JOSE LAGON VS. HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC.

G.R. No. 135657 January 17, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is a businessman and owner of a commercial
building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Respondent HOOVEN on the other is a
domestic corporation known to be the biggest manufacturer and installer of
aluminum materials in the country with branch office at E. Quirino Avenue, Davao
City.
Sometime in April 1981 Lagon and HOOVEN entered into two (2) contracts,
both denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of P104,870.00
HOOVEN agreed to sell and install various aluminum materials in Lagons
commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Upon execution of the contracts,
Lagon paid HOOVEN P48,000.00 in advance.

Lagon, in his answer, denied liability and averred that HOOVEN was the
party guilty of breach of contract by failing to deliver and install some of the materials
specified in the proposals; that as a consequence he was compelled to procure the
undelivered materials from other sources; that as regards the materials duly
delivered and installed by HOOVEN, they were fully paid. He counterclaimed for
actual, moral, exemplary, temperate and nominal damages, as well as for attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation.

Issue:
Whether or not all the materials specified in the contracts had been delivered
and installed by respondent in petitioners commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan
Kudarat.

Ruling:
Firstly, the quantity of materials and the amounts sated in the delivery
receipts do not tally with those in the invoices covering them, notwithstanding that,
according to HOOVEN OIC Alberto Villanueva, the invoices were based merely on
the delivery receipts.

Secondly, the total value of the materials as reflected in all the invoices is P117,329.0
while under the delivery receipts it is only P112, 870.50, or a difference of P4,458.00.
Even more strange is the fact that HOOVEN instituted the present action for
collection of sum of money against Lagon only on 24 February 1987, or more than
five (5) years after the supposed completion of the project. Indeed, it is contrary to
common experience that a creditor would take its own sweet time in collecting its
credit, more so in this case when the amount involved is not miniscule but
substantial.

All the delivery receipts did not appear to have been signed by petitioner or
 his duly authorized representative acknowledging receipt of the materials listed
therein. A closer examination of the receipts clearly showed that the deliveries were
made to a certain Jose Rubin, claimed to be petitioners driver, Armando Lagon, and
a certain bookkeeper. Unfortunately for HOOVEN, the identities of these persons
were never been established, and there is no way of determining now whether they
were indeed authorized representatives of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April

1997 is MODIFIED. Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is ordered to pay respondent Hooven
Comalco Industries, Inc., P6,377.66 representing the value of the unpaid materials
admittedly delivered to him. On the other hand, respondent is ordered to pay
petitioner P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and
P46,554.50 as actual damages and litigation expenses.

Rico Rommel Atienza vs. Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson

G.R. No. 177407

February 9. 2011

Facts:
Private respondent went to Rizal Medical Center to submit for a check up due
to her lumbar pains. Her diagnostic laboratory test results revealed that her right
kidney was normal while her left kidney was non-functioning and non-visualizing.
Hence, she underwent kidney operation under the care of the four physicians namely:
Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio and petitioner Dr. Rico
Rommel Atienza.

The said physicians removed her fully functioning right kidney instead of the
left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. Due to their gross negligence and
incompetence, private respondent filed a complaint against the four doctors before
the Board of Medicine. Private respondent therein offered four certified photocopies
as her documentary evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time that she was operated.

The Board of Medicine admitted the formal offer despite the objection of
herein petitioner. Petitioner contends that the documentary evidence offered were
inadmissible as it were incompetent. Further, he alleged that the same documents
were not properly identified and authenticated, violate the best evidence rule and his
substantive rights, and are completely hearsay.

Issues:
1. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it violates the
best evidence rule.
2. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that they have not
been properly identified and authenticated.
3. Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it is completely
hearsay.
4. Whether the admission of the documents violated the substantive rights of the
petitioner.

Ruling:

1. No. The subject of the inquiry in this case is whether the doctors are liable for
gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left
non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. The
proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence is allowed. Section 3, Rule 130

provides that when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without
bad faith on the offeror. Since the original documents cannot be produced based on
the testimony of Dr. Aquino BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence,
and thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides
the case.

2. No, the documentary evidence were properly identified and authenticated. The
records show that the exhibits offered by private respondent were the same
evidence attached in Doctor Lantin's counter-affidavit filed before the Office of the
City Prosecutor in answer to the criminal complaint of the respondent. To lay the
predicate for her case, private respondent offered the exhibits in evidence to prove
that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her
operation.

3. No, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence. The anatomical positions
whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

4. No, petitioners substantive rights were not violated when the documentary
evidence were admitted. The fact sought to be proved by the exhibits that the two
kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was
operated on is presumed under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which
provides that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of the respondents exhibit need
not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. Laws of nature involving
the physical science, specifically biology include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings in which the court may take
judicial notice.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA

G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001

FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent
DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from
State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The
loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on
the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January
12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent
LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves
jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to
SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner
contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action
was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-
court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the
following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and
the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits
and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued
in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant
SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of
account of even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito
Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of
P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
 The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the
defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said
witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of
either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC
or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial
court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondents witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as required by
law.
3. Whether the best evidence rule should be applied.

RULING:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is

misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.
However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to
hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The rationale for this exception is to
be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the
opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by
a witness are hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such
right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine
the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these
opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine
the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter
of hearsay evidence.
 2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it
through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the
question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial
admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof.

3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as

there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to
be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents
was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to
the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.
No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner
liable on its obligation

People vs. Calumpang

Facts:
Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang were charged with two counts of
murder, committed against the spouses Alicia Catipay and Santiago Catipay. The
trial court dismissed the defense of alibi interposed by the defendants because it was
weak and then convicted the defendants, relying on the testimony of Magno Gomez
who allegedly eye witnessed the killing of the two victims. The defendants appealed,
contending that the testimony of Magno is unreliable and inconsistent, and that the
trial court erred in dismissing their defense of alibi.

Issue:
Whether or not the defense of alibi is sufficient to cast doubt as to the guilt of
the accused.

Ruling:
Yes. Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were
corroborated only by their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was
impossible for them to be at the place of the incident. However, the rule that an
accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never intended to change or shift the
burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution evidence must
stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of
innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. There
being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt
pointing to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed
innocence stands.
 The Supreme Court found that the testimony of the lone witness Magno is full
of inconsistencies. While Magno claimed to have witnessed the gruesome killings,
the records show that serious discrepancies attended Magnos testimony in court
and his sworn statement executed during the preliminary examination. Well settled is
the rule that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itselfsuch as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances stand. Magnos testimony failed to satisfy such rule,
hence, the presumed innocence of the
accused must be upheld

Ubales v. People, 570 SCRA 251

Facts:
Petition for review on certiotari seeking reversal of decision finding petitioner
Angel Ubaldes guilty of the crime of homicide. Ubaldes was convicted of homicide
for killing Mark Santos (victim) by shooting him on the head with a revolver.
Petitioner Ubales claims that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and the Court of Appeals had erred in giving credence to Galvans
testimony which allegedly defies common experience.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution proves that petitioner
committed the crime charged (homicide) beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
SC held that after a meticulous review of the records of the case at bar, we
are constrained to agree with petitioner Ubales.

Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be

considered. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is
consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the
benefit of doubt and should be acquitted. In the instant case, while it is possible that
the accused has committed the crime, there is also the possibility, based on the
evidence presented, that he has not. He should be deemed to have not for failure to
meet the test of moral certainty.

Finally, an accused should not be convicted by reason of the weakness of his

alibi. It is fundamental that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt and must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Since there
are very serious doubts in the testimony of the lone eyewitness to the killing of Mark
Santos, we have no choice but to acquit petitioner Angel Ubales on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
28813 dated 30 November 2006 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Angel
Ubales y Velez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide on account of
reasonable doubt.

6. Tating v. Marcella, 519 SCRA 79

Facts:
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter,
herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in
a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.
Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena.
She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate
taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the
land remained in possession of Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that

she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her
and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to
enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of
helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not
secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena
cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.

Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale between petitioner Nena Tating and
Daniela is simulated.

Ruling:

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela is simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be
bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated). The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract is the intention of the parties. Such intention is determined from the express
terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently

prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her
property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all
civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness
of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private
respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim.
Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different
intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
 However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact
remains that private respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing
evidence beyond mere preponderance of evidence that the contract of sale between
Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity
of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its
simulation. Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving their
allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale
stands.

PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

September 21, 1977 early morning: M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the
vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC)
Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N.
Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault
Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo
Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing
nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV with interest at the
legal rate plus 25% as attorneys fees and later on amended to add the lost value
of the hull less the P200K insurance and unrealized profits and lost business
opportunities
During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel
Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat
with interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit
CA: affirmed in toto

ISSUE:
W/N the damage was adequately proven

HELD:

YES. affirming with modification actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for lack of

evidentiary bases therefor. P2M nominal damages instead.

in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or

incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them
on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond
the consideration of the court.
 If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding or ignoring them
two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente)
failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him
in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the
chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this
means, at least in the case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and
pending engagements
If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain
of profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of
charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff
twice over.
if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in
the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the
value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which
it was unable to fulfill.
damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out
specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or
actual damages are borne
proven through sole testimony of general manager without objection from LSC
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance
(or evidence) is to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private
respondent is `entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property
right has been invaded.
damages in name only and not in fact
amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least
commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the
concept and purpose of such damages
Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the
vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that such
payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation.
Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the
lower courts jurisdiction since the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a
lien on the judgment
 #Calamba Steel Center Inc. v CIR
GR 151857, April 28, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks for
use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and
household appliances. In it's amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on
June 4, 1996 it declared a net taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of
P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount of P3,311,559.00. It also reported
Quarterly payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of
P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively. It is the contention of the
petitioner in this case filed in 1997, that it is entitled to a refund. The refund was
purportedly due to income taxes witheld from it, and remitted in its behalf, by the
withholding agents. Such witheld tax, as per petitioners 1997 return, were not utilised
in 1996 since due to it's income/loss positions for the three quarters of 1996.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a tax refund may be claimed even beyong the taxable
year following that in which the tax credit arises.

Held:
Yes, however; it is still incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it is
entitled to such refund. Tax refunds being in the nature of tax exemptions such
must be construed strictissimi juris against the taypayer-claimant. Under the NIRC,
the only limitation as regards the claiming of tax refunds is that such must be made
within two years. The claim for refund made by Calamba steel was well within the
2 year period. As regards the procedure taken by counsel of Calamba Steel in
submitting the final adjustment returns (1996) after trial has been conducted, the
Court said that although the ordinary rules of procedure from upon this jurisprudence
mandates that the proceedings before the tax court's shall not be governed by strictly
technical rules of evidence. Moreoover, as regards evidence, the court further
said that Judicial notice could have been taken by the cA and the CTA of the 1996
final adjustment return made by petitioner in another case then pending with the
CTA.

Facts

Quoting the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the CA narrated the antecedents as
follows:
 Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel
blanks for use by manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial
and household appliances.

Petitioner filed an Amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4,

1996 declaring a net taxable income of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00
and tax due in the amount of P3,311,559.00.

Petitioner also reported quarterly payments for the second and third quarters
of 1995 in the amounts of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively.

It is the proposition of the [p]etitioner that for the year 1995, several of its
clients withheld taxes from their income payments to [p]etitioner and remitted the
same to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in the sum of P3,159,687.00.
Petitioner further alleged that due to its income/loss positions for the three quarters
of 1996, it was unable to use the excess tax paid for and in its behalf by the
withholding agents.

Thus, an administrative claim was filed by the [p]etitioner on April 10, 1997
for the refund of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or unused creditable
withholding taxes for the year 1995. The instant petition was subsequently filed on
April 18, 1997.

Respondent, in his Answer, averred, among others, that:

1) Petitioner has no cause of action;

2) Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements set out in Section 5 of
Revenue Regulations No. [(RR)] 12-94;

3) It is incumbent upon [p]etitioner to prove by competent and sufficient evidence

that the tax refund or tax credit being sought is allowed under the National Internal
Revenue Code and its implementing rules and regulations; and

4) Claims for tax refund or tax credit are construed strictly against the taxpayer as
they partake the nature of tax exemption.

To buttress its claim, [p]etitioner presented documentary and testimonial evidence.

Respondent, on the other hand, presented the [r]evenue [o]fficer who conducted the
examination of [p]etitioners claim and found petitioner liable for deficiency value
added tax. Petitioner also presented rebuttal evidence.

The sole issue submitted for [o]ur determination is whether or not [p]etitioner is
entitled to the refund of P3,159,687.00 representing excess or overpaid income tax
for the taxable year 1995.
Issue

Petitioner raises this sole issue for our consideration:

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when, while purportedly requiring
petitioner to submit its 1996 annual income tax return to support its claim for refund,
nonetheless ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record the
authenticity of which has not been denied or its admissibility opposed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue

9. People v. Baraoil
676 SCRA 24; G.R. No. 194608

Facts:
On October 20, 2004, the accused-appellant was charged in two
Informations for the crime of rape. Wherein, during arraignment, the accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty.

The CA sustained the conviction of the accused-appellant after finding that

the testimony of AAA was credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. There was no reason to overturn the
accused-appellants conviction under Criminal Case No. T-3682 for the crime of
statutory rape considering that AAA was undeniably under 12 years old and that the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge with her. Furthermore, the CA also found
that the acts of accused-appellant fall under the category of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in conjunction with Section 5, R.A. No.
7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act). However, with respect to the damages, the CA corrected the trial courts
disposition on the matter and specifically awarded civil indemnity automatically upon
proof of the commission of the crime, moral damages, and exemplary damages in
view of the victims minority.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
After a meticulous review of the records of the instant case, the Court holds
that the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution proved the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

AAA testified in a spontaneous and straightforward manner and never

wavered in positively identifying appellant as her rapist despite grueling cross-
examination. The trial court thus found the testimony of AAA to have been amply
corroborated... who bravely, unabashedly, straightforwardly and consistently
narrated in court her harrowing ordeal, vexation and pain in the hands of the
accused.

A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private
parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and
scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to
protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the
wicked acts committed against her.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03546 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
in Criminal Case No. T-3682, accused-appellant Antonio Baraoil is ordered to pay
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum
on each of the amounts awarded reckoned from the finality of this decision.

Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan v. Cormorposa

408 SCRA 692; G.R. No. 152807

Facts:
This case arose from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the MTC by
petitioners against respondents involving possession of a parcel of petitioners land
by respondents. Respondents argue that they have acquired just and valid
ownership of the premises and that the Regional Director of the DENR has already
upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they were the
rightful claimants and possessors. MTC ifo petitioners. RTC reversed, ruled ifo
Respondents. CA affirmed RTC.

CA ruled that although not yet final, the Order issued by the DENR Regional
Director remained in full force and effect. The certification that the DENR's
community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer issued was proof that
when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not
yet allocated to any person. Respondents had the better right to possess alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, because they have sufficiently proven their
actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof since 1960.

Issue:
Whether or not CA gravely abuse its discretion and erred in sustaining the
RTCs ruling giving weight to the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the
facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, that it is a new
matter raised for the first time on appeal.

Ruling:
SC held that petition has no merit. Petitioners contend that the CENR
Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the
CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they cite Garvida v.
Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by
respondents for the first time on appeal.

In Garvida, the Court held: "A facsimile or fax transmission is a process

involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by
scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade
or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current."

Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best
exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a

facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to
is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here
refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by
mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business
transactions

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the
DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order
dated April 2, 1998.

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director
would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either
verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter
was under the former's direct control and supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal
is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for respondents as
stated in the Pre-trial Order. The Certification was not formally offered, however,
because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the

admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this
evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule
on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.