l i t y . I n b o t h c n s e s shown

Low i n t h e diagrams, even h i g h l y u n a c c e p t a b l e groups have a few innocuous c o u r s e s
Low A c c e p t a b i l i t y o f Group Iligh
of a c t i o n open t o them. Even h i g h l y a c c e p t a b l e groups have some a c t i o n s

b a r r e d t o them. Rut t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of t h e a c t i o n v a r J e s w i t h t h e a c c e p t -

a b i l i t y of t h e group.

I n t h e diagrams, a l t h o u g h governments X and Y do a b o u t t h e same

High
amount of f a c i l i t a t i n g of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , Y i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y more r e p r e s -

s i v e than X. Y i s a l s o l e s s t o l e r a n t than X. We c a n r e p r e s e n t tlie d i e -

f e r e n c e i n r e p r e s s i v e n e s s between t h e governments a s AC - A'C'. The same

d e v i c e w i l l s e r v e t o p o r t r a y t h e change i n t h e r e p r e s s i v e n e s s of a s i n g l e

government over time: t h e q u e s t i o n is how f a r C moves up and down tlie d J a -

gonal .
The diagram h a s a n i n t e r e s t i n g by-product: i t h e l p s s p e c i f y some s t n n -

d a r d i n t u i t i o n s of t h e r e p r e s s i v e p a t t e r n s i n d i f f e r c n t s o r t s of regimes.

Low F i g u r e 4-4 l a y s o u t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s among r e p r e s s i v e , t o t a l i t a r i a n . t o l e r -

Low High a n t and weak regimes. I n t h i s chorncterieation. a r e p r e s s i v e regime
A c c e p t a b i l i t y of Croup
represses many groups and a c t i o n s , w h i l e f a c i l i t a t l n g few o f e i t h e r . A

t o t a l i t a r i a n regime may r e p r e s s l e s s , b u t i t f a c i l i t a t e s a wide r a n g e of

 Figure 4 - 4 : Repressive Patterns i n D i f f e r e n t Typcs o f Rcgtmc

A. REPRESSIVE 8. TOTALITARIAN

Figure 4 - 3 : Tolernnce v s . Rcpression

Government X Government Y

A '- C. TOLERANT
a c t i o n s , even t o t h e p o i n t of making them compulsory. As a consequence, s i o n probably does hold.

t h e bnnd of mere1.y t o l e r a t e d a c t i o n s narrows. The t o l e r a n t regime widens T h i s e f f e c t of power on r e p r e s s i o n and E o c i l i t o t i o n r e v e r s e s ~ l i cmain

t h a t middle bnnd: diagram C s n e a k s i n t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t o do s o i t r e l a t i o n s h i p proposed by o u r e l e m e n t a r y m o b i l i z a t i o n model. 'Illere, tlie

must b a r some a c t i o n s t o t h e most powerful groups w i t h i n i t . Finally, contender's c u r r e n t s u b j e c t i o n t o r e p r e s s i o n l f a c i l i t o t i o n a f f e c t s its pw-

the week regime a l s o h a s a wide band of t o l e r a t e d b e h a v i o r , b u t , i t f o c i l i - I e r , but not vice versa. Again t h e d i f F e r e n c e i s d u e t o a s l ~ i f ti n perspec-
I
t a t e s l e s s , and t i p s i t s r e p r e s s i o n toward t h e weaker groups w h i l e d o i n g ! tive. The elementary model d e a l s w i t h t h e moment of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ,

p r a c t i c a l l y n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of t h e s t r o n g . and aims a t t h e a c t i o n of t h e c o n t e n d e r . T h i s supplcmentory model of

So f a r we have simply been e x p l o r i n g a two-dimensional d e f i n i t i o n . repression/facilitation. however, d e a l s w i t h a government's d e c i s i o n t o

of r e p r e s s i v e n e s s . We con edge a b i t f a r t h e r i n t o t h e world of t e s t a b l e repress -- e i t h e r i n r e s p o n s e t o some s i n g l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , o r a s a

p r o p o s i t i o n s by a s k i n g what f e a t u r e s of a c t i o n s make them a c c e p t a b l e ,

i p a t t e r n of r e s p o n s e s o v e r a l o n g e r p e r i o d .

and what f e a t u r e s of groups make them a c c e p t a b l e . Those a r e e m p i r i c a l Our e a r l i e r diagrams now t r a n s l a t e i n t o F i g u r e 4-5. I n t h i s idealized

q u e s t i o n s . tough o n e s . T h e i r d e t a i l e d answers vary a c c o r d i n g t o t h e kind map, a g r o u p w e a k e r t h a n A w i l l be r e p r e s s e d no m a t t e r how s m a l l tlie s c a l e

of people and t h e kind of government we a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t . . Whatever e l s e of i t s a c t i o n . Even t h e s t r o n g e s t group w l l l b e r e p r e s s e d i f i t u n d e r t o k e s

a f f e c t s t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a n a c t i o n , however, i t s s h e e r s c a l e c e r t a i n l y a n a c t i o n l a r g e r t h a n E. A group s t r o n g e r than B w i l l r e c e i v e n c t i v e sup-

does. The l a r g e r t h e s c a l e of a c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , on t h e whole. t h e more p o r t f o r i t s s m a l l e r - s c a l e a c t i o n s . and t h e s t r o n g e s t groups w i l l r e c e i v e

r e p r e s s i o n a government is l i k e l y t o throw a t i t . . By " s c a l e " we may mean f a c i l i t a t i o n from t h e government f o r t h e f u l l r a n g e o f a c t i o n s from C t o

I
number of p a r t i c i p a n t s , d u r a t i o n , geographic r a n g e , e i t e n t of o r g a n i z a t i o n , D. The o d d i t y of some o f t h e s e i m p l i c a t i o n s makes i t c l e a r t h a t o v a l i d

d e g r e e of f o r c e m o b i l i z e d , o r some weighted combination of them. map would show more bumps and d e p r e s s i o n s . For example. i n any p a r t i c u l a r

On t h e s i d e of g r o u p ~ o c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e g r o u p ' s c u r r e n t .power i s p o l i t i c a l system t h e r e i s no doubt a t h r e s h o l d below which groups a r e t o o

t h e most promising s i n g l e f a c t o r . That . f o r two r e a s o n s : because might weak t o b o t h e r w i t h ; s i n c e t h e y pose no t h r e a t , t h e i r s m n l l - s c a l e collec-

o f t e n makes right,..and because c u r r e n t . p o w e r sums up many o t h e r k i n d s of t i v e a c t i o n s a r e ignored. Making t h e map more r e a l i s t i c i n a s i g n i f i c a n t

acceptability. The more powerful t h e group, on t h e average. t h e l e s s r e p r e s - t h e o r e t i d a l and e m p i r i c a l problem.

sion it receives. Although a t f i r s t h e a r i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p sounds obvious, The l a s t f i g u r e i n t h i s s e r i e s , o f f e r s some s p e c u l a t i o n s a b o u t t h e

i t is n e i t h e r s e l f - e v i d e n t nor t r u e by d e f i n i t i o n . Indeed, a government I

I
s t a n d a r d d i s t r i b u t i o n s of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n i n p o p u l a t i o n s w i t h
I
a t t h e edge oE a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n o f t e n c o n c e n t r a t e s whatever r e p r e s - r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g governments. I mean them t o a p p l y t o major w e s t e r n

s i v e s t r e n g t h i t h a s on i t s most powerful r i v a l s , and l e t s t h e weak r u n f r e e . s t a t e s o v e r t h e l a s t two o r t h r e e c e n t u r i e s . The r e p r e s s i o n c u r v e now

N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n g e n e r a l a n i n v e r s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between power and r e p r e s - r e g i s t e r s t h e i d e a t h a t groups w i t h a l i t t l e power pose a g r e a t e r t h r e a t

Figure 4 - 5 : Repression a s a Function of S c a l e and Power
Figure 4-6: Hypothetical d i s t r i b u t i o n of governmental rcpresslon n s o

1
function of t h e s c a l e o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and t h e powcr
A B C of the actor.

Small

Small
Facilitation

4 D

V)

Large
E

Weak +- Strong
Repression
Power of Croup

Large

Weak +Strong
' Power of Group
t o t h e government and i t s main s u p p o r t e r s than do powerless groups. t h e c o s t s of p a r t i c u l a r k i n d s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and perhaps of c o l l c c -
Tlie

h y p o t h e t i c a l government r e p r e s s e s a l l b u t t h e s m a l l e s t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s t i v e a c t i o ~ i ,i n general. To b e more e x a c t , a l i l E t s I n t h e p a t t e r n of r e p r e s -

of s l i g h t l y powerful groups, w h i l e a l l o w i n g more l a t i t u d e t o t h e g e n u i n e l y s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n should have two r e l a t e d e f f e c t s : d e p r e s s i n g o r

powerless. I t a l s o c o n t a i n s t h e i d e a t h a t a s t h e power of a p a r t i c u l a r r a i s i n g t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , a l t e r i n g t h e r e l n t i v e

a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of d i f f e r e n t forms o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
group r i s e s -- a s , f o r example, i t a c t u a l l y becomes i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e
government -- t h e r a n g e o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s denied t o i t e v e n t u a l l y The h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e f o r t h e impact of r e p r e s s i o n on t h e g e n e r n l

dwindles t o n o t h i n g n e s s . The f a c i l i t a t i o n c u r v e t e l l s u s t h a t even r e l a - l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n is. I t h l n k , q u l t e s t r o n g . A t t h e extreme, t h e

t i v e l y ppwerless groups r e c e i v e i n c e n t i v e s t o c a r r y o u t c e r t a i n h i g h l y ac- Europe of o u r own t i m e p r o v i d e s tlie examples of Spain under Prifno d e Rivera

c e p t a b l e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s ; t h e r e s u l t of t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e i s t o s q u e e z e and Franco, P o r t u g a l under S a l a z a r , Germany under H i t l e r , and S o v i e t Unton

t h e r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of s l i g h t l y powerful groups under S t a l i n and h i s s u c c e s s o r s , I t a l y under Mussolini. France under

which i s simply t o l e r a t e d : e i t h e r they c a n ' t do i t o r t h e y must do i t . Vichy and t h e Nazis -- a l l t i m e s of enormously reduced c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n

i n t h b s e c o u n t r i e s , e x c e p t f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n d i r e c t l y i n i t i n t c d by tlie
A s s r e s u l t , r e l a t i v e l y powerless groups f i n d t h e i r world more t o t a l i t a r i a n
state. I n g e n e r a l , when a European s t a t e t e m p o r a r i l y t r a i n e d i t s f u l l
than do t h e powerful o r t h e c o m p l e t e l y powerless.
r e p r e s s i v e power on i t s i n t e r n a l enemies ( a s when t h e I t a l l n n s t a t c a t -
At t h e o t h e r end of t h e power r a n g e , t h e extremely powerful e n j o y

governmental s u p p o r t i n a l m o s t any c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n they c a r r y on. tacked t h e S i c i l i a n F a s c i o f 1893-94), t h e enemies s u b s i d e d .

At t h e extreme, where t h e government and t h e most powerful group merge The a l t e r a t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of d i f f e r e n t forms of

i n d i s s o l u b l y , government s u p p o r t s e v e r y t h i n g t h e group does. This basic c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by r e p r e s s i o n end f a c i l i t a t i o n i s easy t o i l l u s t r o t c

p a t t e r n i s p o s s i b l e w i t h a s m a l l e r o r l a r g e r a r e a of t o l e r a t i o n , s m a l l e r and hard t o e s t a b l i s h a s a g e n e r a l r u l e . T l ~ e"channeling" of c o l l e c t i v e

a c t i o n by governments shows up i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y p r e f e r e n c e f o r
o r l a r g e r zones of r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n .
mutual-aid s o c i e t i e s o v e r t r a d e unions. Western governments g e n e r a l l y
I f t h i s argument is c o r r e c t , r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n should work.
d i s c o u r a g e d t h e banding t o g e t h e t ' of workers who s o u g h t t o c o n t r o l produc-
I t should n o t b e t r u e , f o r example, t h a t a people l o n g h e l d under a r e
tion. They d i v e r t e d workers i n t o presumably s a f e r o r g a n i z n t i o n s o r i e n t e d
p r e s s i v e regime w i l l g r a d u a l l y b u i l d up s o much resentment t h a t i t b u r s t s
t o consumption. The t a c t i c worked i n t h e s h o r t run; u n t i l they bccame
o u t a g a i n s t t h e regime. I t should be t r u e , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h a t v i s i b l e
l e g a l , t r a d e unions a t t r a c t e d few members. A t l i r s t , Friendly S o c i e t i e s
changes I n a government's r e p r e s s i v e p o l i c y -- c r a c k i n g down on v i o l a t o r s
and s o c i b t 6 s d e s e c o u r s mutuels busied themselves w i t h problcms O F w e l f a r e
of a c e r t a i n law, o r e a s i n g up on them -- w i l l r a p i d l y encourage o r d i s -
away from work. I n t h e l o n g e r r u n , however, they became t h e n u c l e i of ac-
c o u r a g e tlie c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of mnny groups b e s i d e s t h o s e most d i r e c t l y
t i o n a g a i n s t employers and a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . T l ~ elower c o s t a l t e r n a t i v e
a f f e c t e d ; t h e news of t h e change should q u i c k l y a f f e c t t h e i r e s t i m a t e s o f
e v e n t u a l l y bccame a v e r y e f f e c t i v e one. That r e p r e s s i o n makes a d i f f e r e n c e
does n o t mean t h a t i t slwnys sccompl.ishes what t h e r e p r e s s o r s had i n mind. sometimes f a i l s u t t e r l y t o a r r a n g e p r o t e c t i v e t a r i f f s ; i t s power is h i g h

Power w i t h r e s p e c t t o l a b o r , low w i t h r e s p e c t t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e . A group

The p r o v i s i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s of t h i s lsst d i s c u s s i o n , t h e n , r u n s a s of r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s who were i n e f f e c t u o l lsst y e a r sometimes r e o r g o n j z e and

f o l l o w s : t h e e x t e n t t o which a g i v e n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by s g i v e n group s t a r t making a r e v o l u t i o n t h i s year: i n lsst y e a r ' s i n t e r a c t i o n s they

is s u b j e c t t o r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r a t i o n o r f a c i l i t a t i o n i s mainly a f u n c t i o n were powerless, w h i l e i n t h i s y e a r ' s t h e y a r e powerful. When we a r g u e

of two f a c t o r s : 1 ) t h e s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n , 2) t h e power of t h e group. a b o u t whether a g i v e n group i s powerful, we a r e o c c n s i o n a l l y d i s n g r e e i n g

about t h e f a c t s . But u s u a l l y we a r e c o n t e n d i n g o v e r which p n r t i e s . i n t e r -

The l a r g e r t h e s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n , t h e more l i k e l y i t s r e p r e s s i o n ; t h e
e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s d e s e r v e t o b e tnken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and how t o
more powerful t h e group, t h e l e s s l i k e l y i t s r e p r e s s i o n . The l a t e r d i a -
weigh then.
grams r e f i n e d t h n t c r u d e h y p o t h e s i s by s p e c i f y i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s between
Now and then someone i n t r o d u c e s p o t e n t i n l power i n t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n .
t h e s c a l e of t h e a c t i o n and t h e power of t h e group. But t h e c o r e of t h e
P o t e n t i a l power d e s c r i b e s t h e e x t e n t . t o which t h e p a r t y ' s i n t e r e s t s would
h y p o t h e s i s remains.
p r e v a i l i f i t used a l l t h e means a t i t s d i s p o s a l : i f a l l women used a l l
S c a l e of a c t i o n i s s f a i r l y c l e a r i d e s . Power i s n o t . Unfortu-
t h e w e a l t h , t o o l s , knowledge, e t c . they d i s p o s e of now t o e n f o r c e t h e i r
n n t e l y f o r c l a r i t y , t h e word h a s many t o n e s and o v e r t o n e s . Enough, I

t h i n k , t o make t h e s e a r c h f o r one e s s e n t i a l meaning o r one comprehensive r i g h t s t o employment, f o r example. The t r o u b l e w i t h n o t i o n s o f p o t e n t i o l

d e f i n i t i o n of power a w i l d goose c h a s e . The meaning I have i n mind h e r e powe; i s t h a t by d e f i n i t i o n t h e y r e f e r t o s i t u a t i o n s we c a n ' t o b s e r v e ,

is s i m p l e and commonsense. Suppose we have two o r more i n t e r a c t i n g p s r - t h a t t h e y f o r c e u s t o d e c i d e between assuming t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s t o

ties. Suppose each p a r t y h a s an i n t e r e s t i n a n outcome of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n . t h e i n t e r a c t i o n c o n t i n u e t o behave a s b e f o r e ( e . g . t h a t men d o n ' t respond

Suppose a t l e a s t one such i n t e r e s t of o n e p a r t y t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n con- by p i l i n g up a l l t h e w e a l t h , t o o l s , knowledge e t c . thev c o n t r o l ) and

f l i c t s w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t of a n o t h e r p a r t y t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n . The power t h e o r i z i n g a b o u t t h e whole sequence o f i n t e r a c t i o n l i k e l y to' follow: war

of t h s t p a r t y i s t h e e x t e n t t o which i t s i n t e r e s t s p r e v a i l o v e r t h e o t h e r s games. Yet we c a n ' t simply brush a s i d e p o t e n t i o l power n s a n i n c o n v e n i e n t

w i t h which i t i s i n c o n f l i c t . i d e a , f o r t h e i m p l i c i t t h r e a t t h n t s p a r t y w i l l u s e t h e means i t hns i n

The o t h e r a c t o r s may r a n g e from s s i n g l e person t o t h e sum of a l l r e s e r v e o f t e n ( p e r h a p s always) m u l t i p l i e s t h e e f f e c t o f t h e means a c t u n l l y

The power of a g i v e n p a r t y i s t h e r e f o r e always used.

o t h e r p e r s o n s and groups.
A r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s e p a r a t e s power-as-effectiveness from powcr-ns-
r e l a t i v e t o a s p e c i f i c 1 ) o t h e r p a r t y o r s e t of p a r t i e s ; 2) i n t e r e s t o r s e t
efficiency. (An e x a c t l y p a r a l l e l d i s t i n c t i o n a p p e a r s i n d i s c u s s i o n s of
of i n t e r e s t s ; 3) i n t e r a c t i o n o r s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s . A farmer who t r a m p l e s
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o u t p u t s ; s e e , e.g. Yuchtman and S e a s h o r e 1967.) A group
t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r members of h i s household sometimes makes no headway
which accomplishes what i t s e t s o u t t o do is e f f e c t i v e , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e
i n t h e v i l l a g e c o u n c i l ; he h a s e x t e n h i v e power a t home. b u t n o t abroad.

An i n d u s t r y which g e t s e x t e n s i v e governmental p r o t e c t i o n from u n i o n i z a t i o n

costs i t incurs. To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t s t h e r e b y pre- my way o f t h i n k i n g , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s among p a r t y . a u t h o r i t y and govern-

v a i l o v e r o t h e r i n t e r e s t s w i t h which t h e y a r e i n c o n f l i c t , t h e group i s ment a r e p u r e l y r e l a t i v e : on a u t h o r i t y i s simply a p a r t y which c o n t r o l s

e x e r c j s i n g e f f e c t i v e power. On t h e o t h e r hand, a group which g e t s a l a r g e some c o n c e n t r a t e d means o f c o e r c i o n ; a government i s simply t h e p a r t y

r e t u r n r e l a t i v e t o t h e means a t i t s d i s p o s a l i s e f f i c i e n t , r e g a r d l e s s of which c o n t r o l s t h e moat i m p o r t a n t c o n c e n t r a t e d means o f c o e r c i o n w i t h i n

t h e s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r of t h a t r e t u r n . To t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e r e t u r n f a v o r s some d e f i n e d p o p u l a t i o n .

t h e g r o u p ' s i n t e r e s t s and c o u n t e r s t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r groups, t h e P o l i t i c a l power, t h e n , i s power o v e r governments. Our e s t i m a t e of a

group i a e x e r c i s i n g e f f i c i e n t power. g r o u p ' s p o l i t i c a l power w i l l depend on which o t h e r p a r t i e s we t a k e i n t o

Both e f f e c t i v e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y a r e r e l a t i v e t o t h e g r o u p ' s de- consideration. At o n e extreme, we c a n l o o k a t t h e group and t h e govern-

fined interests. But an e f f e c t i v e group may be r a t h e r i n e f f i c i e n t ; by ment a l o n e . Then t h e g r o u p ' s p o l i t i c a l power is t h e e x t e n t t o wliicl~ f t s

v i r t u e of t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o s a c r i f i c e almost s n y t h i n g f o r t h e i r objec- i n t e r e s t s p r e v a i l o v e r t h o s e of t h e government when t h e two s e t s of i n t e r -

t i v e s , our "zealots" o f t e n f a l l i n t o t h a t category. Likewise, an e f f i - e s t s are in conflict. That r e s u l t i s vaguely u n s e t t l i n g , p r e c i s e l y because

c i e n t group may b e r e l a t i v e l y i n e f f e c t i v e ; o u r "misers" f r e q u e n t l y end up we u s u a l l y have some o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s f o r t h e government's f a v o r i n mind,

there. A v e r y i n e f f e c t i v e group t e n d s t o d e m o b i l i z e through t h e p r o c e s s and v i s u a l i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n of a p e r f e c t c o i n c i d e n c e of i n t e r e s t s between

t h a t A l b e r t Hirschman a n a l y z e s : a s u c c e s s i o n from some combination of a g i v e n p a r t y and t h e government: s u r e l y we wouldn't want t o soy t h a t

loyslty + voice to exit. A v e r y i n e f f i c i e n t group w a s t e s i t s m o b i l i z e d such a p a r t y had no p o l i t i c a l power!

r e s o u r c e s and t h e n t e n d s e i t h e r a ) t o become i n e f f e c t i v e ss a r e s u l t o r An extreme answer t o t h a t d i f f i c u l t y i s t o i n c l u d e a l l o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s .

b) t o l o s e i t s s u p p o r t t o o t h e r groups p u r s u i n g t h e same i n t e r e s t s more The answer i s extreme because i t e n t a i l s a ) enumernting a l l t h o s e o t h e r

efficiently. I n o r d e r t o s u r v i v e and p r o s p e r , r e a l groups must m a i n t a i n c o n t e n d e r s , b) p r e p a r i n g t h e huge b a l a n c e s h e e t o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s vs.

themselves above some minimum of power-efficiency and some minimum of t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e group whose power we a r e t r y i n g t o a s s a y . The i n -

parer-effectiveness. The s n a l y s i s which f o l l o w s p r o v i d e s a means f o r t e r m e d i a t e answer i s t o l i m i t t h e s e t o f c o n t e n d e r s taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a -

t l e a l l n g w i t h b o t h a s p e c t s of power. tion: o n e c o m p e t i t o r , a l i m i t e d s e t o f powerful c o m p e t i t o r s , a l l t h o s e

Parties which h a v e made themselves known wltli r e s p e c t t o some p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e

Let u s go back t o our t h r e e p o i n t s of r e f e r e n c e : p a r t i e s , i n - a n d l o r some p a r t i c u l a r phase of governmental a c t i v i t y , and s o on.

t e r e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s . Many s t u d e n t s of power l i k e t o d i s t i n g u i s h be- The n o t i o n of a " p o l i t y " t o k e s a s t e p i n t h a t direction by s i n g l i n g

tween "governments" o r " a u t h o r i t i e s " , on t h e one hand, and a l l p a r t i e s o u t - o u t a l l c o n t e n d e r s which have r o u t i n e a c c e s s t o t h e government. For t h i s

s i d e t h e government, on t h e o t h e r . William Camson, f o r example, u s e s articular n o t i o n o f p o l i t y t o b e u s e f u l , t h e r e must b e a b r e a k I n t h e d i s -

power t o r e f e r t o t h e e f f e c t of a u t h o r i t i e s on o t h e r p a r t i e s , and i n f l u e n c e t r i b u t i o n of power. The b r e a k must s e p a r a t e t h e r e l a t i v e l y g r e n t power

t o r e f e r t o t h e e f f e c t s of o t h e r p a r t i e s on a u t h o r i t i e s (Camson 1968). TO
o f a l l c o n t e n d e r s ("members o f t h e p o l i t y " ) who h a v e r o u t i n e a c c e s s t o t h e i n t e r e s t t o s o c i a l position. I n t h e Marxist . t r a d i t i o n , t h e " s o c i a l p s i -

government from t h e r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l power of a l l o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s t i o n " which c o u n t s i s t h e g r o u p ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e means of p r o d u c t i o n .

("challengers") who l a c k t h a t r o u t i n e a c c e s s . I t a l s o i m p l i e s a break i n I t is e a s y t o a c c e p t t h e r e f o r m i s t c o n c e p t i o n of power a s a s u b s t i t u t e

t h e l i f e h i s t o r y of a group which moves from c h a l l e n g e t o membership o r f o r t h e p l u r a l i s t conception. The r e f o r m i s t appeoach simply a d d s new in-

membersl~ip t o c h a l l e n g e . To tlie e x t e n t t h a t t h e s e p r o c e s s e s a r e c o n t i n u o u s t e r e s t s t o t h o s e a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r e d r e l e v a n t by t h e p l u r n l i s t . The c h o i c e

and g r a d u a l , t h e concept of p o l i t y l o s e s i t s v a l u e . between t h e r a d i c a l approach and t h e o t h e r two i s more d r a s t i c . It lcnds

t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t some a p p a r e n t i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and

Interests
pursue a r e not r e a l l y i n t e r e s t s . They a r e chimeras, p r o d u c t s of f a l s e '
We f a c e t h e trilemma which Steven Lukes l a y s o u t . Lukes d i s t i n g u i s h e s
consciousness, t r i v i a l i t i e s . The r a d i c a l approach a l s o l e a d s t o t h e iden-
among " p l u r a l i s t , " " r e f o r m i s t " and " r a d i c a l " c o n c e p t i o n s of power. The
t i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s which t h e a c t o r s themselves do n o t -- and, somc-
e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n r e s t s on t h e means used t o i d e n t i f y t h e r e l e v a n t
t i m e s , would n o t -- r e c o g n i z e a s t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . I t second-guesses
i n t e r e s t s of each a c t o r . A " p l u r a l i s t " view, i n Lukes' terminology, o n l y
t h e a c t o r s ' o m p e r c e p t i o n of t h e world.
t a k e s i n t o a c c o u n t t h o s e i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and p r e s s i n t h e
S u b s t i t u t i n g o n e ' s own a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e r e l e v a n t i n t e r e s t s f o r t h a t
p o l i t i c a l arena. A "reformist" c o n c e p t i o n of power adds o t h e r i n t e r e s t s
of t h e a c t o r s on t h e s c e n e t a k e s c o n f i d e n c e , sometimes even condescension
which a group a r t i c u l a t e s , b u t ,has no o p p o r t u n i t y t o a c t upon. In a re-
and a r r o g a n c e . Those i n t e r e s t s which groups a r t i c u l a t e and pursue, whether
f o r m i s t a n a l y s i s , a t r u l y powerful group n o t o n l y s e e s t o i t t h a t i t s in-
a n o u t s i d e a n a l y s t r a t e s them a s " r e a l " o r not.. s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t r e a l
t e r e s t s p r e v a i l i n t h e e v e n t of a n open c o n f l i c t w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l
s t r u g g l e s f o r power. I n prudence and h u m i l i t y , then, we should g i v e them
a r e n a , b u t a l s o manages t o keep o t h e r g r o u p ' s c h a l l e n g e s t o i t s i n t e r e s t s
priority. Nothing p r e v e n t s u s , however, from posing t h e f o l l o w i n g crnpfri-
o f f t h e p u b l i c agenda. Both t h e p l u r a l i s t and t h e r e f o r m i s t a n a l y s e s
c a l problem:
l i m i t t h e l i s t of r e l e v a n t i n t e r e s t s t o t h o s e which t h e groups themselves

articulate. %- -
IMPUTED INTERESTS ARTICULATED INTERESTS

The " r a d i c a l " analysis, a c c o r d i n g t o Lukes, c o n s i d e r s a g r o u p ' s r e a l

CONTENTION FOR POWER
i n t e r e s t s r e g a r d l e s s of whether t h e group h a s a r t i c u l a t e d them. We looked
We may a s k , t h a t i s , how a c c u r a t e l y t h e i n t e r e s t s we Impute t o o group on
a t t h i s c h o i c e i n tlie p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r : 1 ) i n f e r t h e i n t e r e s t s from t h e
g e n e r a l grounds p r e d i c t t o a ) t h e i n t e r e s t s t h e group n r t i c u l a t e o and pur-
g r o u p ' s own u t t e r a n c e s and a c t i o n s -- u t t e r s n c e s and a c t i o n s i n t h e p u b l i c
s u e s , a n d / o r b) t h e power s t r u g g l e s it1 which t h e group engages. The
a r e n a f o r t h e p l u r a l i s t s , u t t e r a n c e s and a c t i o n s i n any a r e n a f o r t h e
M a r x i s t a n a l y s i s s a y s t h a t both w i l l have p r e d l c t i v e power. Over tlie long
r e f o r m i s t s ; 2) d e r i v e t h e i n t e r e s t s from a g e n e r a l scheme which r e l a t e s
r u n , a g r o u p ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g means of production d e t c r -
mlnes t h e i n t e r e s t s which t h e group a r t i c u l a t e s and pursues. The g r o u p ' s related w i t h t h e power which would show up i n t h e interactions

r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n a l s o nf f e c ts i t s c o n t e n t i o n f o r s h i e l d e d from o u r eyes: i f J.P. Morgan could do t h a t much i n p u b l i c , then

p w c r d l r e c t l y , by d e t e r m i n i n g i t s l i k e l y enemies and a l l i e s , and by how much h e could do i n p r i v a t e 1 . The c o r r e l a t i o n is n e v e r t h e l e s s a m n t t e r

shaping i t s i n t e r n a l organization. M a r x i s t s d i f f e r among themselves when o f f a c t , a s u b j e c t of p o s s i b l e d i s p u t e , and an assumption we c a n n o t con-

i t comes t o d e c i d i n g how much importance t o a t t r i b u t e t o t h e s e d i r e c t e f - t i n u e t o make i n d e f i n i t e l y .

f e c t s of c l a s s p o s i t i o n on c o n t e n t i o n f o r power, and how much t o i n s i s t

The Measurement o f Power
on c l a s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r s u s t a i n e d o r e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n .
L e t u s suppose, m i r n b i l e d i c t u , t h a t we have s e t t l e d on n s p e c i f i c
T C we c a n rind a r e a s o n a b l e way of gauging c l a s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h i s , t o o ,
s e t o f p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s . Wo can now u s e t h e s i m p l t f i e d
can become an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n .
model of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s t h e p u r s u i t of c o l l e c t i v e goods t o d e s c r i b e

Interactions a s i n g l e g r o u p ' s power p o s i t i o n . F i g u r e 4-7 r e f i n e s t h e e a r l i e r c o l l e c -

Ilaving s e t t l e d on a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of p a r t i e s and a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of t i v e goods model i n two r e g a r d s . The r e t u r n s now i n c l u d e t h e p o s a i b t l i t y

i n t e r e s t s , we s t i l l have t o s e t t l e on a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s . of c o l l e c t i v e bads: n e g a t i v e r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . -1 might

The most obvious l i m i t i s time: power today, power t h i s y e a r , power o v e r r e p r e s e n t t h e group's complete e x t i n c t i o n . The diagram a l s o r e p r e s e n t s

t h e l a s t decade, power a t some time i n t h e Euture? DifEerent s e t s o f t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e s o r t of c o n t e n d e r we e a r l i e r c a l l e d an o p p o r t u n i s t :

interactions a r e relevant: I f we want t o s i n g l e o u t t h e e f f e c t s o f power, a group which w i l l a c c e p t any s o r t o f c o l l e c t i v e goods, s o l o n g a s they

we a r e a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y going t o a t t e m p t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between power r e p r e s e n t a s i g n i f i c a n t g a i n o v e r t h e r e s o u r c e s expended t o g e t them.

today and power tomorrow, on t h e assumption t h a t t o d a y ' s e x e r c i s e of power With t h e a d d i t i o n a l p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e bnds, t h e diogrnm n i s o

w i l l , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , a f f e c t tomorrow's power d i s t r i b u t i o n . In shows t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s i n t e r e s t e x t e n d s t o d e f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e s e nega-

a d d i t i o n t o f i x i n g t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n time, we have t o d e c i d e whether t o t i v e outcomes. Even I n t h e c a s e of t h e omnivorous o p p o r t u n i s t . t h e c o l -

c o n s i d e r a l l i n t e r a c t i o n s , o r o n l y some c r u c i a l s u b s e t -- every comunica- l e c t i v e goods we now t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n a r e t h o s e which r e s u l t from

t i o n , d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t , between S t a n d a r d O i l and t h e U.S. Government, a s p e c i f i e d s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r s e t of p a r t i e s by r e f e r -

o r j u s t formal r e q u e s t s f o r r a t e a d j u s t m e n t s ? e n c e t o which we want t o gauge t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s power.

We sometimes s i d e s t e p t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by l o o k i n g simply a t t h e r e t u r n s For s i m p l i c i t y ' s s a k e , l e t u s narrow o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n

a g i v e n group g e t s from o t h e r p a r t i e s o v e r some p e r i o d of i n t e r a c t i o n , of two p a r t i e s . The narrowing is n o t q u i t e s o d r a s t i c a s i t may seem,

w l t h o u t t r y i n g t o d e t e c t t h e impact oE every s i n g l e i n t e r a c t i n n . Logically s i n c e o n e o f t h e " p a r t i e s " t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n may be a sum of a l l o t h e r

speaking, t h a t is a g r o s s s i m p l i f i c a t i o n . We a l s o tend t o assume t h a t t h e parties. We c a n e a s i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e a c t i o n s o f t h i r d p a r t i e s a s i n f l u e n c e s

power which shows up i n a v l s i b l e s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s i s s t r o n g l y c o r - on t h e outcomes i n q u e s t i o n . Then, a s b e f o r e , t h e diagram r e p r e s f m t s

 s e v e r a l c r u c i a l f a c t s : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r e q u i r e s on e x p e n d i t u r e of re-
F i g u r e 4-7: I n t e r e s t s and R e t u r n s from C o l l e c t i v e Action f o r an O p p o r t u n i s t
s o u r c e s ; t h e c o l l e c t i v e goods o b t a i n e d a r e v o r t h something; t o t h e ex-
Con t e n d e r
t e n t t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e s expended and c o l l e c t i v e goods o b t a i n e d have com-

p a r a b l e v a l u e s t h e i n t e r a c t i o n can r e s u l t i n a g a i n , a l o s s o r a s t o n d -

off. Above t h e d i a g o n a l , P a r t y A g e t s back more than i t expends; i t

thus gains. Below t h e d i a g o n a l , P a r t y A g e t s back l e s s t h a n i t expends;

thus i t loses. The d i a g o n a l i s a b r e a k - w e n l i n e .

I n any r e a l i n t e r a c t i o n , a number of t h i n g s c o n s t r a i n 0 ' s r e s p o n s e

Value of Col-
l e c t i v e Coods t o A's a c t i o n : t h e r e s o u r c e s under 0 ' s c o n t r o l , 0 ' s own d e s j r e and cnpa-
Produced by
lnteractidns c i t y t o r e s i s t o r c o o p e r a t e , t h e i n t e r e s t of t h i r d p o r t l e s i n t h e r e -
with 0
s o u r c e s under B's c o n t r o l , and s o on. For a number of r e a s o n s i t i s

r e a s o n a b l e t o suppose t h e f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s :

1. a c o n t e n d e r which d o e s n o t a c t a t a l l w i l l r e c e i v e c o l l e c t i v e

bads;

2. a c o n t e n d e r which a c t s on a v e r y s m a l l s c a l e v i l l r e c e i v e even

more c o l l e c t i v e b s d s , a s t h e o t h e r p a r t y r e s p o n d s n e g a t i v e l y t o

i t s efforts;

-I Interest -------- 3. beyond t h a t p o i n t , t h e c o n t e n d e r w i l l r e c e i v e on i n c r e a s i n g re-

t u r n f o r i n c r e a s i n g o u t p u t s of c o l l e c t i v e s c t l o n , b u t o n l y up

to a l i m i t ;

4. t h e marginal r a t e of r e t u r n f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n e v e n t u a l l y bc-
-1
' Value of Resources Expended by A Maximum comes n e g a t i v e .

The c u r v e i n F i g u r e 4-8 d e s c r i b e s t h o s e h y p o t h e t i c a l e f f e c t s . The r a t e

of r e t u r n e v e n t u a l l y d e c l i n e s because B's resources a r e not inexhaustible.

because B w i l l defend i t s e l f a g a i n s t t h r e a t s t o i t s own s u r v i v a l , and be-

c a u s e t h i r d p a r t i e s w i l l i n t e r v e n e when A ' s g a i n s v i s i b l y t h r e a t e n t h e i r

own i n t e r e s t i n t h e r e s o u r c e s under B'S c o n t r o l . Under t h e c o n d i t i o n s of

 4-37

F i g u r e 4-8: t l y p o t h e t i c a l Sclledule o f Returns from C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n

F i g u r e 4-9: Gaining v s . L o s i n g S c h e d u l e s o f Returns

Maximum

Col.lcctive
Goods
Produced

0 Z Maximum

Resources Expended by A
 4-39
F i g u r e 4-10: How M o b i l i z a t i o n L i m i t s C o l l e c t i v e Action
F i g u r e 4-8, an u n c o n s t r a i n e d , c o o l l y c a l c u l a t i n g P a r t y A -- an opportunist

-- would mnximlze by expending Z r e s o u r c e s , l a n d i n g a t Y on t h e r e t u r n s

c u r v e and g e t t i n g back X i n c o l l e c t i v e goods, f o r a g a i n of X-Z. The

1
r e t u r n s c u r v e g i v e s a s i m p l e d e s c r ' i p t i o n of A ' s power o v e r B.
I
P u t t i n g t h e d i a g o n a l back i n makes i t c l e a r e r t h a t some groups might
I
always b e i n a l o s i n g p o s i t i o n because t h e i r e n t i r e r e t u r n s c u r v e l i e s be-
I
low t h e break-even l i n e . F i g u r e 4-9 s t a t e s t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y .

A 2 h a s l i t t l e hope; i t s c u r v e l i e s t o o low.
There, P a r t y

P a r t y A1 i s b e t t e r o f f ; a
I
!

p o r t i o n of i t s c u r v e l i e s above t h e break-even l i n e . With r e s p e c t t o

I
t h i s s e t of p a r t i e s , i n t e r e s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n s , P a r t y A1 h a s more power

than P a r t y A 2 . An o p p o r t u n i s t P a r t y A would c o n f i n e i t s a c t i o n t o t h e
1
rnngc producing r e t u r n s nbove t h e d i a g o n a l : Z t o Z2. An o p p o r t u n i s t
1
P a r t y A2 wou1.d a c t o n l y enough t o f o r e s t a l l c o l l e c t i v e bods -- and work

t o improve i t s s c h e d u l e of r e t u r n s . i
i
We have f o r g o t t e n , however, t h a t n e i t h e r A nor A2 tias u n l i m i t e d r e -

s o u r c e s t o expend.
1
The amount of r e s o u r c e s P a r t y A c u r r e n t l y h a s under II
i t s c o n t r o l ( t h a t i s , mobilized r e s o u r c e s ) l i m i t s how Par o u t on t h e

S-curve of r e t u r n s A can move. F i g u r e 4-10 i d e n t i f i e s t h a t l i m i t . Wit11 !

i
M i n m o b i l i z e d r e s o u r c e s , P a r t y A can o n l y l o s e , d e s p i t e i t s t h e o r e t i c a l l y
1
favorable position. I f A can a r r a n g e t o m o b i l i z e m o r e r e s o u r c e s , then a c t ,

t h a t l o o k s l i k e a good s t r a t e g y . With M2, expending a l m o s t e v e r y t l ~ i n gon

hand w l l l make s e n s e . With M,, i t would s t i l l b e smart t o expend some-

t h i n g around M2, and keep t h e r e s t i n r e s e r v e f o r a n o t h e r time.

T h i s l a s t diagram p e r m i t s two r e f i n e m e n t s t o t h e a n a l y s i s of power.

F i r s t , t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of t h e S-curve w l t h t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n 1.ine i s a

f a i r l y good approximation of p o t e n t i a l power. I t t e l l s u s what e f f e c t

P a r t y A could have i f i t expended n l l t h e r e s o u r c e s under i t s c o n t r o l .

(You may p r e f e r t o s e a r c h f o r t h e h i g h e s t p o i n t on tlie S-curve which f a l l s At any p o i n t i n time, some (and o n l y some) of t h e c o n t e n d e r s hove

t o t h e l e f t of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n l i n e , and c a l l that A ' s p o t e n t i a l power.) achieved r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s t o wield power o v e r t h e

Second, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between p o w e r - e f f e c t i v e n e s s and power-efficiency government, and have developed r o u t i n e ways of e x e r c i s i n g t h o s e r i g h t s .

nppenrs c l e a r l y . P o w e r - e f f e c t i v e n e s s r e f e r s t o how f a r up t h e v e r t i c a l They a r e members of t h e p o l i t y . A 1 1 other contenders o r e challengers.

a x i s P a r t y A can r e a c h , o r does r e a c h . Power-efficiency r e f e r s t o t h e They contend w i t h o u t r o u t i n e o r r e c o g n i t i o n . Memhership i n t h e p o l i t y

s l o p e of t h e r e t u r n c u r v e a t t h e p o i n t P a r t y A c a n o r d o e s r e a c h . In g i v e s i m p o r t a n t a d v a n t a g e s t o a group. In t h e most general s e n e e , i t s

e i t h e r c a s e , tlie diagram t e l l s u s t h a t t h e c u r r e n t m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l of power r i s e s : i n terms of t h e diagrams of t h e p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n , p o l i t y

P a r t y A s e t s a f i r m l i m i t on P a r t y A ' s power. membership produces a r i s e i n t h e c u r v e of r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t l o n .

A prudent d e s c r i p t i o n o f A ' s power i n t h e r e a l world d i s r e g a r d s D e p a r t u r e from t h e p o l i t y produces a d r o p i n t h e c u r v e . C o n c r e t e l y , recog-

t h e p o r t i o n of t h e S-curve t o t h e r i g h t of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n b a r r i e r . For n i t i o n pays o f f i n c o l l e c t i v e a c c e s s t o j o b s , exemptions from t a x a t i o n .

t h i s s t a t e of t h e world, t l ~ i ss e t of p a r t i e s , t h i s s e t of i n t e r e s t s and 0 a v a i l a b i l i t y of p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n , and s o on.

t h i s s e t of i n t e r a c t i o n s , t h e segment of t h e c u r v e t o t h e l e f t of t h e mo- Every p o l i t y e s t a b l i s h e s t e s t s of membecshlp. A l l p o l i t i e s include

b i l i z a t i o n l i n e d e s c r i b e s t h e power of P a r t y A. among such t e s t s tlie a b i l i t y t o m o b i l i z e o r c o e r c e s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of

people. Furthermore, w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y members c o n t i n u a l l y t e s t o n e anoth-

Power and P o l i t y Membership
er; r e p r e a t e d f a i l u r e s of p a r t i a l t e s t s l e a d t o f u l l e r t e s t s . The f u l l e r
C o n t e n t i o n f o r power l i n k s t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model t o t h e p o l i t y model.
t e s t s l e n d , i n e x t r e m i s , t o e x c l u s i o n from t h e p o l i t y . Each new e n t r y o r
Contention f o r power c o n s i s t s of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s t o i n f l u e n c e
e x i t r e d e f i n e s t h e c r i t e r i a of membership i n a d i r e c t i o n f a v o r a b l e t o t h e
o t h e r groups, and power i t s e l f c o n s i s t s of a g r o u p ' s making i t s i n t e r e s t s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e p r e s e n t s e t of members. I n t h e p r o c e s s , t h e members
p r e v a i l o v e r o t h e r s w i t h which t h e y a r e i n c o n f l i c t . Contention f o r politi-
tend t o become a t t a c h e d t o t h o s e c r i t e r i a a s s m a t t e r o r principle.
-
c a l power i n v o l v e s a p p l y i n g r e s o u r c e s t o a p a r t i c u l a r kind o f o r g a n i z a t i o n :
I n t h e o r y , a group can m o b i l i z e w i t h o u t contending f o r power: i L can
a government. A government is simply t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , i f any, which con-
apply i t s c o l l e c t i v e resources e n t i r e l y to r e c r e a t i o n , t h e search f o r
t r o l s t h e p r i n c i p a l c o n c e n t r a t e d means of c o e r c i o n w i t h i n some p o p u l a t i o n .
enlightenment o r some o t h e r n o n - p o l i t i c a l end. A commune o r r e l i g i o u s cnm-
The c o n t e n d e r s f o r power w i t h i n a g i v e n p o p u l a t i o n i n c l u d e a l l groups which
munity r e t i r i n g from t h e world moves i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n . Within tlie modern
n r e c o l l e c t i v e l y a p p l y i n g r e s o u r c e s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e government. In r e a l
world, however, governments a r e s o l i k e l y t o c l a i m tlie r i g h t t o r e g u l a t e and
l i f e , we u s u a l l y want t o s e t some t h r e s h o l d For c o n t e n t i o n , i n o r d e r t o elim-
t o e x t r a c t r e s o u r c e s from any m o b i l i z i n g group t h a t m o b i l i z a t i o n u s u a l l y
i n a t e t i n y , e v a n e s c e n t , i n t e r m i t t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n s of r e s o u r c e s t o t h e govern-
p r o p e l s a group i n t o c o n t e n t i o n f o r power o v e r o n e government o r a n o t h e r --
ment. I n t h e o r y , we can g e n e r o u s l y i n c l u d e a l l of them.
a t l e a s t i n t o a n e f f o r t t o s e c u r e g u a r a n t e e s of i t s b a s i c r i g h t s t o e x i s t ,
 4-4 3

assemble, nccumu.Late r e s o u r c e s , and c a r r y on i t s valued a c t i v i t i e s . Eric f r a g e and temperance movements i n England and t h e United S t a t e s w i t h

Wolf's a n a l y s i s of t h e involvement of p e a s a n t communities i n r e v o l u t i o n s , o t h e r e s t a b l i s h e d segments of t h e middle c l a s s e s , f o r example, a l m o s t

f o r i n s t a n c e , shows how r e g u l a r l y t h e y m o b i l i z e , a n d t h e n contend f o r power c e r t a i n l y r e s t r a i n e d t h e u s e o f f o r c e a g a i n s t them. Where t h e e f f e c t of

n o t because they i n i t i a l l y want a change i n government, b u t i n s e l f - d e n f e n s e . c o a l i t i o n i s t o s p l i t t h e p o l i t y i n t o f a c t i o n s m k i n g e x c l u s i v e and incom-

W o l f ' s a n a l y s i s a l s o t e l l s u s how c r u c i a l t o t h e s u c c e s s of t h a t conten- p a t i b l e c l a i m s on t h e government, Ilowever, a high d e g r e e of c o l l e c t i v e

t i o n f o r power a r e t h e c o a l i t i o n s p e a s a n t communities make w i t h o t h e r groups violence is l i k e l y t o follow. That is, i n f a c t , a r e * o l u t i o n a r y s i t u n -

outside. No c o a l i t i o n = l o s t r e v o l u t i o n . I n a g r e a t many s i t u a t i o n s , a tion.

s i n g l e c o n t e n d e r d o e s n o t have enough r e s o u r c e s -- enough committed people,

D e t e c t i n g Changes i n P o l i t y M e m b e r s h i p
enough guns, enough t r a i n e d lawyers, enough c a s h -- t o i n f l u e n c e t h e gov-
P o l i t i c a l power i s a characteristic of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s between con-
ernment by i t s e l f . A c o a l i t i o n w i t h a n o t h e r c o n t e n d e r which h a s o v e r l a p p i n g
t e n d e r s and governments. I n s e e k i n g t o d e t e c t major changes i n p o l i t i c a l
o r complementary d e s i g n s on t h e government w i l l then i n c r e a s e t h e j o i n t
power, we have t h e c h o i c e of s t a r t i n g w i t h ' t h e c o n t e n d e r s o r oE s t a r t i n g
power o f t h e c o n t e n d e r s t o accomplish t h o s e d e s i g n s .
w i t h t h e government. What should we l o o k f o r ? A simple, i f s l i g h t l y
C o a l i t i o n s most commonly o c c u r between members of t h e p o l i t y o r be-
r i s k y , approach would b e t o t a k e running a c c o u n t s of p o l i t i c a l l i f e a s
tween nonmembers of t h e p o l i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , c o a l i t i o n s between members
t h e y appear i n p o l i t ' i c a l h i s t o r i e s , yearbooks, memoirs and s o on, t o dc-
and nonmembers o f t e n occur when t h e members a r e s e e k i n g ends f o r which t h e r e
t e r m i n e whether informed o b s e r v e r s r e p o r t changes i n t h e m J o r a c t o r s on
a r e n o t enough c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y . and f o r which t h e r e -
t h e scene. J e a n Laponce (1969) h a s i n v e n t e d a r e f i n e d v e r s i o n of t h i s
s o u r c e s b e i n g mobilized by t h e nonmembers would be u s e f u l . T h i s happens
s t r a t e g y : h e watches t h e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of p a r t y l a b e l s i n Conadion p o l i -
when a p a r t y wins an e l e c t i o n by buying o f f t h e s u p p o r t of a t r i b e through
t i c s a n a n i n d i c a t i o n of t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of v a r i o u s b l o c s o f v o t e r s .
promises of j o b s and i n f l u e n c e . I t a l s o happens when a d i s s i d e n t b u t
A s u c c e s s f u l p a r t y such a s t h e L i b e r a l s t e n d s , a t i t s u c c e e d s , t o d r o p
e s t a b l i s h e d group o f i n t c l l e c t u a l s forms a n a l l i a n c e w i t h n new w o r k e r ' s
t h e q u a l i f i e r s from i t s l a b e l and t o r e t a i n a s h o r t e n e d v e r s i o n of i t s
movement. These c o a l i t i o n s t a k e on s p e c i a l importance because t h e y o f t e n
original title. A p a r t y a t i l l g a t h e r i n g i t s f o r c e s (and perhaps o n e on
open tlie way t o t h e new n c q u i s i t i o n of membership i n t h e p o l i t y , o r t h e way
t h e way o u t , a s w e l l ) t e n d s t o accumulate changes and q u a l i f i e r s a s i t
to a revolutionary alliance.
makes new, p r o v i s i o n a l c o a l i t i o n s .
Member-nonmember c o a l i t i o n s a l s o m a t t e r because they a f f e c t t h e
That approach h a s promise. Another p o s s i b i l i t y is t o examine tlie
amount of v i o l e n c e which grows o u t of c o n t e n t i o n f o r power. Under most
e x p e n d i t u r e p a t t e r n s of t h e government. I f a new b u d g e t ' l i n e r e p r e s e n t i n g
c o n d i t i o n s a c o a l i t i o n with a member r e d u c e s t h e v i o l e n c e which a t t e n d s a
s e r v i c e s t o l i n g u i s t i c m i n o r i t i e s a p p e a r s , t h a t may be a s i g n t h a t a l l n -
c l l a l l c n g e r ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of membership. The c o a l i t i o n s of t h e women's s t ~ f -
g u i s t i c a l l y - b a s e d c h a l l e n g e r is b r e a k i n g i n t o t h e p o l i t y . I f a n o l d pro-
 With t h e i d e a t h a t some such p r o c e s s might be going on. J e f f Pearson
gram d i s a p p e a r s ( a s when s p e c i a l b e n e f i t s f o r Spanish-American War v e t e r a n s
analyzed r o l l - c a l l v o t e s i n t h e Ninth L e g i s l a t u r e of t h e French Chamber
m e l t i n t o t h e g e n e r a l v e t e r a n s ' program), t h a t probably t e l l s u s t h e b l o c
of D e p u t i e s , which met i n 1906-1907. Those were t u r b u l e n t y e a r s i n
i t s e l f is dissolving. Major changes i n t h e amounts s p e n t on war, edu-
France. S o c i a l i s t s had withdrawn t h e i r s u p p o r t from t h e government i n t h e
c n t i o n o r w e l f a r e might p o i n t i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n , a l t h o u g h ( a s Fenno
f a l l of 1905 o v e r t h e i s s u e of s c h o o l t e a c h e r s ' r i g h t t o u n i o n i z e and t o
1966 makes c l e a r ) some such c h a n g e s a r e m y s t i f i c a t i o n s , and o t h e r s depend
strike. The e l e c t i o n s of J a n u a r y 1906 renewed t h e S e n a t e and b r o u g h t
mainly on t h e i n t e r n a l dynamics of t h e government i t s e l f .

Perhaps t h e a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e of a g e n c i e s -- a Department of l a b o r t o
i n a new P r e s i d e n t , Armand ~ a l l i 2 r e s . A s t r i k e wave c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e

mines b u t i n v o l v i n g many workers i n c h e m i c a l s nnd s m e l t i n g a s w e l l began

match t h e a r r i v a l of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r , a Department of V e t e r a n ' s A f f a i r s
t o r o l l i n March and reached a c r e s t i n Mny. During t h e l e g i s l a t l v e
t o match t h e a r r l v s l of v e t e r a n s -- p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e of t h e same kind.
e l e c t i o n s of May, t h e P a r t i S o c i s l i s t e ~ n i f i 6conducted a n a t i o n a l cam-
But i n a p a r l i a m e n t a r y system, t h e b e h a v i o r of t h e p a r l i a m e n t i t s e l f prob-
paign f o r t h e f i r s t time; q u e s t l c m s of n a t i o n a l i z a t l o n of r a i l r o a d l i n e s ,
ably r e f l e c t s t h e va-et-vient of c o n t e n d e r s more a c c u r a t e l y than a n y t h i n g
r e t i r e m e n t p l a n s and b e n e f i t s i n g e n e r a l f i g u r e d widely i n tlie campalgn
else. I)o d i s c u s s l o n s o f i s s u e s c l e a r l y l i n k e d w i t h one c o n t e n d e r o r a n o t h e r
debates. 1907 f e a t u r e d a massive p r o t e s t of s o u t h e r n winegrowers r e s u l -
(whether r e p r e s e n t e d i n tlie p a r l i a m e n t o r n o t ) wax and wane i n time w i t h
t i n g from a n o v e r p r o d u c t i o n c r i s i s . And throughout t h e p e r l o d t h e gov-
t h e p o l i t i c a l f o r t u n e s of t h o s e c o n t e n d e r s 7 Does t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a re-
ernment was implementing t h e d i s e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e C a t h o l i c Church which
l i a b l e s p l i t of t h e v o t e on such i s s u e s s i g n a l t h e a r r i v a l of a member7
had been d e c i d e d two y e a r s b e f o r e , and l i q u i d a t i n g t h e Dreyfus A f f a i r
Is t h e r e a s o r t of s c a l e going:
which had hung o v e r France f o r a decade. Judging from tlie g e n e r a l p o l i t -
-- a d i s c u s s i o n of a n i s s u e c l e a r l y l i n k e d w i t h a c o n t e n d e r (e.g. c a l h i s t o r i e s of t h e time, o n e could r e a s o n a b l y a s s e r t t h a t two mojor
p u t t i n g down u n r u l y workers o r r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s ) changes i n p o l i t y membership were o c c u r r i n g : o r g a n i z e d l a b o r was a c q u i r i n g
-- i n t r o d u c t i o n of b i l l s o r r e s o l u t i o n s a n e s t a b l i s h e d p l a c e i n t h e n a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of power, and t h e C a t h o l i c
-- b r i n g i n g such b i l l s o r r e s o l u t i o n s t o a v o t e Church was l o s i n g a n i m p o r t a n t s h a r e of power.
-- n p p e a r a n c e s w i t h i n t h e p a r l i a m e n t of s b l o c , o r s t a n d a r d a l i g n - P e a r s o n ' s a n a l y s i s j i b e s n i c e l y w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y of t h e
ment, w i t h r e s p e c t t o i s s u e s c l e a r l y i i n k e d w i t h t h e c o n t e n d e r . time. He examined 228 of t h e 324 r o l l - c a l l v o t e s which o c c u r r e d i n t h e
-- a p p e a r a n c e w i t h i n t h e p a r l i a m e n t of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p u b l i c l y parliamentary s e s s i o n . (The i s s u e s of t h e J o u r n a l O f f i c i e l r e p o r t i n g t h e
i d c n t i f i e d with a s p e c i f i c contender other 96 r o l l - c a l l s were u n a v a i l a b l e t o Pearson a t t h e time.) They f e l l
-- a p p e a r a n c e w i t h i n t h e p a r l i a m e n t of a p a r t y p u b l i c l y i d e n t i f i e d i n t o t h r e e c a t e g o r i e s : l e g i s l a t i v e r o l l c a l l s d e c i d i n g tlie f a t e of l a w s
with a s p e c i f i c contender7 proposed f o r enactment; sanctioning r o l l c a l l s a p p r o v i n g o r d i a p p r o v i n g
 4-47 4-48
b e s t s u i t e d t o t h e d e t e c t i o n of groups whose p o s i t i o n is c l i n n ~ i n g , r o t l t c r
an a c t i o n of t h e government; o t h e r s which cover a v a r i e t y of p r o c e d u r a l
than calmly e n j o y i n g l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d benefits. I t assumes t h n t a
matters, r e s o l u t i o n s and o t h e r a c t i o n s none of which can l e a d t o t h e
s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t o f p u b l i c b u s i n e s s i s a c t u a l l y b e i n g done i n t h e
p s s s n g e of a law o r t h e C a l l o f a government. Using t h e c o n t e n t of t h e de-
legislature. I f some c o n t e n d e r s ( b a n k e r s , say. o r t h e m i l i t a r y ) t y p i c a l l y
b a t e s and suclt secondary s o u r c e s a s Bonnefous' H i s t o i r e p o l i t i q u e &&
do t h e i r work through o t h e r branches of government, t h e procedure w i l l
~ r o i s i h n eR z p u b l i q t ~ ea s a g u i d e . Pearson coded ench v o t e f o r t h e groups
n o t work s o w e l l . One might have t o t u r n t o t h e s o r t of a n a l y s i s Tudesq
o u t s i d e t h e Chnmber, i f any, t o w h i c l ~ t h e a c t i o n was supposed t o a p p l y .
h a s undertaken f o r g r a n d s n o t a b l e s and f o r c o n a c i l l e r s Rgn&rsux, o r t h n t
The r e s u l t s of t h e coding appear i n T a b l e 4-1.
many o t h e r s have undertaken f o r c a b i n e t members, government o f f l c i n l s
Pearson was a b l e t o i d e n t i f y a b o u t h a l f t h e r o l l c a l l s h e examined
or legislators: person-by-person c o l l e c t i v e biography a g g r e g a t e d i n t o
w i t h some f a i r l y well-defined group. Some of t h e e n t r i e s r a i s e doubts:
a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e c a t e g o r y of p e r s o n s . At t h e edges of
l e g i s l a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , f o r example, o r t h e Army i n g e n e r a l ; t h o s e d o u b t s
t h e government, i t might b e p r o f i t a b l e t o s e a r c h f o r t h e r i s e nnd fn1.l
i n v o l v e important q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g b o t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n of c o n t e n d e r s
of p r e s s u r e groups, p r o f e s s i o n a l l o b b y i s t s and t h e 1.ike. By t h i s p o i n t ,
f o r power i n g e n e r a l and t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o n t e n t i o n w i t h i n t h e French
Itowever, we a r e beginning t o edge back i n t o t h e s t u d y of m o b i l i z a t i o n nnd
p o l i t i c a l system. Ln g e n e r a l , however, t h e l i s t c a t c h e s e x a c t l y t h e a c t o r s
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . away from t h e a c q u i s i t i o n and l o s s of power a s s u c h .
one would hope f o r : winegrowers, p o s t a l workers, t h e C a t h o l i c Church, and s o
I n d e a l i n g w i t h r e l a t i o n s between major i n d u s t r i e s and t h e U.S.
on. The i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e r o l l c a l l s a r e t h e i s s u e s which r e n t France
government from 1886 t o 1906, William Roy h a s i n v e n t e d some p r o c e d u r e s
a s a whole i n 1906 and 1907. And t h e t a l l y of outcomes i s s u g g e s t i v e .
which n e a t l y l i n k t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s e s and t h e power p r o c e s s e s ,
"Fcvornble" r o l l c a l l s a r e simply t h o s e i n which t h e p r o p o s a l v o t e d on ap-
w i t h o u t confounding them. Roy's work f o c u s e s on t h e i n f l u e n c e e x e r t e d
proves o r promotes t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e group i n q u e s t i o n . To be t h e sub-
by d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s over i n t e r a c t i o n s between t h e U.S. government
j e c t o f r o l l c a l l s which a c t u a l l y p a s s i s e v i d e n c e of power, a t l e a s t power
and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . IIe i n d e x e s t h a t i n f l u e n c e v i a t h e frequency and,
in the legislature. Although t h e numbers of r o l l c a l l s a r e t o o s m a l l t o i n -
t y p e s of e x p l i c i t mention which t h e i n d u s t r i e s i n q u e s t i o n r e c e i v e i n
s p i r e confidence. P e a r s o n ' s t a b u l a t i o n s u g g e s t s t h a t i n 1906-07 t h e power
correspondence between t h e S t a t e Department and ombassndorisl o f C i c i n l s
p o s i t i o n of miners and r a i l r o a d workers was s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of s c l ~ o o l t e a -
overseas. The i n d e x is i m p e r f e c t ; some i m p o r t a n t k i n d s of i n f l u e n c e m y
c h c r s and p o s t a l workers. That remains t o b e v e r i f i e d w i t h o t h e r e v i d e n c e .
n o t appear i n t h e correspondence because they a r e e i t h e r t o o r i s k y o r
n u t t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n m k e s i t seem p o s s i b l e t o draw s y s t e m a t i c
t o o r o u t i n e t o commit t o p r i n t . Neverthel.ess, t h e b a s i c n o t i o n -- t l l s t
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t . c o n t e n t i o n f o r power a t t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l from t h e ample
t o hold power i s t o b e t a k e n account of i n your a r e a s of i n t e r e s t -- i s
proceedings of I e g i s l a t u r e s .
v a l i d , and t h e method of implementing i t ingenious.
The u s e of r o l l c a l l s and d e b a t e s h a s some obvious l i m i t a t i o n s . I t is
Roy a t t e m p t s t o account f o r v a r i a t i o n s i n power among i n d u s t r i e s
 Table 4-1: Groups Figuring i n 1906-07 R o l l C a l l s of French Chamber of Deputies

Number of R o l l C a l l s : Percent
Percent Favorable
Group -
Issue Legislative Sanctioning Other Total Favorable and Passed

schoolteachers r i g h t of s t a t e emplyees t o
s t r i k e f o r vages v i t h o u t 0
government s a n c t i o n s

p o s t a l workers same 6 0 3 9 89 11

r a i l r o a d workers f r e e from compulsory dependence 0 0 2 100 50

on employer-run economats

miners i n t r o d u c e maximum 8-hour day 1 0 0 1 100 100

spinners emergency funds f o r unemployed 0 0 1 1 100 0

winegrowers stemming t h e overproduction

c r i s i s of 1907 and s a f e g u a r d s 22
for future

winegrowers punishment f o r June 1907

demonstrations i n South 0

wine merchants s a f e g u a r d s and c o n t r o l s on 1

and middlemen them t o prevent watering wine

Second Amy d i s c i p l i n e regiment which re-

fused t o q u e l l demonstrations

Second Amy provide e a r l i e r r e l e a s e of

3
draftees to aid harvest

Amy i n g e n e r a l v i n d i c a t e Dreyfus and P i q u a r t 4

Amy i n g e n e r a l increase appropriations 3

Amy i n g e n e r a l reduce compulsory s e r v i c e 5

by one year

Table 4-1: Groups Figuring i n 1960-07 R o l l C a l l s of French Chamber of Deputies (continued)

Number of R o l l C a l l s : Percent
Percent Favorable
Group Issue Legislative S a n c t i o n i n g Other Total Favorable and Passed

small grocers impose t a x on, t o r e g u l a t e s a l e

of sugar t o l o c a l wine makers 2

workers i n g e n e r a l c r e a t e N n i s t r y of Labor 1 0 1 2 100 100

workers i n g e n e r a l l e g a l i z e n a t i o n a l Sunday
holiday f o r 3 0 0 3 67 33

workers i n g e n e r a l abolish p r i v a t e property

in behalf of 0 2 0 2 50 0

left-leaning legis- i n s t i t u t e p r o p o r t i o n a l repre-

lative districts s e n t a t i o n in a l l e l e c t i o n s 0 0 2 2 50 0

lower c l a s s e s r e l a t i v e t a x burden on 1 4 0 5 20 0

agriculture emergency a p p r o p r i a t i o n s f o r 1 0 0 1 100 100

private railroad s t a t e takeover of

company (Chemin d e
Fer d e l ' o u e s t )

Roman C a t h o l i c r i g h t t o r e t a i n tax-free
Church property

Total classifiable

Unclassif i a b l e

Total Roll Calls

 4-51 4-52

and o v e r time t l ~ r o u g hLhree d i f f e r e n t s e t s of i n d u s t r i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : .orderly: s t o l i d ' ~ r i t o n 8w a i t i n g i n l i n e , r a t l o n books i n hand. tn

1 ) t h e network p o s i t i o n of f i r m s i n t h e i n d u s t r y , a s measured e s p e c i a l l y r e a l i t y , i t is t h e o c c a s i o n f o r some of t h e g r e a t e s t s t r u g g l e s i n which

by i n t e r l o c k i n g d i r e c t o r a t e s and by r e l a t i o n s of i n d u s t r y p e r s o n n e l t o p e o p l e engage. I f e v e r y p o l i t y h a s t e s t ' s o f membership. t h a t does n o t

government and s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s ; 2) " o b j e c t i v e " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of mean e v e r y c h a l l e n g e r h a s e q u a l chances of meeting t h o s e t e s t s , o r t h a t

t h e i n d u s t r y such a s s i z e , number of f i r m s and revenue from f o r e i g n t h e l e a d e r s o f e v e r y c o n t e n d e r a r e e q u a l l y w i l l i n g t o make t h e e f f o r t .

t r n d e ; 3) m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e i n d u s t r y , a s The l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a new c o n t e n d e r w i l l a c c e p t and employ t h e means

r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i n t e n s i t y of economic c o o p e r a t i o n and c o n c e n t r a t i o n of a c q u i s i t i o n of power t h e members of t h e p o l i t y p r e s c r i b e (e.8. gathering

among f i r m s , tlie c h a r a c t e r of t r a d e a s s o c i a t i o n s and t r a d e p u b l i c a t i o n s , enough v o t e s t o e l e c t a p a r t y , s a c r i f i c i n g enough people i n war, b r i n g i n g

t h e e x t e n t of lobbying, p o l i t i c a l involvement of e x e c u t i v e s , and s o on. i n enough food from t h e h u n t , buying enough government o f f i c i a l s ) depends

Roy's r e s e a r c h d e s i g n does n o t q u i t e b r i n g u s t o t h e p o i n t o f on t h e congruence of t h e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e which p r e v a i l w i t h i n i t

mcnsuring t h e r e t u r n s d i f f e r e n t i n d u s t r i e s r e c e i v e f o r t h e r e s o u r c e s t o t h o s e b u i l t i n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e p o l i t y . Where the'y d i v e r g e

they a p p l y t o t h e government; i t t h e r e f o r e f a l l s s h o r t of t h e i d e a l w i d e l y , t h e c h a l l e n g e r i s l i k e l y t o employ i r r e g u l a r means -- wl~iclimeans

measure of power proposed e a r l i e r . I t takes important s t e p s i n t h a t a p p l y i n g r e s o u r c e s t o t h e government and t o members of tlie p o l i t y which

direction. Furthermore, i t makes p o s s i b l e a v a l u a b l e p a r t i a l t e s t of a r e r a r e l y used i n t h o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . A c o n c r e t e example: Guatemalan

t h e proposed d i s t i n c t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r s end members of t h e p o l i t y . r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s kidnap government o f f i c i a l s and American e m i s s a r i e s i n

I f a " p o l i t y " e x i s t s i n a s t r o n g s e n s e of t h e term, t h e r e s h o u l d be a o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e r e l e a s e of t h e i r own members from p r i a o n . Another

d i s t i n c t break i n t h e continuum o f i n f l u e n c e - w i e l d i n g ; t h e break should L a t i n American c a s e : P e r u v i a n t r a d e unions d e l i b e r a t e l y s t a e e v i o l e n t

correspond t o t h e t h r e s h o l d below which an i n d u s t r y i s simply n o t a d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a s a way of p r e s s i n g t h e i r demands on' t h e c e n t r a l govern-

p o l i t y member t o be taken account o f . ment (Payne 1965).

I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, tlie continuum runs smoothly from 0 t o i n f i n i t e The i d e a of a p o l i t y , t h e n , sums up t h e major r e l a t i o n s h i p s among

power, t h e motion of a bounded p o l i t y i s misleading. Likewise t h e n o t i o n r e p r e s s i o n , power, and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . . Members of tlie poll.ty have
1
r e q u i r e s a b r e a k i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i e between l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n more power and f a c e l e s s r e p r e s s i o n than c h a l l e n g e r s do. Challengers

and amount of i n f l u e n c e . c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r r e t u r n become members through c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and members defend themselves

p o l i t y members should r e c e i v e f o r t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t s . I n any c a s e , i f a g a i n s t l o s s of power t h r o u g h ~ c o l l e c t i v ea c t i o n . T h i s much i s a u s e f u l

t h e r e is no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i n d u s t r y ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n simplification. But t h e p o l i t y model l a c k s an i m p o r t a n t element: interests.

and i t s p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , t h e model of t h e p o l i t y l a i d o u t h e r e w i l l I t p r o v i d e s no g u i d e t o t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s a f f e c t i n g nny por-

lose plausibility. t i c u l a r group's i n t e r e s t s . Without some i d e a of t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of

So f a r , my account makes t h e p r o c e s s of e n t r y and e x i t t o o calm and i n t e r e s t and power p o s i t i o n , we can have no c l e a r i d e a how t h e e x t e n t and
 4-53
4-54

c h a r a c t e r of c h a l l e n g e r s ' and members' c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n d i f f e r from

F i g u r e 4-11. C o l l e c t i v e Action a s a Function of T h r e a t a , o n d O p p o r t l l n i t i e s .
one a n o t h e r .

~p~ortunit~l~hreat
I
O p p o r t u n i t y h a s two s i d e s . On t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s i d e , we have t h e
.
!
i
e x t e n t t o which o t h e r groups, i n c l u d i n g governments, a r e v u l n e r a b l e t o
I
new c l a i m s which would, i f s u c c e s s f u l , enhance t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n Maximum

of i t s i n t e r e s t s . On t h e t h r e a t a i d e . we have t h e e x t e n t t o which o t h e r

groups a r e t h r e a t e n i n g t o mike c l a i m s which would, i f s u c c e s s f u l , reduce

t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s . The a n a l y s i s of o p p o r t u n i t y l
Extent
t h r e a t p a r a 1 l e l . s t h e a n a l y s i s of power: i n p r i n c i p l e , i t embraces every-
of
t h i n g about t h e s u r r o u n d i n g world which i s l i k e l y t o a f f e c t t h e a c t o r ' s Collective
well-being. In p r a c t i c e , we can o n l y d e a l w i t h i t by r e f e r r i n g t o some Action

s p e c i f i c s e t o f i n t e r e s t s , p a r t i e s and i n t e r a c t i o n s .

One i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between t h e a n a l y s e s of power and of

o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t concerns p e r c e p t i o n s and e x p e c t a t i o n s . In the analysis

of power we can choose t o n e g l e c t them: power then r e f e r s t o t h e

o b s c r v a b l e t r a n s a c t i o n s amon8 t h e p a r t i e s . In the case of opportunityl

t h r e a t we have no c h o i c e b u t t o c o n s t r u c t some model of t h e way t h a t

i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e environment comes t o t h e a c t o r ' s a t t e n t i o n . For

t h e moment. l e t us assume t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r , who i s engaged i n f r e q u e n t

i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h o t h e r groups, simply responds t o t h e t r e n d of t h o s e

I
I
interactions. The c o n t e n d e r responds i n d i v i d u a l l y t o t h e t r e n d of i t s \

i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h each s p e c i f i c group, and c o l l e c t i v e l y t o t h e t r e n d i n

all. interactions. A c o n t e n d e r which is e n c o u n t e r i n g i n c r e a s i n g a t t a c k s

i.
I
0-1 Threat 0 Opportunity +1

Extent of Change i n
on i t s i n t c r e s t s a n t i c i p a t e s more a t t a c k s ; a . c o n t e n d e r which f i n d s t h e
Realization of I n t e r e s t s
government i n c r e a s i n g l y r e s p o n s i v e t o i t s o v e r t u r e s a n t i c i p a t e s f u r t h e r

responsiveness. L a t e r on we w i l l have t o c o n s i d e r a c o n t e n d e r ' s o b s e r v a t i o n

of i n t e r a c t i o n s among o t h e r j p a r t i e s -- n o t i n g , f o r example, t h a t when a I

government shows s i g n s of weakness i n d e a l i n g w i t h any p a r t i c u l a r con-
F i g u r e 4-12. Asymmetrical E f f e c t of T h r e a t and O p p o r t u n i t y on
t e n d e r most o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s read t l ~ o s es i g n s a s t h r e a t s o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s C o l l e c t i v e Action.

w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s . We w i l l a l s o have t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t

s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n u s u a l l y i n v o l v e s f e i n t s and m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s .

L e t us i g n o r e t h e s e i n t e r e s t i n g c o m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e time being.

F i g u r e 4-11 b r e a k s o p p o r t u n i t y / t h r e a t i n t o two dimensions: 1) the

e x t e n t of a n t i c i p a t e d change i n t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of i t s

i n t e r e s t s ; i t runs from -1. (comp1.ete o b l i t e r a t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t s ) t o

0 (no change) t o +I. (complete r e a l i z a t i o n o f i t s i n t e r e s t s ) ; 2) t h e

p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e change w i l l o c c u r a ) i f t h e c o n t e n d e r does n o t n c t ,
I

i n t h e c a s e of t h r e a t s . b) i f t h e group a c t s . i n t h e c a s e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Extent
of
The diagram s a y s t h e t t h e g r e a t e r t h e a b s o l u t e v a l u e of t h e q u a n t i t y
Collective
( p r o b a b l y of o c c u r r e n c e x e x t e n t o f change). t h e more e x t e n s i v e t h e
Act i o n
contender's collective action. In t h i s simple version, the contender's

r e s p o n s e s t o t h r e a t and t o o p p o r t u n i t y a r e e x a c t l y symmetrical: the

more of e i t h e r , t h e more c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . The two c u r v e s a r e g e n t l y

concave t o r e p r e s e n t s mild tendency f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o a c c e l e r a t e

Extent of A n t i c i p a t e d Change
more r a p i d l y w i t h h i e h e r l e v e l s of t h r e a t o r o p p o r t u n i t y .
i n R e a l i z a t i o n of I n t e r e s t s
An a s y m m e t r i c s l response t o t l ~ r e s tand o p p o r t u n i t y i s more p l a u s i b l e

than a symmetrical response. Assuming e q u a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s of o c c u r r e n c e ,

a given amount o f t h r e a t t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e more c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n than

t h e "same" amount of o p p o r t u n i t y . On t h e whole, r e s p o n s e t o o p p o r t u n i t y

i s l i k e l y t o r e q u i r e more a l t e r a t i o n of t h e group!s o r g a n i z a t i o n and

m o b i l i z a t i o n p a t t e r n than i s response t o t h r e a t ; t h e group can respond

to threat via its established routines. European p e a s a n t communities

r e l i e d on t h e i r l o c a l communication networks end s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s

i n g e t t i n g t o g e t h e r t o chase o u t t h e unwanted t a x c o l l e c t o r . They had

much more t r o u b l e s e n d i n g a d e l e g a t i o n t o t h e c a p i t a l t o demand an

 4-57
a l t e r a t i o n of t h e t a x burden. Furthermore, groups g e n e r a l l y i n f l a t e t h e
v a l u e of t h o s e t h i n g s they a l r e a d y p o s s e s s , when someone e l s e is s e e k i n g
t o t a k e them ahay. For e q u a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s , t h e l o s s of t h e e x i s t i n g
v i l l a g e common l a n d c o u n t s more than t h e g a i n of t h e same amount of
common l a n d . F i n a l l y , t h r e a t s g e n e r a l i z e more r e a d i l y t h a n o p p o r t u n i t i e s
do. A group is more l i k e l y t o s e e a t h r e a t t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t a s
a s i g n of t l ~ r e a t st o a wide range of i t s i n t e r e s t s than i t i s t o s e e
an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r enhancement o f one of i t s i n t e r e s t s a s a s i g n of
opportrrnity f o r a wide range of i t s i n t e r e s t s .
These a r e , of c o u r s e . n o t e s t a b l i s h e d v e r i t i e s , b u t hypotheses.
F i g u r e 4-12 sums them up: t h e e x t e n t of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i t s a y s ,
mounts more r a p i d l y a s a [unction of t h r e a t t h a n a s a f u n c t i o n of
opportunity. On t h e t h r e a t s i d e , i t s a y s , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r i s e s t o
t h e maximum p e r m i t t e d by t h e group's m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l c o n s i d e r a b l y
b e f o r e t h e p o i n t a t which t h e t h r e a t means a n n i h i l a t i o n . The l o n g e r t h e
time l a g c o n s i d e r e d , t h e g r e a t e r tlie asymmetry. Over a l o n g e r p e r i o d
d e f e n s i v e m o b i l i z a t i o n i n r e s p o n s e t o t h r e a t t e n d s t o add i t s e f f e c t
more r a p i d l y than o f f e n s i v e o r p r e p a r a t o r y m o b i l i z a t i o n i n response t o
opportunity.
The asymmetry. T b e l i e v e , produces a deep c o n s e r v a t i s m i n e v e r y
polity. Members of t h e p o l i t y r e s i s t changes which would t h r e a t e n t h e i r
c u r r e n t r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s even more than they s e e k changes
which would enhance t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . They f i g h t t e n a c i o r ~ s l ya g a i n s t
l o s s of power, and e s p e c i a l l y a g a i n s t e x p u l s i o n from t h e p o l i t y . They
work a g a i n s t admission t o t h e p o l i t y of groups whose i n t e r e s t s c o n f l i c t
s i g n i f i c a n t l y w i t h t h e i r own.
E x i s t i n g members tend t o be more e x a c t i n g i n t h e i r demands of
c o n t e n d e r s whose very admission would c h a l l e n g e t h e system i n some
s e r i o u s way. Max H e i r i c h p o i n t s o u t t h e s t n r k c o n t r a s t i n t h e rcsponse
of U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a o f f i c i a l s t o two e q u a l l y obscene e v e n t s w l ~ i c h
o c c u r r e d about t h e same time i n 1965: tlie campus Ugly Man c o n t e s t (won
by Alpha E p s i l o n P i f r a t e r n i t y , whose c a n d i d a t e was Miss Pussy G a l o r e )
and t h e l a t e s t a g e s of t h e F r e e Speech Movement. now redubbed tllc F i l t h y
Speech Movement. At t h a t p o i n t , t h e Movement's q u i n t e s s e n c e was t h e
p o s t i n g and p a r a d i n g of s i g n s s a y i n g , simply. Fuck. H e i r i c l ~r e p o r t s a
c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h a f a c u l t y member who a c t i v e l y opposed t h e F6M nnd was
i n c e n s e d a b o u t a r e c e n t " o b s c e n i t y r a l l y " a ~ r o u pof f r e e speech a d v o c a t e s
had o r g a n i z e d :
When I asked him why he was angry a b o u t t h i s b u t n o t a b o u t t h e
obscene remarks by t h e f r a t e r n i t y boys, h e r e p l i e d : That was
different. That was a bunch of f r a t e r n i t y boys blowing o f f stenm.
You know t h a t when i t ' s a l l o v e r t h e y ' r e going t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r
p l a c e a s r e s p e c t a b l e members of s o c i e t y . B r ~ t t h e s e people n r e o u t
t o d e l i b e r a t e l y b r e a k e v e r y r u l e they c a n , t o t r y t o t e a r down
s o c i e t y ( H e i r i c h 1971: 363).
Throughout 1964 and 1965 t h e v a r i c o l o r e d Movement was. indeed. r a p i d l y
m o b i l i z i n g and demobilizing; i t made r e c u r r e n t , spasmodic b i d s f o r power
w i t h i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e u n i v e r s i t y , o r d i n a r i l y by t e s t i n g Lhe Berkeley
r u l e s of assembly, speech, o r advocacy s t t l ~ e i rmost v u l n e r a b l e l i m i t ,
and then c l a i m i n g some a l t e r n a t i v e l e g i t i m a c y f o r i t s a c t i o n . The
u n i v e r s i t y ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e claimed r i g h t would tend t o ndmit t h e
group making t h e c l a i m t o membership i n i t s p o l i t y . and t h e r e b y t o s h i f t
t h e c r i t e r i a of membership i n general.. Something s e r i o u s i s a t s t a k e
i n e v e r y such change.
A s a consequence, people a r e e x c e p t i o n a l l y ready t o f i g h t o v e r
e n t r i e s i n t o a p o l i t y , and e x i t s from i t . A s A r t h u r Stinchcombe (1965)
 s a y s , l e a d e r s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y t o employ, a u t h o r i z e
p a r t i c i p a t i o n t o t h e i r members i n s t e a d of r e l y i n g on d i f f u s e n p p e a l s t o
o r t o l e r a t e u n l i m i t e d means of combat when they s e n s e a d i s c r e p a n c y
s o l i d a r i t y . and were b u r e a u c r a t i c , Thus f a r , t h e r e s u l t s sound l i k e
between what t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n i s g e t t i n g ond what i t i s due. That
an argument f o r c o o l l y - o r g a n i z e d p r e s s u r e groups. But t h e s u c c e s s f u l
e n r a g i n g disagreement t y p i c a l l y h a s t o do, p r e c i s e l y , w i t h what t h e
c h a l l e n g e r s were a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t l y more l i k e l y t o ha;e used v i o l e n c e
o r g a n i z a t i o n is due. I t i s a m a t t e r o f p r i n c i p l e , of r i g h t s , o f j u s t i c e .
and o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s i n t h e i r q u e s t f o r power. The p a s s i v e r e c i p i c n t a
T h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s h a s s t r o n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e l o c u s , t i m i n g
of v i o l e n c e had v e r y low r a t e s o f s u c c e s s . I f i t is true that organization
and p e r s o n n e l of major s t r u g g l e s f o r power.
pays, i t is n o t s o t r u e t h a t p a t i e n c e and moderation pay. Gomson's r e s u l t s
The r e c e n t work of William Gamson (1975) d e a l s e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h
a r e congruent w i t h tlie 'general a G u m e n t . which is u n f o l d i n g h e r e .
some a s p e c t s of t h e power s t r u g g l e . Gamson and h i s a s s o c i a t e s s t u d i e d
Gamson's world i s k e e n l y a n t i - ~ u r k l i e i m i a n : '1t opposes t h e Durklteimian
53 "clial.lenging groups" i n t h e U.S. from 1800 t o 1945. (The l i s t makes
p o r t r a y a l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n two main ways: 1 ) i t s a c t o r s spproscli
n e i g h b o r s of t h e Anarcho-Communists and t h e N a t i o n a l Urban League, of
d e f i n e d o b j e c t i v e s w i t h s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s -- which does n o t mean they
tlie United Sons of Vulcan. t h e Tobacco Night R i d e r s and t h e S t e e l Workers'
always choose t h e b e s t s t r a t e g y o r t h a t t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s o r e o l u a y s
O r g a n i z i n g Committee.) The r e s e a r c h examines two main s o r t s of outcomes
c o n s i s t e n t and a t t a i n a b l e ; 2) t h e i r a c t i o n s and t h e outcomes oE t h o s e
of t h e c h a l l e n g e s :
a c t i o n s cannot be e x p l a i n e d by l o o k i n g a t t h e c h a l l e n g i n g groups a l o n e ;
-- a c c e p t a n c e o r non-acceptance of t h e group by a t l e a s t one o f
they r e s u l t from an i n t e r a c t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r s and o t h e r groups.
i t s a n t a g o n i s t s a s a l e g i t i m a t e spokesman f o r t h e i n t e r e s t s i t
I n t h e terms we have been u s i n g h e r e , they r e s u l t from t h e i n t e r p l a y
claims t o represent
of i n t e r e s t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n , and m o b i l i z a t i o n , on t h e one s i d e . and of
-- a c q u i s i t i o n o r n o n - a c q u i s i t i o n of new a d v a n t a g e s f o r i t s members.
repression / f a c i l i t a t i o n , power, and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e s t . on t h e o t h e r .
The a c c e p t a n c e of t h e group, a s d e f i n e d by Gamson, o v e r l a p s t o some
The I n t e r p l a y of M o b i l i z a t i o n and O p p o r t u n i t y
e x t e n t with entrance i n t o a p o l i t y , a s described e a r l i e r . As one might
L e t us c o n t i n u e t o c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model. We can
e x p e c t , a c c e p t a n c e and t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of new a d v a n t a g e s a r e connected:
c r y s t a l l i z e t h e p r i n c i p a l t e a c h i n g s of t h e l a s t two c h a p t e r s i n a p a i r
8 0 p e r c e n t of t h e groups which g a i n e d some a c c e p t a n c e a l s o a c q u i r e d new
of diagrams. Remember t h e e a r l i e r d i s t i n c t i o n s among f o u r t y p e s o f
a d v a n t a g e s , w h i l e o n l y 2 1 p e r c e n t o f t h o s e which f a i l e d t o g a i n any
contenders: z e a l o t s , run-of-the-mill c o n t e n d e r s . misers. and o p p o r t u n i s t s .
a c c e p t a n c e a c q u i r e d any new advantages. - The run-of-the-mill c o n t e n d e r s d e f i n e t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n terms of a l i m i t e d
More important. t h e groups which gained acceptance tended t o d i f f e r
range of c o l l e c t i v e goods, and a r e u n w i l l i n g t o a c t i f t h e a c t i o n is
i n form and s t r a t e g y from t h e o t h e r s : on t h e whole, they were groups
l i k e l y t o bring a loss. I n f i g u r e s 4-13 and 4-14 u e s e e an i d e a l i z e d
which d i d n o t demand t o d i s p l a c e o t h e r groups, o r g a n i z e d around a s i n g l e
run-of-the-mill c o n t e n d e r i n two c o n t r a s t i n p , s i t u a t i o n s . In the f i r s t ,
i s s u e , were r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e , provided s e l e c t i v e i n c e n t i v e s f o r
t h e p r e c e d i n g arguments s a y t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r is l i k e l y t o produce somc
 collective action. In t h e second, i f t h e arguments a r c c o r r e c t , t h e

contender should n o t a c t .

I n F i g u r e 4-13, t h e run-of-the-mill c o n t e n d e r hne s i g n i f i c a n t

current incentives f o r collective action. Current opportunity includes

I F i g u r e 4-13: I d e a l i z e d S k e t c h of C o n d i t t o n s f o r A c t i o n of s run-of-the-mill
Contender. t h e g r o u p ' s narrow a r e a of i n t e r e s t , w h i l e c u r r e n t t h r e a t i n c l u d e s t h e

p o s s i b i l i t y of s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s , nlthough n o t t h e -1 of t o t a l e x t i n c t i o n .

I f t h o s e were t h e o n l y c o n s t r a i n t s i n o p e r a t i o n . we would e x p e c t t h e

c o n t e n d e r t o a c t b o t h t o c a p i t a l i z e on i t s o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t o defend

i t s e l f against threats of loss.

There i s , however, one o t h e r c o n s t r a i n t : mobilization. In t h i s

s k e t c h , t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l is high enougl~ LO p e r m i t

a c t i o n throughout t h e range of i t s c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t and o p p o r t u n i t y .

Collective Nevertheless, t h e group's power p o s i t i o n would p e r m i t i t t o a c q u i r e

Goods
Returned s t i l l more c o l l e c t i v e goods i f i t mobilized f u r t h e r ; t h e d o t t e d c u r v e

t o t h e r i g h t of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n l i n e d e s c r i b e s t h o s e t h e o r e t i c n l

p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; i t a l s o shows t h e t h e o r e t i c a l d e c l i n e i n t h e group'n

r e t u r n i f i t pushes c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t o o f a r . Beyond a c e r t a i n p o i n t .

we e x p e c t r e p r e s s i o n t o s t a r t d i m i n i s h i n g t h e g r o u p ' s r e t u r n from

collective action.

Repression does n o t a p p e a r i n t h e diagram. b u t i t s e f f e c t i s t h e r e .

F a i t h f u l t o t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model. we r e p r e s e n t i t a s one of t h e f a c t o r s

producing t h e c u r r e n t shape and l o c a t i o n o f t h e p r o b a b l e - r e t u r n curve.

a s well as the current location of the mobilization line. Organization

l i k e w i s e remains hidden from view, a s a v n r i a b l e w h i c l ~works through

Resources Expended i n t e r e s t and m o b i l i z a t i o n . Power is p r e s e n t , however. The crlrve o f

p r o b a b l e r e t u r n s g i v e s us a s i m p l i f i e d summary of t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s c u r r e n t

power p o s i t i o n . Indeed. s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s

power a r e t h e r e : power-efficiency i n t h e r a t e s of r e t u r n of c o l l e c t i v e
 4-63

goods f o r r e s o u r c e s expended i n t h e two zones of most l i k e l y a c t i o n ;

p o w e r - e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n tlie p o r t i o n of i t s i n t e r e s t -- i n t h i s c a s e 100

percent -- t h a t t h e c o n t e n d e r can r e a l i z e ; p o t e n t i a l power i s t h e h i g h F i g u r e 4-14: I d e a l i z e d s k e t c h of c o n d i t i o n s t o r i n a c t i o n of a run-of-the-mill

contender.
p o i n t of t h e p r o b a b l e - r e t u r n l i n e .

I n o u r f i r s t dlagram, then. t h e c u r r e n t combination of i n t e r e s t ,

m o b i l i z a t i o n , power and o p p o r t u n i t y - t h r e a t l e a d s u s t o e x p e c t t h e

c o n t e n d e r t o engage i n two k i n d s and l e v e l s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n : a

low i n t e n s i t y of a c t i o n t o c o u n t e r t h r e a t s of l o s s , a h i g h e r i n t e n s i t y

of n c t i o n t o t a k e advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r g a i n i n t h e a r e a of t h e

group's i n t e r e s t . F i g u r e 4-14 shows u s tlie same s o r t of c o n t e n d e r i n

a very d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n . The s i t u a t i o n i s a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r i n a c t i o n .

'Eniy? Because a l l f o u r major v n r i a b l e s a r e now i n d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s .

Collective
Take o p p o r t u n i t y - t h r e a t : t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r a n g e of d e s i r e d c o l l e c t i v e Goods
Returned
goods l i e s above t h e l i m i t s e t by c u r r e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s , and t h e c u r r e n t

t h r e a t of l o s s is v e r y s l i g h t . I n o t h e r words, no o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s a r e

c u r r e n t l y v u l n e r a b l e t o c l a i m s which would enhance t h i s run-of-the-mill

c o n t e n d e r ' s r e a l i z a t i o n o f i t s d e f i n e d i n t e r e s t s ; h a r d l y any o t h e r

c o n t e n d e r is making p l a u s i b l e t h r e a t s a g a i n s t i t s c u r r e n t r e a l i z a t i o n

of i t s i n t e r e s t s .

M o b i l i z a t i o n l l k e w i s e i n h i b i t s t h i s run-of-the-mill contender's

capncity for collective action. The c u r r e n t m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l r e s t r i c t s

t h e c o n t e n d e r j s p o s s i b l e a c t i o n t o t h e range i n which a n e t l o s s i s

almost c e r t a i n .

The c o n t e n d e r ' s curve of p r o b a b l e r e t u r t i s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n

i s unfavorable a s well. I t b a r e l y c r o s s e s t h e break-even line -- and

t h a t o n l y i n a r e g i o n which a ) i s c u r r e n t l y i n a c c e s s i b l e because of t h e Resources Expended

m o b i l i z a t i o n c e i l i n g , b) does n o t q u i t e r e a c h t o t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s a r e a

of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . Another way o f s t a t i n g t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s is
this: t h e g r o u p ' s aims n r e " t o o high" f o r i t s c u r r e n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of
t h e c l a s s ' r e s p o n s e depends on i t s p r i o r m o b i l i z a t i o n . The argument
action. A change i n any of t h e f o u r v a r i a b l e s could i n c r e a s e t h e
answers t h e Davies l i n e by s a y i n g t h n t t h e q u i c k r e s p o n s e t o d e c l i n e is
l i k l i h o o d of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . An o r g a n i z e r who wanted t o p u t t h i s
o n l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of highly-mobilized g r o u p s , and t h a t i n any c a s e t h e
h a p l e s s run-of-the-mill c o n t e n d e r i n t o a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n would a t t e m p t

t o i n c r e a s e i L s m o b i l i z a t i o n and t r y t o augment i t s power by such t a c t i c s groups which r e b e l do n o t respond t o t h e g e n e r a l f a c t of d c p r i v n t l o n ; they

respond t o t h e s p e c i f i c f a c t of a n o t l ~ e rg r o u p ' s making c l a i m s which would.

n s forming c o a l i t i o n s . IIe might a l s o t r y t o f o s t e r a r e d e f i n i t i o n of
i f r e a l i z e d , v i o l a t e t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d r j g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . The a l t c r -
t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s i n t e r e s t s , i n o r d e r t o b r i n g them w i t h i n t h e range o f

possibility. A powerful c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r might t r y maneuvering t o mnke n a t i v e arguments u n d e r e s t i m a t e o r e l i m i n a t e t h e c o s t s of c o l l e c t i v e

a c t ion.
o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s o r t h e government more v u l n e r a b l e t o t h i s c o n t e n d e r ' s
I f t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model i s an improvement o v e r p r e v i o u s a n a l y s e s
claims -- t o r a j s e t h e l i m i t s e t by o p p o r t u n i t y . Any of t h e s e e f f o r t s ,

i f s u c c c s s f u l , would i n c r e a s e t h e l i k e l i h o o d of t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i t s t i l l h a s some s i g n i f i c a n t weaknesses. I t has

no time i n i t . C o n c e n t r a t i n g on t h e immediate s i t u a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e
action.
actors greatly simplifies the analysis. But i t a l s o mnkes i t d i f f i c u l t t o
Tn t h e s l ~ o r trun we have been c o n s i d e r i n g , t h e e x t e n t of c o l l e c t i v e
d e a l w i t h r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e s such a s t h o s e which l i n k power nnd c o l -
a c t i o n depends g r e a t l y on t h e d e g r e e t o which t h e group involved h a s

Most a l t e r n a t i v e l e c t i v e a c t i o n : c u r r e n t power p o s i t i o n c e r t a i n l y a f f e c t s t h e l i k e l i h o o d
p r e v i o u s l y a c q u i r e d c o l l e c t i v e c o n t r o l of r e s o u r c e s .
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , a s t h e model s a y s ; c u r r e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a l s o
t h e o r i e s e i t h e r make m o b i l i z a t i o n such an immediate f u n c t i o n of changing
a f f e c t s f u t u r e power p o s i t i o n , a s t h e model does n o t s a y . The nbsence of
i n t e r e s t s t h a t mobiliznLion c e a s e s t o a c t a s an independent v a r i a b l e ,
time, f u r t h e r m o r e , e l i m i n a t e s t h e f e i n t s and h e s i t a t i o n s of s t r a t e g i c i n -
o r m n i n t a i n t h a t under many c i r c u m s t a n c e s unmohilized groups t e n d t o
teraction. The most t h e mode1,can do f o r u s i n t h e s e r e g a r d s is t o h e l p
m o b i l i z e s o r a p i d l y and e f f e c t i v e l y a s t o wipe o u t any g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p
us reduce t h e b l u r of t h e newsreel i n t o many d i s t i n c t s u c c e s s i v e frames.
between p r i o r m o b i l i z a t i o n and p r e s e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
each w i t h i t s own l o g i c .
Simple c l a s s - v o t i n g schemes f o l l o w t h e f i r s t l i n e ; b l o c v o t e s r i s e
The m o b i l i z a t i o n model i s e s s e n t i a l l y q u a n t i t a t i v e . I t d e a l s with
nnd f a l l ns an immediate e f f e c t of changing t h r e a t s t o c l a s s i n t e r e s t s .
amounts of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s , r e s o u r c e s and c o l l e c t i v e gooda r n t h e r than
James Davies' J-curve e x p l a n a t i o n of r e b e l l i o n s f o l l o w s t h e second l i n e ;
with t h e i r q u a l i t i e s . Unless we c a n f i n d some way of e s t e b l i s h i n g t h e
a p o p u l a t i o n which e x p e r i e n c e s n l o n g p e r i o d of r i s i n g s a t f s f a c t i o n of
q u a n t i t a t i v e e q u i v a l e n c e s among d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n s .
i t s i n t e r e s t s nnd then e x p e r i e n c e s a r a p i d d e c l i n e i n t h a t s a t i s f a c t i o n ,
resources and c o l l e c t i v e goods, f u r t h e r m o r e , t h e model w i l l o n l y a p p l y t o
Davles a r g u e s , Lends t o m o b i l i z e and t o s t r i k e o u t a t once. The argument
the simplest situations. With t h e d i s c u s s i o n of r e p r e s s i o n and f n c i 1 l . t ~ -
o f r e r e d h e r e nnswers t h e f i r s t l i n e by s a y i n g t h n t t h e e f f e c t of changing
t i o n , we wandered i n t o t h e comparison of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of c o n t e n d e r nnd
t h r e a t s e x i s t s , b u t i s n o t immediate becnuse t h e speed and i n t e n s i t y o f
 CHAPTER 5: CHANGING FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . But by end l a r g e we n o t i c e d q u a l i -

t a t i v e v a r i a t i o n s w i t h o u t b u i l d i n g them i n t o t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model.
The Forms of C o n t e n t i o n
We f a c e a n i r r p o r t a n t c h o i c e . 1Je can c o n t i n u e t h e step-by-step
Real p e o p l e do n o t g e t t o g e t h e r and Act C o l l e c t i v e l y . They meet t o
e x p l o r a t i o n snd e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n and p o l i t y models. Or
p e t i t i o n P a r l i a m e n t , o r g a n i z e t e l e p h o n e champaigns, demogstrate o u t s i d e
we c a n jump headlong i n t o t h e world of time and q u a l i t a t i v e v a r i a t i o n .
of c i t y h a l l , a t t a c k powerlooms, go on s t r i k e . The a b s t r a c t mobilization
I hope many of my r e a d e r s w i l l f o l l o w t h e f i r s t c o u r s e : r e v i s i n g t h e mo-
model we have been u s i n g h a s many v i r t u e s , b u t i t t e n d s t o o b s c u r e two
b i l i z a t i o n and p o l i t y models t o d e a l e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h time, q u a l i t y and
fundamental f a c t s . F i r s t , collective action generally involves inter-
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n , then s c r u t i n i z i n g t h e e v i d e n c e t o s e e i f t h e
a c t i o n w i t h s p e c i f i c o t h e r groups, i n c l u d i n g governments. Collective
models work r i g h t . I p l a n t o keep st t h a t work myself. b u t e l s e w h e r e .
a c t i o n r a r e l y c o n s i s t s of s o l i t a r y performances. P e o p l e do n o t o r d i n a r i l y
The n e x t t h r e e c h a p t e r s w i l l f o l l o w t h e second c o u r s e . They w i l l make
a c t t o i n f l u e n c e a b s t r a c t s t r u c t u r e s such a s p o l i t i e s and mnrkets; they
l o o s e a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e models t o major h i s t o r i c a l problems i n t h e
t r y t o g e t p a r t i c u l a r o t h e r p e o p l e . t o do p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s . A s a consc-
s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Chapter f i v e t r e a t s changes i n t h e p r e v a l e n t
quence, e x p l a n a t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which C o n c e n t r a t e on t h e cnpn-
forms of c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which o c c u r r e d i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s

a s l a r g e - s c a l e i n d u s t r y developed, c i t i e s grew, powerful n a t i o n a l s t a t e s

c i t i e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s of one p a r t i c i p a n t a t o time -- o r t h e average

c a p a c i t i e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s of a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l l c s v e us d i s o p p o i n t c d .
formed, and c a p i t a l i s m expanded. Chapter s i x d e a l s w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
Second, c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n u s u a l l y t a k e s well-defined forms e l r e n d y
between c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e . Chapter seven d i s -
f a m i l i a r t o the.participants. i n t h e some s e n s e t h a t most of an e r a ' s
c u s s e s r e b e l l i o n and r e v o l u t i o n . Then, s t t h e end, we t a k e one more l o o k
a r t t a k e s on of e s m a l l number of e a t o b l i s h $ d forms. Because o f t h a t ,
a t t h e g e n e r a l l o g i c of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . .
n e i t h e r t h e s e a r c h f o r u n i v e r s a l forms (such a s t h o s e nometimes proposed

f o r crowds o r r e v o l u t i o n s ) n o r t h e assumption of on i n f i n i t y of means t o

group ends w i l l t a k e us v e r y f a r . Because o f t h a t , t h e s t u d y of t h e con-

c r e t e forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n immediately draws u s i n t o t h i n k i n g a b o u t

\
t h e c u l t u r a l s e t t i n g s i n which more forms a p p e a r . Much of tlie p l e a s u r e

and a d v e n t u r e i n t h e h i s t o r i c a l s t u d y of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n comes from t h e

r i c h complexity of t h e m a t e r i a l : having t o l e a r n how and why t h e P a r i s i a n s

of 1793 paraded s e v e r e d hends on p i k e s . how and why t h e young p e o p l e of

Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a occupied a m a k e s h i f t p a r k i n 1.969.

P u t t i n g t h e two themes t o g e t h e r opens t h e way t o a f i r s t rough

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t r e s s e s c h a r i v a r i were r e v e r s e d and t h e c o u p l e were accompanied by n n o i s y
t h e n a t u r e of t h e i n t c r o c t i o n between o t h e r groups and t h e group whose crowd t o t h e i r wedding bed, t h e r i t u a l send-off of i t s former mem-
a c t i o n we a r e c l a s s i f y i n g . More p r e c i s e l y , i t depends on t h e c l a i m s t h e b e r s by t h e p e e r group. The m a r r i a g e f e a a t . end t h e Abbcy's p a r t l c i -
c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s a r e a s s e r t i n g i n t h e i r action: competitive claims, p o t i o n i n i t , symbolized t h e c e n t r a l purpose of t h e y o u t l ~group,

--
r e a c t i v e claims o r p r o a c t i v e claims. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n l e a v e s o u t pur- which was t o p r o v i d e o prolonged r i t e o f p a s s a g e from r o t ~ g h l yt h e
s u i t of common ends which i n v o l v e no c l a i m s on o t h e r groups: p u r e r e c r e a - o n s e t of puberty t o t h e p o i n t of m a r r i a g e .
t i o n , contemplation, escape. I n f a c t . i t a p p l i e s most e a s i l y where the'
The Englisli o f t e n c a l l e d t h e i r s i m i l a r custom Rough Music. Host of t h e .
c l a i m s e x p r e s s a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t among t h e p a r t i e s . I have worked
time, i t was a c o n t a i n e d b u t raucous a f f a i r , accompanied by t h e tllumping
o u t t h e c a t e g o r i e s i n s t u d y i n g t h e e v o l u t i o n of forms of c o n f l i c t i n
of pans and blowing of horns. The c h a r i v a r i became a " d i s o r d e r " t o t h e
w e s t e r n Europe, and w i l l i l l u s t r a t e them from European e x p e r i e n c e .
e y e s (and, no d o u b t , t h e e a r s ) of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s when i t p e r s i s t e d more
Competitive a c t i o n s l a y c l a i m t o r e s o u r c e s a l s o claimed by o t h e r
than a n i g h t o r two, o r when dozens of young p e o p l e j o i n e d t h e fun.
groups which t h e a c t o r d e f i n e s a s r i v a l s , c o m p e t i t o r s , o r a t l e a s t a s
The p r e c i s e form of t h e c h a r i v n r i d i f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l y from one
p n r t i c i p n n t s i n t h e same c o n t e s t . Take t h e c h a r i v a r i -- t h e American
r e g i o n o f Europe t o a n o t h e r . Within G r e a t B r i t a i n . E.P. Thompson d i s t t n -
"shivaree" -- f o r a n example. Only r e c e n t l y have European h i s t o r i a n s be-
g u i s h e s f o u r mnin v a r i a n t s :
gun t o uncover t h e l a r g e b a s e of c o m p e t i t i o n and c o n t r o l on which t h i s
a ) c e f f y l p r e n (Welsh f o r "wooden horse"). which i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
o s t e n s i b l y f r i v o l o u n custom r e s t e d . John G i l l i s (1974: 30-31) describes
t h e Rebecca R i o t a i n many p a r t s of I,lales;
one s t a n d a r d v e r s i o n :

b) "Riding t h e stang". commonly p m c t i c e d i n t h e S c o t t i s h Lowlands

I n a t y p i c a l r u r a l c h a r i v a r i , s r e c e n t l y remarried widower might
and t h e n o r t h of England;
f i n d himself awakened by t h e clamor of t h e crowd, on e f f i g y of

h i s dead w i f e t h r u s t up t o h i s window and a l i k e n e s s of h i m s e l f ,

C ) t h e Skimmington o r Skimmety parade, which s t i l l s u r v i v e d i n t h e
placed backwarddon an a s s , drawn through t h e s t r e e t s f o r h i s n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n t h e West, a s w e l l a s i n some r e g i o n s of t h e
neighbors t o see. Paying o f a " c o n t r i b u t i o n " t o t h e Lord of Mis- South; and f i n a l l y
r u l e might q u i e t h i s y o u t h f u l t o r m e n t o r s , b u t by t h a t time t h e
d ) Rough Music i t s e l f , w i t h o u t a parade, b u t i n t h e c o u r s e of which
v o i c e s of v i l l a g e c o n s c i e n c e had made t h e i r p o i n t . Second m a r r i a g e s
p e o p l e o f t e n burned e f f i g i e s o f t h e v i c t i m s ; a widespread custom.
i n v a r i a b l y drew t h e g r e a t e s t wrath and. by c o n t r a s t , endogamous
b u t found e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e I t i d l a n d s and t h e South (Thompson 1972:
m a r r i a g e s of young people of roughly t h e same a g e were t h e o c c a s i o n
287-288).
of t h e youth g r o u p ' s r e j o i c i n g . I n t h a t c a s e , t h e [ u n c t i o n s of
 r e v o l r ~ t i o n a r ymovements o r g r e a t r e b e l l i o n s . Yet they l e f t t h e i r t o l l
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s h l v a r c e , v a r i a n t s of t h e s e o t h e r forms of a c t i o n r e -
of dead and i n j u r e d . I n times of c r i s i s , they blended i n t o mnjor c o n f l i c t s .
m i n embedded i n American f o l k l o r e , even i f they have come unstuck from
They were i m p o r t a n t forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
d a i l y p r a c t i c e : r i d i n g someone o u t of town on a r a i l , p a r a d i n g and

burning e f f i g i e s , and s o on. Some f e a t u r e s of c o l l e c t i v e c o m p e t i t i o n such a s t h e r i t u a l i z e d mockery,

V i l l a g e sue-groups were t h e t y p i c a l i n i t i a t o r s of c h a r i v a r i n . The c a r r i e d o v e r i n t o t h e second major c a t e g o r y : reactive c o l l e c t i v e actions.

(We c a n a l s o c a l l them c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n s . ) They c o n s i s t of group e f f o r t s

o r g n n i z a t i o n and f u n c t i o n s oE age-groups v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y from one
t o r e a s s e r t e s t a b l i s h e d c l a i m s when someone e l s e c h a l l e n g e s o r v i o l a t e s
p a r t of Europe t o a n o t h e r . (For r e g i o n a l p a t t e r n s i n France, e . g . , see
them. Speaking of p e a s a n t l a n d i n v a s i o n s i n contemporary Peru. E.J.
Varagnnc 1947). They o f t e n had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Lenten b o n f i r e s and
Hobsbawm p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e y t a k e t h r e e forms: s q r ~ a L t i n gon l a n d t o
other celebrations. They sometimes c o n t r o l l e d t h e p a i r i n g up of young
which no one ( o r o n l y t h e g o ~ e r n m e n t ) h a s a c l e a r t i t l e , e x p r o p r i n t i n g land
c o u p l e s f o r bundling and c o u r t i n g . V i l l a g e age-groups a l s o f o u g h t tlie
t o which t h e i n v a d e r s have n o t p r e v i o u s l y enjoyed a c l a i m and t o which
youth of n e i g h b o r i n g v i l l a g e s , sometimes t o tlie d e a t h . They o f t e n a s -
someone e l s e h a s , r e p o s s e s s i n g l a n d from which t h e i n v a d e r s have them-
sembled a s a b l o c a t p u b l i c ceremonies, sometimes mounting e l e a b o r a t e
s e l v e s been e x p r o p r i a t e d (Hobsbawm 1974: 120-121).
c h a r a d e s t o mock and warn t h o s e who had t r a n s g r e s s e d t h e i r r u l e s . All
The t h i r d v a r i a n t i s t h e c l e a r r e a c t i v e c a s e : t h e d i s p o s s e s s e d r e a c t .
t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s afctrmed t h e i r p r i o r i t y o v e r t h e e l i g i h l e females and
Thar s o r t of land re-occupation c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e f i r s t s t a g e s of Zopato's
o v e r t h e r i t u a l s of c o u r t s h i p w i t h i n t h e i r own v i l l a g e s . Within t h e i r
r e b c l l i o n d u r i n g t h e Mexican Revolution, r e c u r r e d through much of s o u t h e r n
l i m i t e d s p h e r e , t h e activities were deadly s e r i o u s .
I t a l y d u r i n g t h e massive n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n c e n t r a t i o n of land i n bour-
The c h a r i v a r i , t h e v i l l a g e f i g h t and t h e youth group's mocking c e r e -
g e o i s and n o b l e hands, and marked t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of b o u r g e o i s landowner-
mony had many k i n . There were b r a w l s between s t u d e n t groups, between
s h i p wherever i t developed i n tlie p r e s e n c e of s o l i d a r y p e a s a n t communlLies.
d l f f e r e n t detachments of s o l d i e r s , between s o l d i e r s and c i v i l i a n s , between
I n a s t a n d a r d Europeanscenario, a ~ r o u pof v i l l a g e r s who had long p a s t u r e d
e t l ~ n i cand r e l i g i o u s groups. There were t h e more h i g h l y r o u t i n i z e d s t r u g -
t h e i r c a t t l e , g a t h e r e d firewood and gleaned i n common f i e l d s . found a
g l e s of ~ i v a lgroups of a r t i s a n s t o d i s h o n o r each o t h e r ' s symbols, impede
l a n d l o r d o r a l o c a l o f f i c i a l ( o r , more l i k e l y , t h e two i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n )
each o t h e r ' s ceremonies and c h a l l e n g e each o t h e r ' s p r i o r i t y i n p r o c e s s i o n s
f e n c i n g tlie f i e l d s by newly-acquired o r newly-ssscrted r i g h t of p r o p e r t y .
and o t h e r p u b l i c a s s e m b l i e s . Somehow t h e s e forms of a c t i o n seem t r i v i a l
The v i l l a g e r s commonly warned a g a i n s t tile f e n c i n g . I f t h e warning Went un-
and q u a i n t t o t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y people. Me of t h i s c e n t u r y have s e e n
heeded, they a t t a c k e d t h e f e n c e s and t h e f e n c e r s . They a c t e d i n t h e name o f
g l a n t wars and mass murder, and have come t o t h i n k of " s e r i o u s " p o l i t i c s
r i g h t s they s t i l l considered v a l i d .
on having a nadonnl o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l scope. The e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n were.
The o v e r l a p w i t h c o l l e c t i v e c o m p e t i t i o n appeared c l e a r l y when costumed
indeed, usually small, sllort-lived, localized. They r a r e l y l i n k e d w i t h
a v e n g e r s t o r e down t h e f e n c e s o r occupied t h e f i e l d s , a s i n t h e Demoiselles
movement of t h e 1830's i n t h e Pyrenees ( s e e Merriman 1975). In o t h e r col- a c t i v e and p r o a c t i v e forma of c o l l e c t i v e a c t l o n s .

l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n s , t h e o v e r l a p was a t l e a s t a s n o t a b l e . f o r i n both -
P-
roactive c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s a s s e r t group clntms which have n o t

c a n e s t h e a c t o r s commonly assumed. more o r l e s s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y , the p r e v i o u s l y been e x e r c i s e d . (We may a l s o c a l l them i n s t a n c e s of c o l l e c t i v e

r o l e of t h e a u L h o r i t i e s who were b e i n g d e r e l i c t i n t h e i r d u t y , and t h e proaction.) The s t r i k e f o r h i g h e r wages o r b e t t e r working c o n d i t i o n s pro-

groups which r e a c t e d were o f t e n t h e same l o c a l s o l i d a r i t i e s : t h e youth v i d e s an everyday i l l u s t r a t i o n . D e l i b c r a t e work s t o p p a e e s t o ~ n l na

groups, g i l d s , and s o on. p o i n t have probably e x i s t e d s i n c e people f i r s t worked f o r one a n o t l ~ e r .

T l ~ cb n s i c o u t l i n e of t h e l a n d o c c u p a t i o n a p p l i e d t o t h e b u l k o f N a t a l i e Davjs (1975: 1-16) d e s c r i b e s well-organized s t r i k e s i n s l x i e e n t t ~

E u r ~ p e a nfood r i o t s , machine-breaking, t a x r e b e l l i o n s and l o c a l a c t i o n s c e n t u r y Lyons. But t h e s t r i k e o n l y became a common way of doing p u b l i c

ngninst military conscription: a l l moved d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t someone who business i n t h e nineteenth-century. A s wage-work i n o r g a n l z s t t o n s

had u n j u s t l y d e p r i v e d , o r t r i e d t o d e p r i v e , a l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n of a pre- l a r g e r than households expanded, t h e number and s c a l e of s t r i k c s expondcd.

c i o u s resource. Yves-Marie 8erc6. expanding on h i s comprehensive a n a l y s i s I n most w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s , f i f t y t o a hundred y e a r s went by i n w l ~ i c h

of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e b e l l i o n of t h e Croquants i n s o u t h w e s t e r n s t r i k e s were i n c r e a s i n g l y f r e q u e n t b u t remained i l l e g a l -- sometimes pro-

Frnnce, h a s proposed t h a t t h e k e r n e l of European p e a s a n t r e b e l l i o n s b e f o r e s e c u t e d , sometimes broken up by armed f o r c e , sometimes t o l e r a t e d , alwnys

t h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y was t h e r e s i s t a n c e of c l o s e d , s o l i d o r y p e a s a n t disapproved. Under p r e s s u r e from o r g a n i z e d workers and t h e i r p a r l i n m c n t a r y

communities t o o u t s i d e a t t e m p t s t o i n f r i n g e upon t h e i r e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s a l l i e s . most w e s t e r n governments l e g a l i z e d t h e s t r i k e between 1860 nnd 1900.

and r o u t i n e s . I n t h e c a s e of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y France, h e d i s t i n g u i s h e n S i n c e t h e n , s t a t e s t h a t have ~ t e p p e dup r e p r e s s i o n ( s t a t e s o f emergency,

f o u r major o c c a s i o n s f o r r e h e l l i o n s : high food p r i c e s , b i l l e t i n g of wartimes governments. F a s c i s t regimes) have normnlly r e s c i n d e d t h e r i g h t

t r o o p s . t a x c o l l e c t i o n and t h e i m p o s i t i o n of e x c i s e t a x e s by t a x f a r m e r s . t o s t r i k e , and a l l regimes have n e g o t i a t e d c o n t i n u a l l y wiLh workers nnd

Tn a l l theoe c a s e s , s a y s Berc'e, "Revolt is t h e s t r a t e g y OF t h e l i t t l e employers o v e r who had t h e r i g h t t o s t r i k e . and how. But ill general the

people, a n extraordinary organization f o r defense a g a i n s t f i s c a l aggression" s t r i k e h a s been widely a v a i l a b l e a s a means of a c t i o n s i n c e t h e beginning

(Berci? 1974: 11, 680-681). of t h e t w e n t l e t h c e n t u r y .

A s community s o l i d n r i t y d e c l i n e d , a c c o r d i n g t o 8 e r c 6 , t h e c o n c e r t e d Government s a n c t i o n of t h e s t r i k e shows up i n s t r i k e s t a t i s t i c s ; they

p e a s a n t r e b e l l i o n disnppenred. Only much l a t e r d i d f a r m e r s and a g r i c u l t u r a l d a t e from t h e 18808.or 1890s i n most western c o u n t r i e s . T h e i r sppenronce

workers r e a p p e a r i n a c t i o n ; now they were o r g a n i z e d around forward-looking r e f l e c t s t h e working o u t o f a s t a n d a r d p u b l i c d e f i n i t i o n of t h e word

s p e c l a l - i n t e r e s t groups. A l t l ~ o u g h ( a s 8 e r c 6 himself concedes) t h e scheme "strike". and t h e formation o f a bureaucracy t o monitor nnd r e g u l a t e t h e

homogenizes unduly t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s and motivcs i n t h e o l d e r forms of con- s t r i k e ' s use. I n France, M i c l ~ e l l eP e r r o t (1974) a r g u e s t h a t 1l1e s t r i k e

f l i c t , i t c a p t u r e s an e n s e n t i n l c o n t r a s t . I t is t h e c o n t r a s t between re- l o s t much of i t s e x p r e s s i v e f u n c t i o n . its f e s t i v a l a i r , i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y

potential, as the bureaucratization of the 1890s set in. By way of corn as competitive, reactive or proactive depends on the claims being nsserted.

pensation, it became a more widely accessible, less risky way of making not on the form of the action. The squatting and expropriating land occu-

demands. pations described by Hobabawm have a far more proactive flavor than the

Several other forms of collective proaction came into their own re-occupations of lost land. Workers have often struck in defense of

during the nineteenth century. The demonstration, the sponsored public threatened job rights. Those strikes were reactive.

meeting and the petition drive began to thrive with the arrival of mass Yet the general correletion persists. In general, the demonstro-

electoral politics. The seizure of premises by an insurrectionary c o m i t - tion and the strike have been privileged vehicles for new claims, have

tee also generalized during the nineteenth century, although the ties to risen in periods and places in which ordinary people were articulating new

electoral politics are more distant. The military pronunciamento is of demands, and are peculiarly suitable to the effort to m k e gains rother

the same vintage. On the other hand, the general strike, the sit-in, and than to forestall losses. In general, the tax rebellion, tlle food riots

the farmers' dumping of surplus crops in protest are essentially twentieth- and similar events have cascaded when ordinary people were defending their

century creations. Proactive forms of collective action have proliferated righta against attack, and make little sense as means of stating new claims.

over the last two centtrries. On the average, the demonstration and the strike are proactive, the food

This labeling of forms has two catches. First, although we are riot and tax rebellion reactive.

dealing with situations in which contenders interact. w e are not classi- In Europe of the last few hundred years, tlle three forms of col-

fying the interactions themselves. On the whole, if one group is engaging lective action have waxed and waned in sequence. In the fifteenth and six-

in collective proaction, then at least one of its partners is engaging teenth centuries, competitive actions seem to have predominated. From the
I
in collective reaction: a group of dissident colonels attempts a coup, the seventeenth into the nineteenth century, the reactive forms became much

junta defends itself against the coup. Landlords band together to raise more widespread, while the competitive forms remained steady or perhaps

rents, peasants band together to resist the raising of rents. Only the declined. With the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, collective pro-

collective competition is usually symmetrical: when one party jockeys for action began to predominate, the reactive forms dwindled, while new forms

a visible position in a public ceremony, so does another. of competition came into existence. If I read the record nright, seven-

Second catch. Strictly speaking, a public meeting or a general teenth- and eighteenth-century Europeans took collective oction in de-

strike could fit any of the three types: competitive. reactive or pro- fense of threatened rights much more than their predecessors had, while

active. Just as the charivari could mock a wrongdoer or celebrate a right- twentieth-century Europeans became exceptionally prone to act in support

doer. people can demonstrate for something, against something, or both for of claims they had not previously exercised.

one thing and against another thing at the.same time. The classification The reasons for the successive changes are, I think. twofold: '
 5-10

1) during the period from 1600 to 1850, more so than before and after, the
i Figure 5-1: Hypothetical Effects of Lowered Costs of Collective Action

agents of international markets and of national states were pressing their

II on a Zealot.

new (and proactive) claims on resources which had up to then been under the

control of innumerable households, comunities, brotherhoods and other Mobilization

I

small-scale organizations. The small-scale organizations reacted repeatedly,

fighting against taxation, conscription, the consolidation of landed pro-

perty and numerous other threats to their organizational well-being. Even-

tually the big structures won, the battle died darn, the reactive forms di-

minished. 2) Increasingly, the pools of resources necessary to group sur-

vival came under the control of large organizations, especially governments,

which only redistributed them under the pressure of new claims.

Collective
There may be a third factor: 3) a general decline in the costa of Goods
Produced
mobilization and co1,lective action during the nineteenth and twentieth

centuriea. Such a decline might have resulted from the massing of popu-

lation in large settlements and big organizations, from the elaboration of

comunicntiona and from the expansion of elections as a way of doing public

business. This is roughly the same set of changes which Karl Deutsch calls

Social Mobilization, end which Amitsi Etzioni regards as making possible

the self-directed Active Society. If the analysis of the previous chapter

is correct, however, we could only expect such changes to elevate the level

of collective action if the relationship between contenders and their in- ,

terests altered. For a fixed set of interests and a given level of oppor-

tunity/threat, a general decline in the costs of mobilization and collective

action could well depress the level of colJ.ective action.

Figure 5-1 shows liar that could happen. (It illustrates the prob- Resources Expended

lem for a zealot -- a contender which aims at a narrow range of collective

goods and is prepared to take what others would regard as a loss in order
t o a c h i e v e t h o s e goods -- b u t a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o m i s e r s and run-of-the- p o l i t i c a l end, t h e p a r t y a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e s o c i a l i s t o r g a n i z a -

m i l l contenders. O p p o r t u n i s t s p r e s e n t , a s we s h a l l s e e , a n o t h e r problem.) t i o n , whose s o l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s found p r e c i s e l y i n i t s p n t i e n t

Under high c o s t s ( c u r v e A f o r expected r e t u r n s from c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ) . b u t s y s t e m a t i c p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e orgnniza-

o u r c o n t e n d e r would b e u n a b l e t o a t t a i n i t s i n t e r e s t , r e g a r d l e s s of i t s t i o n of t h e s t a t e i n i t s e x i s t i n g form. Tlie s u b v e r s i v e p n r t y or-
m_obilizstion l e v e l o r t h e c u r r e n t c o n s t e l l a t i o n of o p p o r t u n i t i e s ; a l l we g a n i z e s t h e framework o f t h e s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n . For t h l s r e a s o n
could r e a s o n a b l y a n t i c i p a t e i n t h a t c a s e would be d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n t o i t c o n t i n u a l l y e n d e s v o r s t o s t r e n g t h e n i t s p o s i t i o n s , t o extend

f o r e s t a l l t h r e a t s : c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of amount A on t h e resources-expen- i t s b u r e a u c r a t i c mechanism, t o s t o r e up i t s e n e r g i e s and i t s

ded a x i s . Under medium c o s t s ( c u r v e B), t h e c o n t e n d e r can a c h i e v e i t s f u n d s (Michels 1949: 3 8 4 - 3 8 5 ) .

e n t i r e i n t e r e s t i n new c o l l e c t i v e goods and f o r e s t a l l t h r e a t s a t t h e same

time by p l a c i n g i t s a c t i o n i n t h e r a n g e from B1 t o B2. (Being a z e a l o t ,

The I r o n Law of O l i g a r c h y -- t h s t e v e r y s u c c e s s f u l s t r u g g l e ends w i t h t h e

e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a governing e l i t e -- t h u s a p p l i e s , n c c o r d i n g t o Michela,
t h e c o n t e n d e r h a s no i n t e r e s t i n t h e h i g h e r r e t u r n s o b t a i n a b l e by pushing
t o democratic r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s a s well a s t o a l l o t h e r s .
a b i t beyond B2 -- but not too f a r -- on t h e resources-expended scale.)
T r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e code we have been u s i n g , t h e I r o n Lnw t a k e s two
But n o t e what happens i f c o s t s become v e r y low: c u r v e C a p p l i e s . In t h i s
forms. F i r s t , t h e p r o c e s s of m o b l l i z s t i o n i n i t s e l f t r a n s f o r m s t h e g r o u p ' s
c a s e , t h e p r e s e n t l e v e l s of o p p o r t u n i t y and m o b i l i z a t i o n p e r m i t o u r con-
d e f i n e d i n t e r e s t s ; t h o s e who l e a d t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s m o b i l i z a t i o n a c q u i r e t h e
t e n d e r a v e r y high r e t u r n indeed. Because t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s d e f i n e d i n t e r e s t
d e s i r e and t h e means t o m a i n t a i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e y have b u i l t and t o
remains t h e same, however, i t can a c h i e v e t h e name o b j e c t i v e s w i t h a
i d e n t i f y t h e i r s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s w i t h t h o s e of t h e group a s a whole.
s m a l l e r amount of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n t h a n when c o s t s a r e medium. Now t h e
Second, t h e lowering of c o s t s i n c r e a s e s t h e gap between t h e g r o u p ' s mo-
i d e a l r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n r u n s from C1 t o C2. Lowering c o s t s lowers
b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l and t h e r e s o u r c e s i t must expend t o a c h i e v e i t s ends.
t h e expected l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
That produces a s u r p l u s . Tlie a c c r e t i o n of a s u r p l u a might l o g i c a l l y lend
To be s u r e , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between c o n t e n d e r s and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s
t o demobilization. But a c c o r d i n g t o Mlchels i t encourages t h e o l i g n r c l i s
may a l t e r i n some r e g u l a r f a s h i o n a s c o s t s d e c l i n e . Tlie most obvious a l -
t o d i v e r t t h e a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s t o ends which t h e y themselves d e f i n e an
t e r n a t i v e i s t h e one proposed long ago by Robert Michels. "The revolu-
!
desirable. I n t h e extreme c a s e , t h e new i n t e r e s t s which emerge do n o t
t i o n a r y p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , " s a i d Micliels.
even i n c l u d e t h e i n t e r e s t s which o r i g i n a l l y brought t h e c o n t e n d e r i n t o ex-

i s a s t a t e w i t h i n a s t a t e , p u r s u i n g t h e avowed aim of d e s t r o y i n g istence. I n t h e extreme c a s e , a z e a l o t becomes a n o p p o r t u n i s t , ready t o

the existing s t a t e i n order t o s u b s t i t u t e for i t a s o c i a l order a c t f o r a wide v a r i e t y of c o l l e c t i v e goods, prepared t o s t r i k e f o r t h e

of a fundamentally d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r . To a t t a i n t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y b e s t r e t u r n a v a i l a b l e , b u t u n w i l l f n g t o a c t i n t h e f a c e of a p r o b a b l e

loss. The " s o c i a l movement o r g a n i z a t i o n s " i n contemporary America analyzed

by Zald and ElcCarthy come c l o s e t o t h i s c a r i c a t u r e . t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Canadians, Japanese. Greeks. B r a z i l i a n s and many o t h e r s . '

We must a l s o weigh something e l s e a g a i n s t t h e presumed c o s t - c u t t i n g The r e p e r t o i r e a l s o i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l v n r j e t i e s of s t r i k e s , p e t i t i o n i n g .

e f f e c t s of communications improvements, t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of f r e e e l e c t i o n s , t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of p r e s s u r e groups, and s few o t h e r ways of a r t i c u l a t i n g

and t h e l i k e : t h e i n c r e a s e d r e p r e s s i v e a c t i v i t y and r e p r e s s i v e e f f i c i e n c y g r i e v a n c e s and demands.

of governments and o t l ~ e rl a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . I n t r i n s i c c o s t s a r e down. Pew Americans, on t h e o t h e r hand, know how t o o r g a n i z e t h e h i j a c k i n g

But t h e c o s t s imposed by o t h e r s a r e up. I guess t h a t t h e i n t r i n s i c c o s t s of a n a i r p l a n e , d e s p i t e t h e p u b l i c i t y h t j a c k i n g s have r e c e i v e d t n r e c e n t

hove d e c l i n e d more t h a n t h e Imposed c o s t s have r i s e n . In the present y e a r s ; even fewer would s e r f o u s l y c o n s i d e r h i j a c k i n g a s a way of accomplishing

s t a t e of our knowledge, however, t h a t judgment i s b o t h r i s k y and u n v e r i f i a b l e . their collective objectives. H i j a c k i n g b e l o n g s t o t h e r e p e r t o i r e of o n l y

R e p e r t o i r e s of C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n a few groups anywhere. Uachine-breaking, once s f r e q u e n t o c c u r r e n c e , hnn

At any p o i n t i n t i m e , t h e r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s a v a i l a b l e dropped o u t of t h e r e p e r t o i r e . So have tlie c l ~ s r i v a r iand t h e s e r e n a d e . So

t o a population is s u r p r i s i n g l y limited. S u r p r i s i n g l y , g i v e n t h e innumerable h a s t h e r e g u l a r i n t e r - v i l l a g e f i g h t ; o n l y f o o t b a l l remains t o remind u s of

ways i n which people c o u l d , i n p r i n c i p l e , deploy t h e i r r e s o u r c e s i n p u r s u i t t h a t o l d form of b l o o d l e t t i n g .

of common ends. S u r p r i s i n g l y , g i v e n t h e many ways r e a l groups have pursued Almost no one anywhere i s now f a m i l i a r w i t h a Eorm of a c t i o n which

t h e i r own common ends st one time o r a n o t h e r . was once canmon ir? Europe: t h e r e b e l l i o n i n which an e x i s t i n g , f u n c t i o n i n g

Most t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Americans, f o r example, know how t o demonstrate. group such a s a n army o r a conmnrnity a s s e m b l e s , c a s t s o f f i t s c o n s t i t u t e d

They know t h a t s group w i t h a c l a i m t o make assembles i n a p u b l i c p l a c e , a u t h o r i t i e s , commissions t h a t s u c c e s s o r (who knows f u l l w e l l t h a t once

i d e n t i f i e s i t s e l f and i t s demands o r c o m p l a i n t s i n a v i s i b l e way, o r i e n t s t h e a c t i o n is completed he i s l i k e l y t o b e hanged, o r worse, f o r I l l s p a i n s )

i t s common a c t i o n t o t h e p e r s o n s , p r o p e r t i e s o r symbols of some o t h e r group t o p r e s e n t a s e t of g r i e v a n c e s and demands t o s h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y , r c s j n t s

i t i s seeking t o influence. Within t h o s e g e n e r a l r u l e s , most Americans w i t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n u n t i l t h o s e demands have been met o r u n t i l i t hns been

know how t o c a r r y on s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t forms of d e m o n s t r s t i o n : t h e massed u t t e r l y d e s t r o y e d , t h e n r e t u r n s t o i t s p r e v i o u s s t a t e of submission t o t h e

mnrch, t h e assembly w i t h speechmaking, t h e temporary o c c u p a t i o n of premises. constituted authorities. Remember t h e r e c u r r e n t r e v o l t s of t h e v i c t o r i o u s

Moreover, t h e r e a r e some s p e c i f i a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which most Americans b u t unpaid Spanish a r m i e s i n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s toward t h e end of t h e s i x t e e n t h

would a c t u a l l y a p p l y t h e i r knowledge by j o i n i n g a r e a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n . century: they r e g u l a r l y e l e c t e d t h e i r own c h i e f , t h e e l e c t o ; they d e c l s r c d

Americans who have n o t l e a r n e d t h i s complicated s e t of a c t i o n s through they would f o l l o w no one e l s e ' s o r d e r s u n t i l t h e i r demands f o r hack pay

p e r s o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n have n o n e t h e l e s s w i t n e s s e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s d i r e c t l y , and o t h e r b e n e f i t s were s a t i s f i e d . They sometimes c o n t i n u e d t o f i g h t ,

read about them. watched them on t e l e v i s i o n . Various forms of d e m o n s t r a t i o n even t o f i g h t h e r o i c a l l y . b u t under t h e i r own d i r e c t t o n . 'Chey sometimes

belong t o tlie r e p e r t o i r e of t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Americans -- n o t t o mention p i l l a g e d when i t appeared t h e i r demands would n o t be met. They always
 5-16

demanded amnesty f o r a l l a c t i o n s committed d u r i n g t h e r e b e l l i o n -- and t h e y t o what d e g r e e d o e s t h e group p r e f e r t h e means i t h a s used b e f o r e o v e r

u s u a l l y won. Armies m a t t e r e d t o t h e Spanish k i n g ( P a r k e r 1973). t h o s e which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y a v a i l a h l e f o r t h e same purpose? That i s a

Or r e c a l l t h e P i l g r i m a g e of Grace, t h e g r e a t Y o r k s h i r e r i s i n g of 1536 d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n t o answer i n x t h e r e a l world. I t is hard t o knov two
a g a i n s t Henry V I I I ' s d i s p o s s e s s i o n of t h e m o n a s t e r i e s and a g a i n s t o t h e r t h i n g s : 1 ) what o t h e r forms of a c t i o n a r e r e a l l y " a v a l l a b l e " t o a group,
measures d e s i g n e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e r o y a l revenues. The "commons" r o s e by 2) t h e r e l a t i v e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s and e f f i c i e n c y of t h e means t h e group
t e n s of thousands, took gentlemen f o r t h e i r c a p t a i n s and London lawyer a c t u a l l y u s e s and t h e a l t e r n a t i v e meana which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y n v a i l n h l e .

Robert Aske n s t h e i r c h i e f c a p t a i n . They e v e n t u a l l y c o n t r o l l e d much of However, two a o r t a of n a t u r a l e x p e r i m e n t s occur o f t e n enough t o p r o v i d e

t h e North. But t h e Duke of N o r f o l k ' s vague, l y i n g promises t o t a k e t h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t . F i r s t , s i m i l a r groups i n s i m i l a r s e t t i n g s

c a s e t o t h e King d i s p e r s e d them. By J u l y of 1537 Robert Aske had d i e d on sometimes u s e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . I n tlie 1950s.
a s c a f f o l d a t t h e c a s t l e of York, and two hundred o t h e r r e b e l s had p e r i s h e d f o r example, we f i n d Swedish t r a n s p o r t workers t a k i n g t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s t o

a t t h e e x e c u t i o n e r ' s hand (Dodds and Dodds 1915). The word "mutiny" s t i l l government a g e n c i e s w h i l e t h e i r B r i t i s h c o u n t e r p a r t s g o o u t on s t r i k e .

conveys s s e n s e of t h a t o l d form of a c t i o n . But now we u s e t h e term almost Second, t h e meana of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a l t e r and s p r e a d from one group t o

exclusively i n a military context. We f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t i t was once another. For i n s t a n c e , i n t h e I t a l y of 1919 sit-down s t r i k e s were r a t h e r

an e s t a b l i s h e d , i f r i s k y , p a t h o u t of an i n t o l e r a b l e s i t u a t i o n . a novelty. But by August, 1920 h a l f a m i l l i o n workers were occupying

H i j a c k i n g , mutiny, machine-breaking, charivaris, v i l l a g e fights, tax their factories. Given such e v e n t s , we c a n g a u g e t h e importance of r e p e r -

r e b e l l i o n s , food r i o t s , c o l l e c t i v e s e l f - i m m o l a t i o n , l y n c h i n g , v e n d e t t a t o i r e s by comparing t h e s u c c e s s i v e c h o i c e s of s i m i l a r groups and by ob-

have a l l belonged t o t h e s t a n d a r d c o l l e c t i v e - s c t i o n r e p e r t o i r e of aome s e r v i n g i n n o v a t i o n and d i f f u s i o n i n t h e means o f a c t i o n .

group a t aome time. I n one s e t t i n g o r a n o t h e r , p e o p l e have known r o u t i n e l y F i g u r e 5-2 p r e s e n t s f o u r p o s s i b l e r e s u l t s of s u c h comparisons. In

how t o i n i t i a t e e v e r y one of them. People have a t sometime recognized e a c h c a s e , we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a group which is p r e p a r i n g t o a c t c o l l e c -

e v e r y one of them a s a l e g i t i m a t e , f e a s i b l e way of a c t i n g on an u n s a t i s f i e d t i v e l y i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i m i l a r t o o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s i t h a s fnced be-

grievance o r aapirntion. Most of t h e s e forms of a c t i o n a r e t e c h n i c a l l y fore. We i d e n t i f y a l l t h e means which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y o r p r a c t i c a l l y

f e a s i b l e i n contemporary America. Yet they occur r a r e l y , o r n o t a t a l l . "available" t o t h e group, and t h e n a r r a y them i n terms of t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y

More i m p o r t a n t , no s u b s t a n t i a l American group w i t h a p r e s s i n g g r i e v a n c e i t o t h e means t h e group h a s p r e v i o u s l y employed. In the sheer-efficiency

o r a s p i r a t i o n c o n s i d e r s any of them t o b e a g e n u i n e a l t e r n a t i v e t o model, s i m i l a r i t y t o f a m i l i a r means makes no d i f f e r e n c e ; t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n

d e m o n s t r a t i n g , s t r i k i n g , p e t i t i o n i n g o r forming a p r e s s u r e group. They is t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e means t o t h e end. That model i s extreme; i t

d o not belong t o t h e contemporary American r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . may, i n f a c t , be more e f f i c i e n t t o u s e f a m i l i a r means because f a m i l i a r i t y

To s p e c i f y t h e menning of r e p e r t o i r e , i t h e l p s t o a a k t h i n q u e s t t o n : i t s e l f l e a d s t o b e t t e r execution. The a d v a n t a g e - o f - f a m i l i e c i t y model

 F i g u r e 5-2: Four Models of Group Readiness t o Adopt New Meana of t a k e s t h a t l i k e l i h o o d i n t o a c c o u n t ; i t p o s t u l a t e s a smooth g r a d i e n t i n t h e
C o l l e c t i v e Action.
p r o b a b i l i t y of a d o p t i o n from moat f a m i l i a r t o l e a s t f a m i l i a r . The model im-

p l i e s t h a t f a m i l i a r i t y is simply one of s e v e r a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g t h e

Sheer E f f i c i e n c y Advantage of F a m i l i a r i t y
I c h o i c e of a p a r t i c u l a r means from among a l l t h o s e which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y

100 available. The t h i r d model d e s c r i b e a a f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e . Tn t h i s

c a a e , t h e group h a s a heavy b i a s toward meana i t h a s p r e v i o u n l y used. b u t

is n o t c o m p l e t e l y c l o s e d t o i n n o v a t i o n . Finolly, the rigid-repertoire

Probability
I
of model d e s c r i b e a a group which chooses f a m i l i a r meana u n f a i l i n g l y . To t h e

Adoption e x t e n t t h a t t h i s model a p p l i e a . we would e x p e c t i n n o v a t i o n t o b e r a r e , and

of
t o occur through b r e a k s and c r i s e s .
Meona
I f t h e sheer-efficiency o r advantage-of-familiarity model a p p l i e a ,

i t i s m i s l e a d i n g t o speak of r e p e r t o i r e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Only i n
0, --
Low High t h e t h i r d and f o u r t h c a s e s i s t h e word a u s e f u l summary of t h e r e a l i t y .
D i s s i m i l a r i t y from
E x i s t i n g Meana Thus we have a n e m p i r i c a l t e a t f o r t h e u t i l i t y of t h e concept: how c l o s e

Flexible Repertoire Rigid R e p e r t o i r e t h e o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r of c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s comes t o one o r a n o t h e r of

t h e f o u r modela. My own h y p o t h e s i s i s t h a t t h e f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e i a

t h e moat g e n e r a l c a a e f o r o r g a n i z e d groups. The l e a s o r g a n i z e d t h e group.

t h e more l i k e l y t h a t t h e advantage-of-familiority model w i l l d e s c r i b e i t s

behavior. We might r e a s o n a b l y suppose t h a t a c o n t e n d e r -- especially a

member of t h e p o l i t y -- which remains i n t h e same power p o s i t i o n f o r n

I
I long time t e n d s t o move from a f l e x i b l e t o a r i g i d r e p e r t o i r e . Routini-
I
zation s e t s i n . I t is h a r d , on t h e o t h e r hand, t o imagine any c o n t e n d e r

m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s h e e r - e f f i c i e n c y p a t t e r n f o r a a i g n i f i c o n t span of time.

A f l e x i b l e r e p e r t o i r e p e r m i t s c o n t i n u o u s . g r a d u a l change i n t h e

g r o u p ' s meana. The change may o c c u r through i m i t a t i o n of o t h e r groups o r

through i n n o v a t i o n . The i m i t a t i o n of o t h e r groupa is moat l i k f l y when t h e

members of one c o n t e n d e r o b s e r v e t h a t a n o t h e r c o n t e n d e r i s u s i n g a new

means s u c c e s s f t ~ l l y ,o r new1.y u s i n g an o l d means s u c c e s s f u l l y . That i s no o n l y a h a n d f u l of a l t e r n a t i v e s . I t g e n e r a l l y changes slowly. seems o b v i o u s

doubt one of t h e main r e a s o n s "waves" of s t r i k e s o r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s occur: and n a t u r a l t o t h e p e o p l e i n v o l v e d . I t resembles an elementary lnngunge:

t h e f a c t t h a t a g i v e n s o r t of group g e t s somewhere w i t h t h e t a c t i c s p r e a d s f a m i l i a r a s t h e day t o i t s u s e r s , f o r a l l i t s p o s s i b l e q u a i n t n e s s o r incom-

t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t employers o r governments w i l l b e v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e p r e h e n s i b i l i t y t o an o u t s i d e r . Ilow. t h e n , d o e s such a r e p e r t o i r e come

snme t a c t i c i n t h e hands of o t h e r s i m i l a r groups. i n t o being? How does i t change? The answer s u r e l y i n c l u d e s a t l e a s t

I n n o v a t i o n i s r a r e r , and h a r d e r t o e x p l a i n . One of t h e main pro- t h e s e elements:

c e a s e s i s s u r e l y t h e s t r e t c h i n g of t h e b o u n d a r i e s of forms of a c t i o n which 1. t h e s t a n d a r d s of r i g h t s and j u s t i c e p r e v n i l t n g i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n ;

a l r e a d y belong t o t h e r e p e r t o i r e . In the early nineteenth century, f o r 2. t h e d a i l y r o u t i n e s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n :

i n s t a n c e , we b e g i n t o s e e t h e French c h a r i v a r i i n a new g u i s e . I t no 3. t h e p o p u l a t i o n ' s i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n ;

longer aimed e x c l l ~ s i v e l ys t c u c k o l d s . May-September m a r r i a g e s and c o u p l e s 4. i t s accumulated e x p e r i e n c e w i t h p r i o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ;
who f a i l e d t o t r e a t t h e l o c a l b a c h e l o r s t o t h e customary n u p t i a l c e l e - 5. t h e p a t t e r n of r e p r e s s i o n i n t h e world t o which t h e p o p u l a t i o n
bration. Many c h a r i v a r i s began t o d r a m a t i z e t h e o p p o s i t i o n of l o c a l p e o p l e belongs.

t o a p a r t i c u l a r p u b 1 . i ~o f f i c i a l o r p o l . i t i c a 1 c a n d i d a t e . Likewise. the Let u s t h i n k b r i e f l y a b o u t each of t h e s e e l e m e n t s .

complimentnry s e r e n a d e extended t o p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s who had e n t h u s i a s t i c The p r e v a i l i n g s t a n d a r d s o f r i g h t s and j u s t i c e govern t h e accep-

popular s u p p o r t . I n France, t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y was t a b i l i t y of t h e components of v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e t y p e s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .

t h e heyday of t h e p o l l t i c a l c h a r i v a r i l s e r e n a d e . Then t h e i n s t i t u t i o n gave They do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y govern t h e p a r t i c u l a r Corm of a c t i o n . Por exnmple.

way t o t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h e r a l l y , t h e p u b l i c banquet and t h e f o r m a l a group which c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h e s e t of p e r s o n s d i r e c t l y producing a n ob-

meeting j e c t o r a s e r v i c e h a s a p r i o r r j g h t t o i t s consumption is l i k e l y t o condone

I n a p a r a l l e l f a s h i o n , t h e American p a t r i o t s who mobilized from t h e some k i n d s of f o r c i b l e r e s i s t a n c e t o e x p r o p r i a t i o n of o b j e c t s and s e r v i c e s .

Stamp Act c r i s i s onward a d a p t e d o l d E n g l i s h customs such a s t a r r i n g and That i s t h e i m p l i c i t r a t i o n a l e of t h e modern European food r i o t and t a x re-

f e a t h e r i n g o r r i d i n g t h e s t a n g ( r i d i n g a r e p r o b a t e o u t of t a r n on a r a i l ) . bellion. A s important r i g h t s came t o b e i n v e s t e d i n , end sometimes gtlar-

N a r t h e s e shaming a c t i o n s coupled w i t h mock p u b l i c t r i a l s , and a p p l i e d t o a n t e e d by, t h e n a t i o n a l s t a t e , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i t s e l f n a t i o n n l i z e d .

1 , o y a l i s t s and o t h e r presumed enemies of t h e c o l o n i s t s . I n t h e French The p o p u l a t i o n ' s d a i l y r o u t i n e s m a t t e r becnuse they a f f e c t t h e e a s e

and American c a s e s , b o t h t h e form of t h e a c t i o n and i t s o h j e c t changed. w i t h which one o r a n o t h e r of t h e p o s s i b l e forms of a c t i o n c a n n c t r ~ a l l y

But i n b o t h c a s e s t h e b a s i c a c t i o n was a l r e a d y p a r t of t h e p o p u l a r r e p e r - be c a r r i e d on. The s t r i k e becomes f e n s i b l e when c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers of

toire. p e o p l e assemble t o work i n t h e same l o c a t i o n . The n o t a b l e s h i f t of c o l -

I\ p o p u l n t l o n ' s r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n g e n e r a l l y i n c l u d e s l e c t i v e a c t i o n sway from r o u t i n e a s s e m b l i e s such a s markets and f e s t i v n l s

toword d e l i b e r a t e l y - c a l l e d g a t h e r i n g s a s i n d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and s t r i k e s r e - working-class c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n changed i n c o n j u n c t i o n witli tlie a l t e r a t i o n

of urban form. To t h e f i r s t of o u r rough s t a g e s ( t h e p e r i o d of l i t t l e o r

s u l t e d i n p n r t from t h e r e s i d e n t i a l d i s p e r s i o n of o c c u p a t i o n a l groups nnd

of o t h e r s who s h a r e d a common i n t e r e s t . They no l o n g e r came t o g e t h e r no home-work s e p a r a t i o n ) correspond a r e p e r t o i r e of s m a l l - s c a l e a c t i o n a

which b u i l t d i r e c t l y on t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e t r a d e : t h e p e t i t i o n from
c a a u a l l y nnd d i s c u s s e d t h e i r c o m o n g r i e v a n c e s o r a n p i r o t i o n s i n c i d e n t a l l y .
t h e l e a d e r s of t h e c r a f t , t h e p u b l i c p r o c e s s i o n , t h e s t a g e d b a L t l e he-
I n t h a t p r o c e s s , t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of European women i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n
tween r i v a l groups of a r t i s a n s , and s o on. I n t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e s t n g e OF
d e c l i n e d n o t i c e a b l y ; t h e s e g r e g a t e d w o r l d s of p o l i t i c s and l a b o r orgoni-
l a r g e r workplaces and a d j a c e n t homogeneous d w e l l i n g a r e a s we s e e t h e r i s e
z a t i o n became mole p r e s e r v e s .
of t h e s t r i k e , t h e b l a c k l i s t of u n c o o p e r a t i v e employers, tlie o s t r n c i m o r
I n European and American c i t i e s , t h a t p r o c e s s of s e g r e g a t i o n passed
punishment of non-conforming workers, and s o f o r t h . At t h e s t a g e of l n r g e
t l ~ r o u g ht h r e e rough a t o g e s . I n t h e f i r s t , t h e r e was l i t t l e d i e t i n c t i o n
f i r m s and e x t e n s i v e home-work s e p a r a t i o n , t h e d e l i b e r n t e l y - c a l l e d meeting.
between home and work. For example, c r a f t s m e n l i v e d and g a t h e r e d i n t h e i r
r a l l y . d e m o n s t r a t i o n and s t r i k e took o v e r .
shops and i n t11e nearby s t r e e t s . The growth of l a r g e r f i r m s and workplaces
I n t h i s s e t of changes. i t i s hard t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e e f f e c t s of
produced a s e p a r a t i o n of home and work. The t y p i c a l arrangement, however,
a l t e r a t i o n s i n d a i l y r o u t i n e s from t h e e f f e c t s of our n e x t f a c t o r : changes
was f o r workers t o crowd i n t o d w e l l i n g s w i t h i n walking d i s t a n c e of t h e i r
i n t h e r e l e v a n t groups' i n t e r n a l orgnnizntion. D a i l y r o u t i n e s ond in-
ellops, o f f i c e s and h i r i n g s i t e s . Thus d i s t i n c t i v e working-class neighbor-
t e r n a l organization overlap. The t h r e e s t a g e s correspond approximately
hoods formed. They tended t o b e s m a l l i n s c a l e and s e g r e g a t e d by c r a f t .
t o p u r e c r a f t o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e organization of p r o l e t a r i a n i z l n g t r a d e 0
Between t h e workplace and t h e home grew up g a t h e r i n g p l a c e s f r e q u e n t e d by
and t h e f u l l - f l e d g e d p r o l e t a r i a n s t r u c t u r e . The r e l i g i o u s c o n f r a t e r n i t y i s
s i n g l e groups of workers: pubs, c n f e s . union h e l l s , s o c i a l c l u b s . With
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n of s o l i d a r i t y a t t h e f i r s t s t a g e , t h e mutual-
t h e f u r t h e r growth i n t h e s i z e and s e g r e g a t i o n of workplaces, j o u r n e y s t o
b e n e f i t s o c i e t y a t t h e second, t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c t r a d e union a t t h e t h i r d .
work became l o n g e r and working-clnsa neighborhoods l a r g e r b u t more h e t e r o -
These s h i f t s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t e r a c t w i t h changing d a i l y r o u t i n e s t o
geneous w i ~ l ir e s p e c t t o c r a f t s . G a t h e r i n g witli your fellow-workers n e a r
make d i f f e r e n t forms of c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n f e a s i b l e nnd n d v a n t a p , e o ~ ~ a .
t h e workplace became i e s s and l e a s f e a s i b l e .
P r i o r experience a l s o counts. The r e l e v a n t e x p e r i e n c e i n c l u d e s b o t h
T h e w chnnges i n workers' d a i l y r o u t i n e s g e n e r a l l y r a i s e d t h e mobili-
t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s own s u c c e s s e s o r f n i l u r e a and t h e contender's o b s e r v n t i o n s
z a t i o n c o s t a of p a r t i c u l a r t r a d e s . They t h e r e f o r e tended t o r e d u c e t h e
of o t h e r s i m i l a r groups. We nee Lliat blend of previoun p r a c t i c e and ob-
l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n by t r a d e . A t t h e same time, t h e changes may
s e r v a t i o n i n t h e r i c h s t r e e t t h e a t e r which grew up i n t h e American c o l o n i e s
hove lowered t h e c o s t s of m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r t h e urban working c l a s s a s a
from t h e Stamp Act c r i s i s of 1765 Lo t h e R e v o l u t i o n . Mock t r i a l s , pn-
whole. Thot p o s s i b i l i t y d e s e r v e s f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . For t h e p r e s e n t
r a d i n g of e f f i g i e s , r i t u a l i z e d a t t a c k s on t h e homes nnd o f f i c e p of r o y n l
d i s c u s s i o n , however, t h e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g t o n o t i c e i s t h a t t h e form of
o f f i c i a l s , t a r r i n g and f e a t h e r i n g of L o y a l i s t s accompanied p e t i t i o n s , de-
p a r t i c u l a r r e p e r t o i r e , how t h e p o p u l a t i o n s e l e c t e d a p a r t i c u l a r form of
c l a r a t i o n s and solemn a s s e m b l i e s . Within weeks of B o s t o n ' s f i r s t d i s p l a y
a c t i o n ( o r no a c t i o n a t a l l ) from t h a t r e p e r t o i r e . The a n a l y s i s of inno-
of a boot c o n t a i n i n g a d e v i l a s a symbol of Stamp Act promoter Lord Bute.
vation i n collective action -- f o r example, t h e i n v e n t i o n and d l f f u s i o n
t h e b o o t and d e v i l had become s t a n d a r d p a r t i c i p a n t s i n urban g a t h e r i n g s t o
of t h e s i t - i n a s a way of p r e s s i n g f o r e q u a l r i g h t s i n p u b l i c nccomoda-
oppose t h e Stamp Act up and down t h e American c o a s t . The p a r t i c u l a r form
tions -- b r e a k s n e a t l y i n t o t h e same two p a r t s .
and c o n t e n t of t h e s e g a t h e r i n g s were new. But a l l t h e i r p r i n c i p a l e l e -
The i d e a of a s t a n d a r d r e p e r t o i r e a l s o p r o v i d e s i n s i g h t i n t o "con-
ments were a l r e a d y w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d ways of d e a l i n g w i t h d e c l a r e d enemies
t a g i o n " and "spontaneity" i n collective action. It r a i s e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
of t h e p e o p l e . The p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e of urban s a i l o r s , a r t i s a n s and mer-
t h a t when a p a r t i c u l a r form o f r i o t o r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s p r e a d s r a p i d l y , what
c h a n t s shaped t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
d i f f u s e s i s n o t t h e model of t h e b e h a v i o r i t s e l f , b u t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n --
Repression l i k e w i s e a f f e c t s t h e r e p e r t o i r e . Repression makes a
c o r r e c t o r not -- t h a t t i e c o s t a and b e n e f i t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e a c t i o n
l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s h o r t r u n because o t h e r powerful groups a f f e c t
have suddenly changed. The news t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o r e ( o r a r e n o t )
t h e r e l a t i v e c o s t s and p r o b a b l e r e t u r n s of d i f f e r e n t forms of a c t i o n
c r a c k i n g down on d e m o n s t r a t o r s i n c i t y A f i l t e r s r a p i d l y t o c i t y B. and
t h e o r e t i c a l l y o v s i l ~ b l et o a p a r t i c u l a r group. It a l s o matters i n the
i n f l u e n c e s t h e e s t i m a t e s of p o t e n t i a l d e m o n s t r a t o r s i n c i t y B a s t o t h e
long run hecause t h a t s o r t of c o s t - s e t t i n g t e n d s t o e l i m i n a t e some forms

of a c t i o n a s i t c h a n n e l s b e h a v i o r i n t o o t h e r s . The widespread l e g a l i z a -
I
I p r o b a b l e consequences of d e m o n s t r a t i n g . I n t h a t regard t h e grouches

who a r g u e t h a t governmental "permisiveness" w i l l encourage more a g i t a t i o n

t i o n of t h e s t r i k e i n t h e 1860s and 1870s s o i n c r e a s e d i t s a t t r a c t i v e n e s s i are often right. I t is c l e a r . l i k e w i s e , t h a t a n a c t i o n can be "spon-
r e l a t i v e t o d i r e c t a t t a c k s on employers end on i n d u s t r i a l p r o p e r t y t h a t
taneous" i n t h e s e n s e of n o t having been planned i n advance by any of t h e
t h e l a t t e r v i r t u a l l y d i s a p p e a r e d from t h e workers' r e p e r t o i r e . All these
p a r t i c i p a n t s , and y e t b e h i g h l y o r g a n i z e d , even r i t u a l i z e d . There t h e
changes, however, occur w i t h a l a g . The forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which
grouches a r e u s u a l l y wrong; t h e grouchy i n c l i n a t i o n i s t o a t t r i b u t e s u s -
worked d u r i n g t h e l a s t c r i s i s have a s p e c i a l a p p e a l d u r i n g t h i s o n e a s
t a i n e d , c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n t o some s o r t of c o n s p i r a c y .
well. Thus t h e s u c c e s s e s and f a i l u r e s of c o n t e n t i o n f o r power produce
A Case i n P o i n t : The S t r i k e
changes i n t h e r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , b u t o n l y w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s
Over t h e l a s t c e n t u r y o r s o , Gie most v i s i b l e a l t e r a t i o n of t h e
s e t by t h e a c t o r s ' own d a i l y r o u t i n c s and c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e .
w o r k i n g - c l a s s r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n v e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s h a s
The i d e a of a s t a n d a r d r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s . i f c o r -
been t h e r i s e of t h e s t r i k e . Some form of c o n c e r t e d work s t o p p a g e goes
r e c t , s i m p l i f i e s t h e s t u d y of v a r i a t i o n s i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n from one
f a r back i n time. What i s more, t h e i d e a muat have been i n v e n t e d inde-
p l a c e , time and p o p u l a t i o n t o a n o t h e r . I t s i m p l i f i e s by b r e a k i n g t h e
p e n d e n t l y many t i m e s ; t h e d i s p a r a t e words f o r t h e s t r i k e which emerged
problem i n t o two p a r t s : how t h e p o p u l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n came t o have i t s
i n v a r i o u s European languages s u g g e s t m u l t i p l e o r i g i n s : s c i o p e r o , t u r n o u t ,
Streik, grsve, zabastovka, huelga. f evert he less, strikes were rare
events at the beginning of the nineteenth century. By 1900, they were
routine facts of working-class life. They were generally illegal, and
frequently prosecuted, in 1800. . A century later, they were generally
legal, and rarely prosecuted. What is more, in most western countries
the intensity of strike activity continued to rise past the middle of the
twentieth century (see Hibbs 1976). 'In the process, atrikes routinized:
settled down to a few standard formats, acquired their own jurisprudence,
became objects of official statistics. By "routinized," I do not mean
calmed down." Despite the complex, standard rules according to which
they are played, p r o f e s s i ~ n a l h o c k e ~ m a t c h eare
s often angry, bone-crun-
ching affairs. The same is true of atrikes.
llow and why did strikes enter the repertoire? In multiple ways,
proletarianization created the strike. By definition, proletarianization
created the worker who exercised little or no discretionnry control over
the means of production and who was dependent for survival on the sale of
his or her labor power. That proletarian and the worker threatened with
becoming that proletarian have long been the chief participants in strikes.
(The word "proletarian" has, alas, recently lost some of the precision
Marx gave it in Dns Kapital. In Marx's analysis the central elements were
sepnration from the means of production + wage-labor. Agricultural workers
were. in fact, the chief historical case Marx discussed. He certainly
did not concentrate on unskilled factory workers.) Of all workers, the
proletarian moat clearly had interests opposing him directly to his em-
ployer. The proletarinn had the moat to gain through the'withh~ldin~
of labor power, and the least to gain by other means.
N o w , the pace of proletarianization increased greatly during the
nineteenth century. My own minimum guess is that in Europe as a whole from
1800 to 1900, while the total population rose from about 190 million to 500
million, the proletarian population increased from about 90 million to 300
I
million. If that is true, the very kinds of workers who were the prime
candidates for strike activity were multiplying. Furthermore. many strikes
were about proletarianization. Whether the immediate iasue was wages.
hours or working conditions. the underlying struggle c m o n l y turned about
the employer's effort to exercise greater and greater control over the dia-
position of the means of production, and therefore over the worker's own
use of his labor. .
In his lucid analysis of "remuneration systems," Bernard Mottee dis-
cusses the broad nineteenth-century movement from various forms of task
compensation to various forms of time-effort compensation. A clear exnmple
of task compensation is the set of contracting systems (marchandage) in
which a family or work team undertook to produce a certain number of Fin-
ished objects meeting certain standards at an agreed-upon price. Nuch
mining, woodworking and textile production once took place under contracting
arrangements. Indeed, early quasi-factories often consisted of assemblages
of more or less autonomous artisans who brought their own tools and ma-
terials into a c m o n workplace. (Michael llanagan gives the example of the
artisanal filemakers of nineteenth-century Le Chambon-Feugerolles, near
St. Etienne, who sometimes worked at home and sometimes in omall shops, de-
pending on inclination and the current level of activity in the
trade. )
Time-effort compensation takes many forms. but the two most obviolle
are the hourly wage and piecework. Piecework differo greatly from taskwork:
the employer characteristically owns the materials, tools and workplace.
and controls the basic location, timing and routines of the work; in ad- One sign is its legalization. Moat western countries legalized some form

dition, the "piece" in question is not normally a finished product, but one of strike activity during the latter half of the njneteenth century: Creat

small portion of it. Most contemporary forms of production incentives fall Britain led the way in 1824. Saxony followed in 1861, France in 1864. Bel-

into the same category. They assume a proletarian labor force, while task- gium in 1866. Prusaia in 1869. Austria in 1870. Another sign js the advent
work and contracting assume workers who have substantial control over the of regular statistical reporting: there, the 1880s and 1890s saw tlie

means and conditions of production. launching of annual strike statistics in many western countries. including
As Mottez points out, a nineteenth-century entrepreneur who wanted the United States. A third sign is the growth of professional bureaucracies

to assemble a group of relatively skilled workers into a good-sized pro- devoted to monitoring, regulating, reporting and, on occasion. settling

ductive unit had no choice but to adopt some form of task compensation. strikes. These officials, employers and organized workers hammered out

But when capital accumulated, when the scale of production rose, and when standard definitions of strikes and lockouts. They worked out rules con-

innovations in technology and work-discipline made it possible to routinize. cerning the proper behavior of the parties to a strike. They developed

subdivide and demystify the basic productive tasks, employers pushed toward meana of registering and publicizing a strike's end and outcome. They, the

greater and greater pre-planning and surveillance of the entire process. courts, police and other public officials were fixing the precise place

That included pushing toward time-effort compensation. of the strike in the day's repertoire of collect~veaction. To he sure.

In general, workers resisted the entire process when they could. Not the rules remained uncertain in important regards, the rules changed na

that they were simple conservatives; although on the average they did prefer the balance of power changed, and most of tlie rule-making occurred as a

work arran~ementsthey knew and could somehow manage to those they did not by-product of bitter struggle. That is the way repertoires of collcctive

know, their resistance sometimes took the form of demands for radical reor- action usually change. -
ganization of work and social life: the word "socialism" itself originally Michelle Perrot's collective biography of the roughly 3,000 strikes

represented the vision of a social order in whicli producers would control which occurred in France from 1870 to 1890 catches an important period in

their own fates. The strike grew up as one of the primary means by which the routinization of the strike. The book is a feast: rich with the folk-

artisans threatened with proletarianization and semi-proletarians threatened lore, rhetoric and tactics of strike activity, jammed with telling obser-
with complete loss of control over the disposition of their labor fought vation on the context of the issues about which workers struck. The

back. largest theme of the book, however, is that the 18908 tamed and drilled

If my analysis is correct, the strike entered the collective-action the strike, which had previously displayed great spontaneity, and had ex-

repertoires of European workers as a reactive means, but later became a pressed the immediate concerns of workers quite directly. The growth of

primary meana of collective proaction. In the process, the strike routinized. large, centralized labor unions, in Perrot's view, helped smother the strike's
creativity, its spontaneity, perhaps its revolutionary potential. On the 5. pattern oE repression: increasing readiness of governmentn LO

last point some doubt remnins: the 18900 brought a great swelling of strike tolerate limited forms of strike activity.

activity, an outpouring of revolutionary displays on the occasion of May

None of these explains the invention of the strike, which goes bock well be-
Day and the great strlken, and the heyday of anarcho-syndicelism. Further-
fore the nineteenth century. But they are a convenient inventory of the
more, smaller-scale workers' organizations had been crucial to the develop-
major factors in the nineteenth-century emergence of the strike as a
ment of local strike activity before 1890. Nevertheless, the main obser-
standard workers' performance in western countries.
vation stands: through an interplny of unions, workers, government and em-
The strike continued to change in the twentieth century. Figure 5-3
ployers, the strike was indeed standardizing.
shows neveral aspects of that alteration for France From 1890 to 1954.
In terms of the checklist of factors in the production of collective-
The three-dimensionnl graphs represent the median duration, the n~~mber
of
action repertoires which we looked at earlier, the nineteenth century
strikers per strike and the strike rnte in terms of strikes per year per
crystallization of the strike looks something like this: ,
100.000 workers in the labor force. The volume of the solid gives an ap-

1. prevailing standards of rights and justice: artisanal view that proximation of striker-days per year. The shape of the aolid then sums

the contribution of labor gives n right to control the dinposition up the combination of length, size and frequency of strj.kes. In the 18900,

of its product and the conditions of.its use. confronting bourgeois French strikes were relatively small and infrequent, but they tended to last

view that the ownership of capital bestows a right to its untrammeled a long time. In the,1950s. French strikes averaged large and frequent, but

disposition; short. That general change in shape was very common in western countries

(Shorter and Tilly 1974: chapter 12). It reflected. among other things,
2. daily routines of the population: increasing concentration of
the shift from small shops. artisnnsl organization and local unjons toward
workcra in large shops and the equivalent;
large plants, fully proletarian workers and large-scale unione.

3. population's internal organization: combination of residues of While these changes were quite general, nntionsl patterns of strike

croft organization, e'mployer pressure toward proletarianization, activity diverged considerably. The general withering away of the strike

increasing residential segregation of workers; which many theorists expected to come with "mature" industrialization fniled

to materialize; strike frequencies, sizes and volumes genernlly rose after

4. accumulated experience with collective action: demonstrated suc-
World War I and remained high or cltmbed even higher after World War 11.
cess of artisanal strikes, failure of appeals to officials and
Yet important contrasts upened up.
patrons;
One of the most dramatic contrasts separated the Scandinavian

countries from the rest of the West. While strike levels were reaching new
 5-32

Figure 5-3: The Alteration of French Strike Shapes, 1890-1954. heights elsewhere, they were declining in Scandinavia. Joan Lind'a com-

parison of industrial conflict in twentieth-century Britain and Sweden.

brings out an important element of that contrast. At fjrst inspection,

her findings fall into the pattern we have already discussed at length.

Time-series analyses of strike activity in both countries reveal strong re-

lationships between the level of induatrial conflict and the extent of

worker mobilization, as measured either by union membership or by union

Median Daya = 6 income. But the finding is less straightforward than it sounds. In Bri-
StrikerslStrike = 250.5
Strikes/100.000 - 2.2
tain the relationship is positive: the higher the mobilization level. the

more strikes. In Sweden. it is negative. Swedish strikes declined stea-

8 Median DayslStrike 0 %a
dily as union membership mounted.

That is not all. In Britain, a monthly time-series analysis in-

dicates that the repressive measures of World War I had a small dcpres-

sant effect on the overall level of strike activity (allowing for the ef-

-
Median Daya = 7 fect of such other variables as prices and unemployment) and a larger ten-

-
StrikerslStrike 477.2
dency to promote government-aided voluntary negotiations and binding arbi-
Strikes/100,000 4.9
tration as an alternative to strike activity. But a similar analysia of

World War I1 produces no such results. There, strikes rose greatly during

the later months of the war, despite the outlawing of strikes and the es-

tablishment of compulsory arbitration in June, 1940. They roae despite

Median Days - 1
the rise of prosecutions for strikes and lockouts from fifty in 1941 to

582 in 1942 to 1,279 in 1943 (Lind 1973: 156).

StrikeraIStrike = 747.2
Strikea1100.000 = 9.2 The contradictions are troubling. Some of the things going on are

clear enough. In Britain, organized labor. despite the Labor Party, never

developed the continuous, intimate and reliable tie to the government that

the long incumbency of the Social Democrats nfforded to Swedish labor; in

Sweden, the stronger labor became the easier it was to settle disputes
 through o t h e r means t h a n t h e s t r i k e : n e g o t i a t i o n , l e g i s l a t i o n , gov&rnmen-
t a l p r e s s u r e on t h e employers. As l a b o r e n t e r e d t h e B r i t i s h p o l i t y , mul-
t i p l e t r a d e u n i o n s r e t a i n e d a good d e a l of autonomy; no c e n t r a l l a b o r or-
g a n i z a t i o n a c q u i r e d t h e power t o n e g o t i a t e f o r a l l i t s members o r t o f o r c e
t h o s e members t o a b i d e by t h e terms of t h e i r c o n t r a c t s . I n Sweden, a high-
I
l y - c e n t r a l i z e d f e d e r a t i o n a c q u i r e d g r e a t p a r e r b o t h a s a n e g o t i a t o r and
a s an e n f o r c e r . Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , p o l i t y membership encouraged
s t r i k e s i n B r i t a i n and made r o u t i n e p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e a more a t t r a c t i v e
' a l t e r n a t i v e t o s t r i k e s i n Sweden.
David Snyder's a n a l y s e s of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t i n I t a l y , France
I and T i l l y 1974, esp. c h a p t e r 4 ) .
and t h e United S t n t e s l i k e w i s e p o i n t t w a r d a more complex model of power-
a c t i v i t y . o r t o t a k e advar)tage of i t s momentary f a v o r . s u b s i d e d i n f a v o r
of a fundamentally economic c o n t e s t between employers and o r g a n i z e d
workers. The c o n t e s t was f o u g h t o u t w i t h i n l i m i t s s e t and g u a r a n t e e d by
t h e government. The r o l e of t h e government remained much more c o n t i n g e n t ,
t h e power of o r g a n i z e d l a b o r much weaker and more v a r i a b l e , i n I t a l y
and France.
S n y d e r ' s b e s t - f i t t i n g composite models resemble t h e ones which
Edward S h o r t e r end I found t o b e most e f f i c i e n t i n a c c o u n t i n g f o r yenr-to-
y e a r f l u c t u a t i o n s i n French s t r i k e a c t i v i t y between 1885 and 1965 ( S h o r t e r
Snyder improves on o u r foumulation by
c l a r i f y i n g t h e e f f e c t of l a b o r ' s r e l a t i o n t o aovernment. H i s a c c o u n t of

holding. When Snyder t e s t s s t a n d a r d economic models on a n n u a l s t r i k e changes i n t h a t r e g a r d resembles L i n d ' s comparison of B r i t a i n and Sweden.

s e r i e s r u n n i n g from t h e l a t e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t o around 1970, he f i n d s Douglas Hibbs h a s b r o u g h t a s i m i l a r p e r s p e c t i v e t o b e a r on twen-

they have u n s a t i s f s c t o r y ( a l t h o u g h n o t n e g l i g i b l e ) p r e d i c t i v e power i n a l l

t h r e e c o u n t r i e s b e f o r e World War I1 and i n France and I t a l y s i n c e t h e n ; f o r

! t i e t h - c e n t u r y s t r i k e t r e n d s i n Belgium. Canada, Denmark. F i n l a n d , Prance,

I t a l y . Japan. N e t h e r l a n d s , Norway. Sweden, United Kingdom and United

I
t h e United S t a t e s , t h e p r e d i c t i v e power of a p u r e economic model g r e a t l y S t a t e s (Hibbs 1976). His g e n e r a l conclusions run a s f o l l w s :
improves a f t e r World War 11. A p u r e p o l i t i c a l model ( i n which union mem-

b e r s h i p , Democrats i n Congress, p a r t y of P r e s i d e n t and t h e p r e s e n c e of

. . . strike activity i s one m a n i f e s t a t i o n f~ ongoin8 s t r u g g l e

n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s f i g u r e ) provides a b e t t e r f i t t o t h e observations i n
-
f o r power between s o c i a l c l a s s e s o v e r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e s ,

p r i n c i p a l l y a l t h o u g h not e x c l u s i v e l y n a t i o n a l income. The main

a l l c a s e s b u t t h e U.S. a f t e r World War 11.
t h e s i s of t h e s t u d y i s t h a t long-run changes i n t h e volume of i n -
As one might e x p e c t . s s y n t h e s i s of t h e economic and p o l i t i c a l
d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t a r e l a r g e l y e x p l a i n e d by changes i n t h e l o c u s of
models p r o v i d e s t h e most a c c u r a t e p r e d i c t i o n s ; even t h e r e , t h e p o l i t i c a l

v a r i a b l e s c a r r y a major p a r t of t h e e x p l a n a t o r y weight e x c e p t i n t h e r e c e n t
-
the distributional struggle. S t r i k e a c t i v i t y h a s d e c l i n e d dmma-

t i c a l l y i n n a t i o n s where S o c i a l Democratic o r Labor p a r t i e s assumed

U.S. e x p e r i e n c e . S n y d e r ' s p r o p o s a l i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t t h e New Deal and

t h e accommodations of World War I1 s t r e n g t h e n e d and s t a b i l i z e d t h e t i e s of

power i n t h e 1930s -- o r j u s t a f t e r t h e second World War -- and
c r e a t e d t h e modern " w e l f a r e s t a t e " . I n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s an enor-
o r g a n i z e d American l a b o r t o t h e government. It stabilized those t i e s s o
mous f r a c t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l income n w p a s s e s through t h e p u b l i c
much t h a t p r e v i o u s e f f o r t s t o i n f l u e n c e t h e government i t s e l f by s t r i k e
s e c t o r and is a l l o c a t e d by t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . P o l i t i c a l con-
 f l i c t between l e f t - and right-wing p a r t i e s i n t h e e l e c t o r a l through t h e p r o v i s i o n of o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o a c t on g r i e v a n c e s o r o s p i r a -
arena . . . has r e p l a c e d i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t between l a b o r and ca- t i o n s long nurtured. As a r e s u l t of t h e s e and o t h e r r e c e n t s t u d i e s , tlcere
p i t o l in the private sector . . . as t h e u l t i m a t e mechanism f o r t h e i s l i t t l e remaining doubt c o n c e r n i n g a g e n e r a l tendency of s t r i k e a c t i -
d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t i o n a l income. By comparison, i n c o u n t r i e s go- v i t y t o r i s e w i t h economic e x p a n s i o n and f a l l w i t h c o n t r a c t l o c i (e.8. Knovlcs
verned more o r l e s s c o n t i n u o u s l y by b o u r g e o i s p a r t i e s of t h e c e n t e r 1952. Weintraub 1966. A s h e n f e l t e r and Johnson 1969. Vonderkamp 1970. S k e e l s
and r i g h t . t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r c o n t i n u e s t o dominate t h e a l l o c a t i o n 1971, K a e l b l e and Volkmann 1972). None of t h e s e a n a l y s e s attnclcen much i m -
a s w e l l a s t h e p r o d u c t i o n of r e s o u r c e s . The economic m a r k e t p l a c e p o r t a n c e t o i t s complement, f a c i l i t a t i o n , i n t h e nense of government ac-
remains t h e primary l o c u s of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t i n t h e s e na- t i o n s l o w e r i n g t h e c o s t of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y t o workers.
t i o n s , and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e a v e r a g e l e v e l of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y h a s The comparison of d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s b r i n g s o u t two i n -
been r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t f o r t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of a c e n t u r y o r more teresting difficulties. F i r s t , t h e s t r i k e i s o n l y o n e of s e v e r a l means of
(Ilibbs 1976: 26-27; i t a l i c s i n original). a c t i o n open t o workers. At d i f f e r e n t t i m e s , p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e , s a b o t n g e ,

d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and occtcpation of t h e workplace a l l become n t t r n c t i v e s1-

S y n t h e s i z i n g tlce f i n d i n g s of Lind, Snyder and Hibbs, we a r r i v e a t a t r i -
ternatives t o striking. The workers' r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s n l -
p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n : 1 ) c o u n t r i e s i n which t h e market i s t h e l o c u s of d i s t r i -
ways i n c l u d e s more i t e m s t h a n t h e s t r i k e . Furthermore, whether a p a r t i -
b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t and t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of l a b o r and management t o govern-
c u l a r s t r u g g l e a c t u a l l y produces a work s t o p p a g e depend0 on t h e belcavlor
ment r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e ; t h e r e , market v a r i a t i o n s s t r o n g l y a f f e c t t h e l e v e l
of t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s : management f i r s t of a l l , u n i o n s and government i n
of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y ; 2) c o u n t r i e s i n which a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s a r e b a s i c a l l y
many c a s e s . The l e v e l of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y is t h e r e f o r e a t b e n t nn imper-
under p o l i t i c o 1 c o n t r o l ; t h e r e , s t r i k e a c t i v i t y i s low o r n o n - e x i s t e n t , and
f e c t i n d i c a t o r of working-class c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a s a whole. A proper
t h e r e a l d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s o c c u r i n t h e c o u r s e of e l e c t i o n s and
e x p l a n a t i o n of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y must i n c l u d e en a c c o u n t h o t h of tlce c h o i c e
o t h e r p o l i t i c a l c o n t e s t s ; 3) c o u n t r i e s i n which t h e l o c u s of a l l o c a t i o n de-
among a l t e r n a t i v e forms of c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n and of t h e p r o c e s s of nego-
c i s i o n s i s i t s e l f a t i s s u e ; t h e r e , s h o r t - r u n p o l i t i c a l f l ~ r c t u a t i o n ss t r o n g -
tiation.
ly affect strike activity. The form of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y -- f o r example,
The second d i f f i c u l t y is t h a t t h e of t h e t i e s between o r g a n i z e d
t h e p r e v a l e n c e of t h e one-day p r o t e s t s t r i k e -- undoubtedly v a r i e s i n a
l a b o r and government a f f e c t s s t r i k e a c t i v i t y q u i t e s t r o n g l y . To t h e e x t e n t
p a r a l l e l way.
t h a t l a b o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s become powerful w i t h i n t h e government ond a c q u i r e
A l l t h e s e a n a l y s e s b r i n g o u t t h e g r e a t importance of m o b i l i z a t i o n ,
c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c o l l e c t i v e o c t i o n of workers i n g e n e r a l , s t r i k i n g becomes
a t l e a s t a s r e p r e s e n t e d by u n i o n i z a t i o n of t h e workforce. A l l of them i n -
a r e l a t i v e l y e x p e n s i v e way of doing l a b o r ' s b u s i n e s s . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t
d i c a t e t h a t t h e most d i r e c t wny i n which s h o r t - r u n economic f l u c t u a t i o n s
t h e t h r e a t o r promise of government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n s t r i k e s d e c l i n e s .
promote s t r i k e o c t i v i t y i s n o t through t h e i m p o s i t i o n of hardslcips b u t
 - I
workers become f r e e t o t u n e t h e i r s t r i k e a c t i v i t y t o t h e rhythms of t h e gins. Tlie g r a n t of l e g a l i t y t o e n e l e c t o r a l a s s o c i a t i o n o r a n e l e c t o r a l
I
economy. Tlie t h r e a t o r promise of government i n t e r v e n t i o n depends on t h e assembly p r o v i d e s a c l a i m t o l e g a l i t y f o r a s s o c i a t i o n s nnd a s s e m b l i e s which

s t r u c t u r e of power among l a b o r , management and t h e government. a r e n o t q u i t e e l e c t o r a l , n o t only e l e c t o r a l o r n o t electorsl. The

E l e c t i o n s , Dcmonstrations and P o l i t i c a l Systems g r a n t of l e g a l i t y l o w e r s t h e g r o u p ' s c o s t s of m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v c

The l e s s o n is more g e n e r a l . The s i m p l e model of t h e p o l i t y l a i d action. I t a l s o p r o v i d e s a p r e s t i g i o u s , a c c e s s i b l e model f o r a c t i o n i n

o u t e a r l i e r p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t , b u t i t m i s s e s t h e importance general. I n t h e United S t a t e s of t h e 1960s we f i n d a grudgtng g r a n t of

of p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n s and of t h e means of a c t i o n b u i l t i n t o t h e e x i s t i n g l e g i t i m a c y t o t h e Black P a n t h e r P a r t y , t h e M i s s i s s i p p i Freedom Democratic

p o l i t i c a l organization. The u s e of e l e c t i o n s t o do p u b l i c b u s i n e s s i s a P a r t y , t h e Peace and Freedom P a r t y .

major c a s e t n p o i n t . P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have long s i n c e n o t i c e d t h a t Agents of t h e government t r i e d t o h a r a s s a l l t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s o u t

t h e e s t a b l i s l m e n t of b i n d i n g n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s promotes t h e growth of po- of e x i s t e n c e a t one time o r a n o t h e r . But t h e r e formed on i m p l i c i t c o a l i -

litical parties -- n o t o n l y b e c a u s e governments tend t o l e g a l i z e e l e c t i o n s t i o n between t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and "white l i b e r a l s " w i t h n s t r o n g i n t e r e s t

and p a r t i e s a t t h e same t i m e b u t because e l e c t o r a l c o m p e t i t i o n g i v e s such

I think
I i n a broad d e f i n i t i o n of a c c e p t a b l e p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . The c o a l i t f o n

a p a t e n t advantage of i n t e r e s t s which a r e o r g a n i z e d i n p a r t i e s . made i t h a r d e r f o r t h e government t o withhold from t h e q u a s i - p a r t i e s r i g h t s

t h e e f f e c t of e l e c t o r a l systems on t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n is even t o o r g a n i z e , r e c r u i t , assemble, s o l i c i t , p u b l i c i z e and d e m o n s t r a t e which

more g e n e r a l . A comparison of tlie h i s t o r i e s of c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e ac- e s t a b l i s h e d p a r t i e s e x e r c i s e d a s s m a t t e r of c o u r s e . Yet i t was n o t a p u r e

t i o n i n I t a l y , Germany, F r a n c e and England ( T i l l y . T i l l y and T i l l y 1975) s u g - . power p l a y . The f a c t t h a t movements w i t h i m p o r t a n t a c t i v i t i e s and objec-

g e s t s a c l o s e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s and t i v e s b e s i d e s winning e l e c t i o n s had chosen t o o r g a n i z e i n t h e g u i s e of po-

t h e u s e of f o r m a l a s s o c i a t i o n s of a l l s o r t s a s v e h i c l e s f o r c o l l e c t i v e ac- l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i t s e l f a f f o r d e d them a p r o t e c t i o n u n a v a i l a b l e t o s i m i l a r

tion. The g r c n t p r o l i f e r a t i o n ' of c l u b s , c i r c l e s and s o d a l i t i e s i n t h e movements which c h o s e t o o r g a n i z e a s autonomous communities, m i l i t a r y

French. German and I t a l i a n r e v o l u t i o n s of 1848 ( i n which expanding t h e e l e c - u n i t s o r c o n s p i r a t o r i a l networks. So d o i n g , t o be s u r e , they r a n t h e r i s k

t o r a t e and i n c r e a s i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of e l e c t i o n s were s t a n d a r d
I of c o o p t a t i o n , i n f i l t r a t i o n and e a s y s u r v e i l l a n c e . There l i e s t h e e t e r n a l

p a r t s of t h c r e v o l u t i o n a r y program) i l l u s t r a t e s t h e c o n n e c t i o n . The ex- dilemma o f tlie m i l i t a n t group which f i n d s a p r o t e c t i v e c l e f t i n tlie l e g a l

p e r i e n c e of t h o s e same c o u n t r i e s a l s o makes p l a u s i b l e t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t system: s o l i d a r y r e s i s t a n c e witti a chance of d e s t r u c t i o n , o r a d a p t a t i o n

t h c growth of e l e c t i o n s promotes t h e c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n and s p r e a d of t h e de- w i t h a chance of a b s o r p t i o n o r d i s s o l u t i o n .

m o n s t r a t i o n a s n form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Why s h o u l d t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n p r o s p e r a s a consequence of t h e growth

Why? Because of an umbrella e f f e c t : t h e l e g a l umbrella r a i s e d t o of e l e c t i o n s ? Because i t s b a s i c form resembles t h a t of tlie e l e c t o r a l ss-

p r o t e c t t h e e l e c t o r a l p r o c e s s , and t o keep i t huddled i n tlie c e n t e r away sembly, and because i t p r o v i d e s a n e f f e c t i v e means of d i s p l a y i n g tlie

from t h e r a i n , h a s a ragged edge. There i s s h e l t e r f o r o t h e r s a t i t s mar- s t r e n g t h of a c o o t e s t a n t , sometimes of i n f l u e n c i n g t h e outcome of an e l e c t i o n .

 The d e m o n s t r a t i o n we know e n t e r e d t h e s t a n d a r d r e p e r t o i r e of c o l -
I The f i r s t , known t o b e f r e q u e n t e d by E n g l i s h C a t h o l i c g e n t r y , was burned

l e c t i v e a c t i o n s i n most w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s d u r i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . t o t h e ground; b o t h were plundered and ransacked and t h e i r c o n t e n t s burned

I n England and America, n e v e r t h e l e s s . we can s e e i t s form c r y s t a l l i z i n g be- i n t h e s t r e e t s " ( ~ u d e '1971: 221-222).

f o r e 1800. For s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s , Englishmen had g a t h e r e d i n l a r g e num- The e l e c t o r a l assembly came i n t o i t s own a s t h e s e t t i n g of dcmon-

b e r s on c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d h o l i d a y s , such a s Guy Fawkes' Day. During t h e s t r a t i o n a i n t h e same p e r i o d . At t h e f i n a l e of t h e 1769 e l e c t i o n campaign

f e s t i v i t i e s t h e y o f t e n e x p r e s s e d t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e o p i n i o n s of t h e d a y ' s he- of t h e p o p u l a r h e r o John Wilkes:

r o e s , v i l l a i n s and f o o l s . They paraded e f f i g i e s , f l o a t s , c h a r a d e s and

Wilkes' s u p p o r t e r s formed themselves i n t o v a r i o u s c a v a l c a d e s t h a t
placards. Hangings, f u n e r a l s , e x i t s from p r i s o n , r o y a l b i r t h d a y s , an-
i
paraded p e a c e f u l l y through t h e s t r e e t s of London b e f o r e proceeding
nouncements of m i l i t a r y v i c t o r i e s drew crowds end, sometimes, c o n c e r t e d
t o Brentford t o c a s t t h e i r v o t e s . One of t h c a e s e t o u t from tlie
e x p r e s s i o n s of demands, sympathies o r c o m p l a i n t s . In a l l these cases, the
P r i n c e of Orange i n Jermyn S t r e e t . b e f o r e whom were c a r r i e d s i x o r
a u t h o r i t i e s provided t h e o c c a s i o n and. t o some d e g r e e , t h e s a n c t i o n f o r t h e
seven f l a g s ( B i l l of R i g h t s , Magna C a r t s , e t c . ) , a l l badges of t h e
a s s e m b l i e s i n question,. Contested e l e c t i o n s f e l l e a s i l y i n t o t h e same pat-
d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s of which Mr. Wilkes had been made a member
t e r n , and t h e a s s e m b l i e s of s u p p o r t e r s of d i f f e r e n t c a n d i d a t e s a c q u i r e d
( ~ u d ; 1962: 69).
a d e g r e e of p r o t e c t i o n .

I n t h e f u l l - f l e d g e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n . t h e crowd became more autonomous, As i t happens. P a r l i a m e n t r e f u s e d t o s e a t Wilkes a f t e r h i s e l e c t i o n hy a

choosing i t s own o c c a s i o n and manner of assembly. A f t e r 1750, t h e preaen- resounding m a j o r i t y . That f a c t i n i t i a t e d a n o t h e r g r e a t p e t i t i o n d r i v e , .

t a t i o n of a p e t i t i o n t o P a r l i a m e n t o r t o l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s now and t h e n t h i s one n a t i o n w i d e i n scope; many of t h e p e t i t i o n s a r r i v e d a t P a r l i a m e n t

brought t o g e t h e r thousands of p e o p l e i n s u p p o r t of a common p o s i t i o n . The o r t h e King's d o o r t o t h e accompaniment of d e m o n s t r a t i n g crowds. Wilkes'

famous Gordon r i o t s of 1778 began w i t h a meeting and march o r g a n i z e d around s u p p o r t e r s i n h i s r e p e a t e d s t r u g g l e s w i t h t h e government employed t h e

t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o P s r l i a m e n t of t h e P r o t e s t a n t A s s o c i a t i o n ' s p e t i t i o n . mass p e t i t i o n march w i d e l y t o e x h i b i t t h e i r growing s t r e n g t h .

s i g n e d by some 44,000 p e o p l e , a g a i n s t t h e C a t h o l i c Emancipation Act of t h a t That i n n o v a t i o n took a l o n g s t e p toward t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e demon-

year. Lord George Gordon l e d f o u r g r e a t columns of d e m o n s t r a t o r s t o t h e s t r a t i o n a s a d i s t i n c t i v e ' f o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . Two more changes

House of Commons. They were t h e n u c l e u s of t h e l a r g e crowd t h a t formed would complete t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n : t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e p e t i t i o n a s a

and waited through t h e s e s s i o n i n P a r l i a m e n t Square. L a t e a t n i g h t , "one n e c e s s a r y p r e t e x t f o r t h e show of s t r e n g t h , and tlie g e n e r n l i z a t i o n of

s e c t i o n of tlie crowd moved o f f towards t h e p r i v a t e c h a p e l of t h e Sar- t h e form of a c t i o n beyond King and P a r l i a m e n t . I n t h e s t r u g g l e s between

d i n i a n ambassador i n Duke S t r e e t , L i n c o l n ' s I n n F i e l d s , a n o t h e r t o t h e London R a d i c a l s and t h e C r a m which b l a z e d i n t h e l a s t d e c a d e s of t h e

c h a p e l a t t a c h e d t o t h e Bavarian Embassy i n Warwick S t r e e t , S t . James'. e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , t h o s e f u r t h e r changes began t o o c c u r .

 By t h e 1790s. t h e R a d i c a l s o c i e t i e s of London and e l s e w h e r e o r g a n i z e d s t r e e t i n t o Boston; one r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t a x stsmp d i s t r i h u t o r . Andrew

d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , l a r g e o n e s , w i t h g r e a t frequency. I n S h e f f i e l d , according O l i v e r , t h e o t h e r . a l a r g e boot c o n t a i n i n g a d e v i l . Tlle crowd which

t o E.P. Thompson: g a t h e r e d r e f u s e d t o l e t t h e e f f i g i e s b e t a k e n down.

Demonstrations were h e l d a t t h e end of November t o c e l e b r a t e t h e Towards e v e n i n g some men c u t down t h e e f f i g y of t h e stamp-mnster

s u c c e s s of t h e French a r m i e s a t Valmy, and they were r e p o r t e d i n and placed i t on a b i e r , which was c a r r i e d through t h e town ac-

the Sheffield Register . . . , a weekly newspaper which s u p p o r t e d companied by a c h e e r i n g and lluzzaing m u l t i t u d e : " L i h e r t y and proper-

the reformers. A p r o c e s s i o n of f i v e o r s i x thousand drew a quar- t y f o r e v e r , " "No stamps." "No Placemen." I n t h i s concourse,

t e r e d r o a s t e d ox through t h e s t r e e t s amid t h e f i r i n g of cannon. "some of t h e h i g h e s t Reputotion" were walking " i n t h e g r e a t e s t

I n t h e p r o c e s s i o n were -- "a c a r i c a t u r e p a i n t i n g r e p r e s e n t i n g o r d e r , " "and i n solemn manner." At t h e head of t h e p r o c e s n i o n

Britannia -- Burke r i d i n g on a swine -- and a f i g u r e , t h e upper "Forty o r f i f t y tradesmen, d e c e n t l y d r e s s e d , preceded; and some

p a r t of which wss t h e l i k e n e s s of a S c o t c h S e c r e t a r y , and t h e lower thousands of t h e mob followed ... " The concourse, a m i d s t t h e

p a r t t h a t of a n Ass ... t h e p o l e of L i b e r t y l y i n g broken on a c c l a m a t i o n s of l a r g e numbers of p e o p l e l i n i n g t h e s t r e e t , went

t h e ground, i n s c r i b e d ' T r u t h i a L i b e l ' --- t h e Sun b r e a k i n g from down b i n S t r e e t . t u r n e d i n t o King S t r e e t and stopped under t h e

behind a Cloud, and t h e Angel of Peace, w i t h one hand dropping t h e town h o u i e where Governor and Council were assembled. The m u l t i -

' R i g h t s of Man', and e x t e n d i n g t h e o t h e r t o r a i s e up B r i t a n n i a t u d e , w e l l knowing t h i s , "gave t h r e e huzzas by Way of Defiance,

(Thompson 1963: 104). and p a s s ' d on" (Hoerder 1971: 153).

The symbols a r e e x o t i c , r e m i n i s c e n t of William Blake. I t is e a s y t o f o r - The g r e a t elm which h e l d t h e e f f i g i e s l a t e r became famous a s t h e L i b e r t y

g e t , however, t h a t t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y d e m o n s t r a t o r s o f t e n c a r r y symbolic Tree. I t was t h e model f o r thousands of l i b e r t y t r e e s c o n s e c r a t e d . and

c o f f i n s , and dummies, and masks. The b a s i c form of t h a t 1792 d e m o n s t r a t i o n II s t r u g g l e d o v e r , i n America. L a t e r t h e L i b e r t y T r e e became a prime symbol
I

I n S h e f f i e l d i s t h e o n e we know today.
i i n R e v o l u t i o n a r y France. I n many h i s t o r i e s t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e Stamp

During t h e s e same y e a r s t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n was becoming a s t a n - Act c o u n t s a s t h e beginning of t h e American Revolution. The demonntrs-

dard way of doing p u b l i c b u s i n e s s i n B r i t a i n ' s North American c o l o n i e s . t i o n took a n i m p o r t a n t and d u r a b l e p l a c e i n t h e American r e p e r t o i r e of

. L i k e t h e contemporaneous b a t t l e s o v e r Wilkes i n England, t h e American r e - c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s s a t h a t r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement s w e l l e d .

s i s t o n c e t o t h e Stamp Act of 1765 helped s e p a r a t e t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n from The c a s e of t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n t e a c h e s a g e n e r a l l e s s o n . Tlle forms,

t h e s a n c t i o n e d ossembly, helped e s t a b l i s h i t s importance a s a r o u t i n e i n - f r e q u e n c i e s and p e r s o n n e l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n depend i n t i m a t e l y on tile

strument f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e . On t h e f o u r t e e n t h of e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e of government and p o l i t i c s . When we b e g i n r e f i n i n g t h e

August two e f f i g i e s appeared, suspended from s g r e a t t r e e on a s t r a t e g i c

s i m p l e model of government, p o l i t y and c o n t e n d e r s w i t h which we s t a r t e d , The d e n i a l of r i g h t s t o a c h a l l e n g e r o n l y t h r e a t e n s t h e r i g h t s of e x i s t i n g

we must pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s p e c i f i c r u l e s of p o l i t y membership, t h e members of t h e p o l i t y when t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , o r g a n i z a t i o n .

e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n of r e p r e s s i o n and f n c i l i t a t i o n , t h e r i g h t s claimed by o b j e c t i v e s o r a c t i v i t i e s resemble t h o s e of some members, o r when o c o a l i -

d i f f e r e n t contenders. Our e l e m e n t a r y model does l i t t l e more t h e n spe- t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r and member h a s formed.

c i f y i n what c o n n e c t i o n s each of t h e s e v a r i a b l e s s h o u l d b e s i g n i f i c a n t . A l l our i n q u i r i e s i n t o t h e forms and f r e q u e n c i e s of c o l l e c t i v e

On t h e q u e s t i o n of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e argument a c t i o n e v e n t u a l l y l e a d u s back t o q u e s t i o n s of power. A c l o s e l o o k st

unfolded s o f a r f a v o r s a view of t h e r i g h t t o v o t e , t o p e t i t i o n , t o c o m p e t i t i v e , r e a c t i v e and p r o a c t i v e forms of a c t i o n d i s s o l v e s t h e common

assemble, t o p u b l i s h , and s o on a s a ) c o n s i s t i n g n o t of a g e n e r a l p r i n - d i s t i n c t i o n between " p r e - p o l i t i c a l ' ' and " p o l i t i c a l " p r o t e s t . A careful

c i p l e , b u t of a s p e c i f i c c l a i m of a d e f i n e d c o n t e n d e r on a c e r t a i n gov- e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e c o n t e x t of s t r i k e a c t i v i t y c h a l l e n g e s t h e s e p n r a t i o n

e r m e n t , b) coming i n t o b e i n g a s t h e r e s u l t of s t r u g g l e s among mobilized of "economic" and " p o l i t i c a l " c o n f l i c t s from each o t h e r . A thoughtful re-

c o n t e n d e r s and governments. Thus t h e common i d e a of s t a n d a r d s e t of f l e c t i o n on t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h e c h a r i v a r i and t h e food r i o t r a i s e s fun-

p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s g r a d u a l l y extended from a s m a l l e l i t e t o t h e g e n e r a l popu- damental d o u b t s a b o u t any e f f o r t t o s i n g l e o u t a c l a s s of spontaneous, ex-

l a t i o n is misleading. Not wrong, b e c a u s e on t h e whole t h e s h a r e of t h e p r e s s i v e , i m p u l s i v e , e v a n e s c e n t crowd a c t i o n s -- although i t confirms

p o p u l a t i o n having e n f o r c e a b l e c l a i m s on v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l governments w i t h t h e importance of c r e a t i v i t y , i n n o v a t i o n , dramo and symbolism w i t h i n t h e

r e s p e c t t o v o t i n g , p e t i t i o n i n g , a s s e m b l i n g , and p u b l l s h i n g h a s expanded l i m i t s s e t by t h e e x i s t i n g r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n nnd t h e e x i s t i n g

enormously o v e r t h e l a s t two c e n t u r i e s , h a s i n c r e a s e d i n d i s t i n c t s t e p s s t r u c t u r e o f power.

from e l i t e s t o o r d i n a r y p e o p l e , h a s n o t c o n t r a c t e d d r a s t i c a l l y once i t

has g r a m . Nevertheless misleading, because t h e s i m i l a r claims ordinary

people hnve had on o t h e r governments ( e s p e c i a l l y l o c a l governments) have

g e n e r a l l y dwindled i n t h e same p r o c e s s , and b e c a u s e e a c h s t e p of t h e ex-

pansion hns u s u a l l y o c c u r r e d i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e demand of some w e l l -

d e f i n e d c o n t e n d e r o r c o n l i t i o n of c o n t e n d e r s .

The f a c t t h a t t h e r i g h t s c o n s i s t of e n f o r c e a b l e c l a i m s on t h e gov-

ernment by p a r t i c u l n r groups makes i t l e s s p u z z l i n g t h a t such elementary

r i g h t s a s nssembly nnd p e t i t i o n s h o u l d b e s o e a s i l y d e n i e d t o c h a l l e n g e r s

whose p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , o h j e c t i v e s o r a c t i v i t i e s a r e u n a c c e p t a b l e

t o most o t h e r groups: p r o s t i t u t e s , m i l l e n n i a l i s t s . F a s c i s t s , homosexuals.

CiIAPTER 6: COLLECTLVE VIOLENCE t h a t t h e r e i s no v i o l e n t a c t i o n t o which i t could n o t a p p l y i n p r i n c l p l e ,

and t h e r e f o r e no way t o prove i t wrong. Nothing st a l l . i n t h a t i t

B r i t i s h Rrawls a s C o l l e c t i v e Violence f i n a l l y r e d u c e s t o a d e s c r i p t i o n of what h a s t o b e e x p l o i n e d . Avallnble

"We n l l know what a nomination day i s l i k e , " commented The Times a c c o u n t s of n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i t i s h electoral v i o l e n c e , however, g i v e

i n J u n e 1868. u s hope of e s c a p i n g from t a u t o l o g y and of d e t e c t i n g r e g u l o r r e l a t i o n s h i p s

between tlie p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e and tlie n a t u r e of c u r r e n t

The p r e s i d i n g f u n c t i o n a r y b e s p e a k s s f a i r h e a r i n g f o r b o t h s i d e s ,
s t r u g g l e s o v e r r i g h t s and power.
and i t i s w e l l if he g e t s t o t h e end of h i s few s e n t e n c e s w i t h o u t
As i t happens. R i c h t e r himself g i v e s u s nome v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n
d e r i s i v e c h e e r s and i r o n i c a l c r i e s e x p l i c a b l e o n l y by a l o c a l
on t h e o r i g i n s of B r i t i s h e l e c t o r a l rowdiness. "It wns n o t u n c m o n , "
historian. A f t e r t h a t no one g e t s s h e a r i n g . Unceasing clamour
he r e p o r t s :
p r e v a i l s ; p r o p o s e r s , s e c o n d e r s , and c a n d i d a t e s speak i n dumb show,

o r c o n f i d c t h e i r s e n t i m e n t s t o t h e r e p o r t e r s ; heads a r e broken, f o r a g e n t s of t h e c a n d i d a t e s , n o t always w i t h o u t t h e l a t t e r ' s

blood flows from numerous n o s e s , and t h e judgment of t h e e l e c t o r s c o g n i z a n c e , t o h i r e gangs of r u f f i a n s from nearby collieries t o

is g e n e r a l l y s u b j e c t e d t o a s e v e r e t r a i n i n g a s a p r e l i m i n a r y t o i n t i m i d a t e and b u l l y r i v a l v o t e r s . A w i t n e s s b e f o r e t h e Pnrlinmentnry

t h e v o t i n g of t h e f o l l o w i n g day ( R i c h t e r 1971: 21). Committee i n v e s t i g a t i n g t h e e l e c t i o n of 1868 t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t

B r i s t o l L i b e r a l a g e n t s from London o r g a n i z e d end paid " f l y i n g

A s Donald R i c h t e r s a y s , t h e j e e r s and b r a w l s which r e g u l a r l y accompanied
columns," bands of from 200 t o 300 men r e c r u i t e d from t h e B r i s t o l
n i n c t e e n t h - c e n t u r y e l e c t i o n s b e l i e b o t h t h e o r d e r l y r e p u t a t i o n of V i c t o r i a n
suburbs. isp posed i n q u a s i - m i l i t a r y f o r m a t i o n and armed w i t h
B r i t a i n and t h e n o t i o n t h a t e l e c t o r a l reform + regular policing civic
bludgeons, they appeared on e l e c t i o n day a t v a r i o u s p o l l i n g b o o t h s
calm. Nineteenth-century British elections -- and much o t h e r p u b l i c l i f e
and d r o v e o f f C o n s e r v a t i v e v o t e r s " ( R i c h t e r 1965: 180).
in Britain a s well -- ran v i o l e n t . "Public rowdiness and r e s i s t a n c e t o

a u t h o r i t y , " c o n c l u d e s R i c h t e r , "have been n u r t u r e d i n t o t h e B r i t i s h More g e n e r a l l y , tlie s u p p o r t e r s of a g i v e n c a n d i d a t e -- hfred o r not --

c h a r a c t e r through c e n t u r i e s of independence and p o l i t i c a l i n t r a n s i g e a n c e " o f t e n made a h o l i d a y of t h e e l e c t i o n , s p o r t i n g t h e i r c o l o r s . d r i n k i n g

( R i c h t e r 1971: 28). R i c h t e r ' s i d e a resembles t h e s e n t i m e n t of t h e amply t o t h e h e a l t h of t h e i r champion, j e e r i n g h i s r i v a l s , brawling w i t h

nineteenth-century a u t h o r i t i e s : t h a t they were d e a l i n g w i t h n a t u r a l l y t h e b e a r e r s of o t h e r c o l o r s . T h i s b e h a v i o r may exemplify " p u b l i c rowdincsa

u n r u l y people who had t o b e checked, t r a i n e d and c i v i l i z e d . and r e s i s t a n c e t o a u t h o r i t y , " b u t i t n l s o i d e n t i f i e s a c l e n r e r l i n k betwecn

The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s s o r t of c h a r a c t e r o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of v i o l e n c e and o r g a n i z e d s t r u g g l e s f o r power t h a n The Times commentntor was

v i o l e n c e i s t h a t i t e x p l a i n s t o o much, o r n o t h i n g st a l l . Too much, i n ready t o concede.

 Two y e a r s b e f o r e t h e 1868 e l e c t i o n , t h e Tory government which had ' Except p e r h a p s f o r t h e good c h e e r , t h e a f f a i r was a t e x t b o o k example of

newly come t o power announced, through D i s r a e l i . t h a t i t would n o t neces- large-scale collective violence: one group u n d e r t a k e s a l a r g e a c t i o n

s a r i l y t a k e up p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e f o r m i n t h e n e x t s e s s i o n . The Reform which d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y s t a t e s a c l a i m ; a second group c h a l l e n g e s

Lesgue c a l l e d f o r a mass meeting i n Hyde Park o n 23 J u l y 1866. The t h a t claim: t h e y s t r u g g l e . The group s t a t i n g t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m i s o f t e n

meeting was t h e o c c a s i o n f o r what F r a n c i s Sheppard c a l l s t h e "only a specialized repressive force -- p o l i c e , troops, posse, v i g i l a n t e --
s i g n i f i c a n t o u t b r e a k ' o f v i o l e n c e " i n t h e g r e a t campaign l e a d i n g up t o a c t i n g on b e h a l f of t h e dominant c l a s s e s . No doubt some of t h e demonstm-

t h e Reform B i l l of 1867: t o r s i n 1866 were a n g r y , some were drunk, and some enjoyed t h e rough-and-

tumble. But t h e b r e a k i n g down of f e n c e s and t h e s c u f f l i n g w i t h p o l i c e

The law o f f i c e r s of t h e Crown had d e c i d e d t h a t t h e Crown had t h e
was a by-product of t h e p l a y of c l a i m and c o u n t e r c l a i m . That i s t h e
r i g h t t o c l o s e t h e g a t e s , and t h e llome S e c r e t a r y . Spencer Walpole,
s t a n d a r d s t r u c t u r e of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e .
now decided t o e x e r c i s e t h i s r i g h t . On b e i n g informed of t h i s t h e

l e a d e r s of t h e League d e c i d e d n e v e r t h e l e s s t o march t o llyde Park, Violence: Concept and R e a l i t y

and i f prevented from e n t e r i n g , t o proceed t o T r a f a l g a r Square. I n o r d e r t o g e t t h a t p o i n t s t r a i g h t , however, we have t o d i s p o a e

P r i n t e d l e a f l e t s t o t h i s e f f e c t were d i s t r i b u t e d i n l a r g e numbers. of some s e r i o u s c o n c e p t u a l problems. "Violence" o f t e n s e r v e s a s a

When t h e l e a d e r s of t h e p r o c e s s i o n reached Marble Arch t h e y found c a t c h a l l c o n t a i n i n g a l l t h e v a r i e t i e s of p r o t e s t , m i l i t a n c y , c o e r c i o n ,

t h e g a t e s c l o s e d and a l a r g e body of p o l i c e assembled. A f t e r being d e s t r u c t i o n o r m u s c l e - f l e x i n g which a g i v e n o b s e r v e r happens t o f e a r o r

r e f u s e d admission by t h e p o l i c e commissioner, S i r Richard Mayne. condemn. V i o l e n c e , a s Henry Bienen comments, " c a r r i e s o v e r t o n e s of

B e a l e s and t h e crowd n e a r him l e f t f o r T r a f a l g a r Square. But o t h e r ' v i o l a t i n g ' , and we o f t e n u s e v i o l e n c e t o r e f e r t o i l l e g i t i m a t e f o r c e "

p r o c e s s i o n s were s t i l l s r r i v i n g , c o n t r o l b r o k e down, and soon a (Bienen 1968: 4 ) . Grundy and Weinstein (1974: 113) a r r a y competing

densely-packed mass of men were p r e s s i n g a g a i n s t t h e r a i l i n g s . The d e f i n i t i o n s of v i o l e n c e on a continuum from narrow t o broad:

r a i l i n g s and stonework were o l d and week, and breach a f t e r b r e a c h

narrow: t h o s e u s e s of p h y s i c a l f o r c e which a r e p r o h i b i t e d by a
was q u i c k l y made a l o n g P a r k Lane and t h e Bayswater Road. The p o l i c e
normative o r d e r presumed t o be l e g i t i m a t e :
r e s i s t e d t h e s e i n c u r s i o n s , and s c u f f l i n g broke o u t , b u t many thousands

of p e o p l e were now i n s i d e t h e p a r k , and even s company of t h e intermediate: any u s e of p h y s i c a l f o r c e ;

G r e n a d i e r Guards, whose a r r i v a l was l o u d l y c h e e r e d , could n o t o u s t

broad: a l l d e p r i v a t i o n s of a s s e r t e d human r i g h t s .
t h e i n v a d e r s e x c e p t by t h e u s e of f i r e a r m s . A f t e r an hour o r two

of c h e e r f u l s p e e c h i f y i n g d a r k n e s s began t o f a l l , and t h e crowd I n g e n e r a l , they p o i n t o u t , d e f e n d e r s of c o n s t i t u t e d a u t h o r i t y p r e f e r

d i s p e r s e d v o l u n t a r i l y " (Sheppard 1971: 341). narrow d e f i n i t i o n s . Opponents p r e f e r broad ones. I n betwecn, t h e p l a c e

t h e " l i b e r a l democrats who d e f i n e v i o l e n c e a s any u s e of p h y s i c a l f o r c e . s e e k power, o r something e l s e . The t r o u b l e w i t h l e t t i n g much depend on

because t h e y would l i k e t o j u s t i f y r e v o l u t i o n s a g a i n s t a u t h o r i t a r i a n i n t e n t i o n s is t h a t i n t e n t i o n s a r e mixed and h a r d t o d i s c e r n . The judgments

regimes which do n o t have b u i l t - i n mechanisms f o r p e a c e f u l change" (Grundy o u t s i d e r s make c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n s of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o n f l i c t s

and Weinstein 1974: 113). u s u a l l y i n c l u d e i m p l i c i t t h e o r i e s of c a u s a t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Even

We have, however, p r a c t i c a l a s w e l l a s p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s f o r s e l e c t i n g w i t h f u l l knowledge, i n t e n t i o n s o f t e n t u r n o u t t o b e mlxed and d i v e r g e n t ,

t h e middle term. The narrow d e f i n i t i o n of v i o l e n c e a s i l l e g i t i m a t e f o r c e o f t e n change o r m i s f i r e i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e a c t i o n . We must n s k

i n t r o d u c e s t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p r o p e r scope of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s i n t o t h e intentions when.

v e r y d e l i n e a t i o n of t h e phenomenon t o b e i n v e s t i g a t e d -- a n unpromising
I Violence, f u r t h e r m o r e , i s r a r e l y a s o l o performnnce. It u s u a l l y

way t o b e g i n . The broad d e f i n i t i o n of v i o l e n c e t o i n c l u d e a l l v i o l a t i o n s grows o u t of a n i n t e r a c t i o n of opponents. Whose i n t e n t i o n s sliould c o u n t :

of human r i g h t s n o t o n l ) r e q u i r e s agreement on t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h o s e t h e s m a l l group of d e m o n s t r a t o r s who g a t h e r on t h e s t e p s of t h e c a p i t a l .

r i g h t s , b u t a l s o expands t h e phenomenon t o such a l a r g e range of s o c i a l t h e l a r g e r group of s p e c t a t o r s who e v e n t u a l l y g e t drawn i n t o t h e a c t t o n .

r e l a t i o n s a s t o make s y s t e m a t i c s t u d y of i t almost u n t h i n k a b l e . I f we t h e p o l i c e who f i r s t s t a n d guard and t h e n s t r u g g l e t o d i s p e r s e t h e crowd?

r e s t r i c t o u r a t t e n t i o n t o human a c t i o n s which damage p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s , Both i n t h e o r y and i n p r a c t i c e . then. i n t e n t i o n s p r o v i d e sliaky c r i t e r i a

we have a t l e a s t a chance t o s o r t o u t t h e r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e appearance f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of v i o l e n c e from n o n v i o l e n c e .

of t h o s e a c t i o n s . I n h e r b r i l l i a n t e s s a y on v i o l e n c e . Hannah Arendt urged a fundnmental

Even t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n c a l l a immediately f o r f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s . d i s t i n c t i o n between power and v i o l e n c e . Power, i n h e r view, I s " t h e

Violence s o d e f i n e d s t i l l i n c l u d e s : human a b i l i t y n o t j u s t t o a c t b u t t o a c t i n c o n c e r t . " ' B u t t h e d i f f i c u l t t e s

w i t h which we a r e w r e s t l i n g a p p e a r i n one f a c t : Arendt n e v e r q u i t e

-- c u t thumbs
defined violence. T h i s was t h e c l o s e s t approach:
-- murders V i o l e n c e i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by i t s i n s t r u m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r . Phenomeno-
- hockey games l o g i c a l l y , i t is c l o s e t o s t r e n g t h , s i n c e t h e implements of v i o l e n c e ,
- rebellions l i k e a l l o t h e r t o o l s , a r e designed and used f o r t h e purpose of
-- normal wear of s u t o m o b i l e s o r t h e r o a d s t h e y t r a v e l
m u l t i p l y i n g n a t u r a l s t r e n g t h u n t i l , i n t h e l a s t s t a g e of t h e i r
-- d i s p o s a l of noxious w a s t e s
development. they c a n s u b s t i t u t e f o r i t (Arendt 1970: 46).
- c i g a r e t t e smoking
As a d i s t i n c t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l philosophy -- t h a t is. i n t h e p r i n c i p l e 8

The obvious t e m p t a t i o n i s t o add some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e upon which we can r e a s o n a b l y found s system of government and by which

i n t e n t i o n s of t h e a c t o r s : they want t o d e s t r o y , t h e y a r e a n g r y , they we can j u s t i f y o r condemn p u b l i c a c t i o n s -- A r e n d t ' s t r e a t m e n t of power

and violence is illuminating. As a guide to observation of acting people. so on, enters the definition in order to exclude self-destruction, pot-

however, it has the fatal flaw of resting on exactly the features of col- latches, ceremonial mutilation, urban renewal and other collective damsge

lective action which observers and participants dispute most passionately. in which all partiea are more or less agreed to the damage. In short,

That is precisely because they are the features of the action which will to certify the preaence of complicating interests.)

bring on it justification from some and condemnation from others. Justi- Further distinctions start from there: collective vs. individual,

fication end condemnation are important business, but they are not our depending on the number of parties to the interaction; games va. nongnmea,

business here. depending on the extent to which all participants begin with en agreement

Nor do any easy alternatives lie close at hand. We may try to de- to work toward a determinate set of alternative outcomes by fo.llowing

fine "normal" or "expected" or "legitimate" uses of force in social life. sane standard rules; continuous vs. discontinuous, depending on how great

and define deviations from them as violent. That approach not only re- a time span we observe and how large an interval we permit to elapse be-

quires the (difficult) assessment of the normal, expected state of af- fore we call the action at an end; and so forth.

fairs, but also tends to define away violence exerted by professional Some Lineaments of Violence

specialists in coercion: police, soldiers, mafiosi, muggers. If, on the Once collective violence is defined in these terms, interesting con-

other hand, we turn to the amount of damage sustained by the individuals clusions begin to emerge from the close examination of the actual record

or objects involved, we face the difficulty of determining how direct of violent events. Our study of thousanda of violent incidents occurrii~g

and material the damage must be: Does a firm's dumping of garbage which in western Europe since 1800 reveals several strong tendencies which nf-

promotes disease count? Does the psychic burden of enslavement count? fect our understanding of the roots of violence.

I recite these tedious complications in order to emphasize that in First, most collective violence -- in the sense of interactions which

the present state of knowledge 5 definition will be arbitrary in some produce direct damage to persons and obJects -- grows out of nctions which

regards and debatable in others. People do not agree on whet they will ere not intrinsically violent, and which are basically similar to n much

call violent. What is more, their disagreement springs to an important larger number of collective actions occurrilig without violence in the

extent from differences in political perspective. My own inclination is same periods and s'ettings. The clearest example is the demonstration:

towsrd what Terry Nardin cells e "brute harm" conception of violence: any Some group displays its strength and determination in the presence of the

observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are public, of the agents of the state. and perhaps of its enemies as well.

seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance. (Direct or indirect The great majority of demonstrations pass without direct damage to per-

resistonce, in the form of attacks on persons. erection of barriers, sons or property. But a small proportion do turn to violent encounters

standing in the way, holding on to the persons or objects at issue, and between police and demonstrators, or attacks on property by the demon-
strators. When that happens, we conventionally use a new word for the violent, and repressive forces receive the order to stop them by what-

event -- "riot" -- and thereby obscure its connection witn nonviolent ever means are necessary. The means are often violent.

events. The demonstration is such a common way of doing political busi- Violence in America

ness in modern Europe that even the small proportion of violent outcomes Since no one has done the necessary detailed studies of contemporary

is enough to make the demonstration the most frequent setting for collec- Latin America. North America. Africa or Asia, it is hard to say h w

tive violence. The strike, the parliamentary session, the public meeting. generally these generalizations apply. The fragments of evidence n w

the fiesta follow something like the same pattern: the great majority of available indicate that they apply very widely in contemporary countries

them going off without violence, the violent ones not differing in any with strong governments. Jerome Skolnick (1969: 258) says in aummary of

fundamental way from the rest. one part of his analysis of contemporary American protests. "It is mLs-

A second important feature of collective violence which stands out leading to ignore the part played by social control agencies in aggrn-

in the modern European record is the heavy involvement of agents of the vating and sometimes creating a riot. It is not unusuel. a8 the Kerner

state, especially repressive agents like police and soldiers. This is, Commission observed, for a riot to begin @ end with police violence."

unsurprisingly, a matter of scale: the fewer the people involved, the A chronological review of violence in American labor-management dis-

less likely that repressive agents will be there. Rut it does not mean putes makes it clear both that over the long run police, troops and plant

simply that the larger the scale of violence the more likely the police guards have done the bulk of the killing and wounding, and that the typical

are to step in. For in the niodern European experience repressive forces starting point has been some sort of illegal but nonviolent collective

are themselves the most consistent initiators end performers of collective action by the workers -- a walkout, a sitdown, a demonstration. picketing.

violence. sending of delegations. In their sketch of the usual circumstances in

There is a division of labor: repressive forces do the largest part which the total of at least 700 persons died in American "labor violence"

of the killing and wounding, while the groups they are seeking to con- -
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Taft and Ross report:

trol do most of the damage to objects. The division of labor follows from
Facing inflexible opposition, union leaders and their members fre-
the usual advantage repressive forces have with respect to arms and mili-
quently.found that nothing, neither peaceful persuasion nor the heads
tary discipline; from the common tactics of demonstrators, strikers and
of government, could move the employer towards recognition. Frus-
other frequent participants in collective violence, which are to violate
tration and desperation impelled pickets to react to strike-breakers
symbolically-charged rules and prohibitions whose enforcement is the af-
with anger. Many violent outbreaks followed efforts of strikers to
fair of agents of government; from the typical sequence of events, in
restrain the entry of strike-breakers and raw materials into the
which demonstrators are carrying on an action which is illegal yet non-
struck plant. St~chconduct, obviously illegal, opened the opportunity
 for forceful police measures. In the long run, the employer's side myth of peaceful progress and the culpability of the violent -- it is the

was better equipped for success. The use of force by pickets was existence of this coalition, exercising power through a highly centralized

illegal on its face, but the action of the police and company guards Federal bureaucracy, which helps keep emerging groups powerless and de-

were in vindication of the employer's rights (Taft end Ross 1969: pendent" (p. 17). The consequence, in Rubenstein's view, is that recent

289-290). bids for power have met determined resistance and brought forth the pious

recommendation that the members of the groups involved attempt to enter

The same general pattern recurs in the bulk of contemporary American col-
the system as individuals, on their own merits. rather than dentroying
lective violence: a group undertakes an illegal andlor politically unac-
the system through collective efforts to wrest benefits from it.
ceptable action, forces of order seek to check the group, a violent en-
Rubenatein's analysis includes both an idea of how the American eys-
counter ensues, the "rioters" -- for that is the label the group acquires
tem usually works and a notion of the changes it has undergone since the
at the moment of violent contact with police or troops -- sustain most
1930s. The general picture corresponds to William Gameon's portrayal of
of the casualties.
"stable unrepresentetion" in American politics: " . . . the American po-
Reflecting on the long succession of violent encounters between
litical system normally operates to prevent incipient competitors from
cl~sllengersend power-holders in America. Richard Rubenstein makes an im-
achieving full entry into the political arena" (Gamaon 1968 : 18). That
portant observation:
description applies to all political systems; the real questions are: How

At the outset, one thing seems clear: those groups which achieved great are the obstacles? How do they vary from system to system and time

success without participating in sustained rioting, guerrilla terror- to time?

ism or outright insurrection were not necessarily more talented, That brings up the second part. Has the American system closed down

hard-working or "American" than those that resorted to higher levels since the 1930~7 To try that question out seriously, we shall need much

of violence. The resistance of more powerful groups to change is more precise information than we now have concerning the fates of succes-

one key struggle; another is the match between out-group charac- sive challengers. Gamson's investigation does not reveal any significantly

teristics and the needs of a changing political-economic system increased tendency for the recent challengers in his sample to fail. But
I
(Rubenstein 1970: 15-16). his investigation deals with small numbers, and stops in 1945. It is not

obvious that recent challengers -- antiwar students, organized blacks, goy

Then he goes on to contrast the fluidity of the economic and political
activists and aircraft manufacturers are likely candidates for the post-
arrangements open to the immigrants of 1880-1920 with the formation, in
1940 list -- met more resistance than craft unions, Prohibitionists or
the 1930s and 1940s, of a new ruling coalition quite resistant to dis-
Abolitionists had in the nineteenth century. There is probebly variation
placement: "Ironically, since these are the groups most wedded to the
I
I over t i m e , and t h e r e may w e l l b e a long-run t r e n d . Both a r e s u r e l y t o o t o keep o t h e r s from c l a i m i n g t h e same r e s o u r c e s .

s u b t l e t o show up i n a few offhand comparisons. Then two d i f f e r e n t sequences a r e l i k e l y t o produce c o l l e c t i v e vio-

P o l i t i c a l Action and Involvement i n V i o l e n c e l e n c e i n v o l v i n g d e c l i n i n g members of a p o l i t y . The f i r s t is l i k e t h e one

I n t h e terms we were u s i n g e a r l i e r , Rubenatein is s a y i n g t h a t members i n v o l v i n g new c l a i m a n t s f o r membership i n t h e p o l i t y . i n t h a t a g e n t s of

of t h e p o l i t y , a c t i n g mainly through a g e n t s of t h e s t a t e , have banded to- t h e government d i r e c t l y r e e f a t t h e c l a i m s of t h e p a r t i n g member t o keep ex-

g e t h e r t o r e s i s t t h e c l a i m s of newly-mobilized c h a l l e n g e r s f o r membership. e r t i n g t h e i r former r i g h t s t o c e r t a i n r e a o u r c e s . The second p i t a t h e

His moat prominent c a s e i s o r g a n i z e d b l a c k s . The a n a l y s i s a p p l i e s more p a r t i n g member d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t o t h e r s s e e k i n g t o a c q u i r e t h e d j a p u t e d

g e n e r a l l y t o t h e p a n t and p r e s e n t c o n t e n t i o n of wheat f a r m e r s , women, be- r e s o u r c e s : v i g i l a n t e movements. p r i v a t e armies. and gangs of t h u g s a r e en-

l i e v e r s i n Temperance, s t u d e n t s and o r g a n i z e d l a b o r . I n t h e s e c a s e s and p e c i a l l y l i k e l y t o e n t e r t h e a c t i o n a t t h i s p o i n t , a s t h e o l d member s e e k s

many o t h e r s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e g r o u p ' s c o l l e c t i v e c l a i m s would a i g n i - t o s u b s t i t u t e i t s own f o r c e f o r t h a t of t h e now-unreliable government.

f i c a n t l y r e a l l o c a t e t h e r e a o u r c e a under t h e c o n t r o l of t h e p o l i t y , rede- The r e g i o n a l movement of r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t a c e n t r a l i z i n g s t a t e

f i n e t h e r u l e s of membership f o r f u r t h e r c h a l l e n g e r s , change t h e l i k e l y commonly t a k e s t h i s form ( s e e Hechter 1975). So d o e s t h e c l a s s i c European

c o a l i t i o n s i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y . I n such c a a e a , t h e main l i n e be- food r i o t , i n which t h e members of a community c o l l e c t i v e d i s p u t e t h e r i g h t

tween v i o l e n c e and c o n t e n t i o n f o r power c o n s i s t s of t h e r e p e a t e d sequence of anyone t o s t o r e g r a i n i n t i m e s of hunger o r s h i p g r a i n o u t of t h e commu-

i n which members of t h e c h a l l e n g i n g group p u b l i c l y l a y c l a i m t o some apace, n i t y when l o c a l p e o p l e s t i l l need food, and r e i n f o r c e t h e i r d l a p u t e by

o b j e c t , p r i v i l e g e , p r o t e c t i o n o r o t h e r r e s o u r c e which t h e y c o n s i d e r due a c t i n g i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s : i n v e n t o r y i n g t h e g r o i n

them on g e n e r a l grounds, and t h e a g e n t s of t h e government (backed by t h e on hand, accumulating i t i n a p u b l i c p l a c e . and s e l l i n g i t o f f a t a p r i c e

members of t h e p o l i t y ) f o r c i b l y r e s i s t t h e i r c l a i m s . Collective proaction l o c a l l y determined t o b e j u s t and r e a s o n a b l e ( s e e C. T i l l y 1975. L. T i l l y

on t h e one s i d e , c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n on t h e o t h e r . 1971). So, f i n a l l y , do a v a r i e t y of f a s c i s t movements formed i n o p p o s i t i o n

A complete p i c t u r e of t h e p r o c e s s l i n k i n g c o n t e n t i o n and v i o l e n c e , t o t h e t h r e a t e n i n g c l a i m s of a m o b i l i z e d working c l a s a .

however, r e q u i r e s a d i s t i n c t i o n between c h a l l e n g e r s and members on t h e i r The sequences i n v o l v i n g new c o n t e n d e r s and d e c l i n i n g members mean

way o u t of t h e p o l i t y . Members l o a i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n a r e more l i k e l y t o t h a t c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e t e n d s t o c l u s t e r around e n t r i e s i n t o t h e p o l i t y

f i n d themselves t r y i n g t o m a i n t a i n e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s t o some p a r t i c u l a r and e x i t s from i t . When membership i s s t a b l e , c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i s l e s s . .

resource -- a s c h o o l , a d i s t i n c t i v e costume, a s o u r c e of income, a t a x prevalent. The most i m p o r t a n t s i n g l e r e a s o n f o r t h a t c l u s t e r i n g i s t h e

exemption -- and unable t o e n l i s t t h e s u p p o r t of o t h e r members o r of p r o p e n s i t y of t h e government's r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s t o a c t a g a i n s t new con-

a g e n t s of t h e government i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h o s e c l a i m s . Under t h o s e c i r - t e n d e r s and d e c l i n i n g members.

cumstances, t h e y commonly a t t e m p t t o e x e r t t h o s e c l a i m s on t h e i r own, and Some i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e l i n k s between c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e and

 6-15 6-16

struggles nt the edge of the polity appear in Dee Wernette's nnnlysis of Table 6-1: Percent of All Political Events Preceding the German Elections

the Germnn elections of September 1930 and July 1932 -- crucial moments of September 1930 and July 1932 Involvlng Different Types of

in the ride of the Nnzis and the disappearance of the communists from Ger- Action.

man political life. Among other things. Wernette coded "politicnl events"

reported in the Kiilnische Zeitung during 'the two months preceding ench of

the elections. The events he enumernted included 1) non-violent, organized

polltical activities such as electoral rallles; 2) acts of terrorimn such Type of Action percent in 1930 --
Percent in 1932

as bombings and ambushes touching manifestly political targets; 3) Eights election-oriented 33 15

nonviolent action
and collective violence involving at'least one group clearly identified by
other nonviolent action
political affiliation; 4 ) repressive acts by the state, such as police in-
acts of terror
vestigations. arrests and trials.
attacks on property
As Table 6-1 shows, a significant proportion of all the events

included terror or collective violence. collective violence

More important, the proportions

rose as the struggle became more acute: 27 percent of the events involved police investigations

collective violence. nine percent terror and eight percent attscks on arrests

property in 1930. while the figures for 1932 were 57 percent, 25 percent reports of trials

and thirteen percent. (The categories are not. of course, mvtually exclu- bans on organizations

sive.) The leading participants in violent events, by far, ere Nazis, bans on activities

Cotmnuniats. and police. The chief settings of collective violence were

total number of events
major areas of Comnunist strength: the regions of Berlin, Cologne, Diissel-

dorf and so on -- the areas in which the Nazis concentrated their campaign

to extirpate the Communists. In fact, the most frequent eventn were Nnzt-

Communist clanhes and attacks of each on the other's property. The col-

lective violence grew directly from the struggle for places in the

Cerman polity.

I do 'not mean that'the sequences I have described are the only ones

which produce collective violence, just that they are the moat regular and
reliable. Routine testing among established members of a polity pro-
duces a certain amount of violent conflict. but it tends to be limited;
and treated as a regrettable error. Conventional combats among teams.
communitiea. youth groups or schools sometimes fit the pattern of "teeting"
violence. but more often escape it; they. too, operate oa a small scale.
within large restrictions. Drunken brawls, private vengeance. festival
mdness, impcllsive vandalism, all reach a dangerous magnitude now and then.
What is w r e . the frequency of conventional combats, brawls, vendettas
and so on undoubtedly varies with the basic conceptions of honor, obli-
gation and solidarity which prevail within a population. Nevertheless. I
would say tlmt in populations under tile control of atates all these forms
account for only a smell proportion of the collective violence which
occurs, and change far too gradually to account for the abrupt surges end
recessions of collective violence which appear in such populations. The
chief source of variation in collective violence is the operation of the
polity.
Nor do I mean that moat collective violence goes on in calculating
calm. Par from it. Both those who are arguing for the acquisition of
rights on the basis of general principles end those who are fighting for
the defense of privilege on the basis of custom and precedent are usually
indignant, and often enraged. H m e n t s of dangerous confrontation (as Louis
Cirard saye of the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and almost every-
one saye of the Prencl~ Events of Hey, 1968) frequently bring an air of
festival, of ext~iliration. of release from ordinary restrictions. Plenty
of individual venting of resentments and settling of old scores takes place
under the cover of collective action in the name of high principle. The
.
argument up to this point simply denies the common conclusion that the
rage. the exhiliration or the resentment cause the collective action.
If these arguments are correct. they produce a paradoxical lesson
for researchers: to understand and explain violent actions, you must under-
stand nonviolent actions. Any study which treats violent events alone
deals with the product of two different sots of determinants: 1) the de-
terminants of collective action in general. whether it produces violence
or not; 2) the determinants of violent outcomes to collective action. We
encountered a similar problem in the explanation of strikes: While in some
sense a group of workers chooses to strike or not to strike. the strike is
simply one of several alternative ways to deal with grievances: slowdowns.
political pressure, sabotage, and individual grumbling are also possible.
That is why we can't simply infer the level of discontent from the fre-
quency of strike attempts. Furthermore, whether a strike actually occurs
is a product of strategic estimates and strategic interaction on the part
of at least two contenders; when either party is much stronger and wilier
than the other, the grievance is likely to be settled. or squashed. short
of a strike.
Snyder and Kelly (1976) find that from 1878 through 1903 ltalian
strikes were more likely to be violent if they were large. long and/or
oriented to wage demands rather than union organization. Contrary to many
arguments which proceed immediately from grievances to strikes. thcy find
no relationship between the frequency of violence in strlkes and the rate
of industrial growth or wage changes. Contrary to the findlnga of Shorter
and Tilly (1971) for Prance, they find thnt on the average violent strikes
were less successful then nonviolent strikes. These are important results.
They emphasize all the more the necessity of separating the determinants
of collective action (in this case, the decision to strike) in general
from t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s of v i o l e n t outcomes t o c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . groups. Contentious g a t h e r i n g s s u c h ' a s t h e demonstration, t h e s t r i k e . t h e

I n our f i r s t c a t e g o r y of d e t e r m i n a n t s , we f i n d such i t e m s a s t h e s o - c a l l e d food r i o t and t h e t a x p r o t e s t a r e n o t , on t h e whole. i n t r i n s i c a l l y

frequency of v i o l a t i o n s of e s t a b l i s h e d r i g h t s , t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l s of violent. I n f a c t , most of them o c c u r w i t h o u t v i o l e n c e .

d i f f e r e n t c o n t e n d e r s f o r power, t h e c u r r e n t c o a t s of d i f f e r e n t forms of The v i o l e n t v e r s i o n s of t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n . t h e s t r i k e , t h e food

a c t i o n which a r e i n t h e a v a i l a b l e r e p e r t o i r e , and s o on. I n t h e second, r i o t and t h e t a x p r o t e s t do n o t form a d i s t i n c t l y s e p a r a t e c l s s s of e v e n t s .

we f i n d t h e p r e s e n c e o r a b s e n c e of c o u n t e r - d e m o n s t r a t o r s , t h e t a c t i c s of They o r d i n a r i l y o c c u r i n t h e m i d s t of s t r i n g s of s i m i l a r e v e n t s which a r e
I

r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s , t h e l e n g t h of time d u r i n g which opposing p a r t i e s a r e q u i t e s i m i l a r t o them e x c e p t f o r t h e f a c t t h n t they produce no damage o r

i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h each o t h e r , and s o on. Each of t h e two sometimes s r j z u r e of p e r s o n s o r p r o p e r t y . They a r e . f o r t h e moat p a r t , t h e membcrs

changes w h i l e t h e o t h e r remains more o r l e s s t h e same: d e m o n s t r a t i o n s be- of t h e s t r i n g s i n which o t h e r p a r t i e s r e a i s t t h e c l a i m s b e i n g made. The

come more f r e q u e n t , a l t h o u g h t h e p e r c e n t a g e of d e m o n s t r a t i o n s which pro- o t h e r p a r t i e s a r e more l i k e l y t o r e s i s t i f t h e c o n t e n d e r making t h e c l a i m s

duce s t r e e t - f i g h t i n g remains t h e same; t h e a u t h o r i t i e s g e t tougher w i t h l a c k s a l a r g e advantage i n power o r i f t h e c l a i m s t h r e a t e n t h e i r s u r v i v a l .

s t r i k e r s , a l t h o u g h s t r i k e p r o p e n s i t i e s have n o t a l t e r e d . E i t h e r one But v i o l e n t and n o n v i o l e n t e v e n t s of t h e same g e n e r a l t y p e c l u s t e r to-

changes t h e frequency of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e . A p r o p e r e x p l a n a t i o n of g e t h e r s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r u s t o employ t h e v i s i b l e , v i o l e n t e v e n t s a s a

v i o l e n c e l e v e l s must decompose i n t o a t l e a s t t h e s e two components. t r a c e r of t h e ebb and flow of c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s i n g e n e r a l .

Out of t h e e n t i r e s t r e a m of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , o n l y a s m a l l p a r t Changing C o n t e x t s f o r C o l l e c t i v e Violence

produces v i o l e n c e . The c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n which produces v i o l e n c e a t t r a c t a The competitive/reactive/proactive scheme p r o v i d e s n convenient

d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e a t t e n t i o n b e c a u s e 1 ) t h e immediate c o s t s t o t h e p a r t i - means of summing up t h e l a r g e s t t r e n d s i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e mnjor con-

c i p a n t s tend t o b e g r e a t e r , more v i s i b l e and more d r a m a t i c t h a n i n non- t e x t s of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s o v e r t h e l a s t f o u r o r

v i o l e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ; 2) t h e e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n o f t e n i n v o l v e t h e five centuries. Two main p r o c e s s e s have dominated a l l t h e r e s t : 1 ) t h e

i n t e r v e n t i o n of t h e a u t h o r i t i e s ; t h e s u t h o r i t i e s i n t e r v e n e because t h e y r i s e of n a t i o n a l s t a t e s t o preeminent p o s i t i o n s i n a wide v a r i e t y of po-

find t h e i r i n t e r e s t s -- o r t h o s e of t h e i r a l l i e s -- t h r e a t e n e d by t h e l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s ; 2) t h e i n c r e a s i n g l y a s s o c i a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e

other actors. C o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e is n o t . by and l a r g e , t h e r e s u l t of p r i n c i p a l c o n t e n d e r s f o r power a t t h e l o c a l a s w e l l a s t h e n a t i o n a l l e v e l .

a s i n g l e g r o u p ' s p o s s e s s i o n by a n emotion. s e n t i m e n t , a t t i t u d e o r i d e a . I n 1500, no f u l l - f l e d g e d n a t i o n a l s t a t e w i t h unquestioned p r i o r i t y o v e r

I t grows, f o r t h e moat p a r t , o u t of s t r a t e g i c = a c t i o n among groups. t h e o t h e r governments w i t h i n i t s t e r r i t o r y e x i s t e d anywhere i n t h e West.

I n t h e modern w e s t e r n e x p e r i e n c e , t h e most f r e q u e n t s e t t i n g s f o r England was probably t h e c l o s e s t approximation. The England of 1500 was.

c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e a r e c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s : a s s e m b l i e s of p e o p l e who however, o n l y f i f t e e n y e a r s p a s t t h e s l a y i n g of King Richard 111 by Henry

mnke v i s i b l e c o l l e c t i v e c l a i m s which c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r Tudor a t Bosworth F i e l d . I t was f r e s h from t h e widely-supported r e b e l l i o n s

of Lsmbert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck. It had yet to effect the union with only won their struggle for predominance over the furious resistance of

Scotland. It still harbored a number of great lords who controlled their princes, communes, provinces and peasant communities. For several cen-

own bands of armed retainers. Government itself consisted largely of turies the principal forms of collective violence therefore grew from

shifting, competing coalitions among great magnates and their retinues, reactive movements on the part of different segments of the general popu-

the king being the greatest magnate of the strongest coalition. Become lation: communally-based contenders For power fought againat loss of mem-

Henry VII, Henry Tudor began the large work of statemaking which Henry bership in polities, indeed against the very destruction of the politiea

VIII and Elizabeth so vigorously continued. in which their power was invested. Collective resistance to conscription.

A century and a half after 1500, a great civil war reopened the to taxation, to billeting, to a whole variety of other exactions of the

question of whether the centralized royal apparatus the Tudors, and then state exemplify this reactive road to collective violence.

the Stuarts, had begun building would be the dominant politicnl organi- For a century or more in the experience of most West European coun-

zation in England. In fact, the state which emerged in 1688 had rather tries, however, the most frequent form of violence-producing movement

different contours from the one the Tudors and Stuarts had been building. simed at the k r k e t more directly than at the state. Thot was the food

The strength and autonomy of Parliament far exceeded anything a cool ob- riot. The name is misleading: most often the struggle turned about raw

server of the England of 1600 or 1620 could reasonably have anticipated. grain rather than edibles, and most of the time it did not reach the

In 1500 most states faced serious challenges to their hegemony from point of physical violence. The classic European food riot had three

both inside and outside the territory. Only a small minority of the hun- main variants: the retributive action, in which a crowd attacked the per-

dreds of more or less autonomous governments survived the next two centuries sona, property or premises of someone believed to be hoarding or profi-

of statemaking. Moat power was concentrated in politics of smaller than teering; the blockage, in which a group of local people prevented the

national scale: communities, city-states, principalities, semi-autonomous shipment of food out of their own locality..requiring it to be stored

provinces. Most contenders for power in those polities were essentially andlor sold locally; the price riot, in which people seized Atored food

communal in structure: craft brotherhoods, families, peasant communities. or food displayed for sale, sold it publicly at a price they declared to

The predominnnt forms of collective violence registered those circumstances: be proper, and handed the money over to the owner or merchant.

wars between rival governments, brawls between groups of artisans, battles In the best-documented cases -- England and France of the eighteenth

b o n g the youth of neighboring communes, attacks by one religious group and nineteenth centuries -- the blockage occurred more frequently than the

on another. price riot, and much more often than the retributive action. In those

The rise of the state threatened the power (and often the very sur- two countries, the food riot practically disappeared some time during the

vival) of all these small-scale polities. They resisted. The statemakers nineteenth century. Later, questions of food supply motivated dramatic
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s now and t h e n , b u t almost always i n t h e form of demon- t h e p r o c e s s s o l o n g a s l o c a l s o l i d a r i t y and some c o l l e c t i v e memory of t h e

s t r a t i o n s i n which p r o d u c e r s complained a b o u t low p r i c e s o r consumers com- l o c a l i t y ' s p r i o r claims survived. To a n i m p o r t a n t d e g r e e , t h e crowd's

plained about high p r i c e s . a c t i o n s o f b l o c k i n g . i n v e n t o r y i n g , s t o r i n g , d e c l a r i n g o p r i c e and h o l d i n g

The t i m i n g of t h e food r i o t ' s r i s e and f a l l i s r e v e a l i n g . I n Eng- a p u b l i c s a l e f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e l o c a l s f u l f i l l e d what had p r e v i o u s l y

l a n d , France and some o t h e r p a r t s of w e s t e r n Europe, t h e food r i o t d i s - been t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n d e a l i n g w i t h s h o r t a g e s

placed t h e t a x r e b e l l i o n a s t h e most f r e q u e n t v i o l e n t form of c o l l e c t i v e and h i g h p r i c e s . M a g i s t r a t e s o r mayors o f t e n acknowledged t h a t f a c t i m -

a c t i o n toward t h e end of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . It declined precipi- p l i c i t l y by a c q u i e s c i n g i n t h e r o u t i n e ; when they took t h e i n i t i o t i v e

t o u s l y i n England j u s t a f t e r 1820. i n Germany and France j u s t a f t e r 1850. themselves, t h e crowd u s u a l l y s t o p p e d i t s work.

o n l y t o l i n g e r on i n p a r t s of S p a i n and I t a l y i n t o t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . The immediate o b j e c t s of t h e crowd's a t t e n t i o n were c m o n l y l o c a l

The c a l e n d a r d i d n o t conform t o t h e h i s t o r y of hunger; indeed t h e o f f i c i a l s , b a k e r s , r i c h f a r m e r s a n d , e s p e c i a l l y , g r a i n merchants. The

g r e a t k i l l i n g famines of Medieval and Renaissance Europe were d i s a p p e a r i n g s t r u g g l e p i t t e d t h e c l a i m s of t h e n a t i o n a l market a g a i n s t t h e c l a i m s of t h e

a s t h e food r i o t came i n t o i t s own, and p e r c a p i t a food s u p p l y was pro- l o c a l population. For t h a t r e a s o n , t h e geography of t h e f w d r i o t re-

b a b l y i n c r e a s i n g through much of t h e p e r i o d . Instead, three conjoint f l e c t e d t h e geography of t h e g r a i n market: t e n d i n g t o form s r i n g around

c l ~ a n g e saccount f o r t h e timing: 1 ) t h e p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n of t h e popula- London, P a r i s , a n o t h e r c a p i t a l o r a major p o r t , c o n c e n t r a t i n g e s p e c i a l l y

t i o n , which meant a d r a s t i c d i m i n u t i o n i n t h e p r o p o r t i o n of households a l o n g r i v e r s , c a n a l s end major r o a d s . For t h e a c u t e E n g l i s h c r i s e s of

which produced enough food f o r t h e s u b s i s t e n c e of t h e i r own members, a 1795-96 and 1800-01. Stevenson remarks: "The map shows t h e extremely

g r e a t expansion i n t h e number dependent on t h e market f o r s u r v i v a l ; c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p of d i s t u r b a n c e s t o t h e communications network i n t h e

2) t h e c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n of food p r o d u c t i o n , which i n c l u d e d t h e b u i l a i n g p r o d u c t i o n a r e a s around London i n t h e g e two stlortogee. The most s t r i k i n g

of n a t i o n a l m a r k e t s and t h e promotion of t h e i d e a s t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l p a t t e r n o v e r a l l i s t h a t of 1795-96 when a t l e a s t f i f t y food d i s t u r b a n c e s

markets should have p r i o r i t y o v e r l o c a l needs and t h a t t h e m a r k e t ' s took p l a c e a t c o m u n c a t i o n c e n t r e s , e i t h e r c o a s t a l p o r t s , c a n a l o r r i v e r

o p e r a t i o n tended t o s e t a j u s t , p r o p e r and e f f i c i e n t p r i c e ; 3) t h e d i s - p o r t s , o r towns w i t h i n easy c a r t i n g d i s t a n c e of major p o p u l a t i o n c e n t r e s "

m a n t l i n g of t h e e x t e n s i v e p r e v i o u s l y - e x i s t i n g c o n t r o l s o v e r t h e d i s t r i b u - (Stevenson 1974: 43). Yet t h e r e f l e c t i o n of t h e market came through a

t i o n of food, which gave t h e l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n a p r i o r c l a i m o v e r food pro- d i s t o r t i n g m i r r o r , f o r t h e most thoroughly c o m e r c i a l i z e d a r e a s , a d j a c e n t

duced and s o l d i n s l o c a l i t y , and bound t h e l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o p r o v i d e t o l a r g e o l d c i t i e s , d i d n o t t y p i c a l l y produce food r i o t s . There, t h e

f o r t h e a u b s i a t e n c e of t h e l o c a l poor. market had a l r e s d y won o u t o v e r l o c a l r i g h t s t o t h e food s u p p l y .

E.P. Thompson h a s c a l l e d t h e e n t i r e p r o c e s s a d e c l i n e i n t h e o l d D e s p i t e t h e s a l i e n c e of t h e market. t h e food r i o t a l s o r e s u l t e d

Moral Economy, a s h i f t from a bread nexus t o a c a s h nexus. People r e s i s t e d i n p a r t from t h e r i s e of t h e n a t i o n a l s t a t e . In g e n e r a l (although with
g r e a t h e s i t a t i o n s , v a r i a t i o n s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n outcome) European s t a t e - forms, althougli a t t i m e s and tempos which v a r i e d markedly from one p a r t of

makers a c t e d t o promote a l l t h r e e of t h e p r o c e s s e s u n d e r l y i n g t h e food t h e West t o a n o t h e r . F i r s t , t h e s t a t e won almost everywhere. One may

r i o t : p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n , c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n , d i s m a n t l i n g of l o c a l con- a s k how complete t h e v i c t o r y of t h e s t a t e was i n t h e remote s e c t i o n s

trols. A s t h e i r dependent governmental s t a f f s , urban p o p u l a t i o n s and non- of v a s t t e r r i t o r i e s such a s Canada, A u s t r a l i a o r B r n z i l , and s p e c u l a t e

a g r i c u l t u r a f l a b o r f o r c e s s w e l l e d , t h e managers of s t a t e s i n t e r v e n e d i n - whether r e c e n t s u r g e s of s e c t i o n a l i s m i n Belgium. G r e a t B r i t a i n and even

c r e a s i n g l y t o promote marketing. (There i s i r o n y i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y France p r e s a g e t h e end of s t a t e c o n t r o l . Yet on t h e whole t h e two cen-

a c t e d t h u s i n t h e nome of f r e e i n g t h e m a r k e t . ) As Stevenson s a y s of t h e t u r i e s a f t e r 1700 produced an enormous c o n c e n t r a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s and

English c r i s i s of 1795: means of c o e r c i o n under t h e c o n t r o l of n a t i o n a l s t a t e s , t o t h e v t r t u n l

The government, however, was determined t o keep o u t of t h e i n t e r n a l e x c l u s i o n of o t h e r l e v e l s of government. Second, a whole s e r i e s of orgnni-

c o r n t r a d e and a t t e m p t e d t o keep up t h e normal c i r c u l a t i o n of z a t i o n n l changes c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o u r b a n i z a t i o n . i n d u s t r i a l i z n t i o l ~and t h e

g r o i n , s o t h a t t h e l a r g e urban c e n t r e s would b e s u p p l i e d . On expansion of c a p i t a l i s m g r e a t l y reduced t h e r o l e of t h e communal group a s

t h e s e grounds t h e government r e f u s e d t o y i e l d t o t h e p l e a s of a s e t t i n g f o r m o b i l i z a t i o n and a s a r e p o s i t o r y f o r power; t h e a s s o c i a t i o n

l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e normal movement of g r a i n of one kind o r a n o t h e r came t o b e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c v e h i c l e f o r c o l l e c t i v e

. . . I t was r e p o r t e d t o t h e Home O f f i c e t h a t s t o p p i n g t h e move- action. The r i s e of t h e j o i n t - s t o c k company, tlie p o l i t i c a l p n r t y , tlie

ment of g r a i n had become s o widespread t h a t c o u n t r y m i l l e r s were l a b o r union, t h e c l u b a l l belong t o t h e same g e n e r a l t r e n d .

s a i d t o b e f r i g h t e n e d t o send g r a i n t o t h e c a p i t a l e x c e p t by n i g h t . Working t o g e t h e r , t h e v i c t o r y of t h e s t a t e and t h e r i s e of t h e ss-

I n an a t t e m p t t o f r e e t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of g r a i n from t h e s e checks s o c i a t i o n transformed t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s which most commonly produced

t h e government passed an a c t t o p r e v e n t t h e s t o p p i n g of g r a i n by violence. I n c o u n t r y of t e r c o u n t r y , p o l i t i c s n a t i o n a l i z e d ; tlie p o l i t y

making t h e whole hundred l i a b l e t o f i n e and i n d i v i d u a l s l i a b l e t o which m a t t e r e d was t h e one which c o n t r o l l e d t h e n n t i o n a l s t a t e ; t h e cru-

f i n e and imprisonment (Stevenson 1974: 41-42). c i a l s t r u g g l e s f o r p a r e r went o n a t a n n t i o n a l s c a l e . And tlie p a r t i c i p a n t s

I n t h a t c r i s i s , many l o c o 1 o f f i c i a l s sought t o r e s t r i c t t h e f l o w of g r a i n i n t h o s e s t r u g g l e s were most o f t e n o r g a n i z e d a s a s s o c i a t i o n s . The s t r i k e .

away from t h e i r own markets. Within t h r e e d e c a d e s , however, t h e market t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h e p a r t y c o n s p i r a c y , t h e o r g a n i z e d march on t h e c a p i t a l .

and t h e n n t i o n a l government had won t h e i r b a t t l e ; few mayors and magis- t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y s e s s i o n , t h e mass meeting become t h e u s u a l s e t t i n g s f o r

t r a t e s c h o s e t o c o u n t e r t h e n a t i o n a l w i l l , and few hungry crowds harbored collective violence. The s t a t e became a n i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i c i p a n t Ln a l l

t h e hope of making them do s o . One of t h e E n g l i s h forms.of c o l l e c t i v e collective violence -- a s policemen, a s p n r t y t o t h e c o n f l i c t , a s t e r t i u s

a c t i o n had w i t h e r e d away. gaudens.

Two t h i n g s e v e n t u a l l y p u t a n end t o t h e predominance of t h e r e a c t i v e The d i s c o v e r y t h a t c o l l e c t i v e ' v i o l e n c e i s a by-product of t h e

same political processes which produce nonviolent collective action does CIWPTER SEVEN: REVOLUTION AND REBELLION

not mean, then, that it is an uninteresting by-product. The occurrence

of damage to persons or objects gives us some small assurance that at Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes

least one of the parties to the collective action took it seriously. We have encountered our share of Big Words on the way from mobili-

More important, violence makes collective action visible: authorities, zation to revolution. Interest, power and violence have all turned out

participants and observers tend to set darn some record of their actions. to be controversial concepts not only because they refer to complex reali-

reactions and observations. Collective violence therefore serves as s ties but also because alternative definitions of each of them tend to im-

convenient trscer of major alterations in collective action as a whole. ply alternative political programs. That is why Stephen Lukes npesks of

Like all tracers. we must use it with care. "pluralist ," "reformist" and [truly] "rsdlcsl" definitions of parer. The

same is certainly true of our final Big Word: revolution. Revoli~tionary

reality is complex. And whether it includes coupn, sssossinations, ter-

rorism or slow, massive changes such as induetriolieation is controversial

not only because the world is complex, but also becaune to call something

revolutionary is. within most forms of western political discourse, to

identify it as good or bad.

Nevertheless, most western analysts of revolution restrict their de-

finitions by means of two sorts of requirements: 1) by insisting that the

actors and the action meet some demanding standards -- tl~atthey be booed

on an oppressed class, that they have a comprehensive program of social

transformation in view. or some other Cause of seriouness; 2) by dealing

only with cases in which parer actually changes hands. Peter Cnlvert, for

example, builds the following elements into his conception of revolution:

(a) A process in which the political direction of a state hecomes

increasingly discredited in the eyes of either the populntion an a

whole or certain key sections of it ...

(b) A change of government (transition) at s clearly defined point

in time by the use of armed force, or the credible threat of its

 u s e ; namely, a n event. I w h e r e . a l o n g t h e s e two dimensions.
I
(c) A more-or-less c o h e r e n t programme of change i n e i t h e r t h e pol- Revolutionary S i t u a t i o n s

i t i c a l o r t h e s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of o s t a t e , o r b o t h , induced by The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a r e v o l u t i o n o r y s i t u a t i o n , a s

t h e p o l i t i c a l leadership a f t e r a revolutionory event, the transi- Leon T r o t s k y s a i d l o n g ago, is t h e p r e s e n c e of more than one b l o c e f f e c -

t i o n of power, h a s o c c u r r e d .
I t i v e l y e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l o v e r s s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e s t a t e a p p a r a t u s :

( d ) A p o l i t i c a l myth t h a t g i v e s t o t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p r e s u l - The h i s t o r i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n b r i n g s about. i n t h e

t i n g from a r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r a n s i t i o n s h o r t - t e r m s t a t u s a s t h e l e g i t - 1 pre-revolutionary p e r i o d , a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e c l a s s which is

imate government of t h e s t a t e ( C a l v e r t 1970:4). c a l l e d t o r e a l i z e t h e new s o c i a l system, a l t h o u g h n o t y e t m i s t e r

i of t h e c o u n t r y , h a s a c t u a l l y c o n c e n t r a t e d i n i t s hands a s i g n i f i -
Thus, h e goes o n , " i n o r d e r t o i n v e s t i g a t e f u l l y t h e concept of r e v o l u t i o n ,

i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o s t u d y i n d e t a i l p r o c e s s , e v e n t , programme, and

I c s n t s h a r e of t h e s t a t e power, w h i l e t h e o f f i c i a l a p p a r a t u s of t h e

government i s s t i l l i n t h e hands of t h e o l d l o r d s . That is t h e i n i -

myth a s d i s t i n c t phenomena" ( C a l v e r t 1970:4). He c o n f i n e s h i s own s t u d y
t i a l d u a l power i n every r e v o l u t i o o .
t o r e v o l u t i o n o r y e v e n t s : changes of government accomplished by f o r c e .

That c h o i c e g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e s t h e number of c a s e s he h a s t o examine, s i n c e But t h a t i s n o t i t s o n l y form. I f t h e new c l a s s , pLaced i n power

most such e v e n t s do n o t meet h i s c r i t e r i a a , b and c . Yet t h e i n s i s t e n c e by a r e v o l u t i o n which i t d i d n o t want, is i n e s s e n c e an a l r e a d y o l d ,

on armed f o r c e and on an a c t u a l t r a n s f e r of power e l i m i n a t e s many i n s t a n c e s h i s t o r i c a l l y b e l a t e d , c l a s s ; i f i t was a l r e a d y worn o u t b e f o r e i t

i n which competing o b s e r v e r s s e e something r e v o l u t i o n a r y : t h e I n d u s t r i a l was o f f i c i a l l y crowned; i f on coming t o power i t e n c o u n t e r s on an-

Revolution, r e v o l u t i o n s from above, t h e l e g e n d a r y General S t r i k e of t h e t a g o n i s t s u f f i c i e n t l y mature and r e a c h i n g o u t its hand toward t h c

s y n d i c a l i s t s , and s o on. On t h e o t h e r hand. t h e d e f i n i t i o n h a s a hard- helm of s t a t e ; then i n s t e a d of o n e u n s t a b l e two-power cquilibrium,

nosed q u a l i t y which many a d v o c a t e s of r e v o l u t i o n w i l l f i n d u n a c c e p t a b l e ; i t t h e p o l i t i c a l r e v o l u t i o n produces a n o t h e r , s t i l l l e s s s t a b l e . To

does n o t i n s i s t t h a t t h e p a r t y which s e i z e s power be d i s p o s s e s s e d , pro- overcome t h e "anarchy" of t h i s twofold s o v e r e i g n t y becomes a t c v c r y

g r e s s i v e o r even angry. new s t e p t h e t a s k o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n -- o r t h e counter-revolution

No concept of r e v o l u t i o n can e s c a p e some such d i f f i c u l t i e s , because i (Trotsky 1965: 224).

no c o n c e p t u o l i z e r con a v o i d making some such c h o i c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , we

The shadow of Russia i n 1917 f a l l s d a r k a c r o s s t h i s passage. From t h e
c a n c l e a r a good d e a l of c o n c e p t u a l ground by means of a s i m p l e d i s t i n c t i o n
p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , comes a n i d e a of g e n e r a l v a l u e . Trot-
between r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s and revolutionor)! outcomes. Most s i g n i f i -
s k y ' s i d e a of d u a l s o v e r e i g n t y c l a r i f i e s a number of f e a t u r e s oE r e v o l u -
c a n t disagreement a b o u t t h e proper d e f i n i t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n f a l l s some-
tionary situations. P e t e r Amann h a s gone s o f a r a s t o f a s h i o n i t i n t o a
s e r v i c e a b l e d e f i n i t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n i t s e l f : f o r him, a r e v o l u t i o n b e g i n s t o a l l o w f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h r e e o r more s i m u l t a n e o u s b l o c s . =-
when more than o n e "power bloc" regarded a s l e g i t i m a t e and s o v e r e i g n by s o v e r e i g n t y is t h e n t h e i d e n t i f y i n g E e a t u r e of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u -

some of a c o u n t r y ' s people emerges, and ends when o n l y one power b l o c ations. A r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n b e g i n s when a government p r e v i o u s l y .

remains. under t h e c o n t r o l of a s i n g l e , s o v e r e i g n p o l i t y becomes t h e o b j e c t of e f -

Amann's a d a p t a t i o n of T r o t s k y h a s t h e advantage of n e a t l y i d e n t i f y i n g f e c t i v e , competing, m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s on tlie p a r t of two o r more

t h e common p r o p e r t i e s of coups, c i v i l wars and f u l l - s c a l e r e v o l u t i o n s distinct politiea. I t ends when s s i n g l e s o v e r e i g n p o l i t y r e g a i n s con-

w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g knowledge of what happened n e x t . It still permits t r o l o v e r t h e government.

t h e i r d i s t i n c t i o n i n terms of t h e i d e n t i t i e s of t h e power b l o c s themselves. Such a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of p o l i t i e s o c c u r s under f o u r d i f f e r e n t con-

At t h e same time i t I d e n t i f i e s a weakness i n T r o t s k y ' s f o r m u l s t i o n : the ditions:

i n s i s t e n c e t h a t a s i n g l e c l a s s makes a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n . ,Barring-
1. The members of o n e p o l i t y a t t e m p t t o s u b o r d i n a t e a n o t h e r pre-
ton Moore's t r e a t m e n t of t h e g r e a t e s t modern r e v o l u t i o n s c o r r e c t s t h a t
viously d i s t i n c t polity. Where t h e two p o l i t i e s a r e c l e a r l y s o v e r e i g n
weakness by t r a c i n g o u t t h e c o a l i t i o n s of c l a s s e s which t o r e down t h e o l d
and independent a t t h e o u t s e t we a r e l i k e l y t o c o n s i d e r t h i s con-
regimes. Thus f o r Moore a c o n l l t i o n of workers, b o u r g e o i s and p e a s a n t s
f l i c t a s p e c i a l v a r i e t y of war. Circumstances l i k e t h e a n n e x a t i o n
made t h e French Revolution, even i f t h e workers and p e a s a n t s l o s t o u t
of Texas t o t h e United S t a t e s o r tlie t r a n s f e r s of power t o v a r i o u s
f a i r l y soon. What is more, Moore argues t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e revolu-
communist regimes i n E a s t e r n Europe a t t h e end o f t h e Second World
t i o n a r y s l t u a t i o n shaped t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome. The f a c t t h a t i t
War f a l l , i n f a c t , i n t o an u n c e r t a i n a r e a between war and r e v o l u t i o n .
was b o u r g e o i s + peasants + workers r a t h e r than t h e d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n s

which made t h e American, E n g l i s h o r Russian r e v o l u t i o n s , i n Moore's view, 2. The members of a p r e v i o u s l y s u b o r d i n a t e p o l i t y . such a s t h e

pushed France toward t h e a t t e n u a t e d p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy s h e maintained group of c o n t e n d e r s h o l d i n g power o v e r a r e g i o n a l government, a s s e r t

i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h and t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . sovereignty. Here tlie words " r e b e l l i o n " and " r e v o l t " s p r i n g r e a d i l y

Two of T r o t s k y ' s r e s t r i c t i o n s t h e r e f o r e seem unnecessary: 1 ) t h a t t o mind. Yet i n r e c e n t y e a r s i t h a s become q u i t e u s u a l t o c a l l one

each of t h e b l o c s c o n s i s t of a s i n g l e s o c i a l c l a s s ; 2) t h a t t h e r e b e o n l y v e r s i o n of such e v e n t s a c o l o n i a l o r n a t l o n o l r e v o l u t i o n -- especially

two sucli b l o c s a t any p o i n t i n time. E i t h e r of t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s would i f t h e outcome i s independence.

e l i m i n a t e most of t h e s t a n d a r d c a s e s of r e v o l u t i o n -- n o t l e a s t t h o s e of
3. Contenders n o t h o l d i n g membership i n t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t y mob1,llze
France, China and Mexico.
i n t o a b l o c s u c c e s s f u l l y e x e r t i n g c o n t r o l o v e r some p o r t i o n of t h e
rots sky's i d e a r e t a i n s i t s o n a l y s t i c r e s i l i e n c y i f expanded t o in-
governmental a p p a r a t u s . D e s p i t e t h e o t t r a c t i v e n c s s of t h i s v e r s i o n
c l u d e b l o c s c o n s i s t i n g of c o a l i t i o n s of c l a s s e s and/or o t h e r groups and
 t o l e a d e r s of t h e d i s p o s s e s s e d , i t r a r e l y , i f ever, occurs i n a
body c l a i m i n g c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government, o r c l a i m i n g t o & t h e Rovcrn-
pure form.
ment . . . and t h o s e p r e v i o u s l y a c q u i e s c e n t people obey t h e a l t e r n a t i v e

The more u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e is t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of an e x i s t i n g body. They pay t a x e s , p r o v i d e men t o i t s a r m i e s , f e e d i t s f u n c t i o n a r i e s ,

4.
honor i t s symbols, give, time t o i t s s e r v i c e , o r y i e l d o t h e r r e s o u r c e s des-
p o l i t y i n t o two o r more b l o c s each e x e r c i s j n g c o n t r o l over some p a r t
p i t e t h e p r o h i b i t i o n s of a s t i l l - e x i s t i n g government t h e y Formerly obeyed.
of t h e government. That f r a g m e n t a t i o n f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e s t h e emer-
M u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y h a s begun. When o n l y one p o l i t y e x e r t i n g e x c l ~ r s l v e
gence o f c o a l i t j o n s between e s t a b l i s h e d members of t h e p o l i t y and
c o n t r o l o v e r tlie government remains, and no r i v n l s a r e s u c c e s s f u l l y p r e s -
m o b i l i z i n g nonmembers. 1
/ . I
I sing t h e i r claims -- however t h a t hsppeiis -- the revolutionary situation
How would we r e c o g n i z e t h e o n s e t of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y ? The q u e s t i o n
I h a s ended.*
i s s t i c k i e r than i t seems a t f i r s t g l a n c e . N e i t h e r tlie p r e s e n c e nor t h e
i R e v o l u t i o n a r y Outcomes
expansion of a r e n s of autonomy o r of r e s i s t a n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e s u b j e c t
I "A r e v o l u t i o n . " w r i t e s Samuel Huntington. "is a r a p i d . fundnmentnl,
populntion i s a r e l i a b l e s i g n . A 1 1 governments e x c i t e some s o r t s of r e s i s -

t a n c e , and a l l governments e x e r t incomplete c o n t r o l o v e r t h e i r s u b j e c t s .

I
I
and v i o l e n t ' domestic change i n t h e dominant v a l u e s and myths of a s o c i e t y ,

i n i t s p o l i t i c a l i n s i t u t i o n s , s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . l e a d e r s h i p . and govern-
That was t h e p o i n t of t h e e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s of r e p r e s s i o n , t o l e r a t i o n and

i
ment a c t i v i t y and p o l i c i e s . R e v o l u t i o n s a r e t h u s t o be d i s t i n g u i s l ~ e d
facilitation. Most s t a t e s f a c e c o n t i n u i n g marginal c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e i r
from i n s u r r e c t i o n s , r e b e l l i o n s , r e v o l t s , coups, and wars of independence"
s o v e r e i g n t y : from w i t h j n , b a n d i t s , v i g i l a n t e s , r e l i g i o u s communities, na-
(Huntington 1968: 264). H u n t i n g t o n ' s d e f i n i t i o n s t r e s s e s outcomes, n o t
t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s o r uncompromising s e p a r a t i s t s hold them o f f . From with-
t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s which l e a d t o t h o s e outcomes. Such outcomes a r e
o u t , powerful s t a t e s i n f i l t r a t e them and encroach on t l i e i r p r e r o g a t i v e s . Depending on how g e n e r o u s l y one i n t e r p r e t e d t h e v o r d s "rapjd" and
rare.
A 1 1 of t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s have some d i s t a n t k i n s h i p t o r e v o l u t i o n , b u t
"fundamental", i t would be e a s y t o a r g u e t h a t no r e v o l u t i o n hns e v e r
they do n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s . Even r i v a l c l a i m s t o

I
o c c u r r e d , and h a r d t o a r g u e t h a t t h e number of t r u e c a s e s exceeds n h a l f -
t h o s e of t h e e x i s t i n g p o l i t y by t h e s d h e r e n t s o f d i s p l a c e d regimes, m i -
I dozen. P e t e r ~ s l v e r t ' sd e f i n i t l o n o f r e v o l u t i o n , which we looked a t
litary movements o r o u t s i d e s t a t e s a r e q u i t e common. The c l a i m s them-
e a r l i e r , i s somewhat l e s s demanding than H u n t i n g t o n ' s . I t merely r e -
s e l v e s do n o t amount t o n r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n .
q u i r e s t h a t a government b e d i s c r e d i t e d , t h a t a new group s e i z e t h e gov-
The q u e s t i o n is whether some s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e s u b j e c t popu- ernment by f o r c e , t h a t tlie newcomers i n t r o d u c e a program of change, and
l a t i o n honors t h e c l a i m . The r e v o l u t i o n a r y moment a r r i v e s when p r e v i o u s l y

o c q u l e s c e n t members of t h a t p o p u l a t i o n f i n d themselves c o n f r o n t e d w i t h
* I r e g r e t t o s s y t h a t i n a n e a r l i e r v e r s i o n of t h i s c h a p t e r ( T i l l y 1975 ).
s t r i c t l y i n c o m p a t i b l e demands from t h e and f o r m an a l t e r n a t i v e
I used t h e word " r e v o l u t i o n " f o r t h e c i r c u m s t s n c e s I am h e r e c a l l i n g o r e v o l -

tionary situation
 tions. The medium r u n of T r o t s k y ' s a n a l y s i s c o n c e r n s Lhe p e a s a n t s who
t l i a t a myth l e g i t i m a t i n g t h e t r a n s f e r of power come i n t o being. Except f o r

t h e discrediting, t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , too, a r e outcomes; t h e r e is no r e l i a - had been m o b i l i z e d v i a t h e army. t h e o r g a n i z e d workers of P e t r o a r a d and

Moscow, tlie p a r t i e s and t h e p r o c e s s e s by which each of them m o b i l i z e d

b l e way t o know whether a r e v o l u t i o n i s o c c u r r i n g u n t i l t h e whole p r o c e s s
and formed c o a l i t i o n s . I n t h i s medium run, r e p r e s s i o n and f a c i l i t a t i o n
h a s ended.

For t h e moment, I propose a n even l e s s demanding s t a n d a r d t h a n Cal-

figure a s well -- n o t a b l y i n t h e d i s c r e d i t i n g and wenkening of t h e

T s a r i s t regime by tlie war. I t i s I n t h i s medium r u n t l i a t t h e c r e a t i o n o r

vert's. A r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome i s t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t of o n e s e t of power-

h o l d e r s by a n o t h e r . That s i m p l e d e f i n i t i o n l e a v e s many r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s emergence of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s t o -- and m y be es-

o v n t l a b l e : power o v e r tlie means of p r o d u c t i o n , power o v e r symbols, power

sential to -- a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome. Without t h e a p p e a r a n c e of mul-

o v e r government. P r o v i s i o n a l l y , l e t u s t a k e power o v e r government a s o u r t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y a s i g n i f i c a n t t r a n s f e r o f power is e i t h e r i m p o s s i b l e o r

highly unlikely.
reference point. A r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome i s t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t of o n e s e t
I n t h e l o n g r u n , i n t e r e s t s and o r g a n i z a t i o n b e g i n t o t e l l . In t h i s
of members of :he p o l i t y by a n o t h e r s e t . Clearly, a revolutionory situation
book, we have o n l y faced t h e c h a l l e n g e of l o n g r u n a n a l y s i s i n t e r m i t t e n t l y ,
can occur w i t h o u t n r e v o l u t i o n o r y outcome; i n t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e , t h e
J
through q u i c k g l i m p s e s a t t h e consequences of p r o l e t a r i a n i z n t l o n , t h e
e x i s t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y b e a t down t h e i r c h a l l e n g e r s a f t e r a p e r i o d
development of c a p i t a l i s m , s t a t e m k i n g , u r b a n i z a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .
of e f f e c t i v e , competing, m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s . I t is a t l e a s t logic- I
! The q u i c k g l i m p s e s have, however, been g r a p h i c enough t o conunt~nicate t h e
a l l y p o s s i b l e f o r s r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome t o o c c u r w i t h o u t a r e v o l u t i o n a r y
fundamental importance of t h r e o t e n e d c l a s s i n t e r e s t s . Over t h e l o n g run.
s i t u a t i o n , through t h e g r a d u a l a d d i t i o n a n d / o r s u b t r a c t i o n of members of 1
t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of production c r e a t e s t h e c h i e f h f s t o r i c a l a c t o r s .
the polity.
' t h e major c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of i n t e r e s t s , t h e b a s i c t h r e a t s t o t h o s e i n t e r -
I n g e n e r a l , how does t h e displacement of o n e s e t of powerholders by
e s t s , and t h e p r i n c i p a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a n s f e r s of power.
a n o t h e r happen7 The answer depends i n p a r t on t h e t i m e - p e r s p e c t i v e we
S i t u a t i o n s and Outcomes Combined
adopt. I n t h e s h o r t r u n , t h e q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n s t a c t i c s and t h e b a l a n c e
Our c o n c e p t s w i l l do b e t t e r work f o r u s i f we t u r n them i n t o c o n t i n u o .
of f o r c e s . In T r o t s k y ' s a n a l y s i s of t h e October Revolution, f o r example.
A s i t u a t i o n can be more o r l e s s r e v o l u t i o n a r y . The c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n is:
t h e t a c t i c a l problems of winning over t h e Petrogrod g a r r i s o n and t h e n of
a t t h e p o i n t i n time which we a r e e v a l u a t i n g , how much w u l d i t c o s t t o
c a p t u r i n g t h e Winter P a l a c e loom v e r y l a r g e ; g e n e r a l i z e d . T r o t s k y ' s con-
e l i m i n a t e t h e s p l i t between t h e a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s 7 How n e a r l y i r r e -
c e r n s p l a c e t h e c o n t r o l o r n e u t r a l i z a t i o n of t h e a v a i l a b l e m l l i t a r y f o r c e
vocable is t h e s p l i t 7 We should t r y t o make t h a t jugement from i n t o r m o t i o n
a t tlie c e n t e r of t h e s h o r t - r u n c o n d i t i o n s f o r a t r a n s f e r of power.
a v a i l a b l e a t the, p o i n t i n time we a r e judging, r a t h e r than from e v e n t u a l
I n t h e medium r u n , we a r r i v e a t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which have domin-
outcomes. I f we want t o judge a completed r e v o l u t i o n a s a whole,
a t e d t h i s book: t h e p r e s e n c e of mobilized c o n t e n d e r s i n e f f e c t i v e c o a l i -
we can f i x on t h e mean s p l i t between p o l i t i e s , t h e owximum s p l i t , t h e i n i -

t i a l s p l i t o r t h e time-function a s a whole. I n any c a s e , o n e extreme i s

no m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y a t a l l , t h e o t h e r a n i r r e v o c a b l e s p l i t . Inbetween

are d i v i s i o n s c o s t i n g t h e p a r t i e s v a r y i n g amounts t o e l i m i n a t e .

c o s t d e f i n i t e l y i n c l u d e s t h e c o s t of r e p r e s s i o n t o t h e r e p r e s s o r s and
The
I
I
I
F i g u r e 7-1: Combinations of R e v o l u t i o n a r y S i t u a t i o n s and Revolotionary
Outcomes

tlie r e p r e s s e d . The sum of a l l p a y o f f s and foregone b e n e f i t s should a l s o

enter in. I f s o , t h e e s t i m a t e d c o s t w i l l o b v i o u s l y depend on t h e time-

period c o n s i d e r e d -- and w i l l o b v i o u s l y i n c l u d e some t h i n k i n g a b o u t what

might have happened i f ...

Complete
An outcome can a l s o be more o r l e s s r e v o l u t i o n a r y . Now t h e c e n t r a l
1 Displacement
Revolution
q u e s t i o n is: how c l o s e d i d t h e e x i s t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y come t o

b e i n g compLetely d i s p l a c e d ? We may s e t t l e f o r a s i m p l e h a d c o u n t . We Silent

Revolution
may weight t h e heads by t h e i r power p r i o r t o t h e change, b u t s t i l l s e t t l e

f o r c o u n t i n g how many heads r o l l e d . We may t r y t o e s t i m a t e t h e power of

a l l p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g members b e f o r e and a f t e r . I n any c a s e , o n e extreme

w i l l be t h e maintenance o r r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e s t a t u s quo a n t e , t h e o t h e r

extreme tlie complete e l i m i n a t i o n o f p r e v i o u s members from tlie p o l i t y . In

between w i l l be v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of d i s p l a c e m e n t . i
The d e c i s i o n whether t o c a l l a n e v e n t a r e v o l u t i o n now l o o k s l i k e
Politics
a s Usual
F i g u r e 7-1. P o l i t i c s a s u s u a l i n v o l v e s l i t t l e o r no d i s p l a c e m e n t of e x i s -

t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y , and no more than low-cost s p l i t s between a l -

ternative polities. Coups i n v o l v e h i g h e r - c o s t s p l i t s ( a l t h o u g h n o t i r -

I NO
Split
. .. Irrevocable
Split
r e v o c a b l e o n e s ) , b u t r e s u l t i n r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e displacement of e x i s t i n g
Revolutionary S i t u a t i o n
members. S i l e n t r e v o l u t i o n s , i f they o c c u r , produce major d i s p l a c e m e n t s

w i t h l i t t l e o r no development of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n . Great revolu- !

t i o n s a r e extreme i n b o t h r e g a r d s : e x t e n s i v e s p l i t s between a l t e r n a t i v e

p o l i t i e s , l a r g e - s c a l e d i s p l a c e m e n t of e x i s t i n g members. I n F i g u r e 7-1,
 7-13
F i g u r e 7-2: S y n d i c a l i s t , M a r x i s t and B r i n t o n l n n Maps of Revolutiorlnry
Reality
L i n e A r e p r e s e n t s a gencrous d e f i n i t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n : e v e r y t h i n g t o t h e

r i g h t g e t s counted. Line B s t a t e s a r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n ; only g r e a t SYNDICALIST

revolutions qualify.

Altliougl~t h e diagram i s e n t i r e l y c o n c e p t u a l , i t h e l p s p i n p o i n t some

important t h e o r e t i c a l i s s u e s . S t u d e n t s of r e v o l u t i o n d i s a g r e e o v e r t h e

combinations of outcome and r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t t r a t i o n which a r e a c t u a l l y

p o s s i b l e i n t h i s world. To s i m p l i f y a complex s e t of d i s a g r e e m e n t s , l e t
I \-\/
/ Unreal I
u s l o o k a t t h r e e i d e a l i z e d maps of t h e p o s s i b l e and t h e impossible:
Difiplacement
NO
I
Irrevocable
"Syndicalist", "Marxist" and "Brintonian". They appear i n F i g u r e 7-2.
s'plit
Thc S y n d i c a l i s t argument, i n i t s s i m p l e s t form, r u n s : t h e more e x t e n s i v e
MARXIST
t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e more sweeping t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome.

I t is a c a u s a l argument. I t s a y s t h e c r e a t i o n of a n i r r e v o c a b l e s p l i t be-
Complete 1
tween a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s w i l l , i n i t s e l f , produce a t o t a l d i s p l a c e m e n t

o f t h e e x i s t i n g h o l d e r s of power. It a l s o says: t h e l e s s extensive the

r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e l e s s e x t e n s i v e t h e t r a n s f e r of power.

Tlie Marxlst argumcnt ( e s p e c i a l l y a s a r t i c u l a t e d by such r e v o l u t i o n a r y

t h e o r i s t s a s Cramsci and Lenin) d i s a g r e e s . I t a r g u e s t h a t many a r e v o l u -

t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n f a i l s t o produce a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome -- for lack of

a vanguard, f o r l a c k of a d i s c i p l i n e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y p a r t y , f o r l a c k of

t h e r i g h t c l a s s c o a l i t i o n s , and so on. But i t a g r e e s wit11 t h e s y n d i c a l i s t

nrgument i n o n e i m p o r t a n t r e g a r d : no r e v o l u t i o n a r y t r a n s f e r s of power oc-

c u r w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e revolutionary s i t u a t i o n s . Thus a two-part revolu-

tionary s t r a t e g y : c r e a t e (or look f o r ) a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n ; organize

t h e p o l i t i c a l means f o r a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome.

Crane R r i n t o n d e l i b e r a t e l y took t h e o p p o s i t e view. He argued import-

a n t i n t e r n a l . l i m i t s on t h e c r e a t i o n of any r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n ; r e a c -

t i o n was i n e v i t a b l e . He s u g g e s t e d , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p No Irrevocable
'tl~pl Split
between s i t u a t i o n and outcome was n e g a t i v e : t h e more r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e
s i t u a t i o n , t h e l e s s r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e outcome. A people who went through

a maJor r e v o l u t i o n r e t u r n e d , w i t h r e l i e f , more o r l e s s t o t h e s t a r t i n g

point. But t h e more s e n s i b l e g r a d u a l i s t s , thought B r i n t o n , produced mn-

F i g u r e 7-3: S i t u a t i o n s and Outcomes i n D i f f e r e n t Types of Power T r a n n f e r s
j o r a l t e r a t t o n s of t h e power s t r u c t u r e . The arguments among S y n d i c a l i s t s ,

M a r x i s t s and B r i n t o n i a n s a r e w i t h u s today.

F i g u r e 7-3 o f f e r s a r e v i s e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of t r a n s f e r s of power

i n terms of t h e e x t e n t t o which r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t r ~ tni o n s a n d / o r r e v o l u t i o n -

a r y outcomes o c c u r . The diagram t e l l s u s t o t a k e a k o a d view of revolu-

t i o n , r e q u i r i n g o n l y some minimum combination of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n

and r e v o l u l i o n a r y outcome t o q u a l i f y an e v e n t a s a r e v o l u t i o n . It a s s e r t s
complete
Displacement
/'
I1 Revolution

t h a t t h e phenomena we c a l l "coups", "insurrections", " c i v i l wars" and

"full-scale revolutions" overlap, I ~ u tn o t c o m p l e t e l y . Each h a s i t s own

c l i a r n c t c r i s t i c r a n g e o f outcomes and r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s . But t h e

b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e s among them r e g a r d t h e i d e n t i t i e s of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e

t r a n s f e r of power: i n t h e coup, members of t h e q w l i t y d i s p l a c e each o t h e r ;

Outcome
i n a f u l l - s c a l e r e v o l u t i o n much o r a l l of t h e p r e v i o u s l y dominant c l a s s

l o s e s power. and s o on.

Although t h e diagram d o e s n o t s a y s o e x p l i c i t l y , t h e oblong f o r " c i v i l

war" b r u s h e s t h e extreme r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , i r r e v o c a b l e s p l i t , t o
No
remlnd u s t h a t one common outcome of c i v i l war i s t h e permanent d i v i s i o n
Displacement 1 Routine
Politics
I
of a t e r r i t o r y p r e v i o u s l y c o n t r o l l e d by a s i n g l e government i n t o two o r No + Irrevocohle
Split Split
more autonomous t e r r i t o r i e s . The diagram i n d i c a t e s t h a t extensive revol-
Revolutionary S i t u a t i o n
u t i o n a r y outcomes do n o t occur w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s .

Rut i t d e n i e s t h e converse: extremely r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s do n o t

n e c e s s n r i l y produce extremely r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcomes. The d e b a t e o v e r

dcEinitfons tokes u s i n t o n debate over t h e substance of p o l i t t c a l c o n f l i c t

and t h e strtrcLure of r e v o l u t i o n .
 Some of o u r most v a l u a b l e a n a l y s e s of r e v o l u t i o n and r e b e l l i o n do
ment ...
n o t concern t h e s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s f o r one o r t h e o t h e r , b u t t h e place-
D, A combination of n o n c u l t i v o t o r s dependent on income from l e n d
ment of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of groups w i t h i n some e q u i v n l e n t of t h e diagram.
and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from wnges l e n d s t o r e v o l u t i o n
Some o f t h e a n a l y s e s c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e m o b i l i z a b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s
( P a i g e 1975: 70-71).
of groups f o r d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of a c t i o n : f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y a c t i v i s m , f o r

p o l i t i c s a s u s u a l , and s o on. Eric Wolf's comparison o f t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y P a i g e t h e n c o n d u c t s two s o r t s of a n n l y s i s t o v e r i f y t h e s e hypotheses:

a g r a r i a n r e b e l l i o n s emphasizes t h e r e l a t i v e m o b i l i z a b i l i t y of poor, mid-
d l e and r i c h p e a s a n t s , a l t h o u g h i t a l s o s a y s i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s a b o u t t h e
way expanding c a p i t a l i s m impinges on r u r a l a r e a s and on t h e i n t e r e s t s of
d i f f e r e n t groups o f p e a s a n t s w i t h i n them.
Some a n a l y s e s g i v e t h e i r primary a t t e n t i o n t o t h e correspondence
between d i f f e r e n t forms of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n and d i f f e r e n t c o n f i g u r a t i o n s
of i n t e r e s t s , w h i l e s a y i n g r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e a b o u t m o b i l i z a t i o n o r a b o u t
t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s l e a d i n g t o p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s and outcomes.
They commonly t a k e t h e form of comparisons f o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c forms
of a c t i o n of people i n c o n t r a s t i n g s t r u c t u r a l s e t t i n g s . Jeffrey Paige's
A g r a r i a n Revolution i s on o u t s t a n d i n g c a s e i n p o i n t . P a i g e sums up h i s
g u i d i n g hypotheses i n t h e s e terms:
A. A combination of b o t h n o n c u l t i v o t o r s and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent
on l a n d a s t h e i r p r i n c i p a l s o u r c e of income l e a d s t o an a g r a r i a n
revolt ...
a comparison of r u r a l s o c i a l movements i n 1 3 5 e x p o r t s e c t o r s of 70 r e l o -
t i v e l y poor c o u n t r i e s from 1948 t o 1970, and d e t a i l e d c a s e s t u d i e s of
The e v i d e n c e l o o k s good f o r h i s argument.
Peru, Angola and Vietnam.
Note how t h e argument works: i t c r o s s - t a b u l a t e s t h e i n t e r e s t s of
c u l t i v a t o r s and n o n c u l t i v a t o r s , deduces t h e c h a r a c t e r and e x t e n t of t h e
i n t e r e s t c o n f l i c t r e s u l t i n g from each combination, and p r e d i c t s from
t h e c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s t o t h e form of t h e c u l t i v a t o r s ' p o l i t i c a l ac-
tion. The s u b s t a n c e of h y p o t h e s i s D i s t h a t t h e combinntion of l a n d
and wages
i n c l u d e s some forms of agricultural o r g n n i z a t i o n which combine
t h e i n f l e x i b l e b e h a v i o r of t h e c u l t i v a t o r s of a landed e s t a t e w i t h
t h e s t r o n g c u l t i v a t o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e c o r p o r a t e p l a n t a t i o n .
When b o t h c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , t h e r e s u l t is l i k e l y t o
b e a n a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n i n which a s t r o n g peasant-based ~uerrillo
movement o r g a n i z e d by a n a t i o n a l i s t o r Communist p a r t y a t t e m p t s

t o d e s t r o y b o t h t h e r u r a l upper c l a s s t h e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e
8. A combination of n o n c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from commer-
s t a t e and e s t a b l i s h a new s o c i e t y . ( P a i g e 1975: 358-359).
c i a l c a p i t a l and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from l a n d l e a d s t o

a reform commodity movement ... P a i g e then makes f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o r r e l n t c u of r e v o l -

u t i o n a r y n a t i o n a l i s t movements and r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i n l i s t movements. Al-

C. A combinaton o f n o n c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from c a p i t a l
though i n h i s c a s e s t u d l e s P a i g e is s e n s i t v e nnd i n f o r m o t i v e a b o u t mobil-
and c u l t i v a t o r s dependent on income from wagcs t o a reform l a b o r move-
 7-L9

i z a t i o n , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e b a s i c t h e o r y and d i s a p p e a r a n c e of a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t i e s -- a r e s u l t which w u l d s u r -

p r e d i c t s a c t i o n from i n t e r e s t s . Here, i n s t e a d , we a r e assuming i n t e r e s t s p r i s e me -- t h e t h i n g t o watch f o r would a t i l l b e tlie commitment of a

, and d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s which l e a d from o r g a n i z e d and s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r motives, t o ex-

conflicting i n t e r e s t s to revolution. c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government c u r r e n t l y

Proximate Causes of R e v o l u t i o n a r y S i t u a t i o n s e x e r t e d by t h e members of tlie p o l i t y .

L e t u s l o o k more c l o s e l y a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n of So why d i d n ' t t h e United S t a t e s break i n t o r e v o l u t i o n w i t h t h e on-

a revolutionary s i t u a t i o n a s m u l t i p l e sovereignty. By d e f i n i t i o n , t h e r e s e t of t h e Depression a f t e r 19301 I c l a i m no s p e c i a l wisdom. Assumlna

a r e t h r e e proximate c a u s e s of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y : t h e working c l a s s a s t h e p r i n c i p a l c a n d i d a t e f o r counter-mobilization,

however, t h i s l i n e of argument s i n g l e s o u t f a c t o r s such a s t h e fol.lowing:

1. t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o n t e n d e r s , o r c o a l i t i o n s of c o n t e n d e r s , ad-
a low i n i t i a l l e v e l of m o b i l i z a t i o n , l a c k of a l i e n a t e d c o o l i t l o n p a r t n e r s
vancing e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e govern-
w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y , s h i f t o f tlie burden of e x t r a c t i o n , a t l e a s t r e l a t i v e l y .
ment which i s c u r r e n t l y e x e r t e d by t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ;
t o unmobilized groups such a s b l a c k s , t r a d i n g of c o n c e s s i o n s which were

2. commitment t o t h o s e c l a i m s by a s i g n i f i c a n t segment of t h e sub- r e l a t i v e l y t o t h e government (For example, tlie r i g h t o f i n d u s t r i a l u n i o n s

j e c t p o p u l a t i o n ( e s p e c i a l l y when t h o s e commitments a r e n o t simply t o o r g a n i z e ) f o r t h e g r a n t i n g of l o y a l t y . . The f a s c i s t s of Germany and

acknowledged i n p r i n c i p l e , b u t a c t i v a t e d i n t h e f a c e of p r o h i b i t i o n s I t a l y went a n o t h e r r o u t e , by d e l i b e r a t e l y d e m o b i l i z i n g t h e working c l a s s .

o r c o n t r a r y directives from t h e government); The o t h e r n a t i o n s of t h e world paid t h e c o s t of t h e d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , i n t h e

form of t h e Second World War.

3. i n c a p a c i t y o r u n w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e a g e n t s of t h e government t o
I n a n e s s a y which Followed h i s l a r g e comparative work. B a t r i n g t o n
s u p p r e s s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n a n d l o r t h e commitment t o i t s
Moore (1969) proposed f o u r p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r major r e v o l u t i o n s :
claims.
1. t h e e l i t e ' s l o s s of u n i f i e d c o n t r o l o v e r army, p o l i c y and o t h e r
Tlie c i r i t i c a l s i g n s of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , i n t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e ,
i n s t r u m e n t s of v i o l e n c e :
a r e s i g n s of tlie emergence of a n a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i t y . These s i g n s may pos-
2. t h e emergence of a c u t e c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t w i t h i n t h e "dominant
s i b l y be r e l a t e d t o c'onditions o t h e r a n a l . y s t s have proposed a s p r e c i p i t a n t s
classes";
of r e v o l u t i o n : r i s i n g d i s c o n t e n t , v a l u e c o n f l i c t , f r u s t r a t i o n o r r e l a t i v e
3. t h e development of widespread c h a l l e n g e s t o p r e v a i l i n 8 modes of
deprivation. Tlie r e l n t i o n s l i i p must, however, be proved and n o t assumed.
thought and t o t h e predominant expiana t i o n s of justifications of
Even ' i f i t i s proved t h a t d i s c o n t e n t , v a l u e c o n f l i c t , f r u s t r a t i o n and
human s u f f e r i n g ;
r e l a t i v e deprivation do f l u c t u a t e i n c l o s e correspondence t o tlie emergence
4. t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y mass, most probably through
 some sudden d i s r u p t i o n of everyday l i f e coupled with i n c r e a s e of October Revolution, a s t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s which h a s j o i n e d t h e revoln-

misery. t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n were b e i n g squeezed o u t of power:

The f i r s t two a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same c o n d i t i o n : t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of Now, however. t h e c o u r s e of world e v e n t s and t h e b i t t e r l e s s o n s

t h e p o l i t y i n t o more than o n e c o a l i t i o n , each a p o t e n t i a l c l a i m a n t t o ex- d e r i v e d from t h e a l l i a n c e of a l l t h e Russian monarchists w i t h

c l u s i v e c o n t r o l of t h e government, and each a p o t e n t i a l c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r Anglo-French and American i m p e r i a l i s m a r e proving in p r a c t i c e

with c h a l l e n g e r s t h a t a r e mobilizing r a p i d l y . Condition 3) may w e l l oc- t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c r e p u b l i c i s a bourgeois-democrntlc r e p u b l i c .

c u r r both i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y , a s t h o s e o u t s i d e e x p r e s s t h e i r which is a l r e a d y o u t of d a t e from t h e p o i n t of view of t h e problems

o u t r a g e a t b e i n g excluded and some of t h o s e i n s i d e respond t o t h e i r com- which i m p e r i a l i s m h a s placed b e f o r e h i a t o r y . They show t h a t t h e r e

p l a i n t s w i t h sympathy o r m a n i p u l a t i o n . i s no other a l t e r n a t i v e : e i t h e r S o v i e t government triumphs i n every

The m o b i l i z a t i o n of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y mass d e s c r i b e s t h e r a p i d appear- advanced c o u n t r y i n t h e world, 5 t h e most r e a c t i o n a r y i m p e r i a l i s m

a n c e of a new c h a l l e n g e r . N o t h i n g i n m y a n a l y s i s o r i n my h i s t o r i c a l r e - triumphs, t h e most snvage i m p e r i a l i s m , w l ~ i c h is t h r o t t l i n g t h e

f l e c t i o n l e a d s me t o assume t h a t t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n must be sudden o r t h a t s m a l l and weak n a t i o n s and r e i n s t a t i n g r e a c t i o n a l l o v e r t h e world

i t must come from i m n i s e r a t i o n . But l i g h t n i n g m o b i l i z a t i o n , i f i t o c c u r s . -- Anglo-American i m p e r i a l i s m , which h a s p e r f e c t l y mastered t h e

d o e s r e d u c e t h e c h a n c e s f o r t h e i n c r e m e n t a l c h a l l e n g i n g , t e s t i n g and c o a l - a r t o f u s i n g t h e form of a democratic r e p u b l i c .

i t i o n - f o r m a t i o n which belong t o t h e r o u t i n e a c q u i s i t i o n of power, and con- One o r t h e o t h e r .

c e n t r a t e s t h e a t t e n d a n t c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i n a s h o r t p e r i o d of time. T h e r e i s no middle c o u r s e ; u n t i l q u i t e r e c e n t l y t h i s vlcw was r e -

We have narrowed t h e f o c u s of e x p l a n a t i o n and p r e d i c t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y . garded a s t h e b l i n d f a n a t i c i s m of t h e Bolsheviks.

I t now comes down t o s p e c i f y i n g and d e t e c t i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under But i t t u r n e d o u t t o b e t r u e (Lenin 19670: 35).

which t h r e e r e l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s o c c u r : 1 ) t h e appearance of c o n t e n d e r s
These c l a i m s came from a p a r t y a l r e a d y i n power. But t h e y were a d d r e s s e d
making e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s , 2) s i g n i f i c a n t commitments t o t h o s e
t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r a t e g i s t s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s who wished t o c o n t i n u e a
c l a i m s , 3) r e p r e s s i v e i n c a p a c i t y of t h e government. The s h o r t r u n condi-
c o l l a b o r a t i v e approach w i t h i n Russia i t s e l f .
t i o n s of t h e s e outcomes m a y k q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h e l o n g run changes
When can we e x p e c t t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o n t e n d e r s ( o r c o a l i t i o n s of
which make them p o s s i b l e . L e t u s c o n c e n t r a t e f o r t h e moment on t h e s h o r t
c o n t e n d e r s ) advancing e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l of t h e
run conditions.
government c u r r e n t l y e x e r t e d by t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ? The q u e s t i o n
A 1ternatives to the Existing Polity
is a t r i f l e m i s l e a d i n g , f o r such c o n t e n d e r s a r e a l m o s t always w i t h u s i n
What 1 mean by " e x c l r ~ s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o c o n t r o l of t h e govern-
t h e form of m i l l e n n i a 1 c u l t s , r a d i c a l c e l l s o r r e j e c t s from p o s i t i o n s of
ment" comes o u t d r a m a t i c a l l y i n an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n a h o u t a year a f t e r t h e
power. The r e a l q u e s t i o n is when such c o n t e n d e r s p r o l i f e r a t e a n d / o r mo- f a l l of d i v e r s e movements of p r o t e s t s i n c e World War I1 h a s shown u s

bilize. t h a t we s t i l l have a l m o s t no power t o a n t i c i p a t e where and when such com-

Two p a t h s l e n d t o t h a t p r o l i f e r a t i o n a n d / o r m o b i l l z a t i o n . The f i r s t m i t t e d groups w i l l a p p e a r .

i s t h e f l o u r i s h i n g of groups which from t h e i r i n c e p t i o n hold t o t r s n s - The t u r n i n g of c o n t e n d e r s from c o m p a t i b l e o b j e c t i v e s i s r n t l i e r l e n s

forming aims which a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e c o n t i n u e d power of t h e members of a m y s t e r y , because we can w i t n e s s i t s o c c u r r e n c e a s o l d members l o s e

of t h e p o l i t y . T r u l y o t h e r - w o r l d l y and r e t r e a t i s t groups s e e k i n g t o t a l t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n t h e p o l i t y and ss c h a l l e n g e r s a r e r e f u s e d a c c e s s t o

withdrawal from contemporary l i f e do n o t f u l l y q u a l i f y , s i n c e i n p r i n c i p l e power. The former i s t h e r e c u r r e n t h i s t o r y of r i g h t - w i n & a c t i v i s m . t h e

!
t h e y can prosper s o l o n g a s t h e r e s t of t h e world l e t s them a l o n e . True l a t t e r t h e standard condition f o r left-wing activism. Marx himself gave
/

r a d i c a l s , t r u e r e a c t i o n a r i e s , a n a r c h i s t s , p r e a c h e r s of t h e o c r a c y , m o n i s t s t h e c l a s s i c a n a l y s i s of t h e p r o c e s s of r a d i c a l i z a t i o n away from some

of almost every p e r s u a s i o n come c l o s e r t o t h e mark. s o r t of accommodation w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g system toward nn e x c l r ~ s i v e , r e v o l -

The second p a t h i s t h e t u r n i n g of c o n t e n d e r s from o b j e c t i v e s which utionary position. l l i s areument was p r e c i s e l y t h a t through r e p e a t e d

o r e c u m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e s u r v l v o l of t h e p o l i t y t o o b j e c t i v e s which s p e l l v i c t i m i z a t i o n under b o u r g e o i s democracy ( a v i c t i m i z a t i o n . t o be sure.

I
i t s doom: a c l a i m t o a l l power, a demand f o r c r i t e r i a of membership , d i c t a t e d by t h e l o g i c of c a p i t a l i s m ) workers would g r a d u a l l y t u r n away

which would e x h a u s t a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s , o r e x c l u d e a l l i t s pre- from i t s i l l u s i o n s toward c l a s s - c o n s c i o u s m i l i t a n c y . That he should

s e n t members. have o v e r e s t i m a t e d t h e p o l a r i z i n g e f f e c t s of i t i d u s t r i a l c a p i t n l i s m and

t
Why and how t h e f i r s t s o r t of group -- t h e group committed from t h e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e a b s o r p t i v e c a p a c i t y of t h e p o l i t i e s i t s u p p o r t e d does

s t a r t t o fundomentnl t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e s t r u c t u r e of power -- forms n o t reduce t h e a c c u r a c y of h i s p e r c e p t l o n of t h e r e l o t i o n s l ~ i p s . So f o r

remains one o f t h e m y s t e r i e s of o u r time. Mox Weber t a u g h t t h a t such groups a s n s r x was concerned o newly-brmingand growing c l n s s was t h e o n l y candi-

formed nround charismatic i n d i v i d u a l s who o f f e r e d a l t e r n a t i v e v i s i o n s of d a t e f o r such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . In f a c t . t h e general p r i n c i p l e appears

t h e world, v l s i o n s t h a t made s e n s e of t h e contemporary chaos. Marx sug- t o a p p l y a s w e l l t o n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s , age-sex groups, r e g i o n a l popu-

g e s t e d t h a t from time t o time o few i n d i v i d u a l s would swing s o f r e e of l a t i o n s o r any o t h e r m o b i l i z i n g group which makes r e p e a t e d u n s u c c e s s f u l

t h e i r , a s s i g n e d p l a c e s i n t h e e x i s t i n g c l a s s s t r u c t u r e t h a t t h e y could b i d s f o r power.

view t h e s t r u c t u r e a s a whole and t h e h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s producing i t ; The e l a b o r a t i o n of new i d e o l o g i e s , new c r e e d s . new t h e o r i e s of hw

they could then t e a c h t h e i r view t o o t h e r s who were s t i l l c a u g h t i n t h e t h e world works, I s p a r t and p a r c e l of both patlis t o a r e v o l c ~ t f o n a r yposi-

structure. S i n c e Morx and Weber we have had some h e r o i c c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t i o n : t h e emergence of brand-new c h a l l e n g e r s and t h e t u r n i n g of e x i s i n g

and c a t a l o g i n g of t h e v a r i e t i e s of i n t r i n s i c a l l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y s r o u p s contenders. Flost l i k e l y t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n of i d e o l o g i e s which c a p t u r e

( s e c Smelser 1963, L i p s e t and Raab 1970. Gomson 1 9 6 8 ) . But t h e r i s e and

and formulate the problems of such oontenders in itself accelerates their ment of the subject popu'ation. The first and second conditions overlap.

mobilization and change of direction; how great an independent weight since the veering of an already-mobilized contender toward exclunive al-

to attribute to ideological innovation is another recurrent puzzle in ternative claims to control of the government simultaneously eatnblinhes

th6 analysis of revolution. the claims and produces commitment to them. Yet expansion of commitment

The need for elaboration of ideologies is one of the chief reasons can occur without the establishment of any new exclus1,ve claims tliro~lgli

for the exceptional importance of intellectuals in revolutionary movements. a) the further mobilization of the contenders involved, end b) the eccep-

tsnce of those claims by other individunls and groups. It is in accounting

The reflections of s leading French Marxist intellectual on current
for the expansion and contraction of this sort of commitment that attitud-
political stracegy are revealing:
inal analyses of the type conducted by Ted Gurr, James Dsvies end Neil
The revolutionary party's capacity for hegemony is directly linked
Smelser should have their greatest power.
to the extend of its influence in the professions and in intellec-
Two classes of action by governments have s strong tendency to ex-
tual circles. It can counter bourgeois ideology to the degree that
pand commitment to revolutionary claims. The first is the sudden failure
its inspires their inquiries and draws their vanguard into reflec- I of the government to meet specific obligations which members of the sub-
tion on an "alternative model," while respecting the independence of
ject population regard as well established and crucial to their own
these inquiries. The mediation of the intellectual vanguard is in-
welfare. I have in mind obligations to provide employment, welfare ser-
dispensable in combatting and destroying the grip of the dominant
vices, protection, access to justice, and the other.mjor services of
ideology. It is also necessary in order to give the dominated classes
government.
a language end a means of expression which will make them conscious '
Italy, for example, experienced a series of crises of thts sort at
of the reality of their subordination end exploitation (Gorz 1969: the end of World War I, despite the fact that she had ended up on the

"winning" side. The demobilization of the army threw over two million

men on a soft labor market, the fluctuation and relaxation of controls

This is e congenial doctrine for an intellectual to hold. Yet it corres-
over food supplies and prices aggrieved millions of consumers. and pea-
ponds to a vigorous reality: as Barrington Moore suggests, an outpouring
sants (including demobilized soldiers) began to tnke into their own hands
of new thought articulating objectives incompatible with the continuation
the redistribution of land they argued the government had promlsed during
of the existing polity is probably our single most reliable sign that the
the war. The consequent withdrawal.of commitment from the government opened
first condition of s revolutionary situation is being fulfilled.
the way to fascism. Both Right and Left mobilized in response to the
Acceptance of Alternative Clsims
government's inability to deliver on its promises. In the event, the re-
The second condition in commitment to the claims by a nignficant seg-
gime chose t o ~ t o l e r a t eo r s u p p o r t t h e F a s c i s t strong-arm s q u a d r i i n t h e i r s t a n c e s of t a x r e b e l l i o n s i n Europe s i n c e 1500 a r e n o t what mont historians

e f f o r t t o d e s t r o y t h e most e f f e c t i v e working c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s . For have thought. I n s t e a d of b e i n g e i t h e r tlie l a s t r e s o r t of t h o s e who a r e

t h a t r e a s o n s ( r a t h e r than any fundamental s i m i l a r i t y i n t h e i r s o c i n l b a s e s ) i n such m i s e r y t h a t any more t a x a t i o n w i l l d e s t r o y tl~emo r t h e f i r s t

t h e i n i t i a l g e o g r a p h i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of I t a l i a n Fascism resembled t h e d i s - r e s o r t of p r i v i l e g e d p a r t i e s who r e f u s e t o l e t a n y t h i n g s l l p away from

t r i b u t i o n of s o c i a l i s t s t r e n g t h : t h e Po V a l l e y , t h e n o r t h e r n i n d u s t r i a l them, t h e r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t new t a x e s most commonly a r i s e s wherc com-

c i t i e s . and SO forth. The R i g h t : Fur Right c o a l i t i o n worked, more o r m u n i t i e s f i n d themselves i n c a p a b l e of marketing enough of t h e i r goods

l e s s , i n c r u s h i n g t h e organized segments of t h e L e f t . But i t l e f t t h e t o a c q u i r e t h e f u n d s demanded by t h e government.

F a s c i s t s i n n e a r l y autonomous c o n t r o l of l a r g e p a r t s of I t a l y : m u l t i p l e Ardsnt c o n s i d e r s " i n c a p a b l e of marketing" t o mean e i t h e r t h s t t h e

sovereignty. l o c a l economy i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y commercialized o r t h a t t h e market f o r

The c a s e of postwar I t a l y h a s a t h r e e f o l d importance, f o r i t i l l u s - t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o d u c t s of t h e community i n q u e s t i o n h a s c o n t r a c t e d .

t r n t e s n p r o c e s s which was widespread ( a l t h o u g h g e n e r a l l y l e s s a c u t e ) E r i c I J o l f ' s a n a l y s i s of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p e n s s n t s and t h e market.

e l s e w h e r e i n Europe a t t h e same time. I t f a l l s i n t o s v e r y g e n e r a l pat- however, s u g g e s t s t h s t " i n c a p a b i l i t y " r e f e r s more g e n e r a l l y t o any

t e r n i n which t h e end of war ( v i c t o r i o u s o r n o t ) produces a c r i s i s of demands which would make i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r people t o f u l f i l l t h e ob-

governmental i n c a p a c i t y . F i n a l l y , i t d e m o n s t r a t e s tlie way i n which l i g a t i o n s which bind them t o t h e l o c a l commun;ty, and whose f u l f i l l m e n t

movements of p r o t e s t themselves n o t c l e a r l y " r i g h t " o r " l e f t " i n o r i e n t a - makes them h o n o r a b l e men. I t f o l l o w s d i r e c t l y from Wolf's orgument

t i o n sonctime open t h e way t o s right-wing (or, f o r that matter, l e f t - t h a t i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n i n t h e f a c e of l i t t l e c o m m e r c i n l i z a t i o n o r t h e

wing) s e i z u r e of power. c o n t r a c t i o n of demand f o r t h e p r o d u c t s a l r e a d y b e i n g marketed by a

The second c l a s s of governmental a c t i o n which commonly expands t h e p e a s a n t community t e n d s t o have d e v a s t a t i n g e f f e c t s on t h e s t r u c t u r e of

commitment of i m p o r t a n t segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y c l a i m s t h e community.

i s s r a p i d o r unexpected i n c r e a s e i n t h e government's demand f o r s u r r e n d e r Other t y p e s of communities f a c e d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n s of t h e some

of r e s o u r c e s by i t s s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n . An i n c r e a s e i n t a x e s i s t h e problems. The consequence i s t h a t r a p i d l y i n c r e a s e d e x t r a c t i o n of

c l e a r e s t example, b u t m i l i t a r y c o n s c r i p t i o n , t h e commandeering of land. r e s o u r c e s by t h e government -- which i n w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s h a s most

c r o p s o r farm a n i m a l s and t h e i m p o s i t i o n of c o r v e e s have a l l played f r e q u e n t l y o c c u r r e d i n p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r war -- r e g u l a r l y p e r s u a d e s some

a n h i s t o r i c a l r o l e i n t h e i n c i t e m e n t of o p p o s i t i o n . G a b r i e l Ardant segment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t h a t t h e government is no l o n g e r l e g i t i m n t e .

(1965) a r g u e s , w i t h widespread e v i d e n c e , t h s t i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n h a s been w h i l e t h o s e who oppose i t a r e .

tlie s i n g l e moat i m p o r t a n t s t i m u l u s t o popular r e b e l l i o n throughout wes- Such n s h i f t i n p o s i t i o n sometimes o c c u r s r a p i d l y , w i t h l i t t l e

advance warning. T h i s a p p e a r s t o be e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y when n c o n t e n d e r

tern history. Furthermore, h e p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c circum-
or set of contenders mobilizes quickly in response to a general threat by the tendency of most analysts to work from the fact of revolution
to its ponition -- an invasion, an economic crisis, a major attempt by back to the search for evidence of short-run deprivation and then
landlords, the state or someone else to deprive them of crucial resources. further back to the search for evidence of long-run improvement, not

We find the villagers of northern England rising in a Pilgrimage of necessarily with respect to the same presumed wonts, needs, or expecta-

Grace to oppose Henry VIII's disposscasion of the monasteries, EIexican tiona. The latter procedure has the advantage of slmost alwnys pro-

peasnntn banding together to resist the threat of takeover of their ducing s fit between the data and the theory, and the dlsndvantage of

common lands, Jnpanese countrymen recurrently joining bloody uprisings not being a reliable test of the theory. The question remains open.

ngainst the imposition of new taxes. Assuming that sharp contractions following long exponsions

This defensive mobilization is not simply a cumulation of individual produce revolutionary situations with exceptionnl frequency, however.

dlssatisfections with hardship or a mechanical group response to depri- the line of argument pursued here leads to en interesting alternative

vntfon. Whether it occurs nt all depends very much, as Eric Wolf and explanation of the J-curve phenomenon. It is that during a lonu rut1

others have shown, on the pre-existing structure of power end solidarity of expanding resources, the government tends to take on commitments

within the pop~rlationexperiencing the threat. Furthermore, its character to redistribute resources to new contenders and the polity tends to

is not intrinsically either "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary"; admit challengers more easily because the relative coat to existing

that depends mainly on the coalitions the potential rebels make. This members is lower when resources are expanding. In the event of quick

defensive mobilization is the most volatile feature of n revolutionnry contraction. the government has greeter commitments, new mnttera of

situation. both because it often occurs fast and because new coalitions right, to members of the polity, and has ncquitted partial cmitmcnts
,-
between n rapidly-mobilized group and established contenders for power to new contenders, perhaps not members of the polity, but very likely

can suddenly create s signiticant commitment to en alternative polity. forming coalitions with members. The government faces a choice between

If thst is thc case, there may be something to the common notion 1) greatly increasing the coercion applied to the more vulnerable

that revolutions are most likely to occur when a sharp contraction in segments of tlie population in order to bring up the yield of resources

well-being follows a long period of improvement. Jsmea Davies has for reallocntion or 2) breaking commitments where thst will incite
' the least dangerous opposition. Either step is likely to lend to n
propounded the idea under the label of "J-curve hypothesis" end Ted

Gurr has treated it ss one of the chief variants of his general condition defenaive mobilization, and thence to a threat of revolution. Such a

for rebellion: a widening of the expectation-achievement gap. All the situation does, to be sure, promote the disappointment of rising

attempts to test these attitudinal versions of the theory tlnve been expectations. But the principal link between tlie J-curve end the

dogged by the difficulty of measuring chnnges in expectations and revolutionary situation, in this hypothesis, lies in the changing

achievements for large populations over substantial blocks of time nnd

r e l a t i o n s between c o n t e n d e r s and government l i k e l y t o occur i n a p e r i o d
of expanding r e s o u r c e s .
I n a l o n g e r h i s t o r i c a l view, t h e changes which have most o f t e n
produced t h e r a p i d s h i f t s i n commitment away from e x i s t i n g governments
and e s r a b l i s h e d p o l i t i e s a r e p r o c e s s e s which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t t h e autonomy
of s m a l l e r u n i t a w i t h i n t h e span of t h e government: t h e r i s e and f a l l
of c e n t r n l i z e d s t a t e s , t h e expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n of n a t i o n a l markets,
t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n and d i s p e r s i o n of c o n t r o l o v e r p r o p e r t y . Prosperity
and d e p r e s s i o n , u r b a n i z a t i o n and r u r a l i z a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and
d e i n d u s t r i n l i z a t i o n , s a n c t i f i c a t i o n and s e c u l a r i z a t i o n occur i n a
d i s p e r s e d and i n c r e m e n t a l f a s h i o n .
Although s t a t e m a k i n g , t h e e x p a n s i o n and c o n t r a c t i o n of m a r k e t s and
p r o p e r t y s h i f t s a l s o d e v e l o p i n c r e m e n t a l l y most of t h e time, t h e y a r e
e s p e c i a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e of producinp, d r a m a t i c c o n f r o n t a t i o n s of r i g h t s .
p r i v i l e g e s and p r i n c i p l e s ; t h i s t a x c o l l e c t o r wants tlie f a m i l y cow.
t h i s merchant proposes t o buy t h e v i l l a g e commons, t h i s p r i n c e f a i l s t o
p r o t e c t h i s s u b j e c t s from b a n d i t s . S. N. E i s e n s t a d t (1963) h a s brought
o u t t h e extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y of v a s t b u r e a u c r a t i c empires t o over-
ckpansion and t o damage a t t h e c e n t e r ; b o t h , i n h i s a n a l y s i s , tend t o
produce r e b e l l i o n s i n which p e r i p h e r a l a g e n t s of t h e empire s e e k t o
e s t a b l i s h autonomous c o n t r o l o v e r t h e l a n d s , men, o r g a n i z a t i o n s and
w e a l t h f i r s t mobilized by t h e empire. Fernand Drnuclel (1966) h a s
s t r e s s e d t h e frequency w i t h which b a n d i t r y and r e l a t e d s t r u g g l e s f o r
l o c a l power p r o l i f e r a t e d a s t h e ephemeral s t a t e s of s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
Europe c o n t r a c t e d . I n a l l t h e s e c a s e s , spokesmen f o r l a r g e - s c a l e
o r g a n i z a t i o n and c e n t r i p e t a l p r o c e s s e s f i n d themselves locked i n s t r u g g l e
w i t h a d v o c a t e s of s m a l l - s c a l e autonomy.
I n o r d e r t o produce m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y , and thua become revolu-
t i o n a r y , commitments t o some a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m a n t must be a c t i v a t e d
i n t h e f a c e of p r o h i b i t i o n s o r c o n t r a r y d i r e c t i v e s from t h e government.
The moment a t which some p e o p l e belonging t o members of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
c o a l i t i o n s e i z e c o n t r o l o v e r some p o r t i o n of t h e government, and o t h e r
p e o p l e n o t p r e v i o u s l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e c o a l i t i o n honor t h e i r d i r e c t i v e s
marks t h e beginning of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n . That a c c e p t a n c e of
d i r e c t i v e s may, t o b e s u r e , occur a s a r e s u l t of d u r e s s o r d e c e p t i o n
a s w e l l of c o n v e r s i o n t o t h e c a u s e . A m i x t u r e of d u r e s s , d e c e p t i o n
and c o n v e r s i o n w i l l o f t e n do t h e job.
The p r e s e n c e of a c o h e r e n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n mnken a
great difference a t exactly t h i s point. An o r g a n i z n t l o n f a c i l i t a t e s
t h e i n i t i a l s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l , s p r e a d s t h e news, a c t i v a t e s t h e com-
mitments a l r e a d y made by s p e c i f i c men. I f s o , I.enin pkovides n more
r e l i a b l e guide t o revolutionary s t r a t e g y than S o r e l ; Lcnin's closely-
d i r e c t e d c o n s p i r a t o r i a l p a r t y c o n t r a s t s s h a r p l y w i t h t h e spontnneous
and p u r i f y i n g r e b e l l i o n i n which S o r e l placed h i s hopes. But t h e
e x i s t e n c e of such a n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s o makes t h e s t a r t of r e v o l u t i o n
more c l o s e l y dependent on t h e d e c i s i o n s of a s m a l l number of men -- and
t h u s , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , s u b j e c t t o chance end i d i o s y n c r a s y .
I n tlie l a s t a n a l y s i s , a c t i v a t i o n of r e v o l u t i o n a r y commitments
happens through an e x t e n s i o n of t h e same p r o c e s s e s which c r e a t e t h e
cmitments. C o n s p i r a t o r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n simply linppens t o be t h e one
which maximizes t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e committed t o c n l c u l a t e t h e r i g h t
moment t o s t r i k e a g a i n s t t h e government. The government's sudden
i n a b i l i t y t o meet i t s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ( a s i n t h e German i n s u r -
r e c t i o n s d u r i n g t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e i m p e r i n l war e f f o r t i n 1918)
or lts violation of the established rights of its subject population (as of the alternstive coalition in a rough and unknown terrain and the ndop-

in the 1640 rebellions of Portugal and Catslonia against Castile, which tion of tactics unfamiliar to the professions1 forcen of the government all

followed Olivsres' attempt to squeeze exceptional resources from those re- raise the cost of suppression as well.

luctant provinces for the conduct of his war with France) can simultaneously Ted Gurr (1969: 235-2361 develops an interesting argument about

spread and activate the commitment to its revolutionary opposition. the balance of coercive resources between a government end its opponents.

In a case like that of the Tsiping rebellion, the rapid mobilization In his phrasing. "The likelihood of internal war incressen as the ratio

of s contender advancing exclusive alternstive claims to control over the of dissident to regime coercive control approaches equality." (For
government itself leads quickly and inevitably to s break end to an armed "equality," read "one;" Walter Korpi has expanded a similar argument into

struggle. The drsmntic weakening of a government's repressive capacity a general model of conflict.) Gurr is referring directly to the pro-

through war, defection or catastrophe can simultaneously create the possi- bable magnitude of collective violence; where the balance strongly favors

bility of revolution and encourage the revolutionaries to make their bid; the government, goes the argument, only dispersed acts of rebellion occur;

the quick succession of the French revolution of 1870 to the defeat of the where the balance strongly favors its opponents, the government tends to

Emperor by Prussis falls into this category. be a pawn in their hands. The analysis applies even more plausibly to

Governmental Inaction the likelihood of revolution, for an alternative coslition with large

Condition ehree is the incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of coercive resources is likely to seize control with at most an instant of

the government to suppress the alternstive coalition or the commitment to multiple sovereignty, while an alternative coslition with small coercive

its claims. Three paths are possible: a) sheer insufficiency of the avail- resources will never get multiple sovereignty started.
I

able mesns of coercion; b) inefficiency in applying the means; c) inhibi- Inefficiency in applying mesns which are, in principle, sufficient

tions to their application. The starkest cases of insufficiency occur is harder to pin down and explain; the inefficient almost always plead

when the bslsnce of coercive resources between the government and the sl- insufficient means. William Lnnger (1969 esp. 321-322) 'contends that had

ternstive coalition swings suddenly toward the latter, because the govern- the authorities not bungled their repression of various populnr movements

ment l~sssuffered a sudden depletion of its resources (as in s lost war). the European revolutions of 1848 would never hsve occurred. To have con-

because the alternstive coslition has managed a sudden mobilization of re- fidence in his conclusion we hsve to assess the balsnce of coercive

sources (as in the p ~ ~ i i nof

g private arms) or because a new contender mesns between popular movements and governments as well as the political

with abundant co,?rcive resources has joined the coslition (as in the de- inhibitions to repress'ion. In pre-revol~~tionsry1848 the governments

fection of troops or foreign intervention). However, the massing of rebels clearly had the edge in men, weapons, supplies and coercive technique.

in locations remote from the centers of coercive strength, the implantation The strong commitment of the new bourgeois who had been acquiring signi-
 7-34

ficant roles in European governments to certain kinds of civil liberties
and various working-class movements, however. both stayed 'the government's
hand. Prom a strictly instrumental perspective, all such inhibitions ere
"inefficient." Yet not to distinguish them from tlie apparent incompetence
of the Egyptian reglme toppled in 1952 or the Turkish sultanate displaced
in 1919 blurs the essenti.al explanation of these events.
but important segments of the military defected, disintegrated or refused
to repress their brethren. The more extensive the pre-revolutionary coo-
litions between challengers end militory units, tlie more likely this is to
happen.
In this respect and others, war bears a crucial relationship to
revolution. Walter Laqueur (1968: 501) puts it this way:

Inhibitions to the application of available coercive means are

War appears to have been the decisive factor in the emergence of
more interesting than shortages or inefficiency, because they are so like-
revolutionary situations in modern times; most modern revolutions,
ly to flow from the political process itself. The great importance of
both successful and abortive, have followed in the wake oE war
coalitions between established members of the polity and revolutionary
(the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian revolution of 1905. the
challengers exemplifies the point very well. The United States of the
various revolutions after the two World Wars, including the Chinene
1960s witnessed the constant formation and reformation of coalitions be-
revolutions). These have occurred not only in the countries that
tween groups of intellectuals, opposition politicians, Black Liberation
suffered defeat. The general dislocation caused by war. tlie ma-
movements, students and peace activists, some within the American polity
terial losses and h u m n sacrifices, create o climate conducive to
and some outside of it. The total effect of these coalitions fell con-
radical change. A large section of the population has been armed;
siderahly short of revolution, but while operating they shielded those
human life seems considerably less valunble than in peacetime.
whose principles offered the greatest challenge to the existing distri-
In a defeated country authority tenda to disintegrate, and acute
bution of power from the treatment they received from police, troops end
social dissatisfaction receives additional impetus from s sense
other repressors when acting on their own.
of wounded national prestige (the Young Turks in 1908, Naguib and
Despite the implications of this example, however, the most cru-
Nasser in 1952). The old leadership is discredited by defeat, and
cial coalitions over the whole range of revolutions surely link chsllen-
the appeal for radical social change ond.nationa1 reossertion
gers directly with military forces. The Egyptian and Turkish revolutions
thus falls on fertile ground.
stand near the extreme at which the chief claims to alternative control

of the government come from within tlie military itself; in both cases No doubt the statement suffers from a superabundance of explanations. Still

soldiers dominated a coalition linking dissident politicians and local it points out the essential relationship between war and tlie repressive ca-

movements of resistance. In the midst of the range we find events like pacity of the government.

the Russian revolution, in which the militory were for from paramount, Although war temporarily places large coercive resources under the
c o n t r o l of a government, i t d o e s n o t g u a r a n t e e t h a t they w i l l b e a d e q u a t e of c o n d i t i o n s a p p e a r t o b e powerful proximate c a u s e s of s i g n i f i c n n t t r a n a -

t o tile demnnds placed upon them, t h a t t h e y w i l l b e used e f f i c i e n t l y , o r f e r s of power: 1 ) t h e p r e s e n c e of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n : mcllttple eov-

t h a t they w i l l even remain under t h e government's f i r m c o n t r o l . Defeat e r e i g n t v : 2) r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s between c h a l l e n g e r s and members of

a n d / o r d e m o b i l i z a t i o n p r o v i d e e s p e c i a l l y f a v o r a b l e c i r c u m n t a n c e s f o r revo- t h e p o l i t y ; 3) c_ontrol of s u b s t a n t i a l f o r c e by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n .

l u t i o n b e c a u s e t h e y combine t h e p r e s e n c e of s u b s t a n t i a l c o e r c i v e r e s o u r c e s To what e x t e n t t h e development of a r e v o l u t i o n n r y n i t u a t i o n is a

with uncertain c o n t r o l over t h e i r use. symptom, r a t h e r t h a n a c a u s e , of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome is n o t cosy t o

War a l s o m a t t e r s i n q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t way. By and l a r g e , wars have resolve. I n a l o n g view, whether a r e v o l u t i o r ~ n r y d i v i s i o n of t h e p o l i t y

always provided t h e p r i n c i p a l o c c a s i o n s on which s t a t e s have r a p i d l y in- o c c u r s depends on t h e same c o n d i t i o n s wliicli d e t e r m i n e wllether a major

c r e a s e d t h e i r l e v i e s of r e s o u r c e s from t h e i r s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n s . Conscrip- t r a n s f e r of power o c c u r s : t h e f o r m a t i o n of a c o a l i t i o n of mobilized con-

t i o n is only t h e self-evident case. Demands f o r t a x e s , f o r c e d l o a n s , food, t e n d e r s o r g a n i z e d around i n t e r e s t s which p i t them and a s u b s t n n t i n l seg-

n o n - m i l i t a r y l a b o r , manufactured goods and raw m a t e r i a l s f o l l o w t h e same ment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e dominant members of t h e p o l i t y . In

pattern. The i n c r e a s e d e x a c t i o n s almost always meet widespread r e s i s t a n c e . . t h a t l o n g view, whether t h e t r a n s f e r of power o c c u r s through a brenk i n

which t h e a g e n t s of s t a t e s c o u n t e r w i t h p e r s u a s i o n and f o r c e . t h e p o l i t y , t h e t h r e a t of a break. o r a more g r a d u a l succenuion d o e s n o t

D e s p i t e t h e advantage of having e x t e n s i v e e s t a t e s t o squeeze and a m a t t e r much. N o n e t h e l e s s , I would hazard t h i s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n : t h e more ex-

wealthy church t o d i s p o s s e s s , t h e Tudors p r e s s e d t h e i r England hard t o t e n s i v e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e g r e e t e r t h e l i k e l l h o o d of an ex-

s u p p o r t t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t h e y committed t o s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y w a r f a r e . t e n s i v e t r a n s f e r of power. That i s , indeed, one of t h e i m p l i c i t messages

They faced s e r i o u s r e b e l l i o n i n 1489, 1497, 1536, 1547, 1549, 1553 and 1569. of F i g u r e 7-3, t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of p a r e r t r n n s f e r s .

The l a s t t h r e e -- K e t t ' s , W y a t t ' s and t h e Northern R e b e l l i o n -- c e n t e r e d on An e x t e n s i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n -- a c o s t l y s p l i t hetween t h e

d y n a s t i c i s s u e s and c o n s i s t e d l a r g e l y of r i s i n g s e n g i n e e r e d by r e g i o n a l e x i s t i n g p o l i t y and a n e f f e c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n -- Increanea t h e

mngnntes. Tlie f i r s t f o u r , on t h e o t h e r hand, were popular r e b e l l i o n s ; l i k e l i h o o d o f an e x t e n s i v e t r a n s f e r of power i n s e v e r a l ways. The more ex-

every o n e ' o f them began w i t h t h e crown's sudden l a y i n g hand on r e s o u r c e s t e n s i v e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e h a r d e r i t i~ f o r any orgnnized

previously outnide i t s control. The g e n e r a l p a t t e r n i s t h e same a s I group o r segment of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o a v o i d committing i t s e l f t o one s i d e

have a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d f o r t a x r e b e l l i o n s : t h e r a p i d m o b i l i z a t i o n of an or the other. That commitment makes i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r any c o n t e n d e r

e n t i r e p o p u l a t i o n which t h e n c h a l l e n g e s t h e v e r y i n j u s t i c e of t h e r o y a l t o reconstitute its old multiple alliances i n the po~t-revolutionnry set-

demand f o r men, money o r goods. tlement. The more e x t e n s i v e t h e r e v o l r r t i o n a r y s i t i ~ a t i o n ,t h e morc ex-

Proximate Causes of R e v o l u t i o n a r y Outcomes p e r i e n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o ~ lw i l l have i n f o r g i n g i t s own In-

Let u s f o c u s on t h e s h o r t and medium r u n s , r e s e r v i n g f o r l a t e r an- s t r u m e n t s of government independent of t h e e x i n t i n g h o l d e r s of power. Tlie

o t h e r l o o k a t l o n g l r u n conditions f o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcomes. Three s e t s

p a r t y , t h e nrmy o r t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n a r y committee becomes t h e s k e l e t o n ( o r between members of t h e p o l i t y and t h e c o n t e n d e r s sdvancing e x c l u n i v e n l -

pertlops t h e b l u e p r i n t , o r b o t h ) of t h e new government. The more exten- t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government. The r e l a t i o n s h i p is ac-

s i v e t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n , t h e more o p p o r t u n i t y and j u s t i f i c a t i o n t u a l l y c u r v i l i n e a r : I f no such c o a l i t i o n e x i s t s . t h a t d i m i n i s h e s t h e

t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n w i l l have t o a t t a c k t h e p e r s o n s and r e s o u r c e s chance t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n w i l l win -- t h a t t h e r e w i l l be any

of t h e powerholders, and t h u s t o b l o c k t h e i r chances t o r e g a i n power l a t e r . t r a n s f e r of power a t a l l . The e x i s t e n c e of a c o a l i t i o n i n c r e a n e s t h e

These g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s a r e n o t new. They a r e a s t a n d a r d p i e c e of l i k e l i h o o d of some t r a n s f e r of power. But i f t h e c o a l i t i o n s o r e exten-

r e v o l u t i o n a r y wisdom. W r i t i n g i n December, 1948, Moo Tse-Tung p u t i t t h i n s i v e , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s e t t l e m e n t w i l l tend t o r e s t o r e t h e p r e v i o u s

way: s t a t u s quo. The w i s e r e v o l u t i o n a r y who w i s l ~ e st o produce a l a r g e t r a n s -

f e r of power forms t h e minimum n e c e s s a r y c o a l i t i o n w i t h e x i s t i n g members

The r a g i n g t i d e of China's r e v o l u t i o n i s f o r c i n g a l l s o c i a l s t r a t a
of t h e p o l i t y , and f o r c e s h i s c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s t o breok i r r e v o c a b l y w i t h
t o decide their a t t i t u d e . A new change is t a k i n g p l a c e i n t h e ba-
o t h e r members of .the p o l i t y .
l a n c e of c l a s s f o r c e s i n China. M u l t i t u d e s of people a r e b r e a k i n g
The n a t u r e of such a c o a l i t i o n i s f o r a member of t h e p o l i t y t o
away from Kumintnng i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l and coming o v e r t o t h e
t r a d e r e s o u r c e s w i t h a c h a l l e n g e r , f o r example, an exchange of J o b s f o r
r e v o l u t i o n a r y cnmp; and t h e Chinese r e a c t i o n a r i e s have f a l l e n i n t o
e l e c t o r a l support. Such a c o a l i t i o n i s always r i s k y , s i n c e t h e c h a l l e n g e r
h o p e l e s s s t r a i t s . i s o l a t e d and abandoned. As t h e P e o p l e ' s Mar of
w i l l always b e on t h e l o s i n g end of t h e exchange a s compared wltll t h e v a l u e
L i b e r a t i o n draws c l o s e r and c l o s e r t o f i n a l v i c t o r y . a l l t h e r e v o l u -
of t h e r e s o u r c e s when t r a d e d among members of t h e p o l i t y . and t h e r e f o r e
t i o n a r y people and a l l f r i e n d s of t h e people w i l l u n i t e more s o l i d l y
d i s p o s e d t o move i t s e x t e n s i v e mobilized r e n o u r c e s e l s e w h e r e . Neverthcleus
and, l e d by t h e Communist P a r t y of China, r e s o l . u t e l y demand t h e com-
t h e c h a l l e n g e r i s l i k e l y t o a c c e p t a c o a l i t i o n where i L o f f e r s a defense
p l e t e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e r e a c t i o n a r y f o r c e s and t h e thoroughgoing
a g a i n s t r e p r e s s i o n o r d e v a l u a t i o n of i t s r e s o u r c e s and t h e member i s l i k e l y
development of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s u n t i l a p e o p l e ' s d e m o c r a t i c
t o a c c e p t i t when t h e p o l i t y i s c l o s e l y d i v i d e d , o r when no c o a l i t i o n port-
r e p u b l i c on n country-wide s c a l e i s founded and a peace based on
n e r s a r e a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n t h e p o l i t y , o r when i t s own membership is i n
u n i t y and democracy i s achieved (Moo 1961: 305).
jeopardy f o r want of r e s o u r c e s .

The e x p e r i e n c e of China i n t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r s c o n f i r m s t h e g e n e r a l r e l a - A c l n s s i c r e v o l u t i o n a r y t a c t i c a l s o f a l l s under t h e heading of

t i o n s h i p between t h e e x t e n s i v e n e s s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n and t h e challenger-member c o a l i t i o n : t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of on o r g a n i z a t i o n whlch n l -

thoroughness of t h e t r a n s f e r of power. ready h a s an e s t o b l i s l i e d p l a c e i n t h e s t r u c t u r e of power. A s e n r l y a s 1901.

C o a l i t i o n s between Members and C h a l l e n g e r s Lenin was e n u n c i a t i n g such an approach t o t r a d e unions:

The second proximate c a u s e of s i g n i f i c a n t power t r a n s f e r s , however,

works a g a i n s t t h e f i r s t t o some e x t e n t . I t is t h e f o r m a t i o n of c o a l i t i o n s
 Every Social-Democratic worker should a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e a s s i s t and t o b e a c r u c i a l e a r l y omen of a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n . The " d e s e r t i o n "

a c t i v e l y work i n t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . But, w h i l e t h i s i s t r u e , i t may, of c o u r s e , c o n s i s t of i n d i v i d u a l a c c e p t a n c e of e x c l r ~ s i v ea l t e r n a t i v e

i s c e r t a i n l y n o t i n our i n t e r e s t t o demand t h a t o n l y Social-Demo- c l a i m s t o c o n t r o l of t h e government. I t may a l s o t o k e t h e form of r e j e c t -

c r o t s should he e l i g i b l e f o r memhersliip i n t h e " t r a d e " u n i o n s , s i n c e ing ell c l a i m s , i n good a n a r c h i s t fashion: But t h e n h i f t s i n commitment

t h a t would o n l y narrow t h e s c o p e of o u r i n f l u e n c e upon t h e masses. by i n t e l l e c t u a l s which c o n t r i b u t e most t o h a s t e n i n g a r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u n -

t i o n , i n my view, c o n s i s t of c o a l i t i o n s between r e v o l u t i o n a r y c h a l l e n g e r n
Let e v e r y worker who u n d e r s t a n d s t h e need t o u n i t e f o r t h e s t r u g g l e

a g a i n s t t h e employers and t h e governments j o i n t h e t r a d e unions.

.
and groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s having memberallip i n t h c p o l i t y . The pro-

The v e r y aim of t h e t r a d e u n i o n s would b e i m p o s s i b l e of schievement, p e n s i t y of French l e f t - w i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s t o form such c o a l i t i o n s -- with-

i f t h e y d i d n o t u n i t e a l l who have a t t a i n e d a t l e a s t t h i s e l e m e n t a r y o u t q u i t e r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e i r own c l a i m s t o power and p r i v i l e g e -- is legen-

d e g r e e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g . i f t h e y were n o t v e r y broad organizations. dary.

The b r o a d e r t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . t h e b r o a d e r w i l l b e our i n f l u e n c e C o n t r o l of S u b s t a n t i a l F o r c e

o v e r them -- a n i n f l u e n c e d u e , n o t o n l y t o t h e "spontaneous" devel- C o n t r o l over t h e major o r g a n i z e d means of c o e r c i o n w i t h i n t h e popu-

opment of t h e economic s t r u g g l e , b u t t o t h e d i r e c t and c o n s c i o u s l a t i o n i s p i v o t a l t o t h e s u c c e s s o r f a i l u r e of any e f f o r t t o s e i z e power.

e f f o r t of t h e s o c i a l i s t t r a d e union members t o i n f l u e n c e t h e i r c m - Within a l l contemporary s t a t e s , t h a t means c o n t r o l of t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s .

r o d e s (Lenin 1967b: 1 9 1 ) . Although d e f e c t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y is by no means a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n

f o r a t a k e o v e r by t h e r e b e l s , no t r a n s f e r of power a t a l l is l t k e l y i n a
I n t h e s e c a s e s , t h e t r a d e u n i o n s were normolly e s t a b l i s h e d members of t h e i r
r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n i f t h e government r e t a l n a complete c o n t r o l of t h e
r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i e s , w h i l e t h e S o c i a l Democrats i n q u e s t i o n were c h a l l e n -
m i l i t a r y p a s t t h e opening of t h a t s i t u a t i o n (Chorley 1943, Andreski 1968.
gers still outside the polity. I n t h i s same message, Lenin c o n c l u d e s by
R u s s e l l 1974).
r e c o r n e n d i n g t h e c o n t r o l of t h e l a r g e , open, l e g a l union by t h e s e c r e t ,
D.E.H. R u s s e l l took up t h e q u e s t i o n i n t h e c a s e of f o u r t e e n twen-
closed, d i s c i p l i n e d revolutionary p a r t y .
t i e t h - c e n t u r y mass r e b e l l i o n s , seven of them s u c c e s n f u l . neven of them un-
S p l i n t e r groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s a p p e a r t o have a s p e c i a l pro-
successful:
p e n s i t y t o form c o a l i t i o n s o u t s i d e t h e p o l i t y . They t r a d e o f f i d e o l o g i c a l
auccessful unsuccessful
work p u b l i c i t y f o r t h e demands of t h e c h a l l e n g e r , l e a d e r s h i p s k i l l s and
A f g h a n i s t a n 1929 A u s t r i a 1934
a c c e s s t o p e r s o n s i n high p l a c e s f o r v a r i o u s forms of s u p p o r t : personnel
Albania 1924 Burma 1953
f o r demonstrations, e l e c t o r a l s t r e n g t h , defense a g a i n s t o t h e r threatening
B o l i v i a 1952 Colombia 1948
c h a l l e n g e r s , and s o on. A n a l y s t s of r e v o l u t i o n a s d i v e r s e a s Crane B r i n t o n
B r a z i l 1930 Cuba 1912
and B a r r i n g t o n Moore hove c o n s i d e r e d t h e " d e s e r t i o n of t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l s "
 China 1949 llonduras 1933 T a b l e 7.1: D.E.H. R u s s e l l ' s Armed F o r c e D i s l o y a l t y S c a l e .

Cuba 1959 I t a l y 1949

Mexico 1911 Spain 1934

1. Degree of d i s l o y a l t y (D)
By " r e b e l l i o n " . R u n s e l l means "a form of v i o l e n t power s t r u g g l e i n which
0 = willing, enthusiastic fighters
t h e overthrow of t h e regime i s t h r e a t e n e d by means t h a t i n c l u d e v i o l e n c e "
1 = unwilling f i g h t e r s , e.g. surrendered r e a d i l y
( R u s s e l l 1974: 56). By s u c c e s s f u l r e b e l l i o n , which s h e e q u a t e s w i t h revo-
2 = n e u t r a l , e.g. s t o o d by w i t h o u t r e s i s t i n g . r a n away
l u t i o n , R u s s e l l means t h o s e i n which t h e r e b e l s o r t h e i r chosen r e p r e s e n -

t a t i v e s assume t h e p o s i t i o n s of power. Her d i s t i n c t i o n between r e b e l l i o n

3 - a c t i v e l y helped r e b e l s , e . g . gave arms, informed r e b e l s of
t r o o p maneuvers and b a t t l e p l a n s
and r e v o l u t i o n p a r a l l e l s t h e d j s t i n c t i o n between r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n 4 = f o u g h t on t h e s i d e of t h e r e b e l s
ond r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcome, e x c e p t t h a t i t e x c l u d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of revo-

l u t i o n wlthout r e b e l l i o n . I n t h e f o u r t e e n c a s e s , R u s s e l l works o u t a s c a l e 2. Time a t which d i s l o y a l (T)

f o r t h e d i s l o y a l t y of t h e governmental armed f o r c e s . The s c a l e a p p e a r s i n
T a b l e 7.1. As t h e t a b l e shows, t h e d i s l o y a l t y s c o r e h a s t h r e e components:
tlie d e g r e e of d i s l o y n l t y (D), t h e t i m i n g of d i s l o y a l t y (T), and t h e propor-
t i o n of t h e armed f o r c e s which were d i s l o y a l (P). The b a s i c formula, w i t h
a d j u s t m e n t s f o r t h e number of d i f f e r e n t armed f o r c e s involved and t h e d i f -
f e r e n t phases of t h e i r a c t i o n , i s t h e p r o d u c t of t h e t h r e e components:
0 = n e v e r ( i n t h e l a s t 5% of tlie d u r a t i o n )
1 = n e a r t h e end ( i n t h e l a s t 6-252 of t h e d u r a t i o n
2 a b o u t halfway through (from 26-752 of t h e d u r a t i o n )
3 = n e a r t h e b e g i n n i n g ( i n t h e f i r s t 6-25% of t h e d u r a t i o n )
4- from t h e s t a r t ( i n t h e f i r s t 0-5% of t h e d u r a t i o n )

D x T x P. R u s s e l l found some o v e r l a p between t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s of loy- 3. P r o p o r t i o n of armed f o r c e a d i s l o y a l a t a p n r t i c u l a r time (P)

a l t y s c o r e a f o r successful and u n s u c c e s s f u l r e b e l l i o n s . For example, . 0 = none (0-1%)
tlie Burmese r e b e l l i o n of 1954 f a i l e d d e s p i t e wide s u p p o r t from t h e armed 0.5 - few (2-107.)
forces. For a n o t h e r , t h e d e f e c t i o n s of ~ a t i s t a ' sarmed f o r c e s t o C a s t r o ' a 1 = some (11-252)
s u c c e s s f u l Cuban r e v o l u t i o n were few and l a t e . On t h e a v e r a g e , n e v e r t h e - 2 - c o n s i d e r a b l e (26-502)
l e s s , t h e s u c c e s s f u l r e b e l l i o n s had much h i g h e r d i s l o y a l t y s c o r e s . Further- 3 - m a j o r i t y (51495%)
more, i n no c a s e d i d s u c c e s s come w i t h o u t some armed f o r c e d i s l o y a l t y s i g - 4 = a l l (96-1OOX)
n i f i c a n t l y b e f o r e t h e end of t h e r e b e l l i o n . This l a s t is necessarily

R u s s e l l ' s most c o n t r o v e r s i a l f i n d i n g ; one can e a s i l y a r g u e t h a t i t merely

Source: R u s s e l l 1974: 74.
shows t h a t t h e armed f o r c e s , t o o , e v e n t u a l l y s e e which way t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
 c h a l l e n g e r s and members of t h e p o l i t y : c ) c o n t r o l of s u b s t a n t i a l f o r c e
wind i s blowing. S i n c e R u s s e l l e x p l i c i t l y b u i l d s i n t h e t i m i n g of d i s -
by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n . Put t o g e t h e r , t h e i t e m s a r e a r e c l p c
l o y a l t y , however, t h e g e n e r a l r e s u l t s look s o l i d .
f o r revolution.
I t f o l l o w s more o r l e s s d i r e c t l y t h a t t h e g r e a t e r t h e c o e r c i v e
To sum up t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e r e c i p e , we might p u t t o g e t l ~ c ran
resources -- Lncluding p r i v a t e a r m i e s , weapons and segments of t h e
i d e a l i z e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y sequenc&
n n t i o n o l armed f o r c e s -- i n i t i a l l y c o n t r o l l e d by t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y

c o a l i t i o n , t h e more l i k e l y a t r a n s f e r of power. Likewise, t h e e a r l i e r 1. g r a d u a l m o b i l i z a t i o n of c o n t e n d e r s making e x c l u s i v e c l a i m s t o

movement of c o e r c i v e r e s o u r c e s t o t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n , t h e more governmental c o n t r o l a n d / o r u n s c c e p t a b l e t o t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ;

l i k e l y a t r a n s f e r of power. The m o b i l i z a t i o n of o t h e r r e s o u r c e s probably

2. r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n t h e number of people a c c e p t i n g t h o s e c l a i m s
a f f e c t s t h e chances of a c q u i r i n g power s i g n i f i c a n t l y a s w e l l , b u t a t a

. lower r a t e t h a n t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of c o e r c i v e means. It a l s o f o l l o w s
a n d / o r r a p i d expansion of t h e c o a l i t i o n i n c l u d i n g t h e u n a c c e p t a b l e

o r exclusive contenders;
t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e of e x i s t i n g members of t h e p o l i t y i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y

c o a l i t i o n w i l l i n c r e a s e t h e chances f o r some t r a n s f e r of power ( a l t h o u g l ~ 3. u n s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t s by t h e government ( a t t h e b e h e s t of members

i t r e d u c e s t h e chances f o r a complete w r e s t i n g of power from members of t h e p o l i t y ) t o s u p p r e s s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e coalition and/or t h e

of t h e p o l i t y ) both because of t h e a d d i t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s i t b r i n g s t o a c c e p t a n c e of i t s c l a i m s : t h i s may w e l l i n c l u d e a t t e m p t s a t f o r c e d

~ l l ec o a l i t i o n and becnuse of t h e g r e a t e r l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e armed demobilization s e i z u r e , d e v a l u a t i o n o r d i s p e r s i o n of t h e r e s o u r c e s

f o r c e s w i l l d e f e c t , waver o r remain n e u t r a l when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h e s t a b - a t t h e d i s p o s a l of c o n t e n d e r s ;

l i s h e d members of t h e p o l i t y .
4. e s t a b l i s h m e n t by t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l 1 t i o n of e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l
Revolutionary Sequences and C o l l e c t i v e Violence
o v e r some p o r t i o n of t h e government -- a t e r r i t o r i a l branch, a
We have e x p l o r e d t h r e e proximate c a u s e s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n s :
f u n c t i o n a l s u b d i v i s i o n , a p o r t i o n of i t s p e r s o n n e l ;
1 ) t h e oppenrnnce of c o n t e n d e r s , o r c o a l i t i o n s of c o n t e n d e r s , advancing

e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i m s t o t h e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e government which 5. s t r u g g l e s of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n t o m a i n t a i n o r expnnd

i s c u r r e n t l y e x e r t e d by t h e members of t h e p o l i t y ; 2 ) commitment t o that control;

t h e s e c l a i m s by a s i g n i f i c a n t segment of t h e s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n ; 3) i n -
6. r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s i n g l e p o l i t y through t h e v i c t o r y of t h e
c a p a c i t y o r unwillingmess of t h e a g e n t s of t h e government t o s u p p r e s s
a l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n . througb i t s d e f e a t , o r t h r o u g l ~t h e e s t a b -
t h e n l t e r n a t i v e c o a l i t i o n a n d l o r t h e commitment t o i t s c l a l m s . Another
l i s h m e n t of a modus v i v e n d i between t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o o l i t i o n nnd
t r i a d summarized proximate c a u s e s of r e v o l u t i o n a r y outcomes: a) the
some o r a l l of t h e o l d members; f r a g m e n t a t i o n of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y
p r e s e n c e of a r c v o l u t i o n n t y s i t u a t i o n ; b) revolut5onory c o a H t i o n s between
coalition;
 7. r e h . p o s i t i o n of r o u t i n e governmental c o n t r o l throughout t h e F i g u r e 7-4: The Timing of C o l l e c t i v e Violence i n Tension-Release and
C o n t e n t i o n Models of Revolution.
subject population.

I l a y o u t tlie sequence not t o propose a new " n a t u r a l h i s t o r y " of r e v o l u t i o n

1. Tension-Release
i n t h e a t y l e of Lyford P. Edwards o r Crane B r i n t o n , b u t t o i d e n t i f y t h e

l o g i c of t h e p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n .

That l o g i c d i f f e r s c o n s i d e r a b l y from t h e common i d e a of r e v o l u t i o n

u
a s a s o r t of t e n s i o n - r e l e a s e . I f a t e n s i o n - r e l e a s e model of r e v o l u t i o n
rl

were c o r r e c t , one might r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t t h e l e v e l of c o l l e c t i v e

v i o l e n c e t o mount u n s t e a d i l y t o t h e climax -- t h e revolutionary situation

itself -- and then d e c l i n e r a p i d l y . A t t h a t p o i n t . presumably, t h e

t e n s i o n i s dissipated. The " c o n t e n t i o n " model I have been f o l l o w i n g Time

s u g g e s t s o d i f f e r e n t sequence. I t does n o t p r e d i c t c l e a r l y t o t h e

curve of v i o l e n c e b e f o r e a r e v o l u t i o n , s i n c e t h a t depends on t h e p a t t e r n

of m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o n t e n t i o n l e a d i n g t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of m u l t i p l e

sovereignty. Yet i t d o e s deny t h e n e c e s s i t y of a b u i l d u p of v i o l e n c e

before a revolution.

On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e c o n t e n t l o n model makes i t appear l i k e l y I I

I I
t h a t once m u l t l p l c s o v e r e i g n t y b e g i n s , c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e w i l l c o n t i n u e ti
4
4
a t high l e v e l s l o n g a f t e r t h e b a s i c i s s u e i s d e c i d e d , and w i l l t a p e r
>
0

off gradually. S c h e m a t i c a l l y , t h e c o n t r a s t a p p e a r s i n F i g u r e 7-4. There

3
u
0

a r e s e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i s general p r e d i c t i o n . F i r s t , tlie appearance 4

rl
U
0

of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y p u t s i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e achieved p o s i t i o n of w
Revolutionary I
4
e v e r y s i n g l e c o n t e n d e r , whether a member of t h e p o l i t y o r n o t . and t h e r e - 0 Situation
cl
fore t e n d s t o i n i t i a t e a g e n e r a l round of mutual t e s t i n g among c o n t e n d e r s .
Time
That t e s t i n g i n i t s e l f produces c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e .

Second, t h e s t r u g g l e of one p o l i t y a g a i n s t i t s r i v a l amounts t o

war: a b a t t l e fought w i t h u n l i m i t e d means. S i n c e c o n t r o l of t h e e n t i r e

government i s a t s t a k e , h i g h c o s t s and high r i s k s a r e j u s t i f i e d . High t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of v i o l e n c e produced by a r e v o l u t i o n . In general, the
c o s t s and high r i s k s i n c l u d e d e s t r u c t i o n of p e r s o n s and p r o p e r t y . l a r g e r t h e number of c o n t e n d e r s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a t r u g g l e f o r p a r e r

T h i r d , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n i s l i k e l y t o fragment once t h e ( h o l d i n g c o n s t a n t t h e number of p e o p l e i n v o l v e d ) , t h e h i g h e r tlie l e v e l

i n i t i a l s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c e n t r a l governmental a p p a r a t u s o c c u r s . of v i o l e n c e , because t h e number of mutual t e s t s of p o s i t i o n hetween

and t h a t f r a g m e n t a t i o n i t s e l f t e n d s t o produce f u r t h e r s t r u g g l e s i n v o l v i n g c o n t e n d e r s l i k e l y r i s e s e x p o n e n t i a l l y w i t h t h e number of c o n t e n d e r s .

violence. The r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n fragments f o r s e v e r a l r e a s o n s : The g r e a t e r t h e f l u c t u a t i o n i n c o n t r o l of v a r i o u s segments of t h e govern-

i t t a k e s a l a r g e r m o b i l i z e d mass t o s e i z e power than t o m a i n t a i n i t ; t h e ment by d i f f e r e n t c o a l i t i o n s of c o n t e n d e r s , t h e h i g h e r t h e l e v e l of

i n e v i t a b l e d i v e r g e n c e of some major o b j e c t i v e s of t h e c o n t e n d e r s w i t h i n v i o l e n c e , b o t h because t h e s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l i t s e l f b r i n g s v i o l e n t

tlie c o a l i t i o n w i l l come t o t h e f o r e once t h e common o b j e c t i v e of s e i z u r e r e s i s t a n c e and because e a c h change of c o n t r o l s e t s o f f f u r t h e r t e s t i n g

of power h a s been accomplished; t h o s e c o n t e n d e r s which have mobilized of p o s i t i o n .

r a p i d l y up t o t h e p o i n t of r e v o l u t i o n e r e a l s o l i k e l y t o d e m o b i l i z e F i n a l l y , t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e r e p r e s s i v e means under government

r a p i d l y due t o t h e underdevelopment of t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h e manage- c o n t r o l s t r o n g l y e f f e c t s t h e d e g r e e of v i o l e n c e . The c o n n e c t i o n s a r e

ment of t h e mobilized r e s o u r c e s , and t h u s w i l l tend t o l o s e p o s i t i o n i n obvious y e t c o m p l i c a t e d : t h e u s e of l e t h a l weapons f o r c r w d c o n t r o l

t h e n e x t rounds of t e s t i n g . i n c r e a s e s d e a t h s through c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , t h e d i v i s i o n of l s b o r

F o u r t h , t h e v i c t o r i o u s p o l i t y s t i l l f a c e s t h e problem of reimposing between s p e c i a l i s t s i n domestic o r d e r ( p o l i c e ) and war ( a r m i e s ) probably

r o u t i n g governmental c o n t r o l o v e r t h e s u b j e c t p o p u l a t i o n even a f t e r d e c r e a s e s i t , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o v e r a l l r e p r e s s i v e c a p a c i t y of t h e

m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y h a s ended. As t h e government r e t u r n s t o i t s work government is probably c u r v i l i n e a r ( l i t t l e damnge t o p e r s o n s o r p r o p e r t y

of e x t r a c t i n g and r e d i s t r i b u t i n g r e s o u r c e s , i t f i n d s p e o p l e r e l u c t a n t t o where t h e government h a s g r e a t r e p r e s s i v e c a p a c i t y , l i t t l e damage where

pay t a x e s , g i v e up t h e i r l a n d , send t h e i r s o n s t o war, d e v o t e t h e i r time i t s r e p r e s s i v e c a p a c i t y i s a l i g h t ) , t h e l e v e l of v i o l e n c e probably r i s e s

t o local administration. And s o a new round of v i o l e n t i m p o s i t i o n and a s t h e armament of t h e government and of i t s opponents spproaclles

v i o l e n t r e s i s t a n c e begins. Where t h e i n i t i a l l o c u s of t h e r e v o l u t i o n equality. A l l of t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , a n d more, a r e p l a u s i b l e , b u t no

is c o n s t r i c t e d , t h i s i s l i k e l y t o show up a s a s p r e a d of c o l l e c t i v e more t h a n s l i v e r s of s y s t e m a t i c e v i d e n c e f o r t h e i r a c t u a l v a l i d i t y e x i s t .

v i o l e n c e t o o t h e r p a r t s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n . I n a c e n t r a l i z e d governmental I f t h e s e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s have something t o them, tlie e x t e n t of

system, t h e most common sequence i s t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y t o b e a l a r g e and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e produced by a r e v o l u t i o n should b e o n l y weakly and

d e c i s i v e s t r u g g l e s t t h e c e n t e r followed by a more w i d e ~ p r e a db u t l e s s i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r e r

c r i t i c a l s e r i e s of b a t t l e s through t h e r e s t of t h e t e r r i t o r y 1 . changes. A z e r o r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p a r e r (which most of u s would c a l l a

Within t h i s framework, s e v e r a l c o n d i t i o n s appear l i k e l y t o a f f e c t f a i l u r e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n ) can o c c u r a s nn outcome of any of t h e i d e a l

stages presented before, although it becomes less probable as the stages
aristocratic and ecclesiastical property from 1790 to 1793 permnnently
proceed.
shifted the weight away from those two powerful classes. The soviets
Revolutionary Outcomes and Further Structural Changes
! survived the Bolshevik Revolution. The Chinese communists began reor-
Under what conditions does extensive structural change accompany or
ganizing village structure almost as soon as they were on the scene.
result from a revolution? To the degree that structural change means
Contrary to the world-weary view of Crane Brinton, who argued tliat a
transter of power from class to class, party to party, contender to
revolution took a country through tremendous turmoil to a posltion
contender, to be sure, we have already examined the question. But if it
approximately the same as it would have occupied anyway after an
means further redistribution of resources, changes in the quality of
equivalent lapse of time, it may be that the extent of structurnl
life, urbanization, industrinlizstion, moral'reconstruction,everything
alteration occurring while multiple sovereignty persists is our best sign
depends on the time scale one adopts.
of the depth of the permanent change to be produced by tlic revolution.
Relatively few permanent changes of this sort actually occur in the
Over the long run, revolutions appear to chan~ethe direction of
course of revolutions. Engels. Sore1 and Fanon all held out the hope
structural transformation to the extent that they produce a transfer of
of a vast moral regeneration within the act of revolution itself: the
power. Where there is s large transfer of power among classes, tllc
historical experience is sadly lacking in examples thereof. The other
I
particular coalition which gnins profoundly shapes the subsequent
structural renrrangements which occur in the course of revolutions are
political development of the country. Barrington Moore's comparison of
typically temporary: the mobilization of men, loyalties, organizational
India, Japan, China, the U.S., France, England, Germany and Russia makes
talents and weapons at a national level which recedes as the new structure
precisely tliat point. Military coups almost never produce any significant
of power crystallizes, the disruption of daily routines for festivals,
structural change -- despite the declarations of national renovation
deliberations, emer~encies, the provisional appearance of commissars,
which ritually accompany them these days -- because they involve minor
governing committees, task forces. Michael Walzer has brilliantly
rearrangements among extremely limited sets of contenders. The apparent
portrayed a revolutionary outlook for seventeenth-century England, Richard
exceptions to this rule, revolutions from above llke those of Japan and
Cobb a revolutionary mentality for eighteenth-century France; nevertheless.
Turkey, ordinarily have a reforming segment of the ruling elite effec-
for the outlooks and mentalities of most people, revolutions are but
I
I
tively cutting bff their fellows from further access to power. and form-
passing moments.
ing coalitions with classes proviously excludcd from power.
A few great revolutions provide exceptions to this absence of short-.
However, the organizational means available to those who emerge from
run transformation; that is perhaps what permits us to call them great
the revolution with power affect the degree of structural transformation
revolutions. Although the nobles and the clergy regained some of their
deliberately promoted by the government in post-revolutionary years. In
position in France with and after Napoleon, the confiscation and sale of
a discussion of the effect of the "confining conditions" under which a re- This analysis can be generalized. Despite the "confining conditions"

volutionary coalition seized power on its subsequent capacity to transform faced by the French revolutionary coalitions of 1789-94. they seized a

social organization, Otto Kirchheimer comes to the conclusion that the state apparatus which was already exceptionally centralized and powerful

emergency powers accruing to states during twentieth-century crises like by comparison with those whlch had grown up elsewhere in the world. They

World War I drastically reduced the confinement of power-holders: were able to use that great parer, in fact. to destroy tlie juridical

structure of feudalism, effect large transfers of wealth, subjugote the

The revolution of the 20th Century obliterates the distinction
Church, bui1d.a mass army. The nineteenth-century revoli~tionnrieswho
between emergency and normalcy. Movement plus state can organize
repeatedly seized control of the Spanish state grabbed an apparatus whose
tlie masses because: (a) the technical and intellectual equipment
extractive and repressive capacities were insufficient to any task of na-
is now at hand to direct them toward major societal programs m-
tional transformation.
ther than simply liberating their energies from the bonds of tra-
It is true that the mobilization of contenders which occurs before
dition; (b) they have the means at hand to control people's live-
and during a revolution may itself fncilitote a further nationnl mobili-
lihood by means of job assignments and graduated rewards unavail-
zation, putting resources at the disposal of the state which were simply
able under the largely agricultural and artisanal structure of
unavailable before the revolution: property, energy, information, loyal-
tlie 1790s and still unavailable to the small enterprise and com-
ties. That is, indeed, a characteristic strategy of contempornry na-
mission-merchant type economy of the 1850s and 1860s; (c) they have
tional revolutions. The Chinese experience indicates that in the course
fallen heir to endlessly and technically refined propaganda de-
of a long mobilizstion revolutionaries sometimes build nlternative innti-
vices substitut'ing for the uncertain leader-mass relations of the
tutions which are potentially stronger than tlie existing state, and serve
previous periods; and (d) they face state organizations shaken up
as the infrastructure of a strong new state when the revolutionories come
by war dislocation and economic crisis. Under these conditions
to power. Most revolutionaries, however, seize a state apparatus without
Soviet Russia could carry through simultaneously the job of an
that long preparation of an organizational alternative. In those cases.
economic and a politic~l,a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois revolu-
the already-accrued power of the state affects the probability that funda-
tion in spite of the exceedingly narrow basis of its political
mental structural change will issue from the revolution much more atrong-
elite. On the other hand, the premature revolutionary combination
ly than does the extent of mobilization during the revolution.
of 1793-94 not only dissolved quickly, but left its most'advanced
These facile generalizations, I confess, do not do justice to a
sector, the sans-culottes, with only the melsncl~olychoice between
critical question. For on our estimate of the long-run effects of dif-
desperate rioting -- Germlnal 1795 -- or falling back into a pre-
ferent kinds of revolution must rest our judgment as to whether any par-
organized stage of utter helplessness and agony (Kirchheimer

1965: 973).
t i c u l n r r e v o l u t i o n , o r r e v o l u t i o n a r y o p p o r t u n i t y , i s worth i t s c o s t . I CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND NEW BEGINNINGS
e s t i m a t e some r e v o l u t i o n s a s worth i t . But a t p r e s e n t no one h a s enough Back t o t h e E i g h t e e n t h Century
s y s t e m a t i c knowledge about t h e p r o b a b l e s t r u c t u r a l consequences of one We began t h i s i n q u i r y t o g e t h e r more than two c e n t u r i e s ago, In
v a r i e t y of r e v o l u t i o n o r a n o t h e r t o make such e s t i m a t e s w i t h c o n f i d e n c e . 1765. At t h a t p o i n t we wandered through England, watching p e o p l e a t t a c k
Except. p e r h a p s , i n r e t r o s p e c t . l l i s t o r i a n s c o n t i n u e t o d e b a t e what poorhouses. We were t r a v e l e r s i n time, simply t r y i n g t o g e t a s e n s e of
t h e E n g l i s h . French and Russian r e v o l u t i s n a c o s t and what t h e y accomplished. t h e t e x t u r e and meaning of populnr c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . We went from t h e r e
I n t h o s e c a n e s ( a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e ) they a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a c t u a l i t i e s t o a r a t h e r t i m e l e s s world, a world c o n t a i n i n g a b s t r a c t models'of c o l l c c -
r a t h e r than p r o b a b i l i t i e s . T h a t p o t e n t i a l c e r t a i n t y , however, h a s a s e l f - t i v e action. We climbed up t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n s i d e from i n t e r e s t t o organ-
d e s t r u c t i v e s i d e ; when i t comes t o an e v e n t a s sweeping a s t h e E n g l i s h ization t o mobilization to c o l l e c t i v e action. We then climbcd down t h e
Revolution, a l m o s t e v e r y p r e v i o u s e v e n t which l e f t some t r a c e i n seven- o p p o r t u n i t y a i d e , from r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n t o power t o o p p o r t u n i t y /
t e e n t h - c e n t u r y England i s i n some s e n s e a "cause", and almost e v e r y sub- thrent, only t o return t o collective action. Next we r e - e n t e r c d time,
s e q u e n t e v e n t i n t h e c o u n t r y and i t s ambit is i n some s e n s e an " e f f e c t " . equipped w i t h o u r models. We made t h r e e main c i r c u i t s : tlrrouglr major
Making c a u s e - a n d - e f f e c t a n a l y s i s manageable i n t h i s c o n t e x t means r e d u c i n g changes i n r e p e r t o i r e s of c o n t e n t i o u s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , tlrrough v a r i o u s
t h e r e v o l u t i o n t o c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l s , i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n t condi- forms of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , i n t o t h e t u r b u l e n c e of: r e v o l u t i o n and r e -

t i o n s f o r t h o s e e s s e n t i a l s , and t h e n s p e c i f y i n g subsequent e v e n t s which bellion. Here we a r e now, back n e a r o u r s t a r t i n g p o i n t : generaL r c f l e c -

would have been u n l i k e l y w i t h o u t t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y e s s e n t i a l s . So i n f a c t t i o n on t h e t e x t u r e and meaning of popular c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
t h e c a u s a l a n a l y e i s of r e a l , h i s t o r i c r e v o l u t i o n s and of r e v o l u t i o n s i n Suppose we s p i r i t e d o u r s e l v e s back t o 1765. Armed w i t h tlte t e a c h i n g s
g e n e r a l converge on s t a t e m e n t s of p r o b a b i l i t y . of: t h i s book, what would we do? What we do t h a t we c o u l d n ' t do

when f i r s t we t r o d on Nacton Heath?

One of t h e f i r s t t h i n g s would be t o r e s o l v e t h e g e n e r a l "turbulence"

of 1765 i n t o s p e c i f i c groups, i n t e r e s t s , a c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s among

groups. We might. f o r example, s t a r t l o o k i n g hard a t such d i f f c r e n c e a a s

t h o s e between t h e Sussex poorhouse c o n f l i c t s and t h e a c t i o n behind t h i s

b r i e f n o t i c e f o r 1 0 J a n u a r y i n t h e Annual R e g i s t e r :

Some thousands of weavers went Jn a body t o Westminster, and prevented

petitions t o b o t h houses of p n r l i a m e n t , i n behalf of themselves and

t h e i r n m e r o u s f a m i l i e s , most of them now, a s they represented, in

 a s t a r v i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r want of work: and begging. a s a r e l i e f For o n e t h i n g , t h e poorhouse a t t a c k s have a r a t h e r r e a c t i v e tone: a n

t o t h e i r m i s e r i e s , t h a t t h e y would, i n t h e p r e s e n t s e s s i o n of a t t e m p t t o defend t h e p a r i s h poor a g a i n s t i n c a r c e r a t i o n . The weavers'

p a r l i a m e n t , g r a n t a g e n e r a l p r o h i b i t i o n of f o r e i g n wrought s i l k s . p e t i t i o n march and t h e t a i l o r s ' i n c i p i e n t wage demands l e a n i n t h e pro-

a c t i v e d i r e c t i o n : a l t h o u g h both groups m y w e l l have been responding t o

We would want t o d l f f e r e n t i a t e t h a t from t h e R e g i s t e r ' s r e p o r t f o r 20 A p r i l :
t h r e a t s t o t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d , t h e c l a i m s t h e y made were f o r advnntages they

. . . ten journeymen t a y l o r s were t r i e d , on a n i n d i c t m e n t f o r con- d i d n o t c u r r e n t l y enjoy. The q u i c k n o t e on t h e Whiteboys o f f e r s no i n f o r -

s p i r i n g t o g e t h e r t o r a i s e t h e wages, and l e s s e n t h e h o u r s of work, mation on t h e c l a i m s a t i s s u e . But when we l e a r n t h a t t h e Whiteboys oE

s e t t l e d by a n o r d e r of s e s s i o n s , p u r s u a n t t o an a c t of p a r l i a m e n t f o r I r e l a n d were famous a n t i - B r i t i s h g u e r r i l l a w a r r i o r s , we r e c e i v e an i n d i c -

t h a t purpose, when n i n e of them, who were t h e p r i n c i p a l and committee- a t i o n t h a t t h e i r s k i r m i s h f e l l somewhere i n t h e r a n g e of c o l l e c t i v e

men of s e v e r a l of t h e a s s o c i a t i o n s , which r a i s e d a fund t o s u p p o r t competition and c o l l e c t i v e r e a c t i o n .

each o t h e r i n such unlawful meetings, and who had d i s t i n g u i s h e d For a n o t h e r t h i n g , t h e c o n t r a s t i n g a c c o u n t s g i v e an i n k l i n g of t h e

themselves by t h e name of F l i n t s , were found g u i l t y , and r e c e i v e d p r e v a i l i n g s c h e d u l e of r e p r e s s i o n : no v i s i b l e penalties for the petition

s e n t e n c e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r s e v e r a l d e m e r i t s , v i z . two t o b e imprisoned march. j a i l s e n t e n c e s f o r t h e m o b i l i z i n g t a i l o r s , a r r e s t s and s h o o t i n g

one y e a r i n Newgate, f i v e f o r t h e s p a c e of s i x months, and two f o r f o r a t t a c k e r s of Sussex poorhouses, n i n e dead among t h e Whiteboys. The

t h r e e months; and were, b e s i d e s , f i n e d o n e s h i l l i n g each and o r d e r e d f o u r incompletely-documented c a s e s a r e a s l i m b a s i s f o r any g e n e r a l con-

t o f i n d s e c u r i t y f o r t h e i r behaviour. c l u s i o n s , y e t they immediately draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e v a r i a b i l i t y of r e -

p r e s s i o n w i t h t h e a c t i o n and group i n q u e s t i o n . They a l s o s t a r t u s t h i n k -

A t t h e 30th of June, we would f i n d a b r i e f mention of t h e f a c t t h a t "Nine
i n g a b o u t what was changing: s e n d i n g thousands of weavers t o p r e s e n t n
w h i t e boys were l a t e l y k i l l e d , and twenty made p r i s o n e r s , i n a s k i r m i s h
p e t i t i o n was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n n o v a t i o n , w h i l e j a i l i n g people f o r c o n c e r t i n g
w i t h a p a r t y of dragoons, n e a r Dungannon i n I r e l a n d . "
t h e i r wage demands would p r a c t i c a l l y d i s a p p e a r o v e r t h e n e x t c e n t u r y .
The poor on Nacton Heath, t h e weavers a t Westminster, t h e F l i n t s i n
F i n a l l y , even t h e s e Eragmentnry news s t o r i e s g i v e u s some r e a s o n t o
London and t h e Whiteboys a t Dungannon were a l l a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y . That
b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e p e r t o i r e of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n p r e v a i l i n g i n t h e
a l e r t s u s t o a n e x p l a n a t o r y agenda beginning w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h e
B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d of 1765 d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y from t h e forms n v n i l -
relevant populntions, i n t e r e s t s , organization, mobilization, r e p r e s s i o n /
a b l e t o o r d i n a r y t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y people. Although t h e p e t i t i o n march
f a c i l i t a t i o n , power, and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t , a s w e l l a s a c l o s e l o o k a t
would have a s i g n i f i c a n t p l a c e i n t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n ' s a n c e s t r y , t h e demon-
t h e s p e c i f i c forms, i n t e n s i t i e s and outcomes of t h e c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
s t r a t i o n i t s e l f had n o t y e t e n t e r e d t h e r e p e r t o i r e . Tlie e t i k e was n o t then
I t a l s o draws o u r a t t e n t i o n t o i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s among t h e f o u r
a t o o l r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o workers -- p a r t l y , a s we have s e e n , because
groups.
of tlie r e p r e s s i o n v i s i t e d upon any workers who a t t e m p t e d t o c o n c e r t t h e i r
wage demands. The r e p e r t o i r e v a r i e d from o n e p a r t of B r i t a i n t o a n o t h e r ,
from o n e s o c i a l c l a s s t o a n o t h e r . But i t was d i s t i n c t l y an e i g h t e e n t h -
century repertoire.
I f we took a somewhat l o n g e r view, we would f i n d t h e r e p e r t o i r e
chnnging. Indeed, some s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s i n t h e whole p a t t e r n of
c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n were o c c u r r i n g i n t h e B r i t a i n of t h e 1760s and 1770s.
The y e a r 1766, f o r example, b r o u g h t one of t h e most widespread s e r i e s of
food r i o t s t o a p p e a r i n modern B r i t a i n ; more g e n e r a l l y , food r i o t s became
v e r y common i n t h e v i l l a g e s and s m a l l towns of B r i t a i n d u r i n g t h e middle
d e c a d e s of tlte e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , and o n l y began t h e i r d e f i n i t v e d e c l i n e
a f t e r 1830. I n London (end, t o some e x t e n t , i n o t h e r major c i t i e s ) we
witness a d i f f e r e n t trend. There we s e e a R a d i c a l movement forming on a
m i d d l e - c l a s s b a s e with i m p o r t a n t a l l i a n c e s among s k i l l e d workers; they
brought t o g e t h e r , among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e demand f o r domestic p o l i t i c a l
reform and t h e criticism of t h e crown's p o l i c y i n America. Such s k i l l e d
workers a s t h e silk-weavers who marched on P a r l i a m e n t were b u i l d i n g l a r g e -
s c a l e o r g a n i z a t i o n s and a p p l y i n g p r e s s u r e i n t h e n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l a r e n a .
The R a d i c a l s , t h e s u p p o r t e r s of John Wilkes, t h e s i l k - w e a v e r s and o t h e r
o r g a n i z e d c o n t e n d e r s f o r power, f u r t h e r m o r e , were s h a p i n g new means of
exercising their strength. They p r e s s e d t h e r i g h t t o assemble f o r p e t i -
t i o n i n g and f o r e l e c t i o n s beyond i t s o l d l i m i t , and began t o c r e a t e a
p r o t o t y p e of t h e t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y d e m o n s t r a t i o n .
The decnde a f t e r 1765 was l i k e w i s e a n i m p o r t a n t time of t r a n s i t i o n
i n America. The American t r a n s i t i o n , t o be s u r e , d i f f e r e d g r e a t l y from
t h e B r i t i s h : i t went from t h e g r e a t r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e Stamp Act t o t h e
opening of a t r u l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n -- of m u l t i p l e s o v e r e i g n t y --
a l l the colonies. To r e t u r n t o t h e B r i t i s h periodicn.l.s of 1765. The
Gentleman's Magazine s t e p p e d up i t s covernge of Americsn news a t t h e
end of t h e y e a r . For example:
.. 1 October: T h i s day i s a p p o i n t e d t o b e held a t New-York i n
-
North -
America, a g e n e r a l c o n g r e s s of a l l tlie c o l o n i e s , i n o r d e r
t o draw up a remonstrance t o b e p r e s e n t e d t o h i s m a j e s t y n g a i n a t
t h e stamp d u t i e s , and o t h e r burtliens l a i d upon t h e c o l o n i c e , by
t h e l a t e a c t of t h e B r i t i s h p a r l i a m e n t .
5 October: ... t h e s h i p s a r r i v e d a t P h i l a d e l p h i a , w i t h t h e stamps
on board, f o r Maryland, New J e r s e y , and Pennsylvania, when s e v e r a l
thousand c i t i z e n s assembled i n o r d e r t o c o n s i d e r ways and menns f o r
p r e v e n t i n g t h e stamp a c t t a k i n g p l n c e i n t h a t province. and a t l e a s t
came t o a r e s o l u t i o n t o r e q u e s t t h e d i s t r i b u t o r t o r e s f g n h i s o f f i c e ;
which a f t e r some demur he i n p a r t d i d , a s s u r i n g h i s countrymen t h a t
no a c t of h i s , o r h i s d e p u t i e s , should e n f o r c e t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e
stamp-act i n t h e p r o v i n c e s f o r wliicli h e was c o m i s s i o n e d , b e f o r e tlie
same should b e g e n e r a l l y p u t i n f o r c e i n t h e n e i g h b o r i n g c o l o n i e s .
And a t t h e same time t h e l a w y e r s e n t e r e d i n t o an agreement n o t t o
p u r c h a s e any of t h o s e stamps, g i v i n g i t a s t h e i r o p l n i o n , t h a t i t
was i m p o s s i b l e t h e d u t y imposed by them c o u l d be paid f o r i n gold
and s i l v e r .
4 November [ d a t e l i n e New York] : Some e x t r a o r d i n a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s i n
-
F o r t George, f o r t h e s e c u r i n g t h e stamped paper i n t h a t g a r r l s o n ,
having d i s p l e a s e d t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of t h i s c i t y , s v a s t number of
them assembled l a s t Frfday evening, and proceeded t o tlie f o r t w e l l s ,
in
where they b r o k e open t h e s t a b l e of t h e Lt- G
r- Cndwallnder
 Colden, Esq; took o u t 111scoach and a f t e r c a r r y i n g t h e same t h r o ' p l a y between B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s and American c o l o n i s t s , tlie Amcricans

t h e p r i n c i p a l s t r e e t s of t h e c i t y , i n triumph, marched t o t h e Com- moved u n s t e a d i l y toward a g e n e r a l b o y c o t t on p o l i t i c a l and economlc Lrnns-

mons where a g a l l o w s was e r e c t e d ; oh o n e end of which was suspended actions with the British. They moved toward tlie f a s h i o n i n g of a s e t of

t h e e f f i g y of tlie g r e a t man, having i n h i s r i g h t hand s stamped b i l l governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s -- committees, a s s e m b l i e s , c o u r t s and a s s o c i n -

of l a d i n g , and on h i s b r e a s t a p a p e r w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g inscription: tions -- p a r a l l e l t o B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and independent of

"The Rebel Drummer i n t h e y e a r 1715." A t h i s back was f i x e d a drum, them. A s s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of Americans began t o t a k e t h e i r d i r e c t i o n s

a t t h e o t h e r end of t h e g a l l o w s hung t h e f i g u r e of t h e d e v i l . After from t h o s e p a r a l l e l i n s t i t u t i o n s and t o r e j e c t t h e o r d e r s of L i e u t e n a n t

hanging a c o n s i d e r a b l e time, t h e y c a r r i e d t h e e f f i g i e s , w i t h t h e Governors and o t h e r B t d t i s h o f f i c i a l s , s r e v o l u t i o n a r y s l t u o t i o n was undcr-

g a l l o w s i n t i r e , being preceded by t h e coach, i n grand p r o c e s s i o n , t o way. The outcome, t o o , was a t l e a s t a l i m i t e d r e v o l u t i o n : thousnnds of

t h e g a t e of t h e f o r t . from whence i t was removed t o t h e bowling prominent s u p p o r t e r s of t h e B r i t i s h l e f t tlie c o l o n i e s , t h e Americans ac-

g r e e n , under t h e muzzles of t h e f o r t guns, where a b o n f i r e was i m - q u i r e d p o l i t i c a l independence, and t h e m i d d l e - c l a s s members of t h e r e v o l -

m e d i a t e l y made, and t h e dummer, d e v i l , coach LC. were consumed u t i o n a r y c o a l i t i o n s wielded e x c e p t i o n a l power i n t h e s h a p i n g of t h e new

a d m i s t tlie a c c l a m a t i o n s oE some thousand s p e c t a t o r s . The whole body polity.

n e x t proceeded t o Vsux-hall, t h e house of Major James, who, i t was The s t r u g g l e s of t h e 1760s i n B r i t a i n and America c l e a r l y belong i n

r e p o r t e d , was a f r i e n d t o t h e Stamp-act, from whence they took evey t h e world we have been e x p l o r i n g i n t h i s book: t h e world of c o n t e n t i o u s

i n d i v i d u a l a r t i c l e , t o a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e amount; and having made collective action. Other people have often p o r t r a y e d t h a t world a s f u l l

a n o t h e r b o n f i r e , t h e whole was consumed i n t h e flames. o f "mobs", " d i s o r d e r s " and "mass movements". We have s e e n many of t h e

e v e n t s t h o s e w r d s r e f e r t o , and i n t h e p r o c e s s have n o t i c e d r e p e a t e d l y
The n e x t n i g h t , t h e assembled crowd demanded t h a t t h e L i e u t e n a n t Governor
how m i s l e a d i n g t h e words a r e . Mob, d i s o r d e r and mass movement a r e top-
hand o v e r tlie stamps. After a w h i l e , h e d e c l a r e d under p r e s s u r e t h a t h e
down words. They a r e t h e w o r d s o f a u t h o r i t i e s and e l i t e s f o r a c t i o n s of
would n o t d j s t r i b u t c t h e stamps h i m s e l f , and f i n a l l y p u t them i n t o t h e hands
o t h e r people -- and, o f t e n , f o r a c t i o n s which t h r e a t e n t h e i r owl i n t e r e s t s .
of t h e municipal c o r p o r a t i o n , i n t h e New York c i t y h a l l . Gentleman's
The bottom-up approach we have taken i d e n t i f i e s t h e c o n n e c t i o n s between
Magazine of 1765 p r i n t e d many more r e p o r t s on American Stamp Act r e s i s t a n c e ,
tlie c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s OF o r d i n a r y people and t h e ways they o r g n n i z e around
n o t t o mention m u l t i p l e e s s a y s and commentaries on t h e p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s .
t h e i r workaday i n t e r e s t s . That approach a l s o h e l p s c l a r i f y how much
We a l r e a d y haveean i d e s what happened i n t h e n e x t t e n y e a r s . I n the
of t h e v i o l e n c e which e l i t e o b s e r v e r s have been i n c l i n e d t o a t t r i b u t e t o
t r a d i n g c i t i e s of t h e American c o a s t , a n t i - B r i t i s h c o a l i t i o n s Formed,
t h e d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , d e s p e r a t i o n o r a g g r e s s i v e impulses of t h e masses is
drawing e s p e c i a l l y on t h e merchants, l a w y e r s , tradesmen and c r a f t s m e n , b u t
a c t u a l l y a by-product of i n t e r a c t i o n s between groups which a r e p u r s u i n g
o f t e n a i d e d by such groups a s s a i l o r s and longshoremen. I n a complex i n t e r -
t h e i r ends i n r e l a t i v e l y r o u t i n e ways and r i v a l s o r a u t h o r i t i e s who c h a l -
l e n g e t h e c l a i m s embodied i n t h o s e r e l a t i v e l y r o u t i n e a c t i o n s .
T h e o r i z i n g About C o l l e c t i v e A c t i o n s
We c o u l d , i f we wanted, now f o r m a l i z e t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e S p i t a l f i e l d s
weavers, t h e Nacton poorhouse-wreckers, t h e Stamp Act crowds i n New York.
The f o r m a l i z a t i o n would c o n s i s t of mapping t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e p a r t i c i -
p a n t s , e s t i m a t i n g t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e of o p p o r t u n i t y and t h r e a t w i t h r e s p e c t
t o t h o s e i n t e r e s t s , checking, t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n l e v e l s , gauging t h e i r power
p o s i t i o n s , then s e e i n g t o what e x t e n t t h e s e v a r i a b l e s accounted f o r t h e
i n t e n s i t y and c h a r a c t e r of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . One s t e p back from
t h a t f o r m a l i z a t i o n we would f i n d o u r s e l v e s examining t h e p r e v a i l i n g pat-
t e r n of r e p r e s s i o n a n d f a c i l i t a t i o n , t h e impact of t h e v a r i o u s g r o u p s '
o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n and on t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , t h e e f f e c t of
c o a l i t i o n s w i t h o t h e r c o n t e n d e r s on t h e i r c u r r e n t power p o s i t i o n s , and s o
on.
Thnt is t h e e a s y p a r t : showing t h a t c o n c e p t s such a s m o b i l i z a t i o n
and r e p r e s s i o n p o i n t t o b r o a d l y s i m i l a r p r o c e s s e s i n d i f f e r e n t s e t t i n g s ,
and a p p l y c o n v e n i e n t l y i n t h o s e v a r i o u s s e t t i n g s . We would be s u r p r i s e d
and d i s a p p o i n t e d i f i t came o u t o t h e r w i s e ; a f t e r a l l , t h e c o n c e p t s were
meant t o be q u i t e g e n e r a l . Yet t h e e a s y p a r t h a s i t s s a t i s f a c t i o n s . It
h e l p s i d e n t i f y some unexpected and p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l comparisons --
between, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of B r i t i s h r a d i c a l s i n t h e 1760s
and t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of American r a d i c a l s i n t h e 1960s. It brings o u t
t h e r i c h n e s s nnd r e l e v a n c e of h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l s f o r t h e c o n c e r n s of
contemporary n n n l y s t s of p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s . Thse two advantages combjne
t o produce a t h i r d advantage: tlie r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t h i s t o r i c a l experiences
n r e a n important and a c c e s s i b l e domain f o r t h e t e s t i n g and refinement of
arguments and e x p l a n a t i o n s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
There we a r r i v e a t t h e h a r d p a r t . The hard p a r t i s t h e r e s e n r c l ~
agenda: s o r t i n g p o p u l a t i o n s i n t o members of t h e p o l i t y , c l ~ o l l e n a e r sand
non-actors; i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r i n t e r e s t s r e l i a b l y ; measuring t h e e x t e n t
and c h a r a c t e r of r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t a t i o n t o which they a r e s u b j e c t ; de-
t e r m i n i n g whether i t is t r u e , a s argued e a r l i e r , t h ~ rt i c h p o p u l a t i o n s
tend t o m o b i l i z e o f f e n s i v e l y , poor p o p u l a t i o n s t o m o b i l i z e d e f e n s i v e l y ;
d e t e r m i n i n g whether i t is t r u e , n s I have a s s e r t e d r e p e a t e d l y , tlint t h e
g e n e r a l e f f e c t of s u s t a i n e d r e p r e s s i o n i s n o t t o b u i l d up t e n s i o n s t o
t h e p o i n t of a g r e a t e x p l o n i o ~ l , b u t t o r e d u c e t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of c o l -
lective action.
This is t h e hard p a r t . It is n o t o n l y hard because i t i n v o l v e s many
v a r i a b l e s and i n t e r a c t i o n s among t h e v a r i a b l e s . I t is a l s o hnrd because
t h e measurement problems a r e s o l a r g e ; d e v i s i n g g e n e r a l l y comparable and
meaningful. measures of o r g a n i z a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n , power, r e p r e s s i o n , and
s o on l i e s beyond t h e FreRent s t a t e of t h e a r t . That is why t h i s book h a s
s o o f t e n t u r n e d t o t h e problems of measurement. P l e n t y of work t o do
there.
The a c c o u n t s of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i n B r i t a i n and America we havc j u s t
reviewed a l s o r e c a l l a major t h e o r e t i c a l problem. In the mobilization
model which t h i s book h a s employed, c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s a r e g i v e n a p r i o r i .
We impute them from some g e n e r a l h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s (my p r e f e r r e d nnaly-
sis h e i n g Marx' r e l a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t segments of t h e p o p u l a t i o n t o t h e
p r e v a i l i n g means of p r o d u c t i o n ) o r we determine them e m p i r i c a l l y (my pre-
f e r r e d p r o c e d u r e being t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o what people soy a r e t h e i r griev-,
ances, a s p i r a t i o n s and r i g h t s ) . The t h e o r e t i c a l d i f F i c u l . t i e s m n l t i p l y .
M o b i l i z a t i o n , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n nnd a c q u i s i t i o n o r 1.088 of power f r e q u e n t l y
a l t e r a group's i n t e r e s t s . How s h o u l d we t a k e t h a t a l t e r a t i o n i n t o ac-
count? The i m p u t a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s and t h e e m p i r i c a l d e r i v a t i o n o f t e n
c o n f l i c t w i t h each o t h e r ; L e n i n i s t 8 s p e a k of " f a l s e c o n s c i o ~ ~ s n e s s " . Does
t h a t make s e n s e ?
Another problem h a s been w i t h u s from t h e s t a r t , and h a s r e f u s e d
t o go away: t h e c o n n e c t i o n between c a u s a l and p u r p o s i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s of
collective action. We have o s c i l l a t e d between t h e two w i t h o u t i n t e g r a t i n g
them f i r m l y . The m o b f l i z a t i o n model s e r v e s f o r s h o r t - r u n ana1ysb.s.
When we t a k e up a s e r i e s of a c t i o n s such a s t h e Stamp Act r e s i s t a n c e i n
P h i l . a d e l p h i a and New York we s o r t our o h S e ~ a t i 0 n Si n t o i n t e r e s t s , organ-
i z a t i o n , mobilization, r e p r e s s i o n , power, o p p o r t u n i t y and c o l l e c t i v e
action i t s e l f . But we u l t i m a t e l y v i s u s l i . z e t h e v a r i o u s groups involved
a s undertaking t h e i r a c t i o n purposively: seeking t o r e a l i z e t h e i r i n t e r -
e s t s w i t h t h e means a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s s e t by t h e i r re-
diminished l e v e l s ; t h a t i a becsuae tile governmental a p p a r a t u s p r o t e c t s
them from t h r e a t s and because reduced c o s t s of m o b i l i z a t i o n and collective
a c t i o n mean they can r e a l i z e t h e same i n t e r e s t w i t h l e s s e f f o r t . Thua
t h e c r u c i a l changes a f f e c t c o n s t r a i n t s , n o t i . n t e n t i o n s .
Another kind of c a u s a l argument h a s a l s o f i g u r e d prominently i n t h e
a n a l y s e s of p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . I t concerns tlie e f f e c t s of very 1.arge
s o c i a l changes, n o t a b l y s t a t e m a k i n g , p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n and i n d u s t r i a l i z n -
tion. There 1 have argued r e p e a t e d l y t h a t t h e change i n q u e s t i o n simultnne-
o u s l y a f f e c t e d t h e i n t e r e s t s and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of v a r i o u s c o n t e n d e r s
f o r power, and t h e r e b y a f f e c t e d t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n .
I n t h e c a s e of p e a s a n t r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e i n c r e a s e d t a x a t i o n accompanying
a t a temaking:
ABSTRACT CONCRETE

l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e world around them. I have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t t h e DEEWD FOR TAXES

\ 1 \
l i m i t a t i o n s of t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n model: tlie l a c k of allowance f o r uncer- k L L
THREAT TO SHORT-RUN REINFORCE-
t a i n t y nnd f o r s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . t h e f o c u s on q u a n t i t y r a t h e r t h a n . WCAL CON- MENT OF COMMUNLTY
TROI. OF LAND, POLITLCAL INSTITUTIONS
qt~nl.i.ty, t h e measurement d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t i n each of i t s v a r i a b l e s . MOBILIZATION CROPS. WF,N,TH, /
Even i f we f i n d ways of overcoming t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s , however, we a r e
SUILDUP OF LOCAL
s t i l l d e a l i n g with a p u r p o s i v e model. PARAM!l.LTARY FORCES
J,
T M REBELLIONS
I n coping w i t h long-rlln changes i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , we have gener-

a l l y t u r n e d from p u r p o s i v e t o c a u s a l models. The p o l i t y model h a s s e r v e d T h i s is n o t a complete a c c o u n t , s i n c e s t a t e m k i n g a l s o a f f e c t s r e p r e s s i o n 1

u s i n t h i s way; f o r example, i t p r o v i d e s a c r u d e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e f a c i l i t a t i o n and power. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s account c l e a r l y d i f f e r s from

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c d i f f e r e n c e s i n c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n among groups which a r e t h e s t a n d a r d Durkheimian arguments i n which t h e d i s c r e p a n c y between t h e

g a i n i n g power, groups which a r e l o s i n g power, and groups which a r e main- pace of s t r u c t u r a l change and tlie i n s t i t u t l o ~ l a l i z a t i o nof s o c i a l c o n t r o l

t a i n i n g t h e i r power. C h a l l e n g e r s g a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l power, r u n s one p a r t d e t e r m i n e s t h e l i k e l i h o o d of c o n f l i c t and p r o t e s t . Al.though t h e argu-

of t h e e x p l a n n t i o n , tend t o s h i f t toward c o l l e c t i v e p r o a c t i o n , b u t a t ment h a s i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r changes i n t h e plrrposes of p e a s a n t

c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a c a u s a l argument. and s t r u c t u r e s of power. The p o l i t y model we have used i n t h i s book

I n p r i n c i p l e , i t s h o u l d n o t be h a r d t o i n t e g r a t e t h e p u r p o s i v e and s i n g l e s o u t o n l y one a s p e c t -- t h e relationship of c o n t e n d e r s t o eovern-

causal analyses. I n p r i n c i p l e , we can i n t e g r a t e them by c o n t i n u i n g t o ments -- of a complex s e t of changes. In order t o integrate the causal

t h i n k of group d e c i s i o n r u l e s and t a c t i c a l computations ( t h e p u r p o s i v e and p u r p o s i v e arguments unfoldcd i n t h i s book, we need more. We need o

p a r t ) which o p e r a t e w i t h i n s e v e r e c o n s t r a i n t s s e t by t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s much f u l l e r a n a l y s i s of power s t r u a g l e s . c o o l i t t o n s . and o t h e r forms oE

i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r groups, and t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r a c t i o n among c o n t e n d e r s . For s t u d e n t s o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , t h a t

s t a t e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s i n t h e world ( t h e c a u s a l p a r t ) . i s the next challenge.

I n p r a c t i c e , t h a t is not s o easy. We might t r y t o do i t by g r a d u a l l y The Importance of H i s t o r y

bttild ltig time i n t o t h e b a s i c mobil i z a t i o n model: showing, f o r i n s t a n c e . H i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s , t a k e n s e r i o u s l y , w i l l h e l p us fasltionmorc adc-

how a c o n t e n d e r ' s c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a t one p o i n t i n time changes t h e con- q u a t e models of power s t r u g g l e s . The h i s t o r i c a l r e c o r d i s r i c h nnd r e l e -

d i t i o n s wlticl~ a r e r e l e v a n t t o t h e n e x t round of a c t i o n . I n t h e agenda vant. I t p e r m i t s u s t o f o l l o w m u l t i p l e groups and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s o v e r

s e t by t h e model, t h a t means showing how t h e form, i n t e n s i t y and outcome s u b s t a n t i a l b l o c k s of time. C o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , c o n t e n t i o n and s t r u g g l e s

of t h e a c t i o n a f f e c t t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s i n t e r e s t s , o r g a n i z a l l o n and mobili- f o r p o l i t i c a l power a r e e s p e c i a l l y l i k e l y t o l e a v e t h e i r t r a c e s i n t h e

z a t i o n . i t s power p o s i t i o n , dle new o p p o r t u n i t i e s and t h r e a t s c o n f r o n t i n g h i s t o r i a n ' s raw m a t e r i a l s .

i t , and t h e r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n t o which i t is s u b j e c t . I n a very I t i s t o r y i s more t h a n an abundant s o u r c e of d a t n . I t matters for

s h o r t r u n , we can i g n o r e some o f these r e l a t i o n s h i p s because they w i l l i t s own sake; i t p u t s o u r own e x p e r i e n c e i n t o p e r s p e c t i v e and sometimes

r e n n i n e s s e n t i a l l y t h e name. Over a s e r i e s of s h o r t - r u n s n a p s h o t s , how- helps t o explain i t . The h i s t o r y o f c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n i s a f a s c i n a t i n g

e v e r , t h e i r e f f e c t s w i l l hegin t o accumulate, and t o a f f e c t -5, d r i f t of i n q u i r y which t a k e s 11s i n t o d i f f e r e n t p a t h s from t h e h i s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l

t h e s i t u a t i o n a s a whole. thought o r t h e h i s t o r y of powerholders, a l t h o u g h t h e t h r e e s o r L s of h i s -

A s e r i e s o f many such s h o r t - r i m p o r t r a i t s s h o u l d i n t e g r a t e , l i k e a tory cross frequently. The d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c n l t r a j e c t o r i e s of t h e

many-Cramed movie, i n t o a c o n t i n u o u s account of t h e p r o c e s s by which c o l - d e m o n s t r a t i o n and t h e s t r i k e i n western c o i t t ~ t r i e s . f o r example, h e l p u s

l e c t i v e a c t i o n clinnges and flows. The d i f f i c u l t y , however, i s obvious: understand t h e d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s t h e y occupy i n t o d a y ' s p o l i t i c a l r c p e r -

f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of any p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n t we can a f f o r d t o t r e a t t h e s c - t o i r e s , h e l p us g r a s p such p e c u l i a r t h i n g s a s t h e r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r

t i o n s of oLhcr groups (and t h e c o n t e n d e r ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r groups) frequency w i t h which t h e demonstrations of o u r own time produce c o l l e c -

a s f e a t u r e s o f t h e environment. As soon a s time e n t e r s , t h e a c t i o n s and t i v e v i o l e n c e ; a f t e r a l l , i n most western c o u n t r i e s s t r i k e s were once

r e a c t i o n s of t h e o t h e r s become c r u c i a l . I n t h e s h o r t r u n , we have s t r a - v e r y common s e t t i n g s f o r shootinp,, b r a w l i n g and a t t a c k s on b u i l d i n g s o r

tegic interaction. I n t h e l o n g e r run, we have changing c o a l i t i o n s , c l e a v a g e s equipment.

 of action, the results of action, the Intensitities and loci of nctlon
llistorians commonly treat the history of collective action as a sub-
change in an intelligible manner in the course of such large-scale changes
sldsldiary form of political, social or economic history: strikes and
as industrialization and statemaking; we can rensonnbly ask the same
demonstrations serve as the moral equivalent of the statesman's memoirs.
questions about interest, organization, opportunity and action in wide-
provide evidence of the quality of life among the lower orders, lend
ly different settings, and can even expect similar answers to some qucs-
themselves to the measurement of the impact of economic fluctuations.
tions to come back from very different times and places.
Those are all legitimate uses of the evidence on strikes and demonstrations.
Worthwhile? In the long run, the reaults of tl~einquiry will tell
Taken in its w n terms, however, tl~ehistory of collective action cuts
us. In advance, we can see at least that the study of collective action
across political history, social history, economic history as we usually
gets us to the problems that concerned the ordinary actors of history in
imngine them. The categories and periods of collective action's history
a way that almost no other inquiry does. It takes its place with the
do not f o l l w simply from those of political, social or economic history.
historical study of work and the family: it is about the logic, fmme-
Collective nction follows its own course. Our repeated glimpses of his-
work and content of everyday life.
torical experience in this book have given us clear indications of the impact
The question of accessibility is harder to settle. Too little of
oncollective nction of changes in power structure and in the organization
the work of making the evidence for collective action available and com-
of production, but they have also shown us how the existing repertoire of
prehensible has been done. Interest, opportunity, organization, action
collective action and the previous experience of the collective actors

constrain the way they act together on interests, aspirations and grievances.
-- none of them is easy to reconstruct at a distance of o century or two.

The action is less difficult than the rest, because the most precise and
Instead of treating it ns a minor elaboration of political or social his-
The nutlloritics tried
tory -- for example, as the subject which George Rude labeled The Crowd
voluminous records come from legal authorities.

to establish what happened in order to punish it this time and prevent it

in llistory --
- we have nome warrant to write the history of collective ac-
next time. As for interest, opportunity and orgnnization, we muat either
tion in its own terms.
infer them from the action itself, guess at them on the basis of general
BeEore we stake out a new liistorical field, however, we should not ask
arguments, or piece them together from scattered, brittle materials.
merely whether it 1s conceivable and interesting. We have to ask whether
When dealing with the actions of ordinary people, most historians content
it is coherent, worthwile and accessible. In the case of collective
themselves wihh the first two choices: describe what the people did, then
action, the answer to all three seems to be: yes. The subject is coherent
deduce what interests they were pursuing, what opporttmities to pursuo
in several fundamental regards: any given population tends to have a
those interests they faced and how they were organized from what they said
fairly limited and well-established set of means for action on shared In-
and did during the action, as well as from general argumenta concerning the
terests, and to change tt~osemeans little by little; the available means
character of crowds, the nature of pensant life, the mennlng of resistance
 to conscription, and similar notions. lective violence died away as the building of the state suc-
In the absence of direct, s'olid evidence concerning interest, op- ceeded (Berce 1974a: 117).
portunity and organization, the indirect approach combining general ar-
~erc:'s au-ry underestimates the importance of expanding capitalism.
guments with observations from the action can serve us well. A11 we need
Yet it pinpoints themes which do recur, time and time again, in seven-
are sound general arguments, well-documented actions, and the wit to cor-
teenth-century revolts: established rights being crushed, long-respect-
rect the general arguments when the actions prove them wrong. In analy-
ed privileges being swept aside. miat much appears in the action itself,
zing the actions of the seventeenth-century rural rebels who show up in
history books under such quaint names as Bonnets-Rouges, Camisards and
as when, in 1636, the peasants of Saintonge declared "... that they were
good Frenchmen and would die, rather than live any longer under the ty-
Croquants, Yves-Mar;e ~ b r c eframes a useful argument. At that time, ac-
ranny of Parisians who had reduced them to the despair and extreme pov-
cording to Berce, the local community was the main locus of rural solid-
erty in which our province now find themaelves because of the great tax
arity and the chief repository of rights in which rural people had a strong
assessments and new burdens that they have imposed upon us and invented
investment. The expansion of the state under Louis XI11 and Louis XIV
in this reign ..." (Berce 1974b: 736).
threatened both the solidarity and the rights.
The complaint from Saintonge illustrates both the promise and the
To each form of local solidarity. ~ e r c gargues, corresponded a form
penalty of working with observations of collective action olone. The
of rebellion: revolts of insecurity based on the institutions of common
promise is that people who act together generally have their own idea
defense ngalnst 'marauders, food riots based on the communal arrangements
of the grievances, hopes and interests which motivate them. and a notion
for provisioning in hard times, forceful defense of common agricultural
of their chances of success. If the "tyranny of Parisians" resppears in
rights based on the previous exercise and recognition of those rights,
complaint after complaint, we have some reason to believe thnt the people
rebellions against direct taxes based on the long participation of the
, of Saintonge had a genuine grievance ogainst demands from outside. The
local community in the assessment of those taxes, armed resistance to
penalty, however, is that the rhetoric of rebellion does not reveal the
indirect taxes based on the prior existence of local cl~annelsfor the
origin or factual basis of the grievance: how to distinguish, for exam-
trading of the items now subject to inspection, taxation and seizure.
ple, betwzen a longstanding condition recently become intolerable be-
Says Berce:
cause of changing aspirations or self-definitions, and new privations
It is roughly from 1660 to 1680 that, irreversibly, communal which violate longstanding rights7
powers were dismantled, their military, judiciary and fiscal Part of the remedy consists of paying attention to the whole pat-
prerogatives choked or revoked, their established rights and tern of actions and complaints: in old-regime France, almost everyone
privileges crushed. The chronology of great popular rebell- who made a public lament complalned of "extreme poverty;" if you did
ions follows the same rhythm. Then these reactions of col- otherwise, there was the chance the tax collector would bite harder the
next time lie passed by. Complaints of "new burdens" and "Parisian ty-
- ably warp the interpretation of the past to ftt the preoccupation of
ranny." on the other hand. varied from place to place, time to time,
group to group. In that variation over place, time and group we have
a chance to try out our ideas concerning the interests, opportunities
and organization lying behind the collective action. In the case of
~ercc's argument, we con determine whether there was, indeed, a tendency
for regions just coming under firm royal control to mount major resis-
tance movements, then lapse into docility as the state won out. (There
wns, although the connections were more complex than ~erci's scheme al-
lows.)
Nevertheless, a broad correlation between the rhythm of statemaking
and the rhythm of rebellion will leave open many alternative interpre-
tations of the interests, opportunities and organization at work. Event-
ually we will have to try to observe them directly. Two apparently con-
tradictory strategies apply. The first is the more obvious: dig into
the evidence concerning the settings in which collective action occurs.
With enough spadework, it is often possible to discover the interests.
opportunities and organization in operation outside the great episodes
of action. But eventually we will need comparisons with places, times
and groups in which little or no action occurred: if we find "extreme
poverty" in the setting of every seventeenth-century rebellion, does
that mean the peasants who did not rebel were less poor? That sort of
question leads us to the second strategy: broad comparisons of places,
times, and groups which differed in interest, opportunity end organiza-
tion. Did their collective action, or lack of it, vary accordingly?
In writing the history of collective action, we have a choice hc-
tween historical particularism and the attempt to compare and generalize.
In one view, all such comparisons are odious, First because they inevit-
the present, second because they wrench each event from the only con-
text which can give it substance. "The Burgundian of the seventeenth
century," Gastron Roupnel tells us, "did not bear the mark of the modern
age. At the bottom of his soul there wns something so old that it
was as if the Gauls were still around him in their new land where his-
tory had not yet arrived" (Roupnel 1955: xxx). If so, presumnb1.y
neither the Burgundian nor the American of our own time con reconstitute
' or explain the events of seventeenth-century Rurgundy without projecting
himself across the chasm between the present and on corlier age. Com-
parisons will only serve to map the depth and contours oE the chasm.
The depth and width of the chasm, however, are questions of fact,
not of fnith. We can, to some degree, determine whether the patterns
and explanations which help us order the collective action of thc
seventeenth century give us any grip o,r~that of the twentieth -- pro-
I
I vide usable categories for our observations, b r i n ~out obscure connec-
I tions, anticipate features which are not readily visiblc at first sight.
The points at which the seventeenth-century categories €nil are clues to
change, signals thot we have something new to explnin. Our attempt to
move across the centuries may lead to the conclusion thot different
centuries require fundamentally different approaches to collective
action. Then that conclusion, and the delineation of the essential
breaks between one mode of action and another, will be accomplLshments
in themselves.
The History of collective Action in Modern France
How, then, might we set concrete historical experience into the
framework this book has built up? The historical work consists of
grouping actions within the historical experience into governments, con- In analyzing this interplay, we need to ask over and over for dif-

tenders, polities, coalitions, processes of mobilization, and so on. ferent places and points in time wlwt contenders for power (potentinl and

Other fundamental phenomena, such as changes in beliefs, demographic actrtal) the existing social structure made available, and what governments

change. or demographic crisis, enter the account only in so far as they the existing stage of statemaking left them to contend over. n ~ most
e

affect the pattern of pursuit of interests and contention for power. strenuous current debates over the history bf the turbulent French seven-

In the case of France since 1500, the largest frame for analysis teenth century, for example, pivot, first, on the extent to whlch the

shows us the interplay of a gradually urbanizing, industrializing and national government squeezed out its provincial rivals and acquired firm

proletarianizing population with a national state which was at first control over Frnech social life; second, and even more strenuously. on

emerging, then establishing priority, then consolid~tingits hold on the extent to which the operative divisions of the population were social

the population. The two sets of processes depended on each other to some classes in something like a Marxian sense (soe Mor~snier1970, Lebrun 1967,

degree -- for example, in the way that expanding taxation drove peasants Porchnev 1963. Lublinakaya 1968).

to market goods they would otherwise have kept at home, on the one hand, The analytic scheme I have laid out provides no pat answers to those

nnd the way thnt the degree of commercialization of land, labor, and serious questions; if it did, one would have to suspect that its prin-

ngricultural production set stringent limits on the return from land cipal assertions were true by definitlon. It does suggest thnt the

taxes, income taxes, or excise taxes, on the other. Rut their timing tracing of the actual issues, locations and personnel of violent encoun-

differed. The epic periods of French state-making were the times of ters in seventeenth-century France will provide crucip.1 evidence on the

Louis XI11 and Louis XIV. Those periods had their share of economic pace and extent of political centralization, as well as on the nature of

turmoil. Furthermore, they saw both a significant increase in the impor- the groups which were then engaged in struggles for power. The basic

tnnce of Paris and n few other major cities for the life of France as a research remains to be done. Yet the recurrent importance of new taxn-

whole and the oprend of trade and small-scale manufacturing through the tion in seventeenth-century rebellions, the npparent suhsidence of those

towns and villages of the entire country. Yet in terms of productivity. rebellions toward the end of the century, and the frequent involvement of

organization and sheer numbers of persons involved, the urbanization, in- whole peasant communities in resistance to the demands of the crown nll

dustrialization and yroletarianization of the nineteenth and twentieth point toward a decisive seventeenth-century battle among locnl and nntion-

centuries produced incomparably greater changes. To oversimplify outrage- a1 polities.

ously, the drama consists of two acts: flrst a fast-growing state acting Not that nll struggle ended then. As Tocqueville declared long ago,

on a slow-moving population and economy; then a tast-changing population the Revolution of 1789 pitted centralizers agalnst guardians oC provincial

and economy dealine with a consolidating state. autonomies. The contest betwecn c r o w and provincinl parlemcnts (which
 led quite directly to the calling for the Estates General, which in turn
became the locus of multiple sovereignty in-1789) continued the strug-
gle of the seventeenth century. Throughout the Revolution, in fact,
the issue of predominance of Paris and the national government remained
open, with tax rebellions, movements against conscription and resistance
to the calls of the nation for food recurring when the center weakened
and when its demands increased sharply. Most of the events of the so-
called peasant revolt of 1789 took the form of food riots and other
classic eighteenth-centt~ry local conflicts.
Yet they did not just represent "more of the same," because they
came in extraordinary clusters, because theyoccurred in the presence of
. multiple sovereignty, and because the participants began to form coali-
ttotis with other contenders for power. Now, the exact contours of the
major contenders and the precise nature of their shifting alliances are
the central issues of the big debates about the history of the Revolution
(see e.g. Cobhan 1964, Hazauric 1970). But it is at least roughly true
to say that a loose coalition among peasants, officials, urban commer-
cial cLasscs and small but crucial grotlps of urban craftsmen and stlop-
keepers carried the revolution through its first few years, but began to
fall apart irrevocably in 1792 and 1793. Looked at from the point of
vlew of coalition-formation and multiple sovereignty, the Revolution
breaks into a whole series of revolutionary situations, from the first
declaration of sovereignty by the Third Estate in 1798 to the final
defeat of Napoleon in 1815.
Agagn, in this perspective we begin to grasp tile significance of
matertally trivial events like the taking of the Bastille. For the at-
tack by Parisjans on the old fortress finally set a crowd unambiguously
against the regime, revealed the uncertain commitment of part of the
armed forces to the government. brought the King to his ffrst accessions
to the popular movement (his trip to tlie Natio~~sl
Assembly on thc 15th
of July and his trip to Paris on the 17th) and stimulated a serles of
I
I minor coups in the provinces:
I
Until. July 14th the handful of revolutlonary instituttons sct
up in the provinces were disparate and isolated. Ilcnccfonsnrd
most of the towns and many of the villagcs of Prance wore to
imitate Paris with extraordinary swiftness. During the uceks
that followed the fall of tlie Bastille there arose evcrywhcre
revolutionary Toron Councils of permanent committees, and citizen
4
i militias which soon assumed the name of national guards (Godechot
1970: 273).
So if we date the start of multiple sovereignty from the Third Estate's
Tennis Court Oath to remain assembled despite the prohibitions of
the King, we still have to treat July 15th and its immediate nftcr-
math as a great expansion of the revolutionary coalition.
Obviously the three proximate conditions for a revolutlonary sltu-
ation enumerated earlier -- coalitions of contenders ndvnncing exclu-
sive alternative claims, commitment to those claims, Failure of the
government to suppress them -- appeared in the France of 1789%'' Whnt
cannot be obvlous from a mere chronicle of the events is how long cach
of the conditions existed. what caused them and whether they were suf-
ficient to cause the collapse of the old re~ime. At least these are
researchable questions, as contrasted with attempts to ask directly
whether the rise of the bonrgeoisie, the increase in relattve deprivn-
tion or the decay of the old elite "caused" the Revolution. What is Indeed, these reactive forms of collective action renched their climnx

more, they call attention to the probable importance of shifting coali- around the Revolution of 1848, before fading rnpidly to insignificance.

tions among lawyers, officials, provincial magnates, peasants and wor- From the mid-century crisjs we can date the date the definitive

kers in the nationwide political maneuvering of 1787 to 1789, as well 1 reduction of the smaller polities in whtch Frenchmen had once done

as to the effect of "defensive" mobilization of peasants and workers in most of their political business. the virtual disappearance of communal

response to the multiple pressures impinging on them in 1789. contenders for power, the shift of all contenders townrd associntional

The Revolution produced a great transfer of power. It stamped out organization and action at a national level. The massive urbanizntion

a new and difinctive political system. Despite the'Restoration of 1815, and industrialization of France which gained momentum ofter 1830

the nobility and the clergy never recovered their pre-revolutionary transformed the available contenders for power, especially by crenting

position, some segments of the bourgeoisie greatly enhanced their power a large, new urban working class based in factories and other large

over the national government. and the priority of that national govern- organizations. From that point on, the demonstration, the meeting. the

ment over ell others increased permanently. In Barrington Moore's analy- strike wer? the usual matrices of collective violence as well as the

sis, whose main lines appear correct to me, the predominance of the settings in which an enormous proportion of all struggles for power

coalition of officials, bourgeois and peasant in the decisive early went on. Collective action evolved with the organization of public

phases OF the Revolution promoted the emergence of the attenuated parlia- life.

mentary democracy which characterizes post-revolutionary France (Moore A Last Case'in Point: Rural Collective Action in Burgundy

1966, ch. IT; for explication and critique see Rokkan 1969, Rothman 1970.. If this broad sketch of the evolution of collective action holds

Stone 1967). At thet scale and in the details of public administration, for France as a whole, it m y still lose its verisimilitude when compared

education, ideology and life style, the Revolution left s durable heri- to the experience of particular local populations. In Caston Roupnel'a

tage . opinion, which I quoted earlier, the old-regime Burgundian was so dif-

None of the old conflicts, nevertheless, disappeared completely with ferent from his modern counterpart that a historian hns to apply differ-

the Revolution. The counter-revolutionary vendce, despite having come 1 ent explanatory principles to his behavior.

close to destruction in 1793, again rose in rebellion in 1794, 1795, Roupnel!s challenge to us is to discover vhether we can understand

1799, 1.815 and 1832. Further revolutions overcame France as a whole in and explain the co1,lective action of old-regime Burgundy in terms which

1830, 1848, and 1870. Host of the characteristic forms of resistance to are relevant to the time and place, yet still hnve meaning in other --
demands from the center -- food riots, tax rebellions, movements against and especially later -- times and placea. I think we can. Old-regime

conscri,ption,and so on -- continued well into the nineteenth century. Burgundians felt the effects of two momentous processes: the expansion
of c a p i t a l i s m and t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of power i n t h e French n a t i o n a l That blockage of g r a i n e x p r e s s e d t h e demand of o r d i n a r y p e o p l e t h a t tlle

state. They f e l t t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m c o n c r e t e l y i n t h e growth needs of t h e community have p r i o r i t y over t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e mnr-

of a n a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e s h i f t toward cash-crop p r o d u c t i o n , ket. The market, and t h e r e f o r e t h e merchants a s w e l l .

t h e d e c l i n e of communal p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n f a v o r of i n d i v i d u a l owner- The second common form of a n t i c s p i t a l l s t a c t i o n was l e s s r o u t i n e

s h i p , and a number of o t h e r ways. They f e l t t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of s t a t e and more i r o n i c . It was l o c s l r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e l a n d l o r d ' s c o n s o l i d a -

power i n tlie r i s i n g importance of r o y a l o f f i c i a l s i n t h e r e g i o n . t h e t i o n of l e n d s and of r i g h t s i n t h e l a n d . The i r o n y l i e s i n o u r normnl

d e c l i n i n g autonomy of t h e Parlement and t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y of D i j o n , t h e r e a d i n e s s t o p l a c e t h e l a n d l o r d s themselves i n t h e a n t i c a p i t a l i s t camp.

i n c r e a s e d c o n t r o l , t a x a t i o n and s a l e of l o c a l o f f i c e s by t h e Crown, and A s t h e g r e a t r e g i o n a l h i s t o r i a n P i e r r e d e Saint-Jacoh showcd, tlie

a number of o t h e r ways. Burgundisn l a n d l o r d s of t h e p e r i o d -- i n c l u d i n g b o t h t h e "old" n o b j l t t y

The c o n f l i c t s over s t a t e m a k i n g a r e most v i s i b l e i n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h and t h e ennobled o f f i c i a l s and merchants -- played t h e c a p i t a l i s t game

c e n t u r y , e s p e i c a l l y d u r i n g t h e Fronde of t h e 1640s and 16508, when Bur- by s e i z i n g t h e f o r e s t s , u s u r p i n g common l a n d s , e n c l o s i n g f i e l d s and

gundy wns t h e s i t e of major r e b e l l i o n s a g a i n s t t h e Crown. The c o n f l i c t s i n s i s t i n g on c o l l e c t i n g a l l t h e u s e f e e s t o which t h e i r manors gnve them

o v e r c a p i t a l i s m a r e more v i s i b l e i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , when s t r u g g l e s claim. R u r a l p e o p l e f o u g h t back. S u i t s against landlords multiplied.

f o r c o n t r o l of land. l a b o r and c r o p s r e c u r r e d throughout t h e p r o v i n c e . a f a c t which d e S a i n t - J a c o b i n t e r p r e t s a s e v i d e n c e n o t o n l y of s e i g n i o r i s l

Let u s t a k e a b r i e f look a t t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s t r u g g l e s , t h l n k a b o u t a g g r e s s i o n b u t a l s o of an i n c r e a s i n g l i b e r a t i o n of t h e p e a s a n t s from

t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e expansion of c a p i t a l i s m , and then compare them t r a d i t i o n a l respect.

with t h e r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Where t h e l a w s u i t was i m p o s s i b l e o r i n e f f e c t i v e , p e o s a n t s r e s i s t e d

I n r u r a l Burgundy, e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n t e n t i o n had a s t r o n g a n t i - t h e s e i z u r e of connnons by occupying them, r e s i s t e d e n c l o s u r e s by brcnking

capitalist flavor. I t was t h e golden a g e of food r i o t s . The c r i s e s of t h e hedges o r f e n c e s . A s P i e r r e d e Sajnt-Jacob d e s c r i b e s it:

1709, 1758 and 1775 brought t h e i r c l u s t e r s of c o n f l i c t s , and o t h e r s

The wardens of A t h i e were a t t a c k e d by tlie p e o p l e of Viserny
appeared between t h e g r e a t c r i s e s . That is t h e meaning of t h e 1770
f o r t r y i n g t o f o r b i d e n t r y t o a shepherd. On tlie l e n d s o f
e d i c t o f t h e P a r l e m e n t of Burgundy which f o r b a d e , l i k e s o many o t h e r e d i c t s
Bernard d e F o n t e t t e . P i e r r e ~ 6 s a rdu C r e s t , t h e l o r d of S a j n t -
of t h e p e r i o d
Aubin, o r g a n i z e d an unusual. e x p e d i t i o n . He went w i t h 17 men

t o g a t h e r and s t o p wagons loaded w i t h ' w h e s t o r o t h e r g r a i n , on armed w i t h " g u n s , s t a k e s and s t a v e s " t o h r e a k down t h e enclo-

r o a d s , i n c i t i e s , towns o r v i l l a g e s , on p a i n of s p e c i a l prose- sures. They l e d i n 40 c a t t l e under t h e p r o t e c t i o n of two g u a r d s

cution ... (Archives ~ 6 p a r t e m e n t a l e s~ G t ed'Or [ D i j o n ] C 81) "with guns and h u n t i n g dogs," and k e p t t h e t e n n n t s of Bernard

d e F o n t e t t e from h r i n g i n g i n t h e i r c a t t l e . I n Charmois, a t t h e
 u r g i n g of two women, a band of p e a s a n t s went t o b r e a k down a f e n c e p o l i c i e s , and e s p e c i a l l y t h e f i s c a l p o l i c i e s , of t h e s t a t e .

s e t up by t h e o v e r s e e r of Grenand who could do n o t h i n g b u t watch The a c t i v e groups of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y came e s p e c i a l l y from

and r e c e i v e t h e j e e r s of t h e crowd. I n P a n t h i e r , a merchant wanted t h e s m a l l l a n d h o l d e r s and t h e workers of t h e commercialized, f u l l y c a p i t o -

t o erkclose h i s meodow; he g o t a u t h o r i z a t i o n from t h e l o c a l c o u r t . l i s t vineyards. Robert Laurent p o r t r a y s t h o t s o r t of p r o t e s t a s L t

P e o p l e assembled i n t h e s q u a r e and decided t o break t h e hedges, which took p l a c e j u s t a f t e r t h e R e v o l u t i o n of 1830:

was done t h a t n i g h t . They l e d i n t h e h o r s e s . The merchant wanted

. . . in September, t h e announcement o f t h e resllmption of t h e
t o c h a s e them away, b u t t h e young p e o p l e who were g u a r d i n g them
i n v e n t o r y of wine on t h e premises of winegrower^ s t a r t e d turbu- .
stopped him, "saying t h a t t h e y were on t h e i r own p r o p e r t y , i n a
l e n t demonstrations, n e a r - r i o t s , i n Beatlne. On t h e 1 2 t h of Sep-
p u b l i c meodow, t h a t they had broken t h e e n c l o s u r e s and t h a t t h e y
tember a t t h e time of t h e N a t i o n a l Guard review " c r i e s of anger
would brenk them a g a i n . . ." (Saint-Jacob 1960: 370-371).
a g a i n s t t h e Revenue A d m i n i s t r a t i o n [ l a ~ e f g i er ~
o s e from I t s very

A s we can s e e , t h e o p p o s i t i o n was n i t d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y a g a i n s t t h e ranks." Told t h o t t h e r e s i d e n t s of t h e s u b u r b s planned t o go

landed n o b i l i t y , b u t a g a i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d s of any c l a s s who chewed a t t o t h e t a x o f f i c e s i n o r d e r t o burn t h e r e g i s t e r s a s t h e y hod i n

t h e c o l l e c t i v e r i g h t s of t h e r u r a l community. I f i n Longecourt i n 1764 1814, t h e mayor thought i t prudent t h a t e v e n i n g t o c a l l t h e a r t i l -

i t wns t h e l o r d who demanded h i s own s h a r e of t h e commons, i n D a r o i s two l e r y company t o arms and convoke p a r t of t h e Notional Guord f o r

y e a r s l a t e r t h e Chapter of S a i n t e - C h a p e l l e , i n D i j o n , t r i e d t o t a k e . 0 5 o ' c l o c k t h e n e x t morning. On t h e 1 3 t h . toward 8A.H., "a huge

s h a r e of t h e communal woods, and i n ~ i l l ~ - l e - ~ di nl 61769 i t was a for-' crowd of winegrowers and workers," s h o u t i n g "down w i t h t h e wolves,"

mer-notary who e n c l o s e d a meadow o n l y t o s e e t h e d i t c h e s f i l l e d i n by "down wit11 e x c i s e taxes." occupied t h e c i t y h a l l s q u a r e . To calm

t h e l o c a l p e o p l e (A.D. ~ $ t ed ' o r C 509, C 543, C 1553). t h e d e m o n s t r a t o r s t h e mayor had t o send t h e N o t i o n a l Guard home a t

What a c o n t r a s t w i t h r u r a l c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n a f t e r t h e R e v o l u t i o n l once. h he crowd t h e n d i s p e r s e d g r a d u a l l y " (I.aurent 1957: I . 484-

Food r i o t s d i d s u r v i v e u n t i l t h e middle of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . For 485).

example, i n A p r i l 1829 a crowd i n C h f t i l l o n f o r c e d M. Beaudoin, o p e r a t o r

D e s p i t e t h a t p e a c e f u l d i s p e r s i o n , t h e a u t h o r i t i e s had t o d e l o y t h e inven-
of a f l o u r m i l l . t o s e l l h i s wheat a t 5 f r a n c s and 25 s o u s p e r d o u b l e
t o r y of wine. I n iqeursault i t was l e s s p e a c e f u l : t h e winegrowers d r o v e
b u s h e l , when he had p o s t e d t h e p r i c e a t 5F30 (A.D. ~ & ed'Or M 8 I1 4).
o u t t h e t a x men.
At t h e next market, s e v e r a l b r i g a d e s of gendarmes were on hand t o p r e v e n t
What i s more, t h e a n t i - t a x movement connected d t r e c t l y t o p o l i t i c a l
such " d i s o r d e r s " (A.D. C " a t e d 0 r 8 M 27). Although t h e food r i o t c o n t i n -
movements. The winegrowing a r e a s t o o d o u t f o r i t s r e p u b l i c o n i s m ; t h a t
ued t o f l o u r i s h . p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y r u r a l s t r u g g l e s h o r e h a r d l y a t r a c e
was e s p e i c a l l y t r u e of t h e h i n t e r l a n d s of Dijon and Beaune. A 1 1 thlngs
of t h e r e s i s t a n c e a g n i n s t t h e l a n d l o r d s . I n s t e a d they concerned t h e
c o n s i d e r e d , we o b s e r v e a s i g n f i c n n t t r a n s b r m a t i o n of t h e r e p e r t o i r e of changes of t h e R e v o l u t i o n l e d t o n s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n of t h e pre-
'
c o l l e c t i v e s c t i o n i n Burgundy. As compared w i t h t h e means of n c t i o n v a i l i n g modes of p o p u l a r c o l l e c t i v e a c l i o n .

p r e v a i l i n g h e f o r e t h e R e v o l u t i o n , t h o s e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y were The e v o l u t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n had n o t ended, however. Although

1.ess t i e d t o s communal hase. more a t t a c h e d t o n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . Assoc- t h e D i j o n winegrowers' d e m o n s t r a t i o n s of t h e 1830s c e r t a i n l y d i s p l a y

i a t i o n s , c l u b s , s o c i e t i e s played an i n c r e a s i n g p a r t . Yet t h e r e were many more f a m i l i a r f e a t u r e s t h a n t h e r e g i o n a l t a x r e b e l l i o n s of t h e

i m p o r t a n t c o n t i n i ~ i t i e s : t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e c h a r v a r i , t h e food r i o t , t h e 1630s. they a l s o show t h e i r a g e . Nowadays, tlie s u c c e s s o r s of t h o s e wine-

c l a s s i c anti-tnxrebe1l.ion; the persistent orientation t o the protection growers t y p i c a l l y assemble o u t s i d e t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l c a p i t a l . grouped

of l o c a l I n t e r e s t s n g a l n s t tlie c l a i m s of t h e s t a t e and t h e market r a t h e r around p l a c a r d s and b a n n e r s i d e n t i f y i n g t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n s and s u m n r -

than t o t h e c r e a t i o n of a b e t t e r f u t u r e . The o l d regime r e p e r t o i r e i z i n g t h e i r demands. The c l a s s i c c h a r i v a r i and food r i o t have vanished,

of c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n s u r v i v e d tlie Revolution. The forms of n c t i o n a l o n g w i t h s number of o t h e r forms of s c t i o n which p e r s i s t e d i n t o t h e

themselves a l t e r e d , adapted t o new c o n d i t i o n s ; among o t h e r t h i n g s , we nineteenth century. ~ o d a y ' s l a r g e - s c a l e a c t i o n s a r e even morc h e a v i l y

n o t i c e a s o r t o f p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of a l l t h e forms. New forms of c o l l e c - c o n c e n t r a t e d i n D i j o n , Beaune and o t h e r c f t i e s t h a n they were i n t h e

t i v e action nrosc; t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n and t h e s t r i k e became s t a n d a r d 1830s. Labor unions and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f t e n a p p e a r i n t h e a c t i o n .

e v c n t s i n Burgundy. That hundred y e a r s spanning t h e Revolution was a Although p r i c e s and t a x e s c o n t i n u e t o b e f r e q u e n t c a u s e s f o r c o m p l a i n t .

p e r i o d of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and of growth of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . such e x o t i c q u e s t i o n s a s American warmaking i n Vietnam and t h e f u t u r e

\ & a t of t h e R e v o l u t i o n ' s own p l a c e i n t h a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and growth of s t u d e n t s i n s p o r t s and p h y s i c a l e d u c a t i o n e x e r c i s e many a crowd. As

of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n ? The Revolution brouglit an e x t r a - t h e world h a s changed, s o h a s i t s c o l l e c t i v e n c t i o n .

o r d i n a r y l e v c l of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , a p o l i t i c i z a e i o n of a l l i n t e r e s t s

and t h u s of almost a l l t h e means of a c t i o n . a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power

and t h u s of almost a l l t h e means of a c t i o n , a c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of power

and t h u s of s t r i ~ g g l e sf o r power, a f r e n z y of a s s o c i a t i o n and t h u s of ac-

t i o n on t h e h n s i s of a s s o c i a t i o n n , a promotion of t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r

t h e development of c a p i t a l i s m and hourgeoin hegemony and t h u s of a moun-

t i n g t h r e a t t o n o n - c a p i t a l i s t , non-bourgeois i n t e r e s t s . I f t h a t sum-

mary i s c o r r e c t , t h e Revolution a c t e d a s a fundamental s t a g e i n t h e c o u r s e

of a t r s n s f o r m a t i o n f a r l o n g e r and l a r g e r than t h e Revolution i t s e l f .

Like t h e s e v e n t e e n t h - c c n t u r y c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f the national s t a t e , the

 APPENDIX 1. PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDIES OP STRIKES AND COLLECTI.VE VIO-

LENCE I N FRANCE

APPENDICES I n a n u t s h e l l , t h e s t r a t e g y of t h e French s t u d y hds been t o p l a c e

p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s i n time, s p a c e and s o c i a l s e t t i n g , n o t s o much t o ac-

1. Procedures f o r t h e S t u d i e s OF S t r i k e s and C o l l e c t i v e V i o l e n c e i n
c o u n t f o r any s i n g l e e v e n t a s t o d e t e c t how l a r g e - s c a l e s o c i a l change
France
and a l t e r a t i o n s of t h e s t r u c t u r e of power a f f e c t e d t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c -
2. M n t e r i a l s from t h e Study of C o l l e c t i v e Violence i n France
tive action. We d e a l s e p a r a t e l y w i t h s t r i k e s and w i t h v i o l e n t e v e n t s ,
3. Procedures f o r t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s i n G r e a t B r i t a i n
a l t h o u g h v i o l e n t s t r i k e s a p p e a r i n both h a l v e s of t h e a n a l y s i s . Strikes
4. M a t e r i a l s from t h e Study of C o n t e n t i o u s G a t h e r i n g s i n Grent B r i t a i n
r e p r e s e n t a f r e q u e n t , i m p o r t a n t , well-documented and u s u a l l y n o n v i o l e n t

form of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . V i o l e n t e v e n t s tend t o b e better-documented

t h a n t h e i r n o n v i o l e n t c o u n t e r p a r t s , and t h e r e f o r e s e r v e a s a b i a s e d b u t

useful tracer of c o l l e c t i v e action i n general.

The s t u d i e s ' w i n components a r e :

1. The enumeration and d e s c r i p t i o n o f e v e r y s t r i k e f o r which we

could g a t h e r a s t a n d a r d body of i n f o r m t i o n from 1830 t o 1968,

f o r a t o t a l of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 110,000 s t r i k e s ; t h e most d e t n i l e d

a n a l y s i s c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e 36,000 s t r i k e s r e p o r t e d i n t h e

S t a t i a t i q u e d e s ~ r h e sfrom 1890 through 1935.

2. The enumeration and d e s c r i p t i o n of every v i o l e n t e v e n t meeting

c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s , t o be d i s c u s s e d i n a moment, from 1830 through

1960; o u r a n a l y s e s d e a l w i t h roughly 2,000 v i o l e n t e v e n t s .

3. Indexing of change i n s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n France a s a whole

and i n i t s g e o g r a p h i c s u b d i v i s i o n s -- communes, a r r o n d i s s e m e n t s

and. e s p e c i a l l y . t h e 8 5 t o 95 d e p a r t m e n t s -- over t h e period

1830 t o 1960.

4. Assembling of ( f u r l e s s complete. f a r more t e n t a t i v e ) i n f o r m -

t i o n on p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t i l r e and a c t i v i t y f o r F r a n c e u s a whole

and f o r some t i m e s and p l a c e s w i t h i n i t from 1830 t o 1960.

 5. Use of a l l t h r e e t y p e s o f e v i d e n c e i n t h e a n a l y s i s of v a r i a t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l yearbooks, l i k e t h e & politique; d) l o n g s e r l c s O F French
i n t h e form,' i n t e n s i t y , l o c u s , s o c i a l composition and p r e c i p i - newspapers, n o t a b l y t h e H o n i t e u r u n i v e r s e l . & C o n s t i t ~ ~ t i o n n e lLo
. Gazette
' t a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f s t r i k e s and v i o l e n t e v e n t s ; t h e a n a l y s i s
--
d e s Tribunaux, t h e J o u r n a l d e s De'bats. Le Temps and Le Monde; e) r e g u l a r
s t r e s s e s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of long-run s h i f t s i n t h e p a t t e r n secondary s o u r c e s , i n c l u d i n g r e g i o n a l l e a r n e d and a n t i q u a r i a n j o u r n n l s .
of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n , and t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n o r f a l s i f i c a t i o n of We work l a r g e l y from microfilmed c o p i e s o f t h e s e s o u r c e s .

a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e e f f e c t s of l a r g e - f i c a l e soc- T h e r e a r e f o u r o v e r l a p p i n g samples of e v e n t s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n

-
i a l change on collective^ a c t i o n . The f i r s t i n c l u d e s each s t r i k e r e p o r t e d i n t h e S t a t i s t i q u e d e s ~ r h v e s ,
A compreliensive r e p o r t o f t h e s t r i k e s t u d i e s a p p e a r s i n S t r i k e s i n France,

1830-1968. by Edward S h o r t e r and C h a r l e s T i l l y . The most g e n e r a l sum-

I t h e S t a t i s t i q u e annuelle, t h e Revue franpaise de Travail, t h e Assoclotions

p r o f e s s i o n n e l l e s o u v r i a r e s and s e v e r a l o t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s t n any y e a r

mary o f t h e s t u d i e s of French c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i s c h a p t e r two o f from 1830 t o 1960. The second c o n s i s t s of a hnphazard c o l l e c t i o n of con-

R e b e l l i o u s Century, by C h a r l e s T i l l y , L o u i s e T i l l y and Richard T i l l y .

-
The R e b e l l i o u s Century a l s o summarizes o u r s t u d i e s of I t a l y and Germany.
I
1
f l i c t s and s h o r t p e r i o d s o n which we happen t o have e x c e p t i o n a l l y d e t a i l -

ed e v i d e n c e , e v i d e n c e p e r m i t t i n g c a r e f u l s t u d y of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s and

For more d e t a i l on t h e French, German and I t a l i a n f i n d i n g s , c o n s u l t t h e

I of t h e sequence of a c t i o n : The J u n e Days of 1848, t h e r c s i s t n n c e t o Louis

r e p o r t s l i s t e d i n t h e bibliography. Because S t r i k e s i n France c o n t a i n s

I
I
Napoleon's 1851 coup d ' e t a t . and a number of o t h e r s . The t h i r d -- our

an e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n of s o u r c e s and pro,cedures, w h i l e The R e b e l l i o u s I " g e n e r a l sample" -- c o n t a i n s every e v e n t meeting c e r t a i n minimum c r i t e r i a

C e n t u r y s u m r i z e s them r a t h e r q u i c k l y , t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n w i l l I ( t o b e d i s c u s s e d i n a moment) which t r a i n e d r e n d e r s encountered i n scan-

f o c u s on t h e a n a l y s i s of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e r a t h e r than s t r i k e s . n i n g newspapers c o n t i n u o u s l y , day by day, o v e r each y e a r from 1830 through

Although i n p r i n c i p l e o u r work could be done i n o t h e r ways, we have 1860, t h r e e randomly-chosen months p e r y e a r from 1861 t o 1929, and each
r e l i e d h e a v i l y on high-speed d i g i t a l computers £of t a b u l a t i o n and quan- y e a r from 1930 through 1960; t h e r e were two d i f f e r e n t newspnpers f o r each
t i t a t i v e analysis. The codebooks mentioned h e r e , f o r example, a r e e s - day i n most y e a r s , t h r e e newspapers i n a few c a s e s of f a u l t y coverage.

s e n t i a l l y s e t s of i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of comparable punched The f o u r t h -- o u r " i n t e n s i v e sample" -- is composed of e v e r y e v e n t i n

c s r d s from t h e row d e s c r i p t i o n s of violent events encountered t h e g e n e r a l sample e s t i m a t e d t o i n v o l v e a t l e a s t 1.,000 person-days (1.000

i n a r c h j v a l documents, newspapers and p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r i e s . p e o p l e f o r one day. o r 500 f o r two d a y s , o r 700 on t h e f i r s t pl.us 300

The b a s i c d a t a f o r t h e s t u d y , indeed, come from a ) documents i n on t h e second. and s o o n ) , p l u s e v e r y t e n t h e v e n t o f a l l t h e r e s t . The

French a r c h i v e s , mainly r e p o r t s on c o l l e c t i v e c o n f l i c t s and government g e n e r a l sample h a s a b o u t 2.000 i n c i d e n t s i n i t , t h e i n t e n s i v e sample d-

r e s p o n s e s t o them; b ) published s e r i e s of governmental r e p o r t s and s t a - bout 400.

t i s t i c s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e , p o p u l a t i o n c e n s u s e s , The a c t u a l d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e i n c i d e n t s i n t h e two samples comes

s t r i k e s , s p e c i a l i n q u i r i e s , l a b o r o r g s n i z a t i o n , and s o on; c ) l o n g s e r i e s n o t o n l y from t h e newspaper a c c o u n t s , b u t a l s o from t h e n r c l l i v a l m t e r i -

a l s , h i s t o r i c a l works and o t h e r s o u r c e s enumerated e a r l i e r . The i n t e n - SOME MATTERS OF DEFINITION*
s i v e sample r e c e i v e s e x t e n s i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n and v e r y d e t a i l e d coding, The s t u d y o f France a l s o r e l i c s f o r i n t e r n a l . c o n s i s t e n c y on n s e t
t h e g e n e r a l sample a l e s s i n t e n s i v e t r e a t m e n t . The s y s t e m a t i c , and l a r g e - of s t a n d a r d d e f i n i t i o n s . The c r u c i a l one i d e n t i f i e s t h e " v i o l e n t e v e n t . "
l y q u a n l i t n t i v e , a n a l y s i s of t h e s e coded a c c o u n t s d e a l w i t h - Without d e f e n d i n g i t , I s h a l l have t o p r e s e n t t h a t d e f i n i t i o n and t h e
1. t h e i n t e n s i t y , form, p a r t i c i p a n t s , and geographic i n c i d e n c e o f r u l e s o f thumb we have developed f o r i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . Anyone who h a s
v i o l e n t e v e n t s f o r each major p e r i o d under s t u d y ; a l r e a d y worked w i t h d e s c r i p t i o n s oC c o l l e c t i v e c o n f l l c t s w i l l q u i c k l y
2. t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c o l l e c t i v e n o t i c e two t h i n g s a b o u t t h e s e r u l e s of thumb. F i r s t , they form t h e b r i d s e
v i o l e n c e and t h e n a t u r e of s o c i a l changes o c c u r r i n g i n t h e i r between on a b s t r a c t d e f i n i t i o n and a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d and p l a c e : o t h e r

settings; p e r i o d s and d i f f e r e n t p l a c e s would no doubt r e q u l r e somewhat d i f f e r e n t

3. c o v a r i o t l o n of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i n d i v i d u a l e v e n t s , i n c l u d i n g bridges. Second, even i n t h e c a s e of France t h e r u l e s of thumb Lcave o

t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of common p r e c i p i t a n t s , s t a n d a r d sequences good d e a l of room f o r judgment and a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of ambiguous

of e v e n t s , r e g u l a r outcomes; cases. I o n l y c l a i m t h a t t h e s e c r i t e r i a i n most c a s e s permit n f n l r l y

4. c o n n e c t i o n s between t h e c h a r a c t e r of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t and f i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f whether a p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f e v e n t s makesup a "vio-

t h e p a t t e r n of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e i n a n a r e a a n d / o r p e r i o d ; l e n t event" on t h e b a s i s of i n f o r m a t i o n one h a s e a r l y i n t h e game.

5. changes of t h e s e p a t t e r n s o v e r time.

Obvlouuly, t h e s e a n a l y s e s u s e s t a n d a r d i n d e x e s of v a r i o u s s o c i a l changes

by a r e a and y e a r a s w e l l a s t h e coded a c c o u n t s of v i o l e n t e v e n t s .

*I have c r i b b e d most o f t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n from t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o

t h e i n t e n s i v e sample codebook, which i n t u r n drew hcnvi1.y from s t a f f memo-

randa by Lutz Berkner and C h a r l e s T i l l y .

Here is t h e g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n : a g i t a t i o n , s e d i t i o n , r i x e , bouleversement, f & e ) , b u t t h e ones we have

A " v i o l e n t event" i s a n i n s t a n c e of mutual and c o l l e c t i v e c o e r c i o n chosen imply t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e group of p e o p l e .

w i t h i n a n a u t o n o m o u s ' p o l i t i c a l system which s e i z e s o r p h y s i c a l l y damages We a r e u s i n g t h e s e terms t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n t of v i o l e n c e , b u t

persons o r objects. o n l y a s a n i n d i c a t o r of p a r t i c i p a t i o n .

C o l l e c t i v e Coercion A d j e c t i v e s of s i z e used w i t h t h e s e words a r e i m p o r t a n t . Thus. any

One formntlon of a t l e a s t 50 p e r s o n s must b e p r e s e n t , r e p r e s e n t i n g a d j e c t i v e s u g g e s t i n g a l a r g e s i z e (reassemblemcnts nombreux, r o u l c i m -

e i t h e r t h e f o r c e s of r e b e l l i o n o r t h e f o r c e s of r e p r e s s i o n . This has mense) means i t i s i n c l u d e d . Diminutives ( p e t i t e f o u l e , e t c . ) keep t h e

been done mainly a s a p r a c t i c a l measure, s i n c e we f e e l t h a t l a r g e r groups i n c i d e n t o u t of t h e sample.

a r c more l i k e l y t o b e r e p o r t e d and r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n is more r e a d i l y T h i s e x c l u d e s any independent v i o l e n t a c t i v i t y undertaken by an

a v a i t a b l e on them i n t h e s o u r c e s . - i n d i v i d u a l o r a s m a l l group of i n d i v i d u a l s . Thus we do n o t i n c l n d e a s s a s -

However, f o r o v e r h a l f of o u r i n c i d e n t s , no e x a c t o r approximate s i n a t i o n s , murders, t h e f t s , o r o t h e r c r i m e s , c o m j t t e d by l e s s tlinn 50

number of p a r t i c i p n n t s i s r e p o r t e d . We have d e c i d e d t o a d o p t a List of p e o p l e ( o r a group d e f i n e d by o t h e r t h a n one of our c o l l e c t i v e t e r m s ) .

words which a r e o f t e n used t o d e s c r i b e t h e i n c i d e n t s , and we a r e t e n t a - However, we i n c l u d e v i o l e n c e by a group on t h e p e r i p h e r y of a l a r g e r dem-

t l v e l y a s s c ~ m i n gt h a t they mean t h e involvement of a l a r g e group o f peo- onstration. T h i s a l s o e x c l u d e s a c t i o n by unknown p e r s o n s such n s snbo-

p l e , i . e . , o v e r 50. t a g e , bombs, o r f i r e s . We t a k e t h e s e i n t o a c c o u n t , b u t t h e y a r e n o t t o

mr~l.tLtude rivolt e b e i n c l u d e d i n t h e b a s i c sample.

rasscmblemen t rebellion Mutual

/
reunion insurrection T h i s means t h n t t h e r e must be a t l e a s t two a n t a g o n i s t i c f o r m a t i o n s

Eoule Leute involved. However, one m y be jnvolved by t h e proxy of i t s p r o p e r t y o r

nttroupement 6chauffour~c symbols. We i n c l u d e any o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e symbols o r r e p r e s e n t n t i v c s

troupe bngarre of a u t h o r i t y o r a n o t h e r group. Violence must be d i r e c t e d a t someone e l s e ;

tumulte t h u s , workers a t t a c k i n g a newspaper o f f i c e a r e i n c l u d e d , w h i l e formers

d e s t r o y i n g t h e i r own produce i n p r o t e s t t o government farm p o l i c i e s a r e

trouble not.

I f an i n c i d e n t meets t h e c r i t e r i a of damage o r v i o l e n c e (below) S e i z u r e o r ~ h y s i c i l ~ ~ a m aofg ePersons o r O b j e c t s

and no number of p a r t i c i p a n t s i s g i v e n , we i n c l u d e i t i n t h e sample i f Any dead o r wounded mnke t h e i n c i d e n t q u a l i c y . The major problem

c a s e s i n v o l v e r e s i s t a n c e t o p o l i c e when i t i s n o t c l e a r whether anyone

i t i s d e s c r i b e d by one of t h e s e terms. T h i s d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e s e
was h u r t , e.g., s t o n e s thrown a t t r o o p s o r mounted gendarmes surrounded
a r e t h e o n l y terms which could be used ( e . g . . incident, manifestation,
 A-8 A- 9

by a mob.

a problem.
S e i z u r e of p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s w i t h o u t p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i s a l s o

In general, i f persons o r o b j e c t s a r e seized over r e s i s t a n c e ,

Ii and a n a l i z e d . When two o r more such a c t i o n s o c c u r , we must a l s o d e c i d e

whether t h e y a r e p a r t s of t h e "same" e v e n t , o r r e l a t e d ones. An e v c n t bc-

t h a t i s enough. I f t h e s e i z i n g group f i g h t s o f f a n o t h e r group o r b r e a k s
g i n s when a t l e a s t two of t h e f o r m a t i o n s t a k i n g p a r t i n t h e v i o l e n t a c t i o n
through a p h y s i c a l b a r r i e r of some s o r t , r e s i s t a n c e h a s o c c u r r e d .
b e g i n a c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n and ends when t h e l a s t two f o r m a t i o n s end
We f n c l u d e any damage done by one group t o someone e l s e ' s p r o p e r t y
t h e i r continuous i n t e r a c t i o n . I t o c c u p i e s a l l t h e s p a c e i n which a spec-
by a t t a c k i n g o r s e i z i n g c o n t r o l of i t . Besides s i g n i f i c a n t d e s t r u c t i o n
t a t o r could d i r e c t l y o b s e r v e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o u t b e n e f i t of mechanical
t h i a i n c l u d e s broken windows o r symbolic minor damage. I t does n o t i n -
devices. The p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e a l l p e r s o n s who perform t h e c r u c j a l a c t i o n ( s ) .
cl.ude damage t o o n e ' s own p r o p e r t y ( f a r m e r s d e s t r o y i n g own c r o p s , mer-
a l l p e r s o n s who i n t e r a c t w i t h them d i r e c t l y i n t h e c o u r s e of t h n t a c t i o n ,
c h a n t s burning t h e i r own r e c o r d s i n p r o t e s t ) and i t must be done by a
p l u s a l l p e r s o n s a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h members of e i t h e r of t h e F i r s t
group -- which e x c l u d e s s a b o t a g e , f i r e s , bombings of unknown o r i g i n s .
two c a t e g o r i e s i n t h e s t r e a m of a c t i v i t y i n c l u d i n g t h e c r u c i a l a c t i o n ( s ) .
S e i z u r e of o b j e c t s i n c l u d e s " t a x a t i o n p o p u l a i r e " -- the forcible seizure
F i n a l l y , s e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s f a l l i n t o s e p a r a t e f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e e x t e n t
of g r a i n o r o t h e r f o o d s t u f f s , Eollowed by t h e i r p u b l i c s a l e a t a pro-

claimed " j u s t p r i c e . " I t a l s o i n c l u d e s n o n - v i o l e n t o c c u p a t i o n of b u i l d -

I t h a t t h e y a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y , communicate i n t e r n a l l y , oppose o t h e r sets of

i n g s such a s sit-down s t r i k e s . I n o r d e r t o h a n d l e t h e huge number of
sit-downs i n 1936. 1937, and 1938, we have grouped them i n t o departmen-
t a l summaries f o r e a c h month.
These c r i t e r i a c l e a r l y e x c l u d e any l a r g e p o l i t i c a l g a t h e r i n g s t h a t
do n o t end i n v i o l e n c e o r crowds which s h o u t t h r e a t s of v i o l e n c e b u t
t a k e no a c t i o n .
Within an Autonomous P o l i t i c a l System
T h i s segment of t h e d e f i n i t i o n e x c l u d e s war and b o r d e r i n c i d e n t s .
I t a l s o e x c l u d e s any v i o l e n c e w i t h i n a c l o s e d i n s t i t u t i o n o u t s i d e t h e
g e n e r a l p o l i t i c a l s p h e r e such a s p r i s o n s , asylums and h o s p i t a l s .
b r e a k o u t of t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , however, t h e y must be i n c l u d e d .
c l u d e army m u t i n i e s s i n c e t h e members of t h e armed f o r c e s a r e p a r t of
t h e p o l i t i c a l community.
Boundaries of V i o l e n t Events
When one of t h e a c t i o n s j u s t d i s c u s s e d h a s o c c u r r e d , we must s e t
p a r t i c i p a n t s and a r e . g i v e n d i s t i n c t i d e n t i t i e s by o b s e r v e r s . Where we do
n o t have enough i n f o r m a t i o n t o a p p l y t h e u e d e f i n i t l . o n s w i t h any r i g o r --
which is o f t e n -- we a c c e p t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l o b s e r v e r ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of
a c t o r s , s t a g e and a c t i o n .
When two v i o l e n t a c t i o n s o c c u r on t h e same day o r c o n s e c u t i v e d a y s ,
i n t h e same commune o r a d j a c e n t ones ( i n P a r i s . Lyon o r M a r s e i l l e : t h e
"
same q u a r t e r o r a d j a c e n t o n e s ) and t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e presumption of a n
o v e r l a p of p e r s o n n e l e q u a l t o t e n p e r c e n t o r more of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n
t h e s m a l l e r . a c t i o n , b o t h a c t i o n s c o u n t a s p a r t of t h e same d i s t u r b a n c e ,
and a l l of t h e i n t e r v e n i n g time b e l o n g s t o t h e e v e n t . Three o r more v i o -
I f they
l e n t a c t i o n s w i t h s u c h c o n n e c t i o n s may compound i n t o e v e n t s c o v e r i n g
We i n -
l o n g e r p e r i o d s and l a r g e r t e r r i t o r i e s . Two e v e n t s a r e d i s t i n c t h u t l i n k e d
when they o c c u r i n t h e same o r c o n s e c u t i v e months, and meet any of t h e s e
c o n d i t i o n s : a ) c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n of a t l e a s t one f o r m a t i o n i n one e v e n t
w i t h a t l e a s t one f o r m a t i o n i n t h e o t h e r ; b) s t r o n g evidence of o v e r l a p i n

some l i m i t s i n time, s p a c e and p e r s o n n e l on t h e e v e n t s t o be recorded

p e r s o n n e l ; c ) s t r o n g e v i d e n c e o f t h e p r o v i s i o n of m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e by

t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n one e v e n t t o t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e o t h e r : d) o v e r t A. VIOLENCE

i m i t a t i o n of t h e a c t i o n of one e v e n t by a formation i n a n o t h e r ; e ) o v e r t 1. one dead

r e s p o n s e a s i n d i c a t e d by demands. s l o g a n s o r r i t u a l a c t s . Three o r more 2. one wounded

e v e n t s may b e l i n k e d i n t h i s way. 3. any damage t o o b j e c t s

I n sllmmary, t h e p r o c e d u r e comes t o t h i s : 4. s e i z u r e of c o n t r o l of o b j e c t s

1. Scan t h e s o u r c e s f o r v i o l e n t o c t i o n s . 8. COLLECTIVE

2. llaving l o c a t e d a v i o l e n t a c t i o n , d e t e r m i n e whether t h e e v e n t of 1. st l e a s t 50 p e r s o n s i n one formation ( d i r e c t e v i d e n c e through

which i t i s a p a r t meets t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " v i o l e n t e v e n t . " numbers of p a r t i c i p a n t s wounded o r a r r e s t e d )

3. I f i t d o e s , s e t i t s b o u n d a r i e s i n s p a c e , time and p e r s o n n e l . 2. i n d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of a l a r g e group through t h e u s e of o c o l l e c -

4. I d e n t i f y t h e formations taking p a r t i n t h e event. t i v e terminology:

5. Determine whether i t i s l i n k e d t o any o t h e r e v e n t . multitude r/evolte dgsordre

6. Code. rassemblement rehellion trouble

The diagram a t t h e end of t h i s s e c t i o n r e p r e s e n t s t h e whole c o m p l i c s t - reunion (meu t e

ed p r o c e d u r e . foule kchauff our'ee

attroupement bsgsrre

troupe tumulte

insurrection

C. MUTUAL

1. two f o r m a t i o n s i n c o n f l i c t

2. a formation v e r s u s an individual

3. a f o r m a t i o n v e r s u s o b j e c t s o r symbols r e p r e s e n t i n g a n o t h e r group

D. EXCLUDE:

s a b o t a g e , bombings, f i r e s s e t by unknown p e r s o n s

a s s a s s i n a t i o n s , murders, c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s by i n d i v i d u a l s

l a r g e g a t h e r i n g s where no v i o l e n c e b r e a k s o u t even i f t h e y t h r e a t e n
violence

rebellions within closed i n s t i t u t i o n s : p r i s o n s , h o s p i t a l s , asylums

symbolic damage t o o n e ' s own p r o p e r t y

E. BOUNDARIES: T h i s whole system o f d e f i n i t i o n s and p r o c e d u r e s works w e l l enough

1. Begins w i t h c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n of st l e a s t two f o r m a t i o n s . where t h e r e a r e good (and f a i r l y uniform) a c c o u n t s of many p o l i t i c a l d i n -

2. Ends w i t h t e r m i n a t i o n of c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n of l e s t two f o r - t u r b a n c e a , and where t h e r e is a n i d e n t i f i a b l e "autonomot~s p o l i t i c a l system"

mations.
w i t h a s i n g l e c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y t e n d i n g t o monopolize l e g i t i m a t e c o n t r o l
3. Occupies s p a c e w i t h i n which s p e c t a t o r could o b s e r v e i n t e r a c t i o n
directly. o v e r means of c o l l e c t i v e c o e r c i o n . I n France i t s e l f , i t wenkens d u r i n g

4. P a r t i c i p a n t s : p e r f o r m e r s of v i o l e n t a c t s , o t h e r s i n t e r a c t i n g d i - l o n g i n t e r r e g n a l i k e t h e Occupation and t h e R e s i s t a n c e of World Wnr 11.

r e c t l y w i t h them, p l u s o t h e r s a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h e i t h e r of I n I t a l y and Germany, t h e p e r i o d s b e f o r e u n i f i c a t i o n p r e s e n t s e r i o u s prob-

t h e f i r s t two groups: t h e y a r e d i v i d e d i n t o f o r m a t i o n s . lems. The whole system would probably have t o be r e c a s t t o h a n d l e such

F. MULTIPLE VIOLENT ACTIONS FORNING SINGLE EVENT c a s e s a s ZaYre ( f o r m e r l y t h e Belgian Congo) a f t e r 1960, t h e United S t a t e s

1. Same day o r c o n s e c u t i v e d a y s . from 1860 t o 1865 o r w e s t e r n Europe i t s e l f b e f o r e t h e 1 7 t h c e n t u r y . The

2. Same commune o r a d j a c e n t communes ( i n P a r i s , Lyon. M a r s e i l l e , scheme a l s o h a s two q u i t e i n t e n t i o n a l f e a t u r e s which s u i t i t w e l l f o r t h e

same q u a r t e r o r a d j a c e n t q u a r t e r s ) . kind of a n a l y s i s we have u n d e r t a k e n , b u t might u n f i t i t f o r some o t h e r s o r t s

3. Overlap i n p e r s o n n e l of t e n p e r c e n t o r more of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s of i n q u i r y : 1 ) i t i g n o r e s t h e p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s of t h e e v e n t , g i v i n g no

i n the smaller action. s p e c i a l w e i g h t , f o r example, t o t h e r e b e l l i o n wliicli t o p p l e s a regime; 2)

G. DISTINCT BUT LINKED EVENTS: a l t h o u g h t h e c r i t e r i o n of "violence" is a f n i r l y generous one, t h e scheme

1. Same month o r c o n s e c u t i v e months. b y p a s s e s i n s t a n c e s of n o n v i o l e n t c o e r c i o n u n l e s s they o r e coupled w i t h

2. Concerted a c t i o n of f o r m a t i o n s . violence. N e i t h e r a p a l a c e r e v o l u t i o n nor an u n f u l f i l l e d t h r e a t of m a s

OR r i o t i n g is l i k e l y t o q u n l i f y a s a v i o l e n t e v e n t under i t s restrictions.

3. Overlap i n p e r s o n n e l . These a r e c o s t s we hove a c c e p t e d because of t h e a d v a n t s g e s of economy and

OR p r e c i s i o n they b r i n g ; f o r o t h e r i n v e s t i g a t o r s and o t h e r purposes, they may

4. P r o v i s i o n of m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e . b e c o s t s too g r e a t t o b e a r .

OR

5. Overt i m i t a t i o n .

OR

6. Overt r e s p o n s e by demands, s l o g a n s . r i t u a l a c t s .
 A-13a
SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE

I APPENDIX 2. MATER1AI.S FROM VIE STUDY OF COI.I.ECT1VE VIO1,ENCE 1.N FRANCE

i The m a t e r i a l f o l l o w s a s i n g l e r e l a t i v e l y well-documented e v e n t from

n a r r a t i v e account through coding and t r a n s c r i p t i o n i n mncl~lne-readable form

t o i t s integration into a quantitative analysis. F o r e s t i n v a s i o n s of t h i s

-
DISCARD
s o r t ( a l t h o u g h n o t t h i s s c a l e ) were f r e q u e n t e v e n t s i n t h e Pyrenees from
War, b o r d e r
AUTONOMOUS t h e l a t e 1 8 2 0 ' s through t h e R e v o l u t i o n of 1848. The F o r e s t Code e n a c t e d
POLITICAL
SYSTEM?
- ftof oi gr ochcet c, Ru pienyssii nis dgt ae n c e '

by t h e French government i n 1828 c u r t a i l e d common r i g h t s t o g l e a n , g r a z e

total
institution and g a t h e r firewood, i n f a v o r of t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n of b o u r g e o i s p r o p e r t y

i n woodlands. Poor people of t h e m o u n t a i n s . c l ~ n l l e n g e d t h e Code Eor twen-

COLLECTIVE? (=AT LEAST SO IN ONE t y - f i v e y e a r s , e s p e c i a l l y a t moments when t h e government weakened, a s i n
FORMATION, PER ACTUAL NUMBERS
OR WORD LIST) t h e r e v o l u t i o n s of 1830 and 1848. The c o n f l i c t of l a Bsrousse t o o k p l a c e

no. T j u s t one month a f t e r t h e February R e v o l o t i o n of 1848.

1-% I
When I developed t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r sampling and coding v i o l e n t e v e n t s
II)NY no ANY SIGNIFICANT DESTRUCTION
OR SEIZURE OF OBJECTS? i n t h e mid-19601s, I used t h e word " p o l i t i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e " t o d e s c r i b e t h e
Yes
e v e n t s under s t u d y . As I worked w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l , I r e a l i z e d tlie p h r a s e

c o n t a i n e d a n u n j u s t i f i e d presumption and a m i s l e a d i n g metaphor. Since

we enumerate e v e n t s on t h e b a s i s of s i z e and t h e p r e s e n c e of v i o l e n c e r e -
SUBSAMPLE g a r d l e s s of p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t o r c o n t e n t , t h e word " p o l i t i c a l " presumes

what is t o b e proven: t h a t t h e b u l k of c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e d o e s , indeed.

I-
grow o u t of p o l i t i c a l processes., The word "disturbance" i m p l i e s malfunc-
IN INTENSIVE
SUBSAMPLE t i o n , a b n o r m a l i t y , a b r e a k w i t h ord'inary l i f e which our a n a l y s e s of tlie

evidence g e n e r a l l y c o n t r a d i c t . I now p r e f e r t h e c o l o r l e s s " v i o l e n t event".

SEARCH, FOR ADDITIONAL " v i o l e n t i n c i d e n t " o r even " c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n producing v i o l e n c e . " Ilowever.
DATA IN ARCHIVES, PUB-
LISHED SOURCES t h e o l d e r v o c s b u l a r y pervades o u r m a t e r i a l ; i t would be d l s l ~ o n e s t t o ex-

punge i t .

The v i o l e n t e v e n t s s t u d i e d i n France i n c l u d e d e v e r y one meeting o u r

c r i t e r i a (some damage o r s e i z u r e of p e r s o n s o r o b j e c t s , a t l e a s t one form-

a t i o n of f i f t y p e r s o n s o r more, a t l e a s t one formation non-miliory) we

encountered i n r e a d i n g two d a i l y n a t i o n a l newspapers f o r each day from Dimensions f Q u a n t i t a t i v e Research i n H i s t o r y ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n Uni-

1830 t h r o u g l ~1860 and 1930 through 1960, p l u s t h r e e randomly-selected v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972).

months p e r y e a r from 1861 through 1929. The G e n e r a l Sample i n c l u d e s a l l

I 8 . T a b l e 6 from C h a r l e s T i l l y , "The Chaos of t h e L i v i n g c i t y " i n C h n r l e s
those events. The I n t e n s i v e Sample, f o r t h e p e r i o d s 1830-60 and 1930-60

o n l y , i n c l u d e s a l l e v e n t s we e s t i m a t e d t o i n v o l v e a t l e a s t 1 , 0 0 0 person-
I T i l l y , e d . , An Urban IJorld (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown. 1974).

days p111s a s y s t e m a t i c t e n p e r c e n t of t h e remaining e v e n t s . The informa- 9. Graph r e p r e s e n t i n g a f i v e - y e a r moving a v e r a g e of o u r e s t i m a t e s of t o t a l

t i o n coded comes from t h e newspaper a c c o u n t s , from h i s t o r i c a l works, from

,
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n French c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e , 1830-1960.

p o l i t i c a l yearbooks and from French a r c h i v a l documents.

EXCERPTS FROM REPORTS ON EVENT 848 02 29 0 1
The i t e m s i n t h i s s e t i n c l u d e :
" L e t t e r s from Saint-Caudens w r i t t e n t h e 4 t h of Marc11 nnnounce t l l s t

1. E x c e r p t s from r e p o r t s of a c o n f l i c t between t r o o p s and " i n v a d e r s of o r d e r h a s been r e s t o r e d ... The band of l o o t e r s c o n s i s t e d of almost

f o r e s t s " i n l o Barousse, March 1848. 2,000 people; a t t h e approach of t h e l i n e t r o o p s and t h e N a t i o n a l Guard

they r e t r e a t e d toward t h e mountains of l a Barousse; b u t having a r r i v e d i n

2. R e p o r t s on P o l i t i c a l D i s t u r b a n c e used f o r a b s t r a c t i n g from newspapers,
t h e d e f i l e s , t h e y resumed t h e o f f e n s i v e . The f r o n t r a n k s , nrmed w i t h
a r c h i v a l documents and secondary s o u r c e s and a s a cover s h e e t f o r photo-
I guns, f i r e d ; t h e t r o o p s r e p l i e d and rushed toward t h e i r enemy w i t h b r a v e r y .
c o p i e s of e x c e r p t s from t h o s e s o u r c e s .
1. The e v i l d o e r s t h e n escaped i n e v e r y d i r e c t i o n o c r o s s t h e rough mountain

3. Excerpt from t h e I n t e n s i v e Sample Codehook used i n coding t h e e v e n t i n t e r r a i n , and i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o f o l l o w them. I t a p p e a r s t h a t many of

l a Barousse. ! them were s h o t a s they t r i e d t o e n t e r coves i n t h e m o u n t a i n s i d e s ... "

(Le ~ i 2 c l e . 11 March 1848).

4. E x c e r p t s from t h e coded v e r s i o n . o f t h e e v e n t , i n c l u d i n g t h e complete
"The t r o u b l e s which broke o u t i n t h e v o l l e y of In Borousse were
s e t of c o d e r ' s comments.
s t a r t e d by i l l e g a l u s e r s of t h e f o r e s t . A l a r u e number of i n h a b i t a n t s of

5 . Segments of computer p r i n t o u t i n c l u d i n g a p a r t i a l l i s t i n g of t h e card- t h a t v a l l e y went t o t h e Cuard G e n e r a l of t h e F o r e s t s , who was a s s i g n e d t o

image v e r s i o n of t h e I n t e n s i v e Sample coding. e x e c u t e t h e w a r r a n t s i s s u e d a g a i n s t them and burned a l l h i s p a p e r s w h i l e

h e was gone. Thence t h e y went t o t h e o f f i c e of t h e C o l l e c t o r s f o r Na-

6 . Segment of computer p r i n t o u t i n c l u d i n g s complete 1 i s t i n g . o f t h e OSIRIS
t i o n a l Lands, where t h e y l i k e w i s e d e s t r o y e d a l l t h e r e g i s t e r s and f o r c e d
v e r s i o n of t h e I n t e n s i v e Sample coding.
t h e o f f i c e r s t o pay a c e r t a i n sum of money a s r e p s r n t j o n f o r t h e l a t e s t

7 . Machine v e r s i o n of T a b l e 1 5 from C h a r l e s T i l l y , "How P r o t e s t Modernized f i n e s t h e o f f i c e r s had c o l l e c t e d . F i n n l l y t h e same p e o p l e d i d some damage

i n France" i n 1.lilliom A y d e l o t t e , A l l a n Bogue and Robert F o g e l , e d s . , The t o t h e c h a t e a u of Lusson, b e l o n g i n g t o M. Coulnrd, t h e ex-deputy of

 A-17

~ a ~ n a r e who
s , h a s been d i s p u t i n g t h e ownership bf c e r t a i n f o r e s t s w i t h

t h e communes i n t h e v a l l e y . We l e a r n t h a t a E a i r l y l a r g e number of t r o u - REPORT ON POLITICAL DISTURBANCE (4-65)

blemakers have been a r r e s t e d and have a r r i v e d a t Bagnbres." (Le Moniteur, 1. T i t l e 2. No. 3. Recorder
1 0 March 1848) 4. Date 5. Source .
"A band of a b o u t 1,000, most of them armed, o r g a n i z e d i n t h e Hautes- 6. Location 7. Antecedents/Presumed O r i g i n s
~ ~ r e / n i e,s ., During t h e n i g h t of 2-3 March, t h a t horde invaded t h e can-

t o n s oE S a i n t - B e r t r a n d and s a i n t - ~ b s t i n t h e a r r o n d i s s e m e n t of S a f n t - 8. P r e c i p i t a t i n g Events
Caudens (Haute-Garonne), p i l l a g e d t h e c h a t e a u of M. Coulnrd, t h e former

d e p u t y , a t Lassan, and t h a t of t h e Duke of Rovigo a t Barbazon, and f i n a l l y 9. Description

c o l l e c t e d a kind of t r i b u t e from a few well-to-do landowners i n t h e same

area. The N a t i o n a l Cuard of v a r i o u s communes j o i n e d w i t h l i n e t r o o p s

s e n t from Toulouse and Tarbes t o r e s t o r e o r d e r . The detachments s e n t a f -

t e r tlie m i s c r e n n t s found them. We o r e t o l d t h a t 25 were taken p r i s o n e r ,

3 k i l l e d and 6 o r 7 wounded." (Archives N a t i o n a l e s BB 1 8 1461. r e p o r t of

p r o c u r e u r g b n & r n l , cour d'Appel, Toulouse, 4 March 1848)

10. Objectiveu : D r l o n e ~ b s e r v e r ' s i n f e r e n c e LI,---.explicit
"The change of regime o c c a s i o n e d f a i r l y s e r i o u s d i s o r d e r s i n t h e

arrondissement of Saint-Caudens. A bond of p e a s a n t s from t h e mountains 11. C a s u a l t i e s

of l a Rarousse (~autes-I'vr6n6es) s p r e a d through t h e lowlands i n hopes t h a t 12. P r o p e r t y Damage 13. Duration
tlie f a l l of t h e monarchy might caune an economic o v e r t u r n which could 14. Participants
h a r d l y f a i l t o b e p r o f i t a b l e t o them. On t h e 2d of March, t h e coach from

~ a ~ n d r e s - d e - ~ u c h owos
n robbed between B e r t r a n and Bagiry, and t h e news 15. Repressive Forces
soon s p r e a d t h a t 1,500 o r 1 , 8 0 0 p e a s a n t s armed w i t h c l u b s , p i t c h f o r k s ,

p i c k s and h u n t i n g r i f l e s were p i l l a g i n g tlie houses and c a s t l e s of t h e 16. Linkage w i t h O t h e r D i s t u r b a n c e s 17. Consequences

a r e a , ond h o l d j n g t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s f o r ransom ... " (Antonin cayrG,
I
"Des journ6es d e f b v r i e r aux journ'ees du j u i n , " i n J a c q u ~ sGodechot, ed.,
18. References
-
La ~ Q v o l u t i o nd e 1848 $ Toulouse e t dons l a Haute-Caronne (Toulouse, 1948). L-=ey Notes on back /-:-/ A d d i t i o n a l S h e e t s Dealing w i t h t h i s D i s t u r b o n c e
F u r t h e r I n f o r m a t i o n on C o n t i n u a t i o n S h e e t
(The f u l l e s t a c c o u n t , however, a p p e a r s i n Louis C l a r e n c , "Les t r o u b l e s d e [.- --I/

l a Rarousse cn 1848," Annales du Midi 6 5 (1951), 329-348.)

---
 A-19

Cards 31-39: FORHATION BACKGROUND

l a r g e one could b e combined i n t o a s i n g l e f o r m a t i o n . I n t h i a c a s e , choose

t h e code i n c o l s . 37-38 w i t h g r e a t c a r e . and COMMENT.

A NOTE ON FORHATIONS
Even i n s m a l l d i s t u r b a n c e s , groups s p e c i a l i z e d i n tlie maintenonce and
Some v i o l e n t a c t i o n ( k i l l i n g o r wounding of p e r s o n s , damage o r s e i z -
r e s t o r a t i o n of p u b l i c o r d e r (which t h i s codebook w i l l c a l l R e p r e s s i v e f o r
u r e of p r o p e r t y ) brought t h e e v e n t s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t o t h e sample of
s h o r t ) c a n always b e combined i n t o a s i n g l e Eormation t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t
disturbances. The p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e d i s t u r b a n c e i n c l u d e a l l persons who
their actions ere indistinguishable. Thus when N a t i o n a l Guards and t r o o p s
performed t h e v i o l e n t a c t i o n , a l l p e r s o n s who i n t e r a c t e d w i t h them d i r e c t -
of t h e l i n e under a s i n g l e command d i s p e r s e a group of d e m o t ~ s t r n t d r s , t r e a t
l y i n t h e c o u r s e of t h a t a c t i o n , and a l l p e r s o n s a c t i n g c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h
them a s a s i n g l e f o r m a t i o n u n l e s s t h e y b e g i n t o a c t i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t
members of e i t h e r of t h e f i r s t two c a t e g o r i e s i n t h e c o n t i n u o u s s t r e a m of
ways. Be s u r e t o COMHENT i f t h e code l e a v e s any doubt how and what you
a c t i v i t y which c o n t a j n s t h e v i o l e n t a c t i o n .
have combined.
We d i v i d e t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s up i n t o f o r m a t i o n s . S e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s
I n any c a s e , i d e n t i f y t h e f o r m a t i o n s b e f o r e s t a r t i n g t o code. When a
belong t o d i a t i r i c t f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a c t c o l l e c t i v e l y ,
f o r m a t i o n h a s a p u b l i c i d e n t i t y more s p e c i f i c than words l i k e f o u l e , n t t r o u p e -
communicate i n t e r n a l l y , oppose o t h e r s e t s of p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d / o r a r e g i v e n
ment, p e u p l e , and s o on, i n d i c a t e ( f o r exnmple. " P r o t e s t s n t s " , "CRS", "les
s p e c i f i c i d e n t i t i c s meaningful o u t s i d e t h e d i s t u r b a n c e i t s e l f ( . e . g .

cialistes", "pnysans", "gendarmes") by t h e o b s e r v e r s .

"so-

Many f o r m a t l o n s ,
habitants de " . "Anarchistes"), s p e l l o u t t h e i d e n t i t y i n columns 12-36.

however, compound s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of p e o p l e -- f o r example, m a i t r e s

and compagnons; we do n o t a s s i g n them t o s e p a r a t e f o r m a t i o n s u n l e s s t h e y

a r e r e p o r t e d t o a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y o r i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t ways.

'. , , M o s t d i s t u r b a n c e s i n v o l v e two o r t h r e e e a s i l y d i s t i n g u f s h a b l e forma-

tions. I n an extreme c a s e , R formation can have o n l y one member -- f o r ex-

ample, tlie v i c t i m of a l y n c h i n g . A t a n o t h e r extreme, a d i s t u r b a n c e can i n -

v o l v e o n l y one formation -- f o r example, t h e unanimous d e s t r o y e r s of a cha-

teau. I n v e r y complicated d i s t u r b a n c e s , where t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s would per-

m i t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of t e n o r more d i f f e r e n t f o r m a t i o n s , we combine t h e

p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t o n i n e o r fewer f o r m a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e most i m p o r t a n t

divisions i n collective action. For example, i f t h e b i j o u t i e r s , t h e eben-

i s t e s and tlie o r f 6 v r i e r s e a c h have t h e i r own b a r r i c a d e , t h e y would a p p e a r

a s s e p a r a t e f o r m a t i o n s i n t h e c o d i n g of a s m a l l d i s t u r b a n c e , b u t i n a v e r y
 Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND

cols. 1-2 CARD NUMBER cols. 37-38 TYPES OF' FORMATION

(cant's.)
NUMBER FORMATIONS ARBITRARILY AND NOTE IN FILE 30 Military or paramilitary group
31 Formation 1 to 39 Formation 9 31 National guard
32 Formation 2 32 Civil guard

33 Regular nrmy
cols. 3-11 IDENTIFYING DATA 34 Gnrde mobile
DO NOT CODE - WILL BE DUPLICATED AUTOMATICALLY FROM 35 Milice bourgeoise
FIRST CARD 36 Palace guard

37 Bons citoyens (volunteers)

cols. 12-36 PUBLIC IDENTITY OF FORMATION: ALPHABETIC
39 Any military group plus public officials:
If the formation has no definite public identity,
MANDATORY COMMENT
leave blnnk. If it has a name, put it here.
40 Police

41 Gendarmes
cols. 37-38 TYPE OF FORMATION
42 CRS
01 Crowd (further identifying information unavailable)
43 Military police
10 Crowd of common ideology 48 Police and militnry group: comment en-
11 Crowd of common political attachment couraged
12 Crowd of common religion 49 Police plus public officials:
20 Activist group MANDATORY CObfilENT
21 Political cadres, hacks 50 Occupational group
22 Terrorists 51 Workers of same industry
23 Criminal group (brigands) 52 Workers of snme factory
24 Guerrilla insurgents 53 Workers of same locality
25 Private (party) army 54 Union
26 Secret society 55 Students
 A-24
, .
040 02 7 ' C1 LA Bnronsso
A-23 ,'

::1/1?'12 c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ u r o : . hI!rnf-
- ' T l i ~ !IIO% I i s t c . : r,rr! ~ c r t r ~ n ~ ~ ! - lTrouhnt(1I-F,,
), md
Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND n n ~ l r y:'!I&?). Tho co~xnurlnl i n r o r m n t i o n ~ G ? I . tliom i t ~ l usaxe e s f o r t h o s c col:l:liunc
L
l i o t o d on t h o c o r d s
2 1 t o ,"/ *7 - A % p o l i l : i o ~ r \tandoncy o r npntlw notnd, ;:lnrtwc
- t a t n t o s *\lot t l ~ i arllstrlrbonco I ~ n dnot!~irr:: t o ?o w i t h p o l i t i u o a r
c o l s . 37-38 TYPES OF FORMATION
(con'td;)
60 O u t s i d e r s (group r e p r e s e n t i n g a l o c a l i t y )

6 1 Croup coming d i r e c t l y from a f o r e i g n

country
d r o i t s lcritimos
62 Croup coming from a n o u t s i d e l o c a l i t y
! 2 1 t o 2C!/42 !oson.Lncnt
,- ' &&+
a g o i n s t usnrors : * l - v - r' Fe-
63 Croup of m i g r a n t s from o u t s i d e France
, =/4? Ac+icns by n n t i o n a l c o v l t which d e l i v a r o d i n t o Iiands of
p r i o t a i r c a Innd ; ~ l i i c hrros f e l t t o bo oonnon
64 Croup of m i g r a n t s from a n o t h e r a r e a of
71 t o :2!'/48 Nunio~.oun proccs-verbntx o t c . o::rtinot v i o l a t o r s of Coda ? o r r . s t i o r
France
-."A7 ,!!rmt:rous j.ncidan+.z o r bri,:mdnKc oncl d o s t r u c t i o ! . occurrod 111 v11rio11s co:::mlmon.
I 11s:-o , ~ o u . o n da l l v i c t i n o t~o:c.tkcr. Thoso inclrrdc g r t 5 l i c
o r f i c ~ n l s ( o o n d u c t o ~d~! ~r D i l i ~ e n o o , n a i r a s , I ~ c c c v o u rdo I'!.'nro~iotromant n t o ) pro-
70 Consumer group pr!ctr\Li.rcs and w u r a r s .
.53/.77 knrde nation nu^, m i l i t n i r o s , ~ c n d o r m o s , and soma p r i c a t o
71 Users of t h e same market 32/43 ~ l d n i n i s t r n t i o n , ~ employor, d r o c o n t r i b u t i o n , ? r o p r ? . o t o i r e s e t a .
.73/45 P o l i c o , m i l i t n i r c s , n a t i o n n l gunrd, and p r i o s t s .
72 Users of t h e same w a t e r s u p p l y
31/52 !!om of chnnzc i n r o s i n ? g i v o s h r i p m d s a p r c t c r t f o r r c v o l t ond an iul-
80

90
Public o f f i c i a l s

Combinations: MANDATORY COMMENT

- s e t t . ed s i t u a t i o n t o t n k c o d v o n t o ~ eo f
11/56 t o r t h e f i r s t 3 drip, t h o r o b c l s rriopondcd t o no v i o l o n c c . I b r r , On
!:nrch h, t h e y mot t h o r o g r o n s i v q Porme.tion i n b n t t l c , b o t h s i d e s usin:: f i r o o r m s .

9 1 D e l i b e r a t e combination f o r purposes of

b r e v i t y i n coding: MANDATORY COMMENT

99 Others: MANDATORY COMMENT I

5 to~:ai!: of o v a r 110@0 inhnbitnnts!?tobnl.
frola n n t u r e oE a c t i o n and ~ i z o sof tovrns
. Mationel p a r d s l : r c n ~ t i li:..'t.:'rq,;!

< l / 5 5 F o ~ i n n t i o n y n n e r n l l y ox:onding. !.iondnys.

42/55 Encli p 3 r t i c i p o n t i n t h i s f o n n n t i o n nnc
?.?/57 Thorc n e r o conlo ' o f f b c i n l s r n o l t r o i t o o '
.! ./67 Clnrcnc n c n t i o n o n o rsioundod nnd c t n t c l :

0 1 ) b u t !?O i s o f t o n rupcnkod, and uncd l?y

,:'lnrenc. 1 0 .:roro proacocuted nnd Pour~d ruilt;.
51-52/13 Tho so?uonco p r c s a n t o l bot:toen t h o two XX c o d c s i s n o t n t r u o ncquonco
b u t a ~ c c r c n t i o no f n t y p i c a l i n c i d o n t . 10-12 i n c i d o n t s of s i s l i l c r n:.two l:oqnk
p l n c c I?ol-::ccn ?cb. 2Pr&nd l.:nr. 3, ond t h o r c i s no r o o n t o coda thom s c u , ~ ~ t i n l l : . .
A f t e r t h o second :C,t h o b a t t l e of !.!arch 3 i s codcd uimxt@~ CIS Vl(rQ9. .
51/17 Invozion of m n i r i e , buroou do 1' cnro;:i,,-*rcnunt o r b w o n u o r bho fornn'.icr.
S t ~ h s c ~ u c burnin;:
nt of r c c o r d s and n l o f ; r a n t l n s ofl'icicllc.
- 53/31 A d i r r c r c n t v i c t i m - n c h a t c n u ovmor
51-53/43 Pnrch 8 , noon, n t Antichnn. Roundin6 up of prisono1.s corltir~tr.:: .rn:il
5 :(20 >! .Tb.
G5/1,! C h n n ~ ci n roy.in2
 FORMATION BACKGROUND
- ~.'./,!.1 'l:oromtioll 55 i s In.-! a.nfort.cmont f o r c c . IIo~~:ovor,divisionbotwu,.n 51 m d 5: ,/
con~bitp~r, d i r l ' o r o n c o s of o c r u p : : t i o t ~ and p r o p o r t y
GB/T,I- A ~ r m nt ~ p n h r rn P ~ ~ ~ b r cl cio o rds h u r n o j i n n h o s t ovory tc~vn, mostly Content of Code
! o r t n i ; t ~ i . ~ ~t :o; Codv ; ' o r o s t i c r , l i s t s of o r f r n c o n , f i n o n and prococ-vorbnus.
9ccorc!:: ol' dohgs e l s o b : ~ r i o d . :.:inor p r o p e r t y dann::o t o pr:bljc build in:;^. 1'.
h u i s o i . o r q s hcusc rrns pillny.o:l and l l c r s c s t o l r n i n I.:culoon-Daroosso. E. p i g , 3ona Cord Number
?ark qnd, somo vrino ~ m st a k e n i n S o s t , nrc:s nnd i n s i g n o of a d m i n i s t r n t a u r f o r c s t i o r Code 31-39
o t o 1 . q . : i l l n ~ oi n I & u r c s - ? r r r o u s s ~ ~ ,house invndod nnd p i l l n p d i n Antichnn, *IDENTIFICATION
6 , non ~annozncld i n T r o b n t nnd B o r t r o n , monny nnd p r o v i o i o n o s t o l c n i n Anlo. Pln:; D O N O T CODE
t o r n :in :enotwt. I n r g c s l ; dmnaeo n t a p r o p i n t a i r o ' s cliotcnu i n L..scan vciloro
t r c c s vrcro c u t . rilles broken, d o o r s brokon i n , f u r n i t u r e brokon o r s t o l o n , and
l i m n nnd i:ooka d o s t r o y o d o r t n k e n .
'.6/55 T h i s ic a lois/ o s t i n n t o . 30,000 r r n n c s .n~n:o n l o n c n t c h a t o a u do Luscnn
~ 6 / 7 3 r!lt11011:h c o n p l o t c l y s t i f l o d , t h i s d i n t u r b n n c o s t i n u l n t c d l n t o r i n c i A c n t s ,
notnbl:? n p l o t t o n s o a o s i n n t o Rocovour rlc I ' c n ~ c ~ i s t r o m c n tgho , n p r i l 17 dis-
t w b y ~ oo t S i : ~ n c , and t ' . c i n c i d o n t ~ t .R i z c - i i i s t o s 04; t ! rnd ~ of A p r i l .
73/10 U48-33-lO(501-50.7) <
lI34~.~-08-11 ,.PUBLIC IDENTITY
ef F O R M T I O N
ivory m i c * ~ l t to codc bocntlso of ~ r c n tntwhcr o f s x n l l , incidents. Sco t110
modol ooqucncc co*lo devised t o Iiand!o t h i s and n o t o t h n t t h o r c a r e 1 2 cor:.l:;w:ns Name ef
involvbd. Formation

!\ .
Type of fmrmatlmn

Age-Sex
 FORMATION BACKGROUND ( 2 )

Contcnl of Code ommcnts

. . I

Birthplace of members
Present residence
Occupotlonol
compositlon
:Politlcol

r,
attochmentr
mmediate
background
Code i n units
,' of 2
Legality o f 1st Act
Precipitating
factor

Type of violence
Response t o violence
other forms of
participation
Concerted Action
Mutual A i d
Overt Imitation
'Objectives
Code I n
units of

L
Explicitness of
objectives
Urtity of objectives

Hom?gcneity of
objectives
Autonomy of objectiv
Fluct,uotion I n focus
.Territory controllcd

Fluctuation i n
territory conholled
 ...-:.. ..-' i..
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APPENDIX 3. PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATIIERINGS I N
GREAT BRITAIN

Our newest l a r g e e f f o r t is a s t u d y of c o n f l i c t s i n G r e a t B r i t o i n

from 1828 through 1833. We have s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t i n c e n t i v e s f o r trnder-

t a k i n g t h e new a n a l y s i s . F i r s t , o u r a n a l y s e s of v i o l e n t e v e n t s i n

I t a l y , Germany and France appeared t o confirm our s u p p o s i t i o n t h o t t h e

v i o l e n c e was on t h e whole t h e by-product of t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of f u r t h e r

i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s i n a c t i o n s which were n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y v i o l e n t and

which o c c u r r e d f r e q u e n t l y w i t l ~ o u ts i g n i f i c a n t v i o l e n c e . In particular,

we were i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e frequency w i t h which t h e v i o l e n c e hegsn w i t h

t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of t r o o p s , p o l i c e and o t h e r specialized r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s .

S i n c e t h e o n l y n o n v i o l e n t e v e n t s of which we had made l a r g e . s y s t e m a t i c

enumerations f o r some of t h e same p e r i o d s and p l a c e s were s t r i k e s . how-

e v e r , we d i d n o t have t h e e v i d e n c e t o l o o k c l o s e l y a t t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p

between n o n v i o l e n t and v i o l e n t c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s .

Second, i t seemed worth making a S l ~ S t o i n e dcomparison hetwecn pnt-

t e r n s of c o n f l i c t i n n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y B r i t a i n and t h o s e we ltod found

on t h e C o n t i n e n t . S t u d e n t s of modern Europe o f t e n t h i n k of n i n e t e e n t h -

c e n t u r y B r i t a i n ' s e x p e r i e n c e a s s kind of s u c c e s s s t o r y -- st l e a s t i n

'Bvoiding" tlie r e v o l u t i o n s which o c c u r r e d i n France, Germany. l t o l y ond

elsewhere. A c l o s e s t u d y of c o n f l i c t s i n B r i t a i n sliould g i v e u s t h e means

t o rethink thot question. Hore i m p o r t a n t , i t sliould p r o v i d e f i r m e r

ground f o r choosing among obvious a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e d i f f e r -

e n c e s between B r i t a i n and t h e c o n t i n e n t : t h o t B r i t a i n had fewer of t h e

k i n d s of p e o p l e who made n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e v o l u t i o n s and r e b e l l i o n s .

t h a t t h e most l i k e l y r e b e l s had fewer g r i e v a n c e s , t h ~ rt e p r e s s i o n , w a s more

e f f e c t i v e i n B r i t a i n , and s o on.
 d e l e g a t i o n s , group poaching. and p l e n t y of o t h e r s . Drawing t h e boundaries
Our o r i g i n a l hope was t o examine t h e changing p a t t e r n s of c o n f l i c t

With a wide r a n g e of non- b o t h g e n e r o u s l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y is a d e l i c a t e and l a b o r i o u s t n s k .

i n B r i t a i n throughout t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y .
We a r e s t i l l a d j u s t i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e s f o r t h a t t a s k . A f t e r doing a
v i o l e n t e v e n t s t o c o n s i d e r , however, bhat would have r e q u i r e d a n enormous

effort -- many times t h e a l r e a d y f o r m i d a b l e e f f o r t p e r y e a r i n o u r s t u d i e s

t r i a l enumeration and s u m s r y coding of some e v e n t s from 1830, we d i d

a p r e l i m i n a r y s c a n n i n g of t h i r t y randomly s e l e c t e d ten-day b l o c k s from

of France and Germany. A f t e r some p r e l i m i n a r y enumerations i n s c a t t e r e d
t h e e n t i r e s i x - y e a r p e r i o d , t h e n proceeded t o enumerate s y s t e m n t i c a l l y
y e a r s from t h e end of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y t o t h e end of t h e n i n e t e e n t h .
from t h e beginning of 1828. We have completed t h e p r e l i m i n a r y enumeration
we narrowed o u r a t t e n t i o n t o 1828-1833. That p e r i o d recommends i t s e l f
o f 1828. We f i n d t h e e v e n t s v i a a complete issue-by-issue r e a d i n g of
f o r s e v e r a l reasons. F i r s t , i t was a time of major movements, c o n f l i c t s
t h e Morning C h r o n i c l e , The Times. Gentlemen's Magazine, Hansard's P n r l i a -
and c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s : C a t h o l i c Emancipation, Reform a g i t a t i 0 . n . i n d u s t r i a l
mentary Debates, The M i r r o r of P a r l i a m e n t end t h e Annual R e ~ i s t e r . Once t h e
c o n f l i c t , t h e a t t a c k on s e l e c t v e s t r i e s , and t h e g r e a t a g r a r i a n r e b e l l i o n s
e v e n t s a r e enumerated, we p l a n t o l o o k f o r more i n f o r m a t i o n nbout them i n
of 1830. Second, t h e r e e x i s t e x c e l l e n t h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s of some of t h e

period's c o n f l i c t s -- f o r example. C a p t a i n Swing, by E . J . Hobsbawn and

t h e p a p e r s of t h e Home O f f i c e (of which we have a l r e a d y b u i l t up s u b s t a n t i a l

s e l e c t i o n s v i a photocopy and m i c r o f i l m ) , i n o t h e r p e r i o d i c a l s , and i n

George Rud; -- w i t h which we c a n compare our own r e s u l t s . T h i r d , we have
secondary h i s t o r i c a l works. We a r e s t i l l making p l a n s f o r coding of t h e
some r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p e r i o d a c t e d a s an h i s t o r i c h 1 p i v o t i n some-
i n f o r m a t i o n i n machine-readable form. The f i l e f o r t h e s i x - y e a r p e r i o d
t h i n g l i k e t h e aame way t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o n s of 1848 d i d i n France and
w i l l probably d e s c r i b e on t h e o r d e r of 25.000 e v e n t s .
Germany: marking, and perhaps producing, a s h i f t from r e a c t i v e t o p r o a c t i v e ,
We a r e a l s o s l o w l y making p l a n s Eor t h e c o l l e c t i o n of d a t a on t h e
from "backward-looking" t o "forward-looking" c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t
p o p u l a t i o n s and a r e a s " a t r i s k " t o c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s . The u n i t s of
of o r d i n a r y people.
o b s e r v a t i o n w i l l c e r t a i n l y i n c l u d e a l l c o u n t i e s of England. S c o t l a n d and
I n t h a t p e r i o d , we a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o enumerate, d e s c r i b e and a n a l y z e
Wales. They w i l l probably i n c l u d e complete s e t s of hundreds of p a r i s h e s
a l a r g e s h o r e of a l l t h e " c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s " which occurred i n England,
within selected counties. I f p o s s i b l e , they w i l l a l s o i n c l u d e p n r t i c u l n r
S c o t l a n d , and Wales. Roughly s p e a k i n g , a c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g is an oc-

c a s i o n i n which t e n o r more p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e government g a t h e r i n t h e

p o p u l a t i o n s of p o t e n t i a l a c t o r s -- f o r example, t h e handloom weavers of

L a n c e s h i r e and t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l l a b o r e r s of L e i c e s t e r s h i r e . Ultimately
some p l a c e and make a v i s i b l e c l a i m which, i f r e a l i z e d , would a f f e c t t h e
t h e c h o i c e of u n i t s and of k i n d s of d a t a concerning t h o s e u n i t s w i l l re-
i n t e r e s t s of some s p e c i f i c ~ e r s o n ( s )o r g r o u p ( s ) o u t s i d e t h e i r own number.
s u l t from a compromise between t h e arguments we a r e s e e k i n g t o t e s t and t h e
In p r i n c i p l e , t h e s e g a t h e r i n g s i n c l u d e j u s t about a l l t h e e v e n t s covered
c o s t s of g e t t i n g t h e r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e .
i n our e a r l i e r enumerations of s t r i k e s and c o l l e c t i v e v i o l e n c e . They
Events t o be Enumerated
a l s o i n c l u d e a g r e a t many o t h e r e b e n t s : d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , p e t i t i o n meetings.
The e v e n t s a r e " c o n t e n t i o u s g a t h e r i n g s " (CGs), O C C ~ ~ ~i nO which
~ R ten
 A-39 A-40

o r more p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e government g a t h e r i n t h e same p l a c e and make DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF TIIWB

a v i s i b l e c l a i m which, i f r e a l i z e d , would a f f e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of some reported. Any mention i n any c o n t e x t . I f , f o r example, on M.P. l o y e on

s p e c i f i c p e r s o n ( s ) o r g r o u p ( s ) o u t s i d e t h e i r own numbers. Most CGs i n t h e t a b l e a p e t i t i o n "from a numerous meeting i n Oldham" which conforms

our period f a l l i n t o one o r more of t h e f o l l o w i n g c a t e g o r i e s : 1 ) c o l l e c - t o a l l o u r o t h e r c r i t e r i a , t h a t meeting e n t e r s t h e sample. In parliamentary

t i v e v i o l e n c e , 2) meetings. 3) d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , 4) parades. 5) a s s e m b l i e s , d e b a t e s , mentions of meetings do n o t need n u m e r i c a l i n f o r m t i o n t o be i n -

6) r a l l i e s , 7) c e l e b r a t i o n s , 8 ) d e l e g a t i o n s , 9 ) s t r i k e s , 10) union a c t i v - cluded. For example, i f M i r r o r of P a r l i a m e n t r e p o r t s a meeting of p n r i s h -

ities. More p r e c i s e l y , t h e e v e n t s i n c l u d e d a r e a l l o c c a s i o n s : i o n e r s a t P r e s t o n t o p e t i t i o n P a r l i a m e n t , b u t mokes no mention of how many

1. r e p o r t e d i n t h e London Times, Morning Chronicle,, Hanssrd's P a r l i a - people a t t e n d e d t h e m e e t i n g , we w i l l assume p r o v i s i o n a l l y t h a t o t l e a s t

mentary Debates. Annual R e g i s t e r , Gentlemen's Magazine a n d l o r The 1 0 people took p a r t .

--
Mirror of P a r l i a m e n t .
o c c u r i n g i n England, S c o t l a n d or'Wnles. Ten o r more people must have
2. o c c u r r i n g i n England. S c o t l a n d o r Wales,
a t h e r e d w i t h i n t h e p o l i t i c a l boundoriea ( i n c l u d i n g t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s ) of
3. beginning on any d a t e from 1 J a n u a r y 1828 through 31 December 1833,
England, S c o t l a n d o r Wales. I f any p a r t of t h e a c t i o n o c c u r s w i t h i n t h o s e
4 . i n which t e n o r more p e r s o n s o u t s i d e t h e government:
b o u n d a r i e s , t h e e n t i r e e v e n t f a l l s i n t o t h e sample.
a . g a t h e r i n t h e same p l a c e ,
Sometimes i t is d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e how mnny p e o p l e a r e involved
b. make a v i s i b l e c l a i m which, i f r e a l i z e d , would a f f e c t t h e in-
i n an e v e n t o r a c t i o n . I n vague c a s e s t a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g terms t o mean o t
t e r e s t s of some s e p e c i f i c person(8) o r g r o u p ( s ) o u t s i d e t h e i r
l e a s t t e n people:
own number.
AFFRAY DISTURBANCE NUMEROUS

ASSPIBLY GANG RALLY

Terms which t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e working d e f i n i t i o n s :
BRAWL GATHERING RIOT
reported
CONCOURSE GENERAL BODYlBODY RIOTOUS ASSEMBLAGE
occurring
CROWD . MOB TllRONC
i n England, Scotland o r Wales
DEMONSTRATION MULTITUDE TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLY
beginning

, persons b e g i n n i n g on a n y . d a t e from 1 J a n u a r y 1828 through 3 1 December 1833

o u t s i d e t h e government The e v e n t b e g i n s a t t h e f i r s t p o i n t st which a t l e a s t t e n of t h e p e o p l e

gather who e v e n t u a l l y make t h e v i s i b l e c l a i m a r e g a t h e r e d w i t h o u t f u r t h e r d i s -

same p l a c e p e r s a l b e f o r e t h e y make t h e c l a i m . The day b e g i n s a t midnight.

v i s i b l e claim a f f e c t i n g i n t e r e s t s

s p e c i f i c person(s) o r group(s)
persons. Any human being who can reasonably be presumed to Ilave inten- sentially shilar organizations.

tlonally participated in the making of the claim. .. .

Aa segments of the citizenry. we are considering Freeholders. Householders.

outside the government. When officers ore acting in the capacity given Inhabitants, Landowners, Leypnyeri, Occupiers, Parishioners, Ratepayers,

them by their offices and no group of ten or more non-officers is acting Tithepayers and essentially similar collections of people. One day we m y

wtth cl~em,we exclude the action. If ten or more officers act together well want to analyze the actions of public committees, of segments of the
. .
but on their own responsibility, we include their action. Among the sets citizenry, and of other groups (such as members of particular crofts. assoc-

of people commonly named in discussions of English governments in the iations, age-sex groups or families) separately. For the present, the

nineteenth century, we are actually distinguishing three categories, crucial distinction separates officers from all the rest. Officers often

(6) officers, (b) public committees, and (c) citizenry. As officers. appear as parties in collective actions involving pub1.i~committees, seg-

we are considering: ments of the citizenry and/or other groups. But the only circumstances un-

Aldermen Judges Police Constables der which their concerted action qualifies by itself is when they take

Bailiffs Justices Privy Councilers part in a group of ten or more persons who on their own responsibility ns-

Beadles Justices of the Peace Schoolboards aemble to make a publicly visible claim, demand or complaint.

Boroughreeves Lord Lieutenants Sheriffs

As citizens we are considering everyone else.
Burgesses Magistrates Scotch Guards

Churchwardens Mayors Special Constables gather'same place Ten or more persons, meeting, assembling or any of

Common Councilers Members of Parliament Surveyors the key words used in Page A-42 to define a get-together. Place is
Constables Military (see below*) Town Councilers defined as:

Coroners Militia Yeomanry a) specific location, church, inn. field,

Directors of the Poor Ministers and others of b) secondary location. town, parish, city.

Grand Juries Overseers of the Poor essentially C) area location, county, hundred, etc.

Guardians of the Poor Paymasters similar position. or any combination of these.

Horse Guards Police

visible claims affecting interesta of eome specific persons or groups

*(Militnry): Cavalry, Infantry, Dragoons, Hussars, Marines, Blues, Grays We are trying to prepare a comprehensive list of occasions where people

. .
As public committees we are considering Town Meetings, Vestries, Select
outside the government assemble to m k e a publicly visible claim, demand,

or complaint. At one time or another, we use all the following words to

Vestries. Liveries, Improvement Commissions, Police Commissions, and es-
d e s c r i b e what we're a f t e r : c l a i m s , demands, c o m p l a i n t s , g r i e v a n c e s , a s - b ) o p p o s i t i o n t o government p o l i c y , form of govccnment o r p n r t i c u l n r

pirations, interests. dissatisfactions. Some of t h e s e words, such a s a g e n t s of i t ;

"demands", c l e a r l y have an o b j e c t o u t s i d e t h e group. Others, l i k e

C) s u p p o r t f o r government;
"dissatisfactions", do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have o u t s i d e o b j e c t s ; one can

e a s i l y be d i s s a t i s f i e d with oneself. We want t o c o n c e n t r a t e on a c t i o n s d ) s u p p o r t f o r a n enemy of government;

which & have a t a r g e t o u t s i d e t h e a c t i n g group. L e t ' s t a l k about c l a i m s

e ) c o n t r o l of l o c a l government o r i n s t i t u t i o n ;
nnd o b j e c t s of c l a i m s . . We a r e t r y i n g t o b u i l d a sample of g a t h e r i n g s i n

which -- o r by which -- p e o p l e a r t i c u l a t e c l a i m s on a c t o r s o u t s i d e t h e i r f ) o t h e r g r i e v a n c e s and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g r e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l

own group. o r economic I s s u e s , d i s c u s s i o n of c o m p l a i n t s about wagca, h o u r s

What s o r t s of c l a i m s ? B a s i c a l l y , any e x p e c t a t i o n which would, i f o r c o n d i t i o n s of work;

r e a l i z e d , r e q u i r e t h e o t h e r a c t o r t o expend valued r e s o u r c e s : money, l a b o r -

Here a r e some r u l e s of thumb f o r t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of q u n l i f y i n g
power, i n f o r m a t i o n , and s o on. What s o r t s of a c t o r s ? B a s l o a l l y , any
and n o n - q u a l i f y i n g c l a i m s :
o t h e r s e t of r e a l people. That e x c l u d e s a g r o u p ' s c l a i m s on i t s e l f . It
1. I n t h e a b s e n c e of c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n f o r m a t i o n , collective v i o l e n c c
e x c l u d e s a g r o u p ' s c l a i m s on s u p e r n a t u r a l o r imaginary b e i n g s . I t does
c o n s t i t u t e s prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e of a c l a i m . I f t e n o r more p e r s o n s
n o t however, e x c l u d e c l a i m s on an imaginary "power s t r u c t u r e " , i f t h e
a c t t o g e t h e r t o a t t a c k , damage o r f o r c i b l y s e i z e n person o r object,
group identifies some r e a l p e o p l e w i t h t h a t s t r u c t u r e . Nor does i t e x c l u d e
t h a t is p r o v i s i o n a l e v i d e n c e of n c l a i m .
c l a i m s on r e a l people i n t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s a s s e l f - d e c l a r e d a g e n t s of

s u p e r n n t u r a l b e i n g s o r imaginary groups: p r i e s t s , s o o t h s a y e r s , c h a r l a t a n s , 2. Even i f t h e u l t i m a t e aim of t h c a c t i v i t y i s t h e making of some

members of i n v e n t e d c o n s p i r a c i e s . It does n o t e x c l u d e c l a i m s on r e a l s o r t of c l a i m , p u r e l y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e f f o r t s do n o t q u a l i f y i n

p e o p l e p r e s e n t a t t h e same g a t h e r i n g , j u s t s o l o n g a s t h e r e i s a welthey themselves. For example, t h e c r e a t i o n of a l o c n l Rcform A s s o c i a t i o n

s c p a r s t i o t i between a c t o r s and o b j e c t s which i s n o t simply an i n t e r n a l does n o t i n i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e a clnim. I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, t e n

d i v i s i o n of t h e a c t i n g group and which i s more d u r a b l e t h a n t h c g a t h e r i n g o r more p e r s o n s who a r e o r g a n i z i n g an a s s o c i a t i o n s t a t e a q u a l i f y i n g

itself. I n f a c t , "any o t h e r s e t of r e a l people" does n o t e ~ c l u d eany i n - c l a i m a s they do s o , t h a t c l a i m c o u n t s .

d i v i d u a l anywhere, j u s t s o l o n g a s t h c r e i s a g a t h e r i n g i n which enough

3. B e n e f i t s u p p e r s , b a l l s , e x p o s i t i o n s and t h e l i k e do n o t q u a l i f y
people a r t i c u l a t e c l a i m s on t h a t i n d i v i d u a l .
i n themselves, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e cnuse f o r which t h e y n r e conducted.
When d e s c r i b i n g t h e p o s s i b l e c o n t e n t of such cla.tms, we enumerate:
I f , however, we a c q u i r e f u r t h e r e v l d e n c e of t h e making of n cl.nim
a ) p e t i t i o n i n g o r a d d r e s s i n g o r memorializing l o c a l o r n a t i o n a l
(e.g. a claim-making proclamation by t h e o r g a n i z e r s of t h e b e n e f i t ,
government, e i t h e r f o r o r a g a i n s t government;
o r a widely-cheered claim-making speech i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t ) , i n c l u d i n g c e l e b r a t i o n s and f e s t i v i t i e s , wl~oaecommonly-understood

a b e n c f i t q u a l i f i e s i n t h e same way any o t h e r g a t h e r i n g q u a l i f i e s . purpose is t h e d i s p l a y of s u p p o r t . e.g. Lord Mayor's Day p a r a d e ;

b) t h e r e p o r t e r ' s i m p u t a t i o n of s u p p o r t o r r e j e c t i o n ; c ) a r t i c u l n t i o n
4. A speech by a s i n g l e person which s t a t e s a c l a i m , a r t i c u l a t e s a 1
of a s e n t i m e n t through c h e e r i n g , j e e r i n g . and s o on, however, a s i m p l e
g r i e v a n c e o r makes a demand c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of a c o l l e c t i v e

c l a i m under any of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s : a ) t h e group f o r m a l l y a d o p t s t h e

i t o a s t (e.g. "To t h e King") doe8 n o t q u a l i f y i n i t s e l f , even i f par-

t i c i p a n t s cheer.
s p e a k e r ' s views by p e t i t i o n , r e s o l u t i o n o r memorial; b) t h e r e p o r t e r

e x p l i c i t l y imputes a p p r o v a l of t h e c l a i m t o t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e 1 7. G a t h e r i n g s e x p l i c i t l y conducted t o s u p p o r t o r condemn an a c t i o n

i
g a t h e r i n g ; c ) t h e group m a i n i f e s t l y v o i c e s a n o p i n i o n by c h e e r i n g , of government s t a t e q u a l i f y i n g c l a i m s i f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves

J e e r i n g o r o t h e r vocnl display. a r t i c u l a t e s e n t i m e n t s by p a s s i n g r e s o l u t i o n s . c h e e r i n g s p e e c h e s , and

s o on.
5. I f a g a t h e r i n g i n c l u d e s two o r more f a c t i o n s , a t l e a s t one of

which h a s t e n o r more p a r t i c i p a n t s , c l a i m s made by one of t h e f a c t i o n s 8. Simple e x p r e s s i o n s of s u p p o r t o r r e j e c t i o n do not q u a l i f y i f the

I

on a n o t h e r i f t h e i s s u e s and d i v i s i o n s i n q u e s t i o n e x t e n d beyond t h e o b j e c t s a r e a ) non-governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s o r o f f i c e r s i n B r i t a i n

p a r t i c u l a r g a t h e r i n g and t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f p a r t i c i p a n t s . For
i o r e l s e w h e r e , b) governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s o r officer^ o u t s i d e of

example. when Henry Hunt and h i s s u p p o r t e r s show up a t a p a r i s h v e s t r y

meeting and c h a l l e n g e t h e powers of t h e l o c a l e l i t e t o c o n t r o l t h e

II Britain. I f a g a t h e r i n g makos f u r t h e r c l a i m s on e i t h e r of t h e s e

c a t e g o r i e s of o b j e c t s , however, t h e c l a i m s q u a l i f y . For example, a

e l e c t i o n of new v e s t r y o f f i c e r s , t h e d i v i s i o n e x t e n d s beyond t h a t 1 banquet i n honor of t h e deposed k i n g of S p a i n would n o t q u a l i f y u n l e s s

meeting and t h e c l a i m q u a l i f i e s . t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s d i r e c t l y s t a t e d t h e demand t h a t he b e r e i n s t a t e d .

6. E x p l i c i t s u p p o r t f o r government, o r d e n i a l of s u p p o r t t o government. BOUNDARIES OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS

qualifies. I t can t a k e t h e form of s u p p o r t f o r i n s t i t u t i o n s ( P a r l i o - Most CGs w i l l o c c u r on one day a t one l o c n t i o n ; however, many w i l l

ment, t h e p r e s e n t government, t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n ) o r of s u p p o r t f o r s p e c i f i c l a s t l o n g e r a n d l o r w i l l t a k e p l a c e a t s e v e r a l s i t e s . s o we must d e l i n e a t e

o f f i c e r s o f government: t h e aldermen, b a i l i f f s , b e a d l e s , boroughreeves, b o u n d a r i e s i n time and space. A c t i v i t i e s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o be p n r t

and s o on. l i s t e d e a r l i e r . I t c s n t a k e t h e form of d e l i b e r a t e d e n i a l of t h e same CG i f :

of s u p p o r t f o r t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s o r o f f i c e r s . The i n s t i t u t i o n s and 1. t h e y o c c u r on t h e same day. o r on c o n s e c u t i v e days &

o f f i c e r s must b e . c u r r e n t l y i n o f f i c e ; f o r example, a c e l e b r a t i n g ban- 2. t h e r e i s s t r o n g e v i d e n c e of o v e r l a p p i n g p e r s o n n e l w i t h i n t h e
q u e t f o r a member-elect of P a r l i a m e n t does n o t i n i t s e l f q u a l i f y . c i t i z e n f o r m a t i o n ( s ) , s u c h a s c o n t i n u o u s i n t e r a c t i o n between
Evidence of such s u p p o r t o r d e n i a l i n c l u d e s a ) p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e v e n t s , two o r more of t h e f o r m a t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e i n i t i a l a c t i v i t y
 3. the activities involve the same issue, or some directly related
issue (e.g. the escalation of demands).
accuracy of ending date

Activities that meet the above criteria will be defined as one CG even duration: days

througl~they occur in different locations (e.g. different towns). duration: hours

low estimate of total participants

If on event qualifies on the grounds of,the kind of action and kind
high estimate of total participants
of group involved, but we lack sufficient information to assign it a time
best estimate of total participants
and place in Britain from 1828 through 1833, we exclude the event pending
best estimate of person-days +margin of error
further information. If only one of these elements -- time or place -- is
best estimate of person-hours + margin of error
uncertain, we'include tlie event pending further information.
best estimate of arrests during even + margin of error
GENERAL AGENQA FOR CODING best estimate of arrests after event + margin of error
This is a provisional set of plans for the preparation of a machine- best estimate of wounded during event + margin of error
readable description of each CG. The record for a single event will con- best estimate of killed during event + margin of error
tain the following sections: number of formations
)
. 1. EVENT as a whole, including identification and summary description sunnnary of formation type(s)
of all major features. summary of participation by authorities
2. PLACE: one unit per place in which the event occurred. smlacy of repression exercised durina event
3. FORMATION: one unit per formation participating in the event. summary of repression exercised after evonb
4. ACTION-PIIASE: one unit per action by any formation. s u m r y of major target(s) of action
5. SOURCE: one unit per source 'from which information concerning this broad event type
event was drawn. summary of background
6. COMJIENTS: one unit per comment. All keyed to specific locations summary of outcome
in sections 1-5. .
2. Place Section
1. Event Section
one unit per place in which the action occurred. A "place" 1s any named
identification number: starting date plus sequence number on that date
location, plus any unnamed location in whlcl~we have strong reason to he-
occuracy of starting date
lieve that some portion o l the action occurred. We produce a i1111tfor
day of week on which event began
"?omeplace" in two circumstnnces: 1) we cannot locate tlie action in at
date on which event ended
 A-49 A-50
l e a s t one s p e c i f i c p a r i a h ; 2) we have stro,ng r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t some l o c a t i o n i n B r i t i s h c e n s u s of 1831: nine d,igita

p o r t i o n of t h e a c t i o n o c c u r r e d o u t s i d e t h e p l a c e s f o r which t h e a c c o u n t
NOTE on t h e P l a c e S e c t i o n . T h i s i s n o t t h e o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n on p l a c e s
c o n t a i n s s p e c i f i c names. A "name" can be v e r y g e n e r a l : by t h e r i v e r , on
l t h a t we w i l l e v e n t u a l l y have a v a i l a b l e f o r a n a l y s i s . We p l n n t o c o n s t r u c t
t h e road. a t t h e market, and s o on.
a s e p a r a t e P l a c e F i l e i n c l u d i n g a t l e a a t a l l p a r i s h e s i n which e v e n t s oc-

a) for i n i t i a l codina c u r r e d and a l l c o u n t i e s , whether o r n o t e v e n t s o c c u r r e d i n them. The sdd-

p r i n c i p a l name of p l a c e , a l p h a b e t i c . Parish takes priority. I f i t is im- i t i o n of f u r t h e r p l a c e s , i f any, w i l l depend on c o a t . convenience end ana-
p o s s i b l e , name county; i f county i s i m p o s s i b l e , c o u n t r y . Place inferred l y t i c urgency. The l i k e l y i t e m s of i n f o r m a t i o n i n such a f i l e a r e :

locations i n parenthesis. Thus OXFORD means t h e a c c o u n t s p e c i f i c a l l y men- name of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t ( p a r i s h , e t c . )

t i o n s Oxford, (OXFORD) t h a t we have i n f e r r e d t h e l o c a t i o n from t h e a c c o u n t p r o p e r name of t h e p l a c e

o r its context.
I position within administrative hierarchy: p a r i s h , hundred, county. e t c .

grid square location per Gazetteer

d e t a i l e d name of p l a c e . a l p h a b e t i c . Blank i f we have a p a r i s h name and
l o c a t i o n i n 1831 c e n s u s
no o t h e r p l a c e i n f o r m a t i o n . SOMEPLACE i f t h e p r i n c i p a l p l a c e is a county
p o p u l a t i o n i n 1831
!
o r a c o u n t r y (England, S c o t l a n d , Wales) and we have no f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n
o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h a t p l a c e : p r e s e n c e o r absence of market.
on l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e county o r c o u n t r y ; a more s p e c i f i c d e s i g n a t i o n such
I e x t e n t of manufacturing, e t c .
a s "near Norwich" ( i n p a r e n t h e s i s i f i n f e r r e d ) t a k e s precedence o v e r SOME-

PLACE. SOMEPLACE EI.SE f o r a d d i t i o n a l p l a c e s n o t . s p e c i f i c a l l y named.

I c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of s p e c i f i c l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h a t p l a c e : i n n , church.

p u b l i c aquare;.shop, etc .
b) f o r coding a f t e r a l p h a b e t i c s o r t of p l a c e s e c t i o n s enumeration o f a l l e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g i n t h a t p l a c e

sequence number f o r g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n : 0 i f some p o r t i o n d e f i n i t e l y

I 3. Formation S e c t i o n
took p l a c e i n t h i s g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n , 1 t o 9 i f one of a c l u s t e r of 1

t o 9 p o s s i b l e c o n t i n u o u s g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n s , used t o d e s c r i b e i r r e g u l a r
I One u n i t p e r f o r m a t i o n k n w n t o b e p r e s e n t . Every participant must h e ss-

s i g n e d t o a t l e a a t one f o r m a t i o n . So must e v e r y a c t i o n : i f we know some

s h a p e s , e . g . a s t r e e t , town, r i v e r b a n k , r o a d . Note: t h i s means t h a t a
a c t i o n o c c u r r e d , b u t c a n ' t a s s i g n i t t o a s p e c i f i c f o r m a t i o n , we c r e a t e a
s i n g l e p l a c e r e c o r d may c o n t a i n 1 t o 9 s u b r e c o r d s f o r g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n .
I f o r m a t i o n named SOMEONE. There may b e more t h a n one SOMEONE. In that

grid square location per Gazetteer: two l e t t e r s p l u s f i v e d i g i t s I

v e r t i c a l l o c a t i o n w i t h i n g r i d square:
h o r i z o n t a l l o c a t i o n w i t h i n g r i d square:
margin of e r r o r ' f o r g r i d s q u a r e l o c a t i o n
c a s e , we name them SOMEONE 1, SOMEONE 2. ....
I
0 i f n o t k n 6 , 1 t o 9 i f known
A f o r m a t i o n i s a s e t of p e o p l e who a c t t o g e t h e r a n d l o r i n t e r a c t w i t h a n o t -
0 i f n o t known, 1 t o 9 i f known
h e r f o r m a t i o n i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t . The f i r s t f o r m a t i o n named must
 A-51 A-52
liavc 10+ members. We d i v i d e t h e remainder i n t o a s few f o r m a t i o n s a s p o s s i b l e : . '

I s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e : code
g e n e r a l l y one f o r m a t i o n f o r e a c h s e t of p e o p l e wlio a c t d i s t i n g u i s h a b l y i n t h e
1 b e s t e s t i m a t e of number a r r e s t e d . Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i m a t e s a s COMMENTS.
c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t .
s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e : code

f o r m a t i o n numbers: two d i g i t s b e s t e s t i m a t e of number wounded. Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i m a t e s oe COMMENTS.

o v e r l a p w i t h o t h e r f o r m a t i o n s : l i s t of o t h e r f o r m a t i o n ' s numbers s o u r c e of b e e t e s t i m a t e : code

r c l n t i o n of t h i s f o r m a t i o n t o e v e n t : p a r t i c p a n t , s p e c t a t o r , e t c . b e s t e s t i m a t e of number k i l l e d . Note a l t e r n a t i v e e e t i m a t e a a s COHMENTS.

nnme(s) of f o r m a t i o n : a l p l i a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g SOMEONE ( i n p a r e n t h e s i s i f s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e : code

t h e name i s i n f e r r e d r a t h e r t h a n g i v e n e x p l i c i t l y )
NOTE: b e s t e s t i m n t e s of person-days, person-hours. a r r e s t s , wounded, k i l l -
s o c j u l c o m p o s i t i o n of f o r m a t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DK ( d o n ' t know)
ed, must each sum t o t o t a l s g i v e n i n EVENT SECTION
o t h e r words d e s c r i b i n g f o r m a t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g NONE [ i n p a r e n t h e s i s

i f i n f e r r e d from a c c o u n t , e . g . (LED BY TAILOR)]. 4. Action-Phase S e c t i o n

p l a c e of o r i g i n o r normal r e s i d e n c e : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DI; An e v e n t b e g i n s a t t h e f i r s t p o i n t a t wllich a t l e a s t t e n of t h e p e o p l e wlio

words used t o d e s c r i b e maanitude of f o r m a t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g NONE e v e n t u a l l y make a c l a i m which would q u a l i f y t h e e v e n t f o r i n c l u s i o n i n o u r

[ i n p a r e n t h e s i s i f i n f e r r e d from a c c o u n t , e . g . (GROUP FILLED SQUARE)] sample a r e g a t h e r e d w i t h o u t d i s p e r s i n g b e f o r e they make tlie c l a i m . The

number of p n r l i c i p a n t s : low e s t i m a t e (50+ = a t l e a s t 50. 101+ = more t h a n e v e n t ends when t h e l a s t s e t of p e o p l e which h a s made such a c l a i m i n tlie

100, e t c . ) c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t d i s p e r s e s . I f new c l a i m s by 1 O t p e o p l e which would

number of p a r t i c i p a n t s : high e s t i m a t e
I i n d e p e n d e n t l y q u a l i f y t h e e v e n t f o r i n c l u s i o n a r i s e i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e

number o f p a r t i c i p a n t s : b e s t e s t i m a t e e v e n t , they keep t h e e v e n t g o i n g .

s o u r c e of b e s t e s t i m a t e : code (when t h e a v a i l a b l e a c c o u n t s c o n t a i n more

A new a c t i o n - p h a s e b e g i n when f o r m a t i o n b e g i n s a new a c t i o n . A t least
t h a n one e s t i m a t e , w r i t e COblMENT)

number of person-days: b e s t e s t i m a t e (00 - unknown, 01 = p a r t i c i p a t i o n

one phase must d e s c r i b e a c t i o n b e f o r e t h e e v e n t s b e g i n s ; when p o e s i b l e ,

t h e r e s h o u l d b e one s u c h u n i t f o r each formation p r e s e n t a t t h e beginnjng

, l a s t e d l e s s t h a n o n e day)
of t h e e v e n t . A t l e a s t one phase must d e s c r i b e a c t i o n a f t e r t h e e v e n t
number o f person Ilours: b e s t e s t i m a t e . 0 0 = unknown, 0 1 = l e s s t h a n 1 h o u r .
ends; when p o s s i b l e , t h e r e should b e one such u n i t form each f o r m a t i o n
I'erson-days and person-hours a r e a d d i t i v e . For example. 025, 075 means
which s u r v i v e d t o t h e end of t h e e v e n t .
25 person-dnys + 75 person-hours, a reasonable e s t i m a t e f o r a formation

of 25 p e o p l e i n c o n t i n u o u s a c t i o n t o r 1 day p l u s t h r e e more h o u r s . I f more than one formntjon changes a c t i o n a t t h e same time. we mnke a
01,
75 means 0 person-days + 75 person-liours. phase u n i t f o r each f o r m a t i o n and a s s i g n each u n i t t h e same time.
Note a l t e r n a t i v e e s t i m a t e s

a s COMMENTS. 1 ) b e f o r e t h e event
The minimtlm r e c o r d c o n t a i n s a t l e a s t one phase each:
b e g i ~ ~ s2;) a t tile b e g i n n i n g oC tile e v e n t ; 3 ) i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v e n t ;
name of s o u r c e : a l p l ~ a b e t i c . S t a n d a r d o b b r c v i a t i o ~ ~fso r major s o u r c e s
4 ) a t t h e end of t h e e v c n t ; 5) a f t e r t h e e v e n t .

l o c a t i o n w i t h i n s o u r c e : i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l v a r y w i t h t y p e of s o u r c e . For
Every f o r m a t i o n namecl must a p p e a r i n a t l e a s t one a c t i o n - p h a s e .
newspapers, f o r example, l o c a t i o n w i l l t y p i c a l l y be d a t e , p a g e , l o c a t i o n

Sequence number: f i r s t new p h a s e a t t h i s t i m e . Two d i g i t s ; 0 0 = sometime on page.

Order number f o r m u l t i p l e p h a s e s which s t a r t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y : one d i g i t f u r t h e r i d e n t i f y i n g i n f o r m a t i o n : i n c l u d e s NONE. Hay c i t e h e a d l i n e , i n d i c a t e

l o c a t i o n i n f o o t n o t e , and s o on.
d a t e : y e a r , month, day

c l o c k time: 2400 - m i d n i g h t ; 0000 = unknown

comments on s o u r c e : a l p h a b e t i c . l n c l u d e s NONE.

t r a d i c t i o n of o t h e r s o u r c e s , u s e made i n c o d i n g .
May mention q u a l i t y , con-

r e l a t i o n t o cvent: 1 = before event begins; 2 action i n i t i a t i n g event;

-
0

3 i n c o u r s e of c v e n t ; 4 = a c t i o n e n d i n g e v e n t : 5 - a f t e r event ends
6. Comment S e c t i o n

One u n i t p e r comment. May be keyed t o nny l o c a t i o n w i t h i n EVENT, PLACE,

f o r m t i o n number: 0 0 - someone ( i f u s e d , we must enumerate a SOMEONE forma- FORMATION, ACTION-PHASE, OR SOURCE s e c t i o n s . I n some c a s e s . t h e codebook

t i o n : 99 - a l l formations w i l l r e q u i r e t h e c o d e r who u s e s n c e r t a i n code t o make a CONMENT

J

a c t i o n : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DK ( d e f i n i t e l y p e r m i t s p h r a s e s s u c h a s l o c a t i o n i n r e c c r d : n u m e r i c a l code

ATTEMPT TO . . . .; i n p a r e n t h e s i s i f o u r summary o r i n f e r ~ ? n c e ,w i t h o u t comment: a l p h a b e t i c

p n r e n t l ~ e s i s i f d i r e c t t r a n s c r i p t i o n of words i n a c c o u n t )

o b j e c t of a c t i o n : a l p l ~ a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g DK, NONE, FOREli\TlOPl 2 3 , e t c .

immediate c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r o b j e c t : a l p h a b e t i c , i n c l u d i n g D K , NONE (conse-

quences o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g same a c t i o n - p i l a s e o n l y ; u s e a f t e r - e v e n t p l ~ a s e s f o r

l a t e r consequences).

-
5. F o u r c r SccLio:;

One u n i t p e r s o u r c e . I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e r e s h o u l d be one s o u r c e u n i t p e r

c o v e r s h e e t and o n e c o v e r s h e e t p c r s o u r c e u n i t .
 APPENDIX 4. MATERIALS FROM THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS IN GREAT

BRITAIN
Type of CG Place -
Date Issue
gathering Weymouth 02-18 election victory celebration
The materiala concern February 1828. First comes a provisional list
meeting Mary-la-bonne 02-20 parish rates
of all contentious gatherings reported in our six sources (Morning Chronicle,
violence Scarborough 02-28 smuggling affray
--
The Times. -
Hansard's, The Mirror of Parliament. Gentlemen's and Annual Re-
meeting Sheffield February (approx. ) test and corporation acts
gister) for that month. In the list, two events are underlined. The mn-
meeting Islington February (approx. ) test and corporation acts
terials which follow are readers' reports and copies of some of the relevant
meeting London February (approx. ) test and corporation acts
articles in the periodicals.
meeting Honiton February (approx. ) teat and corporation acts
Type of CC -
Place -
Date -
Issue
meeting Dorcheater February (approx. ) test and corporation acts
meeting Weymouth 02-02 parliamentary election
meeting Manchester February (approx.) stamp duties
meeting London 02-03 protection of victualler trade

meeting Poultry 02-04 test corporation acts

meeting . Edinburgh 02-04 petition king about political favors

gathering Liverpool 02-05 election to parliament

gathering Durham 02-05 local election

gathering Dover 02-06 election to parliament

violence ~bndon 02-06 crowd attacks informer

parade Weymouth 02-07 election

meeting Sheffield 02-07 vestry, church rates

violence Newbury 02-07 crowd attacks informer

demonstration Weymouth 02-09 election

meeting Windsor 02-10 tax on carts

gathering-crowd Weymouth 02-11 election

gathering-mob on don 02-13 threatens informer

gathering-crowd Durham 02-13 county elections

meeting -
London -
02-15 licensed vs. non-licensed sellers

violence Atherstone 02-16 poaching affray

meeting Leicester 02-18 coin laws

~ .-
Tndav': datr - - 197h

:) Ilansnrd ( ) IIVP ( )Scl~wei~zer

, ) L0NlK)W 'PIIIES p;lge column 2- (word ( )Guest

: 5 MORNING CI!RONI<:l,E d a t e d -//- d- 8/ day + 2

Bottom
()Eaton ,)Lewis
( )Green ( )Dunkle
( )Anderson ( ) B a r b e
F i r s t Lint:- - -&_~;~Y-.Q&~~/-C - --- - -- ---- ---- - - -- -- -- -
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: CllECK AS MANY AS APPLY(see memo /! 6 )

(1) VIOLENCE ( )
p r o p e r t y damage ( ) , s e i z u r e of p r o p e r t y , s p a c e s o r persons ( ).
p e r s o n a l i n j u r y ( ), t h r e a t o f a n y of t h e a b o v e ( ).

(2) ElEETlNGS ( )
( ) Election ( s u p p o r t f o r enemy o f g o v e r n m e n t
)
( ) Vestry ( control of l o c a l governmentlinstitution
)
.
f , Liver\. (
(
o t h e r g r i e v a n c e s and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s
)
o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r peoples o r groups
)
( ) Dinner
( ) Political clublparty , ( ) o b j e c t i v e s unclear
( ) with prtition, address, etc. ( ) notices, requests(for past or f u t u r e meetings)
( ) o p p o s i t i o n t o government ( ) other(1ist)
( ) s u p p o r t f o r government

(3-8) GATHERINGS
demonstrflinns
rallies ( ),
(/I: parade( ), ass-es,
s p e c i a l celebrations ( ) .
c r o w d s , mobs (4, gatherings ( ) I

o t h e r ( )-

(10) LADllR ACTI\'ITIES ( )

s t r i k e , t u r n o u t ( ). l o c k o u t ( ), comhination o r union mention ( ),
t l i r e a t n t o s t o p work ( ) , work s t o p p a g e s ( ) . r e t u r n t o work ( ).
dr!?iltations 1 3 f v o r k e r s ( ).

(11) I.ECAI. ACTIOI:S ( )

a r r e s t s ( ). rxaminntlons ( ), r t n o . ( . t r j a l s l c o u r t procedings (
sentences. executions, r t c . ( ). Re s u r e t o c h e c k t h r a p p r o p t n t r a r e a s a h o v e t h a t
p e r t a i n t o t h e a c t i o n Chat b r o u g h t a l > o l ~ tt h e a r r e s t o r t r i a l

EXTRA E!:T[1'.
s w e i l r ill,! i n <,Is p e c i a l c u n s t a h l e s ( 5 , o r s u n o r s u s p e c t e d a r s o n ( 1.
m a c h i n e b r e a k i n g , d e s ~ r u c t i o no f looms o r t h r e s h e r s , c t c . ( ) .

Object .vc. v i a c i i u n > / fi C ~ ( h ' ;

, . p l l t s , rf /&. ~ Y U C _&wD,~we
A~< /;II /%
&
A&
!r
liunhe f7 ~ / , ~ ' ' ~ ~ f l d I.euders
~ &/. .~GL)&x;
Kc6 7, 7iuwl
Y e : ; t e r d ; ~ y , I n s t w e e k , a few d a y s a g o -
I ) u r a t i c n ( i f known)
1 d a y o r l e s s , a f r w d a y s , more

I.C,*:-,. i o a l - ;ri+€
speci i p!ace,
GAT^ '
inn. f i e l d . e t c .
. LC)[ [ & ~ d T / f
vi l l a y n r townlci ty
,
p a r i sli
 :.,Lsa- :>..-' ," - -
- ' C!:!'m' DRlTAllJ STUDY SAMl'LE RECORDING SllEET 3-76
Tnday's date ,.*'-,.., -- 1976
j
( ) G.M.
I .!

( ) A . ~ . C;RI:AT 1)Rll'Alh' STIIDY

;. C.: C'i. GI
SMI'1.I: HECORDIF'(: SIII:I:l 3-7h
T~ri;~v'e
d;itl , .- -
: 1971,

( ) Hansnrd ( ) 1101' -. - ( )Schweltzer

I ( ) llansnrd ( ) 1101'
page 3 column 3 ( )Scl~wcitzer

I
'8

( :) L O N W N TIMES pow .I/ column -' T-qp ._. ( )Lord ( )Guest ( L)"LONIJI?: 'I'lFIIS Top - ( )Lord ( )Guest

( ) MORNING CIIROIIICLE date3-/ 1-1 7~:; day

w e '
Bottom
( aton on
(dcreen
( )Levlo
( )Dunkle ( ) MORNING CllRONICLE dated'//- 42 d day 4' t--!lipdl$ ' ( )Eaton ( )Lewis
~ottom ~ ~ r c c ( n

(1) VlOLENCE ( ) (1) VlOLENCE ( )

property damage ( ), seizure of property, sp.sces.or persons ( ), property damage ( 1, seizure of property, spaces or persons ( ).
personal injury ( 1, threat of any of the above ( ). personal injury ( ), threat of any of the above ( ) .

(2) bEETINGS ( ) (2) EIEETINCS ( )

( ) Election ( ) support for enemy of government ( ) Election ( ) support for enemy of government
( ) Vestry ( ) control of local government/institution ( ) Vestry ( ) control of local government/institution
( ) Livery ( ) other grievances and dissatisfactions ( ) Livery .( ) other grievances and dissstisfactions
( ) Dinner ( ) opposition to other peoples or groups ( ) Ginner ( ) opposition to other peoples or groups
( ) Political club/party ( ) objectives unclear ( ) Political clublparty ( ) objectives unclear ,

( ) with petition, address, etc. ( ) notices, requests(for past or future meetings) ( j with petition, address, etc. ( ) notices, requests(for past or future meetings)
( ) opposition to government ( ) other(1ist) ( ) opposition to government ( ) other(1ist) .
( ) support for.government ( ) support for government

(3-8) GATHERINGS / (3-8) GATHERINGS --'

demonstrations ( ), parade( ) , assemhlies, crowds, mobs (I ), gatl~crings( ) ,
demonstrations ( 1. parade( ) , assemblies, crovds, mobs ( G ' , gatherings ( ) ,
rallies ( ), special celebrations (. ) , rallies ( ) . special celebrations ( 7 , '
other ( ) other ( )

(9)

(10)
DELEGATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )

LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
I (9)

(10)
DELECATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )

LABOR ACTIVITIES ( !
strike, turnout ( ). lockbut ( ) , cdmbination or union mention ( ), strike, turnout ( ) , 1ock.out ( ) , comhination or union mention ( ) .
threats to stop work ( 1, work stoppages ( ). return to work ( ) , threats to stop work ( ) , work stoppages ( ), return to work ( ).
deputations of workers ( ) . . deputations of workers ( ) .

(1 I ) LEGAL ACTIOIIS ( 'j (11) LEGAL ACTIONS ( )

errests ! ) , examinattons ( ) , pretrial info. ( ), trials/court procedings ( ) , arrests ( ) , examinations ( ) , prctrinl info. ( ) , trlalslcourt prncedit~gs ( ) .
sentences. executions-,etc.'( ) . ' Be sure to check the npproplnte area5 ahove that sentences, cxeclltions, etc. ( ) . Re sure to clicck the apprnpinte areas above that
ner:ai? to t11c action that brought ahout the arrest or trial. pertain to the action that brought ahor~r the arrest or trial.

-
EX1'1 :
sveari.11gin oi special constables ( j ,
arson or suspected arson ( 1.
I - - swearlni: in of special constables ( ) . ar:iurl or susoected nrs1.n ( ).

s:~chlnebreaking, destruction of looms or threshers. etc. ( 1 .

I mnclilne hreakinp. destruction of looms or tlireshers, ctc. ( ) .
_ , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - -

Objective of action / e';; m7,,*~7 G',, fi;A0 ,

. ar::ci!.,nts of f l .
&/Fn3/i cci.&.f.-
0
s3, Pi~rcicipants
tiurnbrr /Q14 ,C koA7[ . J ,,,'>
" '"
~ :... I.earlers
.
/,'
,
j-
Number flf? Leaders

i-it? f d f n /nu 0 - 1'. 7~~'/ d ) +[l~'~uration(if ),nk 1 Date

Ye:-;terd:~y,
last week, a few days ago
Ilurat ion(i f knnwn)
1 day or less, a few days, more
Ycrterdcy, last Meek, s few days ago
-
1 day or less, a few days, more
I.oca t ion >- -
'. .___Z
Lttcati~n-
sl:r!fic place, inn, field, etc. villagebr town/city parish specific place, inn. field, etc. par i sh
 'I'<3d:4y1s,!:,tc -1 - '.i - l:l7(,
GREAT BRITAIN STIIDY SAMP1.E RECOHDJNE SllEET 3 - 7 6
( ) Hansard
( ) LONINN TIMES
( ) il0P
page column ' Top ( )Guest

MORNING CllRONICLE date d-18-/ g28 day

CHiddle (
(
)Eaton ( )Levlo
)~urke ( )Dunklo
( )Burns ( )Driver

/ (1) VIOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ),
personal injury ( ),
seizure of property, spaces or persons ( ) ,
threat of any of the above ( ).
(2) MEETINGS (4
( ) Election ( )'support for enemy of government
( ) Vestry ( ) control of local governmentlinstitution
( ) Livery (4 other grievances and dissatisfactions
( ) Dinner (d opposition to other peoples or groups
( ) Political clubfparty ( ) objectives unclear
( ) with petition. address, etc. (9notices, requests(for&r future mertin(tp)
( ) opposition to government

I
( ) support for government
( ) other(I1st)
-
(3-8) GATHERINGS
demonstrations ( ), parade( ), assemblies, crovds, mobs ( ), gatherinms ( ) ,
rallies ( 1, special celebrations ( ),
other ( )

1 (10)
(9) DELEGATIONS. DEPUTATIONS ( )

LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )
strike, turnout ( ), lockout ( ), combination or union mention .( ),
threats to stop work ( ). . work stoppages : 1, return to work ( ),
deputations of workers ( ) .

(11) LEGAL ACTIONS ( )

arrests ( ), examinattons ( ), pretrial info. ( ), trialslcourt procedlngs ( ),
sentences, executions> etc. ( ) . Be sure to check the appropiate areas nbove thnt
pertain to the action that brought about the arrest or trinl.

I/ - -
EXTRA EXTRA
suearin~in of speci~lconstables ( ) , arson or suspected arson ( ) .
machine breaking, destruction of looms or threshers, etc. ( ) .

Objective or action AMIAJ~T /VOAJ- L i ~ e d ~ t d ,se(/en 5 .

/ ~articipants f- (@.AJ&C~ UIL~UIU~?RJ

I Number ,VOW ~ R O V J Leaders C R ~ J ./ ~ L ~ A D P ~ J

1 Date iCRi 2.15./a8
Yesterday, last week, a few days ago
nuration(lf know)
1 day or less, a feu days, more

Location L o f i d ~ TAUeU' , ~ d n l d d
specific place, inn, field, etc. village or townlcity parish

county
COMMEhTS ON BACK? ( ) h - 7 6 6) Bobbi
 ' l ' a * J : ~ y ' sd : ~ t r 6 - Z'j - 1976
GREAT BRITAIN STUDY SAW1.E RECORDING SllEET 3-76
( ) Hansard ( ) HOP \&%k$izer
(flLONDON TIMES page column 2. Top, ( )Lord ( )Guest
( aton on ( )Levis
( ) MORNING CllRONICLE date 9 . / 8- / J Z K day /M Rottom ( )Burke ( )Dunkle

First ~ine:- - -A- - - N ~ M ~ R ~ -U -J~-- ~- -7- -f -. -d- .- 6-( -)Burns

- - - -( -)Driver
--
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: CHECK AS MANY-A' %FLY(:~~memo I1 6)
(1) VIOLENCE ( )
property damage ( ), seizure of property. spaces or persons ( ).
personal injury ( ), threat of any of the above ( ).

(2) MEETINGS (4
( ) Election ( ) support for enemy of government
( ) Vestry ( ) control of local government/institution
( ) Livery ( d o t h e r grievances atrd dtssstisfactions
( ) Dinner (3/opposition to other peoples or groctps
( ) Political clubfpsrty ( ) objectives unclear
( ) with petition, address, etc. ( ) notices, requests(for past or future meetin~r)
( ) opposition to government ( ) other(1ist)
( ) support for government

(3-8) GATHERINGS
demonstrations ( ), parade( ). sssemblies, crowds, mobs ( ). gatherlngs ( ) .
rallies ( ), special celebrations ( ) ,
other ( )

(9) DELEGATIONS, DEPUTATIONS ( )

(10) LABOR ACTIVITIES ( )

strike, turnout ( ), lockout ( ), combination or union mention ( ),
threats-to stop work ( ), work stoppages : ), return to work ( ),
deputations of workers ( ) .

(11) LEGAL ACTIONS ( )

arrests ( ), examinations ( ), pretrial info. ( ), trisls/court procedings (
sentences, executions, etc. ( 0. Be sure to check the appropiate arena nbove thnt
pertain to the action that brought about the arrest or trial.

EXTRA
s w e a r i n g in of special constables ( ) , arson or suspected arson ( ) ,
machine breaking, destruction of looms or threshers, etc. ( ) .
............................................
Objective of action //v~&?wP IJ
Participants L l t e ~ ~ d ~ic7~&l/ek5

Number /DO& ~ R O ~ J Leaders (h&) B,!e~0erJ

Date 2-/ S - / & z r m' I)uration(if knovn)
Yesterday, last week, a few days ego s, a feu days, more

~ocation f
O,?IO~FI ~ A V ~ ~ E, J ~ 3 d J ~ d
specific plac'e, inn, fieid, etc. village or townfcity psri sh
/n~ D O L J B ~ .- -
coun ly
COHMENTS ON BACK? (46-76 !6 ) Bobbi
BW A> mc Cued7
BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography falls into eight sections, corresponding to the book's

eight chapters. In each section you will find the references cited in the

chapter, some background material and a few examples of further work along

the same lines.

1. Introduction

Carden. Maren Lockwood

1974 The New Feminist Movement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation:

Clork,Samuel D.. J. Paul Grayson and Linda M. Grayson, eds.

1975 Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century

Canada. Toronto: Gage.

Coleman. James S.

1973 The Mathematics of Collective Action. Chicago: Aldinc.

Feuer. Lewis S.

1969 The Conflict of Generations: Tlie Character and Significance of

Student Movements. New York: Basic Books.

Hume, David

1875 Essays. Moral, Political and Literary. London: Longmans,

Green. 2 vols. Originally published in 1740.

Klapp, Orrin E.

1969 Collective Search for Identity. New York: Holt, Rinehart 6

Winston.

Kriesberg. Louis

1973 The Sociology of Social Conflict. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- ,

Hall.

Kuczynski. Jurgen

1967 Tlie Rise of the Working Class. New York: McGraw-Hill.

 B- 2

Londsberger. Henry A., e d . Pickvance. C.C.

1974 R u r a l P r o t e s t : P e a s a n t Movements and S o c i a l Change. London:
1975 "On tlie Study of Urban S o c i a l Movements." S o c i o l o g i c a l Review,
Mncmillan. 23: 29-49.
L i p s e t , Seymour Martin Ranulf, Svend
1970 Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Change and P e r s i s t e n c e i n 1964 Moral I n d i g n a t i o n and Middle C l a s s Psyctiology. New York: Schocken.
Social Structures. Garden C i t y : Doubleday Anchor. Revised edn. F i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1938.
Macptierson. C. B. !
N a t i o n a l Advisory Commission on C i v t l D i s o r d e r s
1962 The P o l i t i c a l Theory of P o s s e s s i v e I n d i v i d u a l i s m . Oxford: 1968 Report. Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e . Known i n -
Clnrendon P r e s s . f o r m a l l y a s "The Kerner Report."
Mann, Michael Richardson, Lewis P.
1973 Consciousness and Action among t h e Western Working C l a s s . London: 1960 S t a t i s t i c s of Deadly Quarrels. P i t t s b u r g h : Boxwood P r e s s .
Mncmillan
I
Ridker . Ronald
Miihlmann, Wilhelm E. 1962 "Discontent and Economic Growth," Economic Development and Cul-
196.1 Cliiliasmus und Nativismus. B e r l i n : D i e t r i c h Reimer.
II t u r a l Change. 10: 1-15.
Nordlinger , E r i c A. Rosensu, James N . , ed.
1972 C o n f l i c t R e g u l a t i o n i n Divided S o c i e t i e s . Cambridge. I.laseachuaetts: 1964 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Aspects of C i v i l S t r i f e . P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n Uni-
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y C e n t e r f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . Occasional
v e r s i t y Press.
Papers i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f o i r s . 29. Schwartz. Michael
Ohngren, 8; 1976 R a d i c a l P r o t e s t and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e . New York: Acsdemic P r e s s .
1974 Folk i r l r e l s e . S a m h ~ l l s u t v e c k l i n g , f l y t t n i n g s m i i n s t e r och f o l k - Sharp, Gene
r o r e l s e r i E s k i l s t u n a 1870-1900. Uppsala: Almqvist 6 W i k s e l l . 1973 The P o l i t i c s of Nonviolent Action. Boston: P o r t e r S a r g e n t .
S t u d i a H i s t o r i c a U p s a l i e n s i n , 55 Smith. Adam
P e r e i m d e Queiroz, Maria Isarira 1910 The Wealth of Nations. London: J.M. Dent. 2 vols. F i r s t pub-
1968 ~ 6 f o r m ee t r 6 v o l u t i o n d a n s l e s s o c i h t 6 s t r a d i t i o n n e l l e s . His- l i s h e d i n 1776; many e d i t i o n s .
t o i r e e t ethnologic d e s mouvements messianiques. Paris: S p i e l b e r g , Joseph. and S c o t t Wliiteford, e d s .
Anthropos. 1976 Forging Nations: A Comparative View of R u m 1 Ferment and Revolt.

Fast Lansing: Michigan S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s .

Thompson. E.P. Ash, R o b e r t s

1971 "The Moral Economy of t h e E n g l i s h Crowd i n t h e E i g h t e e n t h Cen- 1972 S o c i a l Movements i n America. Chicago: Msrkham.

t u r y , " P a s t and P r e s e n t , 50: 76-136. A s h e n f e l t e r , O r l e y , and George E. Johnson

T i l l y . Charles 1969 "Bargaining Theory. Trade Unions and I n d u s t r i n l S t r i k e A c t i v i t y , "

1974 "DO Communities Act?" S o c i o l o g i c a l I n q u i r y , 43: 209-240. American Economic Review, 59: 35-49.

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